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
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August, 1889

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THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON.

1775.

ANSWER TO AN ADDRESS OF THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS OF MASSACHUSETTS.[1](#)

4 July, 1775.

Gentlemen,

Your kind congratulations on my appointment and arrival, demand my warmest acknowledgments, and will ever be retained in grateful remembrance.

In exchanging the enjoyments of domestic life for the duties of my present honorable but arduous station, I only emulate the virtue and public spirit of the whole province of the Massachusetts Bay, which, with a firmness and patriotism without example in modern history, have sacrificed all the comforts of social and political life, in support of the rights of mankind, and the welfare of our common country. My highest ambition is to be the happy instrument of vindicating those rights, and to see this devoted province again restored to peace, liberty, and safety.

The short space of time, which has elapsed since my arrival, does not permit me to decide upon the state of the army. The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such circumstances should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans. Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not, soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of success, and put a final period to those distresses, which now overwhelm this once happy country.[1](#)

I most sincerely thank you, Gentlemen, for your declaration of readiness at all times to assist me in the discharge of the duties of my station. They are so complicated and extended, that I shall need the assistance of every good man, and lover of his country. I therefore repose the utmost confidence in your aid.

In return for your affectionate wishes to myself, permit me to say, that I earnestly implore that divine Being, in whose hands are all human events, to make you and your constituents as distinguished in private and public happiness, as you have been by ministerial oppression, and private and public distress.[1](#)

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TO JAMES WARREN, PRESIDENT OF THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Head-Quarters, Cambridge, 10 July, 1775.

Sir,

After much difficulty and delay, I have procured such returns of the state of the army, as will enable us to form a judgment of its strength. It is with great concern I find it inadequate to our general expectations, and the duties that may be required of it. The number of men fit for duty in the forces raised in this province, including all the outposts and artillery, does not amount to nine thousand. The troops raised in the other colonies are more complete, but yet fall short of their establishment; so that, upon the whole, I cannot estimate the present army at more than fourteen thousand five hundred men capable of duty. I have the satisfaction to find the troops, both in camp and quarters, very healthy; so that the deficiency must arise from the regiments never having been filled up to the establishment, and the number of men on furlough; but the former cause is by much the most considerable. Under all these circumstances, I yesterday called a council of war, and enclosed I send you an extract of our determinations, so far as they respect the province of Massachusetts Bay.¹ Your own prudence will suggest the necessity of secrecy on this subject, as we have the utmost reason to believe, that the enemy suppose our numbers much greater than they are, an error which it is not our interest to remove.

The great extent of our lines, and the uncertainty where may be the point of attack, added to the necessity of immediate support, have induced me to order that horses ready saddled should be kept at several posts, in order to bring the most early intelligence of any movement of the enemy. For this purpose, I should be glad that ten horses may be provided as soon as possible. I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.

P. S. As I am informed, that the Congress proposes to rise immediately, I should be glad to know what committees are left, or upon whom the executive business devolves.¹

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.[1](#)

Camp at Cambridge July 10, 1775.

Sir,

I arrived safe at this Place on the 3d inst., after a Journey attended with a good deal of Fatigue, and retarded by necessary Attentions to the successive Civilities which accompanied me in my whole Rout. Upon my arrival, I immediately visited the several Posts occupied by our Troops, and as soon as the Weather permitted, reconnoitred those of the Enemy. I found the latter strongly entrench'd on Bunker's Hill about a Mile from Charlestown, and advanced about half a Mile from the Place of the last Action, with their Centries extended about 150 Yards on this side of the narrowest Part of the Neck leading from this Place to Charlestown; 3 floating Batteries lay in Mystick River, near their camp; and one 20 Gun Ship below the Ferry Place between Boston and Charlestown. They have also a Battery on Copse Hill, on the Boston side, which much annoyed our Troops in the late attack. Upon the Neck, they are also deeply entrenched and strongly fortified. Their advanced Guards 'till last Saturday morning, occupied Brown's Houses, about a mile from Roxbury Meeting House and 20 roods from their Lines: But at that Time a Party from General Thomas's Camp surprized the Guard, drove them in and burnt the houses.[2](#) The Bulk of their Army commanded by Genl. Howe, lays on Bunker's Hill, and the Remainder on Roxbury Neck, except the Light Horse, and a few Men in the Town of Boston. On our side we have thrown up Intrenchments on Winter and Prospect Hills, the Enemies camp in full View at the Distance of little more than a Mile.[1](#) Such intermediate Points, as would admit a Landing, I have since my arrival taken care to strengthen, down to Sewall's Farm, where a strong Entrenchment has been thrown up. At Roxbury General Thomas has thrown up a strong Work on the Hill, about 200 Yards above the Meeting House which with the Broken-ness of the Ground and great Number of Rocks has made that Pass very secure.[2](#) The Troops raised in New Hampshire, with a Regiment from Rhode Island occupy Winter Hill. A Part of those from Connecticut under General Puttnam are on Prospect Hill. The Troops in this Town are intirely of the Massachusetts: The Remainder of the Rhode Island Men, are at Sewall's Farm: Two Regiments of Connecticut and 9 of the Massachusetts are at Roxbury. The Residue of the Army, to the Number of about 700, are posted in several small Towns along the Coast, to prevent the Depredations of the Enemy: Upon the whole, I think myself authorized to say, that considering the great Extent of Line, and the nature of the Ground we are as well secured as could be expected in so short a Time and under the Disadvantages we labour. These consist in a Want of Engineers to construct proper Works and direct the men, a Want of Tools, and a sufficient Number of Men to man the Works in Case of an attack. You will observe by the Proceedings of the Council of War, which I have the Honor to enclose, that it is our unanimous Opinion to hold and defend these Works as long as possible. The Discouragement it would give the Men and its contrary Effects on the ministerial Troops, thus to abandon our Incampment in their Face, form'd with so much Labor, added to the

Congress and different Committees have shewn to make every Thing as convenient and agreeable as possible: but there is a vital and inherent Principle of Delay incompatible with military service in transacting Business thro' such numerous and different Channels. I esteem it therefore my Duty to represent the Inconvenience that must unavoidably ensue from a dependence on a Number of Persons for supplies, and submit it to the Consideration of the Congress whether the publick Service will not be best promoted by appointing a Commissary General for these purposes. We have a striking Instance of the Preference of such a Mode in the Establishment of Connecticut, as their Troops are extremely well provided under the Direction of Mr. Trumbull, and he has at different Times assisted others with various Articles. Should my Sentiments happily coincide with those of your Honors, on this subject, I beg leave to recommend Mr. Trumbull as a very proper Person for this Department. In the Arrangement of Troops collected under such Circumstances, and upon the Spur of immediate Necessity several Appointments are omitted, which appear to be indispensably necessary for the good Government of the Army, particularly a Quartermaster General, a Commissary of Musters and a Commissary of Artillery. These I must Earnestly recommend to the Notice and Provision of the Congress.¹

I find myself already much embarrassed for Want of a Military Chest; these embarrassments will increase every day: I must therefore request that Money may be forwarded as soon as Possible. The want of this most necessary Article, will I fear produce great Inconveniences if not prevented by an early Attention. I find the Army in general, and the Troops raised in Massachusetts in particular, very deficient in necessary Cloathing.² Upon Inquiry there appears no Probability of obtaining any supplies in this Quarter. And the best Consideration of this Matter I am able to form, I am of Opinion that a Number of hunting Shirts not less than 10,000, would in a great Degree remove this Difficulty in the cheapest and quickest manner. I know nothing in a speculative View more trivial, yet if put in Practice would have a happier Tendency to unite the Men, and abolish those Provincial Distinctions which lead to Jealousy and Dissatisfaction. In a former part of this Letter I mentioned the want of Engineers; I can hardly express the Disappointment I have experienced on this Subject. The Skill of those we have, being very imperfect and confined to the mere manual Exercise of Cannon: Whereas—the War in which we are engaged requires a Knowledge comprehending the Duties of the Field and Fortifications.¹ If any Persons thus qualified are to be found in the Southern Colonies, it would be of great publick Service to forward them with all expedition. Upon the Article of Ammunition I must re-echo the former Complaints on this Subject: We are so exceedingly destitute, that our Artillery will be of little Use without a supply both large and seasonable: What we have must be reserved for the small Arms, and that managed with the utmost Frugality.

I am sorry to observe that the Appointments of the General Officers in the Province of Massachusetts Bay have by no Means corresponded with the Judgement and Wishes of either the civil or Military. The great Dissatisfaction expressed on this Subject and the apparent Danger of throwing the Army into the utmost Disorder, together with the strong Representations of the Provincial Congress, have induced me to retain the Commissions in my Hands untill the Pleasure of the Congress should be farther known, (except General Puttnam's which was given the Day I came into Camp and

before I was apprized of these Uneasinesses.)¹ In such a Step I must beg the Congress will do me the Justice I believe, that I have been actuated solely by a Regard to the publick Good. I have not, nor could have any private Attachments; every Gentleman in Appointment, was an intire Stranger to me but from Character. I must therefore rely upon the Candor of the Congress for their favorable Construction of my Conduct in this Particular. General Spencer was so much disgusted at the preference given to General Puttnam that he left the Army without visiting me, or making known his Intentions in any respect.² General Pomroy had also retired before my Arrival, occasioned (as is said) by some Disappointment from the Provincial Congress.³ General Thomas is much esteemed and earnestly desired to continue in the service: and as far as my Opportunities have enabled me to judge I must join in the general opinion that he is an able good Officer and his Resignation would be a publick Loss. The postponing him to Pomroy and Heath whom he has commanded would make his Continuance very difficult, and probably operate on his Mind, as the like Circumstance has done on that of Spencer.¹

The State of the Army you will find ascertained with tolerable Precision in the Returns which accompany this Letter.² Upon finding the Number of men to fall so far short of the Establishment, and below all Expectation, I immediately called a Council of the general Officers, whose opinion as to the mode of filling up the Regiments, and providing for the present Exigency, I have the Honor of inclosing together with the best Judgment we are able to form of the ministerial Troops. From the Number of Boys, Deserters, and Negroes which have been inlisted in the troops of this Province, I entertain some doubts whether the number required can be raised here; and all the General Officers agree that no Dependance can be put on the militia for a Continuance in Camp, or Regularity and Discipline during the short Time they may stay.¹ This unhappy and devoted Province has been so long in a State of Anarchy, and the Yoke of ministerial Oppression been laid so heavily on it that great Allowances are to be made for Troops raised under such Circumstances: The Deficiency of Numbers, Discipline and Stores can only lead to this Conclusion, that their Spirit has exceeded their Strength. But at the same Time I would humbly submit to the consideration of the Congress, the Propriety of making some farther Provision of Men from the other Colonies. If these Regiments should be completed to their Establishment, the Dismission of those unfit for Duty on account of their Age and Character would occasion a considerable Reduction, and at all events they have been inlisted upon such Terms, that they may be disbanded when other Troops arrive: But should my apprehensions be realized, and the Regiments here not filled up, the publick Cause would suffer by an absolute Dependance upon so doubtful an Event, unless some Provision is made against such a Disappointment.¹

It requires no military Skill to judge of the Difficulty of introducing proper Discipline and Subordination into an Army while we have the Enemy in View, and are in daily Expectation of an Attack, but it is of so much Importance that every Effort will be made which Time and Circumstance will admit. In the mean Time I have a sincere Pleasure in observing that there are Materials for a good Army, a great number of able bodied Men, active zealous in the Cause and of unquestionable courage.²

I am now Sir, to acknowledge the Receipt of your Favor of the 28th Inst. inclosing the Resolutions of the Congress of the 27th ult. and a Copy of a Letter from the Committee of Albany, to all which I shall pay due Attention.

General Gates and Sullivan have both arrived in good Health. My best Abilities are at all Times devoted to the Service of my Country, but I feel the Weight Importance and variety of my present Duties too sensibly, not to wish a more immediate and frequent Communication with the Congress. I fear it may often happen in the Course of our present Operations, that I shall need that Assistance and Direction from them which Time and Distance will not allow me to receive.¹

Since writing the above, I have also to acknowledge your Favour of the 4th Inst. by Fessenden, and the Receipt of the Commission and Articles of War. The Former are yet 800 short of the number required, this deficiency you will please supply as soon as you conveniently can. Among the other Returns, I have also sent one of our killed, wounded and missing in the late Action, but have been able to procure no certain Account of the Loss of the ministerial Troops, my best Intelligence fixes it at about 500 killed and 6 or 700 wounded; but it is no more than Conjecture, the utmost Pains being taken on their side to conceal it.¹

P. S. Having ordered the commanding Officer to give me the earliest Intelligence of every Motion of the Enemy, by Land or Water, discoverable from the Heights of his Camp, I this inst., as I was closing my Letter received the enclosed from the Brigade Major. The Design of this Manœuvre I know not, perhaps it may be to make a Descent some where along the Coast; it may be for New York, or it may be practised as a Deception on Us. I thought it not improper however to mention the matter to you. I have done the same to the commanding Officer at New York, and I shall let it be known to the Committee of Safety here, so that the Intelligence may be communicated as they shall think best along the Sea Coast of this Government.

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TO RICHARD HENRY LEE, IN CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 10 July, 1775.

Dear Sir,

I was exceeding glad to receive a letter from you, as I always shall be whenever it is convenient; though perhaps my hurry, till such time as matters are drawn a little out of the chaos they appear in at present, will not suffer me to write you such full and satisfactory answers, or give such clear and precise accounts of our situation and views, as I could wish, or you might expect. After a journey, a good deal retarded, principally by the desire of the different townships through which I travelled of showing respect to the general of your armies, I arrived here on this day week; since which I have been laboring with as much assiduity by fair and threatening means, to obtain returns of our strength in this camp and Roxbury and their dependencies, as a man could do, and never have been able to accomplish the matter till this day; and now, I will not answer for the correctness of them, although I have sent several of the regimental returns back more than once to have mistakes rectified.

I do not doubt but the Congress will think me very remiss in not writing to them sooner; but you may rely on it yourself, and I beg you to assure them, that it has never been in my power till this day to comply with their orders. Could I have conceived, that what ought, and, in a regular army, would have been done in an hour, would employ eight days, I should have sent an express on the second morning after I arrived, with a general account of things; but expecting in the morning to receive the returns in the evening, and in the evening surely to find them in the morning, and at last getting them full of imperfections, I have been drilled on from day to day, till I am ashamed to look back at the time, which has elapsed since my arrival here. You will perceive by the returns, that we have but about sixteen thousand effective men in all this department, whereas, by the accounts which I received from even the first officers in command, I had no doubt of finding between eighteen and twenty thousand; out of these there are only fourteen thousand fit for duty. So soon as I was able to get this state of the army, and came to the knowledge of our weakness, I immediately summoned a council of war, the result of which you will see, as it is enclosed to the Congress. Between you and me, I think we are in an exceedingly dangerous situation, as our numbers are not much larger than we suppose those of the enemy to be, from the best accounts we are able to get. They are situated in such a manner, as to be drawn to any point of attack, without our having an hour's previous notice of it, if the General will keep his own counsel; whereas we are obliged to be guarded at all points, and know not where, with precision to look for them.

I should not, I think, have made choice of the present posts, in the first instance, although I believe the communication between the town and country could not have been so well cut off without them; and, as much labor has been bestowed in throwing up lines, and making redoubts; as Cambridge, Roxbury, and Watertown must be

immediately exposed to the mercy of the enemy, were we to retreat a little further into the country; as it would give a general dissatisfaction to this colony, dispirit our own people, and encourage the enemy, to remove at this time to another place; we have for these reasons resolved in council to maintain our ground if we can. Our lines on Winter and Prospect Hills, and those of the enemy on Bunker's Hill, are in full view of each other, a mile distant, our advance guards much nearer, and the sentries almost near enough to converse; at Roxbury and Boston Neck it is the same. Between these, we are obliged to guard several of the places at which the enemy may land. They have strongly fortified, or will fortify in a few days, their camps and Bunker's Hill; after which, and when their newly landed troops have got a little refreshed, we shall look for a visit, if they mean, as we are told they do, to come out of their lines. Their great command of artillery, and adequate stores of powder, give them advantages, which we have only to lament the want of.

The abuses in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it, in the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and dangerous. If things therefore should not turn out as the Congress would wish, I hope they will make proper allowances. I can only promise and assure them, that my whole time is devoted to their service, and that as far as my judgment goes, they shall have no cause to complain.¹ I need not tell you, that this letter is written in much haste; the fact will sufficiently appear from the face of it. I thought a hasty letter would please you better than no letter, and, therefore, I shall offer no further apology, but assure you, that, with sincere regard for my fellow laborers with you, and Dr. Shippen's family, I am, dear Sir, your most affectionate servant.

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TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.[1](#)

Cambridge, 18 July, 1775.

Sir,

It is with no small concern, that I find the arrangement of general officers, made by the honorable Continental Congress, has produced much dissatisfaction. As the army is upon a general establishment, their right, to supersede and control a Provincial one, must be unquestionable; and, in such a cause, I should hope every post would be deemed honorable, which gave a man opportunity to serve his country.

A representation from the Congress of this province, with such remarks as occurred to me on this subject, is now before the Continental Congress.[1](#) In the mean time, I beg leave to assure you, that, unbiassed by any private attachments, I shall studiously endeavor to reconcile their pretensions to their duty, and so dispose them, as to prevent, as far as possible, any inconvenience to the public service from this competition. I have the honor to be, &c.[2](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 21 July, 1775.

Sir,

Since I did myself the Honor of addressing you the 14th instt I have received Advice from Govr Trumbull, that the Assembly of Connecticut had voted, and that they are now raising two Regiments of 700 Men each, in Consequence of an Application from the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts Bay. The Rhode Island Assembly has also made an Augmentation for this purpose¹; these Reinforcements with the Riffle Men who are daily expected, and such Recruits as may come in, to fill up the Regiments here, will I apprehend compose an Army sufficiently strong, to oppose any force which may be brought against us at present. I am very sensible, that the heavy expence necessarily attendant upon this Campaign, will call for the utmost Frugality and Care, and would therefore if possible avoid inlisting one unnecessary Man. As this is the first certain Account of the Destination of these new raised Troops, I thought proper to communicate my Sentiments as early as possible; least the Congress should act upon my Letter of the 10th, and raise Troops in the Southern Colonies, which in my present Judgment may be dispens'd with.

In these 8 Days past there have been no movements in either Camp of any consequence. On our side, we have continued the Works without any Intermission, and they are now so far advanced, as to leave us little to apprehend on that Score. On the side of the Enemy, they have also been very industrious in finishing their Lines both on Bunker's Hill, and Roxbury Neck. In this Interval also their Transports have arrived from New York, and they have been employed in landing and stationing their Men. I have been able to collect no certain Account of the Numbers arrived, but the inclosed Letter, wrote (tho' not signed) by Mr. Sheriff Lee, and delivered me by Capt Darby, (who went Express with an Account of the Lexington Battle,) will enable us to form a pretty accurate Judgment. The Increase of Tents and Men in the Town of Boston, is very obvious, but all my Accounts from thence agree, that there is a great Mortality occasioned by the Want of Vegetables and fresh Meat: and that their Loss in the late Battle at Charles Town (from the few Recoveries of their Wounded) is greater than at first supposed. The Condition of the Inhabitants detained in Boston is very distressing, they are equally destitute of the Comfort of fresh Provisions, and many of them are so reduced in their Circumstances, as to be unable to supply themselves with salt: Such Fish as the Soldiery leave, is their principal support. Added to all this, such Suspicion and Jealousy prevails, that they can scarcely speak, or even look, without exposing themselves to some Species of military Execution.

I have not been able from any Intelligence I have received, to form any certain Judgment of the future Operations of the Enemy. Some Times I have suspected an intention of detaching a part of their Army to some Part of the Coast; as they have been building a number of flat bottom'd Boats capable of holding 200 Men each. But

from their Works, and the Language held at Boston, there is Reason to think, they expect the Attack from us, and are principally engaged in preparing themselves against it. I have ordered all the Whale Boats along the Coast to be collected, and some of them are employed every Night to watch the Motions of the Enemy by Water, so as to guard as much as possible against any surprize.

Upon my arrival and since, some Complaints have been preferr'd against Officers for Cowardice in the late Action on Bunkers Hill. Though there were several strong Circumstances and a very general Opinion against them, none have been condemned, except a Captn Callender of the Artillery, who was immediately cashier'd.¹ I have been sorry to find it an uncontradicted Fact, that the principal failure of Duty that day was in the Officers, tho' many of them distinguish'd themselves by their gallant Behavior. The Soldiers generally shew'd great Spirit and Resolution.

Next to the more immediate and pressing Duties of putting our Lines in as secure a State as possible, attending to the Movements of the Enemy, and gaining Intelligence, my great Concern is to establish Order, Regularity and Discipline: without which, our numbers would embarrass us, and in case of Action general Confusion must infallibly ensue. In order to this, I propose to divide the Army into three Divisions at the Head of each will be a General Officer—these Divisions to be again subdivided into Brigades, under their respective Brigadiers¹; but the Difficulty arising from the Arrangement of the General Officers, and waiting the farther Proceedings of the Congress on this Subject, has much retarded my Progress in this most necessary Work. I should be very happy to receive their final Commands, as any Determination would enable me to proceed in my Plan.²

General Spencer returned to the Camp two Days ago, and has consented to serve under Puttnam, rather than leave the Army intirely. I have heard nothing from General Pomroy, should he wholly retire, I apprehend it will be necessary to supply his Place as soon as possible. General Folsom proposes also to retire. In addition to the Officers mentioned in mine of the 10. Instt, I would humbly propose that some Provision should be made for a Judge Advocate, and Provost Marshal—the Necessity of the first appointment was so great, that I was obliged to nominate a Mr Tudor, who was well recommended to me, and now executes the Office, under an Expectation of receiving a Captain's pay; an Allowance, in my Opinion, scarcely adequate to the Service in new raised Troops, when there are Court Martials every Day. However as that is the Proportion in the regular Army, and he is contented, there will be no Necessity of an Addition.

I must also renew my Request as to Money, and the Appointment of a Paymaster: I have forbore urging Matters of this Nature from my Knowledge of the many important Concerns which engage the Attention of the Congress; but as I find my Difficulties thicken every Day, I make no Doubt suitable Regard will be paid to a Necessity of this Kind. The Inconvenience of borrowing such Sums as are constantly requisite must be too plain for me to enlarge upon, and is a Situation, from which I should be very happy to be relieved.

Upon the Experience I have had, and the best Consideration of the Appointment of the several Offices of Commissary Genl, Muster master Genl, Quarter Master Genl, Paymaster Genl and Commissary of Artillery, I am clearly of Opinion that they not only conduce to Order, Despatch and Discipline, but that it is a Measure of Oeconomy. The Delay, the Waste, and unpunishable Neglect of Duty arising from these Offices being in Commission, in several Hands, evidently show that the publick Expence must be finally enhanced. I have experienced the Want of these Officers, in completing the Returns of Men, Ammunition, and Stores, the latter are yet imperfect, from the Number of Hands in which they are dispers'd. I have inclosed the last weekly Return which is more accurate than the former, and hope in a little Time we shall be perfectly regular in this, as well as several other necessary Branches of Duty.

I have made Inquiry into the Establishment of the Hospital, and find it in a very unsettled Condition. There is no principal Director, or any Subordination among the Surgeons, of Consequence, Disputes and Contention have arisen, and must continue, untill it is reduced to some system. I could wish it was immediately taken into Consideration, as the Lives and Health of both Officers and Men, so much depend upon a due Regulation of this Department. ¹ I have been particularly attentive to the least Symptoms of the small Pox and hitherto we have been so fortunate, as to have every person removed so soon, as not only to prevent any Communication, but any Alarm or Apprehension it might give in the Camp. We shall continue the utmost Vigilance against this most dangerous Enemy.

In an Army properly organized, there are sundry Offices of an Inferior kind, such as Waggon Master, Master Carpenter, &c, but I doubt whether my Powers are sufficiently extensive for such Appointments: If it is thought proper to repose such a Trust in me, I shall be governed in the Discharge of it, by a strict Regard to Oeconomy, and the publick Interest.

My Instructions from the Hon Congress direct that no Troops are to be disbanded without their express Direction, nor to be recruited to more than double the Number of the Enemy. Upon this Subject, I beg Leave to represent, that unless the Regiments in this Province, are more successful in recruiting than I have Reason to expect, a Reduction of some of them, will be highly necessary; as the Publick is put to the whole Expense of an Establishment of Officers, while the real Strength of the Regiment, which consists in the Rank and file, is defective. In Case of such a Reduction doubtless some of the Privates, and all the Officers would return Home; but many of the former, would go into the remaining Regiments, and having had some Experience would fill them up with useful Men. I so plainly perceive the Expence of this Campaign, will exceed any Calculation hitherto made, that I am particularly anxious to strike off every unnecessary Charge. You will therefore, Sir, be pleased to favor me with explicit Directions from the Congress on the Mode of this Reduction, if it shall appear necessary, that no Time may be lost when such Necessity appears.

Yesterday we had an Account that the Light House was on Fire—by whom, and under what Orders, I have not yet learned. But we have Reason to believe, it has been done by some of our Irregulars.

You will please to present me to the Congress with the utmost Duty, and Respect.

P. S. Capt. Darby's Stay in England was so short, that he brings no other Information than what the inclosed Letter, and the News Papers which will accompany this, contain¹—General Gage's Dispatches had not arrived, and the Ministry affected to disbelieve the whole Account—treating it as a Fiction or at most an Affair of little Consequence. The Fall of Stocks was very inconsiderable.¹

21 July, 1775, Five o'Clock P. M.

Since closing the Letters which accompany this I have received an Account of the Destruction of the Light House, a Copy of which I have the Honor to inclose.¹

P. S. I have also received a more authentick Account of the Loss of the Enemy in the late Battle than any yet received. Dr. Winship who lodged in the same House with an Officer of the Marines assures me they had exactly 1043 killed and wounded, of whom 300 fell on the Field or died within a few Hours. Many of the wounded are since dead.¹

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TO GENERAL THOMAS.[2](#)

23 July, 1775.

Sir:

The retirement of a General Officer possessing the confidence of his country and the army at so critical a period, appears to me to be big with fatal consequences both to the public cause and his own reputation. While it is unexecuted I think it my duty to use this last effort to prevent it, and your own virtue and good sense must decide upon it. In the usual contests of empire and ambition, the conscience of a soldier has so little share, that he may very properly insist upon his claims of rank, and extend his pretensions even to punctilio;—but in such a cause as this, when the object is neither glory nor extent of territory, but a defence of all that is dear and valuable in private and public life, surely every post ought to be deemed honorable in which a man can serve his country. What matter of triumph will it afford our enemies, that in less than one month, a spirit of discord should show itself in the highest ranks of the army, not to be extinguished by any thing less than a total desertion of duty. How little reason shall we have to boast of American union and patriotism, if at such a time and in such a cause smaller and partial considerations cannot give way to the great and general interest. These remarks not only affect you as a member of the great American body, but as an inhabitant of Massachusetts Bay. Your own Province and the other Colonies have a peculiar and unquestionable claim to your services, and in my opinion you cannot refuse without relinquishing in some degree that character of public virtue and honor which you have hitherto supported. If our cause is just, it ought to be supported; but when shall it find support if gentlemen of merit and experience, unable to conquer the prejudices of a competition, withdraw themselves in the hour of danger? I admit, Sir, that your just claims and services have not had due respect,—it is by no means a singular case,—worthy men of all nations and countries have had reasons to make the same complaint, but they did not for this abandon the public cause,—they nobly stifled the dictates of resentment, and made their enemies ashamed of their injustice. And can America afford no such instances of magnanimity? For the sake of your bleeding country,—your devoted Province,—your charter rights,—and by the memories of those brave men who have already fallen in this great cause, I conjure you to banish from your mind every suggestion of anger and disappointment; your country will do ample justice to your merits,—they already do it by the regret and sorrow expressed on this occasion; and the sacrifice you are called to make, will in the judgment of every good man and lover of his country, do you more real honor than the most distinguished victory. You possess the confidence and affection of the troops of this Province particularly;—many of them are not capable of judging the propriety and reasons of your conduct,—should they esteem themselves authorized by your example to leave the service, the consequences may be fatal and irretrievable. There is reason to fear it from the personal attachment of the officers and men, and the obligations that are supposed to arise from these attachments.

But, sir, the other Colonies have also their claims upon you, not only as a native of America, but an inhabitant of this Province. They have made common cause with it, they have sacrificed their trade, loaded themselves with taxes, and are ready to spill their blood, in vindication of the rights of Massachusetts Bay, while all the security and profit of a neutrality have been offered them. But no acts or temptations could seduce them from your side, and leave you a prey to a cruel and perfidious ministry. Sure these reflections must have some weight with a mind as generous and considerate as yours. How will you be able to answer it to your country and to your own conscience, if such a step should lead to a division of the army or the loss and ruin of America be ascribed to measures which your counsels and conduct would have prevented! Before it is too late, I entreat, sir, you would weigh well the greatness of the stake, and upon how much smaller circumstances the fate of empires has depended. Of your own honor and reputation you are the best and only judge; but allow me to say, that a people contending for life and liberty, are seldom disposed to look with a favorable eye upon either men or measures, whose passions, interests or consequences will clash with those inestimable objects. As to myself, Sir, be assured, that I shall with pleasure do all in my power to make your situation both easy and honorable, and that the sentiments I have here expressed flow from a clear opinion that your duty to your country, your posterity, and yourself, most explicitly require your continuance in the service. The order and rank of the commissions is under the consideration of the Continental Congress, whose determination will be received in a few days. It may argue a want of respect to that august body not to wait that decision. But at all events, I shall flatter myself, that these reasons, with others which your own good judgment will suggest, will strengthen your mind against those impressions which are incident to humanity, and laudable to a certain degree, and that the result will be your resolution to assist your country and friends in this day of distress. That you may reap the full reward of honor and public esteem which such a conduct deserves, is the sincere wish of, Sir, Yours, &c—[1](#)

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TO JOHN AUGUSTINE WASHINGTON.

Camp at Cambridge, about 5 miles from Boston, 27 July, 1775.

Dear Brother,

On the 2nd instant I arrived at this place, after passing through a great deal of delightful country, covered with grass, (although the season has been dry) in a very different manner to what our lands in Virginia are.

I found a mixed multitude of people here, under very little discipline, order, or government; I found the enemy in possession of a place called Bunker's Hill, on Charles Town Neck, strongly intrenched, and fortifying themselves. I found part of our army on two hills, (called Winter and Prospect Hills) about a mile and a quarter from the enemy on Bunker's Hill, in a very insecure state; I found another part of the army at this village; and a third part at Roxbury, guarding the entrance in and out of Boston. My whole time, since I came here, has been employed in throwing up lines of defence at these three several places, to secure, in the first instance, our own troops from any attempts of the enemy; and, in the next place, to cut off all communication between their troops and the country. To do this, and to prevent them from penetrating into the country with fire and sword, and to harass them if they do, is all that is expected of me; and if effected, must totally overthrow the designs of administration, as the whole force of Great Britain in the town and harbor of Boston can answer no other end, than to sink her under the disgrace and weight of the expense. Their force, including marines, Tories, &c., are computed, from the best accounts I can get, at about twelve thousand men¹; ours, including sick absent, &c., at about sixteen thousand; but then we have a semicircle of eight or nine miles, to guard to every part of which we are obliged to be equally attentive; whilst they, situated as it were in the center of the semicircle, can bend their whole force (having the entire command of the water), against any one part of it with equal facility. This renders our situation not very agreeable, though necessary. However, by incessant labor (Sundays not excepted), we are in a much better posture of defence now, than when I first came. The enclosed, though rough, will give you some small idea of the situation of Boston and Bay on this side, as also of the post they have taken on Charles Town Neck, Bunker's Hill, and our posts.

By very authentic intelligence lately received out of Boston (from a person who saw the returns), the number of regulars (including I presume the marines) the morning of the action on Bunker's Hill amounted to 7533 men. Their killed and wounded on that occasion amounted to 1043, whereof 92 were officers. Our loss was 138 killed, 38 missing, and 276 wounded.

The enemy are sickly, and scarce of fresh provisions. Beef, which is chiefly got by slaughtering their milch cows in Boston, sells from one shilling to eighteen pence sterling per pound²; and that it may not get cheaper, or more plenty, I have drove all

the stock, within a considerable distance of this place, back into the country, out of the way of the men-of-war's boats. In short, I have [done,] and shall continue to do, every thing in my power to distress them. The transports are all arrived, and their whole reinforcement is landed, so that I can see no reason why they should not, if they ever attempt it, come boldly out, and put the matter to issue at once. If they think themselves not strong enough to do this, they surely will carry their arms (having ships of war and transports ready) to some other part of the continent, or relinquish the dispute; the last of which the ministry, unless compelled, will never agree to do.¹ Our works, and those of the enemy are so near and quite open between that we see every thing that each other is doing. I recollect nothing more worth mentioning. I shall therefore conclude, with my best wishes and love to my sister and family, and compliments to any inquiring friend, your most affectionate brother.¹

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Camp at Cambridge, 28 July, 1775.

Dear Sir,

I wrote you yesterday by way of New York, and in two hours afterwards was favored with yours of the 15th and 18th instant, with their respective enclosures. I was extremely glad to find your first apprehensions of an incursion by the Indians in some degree removed by the later advices. At the same time, I think it is evident from the spirit and tenor of Colonel Johnson's letter, that no art or influence will be left untried by him to engage them in such an enterprise. Should he once prevail upon them to dip their hands in blood, mutual hostilities will most probably ensue, and they may be led to take a more decisive part. All accounts I think agree, that the Canadians are very averse to engage in this unnatural contest; but I am persuaded you will not abate in the least your vigilance to expedite every movement in that quarter, notwithstanding their present pacific appearances.¹

I am much easier with respect to the public interest since your arrival at Ticonderoga, as I am persuaded those abilities and that zeal for the common welfare, which have led your country to repose such confidence in you, will be fully exerted. From my own experience I can easily judge of your difficulties to introduce order and discipline into troops, who have from their infancy imbibed ideas of the most contrary kind. It would be far beyond the compass of a letter, for me to describe the situation of things here on my arrival. Perhaps you will only be able to judge of it from my assuring you, that mine must be a portrait at full length of what you have had a miniature. Confusion and disorder reigned in every department, which, in a little time, must have ended either in the separation of the army, or fatal contests with one another. The better genius of America has prevailed, and most happily the ministerial troops have not availed themselves of their advantages, till I trust the opportunity is in a great measure past over. The arrangement of the general officers in Massachusetts and Connecticut has been very unpopular, indeed I may say injudicious. It is returned to the Congress for further consideration, and has much retarded my plan of discipline. However, we mend every day, and I flatter myself that in a little time we shall work up these raw materials into a good manufacture. I must recommend to you, what I endeavor to practise myself, patience and perseverance. As to your operations, my dear Sir, I can suggest nothing, which your own good judgment will not either anticipate, or control, from your immediate view of things, and the instructions of the Continental Congress.¹

The express from hence to England, with the account of the commencement of hostilities at Lexington, has returned. It was far from making the impression generally expected here. Stocks fell but one and a half per cent. General Gage's account had not arrived, and the ministry affected to treat it as a fiction. Parliament had been prorogued two days, but it was reported that it would be immediately recalled. Our

enemy continues strongly posted about a mile from us, both at Bunker's Hill and Roxbury, but we are not able to get any information of their future intentions. Part of the riflemen are come in, and the rest daily expected.

I did not expect your returns would be very complete at first; but I must beg your attention to reforming them as soon as possible; and I beg leave to add, that I would have you scrutinize with exactness into the application of provisions and stores. I have the utmost reason to suspect irregularities and impositions here. You will be fortunate if the contagion does not reach you. General Lee has removed about four miles from me, but I will take the first opportunity to make your kind wishes known to him. Col. R [eed] and Major M [ifflin] join me in the best wishes for your health and success. I am, &c. [1](#)

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TO GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY.

Camp at Cambridge, 31 July, 1775.

Sir,

I have Considerd the Application² made me yesterday, from the General Court, with all the attention due to the situation of the People in whose Behalf it is made, & the Respect due to such a Recommendation.

Upon referring to my Instructions and Consulting with those Members of Congress who are present as well as the General Officers; they all agree that it would not be consistent with my duty to detach any Part of the Army now here on any Particular Provincial Service. It has been debated in Congress and Settled that the Militia or other Internal Strength of each Province is to be applied for Defence against those Small and Particular Depredations which were to be expected, & to which they were supposed to be Competent. This will appear the more proper, when it is Consider'd that every Town & indeed every Part of our Sea Coast which is exposed to these Depredations would have an equal Claim upon this Army: It is the misfortune of our situation which exposes us to these Ravages, against which in my Judgment no such Temporary relief would possibly secure us. The great Advantage the Enemy has of Transporting Troops by being Masters of the Sea will enable them to harrass us by Diversions of this kind; and should we be tempted to pursue them upon every Alarm, The Army must either be so weaken'd as to Expose it to Destruction or a great Part of the Coast be still left unprotected:

Nor indeed does it appear to me that such a Pursuit would be attended with the least Effect: The first notice of such an Incursion would be its actual Execution; and long before any Troops could reach the Scene of Action, the Enemy would have an Opportunity to Accomplish their Purpose & retire. It would give me great Pleasure to have it in my Power to extend Protection and Safety to every Individual, but the Wisdom of the General Court will Anticipate me in the Necessity of Conducting our Operations on a General and Impartial Scale, so as to exclude any first Cause of Complaint and Jealousy.¹

I beg Sir you will do me the Honor to Communicate these Sentiments to the General Court and to Apologize for my Involuntary Delay: As we were alarm'd this Morning by the Enemy & my Time taken up with giving the Necessary Directions.

I shall be happy in every Opportunity of shewing my very great Respect and Regard for the General Court of Massachusetts Bay.²

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TO DEPUTY GOVERNOR COOKE, OF RHODE ISLAND.

Camp at Cambridge, 4 August, 1775.

Sir,

I was yesterday favored with yours of the 31st July. We have yet no certain account of the fleet, which sailed out of Boston on the 25th; but if our conjectures and information are just, we may expect to hear of it every hour.

I am now, Sir, in strict confidence, to acquaint you, that our necessities in the articles of powder and lead are so great, as to require an immediate supply. I must earnestly entreat, you will fall upon some measures to forward every pound of each in the colony, which can possibly be spared. It is not within the propriety or safety of such a correspondence to say what I might upon this subject. It is sufficient, that the case calls loudly for the most strenuous exertions of every friend of his country, and does not admit of the least delay. No quantity, however small, is beneath notice, and, should any arrive, I beg it may be forwarded as soon as possible.¹

But a supply of this kind is so precarious, not only from the danger of the enemy, but the opportunity of purchasing, that I have revolved in my mind every other possible chance, and listened to every proposition on the subject, which could give the smallest hope. Among others, I have had one mentioned, which has some weight with me, as well as the general officers to whom I have proposed it. One Harris is lately come from Bermuda, where there is a very considerable magazine of powder in a remote part of the island; and the inhabitants well disposed not only to our cause in general, but to assist in this enterprise in particular. We understand there are two armed vessels in your province, commanded by men of known activity and spirit; one of which, it is proposed to despatch on this errand with such assistance as may be requisite. Harris is to go along, as the conductor of the enterprise, and to avail ourselves of his knowledge of the island; but without any command. I am very sensible, that at first view the project may appear hazardous; and its success must depend on the concurrence of many circumstances; but we are in a situation, which requires us to run all risks. No danger is to be considered, when put in competition with the magnitude of the cause, and the absolute necessity we are under of increasing our stock. Enterprises, which appear chimerical, often prove successful from that very circumstance. Common sense and prudence will suggest vigilance and care, where the danger is plain and obvious; but, where little danger is apprehended, the more the enemy will be unprepared, and consequently there is the fairest prospect of success.¹

Mr. Brown² has been mentioned to me as a very proper person to be consulted upon this occasion. You will judge of the propriety of communicating it to him in part or the whole, and as soon as possible favor me with your sentiments, and the steps you may have taken to forward it. If no immediate and safe opportunity offers, you will please to do it by express. Should it be inconvenient to part with one of the armed

vessels, perhaps some other might be fitted out, or you could devise some other mode of executing this plan; so that, in case of a disappointment, the vessel might proceed to some other island to purchase.

My last letter from the honorable Continental Congress recommends my procuring, from the colonies of Connecticut and Rhode Island, a quantity of tow cloth, for the purpose of making Indian or hunting-shirts for the men, many of whom are very destitute of clothing. A pattern will be sent you; and I must request you to give the necessary directions throughout your government, that all the cloth of the above kind may be bought up for this use, and suitable persons set to work to make it up. As soon as any number is made, worth the conveyance, you will please to direct them to be forwarded. It is designed as a species of uniform, both cheap and convenient.

We have had no transactions in either camp since my last, but what are in the public papers, and related with tolerable accuracy. The enemy still continue to strengthen their lines, and we have reason to believe, intend to bombard ours, with the hopes of forcing us out of them. Our poverty in ammunition prevents our making a suitable return.

Since writing the above, Colonel Porter has undertaken to assist in the matter, or to provide some suitable person to accompany Harris to you, who will communicate all the circumstances. I am, &c. [1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 4 August, 1775.

Sir,

I am to acknowledge the receipt of your Favor of the 24th July accompanied by 284 Commissions, which are yet much short of the necessary Number. I am much honored by the Confidence reposing in me of appointing the several Officers recommended in mine of the 10th ult.; and shall endeavor to select such Persons, as are best qualified to fill those important Posts.

General Thomas has accepted his Commission and I have heard nothing of his Retirement since, so that I suppose he is satisfied.

In the Renewal of those Commissions some Difficulties occur, in which I should be glad to know the Pleasure of the honbl Congress. The General Officers of the Massachusetts, have Regiments, those of Connecticut, have both Regiments, and Companies, and the other Field Officers have Companies each. From Rhode Island, the General Officer has no Regimt, but the Field Officers have Companies. But I do not find they have, or expect Pay under more than one Commission. Should the Commission now to be delivered supercede these different Establishments, there will be a Distinction between General and Field Officers of the same Rank. In Order to put New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Rhode Island upon a Line with Connecticut, it would be necessary to dismiss a Number of Officers in Possession of Commissions, without any Fault of theirs; on the other Hand, to bring the Connecticut Generals, and Field Officers to the same Scale with the others, will add to the Number of Officers, and may be deemed inconsistent with the Terms on which they entered into the Service, altho you add nothing to the Expende, except in the Article of Provisions. Upon the whole, it is a Case, which I would wish the Honbl Congress to consider and determine.

Col. Gridley of this Province, who is at the Head of the Artillery has the Rank of Major Genl from the Provincial Congress. Will it be proper to renew his Commission here in the same Manner? It is proper here to remark, that in this Case he will take Rank of all the Brigadiers General, and even the Majors General, whose Commissions are subsequent in Date, and can answer no good Purpose, but may be productive of many bad Consequences.¹

These are Matters of some Importance, but I am embarrassed with a Difficulty of a superior kind. The Estimate made in Congress, supposed all the Regiments to be formed upon one Establishment, but they are different in different Provinces; and even vary in the same Province, in some Particulars. In Massachusetts, some Regiments have Ten Companies, others Eleven; The Establishment of the former is 590 Men Officers included, of the latter 649. The Establishment of Rhode Island, and

New Hampshire is 590 to a Regiment, Officers included. Connecticut has 1000 Men to a Regiment. Should the Massachusetts Regiments be completed; with the new Levies from Rhode Island and Connecticut and the Rifle Men, the Number will exceed 22,000. If they should not be completed, as each Regiment is fully officer'd, there will be a heavy Expense to the Publick without an adequate Service. The Reduction of some of them seems to be necessary and yet is a Matter of much Delicacy, as we are situated. I most earnestly request it may be taken into immediate Consideration, and the Time and Mode of doing it, pointed out by the Honbl Congress. By an Estimate I have made, from the General Return, when the new Levies arrive, and the Regiments are completed there will be 24,450 Men on the Pay and Provision of the united Colonies. Some of the recruiting Officers who have been out on that Service, have returned with very little Success, so that we may safely conclude, the Number of 2064 now wanting to complete will rather increase than diminish. There are the Regiment of Artillery consisting of 493 Men, and one under Col. Sergeant who has not received any commission, altho he had Orders to raise a Regiment from the Provincial Congress here, which are not included in the above Estimate. This last Regiment consists of 234 Men by the last Return, but a Company has since joined.

By adverting to the General Return, which I have the Honor of inclosing (No. [11](#)) it will be seen what Regiments are most deficient.

If the Congress does not chuse to point out the particular Regiments, but the Provinces in which the Reduction is to be made, the several Congresses and Assemblies may be the proper Channell to conduct this Business: which I should also conceive the most adviseable, from their better Acquaintance with the Merits, Terms, and Time of Service of the respective Officers. Reducing some Regiments, and with the Privates thereof, filling up others would certainly be the best Method of accomplishing this Work, if it were practicable; but the Experiment is dangerous, as the Massachusetts Men under the Priviledge of chusing their own Officers, do not conceive themselves bound if those Officers are disbanded.

As General Gage is making Preparations for Winter, by contracting for Quantities of Coal; it will suggest to us the Propriety of extending our Views to that Season. I have directed that such Huts as have been lately made of Boards, should be done in such a Manner, that if necessary they may serve for covering during the Winter; but I need not enlarge upon the Variety of Necessities such as Clothing, Fuel, &c.—both exceedingly scarce and difficult to be procured, which that season must bring with it; if the Army, or any considerable Part of it is to remain embodied. From the Inactivity of the Enemy since the Arrival of their whole Reinforcement, their continual Addition to their lines, and many other Circumstances, I am inclined to think that finding us so well prepared to receive them, the Plan of Operations is varied, and they mean by regular Approaches to bombard us out of our present Line of Defence, or are waiting in Expectation that the Colonies must sink under the Weight of the Expence; or the Prospect of a Winters Campaign, so discourage the Troops as to break up our Army. If they have not some such Expectations the Issue of which they are determined to wait; I cannot account for the Delay, when their Strength is lessened every Day by Sickness, Desertions, and little Skirmishes.

Of these last we have had only two worthy of Notice: Having some Reason to suspect they were extending their Lines at Charles Town, I last Saturday Evening, ordered some of the Riffle Men down to make a Discovery, or bring off a Prisoner. They were accidentally discovered sooner than they expected; by the Guard coming to relieve, and obliged to fire upon them; We have Reason to believe they killed several. They brought in two Prisoners whose Acct confirmed by some other Circumstances removed my Suspicions in part. Since that Time we have on each Side drawn in our Centries, and there have been scattering Fires along the Line. This Evening we have heard of three Captains who have been taken off by the Riffle Men and one killed by a Cannon Shot from Roxbury besides several Privates; but as the Intelligence is not direct, I only mention it as a Report which deserves Credit. The other happened at the Light House. A Number of Workmen have been sent down to repair it with a Guard of 22 Marines and a Subaltern, Major Tupper last Monday Morning about 2 'Clock landed there with about 300 Men, attack'd them killed the Officer, and 4 Privates; but being detained by the Tide, in his Return he was attack'd by several Boats, but he happily got through with the Loss of one Man killed and another wounded. The Remainder of the ministerial Troops, three of which are badly wounded, he brought off Prisoners, with 10 Tories, all of whom are on their Way to Springfield Gaol. The Riffle Men in this Skirmish lost one Man who we hear is a Prisoner in Boston Gaol. The Enemy in Return endeavored to surprise our Guard at Roxbury, but they being apprized of it by a Deserter, had Time to prepare for it; but by some Negligence or Misconduct in the Officer of the Guard, they burnt the George Tavern on the Neck; and have every day since been cannonading us from their Lines both at Roxbury and Charles Town, but with no other Effect than the Loss of two Men. On our Part except straggling Fires from the small Arms about the Lines which we endeavor to restrain, we have made little or no Return. Our Situation in the Article of Powder is much more alarming than I had the most distant Idea of. Having desired a Return to be made out on my Arrival, of the Ammunition, I found 303½ Bbbl's of Powder mentioned as in the Store: But on ordering a new Supply of Cartridges yesterday, I was informed to my very great Astonishment that there was no more than 36 Bbbls of the Massachusetts Store, which with the Stock of Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Connecticut makes 9937 lb—not more than 9 Rounds a Man: As there had been no Consumption of Powder since, that could in any Degree account for such a Deficiency, I was very particular in my Inquiries, and found that the Committee of Supplies, not being sufficiently acquainted with the Nature of a Return, or misapprehending my Request, sent in an Account of all the Ammunition, which had been collected by the Provinces so that the Report included not only what was in Hand, but what had been spent. Upon discovering this Mistake, I immediately went up to confer with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, upon some Measures to obtain a Supply from the neighboring Townships, in such a Manner, as might prevent our Poverty being known, as it is a Secret of too great Consequence to be divulged in the general Court, some Individual of which might perhaps indiscreetly suffer it to escape him, so as to find its Way to the Enemy, the Consequences of which, are terrible even in Idea. I shall also write to the Governors of Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and the Committee of Safety in New Hampshire on this Subject, urging in the most forcible Terms, the Necessity of an immediate Supply if in their Power. I need not enlarge on our melancholy Situation; it is sufficient that the Existence of the Army, and the Salvation of the Country, depends upon something

being done for our Relief both speedy and effectual, and that our Situation be kept a profound secret.

In the Inclosures (No 2 and 3) I send the Allowance of Provisions &c, made by the Provinces of Connecticut and Massachusetts, the Mode and Quantity are different from what has fallen within my Experience, and I am confident must prove very wasteful, and expensive. If any alteration can be safely made, (which I much doubt) there might be a great Saving to the publick.

A Gentleman of my Family, 1 assisted by a Deserter who has some Skill in Fortification, has by my Direction sketchd out two Draughts of our respective Lines, at Charles Town and Roxbury, which with the Explanation will convey some Idea of our Situation, and I hope prove acceptable to the Members of the honorable Congress. They are the Inclosures (No 4 and 5).

Since I had the Honor of addressing you last, I have been applied to, by a Committee of the General Court for a Detachment of the Army, to protect the Inhabitants of the Eastern Parts of this Province, from some apprehended Depredations on their Coasts. I could have wish'd to have complied with their Request; but after due Consideration, and consulting the General Officers, together with those Members of Congress, who are here, I thought it my Duty to excuse myself. The Application, and my Answer are the Inclosures No. 6 and 7, which I hope will be approved by the honorable Congress.

Since I began this Letter, the Original of which the Inclosure No. 8 is a Copy, fell into my Hands; as the Writer is a Person of some Note in Boston, and it contains some Advices of Importance not mentioned by others, I thought proper to forward it as I received it. By comparing the Handwriting with another Letter, it appears the Writer is one Belcher Noyes, a Person probably known to some of the Gentlemen Delegates from this Province; who can determine from his Principles and Character what Credit is due to him.

The Army is now formed into three grand Divisions, under the Command of the Generals Ward, Lee and Puttnam. Each Division into two Brigades, consisting of about 6 Regiments each, commanded by Generals Thomas, and Spencer at Roxbury; Heath at Cambridge, Sullivan and Greene at Winter Hill. By this you will please to observe, there is a Deficiency of one Brigadier General, occasioned by Mr Pomroy's not acting under his Commission, which I beg may be filled up as soon as possible. I observe the Honbl Congress have also favored me with the Appointment of three Brigade Majors; I presume they have, or intend to appoint the rest soon, as they cannot be unacquainted that one is necessary to each Brigade, and in a new raised Army it will be an Office of great Duty and Service.

General Gage has at length liberated the People of Boston, who land in Numbers at Chelsea every Day, the Terms on which the Passes are granted as to Money Effects and Provisions correspond with Mr Noyes's Letter.

We have several Reports that General Gage is dismantling Castle William and bringing all the Cannon up to Town, but upon a very particular Inquiry, Accounts are so various that I cannot ascertain the Truth of it.

I am sorry to be under a Necessity of making such frequent Examples among the Officers when a Sense of Honor, and the Interest of their Country might be expected to make Punishment unnecessary. Since my last, Capt. Parker of Massachusetts for Frauds both in Pay, and Provisions, and Capt. Gardiner of Rhode Island for Cowardice in running away from his Guard on an Alarm, have been broke. As nothing can be more fatal to an Army, than Crimes of this kind, I am determined by every Motive of Reward and Punishment to prevent them in future.

On the first Instt a Chief of the Cagnewaga Tribe,¹ who lives about 6 Miles from Montreal, came in here, accompanied by a Col: Bayley of Cohoss.¹ His Accounts of the Temper and Disposition of the Indians, are very favorable. He says they have been strongly solicited by Gov. Carleton, to engage against us, but his Nation is totally averse: Threats, as well as Intreaties have been used without Effect.² That the Canadians are well disposed to the English Colonies, and if any Expedition is meditated against Canada the Indians in that Quarter will give all their Assistance. I have endeavored to cherish these favorable Dispositions, and have recommended to him to cultivate them on his Return. What I have said, I enforced with a Present which I understood would be agreeable to him, and as he is represented to be a Man of Weight, and Consequence in his own Tribe, I flatter myself his Visit will have a good Effect. His Accounts of Gov. Carleton's Force and Situation at St Johns correspond with what we have already had from that Quarter.

The Accession of Georgia to the Measures of the Congress is a happy Event and must give a sincere Pleasure to every Friend of America.

August 5th.

We have Accounts this Morning of two Explosions at the Castle, so that its Destruction may now be supposed certain.

I have this Morning been alarmed with an Information that two Gentlemen from Philada (Mr Hitchbourn and Capt. White) with Letters for General Lee and myself have been taken by Capt. Ayscough at Rhode Island, the Letters intercepted and sent forward to Boston with the Bearers as Prisoners. That the Captain exulted much in the Discoveries he had made and my Informer who was also in the Boat but released understood them to be the Letters of Consequence. I have therefore dispatch'd the Express immediately back, tho' I had before resolved to detain him till Fessenden's Return. I shall be anxious till I am relieved from the Suspence I am in as to the Contents of those Letters.

It is exceedingly unfortunate that Gentlemen should chuse to travel the only Road on which there is Danger. Let the Event of this be what it will I hope it will serve as a general Caution against trusting any Letter that Way in future.

Nothing of Consequence has occur'd in the Camp these two Days. The Inhabitants of Boston continue coming out at Chelsea, but under a new Restriction that no *Men* shall come out without special Licence—which is refused to all Mechanicks since the Tory Laborers were taken at the Light House.[1](#)

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TO LEWIS MORRIS.¹

Camp at Cambridge, 4 August, 1775.

Dear Sir,

I have been favored with your letter of the 18th ulto. by Messrs. Ogden and Burr, and wish it was in my power to do that justice to the merits of those gentlemen which you think them entitled to. Whenever it is, I shall not be unmindful of your recommendations. The two or three appointments with which I have been honored by Congress were partly engaged, before I received your letter, and you will please recollect that the ultimate appointment of all other officers is vested in the governments in which the regiments were originally raised. I can venture to pronounce, therefore, that few commissions in this army will be disposed of out of the four New England governments; the good policy and justice of which, you may judge of as well as I can: as Volunteers from any other colonies, however deserving they may be of notice, or to be considered on account of the expence which they are run to, will stand little chance whilst there is an application from any person of the government from whence the Regiment came.

Admitting this to be the case and I believe hardly any one will doubt it, had not the Congress better reserve these appointments in their own hands? It will be putting the matter upon a much larger bottom and giving merit a better chance; nor do I see any inconvenience arising from it, as it is highly presumable that during the continuance of these disturbances, the Congress will be chiefly sitting, or acting by a Committee from whence commissions might be as easily obtained as from a Provincial Assembly or Congress. I have taken the liberty of suggesting this matter, as I conceive the service will be infinitely promoted thereby; as merit only, without a regard to Country will entitle a man to preferment, when, and so often as vacancies may happen—Having wrote fully to the Congress respecting the state of publick affairs, I shall refer you to that, and am, &c.

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TO J. PALMER.

Cambridge, 7 August, 1775.

Sir,

Your favor of yesterday came duely to my hands. As I did not consider local appointments, as having any operation upon the general one, I had partly engaged (at least in my own mind) the office of Quartermaster-Genl. before your favor was presented to me.

In truth Sir, I think it sound policy to bestow Officers indiscriminately among the Gentlemen of the different Governmts.; for as all bear a proportionable part toward the expence of this war, if no Gentlemen out of these four Governments come in for any share of the appointments, it may be apt to create jealousies which will, in the end, give disgust; for this reason, I would earnestly recommend to your Board to provide for some of the Volunteers who are come from Philadelphia with very warm Recommendations, tho' strangers to me.—

In respect to the Boats &c. from Salem, I doubt, in the first place, whether they can be brought over by Land—in the Second, I am sure nothing could ever be executed here by Surprise; as I am well convinced that nothing is transacted in our Camp, or Lines, but what is known in Boston in less than 24 hours,—indeed, Circumstanced as we are it is scarce possible to do otherwise, unless we were to stop the Communication between the Country & our Camp & Lines; in which case, we shd. render our Supplies of Milk, Vegetables &c. difficult & precarious.—We are now building a kind of Floating Battery, when that is done & the utility of it discovered, I may possibly apply for Timber to build more, as Circumstances shall require. I remain with great esteem Sir, &c.[1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY.

Head-Quarters, 7 August, 1775.

Sir,

By the general return made to me for last week, I find there are great numbers of soldiers and non-commissioned officers, who absent themselves from duty, the greater part of whom, I have reason to believe, are at their respective homes in different parts of the country; some employed by their officers on their farms, and others drawing pay from the public, while they are working on their own plantations or for hire. My utmost exertions have not been able to prevent this base and pernicious conduct. I must, therefore, beg the assistance of the General Court to coöperate with me in such measures as may remedy this mischief. I am of opinion it might be done, either wholly or in part, by the committees in your several towns making strict and impartial inquiry of such as are found absent from the army, upon whose account they have left it, by whose leave, and for what time; requiring such, as have no impediment of sickness or other good reason, to return to their duty immediately, or, in case of failure sending an account of their names, and the company and regiment to which they belong, that I may be able to make examples of such delinquents.¹

I need not enlarge upon the ruinous consequences of suffering such infamous deserters and defrauders of the public to go unnoticed or unpunished, nor use any arguments to induce the General Court to give it immediate attention. The necessity of the case does not permit me to doubt the continued exertions of that zeal, which has distinguished the General Court upon less important occasions. I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS OF NEW YORK.

Camp at Cambridge, 8 August, 1775.

Gentlemen,

It must give great concern to any considerate mind, that, when this whole continent, at a vast expense of blood and treasure, is endeavoring to establish its liberties on the most secure and solid foundations, not only by a laudable opposition of force to force, but denying itself the usual advantages of trade, there are men among us so basely sordid, as to counteract all our exertions, for the sake of a little gain. You cannot but have heard, that the distresses of the ministerial troops for fresh provisions and many other necessities at Boston were very great. It is a policy, justifiable by all the laws of war, to endeavor to increase them. Desertions, discouragement, and a dissatisfaction with the service, besides weakening their strength, are some of the natural consequences of such a situation; and, if continued, might afford the fairest hope of success, without further effusion of human blood.

A vessel, cleared lately out of New York for St. Croix, with fresh provisions and other articles, has just gone into Boston, instead of pursuing her voyage to the West Indies. I have endeavored to discover the name of the captain, or owner, but as yet without success. The owner it is said, went to St. Croix before the vessel; from which, and her late arrival, I make no doubt you will be able to discover and expose the villain. And, if you could fall upon some effectual measures, to prevent the like in future, it would be doing a signal service to our common country.¹

I have been endeavoring, by every means in my power, to discover the future intentions of our enemy here. I find a general idea prevailing, throughout the army and in the town of Boston, that the troops are soon to leave the town and go to some other part of the continent. New York is generally mentioned, as the place of their destination. I should think a rumor or suggestion of this kind worthy of very little notice, if it were not confirmed by some corresponding circumstances. But four weeks of total inactivity, with all their reinforcements arrived and recruited, the daily diminution by desertion, sickness, and small skirmishes, induce an opinion, that any effort they propose to make will be directed elsewhere.²

I thought it proper just to hint to you what is probably intended, and you will then consider what regard is to be paid to it, and what steps it will be expedient for you to take, if any. I am, with great respect and regard, Gentlemen, &c.¹

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TO A COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY.

Camp at Cambridge, 11 August, 1775.

Gentlemen,

I have considered the papers you left with me yesterday.²

As to the expedition proposed against Nova Scotia, by the inhabitants of Machias, I cannot but applaud their spirit and zeal; but, after considering the reasons offered for it, several objections occur, which seem to me unanswerable. I apprehend such an enterprise to be inconsistent with the general principle upon which the colonies have proceeded. That province has not acceded, it is true, to the measures of Congress; and, therefore, it has been excluded from all commercial intercourse with the other colonies; but it has not commenced hostilities against them, nor are any to be apprehended. To attack it, therefore, is a measure of conquest, rather than defence, and may be attended with very dangerous consequences. It might, perhaps, be easy, with the force proposed to make an incursion, into the province and overawe those of the inhabitants, who are inimical to our cause, and, for a short time, prevent their supplying the enemy with provisions; but, to produce any lasting effects, the same force must continue.

As to the furnishing vessels of force, you, Gentlemen, will anticipate me, in pointing out our weakness and the enemy's strength at sea. There would be great danger, that, with the best preparations we could make, they would fall an easy prey, either to the men-of-war on that station, or to some which would be detached from Boston. I have been thus particular, to satisfy any gentleman of the Court, who should incline to adopt the measure. I could offer many other reasons against it, some of which, I doubt not, will suggest themselves to the honorable Board. But it is unnecessary to enumerate them, when our situation as to ammunition absolutely forbids our sending a single ounce of it out of the camp at present. I am, Gentlemen, &c.¹

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TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAGE.

Head-Quarters, Cambridge, 11 August, 1775.

Sir,

I understand that the officers engaged in the cause of liberty and their country, who by the fortune of war have fallen into your hands, have been thrown indiscriminately into a common gaol appropriated for felons; that no consideration has been had for those of the most respectable rank, when languishing with wounds and sickness; that some have been even amputated in this unworthy situation.

Let your opinion, Sir, of the principle which actuates them be what it may, they suppose they act from the noblest of all principles, a love of freedom and their country. But political principles, I conceive, are foreign to this point. The obligations arising from the rights of humanity and claims of rank are universally binding and extensive, (except in case of retaliation.) These, I should have hoped, would have dictated a more tender treatment of those individuals, whom chance or war had put in your power. Nor can I forbear suggesting its fatal tendency to widen that unhappy breach, which you, and those ministers under whom you act, have repeatedly declared you wished to see for ever closed.

My duty now makes it necessary to apprize you, that, for the future, I shall regulate my conduct towards those gentlemen, who are or may be in our possession, exactly by the rule you shall observe towards those of ours now in your custody.

If severity and hardship mark the line of your conduct, (painful as it may be to me,) your prisoners will feel its effects. But if kindness and humanity are shown to ours, I shall with pleasure consider those in our hands only as unfortunate, and they shall receive from me that treatment to which the unfortunate are ever entitled.

I beg to be favored with an answer as soon as possible, and am, Sir, your very humble servant.^{[1](#)}

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TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Camp at Cambridge, 14 August, 1775.

Sir

Your favors of the 7th 8th and 12th Inst. are all received. The detention of the new raised levies has happily coincided with my Intentions respecting them. In the present uncertainty I think it best they should continue where they are and I hope their officers will be assiduous in disciplining and improving them in the use of their arms.

Upon the subject of powder I am at a loss what to say—Our necessities are so great and it is of such importance that this army should have a full supply that nothing but the most urgent and pressing exigence would make it proper to detain any on its way—I have been informed that 15 Hhds were lately landed at New York and that farther supplies were daily expected both there and at Connecticut: Should there be any arrivals, I beg no time may be lost in forwarding this from Hartford and what can be spared from the necessary Colony stock—Indeed at present I should chuse you to forward one of these waggons and the other may remain where it is till we see the issue of our expectations on this head. The removal from Boston I consider as very precarious, by no means deserving to have so much stress laid on it. We begin to feel a scarcity of Lead, and as I do not learn that we are to expect any from the southward—I have concluded that a part of the stock found at Ticonderoga should be brought down and for this purpose have wrote to Genl. Schuyler. I am not sufficiently Master of the geography of the Country to know the easiest Mode of Conveyance—but from the Time in which Letters have come thro' your Hands I apprehend thro Connecticut must be the best & most expeditious. You will therefore be pleased to give us your Assistance and take the Direction of this Matter into your own Hands, to which I have not the least Doubt you will attend as well to the Expence as other Circumstances conducive to the publick Service.

Nothing new in the Camp for several Days past.—Three Deserters have come in within these 48 Hours but they bring no Intelligence of any Consequence. I am, sir, &c.

Since writing the above I have been informed there is a Lead Mine in your Colony which may be work'd to Advantage. Cut off from all foreign supplies every internal resource is worthy of attention & I make no Doubt if my Information is just some proper Steps may be taken to turn this to the publick advantage.

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TO DEPUTY-GOVERNOR COOKE.

14 August, 1775.

Sir,

Your Favours of the 8 and 11th Instt. are duly received. The former I laid before the General Court of this Province but one of the Delegates having communicated to them what Mr. Ward did to you of the Proceedings of the Continental Congress touching this Powder, nothing was done towards the providing of specie that the Vessel might proceed to other Places in Case of a Disappointment at the first. I am of opinion that the Collection of any considerable sum here would be difficult in the Time proposed: and I think there is the less Necessity for it, as there are few Colonies who have not some Vessel out on this Errand and will probably bring all that is at Market—Having conversed with Col. Porter and farther considered the Matter, I am of Opinion it ought to be prosecuted on the single Footing of procuring what is in the Magazine. The Voyage is short, our Necessity is great; the Expectation of being supplied by the Inhabitants of the Island under such hazards as they must run is slender, so that the only Chance of Success is by a sudden Strike. There is a great Difference between acquiescing in the Measure and becoming Principals, the former we have great Reason to expect, the latter is doubtful. The Powder by all our Information is publick Property so that as you observe it may be settled with our other Accounts. The draughting of Men from hence would be very difficult and endanger a Discovery of the Scheme. I am not clear that I have Power to send them off the Continent and to engage them as Volunteers it would be necessary to make their Destination known; I should suppose the Captain who is to have the Direction of this Enterprize would rather chuse to have Men whom he knew and in whom he could confide, in Preference to strangers. From what Col. Parks informs me I do not see that Harris's Presence is absolutely necessary, and as his Terms would add considerably to the Expence after obtaining from him all the Intelligence he could give his Attendance might be dispensed with—The Vessel lately sent out to cruise for Powder seems to me the properest for this Voyage, and as the ten Days will soon be out, if no objection occurs to you she might be dispatched.

I have given Directions respecting the Lead at Ticonderoga which I am of Opinion with you is the surest Mode of Supply in that Article.

I have sent by this Opp'y a hunting-Shirt as a Pattern. I should be glad you would inform me of the Number you think I may expect.

I have flattered myself that the Vigilance of the Inhabitants on the Islands and Coasts would have disappointed the Enemy in their late Expedition after live Stock. I hope nothing will be omitted by the several Committees and other Persons to guard against any future Attempts by removing all the Stock from those Places where their Shipping can protect them in plundering. I do assure you Sir that it would be rendering a most

essential Service to the publick Interest. Their Distresses before were very great and if renewed after their present supply is exhausted must be productive of very great Advantage.[1](#)

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Camp at Cambridge, 15 August, 1775.

Sir,

I received your favor of the 31st of July,¹ informing me of your preparations to cross the Lake, and enclosing the affidavits of John Shatforth, and John Duguid.² Several Indians of the tribe of St. Francis came in here yesterday, and confirm the former accounts of the good dispositions of the Indian nations and Canadians to the interests of America; a most happy event, on which I sincerely congratulate you.³

I am glad to relieve you from your anxiety, respecting troops being sent from Boston to Quebec. These reports, I apprehend, took their rise from a fleet being fitted out about fourteen days ago to plunder the islands in the Sound of their live stock; an expedition, which they have executed with some success, and are just returning; but you may depend on it no troops have been detached from Boston for Canada or elsewhere.

Among other wants, of which I find you have your proportion, we feel that of lead most sensibly; and as we have no expectation of a supply from the southward, I have concluded to draw upon the stock found at Ticonderoga when it fell into our hands. I am informed, that it is considerable, and that a part of it may be spared, without exposing you to any inconvenience. In consequence of this I have wrote to Governor Trumbull to take the direction of the transportation of it, supposing the conveyance through Connecticut the most safe and expeditious. I expect he will write you on this subject by this opportunity.

I have nothing new, my dear Sir, to write you. We are precisely in the same situation, as to the enemy, as when I wrote last, nor can I gain any certain intelligence of their future intentions. The troops from the southward are come in very healthy and in good order.¹ To-morrow I expect a supply of powder from Philadelphia, which will be a most seasonable relief in our present necessity.

God grant you health and success, equal to your merit and wishes. Favor me with intelligence as often as you can, and believe me with very sincere regard, dear Sir, yours, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Head-Quarters, Cambridge, 20 August, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Since my last of the 15th instant I have been favored with yours of the 6th. I am much concerned to find, that the supplies ordered have been so much delayed. By this time I hope Colonel McDougall, whose zeal is unquestionable, has joined you with every thing necessary for prosecuting your plan.

Several of the delegates from Philadelphia, who have visited our camp, assure me that powder is forwarded to you; and the daily arrivals of that article give us reason to hope, that we shall soon have a very ample supply.² Animated with the goodness of our cause, and the best wishes of your countrymen, I am sure you will not let any difficulties, not insuperable, damp your ardor. Perseverance and spirit have done wonders in all ages.¹

In my last, a copy of which is enclosed, I sent you an account of the arrival of several St. Francis Indians in our camp, and their friendly dispositions. You have also a copy of the resolution of Congress, by which you will find it is their intention to seek only a neutrality of the Indian nations, unless the ministerial agents should engage them in hostilities, or enter into an offensive alliance with them.² I have been, therefore, embarrassed in giving them an answer, when they have tendered their services and assistance. As your situation enables you best to know the notions of the Governor³ and the agents, I proposed to him [the chief] to go home by way of Ticonderoga, referring him to you for an answer, which you would give according to the intelligence you have had, and the judgment you have formed of the transactions among the Indians; but as he does not seem in any hurry to leave our camp, your answer by the return of this express may possibly reach me, before he returns, and alter his route. Four of his company still remain in our camp, and propose to stay some time with us.¹

The design of this express is to communicate to you a plan of an expedition, which has engaged my thoughts for several days. It is to penetrate into Canada, by way of Kennebec River, and so to Quebec by a route ninety miles below Montreal. I can very well spare a detachment for this purpose of one thousand, or twelve hundred men, and the land-carriage by the route proposed is too inconsiderable to make an objection. If you are resolved to proceed, which I gather from your last letter is your intention, it would make a diversion, that would distract Carleton, and facilitate your views. He must either break up and follow this party to Quebec, by which he will leave you a free passage, or he must suffer that important place to fall into our hands; an event that would have a decisive effect and influence on the public interests. There may be some danger, that such a sudden incursion might alarm the Canadians, and detach them from that neutrality which they have hitherto observed; but I should hope, that,

with suitable precautions, and a strict discipline preserved, any apprehensions and jealousies might be removed. The few, whom I have consulted upon it, approve it much; but the final determination is deferred until I hear from you. You will, therefore, by the return of this messenger, inform me of your ultimate resolution. If you mean to proceed, acquaint me as particularly as you can with the time and force, what late accounts you have had from Canada, and your opinion as to the sentiments of the inhabitants, as well as those of the Indians upon a penetration into their country; what number of troops are at Quebec, and whether any men-of-war; with all other circumstances, which may be material in the consideration of a step of such importance. Not a moment's time is to be lost in the preparation for this enterprise, if the advices received from you favor it. With the utmost expedition, the season will be considerably advanced, so that you will dismiss the express as soon as possible.

While the three New Hampshire companies remain in their present station, they will not be considered as composing a part of the Continental army, but as a militia under the direction and pay of the colony, whose inhabitants they are, or for whose defence they are stationed; so that it will not be proper for me to give any orders respecting them.

We still continue in the same situation, as to the enemy, as when I wrote you last; but we have had six tons and a half of powder from the southward, which is a very seasonable supply. We are not able to learn any thing further of the intentions of the enemy, and they are too strongly posted for us to attempt any thing upon them at present.

My best wishes attend you; and believe me, with much truth and regard, my dear Sir, your very obedient humble servant.

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TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAGE.

Head-Quarters, Cambridge, 20 August, 1775.

Sir,

I addressed you, on the 11th instant, in terms which gave the fairest scope for that humanity and politeness, which were supposed to form a part of your character. I remonstrated with you on the unworthy treatment shown to the officers and citizens of America, whom the fortune of war, chance, or a mistaken confidence had thrown into your hands.

Whether British or American mercy, fortitude, and patience are most pre-eminent; whether our virtuous citizens, whom the hand of tyranny has forced into arms to defend their wives, their children, and their property, or the mercenary instruments of lawless domination, avarice, and revenge, best deserve the appellation of rebels, and the punishment of that cord, which your affected clemency has forborne to inflict; whether the authority under which I act is usurped, or founded upon the genuine principles of liberty, were altogether foreign to the subject. I purposely avoided all political disquisition; nor shall I now avail myself of those advantages, which the sacred cause of my country, of liberty, and of human nature, give me over you; much less shall I stoop to retort and invective; but the intelligence you say you have received from our army requires a reply. I have taken time, Sir, to make a strict inquiry, and find it has not the least foundation in truth. Not only your officers and soldiers have been treated with a tenderness due to fellow citizens and brethren, but even those execrable parricides, whose counsels and aid have deluged their country with blood, have been protected from the fury of a justly enraged people. Far from compelling or permitting their assistance, I am embarrassed with the numbers, who crowd to our camp, animated with the purest principles of virtue and love to their country. You advise me to give free operation to truth, to punish misrepresentation and falsehood. If experience stamps value upon counsel, yours must have a weight, which few can claim. You best can tell how far the convulsion, which has brought such ruin on both countries, and shaken the mighty empire of Britain to its foundation, may be traced to these malignant causes.

You affect, Sir, to despise all rank not derived from the same source with your own. I cannot conceive one more honorable, than that which flows from the uncorrupted choice of a brave and free people, the purest source and original fountain of all power. Far from making it a plea for cruelty, a mind of true magnanimity and enlarged ideas would comprehend and respect it.

What may have been the ministerial views, which have precipitated the present crisis, Lexington, Concord, and Charlestown can best declare. May that God, to whom you then appealed, judge between America and you. Under his providence, those who influence the councils of America, and all the other inhabitants of the United

Colonies, at the hazard of their lives, are determined to hand down to posterity those just and invaluable privileges, which they received from their ancestors.

I shall now, Sir, close my correspondence with you, perhaps for ever. If your officers, our prisoners, receive a treatment from me different from that, which I wished to show them, they and you will remember the occasion of it. I am Sir, your very humble servant. [1](#)

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TO J. PALMER.

Cambridge, 22 Augst., 1775.

Sir,

In answer to your favor of yesterday I must inform you, that I have often been told of the advantages of Point Alderton with respect to its command of the shipping going in and out of Boston Harbor; and that it has, before now, been the object of my particular enquiries,—That I find the Accts. differ, exceedingly, in regard to the distance of the Ship Channel,—and that, there is a passage on the outer side of the light House Island for all Vessels except Ships of the first Rate.

My knowledge of this matter would not have rested upon enquires only, if I had found myself at any time since I came to this place, in a condition to have taken such a post. But it becomes my duty to consider, not only what place is advantageous, but what number of Men are necessary to defend it; how they can be supported in case of an attack; how they may retreat if they cannot be supported; and what stock of Ammunition we are provided with for the purpose of self defence, or annoyance of the enemy. In respect to the first, I conceive our defence must be proportioned to the attack of Genl. Gage's whole force (leaving him just enough to Man his Lines on Charles Town Neck & Roxbury); and with regard to the Second, and most important object, we have only 184 Barrls. of Powder in all, which is not sufficient to give 30 Musket Cartridges a Man, & scarce enough to serve the Artillery in any brisk action a single day.¹

Would it be prudent then in me, under these Circumstances, to take a Post 30 Miles distant from this place when we already have a Line of Circumvaleation at least Ten Miles in extent, any part of which may be attacked (if the Enemy will keep their own Council) without our having one hours previous notice of it?—Or is it prudent to attempt a Measure which necessarily would bring on a consumption of all the Ammunition we have, thereby leaving the Army at the Mercy of the Enemy, or to disperse; & the Country to be ravaged, and laid waste at discretion?—To you Sir who is a well wisher to the cause, and can reason upon the effects of such a Conduct, I may open myself with freedom, because no improper discoveries will be made of our Situation: but I cannot expose my weakness to the Enemy (tho' I believe they are pretty well informed of every thing that passes) by telling this, and that man who are daily pointing out this—that—and t'other place, of all the motives that govern my actions, Notwithstanding, I know what will be the consequence of not doing it—Namely, that I shall be accused of inattention to the publick Service—& perhaps with want of spirit to prosecute it—but this shall have no effect upon my mind, and I will steadily (as far as my judgment will assist me) pursue such measures as I think most conducive to the Interest of the cause, & rest satisfied of any obloquy that shall be thrown conscious of having discharged my duty to the best of my abilities.

I am much obliged to you, however, as I shall be to every Gentleman, for pointing out any measure which is thought conducive to the publick good, and chearfully follow any advice which is not inconsistent with, but corrispondant to, the general Plan in view, & practicable under such particular circumstances as govern in cases of the like kind.

In respect to point Alderton, I was no longer ago than Monday last, talking to Genl. Thomas on this head & proposing to send Colo. Putnam down to take the distances &c, but considered it could answer no end but to alarm, & make the Enemy more vigilant, unless we were in condition to possess the Post to effect, I thought it as well to postpone the matter a while. I am, Sir, &c.[1](#)

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TO SIR WILLIAM HOWE.²

Camp at Cambridge, 23 August, 1775.

Sir,

I flatter myself you have been misinformed, as to the conduct of the men under my command, complained of in yours of yesterday. It is what I should highly disapprove and condemn.

I have not the least objection to put a stop to the intercourse between the two camps, either totally or partially. It obtained through the pressing solicitations of persons cruelly separated from their friends and connexions, and I understood was mutually convenient.

I Am, Sir, Your Most Obedient Humble Servant.

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TO RICHARD HENRY LEE.

Camp at Cambridge, 29 August, 1775.

Dear Sir:

Your favor of the first Inst. by Mr. Randolph¹ came safe to hand—the merits of this young Gentleman added to your recommendation, and my own knowledge of his character induced me to take him into my Family as an aid *de camp in the room of* Mr. Mifflin, whom I have appointed Quarter Master Genl. from a thorough perswasion of his Integrity—my own experience of his activity—and finally, because he stands unconnected with either of these Governments; or with this that, or t’other man; for between you and I there is more in this than you can easily imagine.

As we have now nearly compleated our Lines of Defence, we have nothing more, in *my opinion* to fear from the *Enemy*, provided we can keep our men to their duty and make them watchful and vigilant; but it is among the most difficult tasks I ever undertook in my life to induce these people to believe that there is, or can be, danger till the Bayonet is pushed at their Breasts; not that it proceeds from any uncommon prowess, but rather from an unaccountable kind of stupidity in the lower class of these people which, believe me, prevails but too generally among the officers of the Massachusetts *part* of the Army who are *nearly* of the same kidney with the Privates, and adds not a little to my difficulties; as there is no such thing as getting of officers of this stamp to exert themselves in carrying orders into execution—to curry favor with the men (by whom they were chosen, & on whose smiles possibly they may think they may again rely) seems to be one of the principal objects of their attention.

I submit it therefore to your consideration whether there is, or is not, a propriety in that Resolution of the Congress, which leaves the ultimate appointment of all officers below the Rank of Generals to the Governments where the Regiments originated, now the Army is become Continental?—To me it appears improper in two points of view; first, it is giving that power and weight to an Individual Colony, which ought, of *right*, to belong only to the whole, and next *it* damps the spirit and ardor of volunteers from all but the four New England Governments as none but their people have the least chance of getting into office.—Would it not be better therefore to have the warrants which the Commander-in-Chief is authorized to give Pro-tempore, approved or disapproved, by the Continental Congress, or a Committee of their body, which I should suppose in any *long* recess must always sit? In this case *every* Gentleman will stand an equal chance of being promoted according to his merits; in the other all officers will be confined to the Inhabitants of the 4 New England Governments which in my opinion is impolitick to a degree. I have made a pretty good slam among such kind of officers as the Massachusetts Government abound in since I came to this Camp having Broke one Colo. and two Captains for cowardly behavior in the action on Bunkers Hill,—two Captains for drawing more provisions and pay than they had men in their Company—and one for being absent from his Post when the Enemy appeared

there and burnt a House just by it. Besides these, I have at this time—one Colo., one Major, one Captn., & two subalterns under arrest for tryal—In short I spare none yet fear it will not all do as these People seem to be too inattentive to every thing but their Interest.¹

I have not been unmindful of that part of your Letter respecting Point Alderton—before the receipt of it, it had become an object of my particular enquiry, but the Accts. of its situation differ exceedingly in respect to the command it has of the ship *channel* but my knowledge of this matter would not have been confined to enquiries only if I had ever been in a condition, since my arrival here, to have taken possession of such a Post; but you well know, my good Sir, that it becomes the duty of an Officer to consider some other matters, as well as a situation,—namely, What number of men are necessary to defend a place—how it can be supported—& how furnished with ammunition.—

In respect to the first I conceive our defence of this place (point alderton) *must* be proportioned to the attack of Genl. Gage's whole force, leaving him just enough to man his Lines on Boston & Charles-Town Necks—& with regard to the second, and most important, as well as alarming object we have only 184 Barls. of Powder in all (including the late supply from Philadelphia) wch is not sufficient to give 25 muskets cartridges to each man, and scarcely to serve the artillery in any brisk action one single *day*—Under these circumstances I dare say you will agree with me, that it would not be very eligible to take a post 30 miles distant (by Land) from this place, when we have already a line of circumvallation round Boston of at least 10 miles in extant to defend any part of which may be attacked without our having (if the Enemy will keep their own Council) an hours previous notice of it; and that, it would not be prudent in me, to attempt a measure which would necessarily bring on a consumption of all the ammunition we have, thereby leaving the Army at the mercy of the Enemy, or to disperse; and the Country to be ravaged and laid waste at discretion—to you, Sir, I may Account for my conduct, but I cannot declare the motives of it to every one, notwithstanding I know by not doing it, that I shall stand in a very unfavorable light in the opinion of those who expect much, and will find little done, without understanding or perhaps giving themselves the trouble of enquiring into the cause.—Such however is the fate of all those who are obliged to act the part I do, I must therefore submit to it, under a consciousness of having done my duty to the best of my abilities.

On Saturday night last we took *possession* of a Hill advanced of our Lines, & within point blank shot of the Enemy on Charles Town neck.—We worked incessantly the whole night with 1200 men, & before morning got an Intrenchment in such forwardness as to bid defiance to their Cannon; about nine o'clock on Sunday they began a heavy cannonade which continued through the day without any injury to our work, and with the loss of four men only two of which were killed through their own folly—The Insult of the cannonade however we were obliged to submit to with impunity, not daring to make use of artillery on acct. of the consumption of powder, except with one nine pounder placed on a point, with which we silenced, & indeed sunk, one of their Floating Batteries—

This move of ours was made to prevent the Enemy from gaining this Hill, and we thought was giving them a fair challenge to dispute it as we had been told by various people who had just left Boston, that they were preparing to come out, but instead of accepting of it, we learn that it has thrown them into great consternation which might be improved if *we had* the means of doing it—Yesterday afternoon they began a Bombardment without any effect, as yet.—

There has been so many great, and capital errors, & abuses to rectify—so many examples to make—& so little Inclination in the officers of inferior Rank to contribute their aid to accomplish this work, that my life has been nothing else (since I *came here*) *but* one continued round of *annoyance & fatigue*; in short no pecuniary *recompense* could induce me to undergo what I *have especially* as I expect, by shewing so little *countenance* to irregularities & publick *abuses* to render myself very obnoxious to a *greater* part of these People.—But as I have already greatly exceeded the bounds of a Letter I will not trouble you with matters relative to my own feelings.[1](#)

As I expect this Letter will meet you in Philadelphia I must request the favor of you to present my affecte. & respectful compliments to Doctr. Shippen, his Lady and Family, my Brothers of the Delegation, and any other enquiring friends—& at the same time do me the justice to believe that I am with a sincere regard.

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TO CAESAR RODNEY AND THOMAS McKEAN.¹

Camp at Cambridge, 30 August, 1775.

Gentlemen,

I have endeavored to pay the best attention in my power to your recommendation of Mr. Parke² by making him an assistant Quartermaster-General, an office indispensably necessary in discharge of that important and troublesome business. I wish it was in my power to provide for more of the young gentlemen who, at their own expence have travelled and now continue here, from Pennsylvania and elsewhere; but the Congress seems to have put it out of their own power to do this, leaving by their instructions to me the ultimate appointment of all officers as high as a colonel to the government in which the regiments originated, the obvious consequence of which is that every commission will be monopolized by these four New England governments; the good policy and justice of which I submit to your better judgment, but should give it as my own opinion that as the whole troops are now taken into the pay of the United Colonies, the Congress (which I presume will either by themselves, or a Committee of their own body always be sitting) ought to reserve the filling up of all vacancies themselves, in order that volunteers from every government may have an equal chance of preferment, instead of confining all offices to a few governments to the total exclusion of the rest. I have dropt these thoughts by way of hints which you may improve or reject as they shall appear to have or want weight.¹ For the occurrences of the camp, the state of the army, &c., I refer to my publick letters addressed to Mr. Hancock, and with great respect and gratitude for your good wishes contained in your letter, I remain &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 31 August, 1775.

Sir,

The enclosed letter came under such a direction and circumstances as led me to suppose it contained some interesting advices, either respecting a supply of powder, or the clothing lately taking at Philadelphia. I therefore took the liberty of breaking the seal, for which I hope the service and my motives will apologize.

As the filling up the place of vacant brigadier-general will probably be of the first business of the honorable Congress, I flatter myself it will not be deemed assuming, to mention the names of two gentlemen, whose former services, rank, and age, may be thought worthy of attention on this occasion. Of the one I can speak from my own knowledge, of the other only from character. The former is Colonel John Armstrong, of Pennsylvania; he served during the last war, in most of the campaigns to the southward, was honored with the command of the Pennsylvania forces, and his general military conduct and spirit much approved by all who served with him; besides which, his character was distinguished by an enterprise against the Indians, which he planned with great judgment, and executed with equal courage and success.¹ It was not till lately that I had reason to believe he would enter again on public service; and it is now wholly unsolicited and unknown on his part. The other gentleman is Colonel Frye of Massachusetts Bay. He entered into the service as early as 1745, and rose through the different military ranks in succeeding wars, to that of colonel, until last June, when he was appointed a major-general by the Congress of this province.² From these circumstances, together with the favorable report made to me of him, I presume he sustained the character of a good officer, though I do not find it distinguished by any peculiar service.

Either of these gentlemen, or any other whom the honorable Congress shall please to favor with this appointment, will be received by me with the utmost deference and respect.³

The late adjournment having made it impracticable to know the pleasure of the Congress as to the appointment of brigade majors beyond the number of three, which they were pleased to leave to me, and the service not admitting of further delay, I have continued the other three, which I hope their honors will not disapprove. These latter were recommended by the respective corps to which they belong, as the properest persons for these offices until further direction, and have discharged the duty ever since. They are the majors Box, Scammell, and Samuel Brewer.

Last Saturday night we took possession of a hill considerably advanced beyond our former lines;¹ which brought on a very heavy cannonade from Bunker's Hill, and afterwards a bombardment, which has been since kept up with little spirit on their

part, or damage on ours. The work, having been continued ever since, is now so advanced, and the men so well covered as [to] leave us under no apprehensions of much farther loss. In this affair we had killed one adjutant, one volunteer,² and two privates. The scarcity of ammunition does not admit of our availing ourselves of the situation, as we otherwise might do; but this evil, I hope, will soon be remedied, as I have been informed of the arrival of a large quantity at New York, some at New London, and more hourly expected at different places. I need not add to what I have already said on this subject. Our late supply was very seasonable, but far short of our necessities. * * * The treatment of our officers, prisoners in Boston, induced me to write to General Gage on that subject. His answer and my reply I have the honor to lay before the Congress; since which I have heard nothing from him. I remain, with the greatest respect and regard, &c.¹

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOOSTER.[2](#)

Camp at Cambridge, 2 September, 1775.

Sir,

I have just received your favor of the 29th ultimo by express. I am very sensible, that the situation of the inhabitants of Long Island, as well as of all those on the coast, exposes them greatly to the ravages of the enemy, and it is to be wished that general protection could be extended to them, consistent with the prosecution of those great plans, which have been adopted for the common safety. This was early foreseen, and the danger provided for by a resolution of Congress, that each province should depend on its own internal strength against these incursions, the prejudice arising from them, even if successful, not being equal to that of separating the army into a number of small detachments, which would be harassed in fruitless marches and countermarches after an enemy, whose conveyance by shipping is so advantageous, that they might keep the whole coast in constant alarm, without our being able, perhaps, at any time to give them vigorous opposition. Upon this principle I have invariably rejected every application made to me here, to keep any detachments on the coast for these purposes.

I should, therefore, most probably have thought it my duty to order the three companies, mentioned in your letter as having joined your army, to aid in the general service, had they not been under command from General Schuyler to join him; but as it is, I can by no means interfere. He is engaged in a service of the greatest importance to the whole continent, his strength and appointments being far short of his expectations, and to give any counter orders may not only defeat his whole plan, but must make me responsible to the public for the failure. Instead, therefore, of their further stay, I would have them march immediately. I fear the delay of the ten days may have very bad effects, as, by my last advice from Ticonderoga, General Schuyler was to march in a few days for Canada; and it is highly probable he may depend upon these companies to occupy the posts of communication, which otherwise he must weaken his army to do. No Provincial Congress can, with any propriety, interfere with the disposition of troops on the Continental establishment, much less control the orders of any general officer; so that in this instance the Congress at New York have judged properly, in declining to counteract General Schuyler's orders. I wish I could extend my approbation equally to the whole line of their conduct. Before you receive this letter, you will most probably be able to judge how far your continuance on Long Island will be farther necessary. If the fleet, which last sailed, was destined for those coasts, it must be arrived. If it is not, it is certainly gone to the eastward, and your present station is no longer necessary. The importance of preserving the communication of the North River, and many other reasons, induce me to wish you were returned to your former post. The late transactions at New York furnish additional reasons for your being as near that city, as is consistent with the discipline and convenience of your troops. Your next, therefore, I flatter myself, will inform me

of your having resumed your former station. I am, Sir, with much regard and esteem,
&c.[1](#)

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TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLAND OF BERMUDA.[2](#)

Camp at Cambridge, 3 miles from Boston, 6 September, 1775.

Gentlemen,

In the great conflict, which agitates this continent, I cannot doubt but the assertors of freedom and the right of the constitution are possessed of your most favorable regards and wishes for success. As descendants of freemen, and heirs with us of the same glorious inheritance, we flatter ourselves that, though divided by our situation, we are firmly united in sentiment. The cause of virtue and liberty is confined to no continent or climate. It comprehends, within its capacious limits, the wise and good, however dispersed and separated in space or distance.

You need not be informed, that the violence and rapacity of a tyrannic ministry have forced the citizens of America, your brother colonists, into arms. We equally detest and lament the prevalence of those counsels, which have led to the effusion of so much human blood, and left us no alternative but a civil war, or a base submission. The wise Disposer of all events has hitherto smiled upon our virtuous efforts. Those mercenary troops, a few of whom lately boasted of subjugating this vast continent, have been checked in their earliest ravages, and are now actually encircled in a small space, their arms disgraced, and suffering all the calamities of a siege. The virtue, spirit, and union of the provinces leave them nothing to fear, but the want of ammunition. The applications of our enemies to foreign states, and their vigilance upon our coasts, are the only efforts they have made against us with success. Under these circumstances, and with these sentiments, we have turned our eyes to you, Gentlemen, for relief. We are informed, there is a very large magazine on your island under a very feeble guard. We would not wish to involve you in an opposition, in which, from your situation, we should be unable to support you; we know not, therefore, to what extent to solicit your assistance in availing ourselves of this supply; but, if your favor and friendship to North America and its liberties have not been misrepresented, I persuade myself you may, consistently with your own safety, promote and further this scheme, so as to give it the fairest prospect of success. Be assured, that, in this case, the whole power and exertion of my influence will be made with the honorable Continental Congress, that your island may not only be supplied with provisions, but experience every mark of affection and friendship, which the grateful citizens of a free country can bestow on its brethren and benefactors. I am, &c.[1](#)

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TO THE MAJOR AND BRIGADIER GENERALS.

Camp at Cambridge, 8 September, 1775.

Gentlemen,

As I mean to call upon you in a day or two for your opinions upon a point of very great importance to the welfare of this continent in general, and this colony in particular, I think it proper, indeed, an incumbent duty on me, previous to this meeting to intimate to you the end and design of it, that you may have time to consider the matter with that deliberation and attention, which the importance of it requires.

It is to know, whether, in your judgment, we cannot make a successful attack upon the troops at Boston by means of boats, coöperated by an attempt upon their lines at Roxbury. The success of such an enterprise depends, I well know, upon the All-wise Disposer of events, and it is not within the reach of human wisdom to foretell the issue; but if the prospect is fair, the undertaking is justifiable under the following, among other reasons, which might be assigned.

The season is now fast approaching, when warm and comfortable barracks must be erected for the security of the troops against the inclemency of winter. Large and costly provision must be made in the article of wood for the supply of the army; and after all that can be done in this way, it is but too probable that fences, woods, orchards, and even houses themselves will fall a sacrifice to the want of fuel before the end of winter. A very considerable difficulty, if not expense, must accrue on account of clothing for the men now engaged in the service; and if they do not enlist again, this difficulty will be increased to an almost insurmountable degree. Blankets, I am informed, are now much wanted, and not to be got. How then shall we be able to keep soldiers to their duty, already impatient to get home, when they come to feel the severity of winter without proper covering? If this army should not incline to engage for a longer time than the 1st of January, what consequences more certainly can follow, than that you must either be obliged to levy new troops and thereby have two sets, or partly so, in pay at the same time, or by disbanding one before you get the other, expose the country to desolation and the cause perhaps to irretrievable ruin. These things are not unknown to the enemy; perhaps it is the very ground they are building on, if they are not waiting for a large reinforcement; and if they are waiting for succorers, ought it not to give a spur to the attempt? Our powder, not much of which will be consumed in such an enterprise, without any certainty of a supply, is daily wasting; and, to sum up the whole, in spite of every saving that can be made, the expense of supporting this army will so far exceed any idea, that was formed in Congress of it, that I do not know what will be the consequences.

These, among many other reasons, which might be assigned, induce me to wish a speedy finish of the dispute; but to avoid these evils we are not to lose sight of the

difficulties, the hazard, and the loss, that may accompany the attempt, nor what will be the probable consequences of a failure.

That every circumstance for and against this measure may be duly weighed, that there may be time for doing it, and nothing of this importance resolved on, but after mature deliberation, I give this previous notice of the intention of calling you together on Monday next at nine o'clock, at which time you are requested to attend at headquarters. It is not necessary, I am persuaded, to recommend secrecy. The success of the enterprise, (if undertaken,) must depend in a great measure upon the suddenness of the stroke. I am with great esteem, etc.[1](#)

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Camp at Cambridge, 8 September, 1775.

Dear Sir,

I have received your favor of the 31st of August. I am much engaged in sending off the detachment under Colonel Arnold, upon the plan contained in mine of the 20th ultimo. A variety of obstacles has retarded us, since the the express returned with yours of the 27th August from Albany; but we are now in such forwardness, that I expect they will set out by Sunday next at farthest. I shall take care in my instructions to Colonel Arnold, that, in case there should be a junction of the detachment with your army, you shall have no difficulty in adjusting the scale of command.

You seem so sensible of the absolute necessity of preserving the friendship of the Canadians, that I need say nothing on that subject; but that a strict discipline, and punctual payment for all necessaries brought to your camp, will be the most certain means of attaining so valuable and important an end. I shall inculcate the same principle most strongly on our troops, who go from hence, as that on which their safety, success, and honor entirely depend.

I am truly concerned, that your supplies and appointments are so far short of your expectations; but trust you will have a feeble enemy to contend with, and a whole province on your side, two circumstances of great weight in the scale. Your situation for some time must be so critical and interesting, that I hope you will not fail giving me constant information of your motions and success.¹

Believe me, with much truth and regard, dear Sir, your obedient and humble servant.

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TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Camp at Cambridge, 8 September, 1775.

Sir,

Upon the receipt of this you will please to give directions, that all the new levies march immediately to this camp. By a resolution of Congress, the troops on the Continental establishment were not to be employed for the defence of the coasts, or of any particular province, the militia being deemed competent to that service.¹ When I directed these troops to remain in their own province, I had some reason to expect a remove from Boston to New York, in which case they would have been able to give them a more speedy opposition; but as that suspicion now appears groundless, there will be an impropriety in continuing them where they now are, considering the above resolve.

The detachment, which I mentioned in my last, will march in two days, and I shall have occasion for the troops from you to fill their places. The ministerial expedition must, I apprehend, by this time have come to some issue; they are either returned with disappointment, or have succeeded in their errand; in either case the men can be spared without danger to the country. But should this not be the case, and they are still hovering on the coast, it is to make no difference in their march; so that I shall at all events expect them here next week, for which you will please to give the necessary orders. I am, &c.

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TO JOHN AUGUSTINE WASHINGTON.

Camp at Cambridge, 10 September, 1775.

Dear Brother,

So little has happened since the date of my last, that I should scarce have given you the trouble of reading this letter, did I not imagine that it might be some satisfaction to you to know, that we are well, and in no fear or dread of the enemy; being in our own opinion at least, very securely intrenched, and wishing for nothing more than to see the enemy out of their strong-holds, that the dispute may come to an issue. The inactive state we lie in is exceedingly disagreeable, especially as we can see no end to it, having had no advices lately from Great Britain to form a judgment upon.

In taking possession, about a fortnight ago, of a hill within point-blank (cannon-)shot of the enemy's lines on Charles Town Neck, we expected to bring on a general action, especially as we had been threatened by reports from Boston several days before, that they (that is the enemy) intended an attack upon our intrenchments. Nothing, however, followed but a severe cannonade for a day or two, and a bombardment afterwards for the like time; which, however, did us no other damage, than to kill two or three men, and to wound as many more. Both are now at an end, as they found that we disregarded their fire, and continued our works till we had got them completed.

Unless the ministerial troops in Boston are waiting for reinforcements, I cannot devise what they are staying there for, nor why (as they affect to despise the Americans,) they do not come forth, and put an end to the contest at once. They suffer greatly for want of fresh provisions, notwithstanding they have pillaged several islands of a good many sheep and cattle. They are also scarce of fuel, unless, (according to the account of one of their deserters,) they mean to pull down houses for firing. In short, they are, from all accounts, suffering all the inconveniences of a siege. It is true, by having the entire command of the sea, and a powerful navy, and, moreover, as they are now beginning to take all vessels indiscriminately, we cannot stop their supplies through that channel; but their succors in this way hath not been so powerful, as to enable them to give the common soldiers much fresh meat as yet. By an account from Boston, of the 4th instant, the cattle lately brought in there sold at public auction from fifteen to thirty-four pounds ten shillings sterling apiece; and the sheep from thirty to thirty-six shillings each; and that fowls and every other species of fresh provisions went in proportion. The expense of this, one would think, must soon tire them, were it not, that they intend to fix all the expense of this war upon the colonies,—if they can, I suppose we shall add.

I am just sending off a detachment of one thousand men to Quebec, by the way of Kennebec River, to coöperate with General Schuyler, who by this is, I expect, at or near St. John's, on the north end of Lake Champlain; and may, for aught I know, have determined the fate of his army and that of Canada, as he left Crown Point the 31st of

last month for the Isleaux-Noix, (within twelve miles of St. John's, where Governor Carleton's principal force lay.) If he should succeed there, he will soon after be in Montreal without opposition; and if the detachment I am sending from hence, (though late in the season,) should be able to get possession of Quebec, the ministry's plan, in respect to that government, will turn out finely.[1](#)

I have only to add my love to my sister and the little ones, and that I am, with the greatest truth, your most affectionate brother.

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TO COLONEL BENEDICT ARNOLD.

INSTRUCTIONS.

1. You are immediately on their march from Cambridge to take the command of the detachment from the Continental army against Quebec, and use all possible expedition, as the winter season is now advancing, and the success of this enterprise, under God, depends wholly upon the spirit with which it is pushed, and the favorable dispositions of the Canadians and Indians.
2. When you come to Newburyport you are to make all possible inquiry, what men-of-war or cruisers there may be on the coast, to which this detachment may be exposed on their voyage to Kennebec River; and, if you should find that there is danger of your being intercepted, you are not to proceed by water, but by land, taking care on the one hand not to be diverted by light and vague reports, and on the other not to expose the troops rashly to a danger, which by many judicious persons has been deemed very considerable.
3. You are, by every means in your power, to endeavor to discover the real sentiments of the Canadians towards our cause, and particularly as to this expedition, bearing in mind, that if they are averse to it and will not coöperate, or at least willingly acquiesce, it must fail of success. In this case you are by no means to prosecute the attempt; the expense of the expedition, and the disappointment, are not to be put in competition with the dangerous consequences, which may ensue from irritating them against us, and detaching them from that neutrality, which they have adopted.
4. In order to cherish those favorable sentiments to the American cause, that they have manifested, you are, as soon as you arrive in their country, to disperse a number of the addresses you will have with you, particularly in those parts, where your route shall lie; and observe the strictest discipline and good order, by no means suffering any inhabitant to be abused, or in any manner injured, either in his person or property, punishing with exemplary severity every person, who shall transgress, and making ample compensation to the party injured.
5. You are to endeavor, on the other hand, to conciliate the affections of those people, and such Indians as you may meet with, by every means in your power; convincing them, that we come, at the request of many of their principal people, not as robbers or to make war upon them, but as the friends and supporters of their liberties as well as ours. And to give efficacy to these sentiments, you must carefully inculcate upon the officers and soldiers under your command, that, not only the good of their country and their honor, but their safety, depend upon the treatment of these people.
6. Check every idea and crush in its earliest stage every attempt to plunder even those, who are known to be enemies to our cause. It will create dreadful apprehensions in our friends, and, when it is once begun, no one can tell where it will stop. I therefore

again most expressly order, that it be discouraged and punished in every instance without distinction.

7. Any King's stores, which you shall be so fortunate as to possess yourself of, are to be secured for the Continental use, agreeably to the rules and regulations of war published by the honorable Congress. The officers and men may be assured, that any extraordinary services performed by them will be suitably rewarded.

8. Spare neither pains nor expense to gain all possible intelligence on your march, to prevent surprises and accidents of every kind, and endeavor if possible to correspond with General Schuyler, so that you may act in concert with him. This, I think, may be done by means of the St. Francis Indians.

9. In case of a union with General Schuyler, or if he should be in Canada upon your arrival there, you are by no means to consider yourself as upon a separate and independent command, but are to put yourself under him and follow his directions. Upon this occasion, and all others, I recommend most earnestly to avoid all contention about rank. In such a cause every post is honorable, in which a man can serve his country.

10. If Lord Chatham's son should be in Canada, and in any way should fall into your power, you are enjoined to treat him with all possible deference and respect. You cannot err in paying too much honor to the son of so illustrious a character, and so true a friend to America. Any other prisoners, who may fall into your hands, you will treat with as much humanity and kindness, as may be consistent with your own safety and the public interest. Be very particular in restraining, not only your own troops, but the Indians, from all acts of cruelty and insult, which will disgrace the American arms, and irritate our fellow subjects against us.

11. You will be particularly careful to pay the full value for all provisions, or other accommodations, which the Canadians may provide for you on your march. By no means press them or any of their cattle into your service, but amply compensate those, who voluntarily assist you. For this purpose you are provided with a sum of money in specie, which you will use with as much frugality and economy, as your necessities and good policy will admit, keeping as exact an account as possible of your disbursements.

12. You are by every opportunity to inform me of your progress, your prospects, and intelligence, and upon any important occurrence to send an express.

13. As the season is now far advanced, you are to make all possible despatch; but if unforeseen difficulties should arise, or if the weather should become so severe, as to render it hazardous to proceed, in your own judgment and that of your principal officers, whom you are to consult,—in that case you are to return, giving me as early notice as possible, that I may render you such assistance as may be necessary.

14. As the contempt of the religion of a country by ridiculing any of its ceremonies, or affronting its ministers or votaries, has ever been deeply resented, you are to be

particularly careful to restrain every officer and soldier from such imprudence and folly, and to punish every instance of it. On the other hand, as far as lies in your power, you are to protect and support the free exercise of the religion of the country, and the undisturbed enjoyment of the rights of conscience in religious matters, with your utmost influence and authority.

Given under my hand, at head-quarters, Cambridge, this 14th day of September, 1775.

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TO COLONEL BENEDICT ARNOLD.

Camp at Cambridge, 14 September, 1775.

Sir,

You are entrusted with a command of the utmost consequence to the interest and liberties of America. Upon your conduct and courage, and that of the officers and soldiers detached on this expedition, not only the success of the present enterprise, and your own honor, but the safety and welfare of the whole continent may depend. I charge you, therefore, and the officers and soldiers under your command, as you value your own safety and honor, and the favor and esteem of your country, that you consider yourselves, as marching not through the country of an enemy, but of our friends and brethren, for such the inhabitants of Canada, and the Indian nations, have approved themselves in this unhappy contest between Great Britain and America; and that you check, by every motive of duty and fear of punishment, every attempt to plunder or insult the inhabitants of Canada. Should any American soldier be so base and infamous as to injure any Canadian or Indian, in his person or property, I do most earnestly enjoin you to bring him to such severe and exemplary punishment, as the enormity of the crime may require. Should it extend to death itself, it will not be disproportioned to its guilt, at such a time and in such a cause.

But I hope and trust, that the brave men, who have voluntarily engaged in this expedition, will be governed by far different views; and that order, discipline, and regularity of behavior, will be as conspicuous as their valor. I also give it in charge to you to avoid all disrespect of the religion of the country, and its ceremonies. Prudence, policy, and a true Christian spirit will lead us to look with compassion upon their errors without insulting them. While we are contending for our own liberty, we should be very cautious not to violate the rights of conscience in others, ever considering that God alone is the judge of the hearts of men, and to him only in this case they are answerable.

Upon the whole, Sir, I beg you to inculcate upon the officers and soldiers the necessity of preserving the strictest order during the march through Canada; to represent to them the shame, disgrace, and ruin to themselves and their country, if they should by their conduct turn the hearts of our brethren in Canada against us; and, on the other hand, the honors and rewards, which await them if by their prudence and good behavior they conciliate the affections of the Canadians and Indians to the great interests of America, and convert those favorable dispositions they have shown into a lasting union and affection. Thus wishing you, and the officers and soldiers under your command, all honor, safety, and success, I remain, Sir, your most obedient humble servant.

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TO THE INHABITANTS OF CANADA.1

Friends And Brethren,

The unnatural contest between the English colonies and Great Britain has now risen to such a height, that arms alone must decide it. The colonies, confiding in the justice of their cause, and the purity of their intention, have reluctantly appealed to that Being, in whose hands are all human events. He has hitherto smiled upon their virtuous efforts, the hand of tyranny has been arrested in its ravages, and the British arms, which have shone with so much splendor in every part of the globe, are now tarnished with disgrace and disappointment. Generals of approved experience, who boasted of subduing this great continent, find themselves circumscribed within the limits of a single city and its suburbs, suffering all the shame and distress of a siege, while the free-born sons of America, animated by the genuine principles of liberty and love of their country, with increasing union, firmness, and discipline, repel every attack, and despise every danger.

Above all we rejoice, that our enemies have been deceived with regard to you. They have persuaded themselves, they have even dared to say, that the Canadians were not capable of distinguishing between the blessings of liberty, and the wretchedness of slavery; that gratifying the vanity of a little circle of nobility would blind the people of Canada. By such artifices they hoped to bend you to their views, but they have been deceived; instead of finding in you a poverty of soul and baseness of spirit, they see with a chagrin, equal to our joy, that you are enlightened, generous, and virtuous; that you will not renounce your own rights, or serve as instruments to deprive your fellow subjects of theirs. Come then, my brethren, unite with us in an indissoluble union, let us run together to the same goal. We have taken up arms in defence of our liberty, our property, our wives, and our children; we are determined to preserve them, or die. We look forward with pleasure to that day, not far remote, we hope, when the inhabitants of America shall have one sentiment, and the full enjoyment of the blessings of a free government.

Incited by these motives, and encouraged by the advice of many friends of liberty among you, the grand American Congress have sent an army into your province, under the command of General Schuyler, not to plunder, but to protect you; to animate, and bring into action those sentiments of freedom you have disclosed, and which the tools of despotism would extinguish through the whole creation. To coöperate with this design, and to frustrate those cruel and perfidious schemes, which would deluge our frontiers with the blood of women and children, I have detached Colonel Arnold into your country, with a part of the army under my command. I have enjoined it upon him, and I am certain that he will consider himself, and act, as in the country of his patrons and best friends. Necessaries and accommodations of every kind, which you may furnish, he will thankfully receive and render the full value. I invite you therefore as friends and bretheren, to provide him with such supplies as your country affords; and I pledge myself, not only for your safety and security, but

for an ample compensation. Let no man desert his habitation; let no one flee as before an enemy.

The cause of America, and of liberty, is the cause of every virtuous American citizen; whatever may be his religion or descent, the United Colonies know no distinction but such as slavery, corruption, and arbitrary dominion may create. Come, then, ye generous citizens, range yourselves under the standard of general liberty, against which all the force and artifices of tyranny will never be able to prevail.

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TO THOMAS EVERHARD, VIRGINIA.

Camp at Cambridge, 17 September, 1775.

Dear Sir,

As I believe it will be three years next December since some of my Ohio lands (under the proclamation of 1754) were patented; and as they are not yet improved agreeably to the express letter of the law, it behoves me to have recourse, in time, to the common expedient of saving them by means of a friendly petition. My distance from Williamsburg, and my ignorance of the mode of doing this, lays me under the necessity of calling upon some friend for assistance. Will you, then, my good Sir, aid me in this work? I shall acknowledge it as a singular favor if you will, and, unless you discourage me, I shall rely on it.

I have already been at as much expense in attempting to seat and improve these lands, as would nearly if not quite have saved them, agreeable to our act of Assembly, had it been laid out thereon. In March, 1774, I sent out more than twenty odd servants and hirelings, with a great number of tools, nails, and necessities for this purpose; but, hostilities commencing with the Indians, they got no further than the Red-stone settlement, where the people dispersed, my goods got seized and lost, and the whole expedition, (which I suppose stood me in at least three hundred pounds,) came to nothing.¹ In March last, I again purchased a parcel of servants, hired men at considerable wages, and sent out a second time; but what they have done, I neither know nor have heard, further than that, after buying tools and provisions at most exorbitant prices, and not being able (for money) to procure a sufficiency of the latter, my servants, for the most part, had run away, and the manager with a few negroes and hirelings left in an almost starving condition.¹ This, Sir, is my situation; and to avoid a total loss of the land (as I conceive there are some peculiar circumstances attending the matter, on account of other claims), and to prevent involving myself in any disagreeable controversy in defence of my property, having already had a great deal of trouble about it, I am desirous of adopting in time the method of petitioning.

The enemy and we are very near neighbors. Our advanced works are not more than five or six hundred yards from theirs, and the main bodies of the two armies scarce a mile. We see every thing that passes, and that is all we can do, as they keep close on the two peninsulas of Boston and Charlestown, both of which are surrounded by ships of war, floating batteries, &c.; and the narrow necks of land leading into them fortified in such a manner as not to be forced, without a very considerable slaughter, if practicable at all. I am, &c.

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TO DEPUTY GOVERNOR COOKE.

18 September, 1775.

Sir,

Your Favors of the 9th, 14th and 15 Instant have been duly received. The readiness of the committee to cooperate with me in procuring the most authentick intelligence and dispatching Captain Whipple for this purpose, is peculiarly satisfactory, and I flatter myself will be attended not only with Success, but the happiest consequences to the publick cause. I should immediately have sent you notice of the paragraph in the Philadelphia papers which is all the Account I have of the taking the powder at Bermudas; but I supposed it must have come to your hands before it reached ours. I am inclined to think it sufficient to suspend Captain Whipple's voyage at least till farther intelligence is procured from Philadelphia, as it is scarce supposable these vessels would leave any quantity behind worth the risque and expence of such a voyage. As this enterprize will therefore most probably be laid aside for the present it may be proper for Captain Whipple to keep his station a few days longer for the packet. It must be remembered they generally have long passages, and we are very sure she has not yet arrived at Boston, nor do I find she is expected there. The voyage to Bayonne is what I should approve and recommend. The person sent to Governor Trumbull has not yet called upon me, but the scheme appears so feasible that I should be glad to see it executed. At the same time I must add that I am in some doubt as to the extent of my powers to appropriate the publick Moneys here to this purpose. I could wish you would communicate it to the Congress for which you will have sufficient time and I make no doubt of their concurrence. In fact the state of our treasury here at present is so low that it would be impracticable to be of any service to the expedition if all other objections were obviated. We have no news either in the Camp or from Boston, except a piece of intelligence from the latter, that the Enemy are pulling down the South end of the town in order to continue a work across from River to River.

Your chearful Concurrence with me in publick Measures and Zeal for the service calls for my best Thanks.—You will please to accept them and believe me to be with much Truth and Esteem, etc.

P. S.—No Southern Mail arriving last Saturday we are apprehensive it has again fallen into the Enemy's Hands. If it was not attended with too much Trouble should be glad you would cause Inquiry to be made, if by any Accident the Letters are at Providence you will please to forward them by Express—[1](#)

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TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Cambridge, 21 September, 1775.¹

Sir,

It gives me real concern to observe by yours of the 15th instant, that you should think it necessary to distinguish between my personal and public character, and confine your esteem to the former. Upon a reperusal of mine of the 8th instant, I cannot think the construction you have made one; and, unless it was I should have hoped that the respect I really have, and which I flattered myself I had manifested to you, would have called for the most favorable. In the disposition of the Continental troops, I have long been sensible that it would be impossible to please, not individuals merely, but particular provinces, whose partial necessities would occasionally call for assistance. I therefore thought myself happy, that the Congress had settled the point, and apprehended I should stand excused to all, for acting in the line, which not only appeared to me to be that of policy and propriety, but of express and positive duty. If, to the other fatigues and cares of my station, that is to be added of giving reasons for all orders, and explaining the grounds and principles on which they are formed, my personal trouble will perhaps be of the least concern. The public would be most affected. You may be assured, Sir, nothing was intended that might be construed into disrespect; and, at so interesting [a] period, nothing less ought to disturb the harmony so necessary for the happy success of our public operations.

The omission of acknowledging, in precise terms, the receipt of your favor of the 5th instant was purely accidental. The subject was not so new to me as to require long consideration. I had had occasion fully to deliberate upon it, in consequence of applications for troops from Cape Ann, Machias, New Hampshire, and Long Island, where the same necessity was as strongly pleaded, and, in the two last instances, the most peremptory orders were necessary to prevent the troops from being detained. I foresaw the same difficulty here. I am by no means insensible to the situation of the people on the coast. I wish I could extend protection to all; but the numerous detachments, necessary to remedy the evil, would amount to a dissolution of the army, or make the most important operations of the campaign depend upon the piratical expeditions of two or three men-of-war and transports.

The spirit and zeal of the colony of Connecticut are unquestionable; and whatever may be the hostile intentions of the men-of-war, I hope their utmost efforts can do little more than alarm the coast.

I am, with great esteem and regard for both your personal and public character, Sir,
&c.¹

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 21 September, 1775.[2](#)

Sir,

I have been in daily expectation of being favored with the commands of the honorable Congress on the subject of my two last letters. The season now advances so fast, that I cannot any longer defer laying before them such further measures as require their immediate attention, and in which I wait their direction.

The mode in which the present army has been collected has occasioned some difficulty, in procuring the subscription of both officers and soldiers to the Continental articles of war. Their principal objection has been, that it might subject them to a longer service, than that for which they engaged under their several provincial establishments. It is in vain to attempt to reason away the prejudices of a whole army, often instilled, and in this instance at least encouraged, by their officers from private and narrow views. I have therefore forbore pressing them, as I did not experience any such inconvenience from their adherence to their former rules, as would warrant the risk of entering into a contest upon it; more especially as the restraints, necessary for the establishment of essential discipline and subordination, indisposed their minds to every change, and made it both duty and policy to introduce as little novelty as possible. With the present army, I fear, such a subscription is impracticable; but the difficulty will cease with this army.[1](#)

The Connecticut and Rhode Island troops stand engaged to the 1st of December only; and none longer than the 1st of January. A dissolution of the present army therefore will take place, unless some early provision is made against such an event. Most of the general officers are of opinion, that the greater part of them may be reënlisted for the winter, or another campaign, with the indulgence of a furlough to visit their friends, which may be regulated so as not to endanger the service. How far it may be proper to form the new army entirely out of the old, for another campaign, rather than from the contingents of the several provinces, is a question which involves in it too many considerations of policy and prudence, for me to undertake to decide. It appears to be impossible to draw it from any other source than the old army, for this winter; and, as the pay is ample, I hope a sufficient number will engage in the service for that time at least. But there are various opinions of the temper of the men on the subject; and there may be great hazard in deferring the trial too long.

In the Continental establishment no provision has been made for the pay of artificers, distinct from that of the common soldiers; whereas, under the provincial such as found their own tools were allowed one shilling *per diem* advance, and particular artisans more. The pay of the artillery, also, now differs from that of the province; the men have less, the officers more; and, for some ranks, no provision is made, as the Congress will please to observe by this list, which I have the honor to enclose. These

particulars, though seemingly inconsiderable, are the source of much complaint and dissatisfaction, which I endeavor to compose in the best manner I am able.

By the returns of the rifle companies, and that battalion, they appear to exceed their establishment very considerably. I doubt my authority to pay these extra men without the direction of the Congress; but it would be deemed a great hardship wholly to refuse them, as they have been encouraged to come.[1](#)

The necessities of the troops having required pay, I directed that those of the Massachusetts should receive for one month, upon their being mustered, and returning a proper roll; but a claim was immediately made for pay by lunar months; and several regiments have declined taking up their warrants on this account. As this practice was entirely new to me, though said to be warranted by former usage here, the matter now waits the determination of the honorable Congress.[1](#) I find, in Connecticut and Rhode Island, this point was settled by calendar months; in Massachusetts, though mentioned in the Congress, it was left undetermined, which is also the case of New Hampshire.[2](#)

The enclosure No. 2 is a petition from the subalterns, respecting their pay. Where there are only two of these in a company, I have considered one as an ensign, and ordered him pay as such, as in the Connecticut forces. I must beg leave to recommend this petition to the favor of the Congress, as I am of opinion the allowance is inadequate to their rank and service, and is one great source of that familiarity between the officers and men, which is so incompatible with subordination and discipline.[3](#) Many valuable officers of those ranks, finding themselves unable to support the character and appearance of officers, I am informed, will retire as soon as the term of service is expired, if there is no alteration.[1](#)

For the better regulation of duty, I found it necessary to settle the rank of the officers, and to number the regiments; and, as I had not received the commands of the Congress on the subject, and the exigence of the service forbade any further delay, the general officers were considered as having no regiments; an alteration, which, I understand, is not pleasing to some of them, but appeared to me and others to be proper, when it was considered, that, by this means, the whole army is put upon one footing, and all particular attachments are dissolved.[2](#)

Among many other considerations which the approach of winter will demand, that of clothing appears to be one of the most important. So far as regards the preservation of the army from cold, they may be deemed in a state of nakedness. Many of the men have been without blankets the whole campaign, and those which have been in use during the summer are so much worn as to be of little service. In order to make a suitable provision in these articles, and at the same time to guard the public against imposition and expense, it seems necessary to determine the mode of continuing the army; for should these troops be cloathed under their present engagement, and at the expiration of the term of service decline renewing it, a set of unprovided men may be sent to supply their places.

I cannot suppose it to be unknown to the honorable Congress, that in all armies it is an established practise to make an allowance to officers of provisions and forage

proportionate to their rank. As such an allowance formed no part of the continental establishment, I have hitherto forbore to issue the orders for that purpose: but as it is a received opinion of such members of the Congress, as I have had an opportunity of consulting, as well as throughout the army, that it must be deemed a matter of course, and implied in the establishment of the army, I have directed the following proportion of rations, being the same allowance in the American armies last war:—

Major General	15	Major	4
Brigadier General	12	Captain	3
Colonel	6	Subaltern	2
Lieut. Colonel	5	Staff	2

If these should not be approved by the honorable Congress, they will please to signify their pleasure as to the alterations they would have made, in the whole or in part.

I am now to inform the honorable Congress, that, encouraged by the repeated declarations of the Canadians and Indians, and urged by their requests, I have detached Colonel Arnold with a thousand men, to penetrate into Canada by way of Kennebec River, and, if possible, to make himself master of Quebec. By this manœuvre, I proposed either to divert Carleton from St. John's, which would leave a free passage to General Schuyler; or, if this did not take effect, Quebec, in its present defenceless state, must fall into his hands an easy prey. I made all possible inquiry, as to the distance, the safety of the route, and the danger of the season being too far advanced; but found nothing in either to deter me from proceeding, more especially as it met with very general approbation from all whom I consulted upon it. But, that nothing might be omitted, to enable me to judge of its propriety and probable consequences, I communicated it by express to General Schuyler, who approved of it in such terms, that I resolved to put it in immediate execution. They have now left this place seven days; and, if favored with a good wind, I hope soon to hear of their being safe in Kennebec River. For the satisfaction of the Congress, I here enclose a copy of the proposed route. I also do myself the honor of enclosing a manifesto, which I caused to be printed here, and of which Colonel Arnold has taken a suitable number with him. I have also forwarded a copy of his instructions. From all which, I hope the Congress will have a clear view of the motives, plan, and intended execution of this enterprise, and that I shall be so happy as to meet with their approbation in it.

I was the more induced to make this detachment, as it is my clear opinion, from a careful observation of the movements of the enemy, corroborated by all the intelligence we receive by deserters and others of the former of whom we have some every day, that the enemy have no intention to come out, until they are reinforced. They have been wholly employed for some time past in procuring materials for barracks, fuel, and making other preparations for winter. These circumstances, with the constant additions to their works, which are apparently defensive, have led to the above conclusion, and enabled me to spare this body of men where I hope they will be usefully and successfully employed.

The state of inactivity, in which this army has lain for some time, by no means corresponds with my wishes by some decisive stroke, to relieve my country, from the

heavy expense its subsistence must create. After frequently reconnoitring the situation of the enemy in the town of Boston, collecting all possible intelligence, and digesting the whole, a surprise did not appear to me wholly impracticable, though hazardous. I communicated it to the general officers some days before I called them to a council, that they might be prepared with their opinions. The result I have the honor of sending in the inclosure No 6. I cannot say that I have wholly laid it aside; but new events may occasion new measures. Of this I hope the honorable Congress can need no assurance, that there is not a man in America, who more earnestly wishes such a termination of the campaign, as to make the army no longer necessary.

The season advances so fast, that I have given orders to prepare barracks and other accommodations for the winter. The great scarcity of tow cloth in this country, I fear, will totally disappoint us in our expectations of procuring hunting shirts. Gov. Cooke informs me, few or none are to be had in Rhode Island, and Gov. Trumbull gives me little encouragement to expect many from Connecticut.

I have filled up the office of quartermaster-general, which the Congress was pleased to leave to me, by the appointment of Major Mifflin, which I hope and believe will be universally acceptable.

It gives me great pain to be obliged to solicit the attention of the honorable Congress to the state of this army, in terms which imply the slightest apprehension of being neglected. But my situation is inexpressibly distressing, to see the winter fast approaching upon a naked army, the time of their service within a few weeks of expiring, and no provision yet made for such important events. Added to these, the military chest is totally exhausted; the paymaster has not a single dollar in hand; the commissary-general assures me he has strained his credit, for the subsistence of the army, to the utmost. The quartermaster-general is precisely in the same situation; and the greater part of the troops are in a state not far from mutiny, upon the deduction from their stated allowance.¹ I know not to whom I am to impute this failure; but I am of opinion, if the evil is not immediately remedied, and more punctually observed in future, the army must absolutely break up. I hoped I had expressed myself so fully on this subject, both by letter, and to those members of the Congress, who honored the camp with a visit, that no disappointment could possibly happen. I therefore hourly expected advice from the paymaster, that he had received a fresh supply, in addition to the hundred and seventy-two thousand dollars delivered him in August; and thought myself warranted to assure the public creditors, that in a few days they should be satisfied. But the delay has brought matters to such a crisis, as admits of no farther uncertain expectations. I have therefore sent off this express with orders to make all possible despatch. It is my most earnest request, that he may be returned with all possible expedition, unless the honorable Congress have already forwarded what is so indispensably necessary. I have the honor to be, &c.²

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TO MAJOR CHRISTOPHER FRENCH.1

Camp at Cambridge, 26 September, 1775.

Sir,

Your favor of the 18th instant is now before me, as well as that from the Committee of Hartford on the same subject. When I compare the treatment you have received with that, which has been shown to those brave American officers, who were taken fighting gallantly in defence of the liberties of their country, I cannot help expressing some surprise, that you should thus earnestly contest points of mere punctilio. The appellation of Rebel has been deemed sufficient to sanctify every species of cruelty to them; while the ministerial officers, the voluntary instruments of an avaricious and vindictive ministry, claim, upon all occasions, the benefit of those military rules, which can only be binding where they are mutual. We have shown, on our part, the strongest disposition to observe them, during the present contest; but I should ill support my country's honor, and my own character, if I did not show a proper sense of their sufferings, by making the condition of the ministerial officers in some degree dependent upon theirs.

My disposition does not allow me to follow the unworthy example set me by General Gage to its fullest extent. You possess all the essential comforts of life; why should you press for indulgences of a ceremonious kind, which give general offence?

I have looked over all the papers sent me from Philadelphia. I find nothing in them upon the present subject, nor do I know whether the liberty of wearing your sword was given or taken. But I flatter myself, that, when you come to consider all circumstances, you will save me the trouble of giving any positive directions. You will easily conceive how much more grateful a compliance with the wishes of the people, among whom your residence may be longer than you expect, will appear, when it is the result of your prudence and good sense, rather than a determination from me. I therefore should be unwilling to deprive you of an opportunity of cultivating their esteem by so small a concession as this must be.

As I suppose your several letters to me have been communicated to others, I cannot forbear considering your conduct in "declaring, in a high tone, that, had you joined your regiment, you would have acted vigorously against this country, and done all in your power to reduce it,"1 as a deviation from the line of propriety and prudence, which I should have expected to distinguish the conduct of so old and experienced an officer. Your being so entirely in our power may extinguish the resentment, which a generous and enlightend mind would otherwise feel; but I cannot commend the conduct, which puts such a mind to the trial.2

I am Sir, your most obedient humble servant.

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOSEPH SPENCER.

Head-Quarters, 26 September, 1775.

Sir,

I have perused and considered a petition, or rather a remonstrance, directed to you and signed by several captains and subalterns, on the appointment of Mr. Huntington to the lieutenancy of Captain Chester's company.

The decent representation of officers, or even of common soldiers, through the channel of their Colonel, or other superior officers, I shall always encourage and attend to; but I must declare my disapprobation of this mode of associating and combining, as subversive of all subordination, discipline, and order.

Should the proper officers refuse or neglect to receive their complaints, an immediate application to their general officer would be proper. Much as I disapprove the mode of opposition to this gentleman, I disapprove the opposition itself still more. To yield to it would be in effect to surrender the command of the army to those, whose duty it is, and whose honor it ought to be, to obey. Commission should be ever the reward of merit, not of age, and I am determined never to put it out of the proper power to reward a deserving, active officer, whatsoever may be his standing in the army, or the pretensions of those, who have no other merit than that of having been born or enlisted before him.

In an army so young as ours, the claims arising from real service are very few, and the accidental circumstance of obtaining a commission a month or two sooner can with no reasonable person claim any superior regard, or make such a scrutiny of any consequence. This army is supported by the whole continent; the establishment is entirely new. All provincial customs, therefore, which are different in different provinces, must be laid out of the question. The power, which has established and which pays this army, has alone the right to judge, who shall command in it, from the general to the ensign. To put it into any other hands would be a high breach of my trust, and would give birth to such factions and cabals, as must soon end in the dissolution of the army, and the ruin of our country.

As no objections are made to Mr. Huntington's character, nor any other reason assigned, than his not rising by gradation, I can make no alteration in his appointment. At the same time I declare, that I shall upon all occasions pay a proper respect to long service, and as far as lies in my power give it all the preference, which is consistent with the welfare of the army and the duties of my station. I make no doubt, therefore, when these and all other officers (who, in such cases, are both parties and judges) divest themselves of prejudice and partiality, they will cheerfully acquiesce in such appointments as are made, and manifest their sincere attachment to their country, and

the great cause in which we are engaged, by a ready and hearty obedience to all orders and rules judged necessary for the general interest. I am, Sir, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 30 September, 1775.

Sir,

The Rev. Mr. Kirkland, [1](#) the bearer of this, having been introduced to the honorable Congress, can need no particular recommendation from me. But as he now wishes to have the affairs of his mission and public employ put upon some suitable footing, I cannot but intimate my sense of the importance of his station, and the great advantages which have [resulted] and may result to the United Colonies, from his situation being made respectable.

All accounts agree, that much of the favorable disposition, shown by the Indians, may be ascribed to his labor and influence. He has accompanied a chief of the Oneidas to this camp, which I have endeavored to make agreeable to him, both by civility and some small presents. [1](#) Mr. Kirkland being also in some necessity for money to bear his travelling charges and other expenses, I have supplied him with thirty-two pounds lawful money.

I cannot but congratulate the honorable Congress on the happy temper of the Canadians and Indians, our accounts of which are now fully confirmed by some intercepted letters from officers in Canada to General Gage and others in Boston, which were found on board the vessel lately taken, going into Boston with a donation of cattle and other fresh provisions for the ministerial army. [1](#) I have the honor to be, &c. [2](#)

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TO CAPTAIN DANIEL MORGAN.

Camp at Cambridge, 4 October, 1775.

Sir,

I write to you in consequence of information I have received, that you and the captains of the rifle companies on the detachment against Quebec, claim an exemption from the command of all the field-officers, except Colonel Arnold, I understand this claim is founded upon some expressions of mine; but, if you understood me in this way, you are much mistaken in my meaning. My intention is, and ever was, that every officer should command according to his rank. To do otherwise would subvert all military order and authority, which, I am sure, you could not wish or expect.

Now the mistake is rectified, I trust you will exert yourself to support my intentions, ever remembering that by the same rule by which you claim an independent command, and break in upon military authority, others will do the same in regard to you, and, of consequence, the expedition must terminate in shame and disgrace to yourselves, and the reproach and detriment of your country. To a man of true spirit and military character, farther argument is unnecessary. I shall, therefore, recommend to you to preserve the utmost harmony among yourselves, to which a due subordination will much contribute; and, wishing you health and success, I remain your very humble servant.[1](#)

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Camp at Cambridge, 4 October, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your favor of the 20th ultimo came safely to hand, and I should have despatched the express much sooner, but Colonel Arnold's expedition is so connected with your operations, that I thought it most proper to detain him, until I could give you the fullest account of his progress. This morning the express, I sent him, returned, and the enclosure No. 1 is a copy of his letter to me; No. 2 is a copy also of a paper sent me, being the report of a reconnoitring party sent out some time ago.¹ You will certainly hear from him soon, as I have given him the strongest injunctions on this head.

Inclosed No. 3, I send you a copy of his instructions, and No. 4 is a Manifesto, of which I have sent a number with him to disperse throughout Canada. He is supplied with one thousand pounds lawful money in specie, to answer his contingent charges.

About eight days ago a brig from Quebec to Boston was taken and brought into Cape Ann. By some intercepted letters from Captain Gamble to General Gage and Major Sheriff, the account of the temper of the Canadians in the American cause is fully confirmed. The Captain says, that if Quebec should be attacked before Carleton can throw himself into it, there will be a surrender without firing a shot. We most anxiously hope you will find sufficient employ for Carleton at St. John's and its neighborhood.

We at last have the echo of Bunker's Hill from England. The number of killed and wounded by General Gage's account nearly corresponds with what we had, vizt., 1100. There does not seem the least probability of a change of measures or of ministers.¹

General Gage is recalled from Boston, and sails tomorrow; he is succeeded by General Howe.² We have had no material occurrence since I had the pleasure of writing to you last. Our principal employ at present is preparing for the winter, as there seems to be no probability of an accommodation, or any such decision as to make the present army less necessary.¹

I also send a copy of a letter given to Colonel Arnold to be communicated to the officers and men. The accounts we have of your health gives us great concern, not only on your own account, but that of the public service, which must suffer in consequence. I shall most sincerely rejoice to hear of your perfect recovery; and now, most fervently wishing you all possible success, honor, and safety, I am, dear Sir, &c.

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TO THE GENERAL OFFICERS.

Head-Quarters, Cambridge, 5 October, 1775.

Sir,

In a letter from the Congress, dated September 26th, information on the following points is required:

What number of men are sufficient for a winter campaign?

Can the pay of the privates be reduced? How much?

What regulations are further necessary for the government of the forces?

To the above queries of the Congress I have to add several of my own, which I also request your opinion upon, viz.:—

For how long a time ought the men in the present army (should we set about enlisting them) be engaged?

What method would you recommend as most eligible to cloathe a new raised army with a degree of decency and regularity? Would you advise it to be done by the Continent? In that case would you lower the men's wages, and make no deduction for cloathing, or let it stand and make stoppages? and how much a month?

As there appears to be great irregularity in the manner of paying the men, and much discontent has prevailed on this account, in what manner and at what fixed periods would you advise it to be done under a new establishment?

What sized regiments would you recommend under this establishment; that is how many men to a company? how many companies to a regiment, and how officered?

Is there any method by which the best of the present officers in this army can be chosen without impeding the inlistment of the men, by such choice and preference? Under any complete establishment, even if the privates in the army were engaged again, many of the present officers must be discharged as there is an over-proportion, of course we ought to retain the best.

Your close attention to the foregoing points against Monday, ten o'clock, at which time I shall expect to see you at this place, will much oblige, Sir, &c. [1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 5 October, 1775.

Sir,

I was honored with your favor of the 26th ultimo, late the night before last; and a meeting of the general officers having been called upon a business, which will make a considerable part of this letter, I took the opportunity of laying before them those parts of yours, which respect the continuance and new-modelling the army, the fuel, clothing, and other preparations for the ensuing winter. They have taken two or three days to consider; and, as soon as I am possessed of their opinions, I shall lose no time in transmitting the result, not only on the above subjects, but the number of troops necessary to be kept up. I have also directed the commissary-general and the quartermaster-general to prepare estimates of the expense of their departments for a certain given number of men, from which a judgment may be made, when the number of men to be kept in pay is determined; all which I shall do myself the honor to lay before the Congress, as soon as they are ready.

I have now a painful though a necessary duty to perform, respecting Dr. Church, director-general of the hospital. About a week ago, Mr. Secretary Ward of Providence sent up to me one Wainwood, an inhabitant of Newport, with a letter directed to Major Cane in Boston, in characters; which he said had been left with Wainwood some time ago, by a woman who was kept by Dr. Church. She had before pressed Wainwood to take her to Captain Wallace,¹ Mr. Dudley the collector, or George Rome, which he declined. She then gave him a letter, with a strict charge to deliver it to either of those gentlemen. He, suspecting some improper correspondence, kept the letter, and after some time opened it; but, not being able to read it, laid it up, where it remained until he received an obscure letter from the woman, expressing an anxiety after the original letter. He then communicated the whole matter to Mr Ward, who sent him up with the papers to me. I immediately secured the woman; but for a long time she was proof against every threat and persuasion to discover the author. However, at length she was brought to a confession, and named Dr. Church. I then immediately secured him and all his papers. Upon his first examination he readily acknowledged the letter, said it was designed for his brother Fleming, and, when deciphered, would be found to contain nothing criminal. He acknowledged his never having communicated the correspondence to any person here but the girl, and made many protestations of the purity of his intentions.¹ Having found a person capable of deciphering the letter, I in the mean time had all his papers searched, but found nothing criminal among them. But it appeared, on inquiry, that a confidant had been among the papers before my messenger arrived. I then called the general officers together for their advice, the result of which you will find in the enclosure No. 1. The deciphered letter is the enclosure No. 2. The army and country are exceedingly irritated; and, upon a free discussion of the nature, circumstances, and consequence of this matter, it has been unanimously agreed to lay it before the honorable Congress for

their special advice and direction; at the same time suggesting to their consideration, whether an alteration of the twenty-eighth article of war may not be necessary.¹

As I shall reserve all farther remarks upon the state of the army till my next, I shall now beg leave to request the determination of Congress, as to the property and disposal of such vessels and cargoes, as are designed for the supply of the enemy, and may fall into our hands. There has been an event of this kind at Portsmouth as by the enclosure No. 3,² in which I have directed the cargo to be brought hither for the use of the army, reserving the settlement of any claims of capture to the decision of Congress.

As there are many unfortunate individuals, whose property has been confiscated by the enemy, I would humbly suggest to the consideration of Congress the humanity of applying, in part or in the whole, such captures to the relief of those sufferers, after compensating any expense of the captors, and for their activity and spirit. I am the more induced to request this determination may be speedy, as I have directed three vessels to be equipped in order to cut off the supplies; and from the number of vessels hourly arriving, it may become an object of some importance. In the disposal of these captures, for the encouragement of the officers and men, I have allowed them one third of the cargoes, except military stores, which, with the vessel, are to be reserved for the public use. I hope my plan, as well as the execution, will be favored with the approbation of Congress.

One Mr. Fisk, an intelligent person, came out of Boston on the 3d instant, and gives us the following advices; that a fleet, consisting of a sixty-four, and a twenty-gun ship, two sloops of eighteen guns, [and] two transports with six hundred men, were to sail from Boston yesterday; that they took on board two mortars, four howitzers, and other artillery calculated for the bombardment of a town; their destination was kept a profound secret;¹ that an express sloop of war, which left England the 8th of August, arrived four days ago; that General Gage is recalled, and last Sunday resigned his command to General Howe; that Lord Percy, Colonel Smith, and other officers, who were at Lexington, are ordered home with Gage; that six ships of the line and two cutters were coming out under Sir Peter Dennis; that five regiments and a thousand marines are ordered out, and may be expected in three or four weeks; no prospect of an accommodation, but the ministry determined to push the war to the utmost.

I have an express from Colonel Arnold, and herewith send a copy of his letter and an enclosure No. 4; and I am happy in finding he meets with no discouragement. The claim of the rifle officers to be independent of all the superior officers, except Colonel Arnold, is without any countenance or authority from me, as I have signified in my last despatch, both to Colonel Arnold and Captain Morgan. The captain of the brig from Quebec for Boston informs me, that there is no suspicion of any such expedition; and that, if Carleton is not drove from St. John's, so as to be obliged to throw himself into Quebec, it must fall into our hands, as it is left without a regular soldier, and many of the inhabitants are most favorably disposed to the American cause; and that there is the largest stock of ammunition ever collected in America. In the above vessel some letters were also found, from an officer at Quebec to General Gage and Major Sheriff at Boston, containing such an account of the temper of the

Canadians, as cannot but afford the highest satisfaction. I have thought it best to forward them. They are enclosures No. 6 & 7.¹ I am, with the greatest respect, &c.²

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Camp at Cambridge, 5 October, 1775.

Dear Sir,

I wrote you yesterday, of which the enclosed is a copy, since which I have been informed, that your illness has obliged you to quit the army, and General Wooster as the eldest Brigadier will take rank and command of Mr. Montgomery. General Wooster, I am informed, is not of such activity as to press through difficulties, with which that service is environed. I am therefore much alarmed for Arnold, whose expedition was built upon yours, and who will infallibly perish, if the invasion and entry into Canada are abandoned by your successor.¹

I hope by this time the penetration into Canada by your army is effected; but if it is not, and there are any intentions to lay it aside, I beg it may be done in such a manner, that Arnold may be saved by giving him notice, and in the mean time your army to keep up such appearances as may fix Carleton, and prevent the force of Canada being turned wholly upon Arnold. He expected to be at Quebec in twenty days from the 26th of September, so that I hope you will have no difficulty in regulating your motions with respect to him. Should this find you at Albany, and General Wooster about taking the command, I intreat you to impress him strongly with the importance and necessity of proceeding, or so to conduct, that Arnold may have time to retreat.

Nothing new has occurred since yesterday deserving your notice. Our next accounts of your health I hope will be more favorable. Ten thousand good wishes attend you from this quarter; none more sincere and fervent than those of, dear Sir, your most obedient, &c.

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TO ROBERT CARTER NICHOLAS, VIRGINIA.

Camp at Cambridge, 5 October, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your favor of the 8th ultimo came to my hands on the 2d instant by Mr. Byrd.¹ I return you my sincere thanks for your kind congratulation on my appointment to the honorable and important post I now hold, by the suffrages of this great continent. My heart will ever bear testimony of my gratitude for the distinguished mark of honor, which has been conferred on me by this appointment; as it also will of my wishes, that so important a trust had been placed in the hands of a person of greater experience and abilities than mine. I feel the weight of my charge too sensibly not to make this declaration. At the same time, I must add, that I do not want to withdraw any services, within the compass of my power, from the cause we are nobly engaged in.

Mr. Byrd shall not want for his pay, whilst he is in this camp; although, as I have no cash of my own here, and charge the public with my expenses only, I shall be a little at a loss to know in what manner to advance it with propriety. Bills of exchange would answer no end here, as we have not the means of negotiating them; but, if you would place the money in the hands of Messrs. Willing and Morris of Philadelphia, (either in specie, continental, Maryland, or Pennsylvania paper,) they could easily remit or draw for it. But, at any rate, make yourself easy, as Mr. Byrd shall not want to the amount of his pay. * * *

The enemy in Boston and on the heights at Charlestown (two peninsulas surrounded in a manner by ships of war and floating batteries) are so strongly fortified, as to render it almost impossible to force their lines, which are thrown up at the head of each neck; without great slaughter on our side, or cowardice on theirs, it is absolutely so. We therefore can do no more, than keep them besieged, which they are, to all intents and purposes, as close as any troops upon earth can be, that have an opening to the sea. Our advanced works and theirs are within musket-shot. We daily undergo a cannonade, which has done no injury to our works, and very little hurt to our men. Those insults we are obliged to submit to for want of powder, being obliged, (except now and then giving them a shot,) to reserve what we have for closer work than cannon-distance.

My respectful compliments to Mrs. Nicholas and the rest of your fireside, and to any inquiring friends, conclude me, with grateful thanks for the prayers and good wishes you are pleased to offer on my account, I am, &c.¹

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 12 October, 1775

Sir,

I am honored with your several favors of the 26th and 30th of September, and 5th of October, the contents of which I shall beg leave to notice in their respective order.

Previous to the direction of Congress to consult the general officers on the best mode of continuing and providing for the army during the winter, I had desired them to turn their thoughts upon these subjects, and to favor me with the result, by a particular day, in writing. In this interval, the appointment of Dr. Franklin, Mr. Lynch, and Colonel Harrison, was communicated, an event which has given me the highest satisfaction, as the subject was too weighty and complex for a discussion by letter. This appointment made any conclusion here unnecessary, as it is not probable any such arrangement would be agreed on, as would not be altered in some respects, upon a full and free conference. This good effect will arise from the step already taken, that every officer will be prepared to give his sentiments upon these important subjects.¹

The estimates of the commissary and quartermaster general I have now the honor of enclosing. * * *

With respect to the reduction of the pay of the men, which may enter into the consideration of their support, it is the unanimous opinion of the general officers, that it cannot be touched with safety at present. * * *

Upon the presumption of there being a vacancy in the direction of the hospital, Lieut. Col. Hand, formerly a surgeon in the 18th Regiment, or Royal Irish, and Dr. Foster, late of Charles Town, and one of the surgeons of the hospital under Dr. Church, are candidates for that office. I do not pretend to be acquainted with their respective merits, and therefore have given them no further expectation than that they should be mentioned as candidates for the department. I therefore need only to add upon the subject that the affairs of the hospital require that the appointment should be made as soon as possible.

Before I was honored with your favor of the 5th instant, I had given orders for the equipment of some armed vessels, to intercept the enemy's supplies of provisions and ammunition. One of them was on a cruise between Cape Ann and Cape Cod, when the express arrived. The others will be fit for the sea in a few days, under the command of officers of the Continental army, who are well recommended, as persons acquainted with the sea, and capable of such a service. Two of these will be immediately despatched on this duty, and every particular, mentioned in your favor of the 5th instant, literally complied with.¹ That the honorable Congress may have a more complete idea of the plan on which these vessels are equipped, I enclose a copy

of the instructions given to the captains now out.² These, with the additional instructions directed, will be given to the captains, who go into the mouth of St. Lawrence's River. As both officers and men most cheerfully engage in the service, on the terms mentioned in these instructions, I fear that the proposed increase will create some difficulty, by making a difference between men engaged on similar service. I have therefore not yet communicated this part of the plan, but reserved an extra bounty as a reward for extraordinary activity. There are no armed vessels in this province; and Governor Cooke informs me, the enterprise can receive no assistance from him, as one of the armed vessels of Rhode Island is on a long cruise, and the other unfit for the service. Nothing shall be omitted to secure success. A fortunate capture of an ordnance ship would give new life to the camp, and an immediate turn to the issue of this campaign.

Our last accounts from Colonel Arnold are very favorable. He was proceeding with all expedition; and I flatter myself, making all allowances, he will be at Quebec the 20th instant, where a gentleman from Canada (Mr. Price) assures me he will meet with no resistance.¹ * * * From the various accounts received from Europe, there may be reason to expect troops will be landed at New York, or some other middle colony. I should be glad to know the pleasure of the Congress, whether, upon such an event, it would be expected that a part of this army should be detached, or the internal force of such colony and its neighborhood be deemed sufficient; or whether, in such case, I am to wait the particular direction of Congress.²

The fleet, mentioned in my last, has been seen standing N. N. E.; so that we apprehend it is intended for some part of this province, or New Hampshire, or possibly Quebec.

The latest and best accounts we have from the enemy are, that they are engaged in their new work across the south end of Boston, preparing their barracks, &c. for winter; that it is proposed to keep from five hundred to a thousand men on Bunker's Hill all winter, who are to be relieved once a week; the rest to be drawn into Boston. A person,¹ who has lately been a servant to Major Connolly, a tool of Lord Dunmore's, has given an account of a scheme to distress the southern provinces, which appeared to me of sufficient consequence to be immediately transmitted. I have therefore got it attested, and do myself the honor of enclosing it.

The new levies from Connecticut have lately marched into camp, and are a body of as good troops as any we have; so that we have now the same strength, as before the detachment made under Colonel Arnold. I am, &c.²

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TO JOHN AUGUSTINE WASHINGTON.

Camp at Cambridge, 13 October, 1775.

Dear Brother,

Your favor of the 12th ultimo came to hand a few days ago. By it I gladly learnt, that your family were recovered of the two complaints, which had seized many of them and confined my sister. I am very glad to hear, also, that the Convention had come to resolutions of arming the people, and preparing vigorously for the defence of the colony; which, by the latest accounts from England, will prove a salutary measure.¹ I am also pleased to find, that the manufactory of arms and ammunition has been attended to with so much care. A plenty of these, and unanimity and fortitude among ourselves, must defeat every attempt that a diabolical ministry can invent to enslave this great continent. In the manufacturing of arms for public use, great care should be taken to make the bores of the same size, that the same balls may answer, otherwise great disadvantages may arise from a mixture of cartridges.

The enemy, by their not coming out, are, I suppose, afraid of us; whilst their situation renders any attempts of ours upon them in a manner impracticable.² Nothing new has happened, since my last, worth communicating. Since finishing our own lines of defence, we, as well as the enemy, have been busily employed in putting our men under proper cover for the winter. Our advanced works, and theirs, are within musket-shot of each other. We are obliged to submit to an almost daily cannonade without returning a shot, from our scarcity of powder, which we are necessitated to keep for closer work than cannon-distance, whenever the red-coat gentry please to step out of their intrenchments. Seeing no prospect of this, I sent a detachment, about a month ago, into Canada, by the way of Kennebec River, under the command of a Colonel Arnold. This detachment consisted of one thousand men, and was ordered to possess themselves of Quebec if possible; but, at any rate, to make a diversion in favor of General Schuyler, who by this is in possession, I expect, of Montreal and St. John's, as I am not altogether without hopes that Colonel Arnold may be [possessed] of the capital. If so, what a pretty hand the ministry have made of their Canada bill, and the diabolical scheme which was constructed upon it. I have also, finding that we were in no danger of a visit from our neighbors, fitted and am fitting out several privateers with soldiers (who have been bred to the sea), and have no doubt of making captures of several of their transports, some of which have already fallen into our hands, laden with provisions.

I am obliged to you for your advice to my wife, and for your intention of visiting her. Seeing no great prospect of returning to my family and friends this winter, I have sent an invitation to Mrs. Washington to come to me, although I fear the season is too far advanced (especially if she should when my letters get home be in Kent, as I believe the case will be) to admit this with any tolerable degree of convenience. I have laid a

state of difficulties, however, which must attend the journey before her, and left it to her own choice.

My love to my sister and the little ones is sincerely tendered, and I am, with true regard, your most affectionate brother. [1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 24 October, 1775.

Sir,

My conjecture of the destination of the late squadron from Boston, in my last, has been unhappily verified by an outrage, exceeding in barbarity and cruelty every hostile act practised among civilized nations. I have enclosed the account given me by Mr. Jones,¹ a gentleman of the town of Falmouth, of the destruction of that increasing and flourishing village. He is a very great sufferer, and informs me that the time allowed for the removal of effects was so small, that valuable property of all kinds, and to a great amount, has been destroyed. The orders shown by the captain for this horrid procedure, by which it appears the same desolation is meditated upon all the towns on the coast, made it my duty to communicate it as quickly and as extensively as possible. As Portsmouth was the next place to which he proposed to go, General Sullivan was permitted to go up, and give them his assistance and advice to ward off the blow. I flatter myself the like event will not happen there, as they have a fortification of some strength, and a vessel has arrived at a place called Sheepscot, with fifteen hundred pounds of powder.

The gentlemen of the Congress have nearly finished their business¹; but, as they write by this opportunity, I must beg leave to refer you to their letter, for what concerns their commission.

We have had no occurrence of any consequence in the camp, since I had the honor of addressing you last; but expect every hour to hear that Newport has shared the fate of unhappy Falmouth.²

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TO THE COMMITTEE OF FALMOUTH, CASCO BAY.

Camp at Cambridge, 24 October, 1775.

Gentlemen,

The desolation and misery, which ministerial vengeance had planned, in contempt of every principle of humanity, and so lately brought on the town of Falmouth, I know not how sufficiently to commiserate. Nor can my compassion for the general suffering be conceived beyond the true measure of my feelings. But my readiness to relieve you, by complying with your request, signified in your favor of the 21st instant, is circumscribed by my inability. The immediate necessities of the army under my command require all the powder and ball, that can be collected with the utmost industry and trouble. The authority of my station does not extend so far, as to empower me to send a detachment of men down to your assistance. Thus circumstanced, I can only add my wishes and exhortations, that you may repel every future attempt to perpetrate the like savage cruelties.

I have given liberty to several officers in Colonel Phinny's regiment to visit their connexions, who may now stand in need of their presence and assistance, by reason of this new exertion of despotic barbarity. I am, Gentlemen, &c. [1](#)

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Camp at Cambridge, 26 October, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your several favors of the 12th and 14th instant came safely to hand, though not in the proper order of time, with their several enclosures. You do me justice in believing, that I feel the utmost anxiety for your situation, that I sympathize with you in all your distresses, and shall most heartily share in the joy of your success.² My anxiety extends itself to poor Arnold, whose fate depends upon the issue of your campaign. Besides your other difficulties, I fear you have those of the season added, which will increase every day. In the article of powder, we are in danger of suffering equally with you. Our distresses on this head are mutual; but we hope they are short-lived, as every measure of relief has been pursued, which human invention could suggest.

When you write to General Montgomery, be pleased to convey my best wishes and regards to him.¹ It has been equally unfortunate for our country and yourself, that your ill health has deprived the active part of your army of your presence. God Almighty restore you, and crown you with happiness and success.

Colonel Allen's misfortune will, I hope, teach a lesson of prudence and subordination to others, who may be too ambitious to outshine their general officers, and, regardless of order and duty, rush into enterprises, which have unfavorable effects to the public, and are destructive to themselves.¹

Dr. Franklin, Mr. Lynch, and Colonel Harrison, delegates from the Congress, have been in the camp for several days, in order to settle the plan for continuing and supporting the army.² This commission extended to your department; but, upon consideration, it appeared so difficult to form any rational plan, that nothing was done upon that head. If your time and health will admit, I should think it highly proper to turn your thoughts to this subject, and communicate the result to the Congress as early as possible.

We have had no event of any consequence in our camp for some time, our whole attention being taken up with preparations for the winter, and forming the new army, in which many difficulties occur. The enemy expect considerable reinforcements this winter, and from all accounts are garrisoning Gibraltar and other places with foreign troops, in order to bring their former garrison to America. The ministry have begun the destruction of our seaport towns, by burning a flourishing town of about three hundred houses to the eastward, called Falmouth. This they effected with every circumstance of cruelty and barbarity, which revenge and malice could suggest. We expect every moment to hear other places have been attempted, and have been better prepared for their reception.

The more I reflect upon the importance of your expedition, the greater is my concern, lest it should sink under insuperable difficulties. I look upon the interest and salvation of our bleeding country in a great degree to depend upon your success. I know you feel its importance, as connected not only with your own honor and happiness, but the public welfare; so that you can want no incitements to press on, if it be possible. My anxiety suggests some doubts, which your better acquaintance with the country will enable you to remove. Would it not have been practicable to pass St. John's, leaving force enough for a blockade; or, if you could not spare the men, passing it wholly, possessing yourselves of Montreal, and the surrounding country? Would not St. John's have fallen of course, or what would have been the probable consequence? Believe me, dear General, I do not mean to imply the smallest doubt of the propriety of your operations, or of those of Mr. Montgomery, for whom I have a great respect. I too well know the absurdity of judging upon a military operation, when you are without the knowledge of its concomitant circumstances. I only mean it as a matter of curiosity, and to suggest to you my imperfect idea on the subject. I am, with the utmost truth and regard, dear Sir, your most obedient servant.[1](#)

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 30 October, 1775.

Dear Sir,

After you left this yesterday, Mr. Tudor presented me with the enclosed. As there may be some observations worthy of notice, I forward it to you, that it may be presented to Congress; but I would have his remarks upon the frequency of general courts martial considered with some degree of caution, for although the nature of his office affords him the best opportunity of discovering the imperfections of the present Rules and Regulations for the Army, yet a desire of lessening his own trouble may induce him to transfer many matters from a general court martial, where he is the principal actor, to regimental courts where he has nothing to do. I do not know that this is the case, but as it may be, I think it ought not to be lost sight of.

In your conference with Mr. Bache, be so good as to ask him whether the two posts which leave Philadelphia for the southward, both go through Alexandria, and if only one, which of them it is, the Tuesday's or Saturday's, that I may know how to order my letters from this place.

My letter to Colonel Harrison, on the subject we were speaking of, is inclosed, and open for your perusal; put a wafer under it and make what use you please of it. Let me know by the post or * * * what the world says of men and things. My compliments to Mrs. Reed, and with sincere regard, I remain, &c. [1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 30 October, 1775.

Sir,

The information, which the gentlemen who have lately gone from hence can give the Congress, of the state and situation of the army, would have made a letter unnecessary, if I did not suppose there would be some anxiety to know the intentions of the army on the subject of the reënlistment.

Agreeably to the advice of those gentlemen, and my own opinion, I immediately began by directing all such officers, as proposed to continue, to signify their intentions as soon as possible.¹ A great number of the returns are come in, from which I find, that a very great proportion of the officers of the rank of captain, and under, will retire; from present appearances I may say half; but at least one third. It is with some concern also that I observe, that many of the officers, who retire, discourage the continuance of the men, and, I fear, will communicate the infection to them. Some have advised, that those officers, who decline the service, should be immediately dismissed; but this would be very dangerous and inconvenient. I confess I have great anxieties upon the subject, though I still hope the pay and terms are so advantageous, that interest, and I hope also a regard to their country, will retain a greater portion of the privates than their officers. In so important a matter, I shall esteem it my indispensable duty, not only to act with all possible prudence, but to give the most early and constant advice of my progress.¹ A supply of clothing equal to our necessities would greatly contribute to the encouragement and satisfaction of the men: in every point of view it is so important that I beg leave to call the attention of the Congress to it in a particular manner.² I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 2 November, 1775.

Sir,

I could not suffer Mr. Randolph¹ to quit this camp, without bearing some testimony of my duty to the Congress; although his sudden departure (occasioned by the death of his worthy relative,² whose loss, as a good citizen and valuable member of society, is much to be regretted) does not allow me time to be particular.

The enclosed return shows, at one view, what reliance we have upon the officers of this army, and how deficient we are likely to be in subaltern officers. A few days more will enable me to inform the Congress what they have to expect from the soldiery, as I shall issue recruiting-orders for this purpose, so soon as the officers are appointed, which will be done this day, I having sent for the general officers, to consult them in the choice.

I must beg leave to recall the attention of the Congress to the appointment of a brigadier-general, an officer as necessary to a brigade, as a colonel is to a regiment, and one that will be exceedingly wanted in the new arrangement.¹

The proclamations and association, herewith enclosed, came to my hands on Monday last.² I thought it my duty to send them to you. Nothing of moment has happened since my last. With respectful compliments to the members of Congress, I have the honor to be, &c.¹

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TO THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Cambridge, 2 November, 1775.

Sir:

I promised the gentlemen who did me the honour to call upon me yesterday, by order of your House, that I would inquire of the Quartermaster-General, and let them know to-day, what quantity of wood and hay would be necessary to supply the Army through the winter. I accordingly did so, and desired General Gates this morning to inform you that it was his (the Quartermaster's) opinion it would require ten thousand cords of the first, and two hundred tons of the latter, to answer our demands; but the hurry in which we have been all day engaged caused him to forget it, till a fresh complaint brought it again to remembrance. When the Committee were here yesterday, I told them I did not believe that we had then more than four days' stock of wood beforehand. I little thought that we had scarce four hours', and that different Regiments were upon the point of cutting each others' throats for a few standing locusts near their encampments, to dress their victuals with. This, however, is the fact; and unless some expedient is adopted by your honourable body to draw more teams into the service, or the Quartermaster-General empowered to impress them, this Army, if there comes a spell of rain or cold weather must inevitably disperse; the consequence of which needs no animadversion of mine.

It has been matter of great grief to me to see so many valuable plantations of trees destroyed. I endeavored (whilst there appeared a possibility of restraining it) to prevent the practice but it is out of my power to do it. From fences to forest trees, and from forest trees to fruit trees, is a natural advance to houses, which must next follow. This is not all; the distress of the soldiers in the article of wood, will I fear, have an unhappy influence upon their enlisting again. In short, Sir, if I did not apprehend every evil that can result from the want of these two capital articles, wood especially, I should not be so importunate; my anxiety on this head must plead my excuse. At the same time, I assure you that, with great respect and esteem, I am, &c.

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TO JOSIAH QUINCY.1

Cambridge, 4 November, 1775.

Sir,

Your favor of the 31st ultimo was presented to me yesterday. I thank you (as I shall do every gentleman), for suggesting any measure, which you conceive to be conducive to the public service; but, in the adoption of a plan, many things are to be considered to decide upon the utility of it. In the one proposed by you, I shall not undertake to determine whether it be good, or whether it be bad; but thus much I can say, that if there is any spot upon the main, which has an equal command of the ship-channel to Boston harbor (and give me leave to add that Point Alderton is not without its advocates), in all other respects it must have infinitely the preference; because the expense of so many batteries as you propose, with the necessary defences to secure the channel, the communication, and a retreat in the *dernier resort* from the east end of Long Island, are capital objections. Not, I confess, of such importance as to weigh against the object in view, if the scheme is practicable. But what signifies Long Island, Point Alderton, and Dorchester, while we are in a manner destitute of cannon, and compelled to keep the little powder we have for the use of the musketry. The knowledge of this fact is an unanswerable argument against every place, and may serve to account for my not having viewed the several spots, which have been so advantageously spoken of. I am not without intentions of making them a visit, and shall assuredly do myself the honor of calling upon you. In the mean while, permit me to thank you most cordially for your polite invitation, and to assure you that I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Cambridge, 5 November, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your favor of the 26th ultimo with the enclosures, containing an account of the surrender of Fort Chamblee, was an excellent repast, but somewhat incomplete for want of Montgomery's letter, which (a copy) you omitted to enclose. On the success of your enterprise so far, I congratulate you, as the acquisition of Canada is of immeasurable importance to the cause we are engaged in. No account of Arnold since my last. I am exceeding anxious to hear from him, but flatter myself, that all goes well with him, as he was expressly ordered, in case of any discouraging event, to advertise me of it immediately.¹

I much approve your conduct in regard to Wooster. My fears are at an end, as he acts in a subordinate character. Intimate this to General Montgomery, with my congratulations on his success [and] the seasonable supply of powder, and wishes that his next letter may be dated from Montreal. We laugh at his idea of chasing (?) the Royal Fusileers with the stores. Does he consider them as inanimate, or as a treasure? If you carry your arms to Montreal, should not the garrisons of Niagara, Detroit, &c., be called upon to surrender, or threatened with the consequences of a refusal? They may indeed destroy their stores, and, if the Indians are aiding, escape to Fort Chartres, but it is not very probable.

The enclosed gazette exhibits sundry specimens of the skill of the new commander in issuing proclamations, and a proof, in the destruction of Falmouth, of barbarous designs of an infernal ministry. Nothing new hath happened in this camp. Finding the ministerial troops resolved to keep themselves close within their lines, and that it was judged impracticable to get at them, I have fitted out six armed vessels, with the design to pick up some of their store-ships and transports. The rest of our men are busily employed in erecting of barracks, &c. I hope, as you have said nothing of the state of your health, that it is much amended, and that the cold weather will restore it perfectly. That it may do so, and you enjoy the fruit of your summer's labor and fatigue, is the sincere wish, dear Sir, of yours, &c.

Generals Lee and Mifflin are well; Colonel Reed gone to Philadelphia.¹

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TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN SULLIVAN.

INSTRUCTIONS.

You are to proceed immediately to Portsmouth in New Hampshire, and complete the works already begun, to secure that and the other towns, at the entrance of Piscataqua River, from any attacks by ships of war. For this purpose you are to fix fire-ships and fire-rafts in such places, as you find most convenient to prevent the enemy from passing up the river.

As great calamities and distress are brought upon our seaport towns, through the malicious endeavors and false representations of many persons, holding commissions under the crown, who, not content with bringing destruction upon some of our principal towns, are yet using every art that malice can devise to reduce others to the same unhappy state, in hopes by such cruel conduct to please an arbitrary and tyrannical ministry, and to receive from them in return a continuance of such places and pensions, as they now hold at the expense of the blood and treasure of this distressed continent; you are, therefore, immediately upon your arrival in that province, to seize such persons as hold commissions under the crown, and are acting as open and avowed enemies to their country, and hold them as hostages for the security of those towns, which our ministerial enemies threaten to invade. In case any attack should be made upon Portsmouth, or other seaports in that quarter, you are immediately to collect such force as can be raised to repel invasion, and, at all hazards, to prevent the enemy from landing and taking possession of any posts in that quarter. When you have completed the works at Portsmouth, and secured the passage of the river there, you are to return without delay to the army, unless you find the enemy are about to make an immediate attack upon that or the neighboring towns.

The above is rather to be considered as matter of advice than orders, as I do not conceive myself authorized to involve the continent in any expense for the defence of Portsmouth, or other place, out of the line of the great American defence, particular colonies being called upon by the Congress to prepare for their own internal security. Given under my hand, this 7th day of November, 1775.^{[1](#)}

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 8 November, 1775.

Sir,

The immediate occasion of my giving the Congress the trouble of a letter at this time is to inform them, that, in consequence of their order signified in your letter of the 20th ultimo, I laid myself under a solemn tie of secrecy to Captain Macpherson,¹ and proceeded to examine his plan for the destruction of the fleet in the harbor of Boston, with all that care and attention, which the importance of it deserved, and my judgment could lead to. But not being happy enough to coincide in opinion with that gentleman, and finding that his scheme would involve greater expense, than (under my doubts of its success), I thought myself justified in giving into, I prevailed upon him to communicate his plan to three gentlemen of the artillery (in this army), well versed in the knowledge and practice of gunnery. By them he has been convinced, that, inasmuch as he set out upon wrong principles, the scheme would prove abortive. Unwilling, however, to relinquish his favorite project of reducing the naval force of Great Britain, he is very desirous of building a number of row-galleys for this purpose. But as the Congress alone are competent to the adoption of this measure, I have advised him (although he offered to go on with the building of them at his own expense, till the Congress should decide) to repair immediately to Philadelphia with his proposals; where, if they should be agreed to, or vessels of superior force, agreeable to the wishes of most others, should be resolved on, he may set instantly about them, with all the materials upon the spot; here, they are to collect. To him, therefore, I refer for further information on this head.

A vessel said to be from Philadelphia and bound to Boston with 120 pipes of wine (118 of which are secured) stranded at a place called Eastham, in a gale of wind on the 2d inst. Another from Boston to Halifax with dry goods, &c. (amounting per invoice to about 240£ lawful) got disabled in the same gale near Beverly. These cargoes, with the papers, I have ordered to this place, the vessels to be taken care of until further orders. I have also an account of the taking of a wood sloop bound to Boston, and carried into Portsmouth by one of our armed vessels—particulars not yet come to hand, and this instant of two others from Nova Scotia to Boston, with hay, wood, live stock, &c., by another of our armed schooners. These are in Plymouth.

These accidents and captures point out the necessity of establishing proper courts without loss of time for the decision of property, and the legality of seizures. Otherwise I may be involved in inextricable difficulties.¹

Our prisoners, by the reduction of Fort Chamblee (on which happy event I most sincerely congratulate the Congress), being considerably augmented, and likely to be increased, I submit it to the wisdom of Congress, whether some convenient inland towns, remote from the post roads, ought not to be assigned them; the manner of their

treatment, subsistence, &c., defined; and a commissary or agent appointed, to see that justice is done both to them and the public, proper accounts rendered, &c. Unless a mode of this sort is adopted, I fear there will be sad confusion hereafter, as there are great complaints at present.[2](#)

I reckoned without my host, when I informed the Congress in my last, that I should in a day or two be able to acquaint them with the disposition of the soldiery towards a new enlistment. I have been in consultation with the generals of this army ever since Thursday last, endeavoring to establish new corps of officers; but find so many doubts and difficulties to reconcile, I cannot say when they are to end, or what may be the consequences; as there appears to be such an unwillingness in the officers of one government mixing in the same regiment with those of another; and, without it, many must be dismissed, who are willing to serve, notwithstanding we are deficient on the whole. I am to have another meeting to-day upon this business, and shall inform you of the result.

The council of officers are unanimously of opinion, that the command of the artillery should no longer continue in Colonel Gridley[1](#) ; and, knowing of no person better qualified to supply his place, or whose appointment will give more general satisfaction, I have taken the liberty of recommending Henry Knox, Esq., to the consideration of the Congress, thinking it indispensably necessary, at the same time, that this regiment should consist of two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, and twelve companies, agreeable to the plan and estimate handed in;—which, differing from the last establishment, I should be glad to be instructed on.

The Commissary General not being returned, will apologize I hope for my silence, respecting a requisition of the expence of his clerks, &c., which I was to have obtained, together with others, and forward.

I have heard nothing of Colonel Arnold since the 13th ultimo. His letter of, and journal to, that date, will convey all the information I am able to give of him. I think he must be in Quebec. If any mischance had happened to him, he would, as directed, have forwarded an express. No account yet of the armed vessels sent to the St. Lawrence. I think they will meet with the stores inward or outward bound.

Captain Symons, in the Cerberus, lately sent from Boston to Falmouth, has published the enclosed declaration at that place; and, it is suspected, intends to make some kind of a lodgment there. I wrote immediately to a Colonel Phinny (of this army) who went up there upon the last alarm, to spirit up the people and oppose it at all events. Falmouth is about a hundred and thirty miles from this camp.[1](#)

I Have The Honor To Be, &C.

P. S. I send a general return of the troops, and manifests of the cargoes and vessels, taken at Plymouth.

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TO JOSEPH REED, PHILADELPHIA.

Cambridge, 8 November, 1775.

Dear Sir,

The shipwreck of a vessel, said to be from Philadelphia to Boston, near Plymouth, with one hundred and twenty pipes of wine, one hundred and eighteen of which are saved; another, from Boston to Halifax, near Beverly, with about two hundred and forty pounds' worth of dry goods; the taking of a wood-vessel bound to Boston by Captain Adams; and the sudden departure of Mr. Randolph, (occasioned by the death of his uncle,) are all the occurrences worth noticing, which have happened since you left this.

I have ordered the wine and goods to this place for sale; as also the papers. The latter may unfold secrets, that may not be pleasing to some of your townsmen, and which, so soon as known, will be communicated.

I have been happy enough to convince Captain Macpherson, as he says, of the propriety of returning to the Congress. He sets out this day, and I am happy in his having an opportunity of laying before them a scheme for the destruction of the naval force of Great Britain. A letter and journal of Colonel Arnold's, to the 13th ultimo, are come to hand, a copy of which I enclose to the Congress, and by application to Mr. Thomson you can see. I think he is in Quebec. If I hear nothing more of him in five days, I shall be sure of it.

I had like to have forgotten what sits heaviest upon my mind, the new arrangement of officers. Although we have not enough to constitute the new corps, it hath employed the general officers and myself ever since Thursday last, and we are nearly as we begun.

Connecticut wants no Massachusetts man in their corps; Massachusetts thinks there is no necessity for a Rhode-Islander to be introduced amongst them; and New Hampshire says, it 's very hard, that her valuable and experienced officers (who are willing to serve) should be discarded, because her own regiments, under the new establishment, cannot provide for them. In short, after a four days' labor, I expect that numbers of officers, who have given in their names to serve, must be discarded from Massachusetts, (where the regiments have been numerous, and the number in them small) and Connecticut, completed with a fresh recruit of officers from its own government. This will be departing, not only from the principles of common justice, but from the letter of the resolve agreed on at this place; but, at present, I see no help for it. We are to have another meeting upon the matter this day, when something must be hit upon, as time is slipping off. My compliments to Mrs. Reed and to all inquiring friends. I am, with sincerity and truth, dear Sir, your affectionate humble servant.

P. S. I had just finished my letter when a blundering Lieutenant of the blundering Captain Coit, who had just blundered upon two vessels from Nova Scotia, came in with the account of it, and before I could rescue my letter, without knowing what he did, picked up a candle and sprinkled it with grease; but these are kind of blunders which one can readily excuse. The vessels contain hay, live-stock, poultry, &c., and are now safely moored in Plymouth harbour. [1](#)

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TO COLONEL WILLIAM WOODFORD.[2](#)

Cambridge, 10 November, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your favor of the 18th of September came to my hands on Wednesday last, through Boston, and open, as you may suppose. It might be well to recollect by whom you sent it, in order to discover if there has not been some treachery practised.

I do not mean to flatter, when I assure you, that I highly approve of your appointment. The inexperience you complain of is a common case, and only to be remedied by practice and close attention. The best general advice I can give, and which I am sure you stand in no need of, is to be strict in your discipline; that is, to require nothing unreasonable of your officers and men, but see that whatever is required be punctually complied with. Reward and punish every man according to his merit, without partiality or prejudice; hear his complaints; if well founded, redress them; if otherwise, discourage them, in order to prevent frivolous ones. Discourage vice in every shape, and impress upon the mind of every man, from the first to the lowest, the importance of the cause, and what it is they are contending for. For ever keep in view the necessity of guarding against surprises. In all your marches, at times, at least, even when there is no possible danger, move with front, rear, and flank guards, that they may be familiarized to the use; and be regular in your encampments, appointing necessary guards for the security of your camp. In short, whether you expect an enemy or not, this should be practised; otherwise your attempts will be confused and awkward, when necessary. Be plain and precise in your orders, and keep copies of them to refer to, that no mistakes may happen. Be easy and condescending in your deportment to your officers, but not too familiar, lest you subject yourself to a want of that respect, which is necessary to support a proper command. These, Sir, not because I think you need the advice, but because you have been condescending enough to ask it, I have presumed to give as the great outlines of your conduct.

As to the manual exercise, the evolutions and manœuvres of a regiment, with other knowledge necessary to a soldier, you will acquire them from those authors, who have treated upon these subjects, among whom Bland (the newest edition) stands foremost; also an Essay on the Art of War; Instructions for Officers, lately published at Philadelphia; the Partisan; Young; and others.

My compliments to Mrs. Woodford; and that every success may attend you, in this glorious struggle, is the sincere and ardent wish of, dear Sir, your affectionate humble servant.[1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 11 November, 1775.

Sir,

I had the honor to address myself to you the 8th inst. by Captain Macpherson, since which I have an account of a schooner laden chiefly with fire wood being brought into Marblehead, by the armed schooner Lee, Captain Manly. She had on board the master, a midshipman, two marines, and four sailors, from the Cerberus, man of war, who had made a prize of this schooner a few days before, and was sending her into Boston.

Enclosed you have a copy of an act passed this session, by the honorable Council and House of Representatives of this province.¹ It respects such captures as may be made by vessels fitted out by the province, or by individuals thereof. As the armed vessels, fitted out at the Continental expense, do not come under this law, I would have it submitted to the consideration of Congress, to point out a more summary way of proceeding, to determine the property and mode of condemnation of such prizes, as have been or hereafter may be made, than is specified in this act.

Should not a court be established by authority of Congress, to take cognizance of prizes made by the Continental vessels? Whatever the mode is, which they are pleased to adopt, there is an absolute necessity of its being speedily determined on; for I cannot spare time from military affairs, to give proper attention to these matters.

The inhabitants of Plymouth have taken a sloop, laden with provisions, from Halifax, bound to Boston; and the inhabitants of Beverly have, under cover of one of the armed schooners, taken a vessel from Ireland, laden with beef, pork, butter, &c., for the same place. The latter brings papers and letters of a very interesting nature, which are in the hands of the honorable Council, who informed me they will transmit them to you by this conveyance. To the contents of these papers and letters I must beg leave to refer you and the honorable Congress, who will now see the absolute necessity of exerting all their wisdom, to withstand the mighty efforts of our enemies.

The trouble I have in the arrangement of the army is really inconceivable. Many of the officers sent in their names to serve, in expectation of promotion; others stood aloof to see what advantage they could make for themselves; whilst a number, who had declined, have again sent in their names to serve. So great has the confusion, arising from these and many other perplexing circumstances, been, that I found it absolutely impossible to fix this very interesting business exactly on the plan resolved on in the conference, though I have kept up to the spirit of it, as near as the nature and necessity of the case would admit of. The difficulty with the soldiers is as great, indeed more so, if possible, than with the officers. They will not enlist, until they know their colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, captain, &c.; so that it was necessary to fix the

officers the first thing; which is, at last, in some manner done; and I have given out enlisting orders. You, Sir, can much easier judge, than I can express, the anxiety of mind I must labor under on this occasion, especially at this time, when we may expect the enemy will begin to act on the arrival of their reinforcement, part of which is already come, and the remainder daily dropping in.¹ I have other distresses of a very alarming nature. The arms of our soldiery are so exceedingly bad, that I assure you, Sir, I cannot place a proper confidence in them. Our powder is wasting fast, notwithstanding the strictest care, economy, and attention are paid to it. The long series of wet weather, which we have had, renders the greater part of what has been served out to the men of no use. Yesterday I had a proof of it, as a party of the enemy, about four or five hundred, taking the advantage of a high tide, landed at Lechmere's Point, which at that time was in effect an island; we were alarmed, and of course ordered every man to examine his cartouch-box, when the melancholy truth appeared; and we were obliged to furnish the greater part of them with fresh ammunition.

The damage done at the Point was the taking of a man, who watched a few horses and cows; ten of the latter they carried off. Colonel Thompson marched down with his regiment of riflemen, and was joined by Colonel Woodbridge, with a part of his and a part of Patterson's regiment, who gallantly waded through the water, and soon obliged the enemy to embark under cover of a man-of-war, a floating battery, and the fire of a battery on Charlestown Neck. We have two of our men dangerously wounded by grape-shot from the man-of-war; and by a flag sent out this day, we are informed the enemy lost two of their men.¹ I have the honor to be, &c.²

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TO WILLIAM PALFREY, PORTSMOUTH.[3](#)

Cambridge, 12 November, 1775.

Sir,

At a time when some of our seaport towns are cruelly and wantonly laid in ashes, and ruin and devastation denounced against others; when the arms are demanded of the inhabitants, and hostages required (in effect) to surrender of their liberties; when General Howe by proclamation, under the threat of military execution, has forbid inhabitants of Boston to leave the town without his permission first had and obtained in writing; when, by another proclamation, he strictly forbids any persons bringing out of that place more than five pounds sterling of their property in specie, because truly the ministerial army under his command may be injured by it; and when, by a third proclamation, after leaving the inhabitants no alternative, he calls upon them to take arms under officers of his appointing; it is evident, that the most tyrannical and cruel system is adopted for the destruction of the rights and liberties of this continent, that ever disgraced the most despotic ministry, and ought to be opposed by every means in our power. I therefore desire, that you will delay no time in causing the seizure of every officer of government at Portsmouth, who has given proofs of his unfriendly disposition to the cause we are engaged in; and when you have secured all such, take the opinion of the provincial Congress, or Committee of Safety, in what manner to dispose of them in that government. I do not mean that they should be kept in close confinement. If either of those bodies should incline to send them to any interior towns, upon their parole not to leave them until released, it will meet with my concurrence. For the present I shall avoid giving you the like order in respect to the Tories in Portsmouth; but the day is not far off, when they will meet with this or a worse fate, if there is not a considerable reformation in their conduct. Of this they may be assured from, Sir, your most humble servant.[1](#)

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TO HENRY KNOX.

INSTRUCTIONS.

Cambridge, 16 November, 1775.

Sir,

You are immediately to examine into the state of the artillery of this army, and take an account of the cannon, mortars, shells, lead, and ammunition, that are wanting. When you have done that, you are to proceed in the most expeditious manner to New York, there apply to the President of the Provincial Congress, and learn of him, whether Colonel Reed did any thing, or left any orders respecting these articles, and get him to procure such of them as can possibly be had there.

The President, if he can, will have them immediately sent hither; if he cannot, you must put them in a proper channel for being transported to this camp with despatch, before you leave New York. After you have procured as many of these necessaries as you can there, you must go to Major-General Schuyler, and get the remainder from Ticonderoga, Crown Point, or St. John's; if it should be necessary, from Quebec, if in our hands. The want of them is so great, that no trouble or expense must be spared to obtain them. I have written to General Schuyler; he will give every necessary assistance, that they may be had and forwarded to this place with the utmost despatch. I have given you a warrant to the paymaster-general of the Continental army for a thousand dollars, to defray the expense attending your journey and procuring these articles; an account of which you are to keep and render upon your return.¹

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARTEMAS WARD.

Camp at Cambridge, 17 November, 1775.

Sir,

As the season is fast approaching, when the bay between us and Boston will in all probability be close shut up, thereby rendering any movement upon the ice as easy as if no water was there; and as it is more than possible, that General Howe, when he gets the expected reinforcement, will endeavor to relieve himself from the disgraceful confinement in which the ministerial troops have been all the summer; common prudence dictates the necessity of guarding our camps wherever they are most assailable. For this purpose, I wish you, General Thomas, General Spencer, and Colonel Putnam, to meet me at your quarters tomorrow at 10 o'clock, that we may examine the ground between your work at the Mill and Sewall's Point, and direct such batteries, as shall appear necessary for the security of your camp on that side, to be thrown up without loss of time.

I have long had it upon my mind, that a successful attempt might be made by way of surprise upon Castle William. From every account, there are not more than three hundred men in that place. The whale-boats, therefore, which you have, and such as could be sent you, would easily transport eight hundred or one thousand men, which, with a very moderate share of conduct and spirit, might, I should think, bring off the garrison, if not some part of the stores. I wish you to discuss this matter, (under the rose,) with officers on whose judgment and conduct you can rely. Something of this sort may show how far the men are to be depended upon. I am, &c. [1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 19 November, 1775.

Sir,

I received your favors of the 7th and 10th instant, with the resolves of the honorable Congress, to which I will pay all due attention. As soon as two capable persons can be found, I will despatch them to Nova Scotia, on the service resolved on by Congress. The resolve to raise two battalions of marines will, (if practicable in this army,) entirely derange what has been done. It is therein mentioned, "one colonel for the two battalions"; of course, a colonel must be dismissed. One of the many difficulties, which attended the new arrangement, was in reconciling the different interests, and judging of the merits of the different colonels. In the dismissal of this one, the same difficulties will occur. The officers and men must be acquainted with maritime affairs; to comply with which, they must be picked out of the whole army, one from this corps one from another, so as to break through the whole system, which it has cost us so much time, anxiety, and pains, to bring into any tolerable form. Notwithstanding any difficulties which will arise, you may be assured, Sir, that I will use every endeavor to comply with their resolve.

I beg leave to submit it to the consideration of Congress, if those two battalions can be formed out of this army, whether this is a time to weaken our lines, by employing any of the officers appointed to defend them on any other service? The gentlemen, who were here from Congress, know their vast extent; they must know, that we shall have occasion for our whole force for that purpose, more now than at any past time, as we may expect the enemy will take the advantage of the first hard weather, and attempt to make an impression somewhere. That this is the intention, we have many reasons to suspect. We have had in the last week six deserters, and took two straggling prisoners. They all agree that two companies with a train of artillery, and one of the regiments from Ireland, were arrived at Boston, that fresh ammunition and fruits have been served out, that the grenadiers and light infantry had orders to hold themselves in readiness at a moment's warning.

As there is every appearance, that this contest will not be soon decided, and of course that there must be an augmentation of the Continental army, would it not be eligible to raise two battalions of marines in New York and Philadelphia, where there must be numbers of sailors now unemployed? This, however, is matter of opinion, which I mention with all due deference to the superior judgment of the Congress.¹

Enclosed you have copies of two letters, one from Colonel Arnold, the other from Colonel Enos. I can form no judgment on the latter's conduct until I see him.² Notwithstanding the great defection, I do not despair of Colonel Arnold's success. He will have, in all probability, many more difficulties to encounter, than if he had been a fortnight sooner; as it is likely that Governor Carleton will, with what forces he

can collect after the surrender of the rest of Canada, throw himself into Quebec, and there make his last effort.

There is no late account from Captains Broughton and Sellman, sent to the River St. Lawrence. The other cruisers have been chiefly confined to harbors, by the badness of the weather. The same reason has caused great delay in the building of our barracks; which, with a most mortifying scarcity of firewood, discourages the men from enlisting. The last, I am much afraid, is an insuperable obstacle. I have applied to the honorable House of Representatives of this province, who were pleased to appoint a committee to negotiate this business; and, notwithstanding all the pains they have taken, and are taking, they find it impossible to supply our necessities. The want of a sufficient number of teams I understand to be the chief impediment.

I got returns this day from eleven colonels, of the numbers enlisted in their regiments. The whole amount is nine hundred and sixty-six men. There must be some other stimulus, besides love for their country, to make men fond of the service. It would be a great encouragement, and no additional expense to the continent, were they to receive pay for the months of October and November; also a month's pay advance. The present state of the military chest will not admit of this. The sooner it is enabled to do so the better.[1](#)

The commissary-general is daily expected in camp. I cannot send you the estimate of the clerks in his department, until he arrives.

I sincerely congratulate you upon the success of your arms, in the surrender of St. John's, which I hope is a happy presage of the reduction of the rest of Canada. I have the honor to be, &c.[2](#)

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Camp at Cambridge, 20 November, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your letters of the 4th from New York, 7th and — from Philadelphia (the last by express), are all before me, and gave me the pleasure to hear of your happy meeting with Mrs. Reed, without any other accident than that of leaving a horse by the way.

The hint contained in the last of your letters, respecting your continuance in my family, in other words, your wish that I could dispense with it, gives me pain. You already, my dear Sir, knew my sentiments on this matter; you cannot but be sensible of your importance to me; at the same time I shall again repeat, what I have observed to you before, that I can never think of promoting my convenience at the expense of your interest and inclination. That I feel the want of you, yourself can judge, when I inform you, that the peculiar situation of Mr. Randolph's affairs obliged him to leave this soon after you did; that Mr. Baylor, contrary to my expectation, is not in the slightest degree a penman, though spirited and willing; and that Mr. Harrison, though sensible, clever, and perfectly confidential, has never yet moved upon so large a scale, as to comprehend at one view the diversity of matter, which comes before me, so as to afford that ready assistance, which every man in my situation must stand more or less in need of. Mr. Moylan, it is true, is very obliging; he gives me what assistance he can; but other business must necessarily deprive me of his aid in a very short time. This is my situation; judge you, therefore, how much I wish for your return, especially as the armed vessels, and the capital change (in the state of this army) about to take place, have added an additional weight to a burthen, before too great for me to stand under with the smallest degree of comfort to my own feelings. My mind is now fully disclosed to you, with this assurance sincerely and affectionately of accompanying it, that whilst you are disposed to continue with me, I shall think myself too fortunate and happy to wish for a change.

Dr. Morgan, (as director of the hospital,) is exceedingly wanted at this place, and ought not to delay his departure for the camp a moment, many regulations being delayed, and accounts postponed, till his arrival. I have given G. S. and Col. P. a hint of the prevailing reports in Connecticut, without intimating from what quarter they came (for indeed I received them through different channels) in order to put them upon their guard; they both deny the charge roundly, and wish for an opportunity of vindication. I thought as this information had come to my ears in different ways, it was best to speak to these gentlemen in terms expressive of my abhorrence of such conduct, and of the consequences that might flow from it, and think it will have a good effect. The method you have suggested, of the advanced pay, I very much approve of, and would adopt, but for the unfortunate cramped state of our treasury, which keeps us for ever under the hatches. Pray urge the necessity of this measure to such members as you may converse with, and the want of cash to pay the troops for

the months of October and November; as also to answer the demands of the commissary, quartermaster, and for contingencies. To do all this, a considerable sum will be necessary. Do not neglect to put that wheel in motion, which is to bring us the shirts, medicines, &c. from New York; they are much wanting here, and cannot be had, I should think, upon better terms than on a loan from the best of Kings, so anxiously disposed to promote the welfare of his American subjects.

Dr. Church is gone to Governor Trumbull, to be disposed of in a Connecticut gaol, without the use of pen, ink, or paper, to be conversed with in the presence of a magistrate only, and in the English language. So much for indiscretion, the Doctor will say. Your accounts of our dependence upon the people of Great Britain, I religiously believe. It has long been my political creed, that the ministry durst not have gone on as they did, but under the firmest persuasion that the people were with them. The weather has been unfavorable, however, for the arrival of their transports; only four companies of the seventeenth regiment and two of the artillery are yet arrived, by our last advices from Boston.

Our rascally privateersmen go on at the old rate, mutinying if they cannot do as they please.¹ Those at Plymouth, Beverly, and Portsmouth, have done nothing worth mentioning in the prize way, and no accounts are yet received from those farther eastward.

Arnold, by a letter which left him the 27th ultimo, had then only got to the Chaudière Pond, and was scarce of provisions. His rear division, under the command of the *noble* Colonel Enos, had, without his privity or consent, left him with three companies; and his expedition, (inasmuch as it is to be apprehended, that Carleton, with the remains of such force as he had been able to raise, would get into Quebec before him,) I fear, in a bad way. For further particulars I refer you to Mr. Hancock who has enclosed to him copies of Arnold's and Enos's letters. The last-named person is not yet arrived at this camp.

I thank you for your frequent mention of Mrs. Washington. I expect she will be in Philadelphia about the time this letter may reach you, on her way hither. As she and her conductor, (who I expect will be Mr. Custis, her son,) are perfect strangers to the road, the stages, and the proper place to cross Hudson's River, (by all means avoiding New York,) I shall be much obliged in your particular instructions and advice to her. I do imagine, as the roads are bad and the weather cold, her stages must be short, especially as I expect her horses will be pretty much fatigued; as they will, by the time she gets to Philadelphia, have performed a journey of at least four hundred and fifty miles, my express finding of her among her friends near Williamsburg, one hundred and fifty miles below my own house.

As you have mentioned nothing in your letters of the cannon, &c., to be had from New York, Ticonderoga, &c., I have, in order to reduce the matter to a certainty, employed Mr. Knox to go to those places, complete our wants, and to provide such military stores as St. John's can spare.

My respectful compliments to Mrs. Reed, and be assured that I am, dear Sir, with affectionate regard, &c.

Flints are greatly wanted here.[1](#)

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TO AARON WILLARD.

INSTRUCTIONS.

Sir,

The honorable Continental Congress having lately passed a resolve, expressed in the following words,—“That two persons be sent, at the expense of these colonies, to Nova Scotia to inquire into the state of that colony, the disposition of the inhabitants towards the American cause, the condition of the fortifications and dock-yards, the quantity of artillery and warlike stores, and the number of soldiers, sailors, and ships of war there, and transmit the earliest intelligence to General Washington”; I do hereby constitute and appoint you, the said Aaron Willard, to be one of the persons to undertake this business; and, as the season is late and this work of great importance, I entreat and request, that you will use the utmost despatch, attention, and fidelity in the execution of it. The necessity of acting with a proper degree of caution and secrecy is too apparent to need recommendation.

You will keep an account of your expenses, and, upon your return, will be rewarded in a suitable manner for the fatigue of your journey, and the services you render your country, by conducting and discharging this business with expedition and fidelity. Given under my hand, this 24th day of November, 1775.¹

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TO LUND WASHINGTON, MOUNT VERNON.¹

Cambridge, 26 November, 1775.

What follows is part of a letter written to Mr. Lund Washington, the 26th day of November, 1775. A copy is taken to remind me of my engagements and the exact purport of them. These paragraphs follow an earnest request to employ good part of my force in clearing up swamps, h. hole, ditching, hedging, &c.

“I well know where the difficulty of accomplishing these things will lie. Overseers are already engaged (upon shares), to look after my business. Remote advantages to me, however manifest and beneficial, are nothing to them; and to engage standing wages, when I do not know that any thing that I have, or can raise, will command cash, is attended with hazard; for which reason, I hardly know what more to say, than to discover my wishes. The same reason, although it may in appearance have the same tendency in respect to you, shall not be the same in its operation; for I will engage for the year coming, and the year following, if these troubles and my absence continue, that your wages shall be standing and certain, at the highest amount, that any one year’s crop has produced to you yet. I do not offer this as any temptation to induce *you* to go on more cheerfully in prosecuting *these* schemes of *mine*. I should do injustice to you, were I not to acknowledge, that your conduct has ever appeared to me above every thing sordid; but I offer it in consideration of the great charge you have upon your hands, and my entire dependence upon your fidelity and industry.

“It is the greatest, indeed it is the only comfortable reflection I enjoy on this score, that my business is in the hands of a person in whose integrity I have not a doubt, and on whose care I can rely. Was it not for this, I should feel very unhappy, on account of the situation of my affairs; but I am persuaded you will do for me as you would for yourself, and more than this I cannot expect.

“Let the hospitality of the house, with respect to the poor, be kept up. Let no one go hungry away. If any of this kind of people should be in want of corn, supply their necessities, provided it does not encourage them in idleness; and I have no objection to your giving my money in charity, to the amount of forty or fifty pounds a year, when you think it well bestowed. What I mean by having no objection is, that it is my desire that it should be done. You are to consider, that neither myself nor wife is now in the way to do these good offices. In all other respects, I recommend it to you, and have no doubt of your observing the greatest economy and frugality; as I suppose you know, that I do not get a farthing for my services here, more than my expenses. It becomes necessary, therefore, for me to be saving at home.”

The above is copied, not only to remind myself of my promises and requests, but others also, if any mischance happens to

G. Washington.

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TO RICHARD HENRY LEE.

Camp at Cambridge, 27 November, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your favor of the 13th, with the enclosures, for which I thank you, came to this place on Wednesday evening; part of which, that is, the night, I was engaged with a party of men throwing up a work upon a hill, called Cobble Hill, which, in case we should ever be supplied with such things as we want, may prove useful to us, and could not be delayed, as the earth here is getting as hard as a rock,¹ This, and the early departure of the post, prevented my giving your letter an answer the next morning.

In answer to your inquiries respecting armed vessels, there are none of any tolerable force belonging to this government. I know of but two of any kind; those very small. At the Continental expense, I have fitted out six, as by the enclosed list, two of which are upon the cruise directed by Congress; the rest ply about Cape Cod and Cape Ann, as yet to very little purpose. These vessels are all manned by officers and soldiers, except perhaps a master and pilots; but how far, as they are upon the old establishment, which has not more than a month to exist, they can be ordered off this station, I will not undertake to say, but suppose they might be engaged anew. Belonging to Providence there are two armed vessels; and I am told Connecticut has one, which, with one of those from Providence, is, I believe, upon the cruise you have directed.

I have no idea that the troops can remove from Boston this winter to a place, where no provision is made for them; however, we shall keep the best lookout we can; and upon that, and every occasion where practicable, give them the best we have. But their situation in Boston gives them but little to apprehend from a parting blow, whilst their ships can move, and floating batteries surround the town.

Nothing of importance has happened since my last. For God's sake hurry the signers of money, that our wants may be supplied. It is a very singular case, that their signing cannot keep pace with our demands. I heartily congratulate you and the Congress on the reduction of St. John's. I hope all Canada is in our possession before this. No accounts from Arnold since those mentioned in my last letter to the Congress. Would it not be politic to invite them to send members to Congress? Would it not be also politic to raise a regiment or two of Canadians, and bring them out of the country? They are good troops, and this would be entering them heartily in the cause.¹ My best regards to the good families you are with. I am, very affectionately, your obedient servant.

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 27 November, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your letter of the 16th by Post now lyes before me, & I thank you for the attention paid to my Memorandums; the arrival of Money will be an agreeable Circumstance.

I recollect no occurance of moment since my last, except the taking possession of Cobble Hill on Wednesday night. This to my great surprize we did, and have worked on ever since, without receiving a single shott from Bunkers Hill,—the ship—or Floating Batteries—what all this means we know not unless some capitol strike is meditating—I have caused two half Moon Batteries to be thrown up for occasional use, between Litchmore's Point & the mouth of Cambridge River; and another Work at the Causey going on to Litchmores point to command that pass & rake the little Rivulet which runs by it to Patterson's Fort. Besides these I have been, & mark'd three places between Sewall's point & our Lines on Roxbury Neck for Works to be thrown up and occasionally mann'd in case of a Sortee, when the Bay gets froze.

By order of Genl. Howe, 300 of the poor Inhabitants of Boston were landed on Saturday last at point Shirley, destitute almost of every thing; the Instant I got notice of it, I informed a Committee of Council thereof, that proper care might be taken of them—Yesterday in the evening I received information that one of them was dead, & two more expiring; and the whole in the most miserable & piteous condition.—I have order'd Provision to them till they can be remov'd, but am under dreadful apprehensions of their communicating the small Pox as it is Rief in Boston. I have forbid any of them coming to this place on that acct.

A Ship well fraught with Ordinance, Ordinance Stores, &c., is missing and gives great uneasiness in Boston, her Convoy has been in a fortnight—I have order'd our Arm'd Vessels to keep a good look out for her. The same reasons which restrained you from writing fully, also prevent me. I shall therefore only add that I am, &c.

If any waggon should be coming this way, Pray order a qty of good writing Paper to head Quarters, & Sea'g Wax.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Camp at Cambridge, 28 November, 1775.

Sir,

I had the honor of writing to you on the 19th instant. I have now to inform you that Mr. Henry Knox, Esq. is gone to New York, with orders to forward to this place what cannon and ordnance stores can be there procured. From thence he will proceed to General Schuyler on the same business, as you will see by the enclosed copy of instructions, which I have given him. It would give me much satisfaction, that this gentleman, or any other whom you may think qualified, were appointed to the command of the artillery regiment. In my letter to you of the 8th instant, I have expressed myself fully on this subject, which I beg leave to recommend to your immediate attention; as the formation of that corps will be at a stand, until I am honored with your instructions thereon. The vessel laden with wine which I advised you was wrecked on this coast, proves to have been the property of Thomas Satler of Philadelphia. The papers relative to her and cargo were sent to Robert Morris, Esqr. who can give you every information thereon. The schooner with the dry goods from Boston to Halifax, is given up to the Committee of Safety at Beverly, who will dispose of her and cargo, agreeable to the decision of a Court of Admiralty, and the schooner, carried into Portsmouth by Captain Adams, proves to be a friend, is of course discharged.

There are two persons engaged to go to Nova Scotia, on the business recommended in your last. By the best information we have from thence, the stores have been withdrawn some time. Should this not be the case, it is next to an impossibility to attempt any thing there, in the present unsettled and precarious state of the army.

Colonel Enos is arrived, and is under arrest; he acknowledges, that he had no orders for coming away. His trial cannot come on until I hear from Colonel Arnold, from whom there is no account since I last wrote you.

From what I can collect by my inquiries amongst the officers, it will be impossible to get the men to enlist for the continuance of the war, which will be an insuperable obstruction to the formation of the two battalions of marines on the plan resolved on in Congress.¹ As it can make no difference, I propose to proceed on the new arrangement of the army, and, when completed, inquire out such officers and men as are best qualified for that service, and endeavor to form these two battalions out of the whole. This appears to me the best method, and I hope it will meet the approbation of Congress.

As it will be very difficult for the men to work, when the hard frost sets in, I have thought it necessary, (though of little use at present,) to take possession of Cobble Hill, for the benefit of any future operations. It was effected, without the least

opposition from the enemy, the 23d instant. Their inactivity on this occasion is what I cannot account for; it is probable they are meditating a blow somewhere.

About three hundred men, women, and children of the poor inhabitants of Boston, came out to Point Shirley last Friday. They have brought their household furniture, but unprovided of every other necessary of life. I have recommended them to the attention of the committee of the honorable Council of this province, now sitting at Watertown.

The number enlisted since my last is two thousand five hundred and forty men. I am very sorry to be necessitated to mention to you the egregious want of public spirit, which reigns here. Instead of pressing to be engaged in the cause of their country, which I vainly flattered myself would be the case, I find we are likely to be deserted, and in a most critical time. Those that have enlisted must have a furlough, which I have been obliged to grant to fifty at a time, from each regiment. The Connecticut troops, upon whom I reckoned, are as backward, indeed, if possible, more so than the people of this colony. Our situation is truly alarming; and of this General Howe is well apprized, it being the common topic of conversation, when the people left Boston last Friday. No doubt, when he is reinforced, he will avail himself of the information.[1](#)

I am making the best disposition I can for our defence, having thrown up, besides the work on Cobble Hill, several redoubts, half-moons, &c., along the bay; and I fear I shall be under the necessity of calling in the militia and minute-men of the country to my assistance. I say, I fear it, because, by what I can learn from the officers in the army belonging to this colony, it will be next to an impossibility to keep them under any degree of discipline, and it will be very difficult to prevail on them to remain a moment longer, than they choose themselves. It is a mortifying reflection, to be reduced to this dilemma. There has been nothing wanting on my part to infuse a proper spirit amongst the officers, that they may exert their influence with the soldiery. You see, by a fortnight's recruiting amongst men with arms in their hands, how little has been the success.

As the smallpox is now in Boston, I have used the precaution of prohibiting such, as lately came out, from coming near our camp. General Burgoyne, I am informed, will soon embark for England. I think the risque too great to write you by post whilst it continues to pass thro' New York. It is certain that a post has been intercepted the beginning of last month, as they sent out several letters from Boston with the postmark at Baltimore on them. This goes by Captain Joseph Blewer, who promises to deliver it carefully unto you.

You doubtless will have heard, before this reaches you, of General Montgomery's having got possession of Montreal.[1](#) I congratulate you thereon. He has troubles with his troops, as well as I have. All I can learn of Colonel Arnold is, that he is near Quebec. I hope Montgomery will be able to proceed to his assistance. I shall be very uneasy until I hear they are joined.

My best respects attend the gentlemen in Congress; and believe me, Sir, your most obedient, &c.[2](#)

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 28 November, 1775.

Dear Sir,

By post I wrote you yesterday in answer to your letter of the 16th, since which your favors of the 15th and 17th are come to hand. In one of these you justly observe, that the sudden departure of Mr. Randolph must cause your absence to be the more sensibly felt. I can truly assure you, that I miss you exceedingly, and if an express declaration of this be wanting to hasten your return, I make it most heartily; and with some pleasure, as Mr. Lynch in a letter of the 13th (received with yours) gives this information. "In consequence of your letter by Colonel Reed, I applied to the chief justice, who tells me the Supreme Courts are lately held, and that it will be some time before their term will return; that he knows of no capital suit now depending, and that it is very easy for Colonel Reed to manage matters so as not to let that prevent his return to you; I am sure Mr. Chew is so heartily disposed to oblige you, and serve the cause, that nothing in his power will be wanting." I could wish, my good friend, that these things may give a spur to your inclination to return; and that I may see you here as soon as convenient, as I feel the want of your ready pen, &c., greatly.

What an astonishing thing it is, that those who are employed to sign the Continental bills should not be able, or inclined, to do it as fast as they are wanted. They will prove the destruction of the army, if they are not more attentive and diligent. Such a dearth of public spirit, and want of virtue, such stock-jobbing, and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantages of one kind or another, in this great change of military arrangement, I never saw before, and pray God I may never be witness to again. What will be the ultimate end of these manœuvres is beyond my scan. I tremble at the prospect. We have been till this time enlisting about three thousand five hundred men. To engage these I have been obliged to allow furloughs as far as fifty men a regiment, and the officers I am persuaded indulge as many more. The Connecticut troops will not be prevailed upon to stay longer than their term (saving those who have enlisted for the next campaign, and mostly on furlough), and such a dirty, mercenary spirit pervades the whole, that I should not be at all surprised at any disaster that may happen. In short, after the last of this month our lines will be so weakened, that the minute-men and militia must be called in for their defence; these, being under no kind of government themselves, will destroy the little subordination I have been laboring to establish, and run me into one evil whilst I am endeavoring to avoid another; but the lesser must be chosen. Could I have foreseen what I have, and am likely to experience, no consideration upon earth should have induced me to accept this command. A regiment or any subordinate department would have been accompanied with ten times the satisfaction, and perhaps the honor.¹

I think I informed you in my letter of yesterday that we had taken possession of, and had fortified Cobble Hill, and several points round the Bay, between that and

Roxbury. In a night or two more, we shall begin our work on Lechmore's Point; when doubtless we shall be honored with their notice, unless General Howe is waiting the favorable moment he has been told of, to aim a capital blow; which is my fixed opinion.

The Congress already know, from the general estimate given in (for a month), what sum it will take to supply this army; and that little less than two hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars will answer the purpose.

Pray impress this upon the members, and the necessity of forwarding the last sum voted, as one hundred thousand dollars will be but a flea-bite to our demands at this time. Did I not in one of my late letters inform you that I had sent Mr. Knox through New York to General Schuyler to see what artillery I could get from those places? He has been set out upon this business about ten days, and I hope will fall in with the Committee of Congress. Powder is also so much wanted, that nothing without it can be done.

I wish that matter respecting the punctilio, hinted at by you, could come to some decision of Congress. I have done nothing yet in respect to the proposed exchange of prisoners, nor shall I now, until I hear from them or you on this subject. I am sorry Mr. White met with a disappointment in the Jerseys; as I could wish not to be under the necessity, from any former encouragement given him, of taking him into my family. I find it is absolutely necessary that the aids to the Commander-in-chief should be ready at their pen, (which I believe he is not,) to give that ready assistance, that is expected of them. I shall make a lame hand therefore to have two of this kidney. It would give me singular pleasure to provide for those two gentlemen, mentioned in your letter; but, believe me, it is beyond the powers of conception to discover the absurdities and partiality of these people, and the trouble and vexation I have had in the new arrangement of officers. After five, I think, different meetings of the general officers, I have in a manner been obliged to give in to the humor and whimsies of the people, or get no army. The officers of one government would not serve in the regiments of another, (although there was to be an entire new creation;) a captain must be in this regiment, a subaltern in that company. In short, I can scarce tell at this moment in what manner they are fixed. Some time hence strangers may be brought in; but it could not be done now, except in an instance or two, without putting too much to the hazard.¹

I have this instant by express received the agreeable news of the capitulation of Montreal. The account of it, you also undoubtedly have. Poor Arnold, I wonder where he is. Enos left him with the rear division of his army, and is now here under arrest.

What can your brethren of the law mean, by saying your perquisites as secretary must be considerable? I am sure they have not amounted to one farthing. Captain Blewer waits, and therefore I shall add no more than that I am, dear Sir, your most obedient and affectionate servant.

P. S. Please to let Col. Lee know that I answered his query by last post respecting the armed vessels of this Province, and those fitted out by the Continent.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Cambridge, 28 November, 1775.

Dear Sir,

You may easily conceive, that I had great pleasure in perusing your letter of the 18th instant, which, with the enclosures, I received last evening. It was much damped by my finding that General Montgomery had the same difficulties to encounter, with the troops under your command, that I have with these here.¹ No troops were ever better provided, or higher paid; yet their backwardness to enlist for another year is amazing. It grieves me to see so little of that patriotic spirit, which I was taught to believe was characteristic of this people.

Colonel Enos, who had the command of Arnold's rear division, is returned with the greater part of his men, which must weaken him so much, as to render him incapable of making a successful attack on Quebec, without assistance from General Montgomery. I hope he will be able to give it him, and, by taking that city, finish his glorious campaign. I have nothing material to communicate to you from hence. I am making every disposition for defence, by throwing up redoubts, &c., along the Bay; some of which have been constructed under the enemy's guns, but they have not given us the least disturbance. I suppose Mr. Howe waits the arrival of his reinforcements, when probably he will attempt something. He sent out about three hundred men, women, and children last week. They give shocking accounts of the want of fuel and fresh provisions.¹ General Burgoyne is gone, or going home.

November 30. Last evening I received the agreeable account of one of our armed schooners having taken a large brigantine, laden with military stores, the inventory of which I have the pleasure to enclose.² But let not this acquisition prevent your sending what stores you can spare. We shall want them all. Adieu, my dear General. I wish you a return of your health, and am, &c.³

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TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Cambridge, 2 December, 1775.

Sir,

The reason of my giving you the trouble of this, is the late extraordinary and reprehensible conduct of some of the Connecticut troops. Some time ago, apprehending that some of them might incline to go home, when the time of their enlistment should be up, I applied to the officers of the several regiments, to know whether it would be agreeable to the men to continue till the 1st of January, or until a sufficient number of other forces could be raised to supply their place, who informed me, that they believed the whole of them would readily stay, till that could be effected. Having discovered last week, that they were very uneasy to leave the service, and determined upon it, I thought it expedient to summon the general officers at head-quarters, and invited a delegation of the General Court to be present,¹ that suitable measures might be adopted for the defence and support of our lines. The result was that three thousand of the minute-men and militia of this province, and two thousand men from New Hampshire, should be called in, by the 10th instant, for that purpose. With this determination the Connecticut troops were made acquainted, and requested and ordered to remain here, as the time of most of them would not be out before the 10th, when they would be relieved. Notwithstanding this, yesterday morning most of them resolved to leave the camp. Many went off, and though the utmost vigilance and industry were used to apprehend them, several got away with their arms and ammunition. I have enclosed you a list of the names of some of them in General Putnam's regiment only, who escaped, and submit to your judgment, whether some example should not be made of these men, who have basely deserted the cause of their country at this critical juncture, when the enemy are receiving reinforcements.²

I have the pleasure to inform you, that one of our armed vessels, the Lee, Captain Manly, took and brought in the other day a valuable store-ship bound to Boston. I am, &c.¹³

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 4 December, 1775.

Sir,

I had the honor of writing to you on the 30th. ult., inclosing inventory of the military stores, taken on board the brig Nancy, by Capt. Manly, of the armed schooner Lee. I have now to inform you that he has since sent into Beverley a ship named the Concord, James Lowrie, master, from Greenock in Scotland, bound to Boston. She has on board dry goods and coals to the value of £3606. 9. 7. sterling, shipped by Crawford, Anderson, & Co, and consigned to James Anderson, merchant in Boston. It is mentioned in the letters found on board, that this cargo was for the use of the army, but on a strict examination I find it is really the property of the shippers and the person to whom consigned. Pray what is to be done with this ship and cargo? And what with the brigantine which brought the military stores?

It was agreed in the conference last October, “that all vessels employed merely as transports and unarmed, with their crews, to be set at liberty upon giving security to return to Europe, but that this indulgence be not extended longer than till the first of April next.” In the shipper’s letter they mention: “that you must procure a certificate from the general and admiral of the Concord’s being in the government service, such as the Glasgow packet brought with her, which was of great service, procured a liberty to arm her which was refused us; also gave her a preference for some recruits that went out in her.” In another part of their letter they say: “Captain Lowrie will deliver you the contract for the coals. We gave it to him, as it perhaps might be of use as a certificate of his ship’s being employed in the government service.” Every letter on board breathes nothing but enmity to this country, and a vast number of them there are.^{[1](#)}

It is some time since I recommended to the Congress, that they would institute a court for the trial of prizes made by the Continental armed vessels, which I hope they have ere now taken into their consideration; otherwise I should again take the liberty of urging it in the most pressing manner.

The scandalous conduct of a great number of the Connecticut troops has laid me under the necessity of calling in a body of the militia, much sooner than I apprehended there would be an occasion for such a step. I was afraid some time ago, that they would incline to go home when the time of their enlistment expired. I called upon the officers of the several regiments, to know whether they could prevail on the men to remain until the 1st of January, or till a sufficient number of other forces could be raised to supply their place. I suppose they were deceived themselves. I know they deceived me by assurances, that I need be under no apprehension on that score, for the men would not leave the lines. Last Friday showed how much they were mistaken, as the major part of the troops of that colony were going away with their arms and

ammunition. We have, however, by threats, persuasions, and the activity of the people of the country, who sent back many of them, that had set out, prevailed upon the most part to stay. There are about eighty of them missing.[1](#)

I have called in three thousand men from this province; and General Sullivan, who lately returned from the province of New Hampshire, having informed me that a number of men were there ready at the shortest notice, I have demanded two thousand from that province. These two bodies, I expect, will be in by the tenth instant, to make up the deficiency of the Connecticut men, whom I have promised to dismiss on that day, as well as the numbers to whom I was obliged to grant furloughs before any would enlist. As the same defection is much to be apprehended, when the time of the Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island forces is expired, I beg the attention of Congress to this important affair.[1](#)

I am informed, that it has been the custom of these provinces in the last war, for the legislative power to order every town to provide a certain quota of men for the campaign. This, or some other mode, should be at present adopted, as I am satisfied the men cannot be had without. This the Congress will please to take into their immediate consideration. My suspicions on this head I shall also communicate to the Governors Trumbull and Cooke, also to the New Hampshire Convention.

The number enlisted in the last week is about thirteen hundred men. By this you see how slow this important work goes on. Enclosed is a letter written to me by General Putnam, recommending Colonel Babcock[1](#) to the brigadier-generalship now vacant in this army. I know nothing of this gentleman, but I wish the vacancy was filled, as the want of one is attended with very great inconveniences. An express is just come in from General Schuyler, with letters from Colonel Arnold and General Montgomery, copies of which I have the honor to enclose. Upon the whole, I think affairs carry a pleasing aspect in that quarter. The reduction of Quebec is an object of such great importance, that I doubt not the Congress will give every assistance in their power for the accomplishing it this winter.[2](#)

By the last accounts from the armed schooners sent to the River St. Lawrence, I fear we have but little to expect from them. They were falling short of provision, and mentioned that they would be obliged to return; which at this time is particularly unfortunate, as, if they chose a proper station, all the vessels coming down that river must fall into their hands.[1](#) The plague, trouble, and vexation I have had with the crews of all the armed vessels, are inexpressible. I do believe there is not on earth a more disorderly set. Every time they come into port, we hear of nothing but mutinous complaints. Manly's success has lately, and but lately, quieted his people. The crews of the Washington and Harrison have actually deserted them; so that I have been under the necessity of ordering the agent to lay the latter up, and get hands for the other on the best terms he could.[1](#)

The House of Representatives and the honorable Board have sent me a vote of theirs relative to the harbor of Cape Cod, which you have herewith. I shall send an officer thither to examine what can be done for its defence, though I do not think I shall be able to give them such assistance as may be requisite; for I have at present neither

men, powder, nor cannon to spare. The great want of powder is what the attention of Congress should be particularly applied to. I dare not attempt any thing offensive, let the temptation or advantage be ever so great, as I have not more of that most essential article, than will be absolutely necessary to defend our lines, should the enemy attempt to attack them.

By recent information from Boston, General Howe is going to send out a number of the inhabitants, in order, it is thought, to make more room for his expected reinforcements. There is one part of the information I can hardly give credit to. A sailor says, that a number of those coming out have been inoculated, with the design of spreading the smallpox through this country, and camp. I have communicated this to the General Court, and recommended their attention thereto. They are arming one of the transports in Boston, with which they mean to decoy some of our armed vessels. As we are apprized of their design, I hope they will be disappointed. My best respects wait on the gentlemen in Congress, and I am, Sir, your most humble, &c.

P. S. I was misinformed when I mentioned that one regiment had arrived at Boston. A few companies of the 17th and artillery were all that are yet come. Near 300 persons are landed on Point Shirley from Boston.[1](#)

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TO GOVERNOR COOKE.

Cambridge, 5 December, 1775.

Sir,

I have of late met with abundant reason to be convinced of the impracticability of recruiting this army to the new establishment, in any reasonable time by voluntary enlistments. The causes of such exceeding great lukewarmness I shall not undertake to point out; sufficient it is to know, that the fact is so. Many reasons are assigned; one only I shall mention, and that is, that the present soldiery are in expectation of drawing from the landed interest and farmers a bounty, equal to the allowance at the commencement of this army, and that therefore they play off. Be this as it may, I am satisfied that this is not a time for trifling, and that the exigency of our affairs calls aloud for vigorous exertions.

By sad experience it is found, that the Connecticut regiments have deserted, and are about to desert, the noble cause we are engaged in. Nor have I any reason to believe, that the forces of New Hampshire, this government, or Rhode Island, will give stronger proofs of their attachment to it, when the period arrives that they may claim their dismissal. For after every stimulus in my power to throw in their way, and near a month's close endeavor, we have enlisted — men, one thousand five hundred of which are to be absent at a time on furlough, until all have gone home in order to visit and provide for their families.

Five thousand militia, from this government and the colony of New Hampshire, are ordered to be at this place by the 10th instant, to relieve the Connecticut regiments and supply the deficiency, which will be occasioned by their departure and of those on furlough.¹ These men, I have been told by officers, who were eyewitnesses to their behavior, are not to be depended on for more than a few days; as they soon get tired, grow impatient, ungovernable, and of course leave the service. What will be the consequence, then, if the greatest part of the army is to be composed of such men? Upon the new establishment twenty-six regiments were ordered to be raised, besides those of the artillery and riflemen; of these New Hampshire has three, Massachusetts sixteen, Rhode Island two, and Connecticut five. A mode of appointing the officers was also recommended, and as strictly adhered to as circumstances would admit of. These officers are now recruiting, with the success I have mentioned.

Thus, Sir, have I given you a true and impartial state of our situation, and submit it to the wisdom of your and the other three New England colonies, whether some vigorous measures, if the powers of government are adequate, ought not to be adopted, to facilitate the completion of this army without offering a bounty from the public, which Congress have declared against, thinking the terms, exclusive thereof, greater than ever soldiers had.¹ I have, by this conveyance, laid the matter before

Congress, but the critical situation of our affairs will not await their deliberation and recommendation; something must be done without further delay.

I Am, Sir, &C.[2](#)

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Cambridge, 5 December, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your much esteemed favor of the 22d ultimo, covering Colonel Arnold's letter, with a copy of one to General Montgomery and his to you, I received yesterday morning. It gave me the highest satisfaction to hear of Colonel Arnold's being at Point Levi, with his men in great spirits, after their long, fatiguing march, attended with almost insuperable difficulties, and the discouraging circumstance of being left by near one third of the troops, that went on the expedition. The merit of this gentleman is certainly great, and I heartily wish, that fortune may distinguish him as one of her favorites. I am convinced, that he will do every thing that prudence and valor shall suggest, to add to the success of our arms and for reducing Quebec to our possession. Should he not be able to accomplish so desirable a work with the forces he has, I flatter myself, that it will be effected when General Montgomery joins him, and our conquest of Canada be complete.

I am exceeding sorry to find you so much plagued and embarrassed by the disregard of discipline, confusion, and want of order among the troops, as to have occasioned you to mention to Congress an inclination to retire. I know that your complaints are too well founded; but I would willingly hope, that nothing will induce you to quit the service, and that, in time, order and subordination will take place of confusion, and command be rendered more agreeable. I have met with difficulties of the same sort, and such as I never expected; but they must be borne with. The cause we are engaged in is so just and righteous, that we must try to rise superior to every obstacle in its support; and, therefore, I beg that you will not think of resigning, unless you have carried your application to Congress too far to recede. I am, dear Sir, with great esteem and regard, yours, &c.[1](#)

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TO COLONEL BENEDICT ARNOLD.

Cambridge, 5 December, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your letter of the 8th ultimo, with a postscript of the 14th from Point Levi, I have had the pleasure to receive. It is not in the power of any man to command success, but you have done more, you have deserved it²; and before this I hope you will have met with the laurels, which are due to your toils, in the possession of Quebec. My thanks are due, and sincerely offered to you, for your enterprising and persevering spirit. To your brave followers I likewise present them. I was not unmindful of you, or them, in the establishment of a new army. One out of twenty-six regiments (lately General Putnam's) you are appointed to the command of, and I have ordered all the officers with you to the one or the other of these regiments, in the rank they now bear, that in case they choose to continue in service, and no appointments take place where they now are, no disappointment may follow.

Nothing very material has happened in this camp since you left it. Finding we were not likely to do much in the land way, I fitted out several privateers, or rather armed vessels, in behalf of the continent, with which we have taken several prizes to the amount, it is supposed, of fifteen thousand pounds sterling; one of them, a valuable store-ship, (but no powder in it,) containing a fine brass mortar, thirteen-inch, two thousand stand of arms, shot, &c. &c.

I have no doubt but a juncture of your detachment with the army under General Montgomery is effected before this. If so, you will put yourself under his command, and will, I am persuaded, give him all the assistance in your power, to finish the glorious work you have begun. That the Almighty may preserve and prosper you in it, is the sincere and fervent prayer of, dear Sir, &c.

P. S. You could not be more surprised than I was, at Enos's return with the division under his command. I immediately put him under arrest, and had him tried for quitting the detachment without your orders. He is acquitted on the score of provisions.¹

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 11 December, 1775.

Sir,

Captain Manly, of the *Lee* armed schooner, has taken and sent into Beverly two prizes since I wrote you last, (which was the 7th instant.) One of them is the ship *Jenny*, Captain Forster, who left London late in October. He has very unfortunately thrown all his papers overboard, and is not yet arrived at camp. If he does before I close this, I will let you know what information I get from him. His vessel is loaded with coal and porter; of the latter he has about one hundred butts. The other is a brigantine from Antigua, called the *Little Hannah*, Robert Adams, master. Her cargo consists of one hundred and thirty-nine hogsheads of rum, one hundred cases of Geneva, and some other trifling articles.¹ Both cargoes were for the army and navy at Boston. I have great pleasure in congratulating you on this business.

The numbers enlisted last week are NA men. If they go on at this slow rate, it will be a long time before this army is complete. I have wrote to the Governors of Connecticut and Rhode Island, also to the Convention of New Hampshire, on this subject. A copy of my letter to them I have the honor to enclose herewith. A letter to the same purport I sent to the legislature of this province.

The militia are coming in fast. I am much pleased with the alacrity, which the good people of this province, as well [as] those of New Hampshire, have shown upon this occasion. I expect the whole will be in this day and to-morrow, when what remains of the Connecticut gentry, who have not enlisted, will have liberty to go to their firesides. The Commissary General is still (by his indisposition) detained from camp. He committed an error when making out the ration list, for he was then serving out, and has continued so to do, six ounces pr. man pr. week of butter, tho' it is not included in the list approved of by Congress. I do not think it would be expedient to put a stop thereto, as everything that would have a tendency to give the soldiery room for complaint, must be avoided.

The information I received, that the enemy intended spreading the smallpox amongst us, I could not suppose them capable of. I now must give some credit to it, as it has made its appearance on several of those, who last came out of Boston. Every necessary precaution has been taken to prevent its being communicated to this army; and the General Court will take care, that it does not spread through the country.

I have not heard that any more troops are arrived at Boston; which is a lucky circumstance, as the Connecticut troops, I now find, are for the most part gone off.¹ The houses in Boston are lessening every day; they are pulled down, either for fire-wood, or to prevent the effects of fire, should we attempt a bombardment or an attack

upon the town. Cobble Hill is strongly fortified, without any interruption from the enemy.¹

Colonel Enos has been tried and acquitted; upon what principle you will see by the process of his trial, which I now send you. As the time of Colonel Enos's engagement was near expired, a doubt arose whether he could then be tried by a court-martial. This it was, which occasioned his trial to come on before Colonel Arnold's evidence could be had.² This is what at present occurs from, Sir, &c.

P. S. The weekly returns of enlistment not being yet received for more than ten regiments, amounting to 725 men, I cannot fill up the blank in this letter; but this added to the former makes in the whole, 5253.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.[1](#)

Cambridge, 14 December, 1775.

Sir,

I received your favor of the 2d instant, with the several resolves of Congress therein enclosed. The resolves relative to captures made by Continental armed vessels only want a court established for trial, to make them complete. This, I hope, will be soon done, as I have taken the liberty to urge it often to the Congress.

I am somewhat at a loss to know whether I am to raise the two battalions of marines here or not. As the delay can be attended with but little inconvenience, I will wait a further explanation from Congress, before I take any further steps thereon. I am much pleased that the money will be forwarded with all possible expedition, as it is much wanting; also that Connolly and his associates are taken. It has been a very fortunate discovery. I make no doubt, but that Congress will take every necessary measure to dispossess Lord Dunmore of his hold in Virginia. The sooner steps are taken for that purpose, the more probability there will be of their being effectual.[1](#)

Mr. William Aspinwall and Mr Lemuel Hayward were appointed surgeons at Roxbury in the first formation of the army. They were confirmed by Doctor Church, who promised them to write to the Congress in their behalf. They applied to me during his confinement here, at a time that I had notice of Doctor Morgan's appointment. I referred them to his arrival, and inclosed you have his sentiments relative to them, also of Doctor Rand, surgeon to the smallpox hospital and his mate. I have to remark to you that when we had some time past got the better of the smallpox, Doctor Rand applied to me for a continuance of him in that department, which from a principle of not multiplying offices, I declined. He is at present wanting, and says that by only attending occasionally he loses his country practice; of course his livelihood. You will please to lay these matters before Congress for their consideration.

I was happy enough to anticipate the desire of Congress, respecting Mr. Croft and Mr. Trot. They both declined. The latter did not choose to serve, the former's ambition was not fully gratified by the offer made to him of a majority, and higher rank must have turned out Col. Burbeck, or Major Mason, who had served in those characters in that regiment to acceptance.

I hope Colonel Knox will soon finish the business he is upon, and appear here to take the honorable command conferred on him by Congress.[1](#)

I will make application to General Howe, and propose an exchange for Ethan Allen. I am much afraid I shall have a like proposal to make for Captain Martindale and his men, of the armed brigantine Washington, which, it is reported, was taken a few days past by a man-of-war, and carried into Boston. We cannot expect to be always

successful. You will doubtless hear of the barbarity of Captain Wallace on Conanicut Island, ere this reaches your hands.[2](#)

About a hundred and fifty more of the poor inhabitants are come out of Boston. The smallpox rages all over the town. Such of the military, as had it not before, are now under inoculation. This, I apprehend, is a weapon of defence they are using against us. What confirms me in this opinion, is, that I have information, that they are tearing up the pavement, to be provided against a bombardment. I wrote to you this day by Messrs. Penet and de Pliarne, who will lay before the Congress, or a committee thereof, proposals for furnishing the continent with arms and ammunition. I refer you to themselves for further particulars.[3](#) I have the honor to be, &c.

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 15 December, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Since my last, I have had the pleasure of receiving your favors of the 28th ultimo, and the 2d instant. I must again express my gratitude for the attention shown Mrs. Washington at Philadelphia. It cannot but be pleasing, although it did, in some measure, impede the progress of her journey on the road.¹ I am much obliged to you for the hints contained in both of the above letters, respecting the jealousies which you say are gone abroad.¹ I have studiously avoided in all letters intended for the public eye, I mean for that of the Congress, every expression that could give pain or uneasiness; and I shall observe the same rule with respect to private letters, further than appears absolutely necessary for the elucidation of facts. I cannot charge myself with incivility, or, what in my opinion is tantamount, ceremonious civility, to the gentlemen of this colony; but if such my conduct appears, I will endeavor at a reformation, as I can assure you, my dear Reed, that I wish to walk in such a line as will give most general satisfaction. You know, that it was my wish at first to invite a certain number of gentlemen of this colony every day to dinner, but unintentionally I believe by anybody we some how or other missed it. If this has given rise to the jealousy, I can only say that I am sorry for it; at the same time I add, that it was rather owing to inattention, or, more properly, too much attention to other matters, which caused me to neglect it. The extracts of letters from this camp, which so frequently appear in the Pennsylvania papers, are not only written without my knowledge, but without my approbation, as I have always thought they must have a disagreeable tendency; but there is no restraining men's tongues, or pens, when charged with a little vanity, as in the accounts given of, or rather by, the riflemen.

With respect to what you have said of yourself, and your situation, to what I have before said on this subject I can only add, that whilst you leave the door open to my expectation of your return, I shall not think of supplying your place. If ultimately you resolve against coming, I should be glad to know it, as soon as you have determined upon it. The Congress have resolved well in respect to the pay of and advance to the men; but if they cannot get the money-signers to despatch their business, it is of very little avail; for we have not at this time money enough in camp to answer the commissary's and quarter-master's accounts, much more to pay the troops. Strange conduct this!

The account, which you have given of the sentiments of the people respecting my conduct, is extremely flattering. Pray God, that I may continue to deserve them, in the perplexed and intricate situation I stand in. Our enlistment goes on slowly. By the returns last Monday, only five thousand nine hundred and seventeen men are engaged for the ensuing campaign; and yet we are told, that we shall get the number wanted, as they are only playing off to see what advantages are to be made, and whether a bounty

cannot be extorted from the public at large, or individuals, in case of a draft. Time only can discover this. I doubt the measure exceedingly. The fortunate capture of the store-ship has supplied us with flints, and many other articles we stood in need of; but we still have our wants. We are securing our approach to Letchmore's Point, unable upon any principle whatever to account for their silence, unless it be to lull us into a fatal security to favor some attempt they may have in view about the time of the great change they expect will take place the last of this month. If this be the drift, they deceive themselves, for if possible, it has increased my vigilance, and induced me to fortify all the avenues to our camps, to guard against any approaches upon the ice.

If the Virginians are wise, that arch-traitor to the rights of humanity, Lord Dunmore, should be instantly crushed, if it takes the force of the whole colony to do it; otherwise, like a snow ball, in rolling, his army will get size, some through fear some through promises, and some from inclination joining his standard. But that which renders the measure indispensably necessary is the negroes. For if he gets formidable, numbers will be tempted to join, who will be afraid to do it without. [1](#) I am exceeding happy to find that that villain Connolly is seized; I hope if there is any thing to convict him, that he will meet with the punishment due to his demerit and treachery.

We impatiently wait for accounts from Arnold. Would to God we may hear he is in Quebec, and that all Canada is in our possession. My best respects to Mrs. Reed. I am, &c.

P. S. The smallpox is in every part of Boston. The soldiers there who have never had it, are, we are told, under innoculation, and considered as a security against any attempt of ours. A third shipload of people is come out to Point Shirley. If we escape the smallpox in this camp, and the country around about, it will be miraculous. Every precaution that can be is taken, to guard against this evil, both by the General Court and myself.

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TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL HOWE.

Camp at Cambridge, 18 December, 1775.

Sir,

We have just been informed of a circumstance, which, were it not so well authenticated, I should scarcely think credible. It is that Colonel Allen, who, with his small party, was defeated and taken prisoner near Montreal, has been treated without regard to decency, humanity, or the rules of war; that he has been thrown into irons, and suffers all the hardships inflicted upon common felons.

I think it my duty, Sir, to demand, and do expect from you, an *eclaircissement* on this subject. At the same time, I flatter myself, from the character which Mr. Howe bears, as a man of honor, gentleman, and soldier, that my demand will meet with his approbation. I must take the liberty, also, of informing you, that I shall consider your silence as a confirmation of the report; and further assuring you, that, whatever treatment Colonel Allen receives, whatever fate he undergoes, such exactly shall be the treatment and fate of Brigadier Prescott, now in our hands.¹ The law of retaliation is not only justifiable in the eyes of God and man, but absolutely a duty, which, in our present circumstances, we owe to our relations, friends, and fellow-citizens.

Permit me to add, Sir, that we have all here the highest regard and reverence for your great personal qualities and attainments, and that the Americans in general esteem it as not the least of their misfortunes, that the name of Howe, a name so dear to them,¹ should appear at the head of the catalogue of the instruments employed by a wicked ministry for their destruction.

With due respect, I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant.²

P. S. If an exchange of prisoners taken on each side in this unnatural contest is agreeable to General Howe, he will please to signify as much to his most obedient, &c.³

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 18 December, 1775.

Sir,

Captain Manly, of the *Lee* armed schooner, took and sent into Beverly the sloop *Betsey*, A. Atkinson master. She is an armed vessel, despatched by Lord Dunmore, with Indian corn, potatoes, and oats, for the army in Boston. The packets of letters found on board, I have the honor to send you with this by Captain James Chambers, they being of so much importance, that I do not think it would be prudent to trust them by a common express. As Lord Dunmore's schemes are fully laid open in these letters, I need not point out to the Congress the necessity there is of a vigorous exertion being adopted by them, to dispossess his Lordship of the stronghold he has got in Virginia. I do not mean to dictate, but I am sure they will pardon me for giving them freely my opinion, which is, that the fate of America a good deal depends on his being obliged to evacuate Norfolk this winter or not.

I have Kirkland¹ well secured, and think I will send him to you for examination. By most of the letters relative to him, he is a dangerous fellow. John Steuart's letters and papers are of a very interesting nature. Governor Tonym's and many other letters from St. Augustine show the weakness of the place; at the same time, of what vast consequence it would be for us to possess ourselves of it, and the great quantity of ammunition contained in the fort.² Indeed these papers are of so great consequence, that I think this but little inferior to any prize our famous Manly has taken.

We now work at our ease on Lechmere's Hill. On discovering our party there yesterday morning, the ship which lay opposite began a cannonade, to which Mount Horem¹ added some shells. One of our men was wounded. We fired a few shot from two eighteen pounders, which are placed on Cobble Hill, and soon obliged the ship to shift her station. She now lies in the ferry-way; and, except a few shells from the mount in Boston, (which do no execution,) we have no interruption in prosecuting our works, which will in a very short time be completed. When that is done, when we have powder to sport with, I think, if the Congress resolves on the execution of the proposal made relative to the town of Boston, that it can be done.

I have sent a letter this day to General Howe, of which a copy goes herewith. My reason for pointing out Brigadier-General Prescott as the object, who is to suffer Mr. Allen's fate, is, that, by letters from General Schuyler, and copies of letters from General Montgomery to Schuyler, I am given to understand that Prescott is the cause of Allen's sufferings. I thought it best to be decisive on the occasion, as did the generals whom I consulted thereon.

The returns of men enlisted since my last amount to about eighteen hundred, making in the whole seven thousand one hundred and forty. The militia that are come in, both

from this province and New Hampshire, are very fine-looking men, and go through their duty with great alacrity. The despatch made, both by the people in marching and by the legislative powers in complying with my requisition, has given me infinite satisfaction. Your letter of the 8th instant, with the explanatory resolve respecting my calling forth the militia and minute-men, is come to hand; to which I shall pay all due attention. You have removed all the difficulties, which I labored under, about the two battalions of marines. I shall obey the orders of Congress in looking out for proper officers to command that corps.¹ I make no doubt but, when the money arrives to pay off the arrears and the month's advance, that it will be a great encouragement for the men to enlist.

Enclosed is a letter I lately received from Mr. James Lovell. His case is truly pitiable. I wish some mode could be fallen upon to relieve him from the cruel situation he is now in. I am sensible of the impropriety of exchanging a soldier for a citizen; but there is something so cruelly distressing in regard to this gentleman, that I dare say you will take it under your consideration.² I am, with great respect, &c.³

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Cambridge, 18 December, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your favors, the first of the 28th ultimo, and the two last of the 9th instant, with their enclosures, I received. I am happy to hear of your being better, and heartily wish, that you may soon be perfectly recovered from your indisposition.

I should have been very glad, if Mr. Carleton had not made his escape. I trust ere long he will be in our hands, as I think we shall get possession of Quebec,¹ from whence he will not easily get away. I am much concerned for Mr. Allen, and that he should be treated with such severity. I beg that you will have the matter and manner of his treatment strictly inquired into, and transmit me an account of the same, and whether General Prescott was active and instrumental in occasioning it. From your letter, and General Montgomery's to you, I am led to think he was. If so, he is deserving of your particular notice, and should experience some marks of our resentment for his cruelty to this gentleman, and his violation of the rights of humanity. As some of the prisoners had attempted to escape, I doubt not of your giving the necessary orders, that they may be prevented. It is a matter that should be attended to. In a letter from the Reverend Dr. Wheelock, of Dartmouth College, of the 2d instant, I had the following intelligence:—

“That the day before, two soldiers returning from Montreal informed him, that our officers were assured by a Frenchman (a captain of the artillery whom they had taken captive), that Major Rogers was second in command under General Carleton, and that he had been in Indian habit through our encampment at St. John's, had given a plan of them to the General, and supposed that he made his escape with the Indians, which were at St. John's.”

You will be pleased to have this report examined into, and acquaint me as to the authenticity or probability of the truth of it. If any circumstances can be discovered to induce a belief, that he was there, he should be apprehended. He is now in this government.¹

The Congress have sent me several accounts against the rifle companies, one of which is against Captain Morgan, which I enclose to you, and desire it may be transmitted to Colonel Arnold, who will have proper steps taken for the payment of it, as Captain Morgan is with him.

I flatter myself that your next favor will give me an account of General Montgomery's joining Col. Arnold, and that Quebec is, or soon will be, reduced to our possession. Should our arms be crowned with such success, to me it appears that Administration will be much embarrassed and stand in a very disagreeable predicament. I am, &c.¹

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Cambridge, 24 December, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Your favor of the 15th instant came yesterday to hand, with copies and extracts of your late letters to Congress. I have with great attention perused them. I am very sorry to find by several paragraphs, that both you and General Montgomery incline to quit the service. Let me ask you, Sir, when is the time for brave men to exert themselves in the cause of liberty and their country, if this is not? Should any difficulties that they may have to encounter at this important crisis, deter them? God knows, there is not a difficulty, that you both very justly complain of, which I have not in an eminent degree experienced, that I am not every day experiencing; but we must bear up against them, and make the best of mankind as they are, since we cannot have them as we wish. Let me, therefore, conjure you and Mr. Montgomery to lay aside such thoughts,—thoughts injurious to yourselves, and excessively so to your country, which calls aloud for gentlemen of your abilities.

You mention in your letter to Congress of the 20th ultimo, that the clothing was to remain at Albany, as General Montgomery would provide the troops in Canada. I wish they could be spared for this army, for we cannot get clothing for half of our troops.¹ Let me hear from you on this subject as soon as possible.

The proofs you have of the ministry's intention to engage the savages against us are incontrovertible.¹ We have other confirmations of it, by several despatches from John Stuart, the superintendent for the southern district, which luckily fell into my hands, being found on board a sloop, sent by Lord Dunmore, bound to Boston. She was taken by one of our armed vessels. These, with many letters of consequence from his Lordship, I have lately sent to the Congress.

I hope soon to hear, that Colonel Knox has made good progress in forwarding the artillery. It is much wanted for the works we have lately thrown up. I have written a letter, of the 18th instant, to General Howe respecting Mr. Allen, of which and the answer you have copies enclosed. I am, with great regard, Sir, yours, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 25 December, 1775.

Sir,

I had the honor to address myself to you on the 19th instant, since which I have received undoubted information, that the genuine instructions given to Connolly have not reached your hands; that they are very artfully concealed in the tree of his saddle, and covered with canvass so nicely, that they are scarcely discernible; that those, which were found upon him, were intended to deceive, if he was caught. You will most certainly have his saddle taken to pieces, in order to discover this deep-laid plot.¹

Enclosed is a copy of General Howe's letter in an swer to the one I wrote to him on the 18th instant. The conduct I am to observe towards Brigadier Prescott, in consequence of these letters, the Congress will oblige me by determining for me. The gentlemen by whom you sent the money are arrived. The sum they brought, though large, is not sufficient to answer the demands of the army, which at this time are remarkably heavy. There is three months' pay due, one month's advance, two dollars for each blanket, the arms, which are left by those who are dismissed, to be paid for, besides the demands, on the commissary and quartermaster-generals. You will, therefore, see the necessity of another remittance, which I beg may be as soon as you conveniently can.² I will take the opportunity of the return of these gentlemen, to send Colonel Kirkland to you for examination, and that you may dispose of him as to you may seem proper.

A committee from the General Court of this province called on me the other day, informing me that they were in great want of ordnance for the defence of the colony; that, if what belonged to them, now in use here, was kept for the continent, they will be under the necessity of providing themselves with other; of course, what is kept must be paid for. There are many of the cannon of very little use; such of them as are good, I cannot at present part with; perhaps when I receive the supply from New York and Canada, it may be in my power to spare them. Mr. Wadsworth¹ has sent in his report respecting Cape Cod harbor, a copy of which you will receive herewith. Also a letter from a Mr. Jacob Bayley, put into my hands by Colonel Little. It contains some things that may not be unworthy the consideration of Congress.

We have made good progress in the works on Lechmere's Point. They would have been finished ere this, but for the severity of the weather, which prevents our people from working. I received a letter from Governor Cooke, which expresses the fears of the people of Rhode Island, lest the ships, which we had information were sailed with some troops on board, were destined for Newport. I sent Major-General Lee there, to point out to them such defence as he may think the place capable of. I sincerely wish he may be able to do it with effect, as that place, in its present state, is an asylum for

such as are disaffected to American liberty.² Our returns of enlistments, to this day, amount to eight thousand five hundred men. I have the honor to be, &c.³

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 25 December, 1775.

Dear Sir,

Since my last your favors of the 7th and 11th are come to hand, as also the 8th; the first last night, the second by Wednesday's post. For the several pieces of information therein contained, I thank you.

Nothing new has happened in this quarter since my last, except the setting in of a severe spell of cold weather, and a considerable fall of snow; which together have interrupted our work on Lechmere's Point; which otherwise, would have been compleated before this. At first we only intended a bomb battery there, but afterwards constructed two redoubts, in one of which a mortar will be placed at a proper season. A line of communication extends from the point of wood this side the causey, leading on to Lechmere's Point, quite up to the redoubt. From Boston and Bunker's Hill both, we have received (without injury, except from the first case shot) an irregular fire from cannon and mortars ever since the 17th, but have returned none except upon the ship; which we soon obliged to move off. At the same time that I thank you for stopping visitors in search of preferment, it will give me pleasure to show civilities to others of your recommendation. Indeed no gentleman, that is not well known, ought to come here without letters of introduction, as it puts me in an awkward situation with respect to my conduct towards them.

I do not well understand a paragraph in your letter, which seems to be taken from mine to Colonel Hancock, expressive of the unwillingness of the Connecticut troops to be deemed Continental. If you did not misconceive what Col. Hancock read, he read what I never wrote; as there is no expression in any of my letters, that I can either recollect or find, that has a tendency that way; further than their unwillingness to have officers of other governments mixed in their corps, in which they are not singular, as the same partiality runs through the whole. I have in some measure anticipated the desires of the Connecticut delegates, by a kind of representation to each of the New England governments of the impracticability (in my eye) of raising our complement of men by voluntary enlistments, and submitting it to their consideration, whether, (if the powers of government are sufficiently coercive,) each town should not be called upon for a proportionate number of recruits. What they will do in the matter remains to be known. The militia, which have supplied the places of the Connecticut regiments, behave much better than I expected under our want of wood, barracks (for they are not yet done), and blankets, &c. With these, and such men as are reënlisted, I shall hope, if they will be vigilant and spirited, to give the enemy a warm reception, if they think proper to come out. Our want of powder is inconceivable. A daily waste and no supply administers a gloomy prospect.

I fear the destination of the vessels from your port is so generally known, as to defeat the end. Two men-of-war (forty guns), it is said, put into New York the other day, and were instantly ordered out, supposed to be for Virginia.

I am so much indebted for the civilities shown to Mrs. Washington on her journey hither, that I hardly know how to go about to acknowledge them. Some of the enclosed (all of which I beg the favor of you to put into the post-office) are directed to that end, and I shall be obliged to you for presenting my thanks to the commanding officers of the two battalions of Philadelphia for the honors done to her and me, as also to any others, equally entitled. I very sincerely offer you the compliments of the season, and wish you and Mrs. Reed, and your fireside, the happy return of a great many of them, being, dear Sir, yours, &c.

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TO RICHARD HENRY LEE.

Cambridge, 26 December, 1775.

Dear Sir.

Your favor of the 6th instant did not reach this place till Saturday afternoon. The money, which accompanied it, came seasonably, but not, as it was so long delayed, *quantum sufficit*, our demands at this time being peculiarly great for pay and advance to the troops; pay for their arms and blanketing, independent of the demands of the commissary and quartermaster general.

Lord Dunmore's letters to General Howe, which very fortunately fell into my hands, and were enclosed by me to Congress, will let you pretty fully into his diabolical schemes. If, my dear Sir, that man is not crushed before spring, he will become the most formidable enemy America has; his strength will increase as a snow ball by rolling; and faster, if some expedient cannot be hit upon to convince the slaves and servants of the impotency of his designs. You will see by his letters, what pains he is taking to invite a reinforcement at all events there, and to transplant the war to the southern colonies. I do not think, that forcing his Lordship on shipboard is sufficient; nothing less than depriving him of life or liberty will secure peace to Virginia, as motives of resentment actuate his conduct, to a degree equal to the total destruction of the colony. I fear the destination of the naval armament at Philadelphia is too well known to answer the design. I have heard it spoken of in common conversation, at this place, near a fortnight ago; and the other day was told, that two men-of-war, going into the harbor of New York, supposed to be those for the relief of the Asia, were ordered and accordingly sailed immediately out, as it is imagined for Virginia.

My letters to Congress will give you the occurrences of this place. I need not repeat them, but I must beg of you, my good Sir, to use your influence in having a court of admiralty, or some power appointed to hear and determine all matters relative to captures; you cannot conceive how I am plagued on this head, and how impossible it is for me to hear and determine upon matters of this sort, when the facts, perhaps, are only to be ascertained at ports, forty, fifty, or more miles distant, without bringing the parties here at great trouble and expense. At any rate, my time will not allow me to be a competent judge of this business. I must also beg the favor of you, to urge the necessity of appointing a brigadier-general to the vacant brigade in this army. The inconvenience we daily experience for want of one is very great; much more than the want of a colonel to a regiment, for then the next officer in command does the duty; in a brigade this may not with propriety happen, and seldom or never is done with any kind of regularity. Perfectly indifferent is it to me, whom the Congress shall please to appoint to these offices; I only want it done, that business may go regularly on. My best respects to the good family you are in, and to your brothers of the delegation; and be assured, that I am, dear Sir, your most obedient and affectionate servant.¹

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TO THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Cambridge, 29 December, 1775.

Gentlemen,

Having never considered the four Independent Companies which have been doing duty at Braintree, Weymouth, and Hingham, in the same point of view, as the rest of the army, although some Orders may have gone to or for them, through the hurry of business; nor Included them in my returns to Congress, according to the Brigade Major's report from Roxbury; I do not think myself Authorized to direct pay for them; without first laying the matter before Congress, which I shall do by inclosing an exact transcript of your representation of the case, with this single remark, that is they were not regimented and were doing duty at some distance from these Camps. I did not know whether to consider them as part of the Continental Army, and therefore had not ordered them payment heretofore.¹

With respect to the other requisition contained in your resolve of the 20, I do not think myself at liberty to extend the guards of this camp beyond Squantum and Chelsea, both fit places for observation.—This was my sentiment of the matter, when the Committee did me the honor to call yesterday; but, as it appeared to be of some importance to this government, I did not care to determine upon it without asking the opinion of some of the principal Officers in this Army, whose sentiments I am happy to find coincide with my own.

This might be assigned as one, among other reasons to shew, that I did not consider these four Companies as part of the Continental troops; that there were times in the course of the past summer when I should not have suffered them to have remained at the places they were posted, if I had conceived myself vested with power to have withdrawn them.

I would not have it inferred from hence that I do not think it my duty, and with the greatest cheerfulness shall undertake, to march troops if these lines are not to be exposed by it, to any place in this or the neighbouring Governments, to oppose an invasion; But whilst the body of the ministerial Troops continue in Boston, and the circumstances of this army remain as they are, it must be my first object to Guard these lines. I am, &c.¹

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 31 December, 1775.

Sir,

I wrote to you on the 25th instant, since which I am not honored with any of your favors. The estimate I then enclosed to you was calculated to pay the troops up to the first of January. That cannot be done for want of funds in the paymaster-general's hands, which causes a great murmuring amongst those who are going off. The monthly expenses of this army amount to near two hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars, which I take the liberty of recommending to the observation of Congress, that their future remittances may be governed thereby.

It sometimes happens that persons would wish to deposit money in the hands of the paymaster-general, for his bills on the treasury at Philadelphia. He has hitherto declined such offers, not having authority from Congress to draw. Would it not be proper to give this power? If it should be approved of, you will please to point out the mode, that the Congress would chuse to have it done in. [1](#)

The clothing sent to the Quartermaster-general is not sufficient to put half our army into regimentals, nor is there a possibility of getting any quantity here. I have wrote to Gen'l Schuyler that I wish what was lodged at Albany could be spared for these troops, as General Montgomery would clothe the men under his command at Montreal. If this can be done, it will be of infinite service, and no time should be lost in forwarding them to this camp.

In forming the regiments for the new establishment, I thought it but justice to appoint the officers detached under Colonel Arnold to Commissions in them. Their absence at present is of very great detriment to the service, especially in recruiting. I would therefore wish if the Congress intends raising troops in or for Canada, that they could be taken in there. The sooner I have their opinion of this matter the better, that if they can be commissioned in Canada, I may appoint officers here to replace them.

Enclosed you have a copy of a representation sent to me by the legislative body of this province respecting four companies stationed at Braintree, Weymouth, and Hingham. As they were never regimented, and were doing duty at a distance from the rest of the army, I did not know whether to consider them as a part of it; nor do I think myself authorized to direct payment for them without the approbation of Congress.

It has been represented to me that the free negroes, who have served in this army, are very much dissatisfied at being discarded. As it is to be apprehended, that they may seek employ in the ministerial army, I have presumed to depart from the resolution respecting them, and have given license for their being enlisted. If this is disapproved of by Congress, I will put a stop to it. [1](#)

I believe Colonel Gridley expects to be continued as chief engineer in this army. It is very certain that we have no one here better qualified. He has done very little hitherto in that department; but if the Congress choose to appoint him I will take care that he pays a proper attention to it. Before I quit this subject I must remark, that the pay of the assistant engineers is so very small, that we cannot expect men of science will engage in it. Those gentlemen, who are in that station, remained under the expectation, that an allowance would be made them by the respective provinces in which they were appointed, additional to that allowed by the Congress.¹

Captain Freeman arrived this day at camp from Canada. He left Quebec the 24th ultimo, in consequence of General Carleton's proclamation, which I have the honor to send you herewith. He saw Colonel Arnold the 26th, and says that he was joined at Point aux Trembles by General Montgomery, the 1st instant; that they were about two thousand strong, and were making every preparation for attacking Quebec; that General Carleton had with him about twelve hundred men, the majority of whom are sailors; that it was his opinion the French would give up the place, if they get the same conditions, that were granted to the inhabitants of Montreal.

Captain Adams of the *Warren*, armed schooner, sent into Marblehead the sloop *Sally*, bound from Lisbon to New York with 2 pipes and 126 quarter casks of rum. This sloop was made a prize of by the *Niger* man of war, somewhere near Bermudas, the captain of whom put his mate and his hands on board with orders to proceed with her to Boston. The sloop and cargo belong to Mr. Peter Barberie of Perth Amboy in New Jersey.

Captains Semple and Harbeson take under their care Mr. Kirkland, who appears to be a much more illiterate and simple man than his strong recommendations bespoke him. Captain Mathis and Mr. Robinson will accompany them. The two latter were taken prisoners by Lord Dunmore,¹ who was sending them to Boston, from whence there is little doubt, but that they would be forwarded to England, to which place I am credibly informed Captain Martindale and the crew of the *Washington* are sent; also Colonel Allen, and the prisoners taken with him in Canada. This may account for General Howe's silence on the subject of an exchange of prisoners mentioned in my letter to him.

General Lee is just returned from his excursion to Rhode Island. He has pointed out the best method the island would admit of for its defence. He has endeavored all in his power to make friends of those that were our enemies. You have, enclosed, a specimen of his abilities in that way, for your perusal. I am of opinion that, if the same plan was pursued through every province it would have a very good effect.¹

I have long had it on my mind to mention to Congress, that frequent applications had been made to me respecting the chaplains' pay, which is too small to encourage men of abilities. Some of them, who have left their flocks, are obliged to pay the parson acting for them more than they receive. I need not point out the great utility of gentlemen, whose lives and conversation are unexceptionable, being employed for that service in the army. There are two ways of making it worth the attention of such; one is an advancement of their pay; the other, that one chaplain be appointed to two

regiments. This last, I think, may be done without inconvenience.² I beg leave to recommend this matter to Congress, whose sentiments hereon I shall impatiently expect.

Upon a farther conversation with Captain Freeman, he is of opinion, that General Montgomery has with him near three thousand men including Colonel Arnold's. He says that Lord Pitt had received repeated orders from his father to return home; in consequence of which, he had embarked some time in October, with a Captain Green, who was master of a vessel belonging to Philadelphia. By a number of salutes in Boston harbor yesterday, I fancy Admiral Shuldham is arrived. Two large ships were seen coming in. Our enlistments now amount to nine thousand six hundred and fifty.

Those gentlemen, who were made prisoners by Lord Dunmore, being left destitute of money and necessaries, I have advanced them a hundred pounds lawful money belonging to the public, for which I have taken Captain Matthews's draft on the treasury of Virginia, which goes enclosed. I have the honor to be, &c.¹

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1776.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 4 January, 1776.

Sir,

Since my last of the 31st ultimo, I have been honored with your favor of the 22d, enclosing sundry resolves, which shall, in matters they respect, be made the rule of my conduct. The resolution relative to the troops in Boston, I beg the favor of you, Sir, to assure Congress, shall be attempted to be put in execution the first moment I see a probability of success, and in such a way as a council of officers shall think most likely to produce it; but if this should not happen as soon as you may expect, or my wishes prompt to, I request that Congress will be pleased to advert to my situation, and do me the justice to believe, that circumstances, and no want of inclination, are the cause of delay.

It is not in the pages of history, perhaps, to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket-shot of the enemy, for six months together, without [1](#)NA, and at the same time to disband one army, and recruit another, within that distance of twenty-odd British regiments, is more, probably, than ever was attempted. But if we succeed as well in the last, as we have heretofore in the first, I shall think it the most fortunate event of my whole life.

By a very intelligent gentleman, a Mr. Hutchinson from Boston, I learn, that it was Admiral Shuldham that came into the harbor on Saturday last; that two of the five regiments from Cork are arrived at Halifax; two others have sailed for Quebec (but what was become of them could not be told); and the other, the fifty-fifth, has just got into Boston. Certain it is, also, that the greater part of the seventeen regiments is arrived there. Whether we are to conclude from hence, that more than five regiments have been sent out, or that the companies of the seventeen, arrived at Boston, are part of the regiments destined for Halifax and Quebec, I know not. We also learn from this gentleman and others, that the troops, embarked for Halifax, as mentioned in my letter of the 16th, were really designed for that place, but recalled from Nantasket Road, upon advice being received of the above regiments there. I am also informed of a fleet now getting ready, under the convoy of the *Scarborough* and *Fowey* men-of-war, consisting of five transports and two bomb-vessels, with about three hundred marines, and several flat-bottomed boats. It is whispered, that they are designed for Newport, but generally thought in Boston that they are meant for Long Island; and it is probable they will be followed by more troops, as the other transports are taking in water, to lie, as others say, in Nantasket Road, to be out of the ice. A large quantity of biscuit is also baking.

As the real design cannot with certainty be known, I submit it with all due deference to the superior judgment of Congress, whether it would not be consistent with prudence to have some of the Jersey troops thrown into New York, to prevent an evil, which would be almost irremediable, should it happen, I mean the landing of troops at that place, or upon Long Island near it.¹ As it is possible you may not yet have received his Majesty's "*most gracious*" speech, I do myself the honor to enclose one of many, which were sent out of Boston yesterday. It is full of rancor and resentment against us, and explicitly holds forth his royal will to be, that vigorous measures must be pursued, to deprive us of our constitutional rights and liberties. These measures, whatever they be, I hope will be opposed by more vigorous ones, and rendered unavailing and fruitless, though sanctioned and authorized by the name of majesty, a name which ought to promote the happiness of his people, and not their oppression.¹ I am, Sir, &c.

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 4 January, 1776.

Dear Sir,

Since my last I have received your obliging favours of the 19th and 23d ulto., and thank you for the articles of intelligence therein contained, as I also do for the buttons which accompanied the last letter, although I had got a set better, I think, made at Concord. I am exceedingly glad to find that things wear a better face in Virginia than they did some time ago; but I do not think that any thing less than the life or liberty will free the colony from the effects of Lord Dunmore's resentments and villainies.

We are at length favored with a sight of his Majesty's most gracious speech, breathing sentiments of tenderness and compassion for his deluded American subjects; the echo is not yet come to hand; but we know what it must be, and as Lord North said, and we ought to have believed (and acted accordingly,) we now know the ultimatum of British justice. The speech I send you. A volume of them was sent out by the Boston gentry, and, farcical enough, we gave great joy to them, (the red coats I mean,) without knowing or intending it; for on that day, the day which gave being to the new army, (but before the proclamation came to hand,) we had hoisted the union flag in compliment to the United Colonies.¹ But, behold, it was received in Boston as a token of the deep impression the speech had made upon us, and as a signal of submission. So we learn by a person out of Boston last night. By this time I presume they begin to think it strange, that we have not made a formal surrender of our lines. Admiral Shulldham is arrived at Boston. The 55th and the greatest part, if not all, of the 17th regiment, are also got in there. The rest of the 5 regiments from Ireland were intended for Halifax and Quebec; those for the first, have arrived there, the others we know not where they are got to.

It is easier to conceive than to describe the situation of my mind for some time past, and my feelings under our present circumstances. Search the vast volumes of history through, and I much question whether a case similar to ours is to be found; to wit, to maintain a post against the flower of the British troops for six months together, without —, and at the end of them to have one army disbanded and another to raise within the same distance of a reinforced enemy. It is too much to attempt. What may be the final issue of the last manœuvre, time only can tell. I wish this month was well over our heads. The same desire of retiring into a chimney-corner seized the troops of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, (so soon as their time expired,) as had worked upon those of Connecticut, notwithstanding many of them made a tender of their services to continue, till the lines could be sufficiently strengthened. We are now left with a good deal less than half raised regiments, and about five thousand militia, who only stand engaged to the middle of this month; when, according to custom, they will depart, let the necessity of their stay be never so urgent. Thus it is, that for more than two months past, I have scarcely immersed from one difficulty

before I have [been] plunged into another. How it will end, God in his great goodness will direct. I am thankful for his protection to this time. We are told that we shall soon get the army completed, but I have been told so many things which have never come to pass, that I distrust every thing.

I fear your fleet has been so long in fitting, and the destination of it so well known, that the end will be defeated, if the vessels escape.¹ How is the arrival of French troops in the West Indies, and the hostile appearance there, to be reconciled with that part of the King's speech, wherein he assures Parliament, "that as well from the assurances I have received, as from the general appearance of affairs in Europe, I see no probability that the measures, which you may adopt, will be interrupted by disputes with any foreign power"? I hope the Congress will not think of adjourning at so important and critical a juncture as this. I wish they would keep a watchful eye to New York. From Captain Sears' account, (now here,) much is to be apprehended from that quarter.

A fleet is now fitting out at Boston, consisting of five transports and two bomb-vessels, under convoy of the Scarborough and Fowey men-of-war. Three hundred, some say, others more, troops are on board, with flat-bottomed boats. It is whispered, as if designedly, that they are intended for Newport; but it is generally believed that they are bound either to Long Island or Virginia; the other transports are taking in water and a good deal of bisquet is baking, some say for the shipping to lay in Nantasket Road, to be out of the way of ice, whilst others think a more important move is in agitation. All, however, is conjecture. I heartily wish you, Mrs Reed and family, the compliments of the season, in which the ladies here and family join.¹

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TO GOVERNOR COOKE.

Cambridge, 6 January, 1776,

Sir,

I received your favor of the 1st instant, and return you my thanks for the blankets and your promise of having more procured, as they are much wanted. I did not see Mr. Hale, who brought them, nor the account, or the money should have been transmitted to you by his return. You will be pleased to draw on the quartermaster-general, and it shall be immediately paid. I have seen General Lee since his expedition, and hope Rhode Island will derive some advantage from it.

I am told that Captain Wallace's ships have been supplied for some time by the town of Newport, on certain conditions stipulated between him and the committee. When this truce first obtained, perhaps it was right; then there might have been hopes of an accommodation taking place; but now, when every prospect of it seems to be cut off by his Majesty's late speech; when the throne, from which we had supplicated redress, breathes forth vengeance and indignation, and a firm determination to remain unalterable in its purposes, and to prosecute the system and plan of ruin formed by the ministry against us, should not an end be put to it, and every possible method be fallen upon to prevent their getting necessities of any kind? We need not expect to conquer our enemies by good offices; and I know not what pernicious consequences may result from a precedent of this sort. Other places, circumstanced as Newport is, may follow the example, and by that means their whole fleet and army will be furnished with what it highly concerns us to keep from them.¹

I received a letter from Governor Trumbull of the 1st instant, by which I am informed, that the Connecticut Assembly are very unanimous in the common cause; and, among others have passed an act for raising and equipping a fourth of their militia, to be immediately selected by voluntary enlistments; with such other able, effective men, as are not included in their militia rolls, who incline to enlist, to act as minute-men for their own or the defence of any of the United Colonies, and this under proper encouragements;—another act for restraining and punishing persons inimical to us, and directing proceedings therein;—no person to supply the ministerial army or navy, to give them intelligence, to enlist, or procure others to enlist, in their service, to pilot their vessels, or in any way assist them, under pain of forfeiting his estate, and an imprisonment not exceeding three years;—none to write, speak, or act against the proceedings of Congress, or their acts of Assembly, under penalty of being disarmed, and disqualified from holding any office, and be further punished by imprisonment, &c.;—for seizing and confiscating, for the use of the colony, the estates of those putting or continuing to shelter themselves under the protection of the ministerial fleet or army, or assist in carrying on their measures against us;—a resolve to provide two armed vessels, of sixteen and fourteen guns, with a spy-schooner of four, and four row-galleys;—an act exempting the polls of soldiers from taxes, for the last and

ensuing campaigns;—another for encouraging the making of saltpetre and gunpowder, a considerable quantity of both Mr. Trumbull hopes to make early in the spring. He says the furnace at Middletown is smelting lead, and likely to turn out twenty or thirty tons, and that ore is plenty. They have also passed an act empowering the Commander-in-chief of the Continental army, or officers commanding a detachment, or outposts, to administer an oath and swear any person or persons to the truth of matters relative to the public service. The situation of our affairs seems to call for regulations like these, and I should think the other colonies ought to adopt similar ones, or such of them as they have not already made. Vigorous measures, and such as at another time would appear extraordinary, are now become absolutely necessary, for preserving our country against the strides of tyranny making against it.

Governor Trumbull, in his list, has not mentioned an act for impressing carriages, &c., agreeable to the recommendation of Congress. This, I hope, they have not forgotten. It is highly necessary, that such an authority should be given, under proper restrictions, or we shall be greatly embarrassed, whenever the army, or any detachment from it, may find it necessary to march from hence. I am, &c.

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TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Cambridge, 7 January, 1776.

Sir,

Your favor of the 1 inst. I received and heartily thank you for your kind salutations — I was happy to hear of the great unanimity in your Assembly, & of the general salutary laws they passed; which shew them to be well attached to the common cause & to have taken proper measures for supporting it.

Inclosed you have the amount of lead from Crown Point, agreeable to your request. The account of the smelting furnace and your expectations to make a considerable amount of saltpetre and powder, please me much. I wish your most sanguine endeavors may be more than answered.

As to gun locks it is not in my power to furnish any. The information you had was groundless, for there were no spare ones in the Ordnance Stores, which fell into our hands, none were ever found that I have heard of, nor is there mention of them in the Invoice.

Having undoubted intelligence of the fitting out a fleet at Boston—and of the embarkation of troops from thence, which from the season of the year and other circumstances, must be destined for some expedition South of this; and having such information as I can depend upon, that the Inhabitants of Long Island, in the Colony of New York, or a great part of them are inimical to the rights and liberties of America, and from their conduct and professions have discovered an apparent inclination to assist in subjugating their fellow citizens to ministerial tyranny; there is the greatest reason to believe that this armament if not immediately designed against the City of New York, is nevertheless intended for Long island; and as it is of the utmost importance to prevent the Enemy from possessing themselves of the City of New York and the North River, which would give them the command of the country and the communication with Canada, I shall dispatch Major General Lee with orders to repair thither, with such Volunteers as are willing to join and can be expeditiously raised (having no troops to spare from hence) to put the City and fortifications on the North River in the best posture of defense the season and circumstances will admit of; and for disarming all such persons upon Long Island, and elsewhere whose conduct and declarations have rendered them justly suspected of designs unfriendly to the views of Congress.¹ I have directed him to call upon the commanding officer of the Jersey troops for such assistance as he can afford, and being Informed by Captain Sears, and Mr. Woodward, who will deliver you this, and whom Genl Lee will follow in a day or two, that he apprehends 1000 or 1100 Volunteers may be readily raised in your government in the town through which Mr. Lee will pass, I beg the favor of you to interpose your good offices and interest in the matter, to encourage men to go on this important service and as expeditiously as possible for counteracting any designs

our Enemies may have against us in that Quarter.—Every necessary expence attending their march and stay will be borne by the public.² I have just receivd. advice from Chelsea, about 9 or 10 miles from this, that several ships have sailed from Nantasket road that were lying there. I shall write to the Honorable the Convention of New York by General Lee and direct his instructions to be laid before them, praying their assistance to facilitate the purposes of his going; I am, &c.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL CHARLES LEE.[1](#)

INSTRUCTIONS.

Having undoubted intelligence of the fitting out of a fleet at Boston, and of the embarkation of troops from thence, which, from the season of the year and other circumstances, must be destined for a southern expedition; and having such information as I can rely on, that the inhabitants, or a great part of them, on Long Island in the colony of New York, are not only inimical to the rights and liberties of America, but, by their conduct and public profession, have discovered a disposition to aid and assist in the reduction of that colony to ministerial tyranny; and as it is a matter of the utmost importance to prevent the enemy from taking possession of the city of New York, as they will thereby command the country, and the communication with Canada; it is of too much consequence to hazard such a post at so alarming a crisis, since we find by his Majesty's speech to Parliament, that, disregarding the petition of the united voice of America, nothing less than the total subversion of her rights will satisfy him.

You will, therefore, with such volunteers as are willing to join you, and can be expeditiously raised, repair to the city of New York; and calling upon the commanding officer of the forces of New Jersey for such assistance as he can afford, and you shall require, you are to put that city into the best posture of defence, which the season and circumstances will admit, disarming all such persons upon Long Island and elsewhere, (and if necessary otherwise securing them,) whose conduct and declarations have rendered them justly suspected of designs unfriendly to the views of Congress.[1](#)

You are, also, to inquire into the state and condition of the fortifications up the North River, and as far as shall be consistent with the orders of Congress, or not repugnant to them, to have the works guarded against surprises from a body of men, which might be transported by water near the place, and then marched in upon the back of them.

You will also endeavor to have the medicines, shirts, and blankets, now at New York, belonging to the ministerial troops, secured, and forwarded to this army. Captain Sears can give you particular information concerning them.[2](#)

In all other matters relative to the execution of the general plan you are going upon, your own judgment (as it is impossible with propriety to give particular directions), and the advice of those whom you have reason to believe are hearty in the cause, must direct you; keeping always in view the declared intentions of Congress.

I am persuaded I need not recommend despatch in the prosecution of this business. The importance of it alone is a sufficient incitement. I would advise a dismissal of the volunteers, whose necessary expenses will be borne, so soon as the service will

admit of it; and that you endeavor as much as possible at all times to be in readiness to join the army, if the exigency of our affairs here should call for it. Given under my hand, at Head-Quarters, Cambridge, this 8th day of January, 1776.[1](#)

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TO THE COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY.

Cambridge, 10 January, 1776.

Gentlemen,

In the confused and disordered state of this army, occasioned by such capital changes as have taken place of late, I have found it almost impossible to come at exact returns of the strength of our lines. Not till last night was I able to get in the whole, since the dissolution of the old army. By these I find myself weaker than I had any idea of, and under the necessity of requesting an exertion of your influence and interest to prevail upon the militia of this government, now in the pay of the Continent, to continue till the last of the month and longer, if requisite. I am assured that those of New Hampshire will not stay any longer than they engaged for, notwithstanding our weak state and the slow progress we make in recruiting, which by the last week's report, amounts to but little more than half of our usual complement, owing it is said to the number of men going or expecting to go into the provincial service at or near their own homes.

I am more and more convinced that we shall never raise the army to the new establishment by voluntary enlistments. It is, therefore, necessary that the neighboring governments should consider in time and adopt some other expedient for effecting it.

The hurry I was in the other day, when your committee did me the honor to present a petition from a person, (whose name I have forgot,) wanting to be employed in the Continental army, prevented me from being so full on the subject as I wished.

I shall beg leave, therefore, at this time to add, that I hope your honorable Board will do me the justice to believe, that it will give me pleasure at all times to pay a proper respect to any recommendation coming from them, and that the reason why I do not now encourage such kind of applications, as was then made, is, that the new army was arranged, as near the plan and agreeable to the orders of Congress, (although some unavoidable departures and changes have taken place,) as it was in my power to comply with; and the officers thus constituted ordered to recruit. Every attempt, therefore, of others not of this appointment must counteract, and has been of infinite prejudice to the service. They infuse ideas into the minds of men they have any influence over, that, by engaging with them, or, which is tantamount, not engaging with others, they shall be able to force themselves into the service. Of this we have numberless instances. I am, therefore, anxious to discourage every attempt of the kind, by convincing such persons, that their engaging a company will not bring them in. If such persons could once be convinced of this, the business of this army would go on more smoothly, and with much more regularity and order. In short, gentlemen, it is scarce possible for me to convey to you a perfect idea of the trouble and vexation I have met with, in getting this matter fixed upon some settled footing. One day an officer would serve; another, he would not, and so on, till I have hardly known what

steps to pursue for preserving of consistency, and advancing the good of the service, which are the only objects I have in view. I have no friend whom I want to bring in, nor any person with whom I am in the least connected, that I wish to promote. I am, gentlemen, with much esteem, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 11 January, 1776.

Sir,

Every account I have out of Boston confirms the embarkation of troops mentioned in my last, which, from the season of the year and other circumstances, must be destined for some expedition to the southward of this. I have therefore thought it prudent to send Major-General Lee to New York. I have given him letters recommendatory to Governor Trumbull, and to the Committee of Safety at New York. I have good hopes that in Connecticut he will get many volunteers, who, I have some reason to think, will accompany him on this expedition, without more expense to the continent than their maintenance. But should it be otherwise, and should they expect pay, I think it is a trifling consideration, when put in competition with the importance of the object, which is to put the city of New York, with such parts of the North River and Long Island, as to him shall seem proper, in that state of defence, which the season of the year and circumstances will admit of, so as, if possible, to prevent the enemy from forming a lodgment in that government, which, I am afraid, contains too many persons disaffected to the cause of liberty and America. I have also written to Lord Stirling to give him all the assistance that he can, with the troops under his command in the Continental service, provided it does not interfere with any orders he may receive from Congress relative to them.¹

I hope the Congress will approve of my conduct in sending General Lee upon this expedition. I am sure I meant it well, as experience teaches us, that it is much easier to prevent an enemy from posting themselves, than it is to dislodge them after they have got possession. The evening of the 8th. instant a party of our men under the command of Major Knowlton were ordered to go and burn some houses which lay at the foot of Bunker's Hill, and at the head of Charlestown; they were also ordered to bring off the guard which we expected consisted of an officer and 30 men. They crossed the milldam about half after eight o'clock and gallantly executed their business, having burnt eight houses, and brought with them a sergeant and four privates of the 10th Regiment. There was but one man more there, who making some resistance they were obliged to despatch. The gun that killed him was the only one that was discharged by our men, tho' several hundreds were fired by the enemy from within their works, but in so confused a manner, that not one of our people was hurt. Our inlistments go on very heavily.¹

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TO COLONEL BENEDICT ARNOLD.

Cambridge, 12 January, 1776.

Sir,

Your favor of the 5th ultimo from before Quebec, enclosing the returns of your detachment, is come to hand. From the account you give of the garrison, and the state of the walls, I expect soon to hear from you within them, which will give me vast pleasure.

I am informed that there are large quantities of arms, blankets, clothing, and other military stores in that city. These are articles, which we are in great want of here; I have, therefore, written to General Montgomery, or whoever is commanding officer in that quarter, to send me as many as can be spared from thence. If you can assist in expediting them, you will much oblige me.

I understand that the Congress have it under their consideration to raise an army for the defence of Canada, on a new establishment. When I received this information, I applied to Congress to know whether it was their intention, that you and the officers in your detachment were to be appointed there, or remain as you were appointed in this army as newly arranged; to which I have not yet received their answer.

The want of so many good officers is felt here, especially in the recruiting service, which does not go on so briskly as I could wish. I think it will be best for you to settle for the arrearages, due to your men since October last, with the paymaster of the army at your place. I do not know any better way for you or them to receive it. I am, Sir, yours, &c.[1](#)

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TO JAMES WARREN, SPEAKER ETC.

Cambridge, 13 January, 1776.

Gentlemen,

It is exceedingly painfull to me to give you so much trouble as I have, and am like to do, in the support of our lines and the arrangement of the new Army; but my difficulties must in their consequences devolve trouble on you.

To my very great surprize I find, that the whole number of arms, which have been stopped from the discharged soldiers amount to no more than 1620 and of that number no more than 120 are in store, the rest being redelivered to the recruits which have come in. I also find from the report of the recruiting officers, that few men are to be inlisted, who have arms in their hands, and that they are reduced to the alternative of either getting no men or men without arms. Unhappy situation! What is to be done, unless these governments will exert themselves in providing arms from the several Towns, or in such other manner as to them, shall seem speedy and effectual.

To account for this great deficiency would be tedious and not much to the purpose. Suffice it generally to say, that it has arisen from two causes: the badness of the arms of the Old Army, which the Inspectors and valuers of, did not think fit to detain: And to the disobedient Regiments, which in spite of every order I could issue to the contrary (even to a solemn threat of stopping the pay for the months of November and December of all those, who should carry away their arms) have, in a manner by stealth borne them away.

I am glad to hear by a Gentleman of your Honorable body, who does me the honor to be the bearer of this letter, that you have for some time past been collecting arms at Watertown, whilst a good deal of dispatch has been used in making them elsewhere. I beg to know how many I can rely upon; as the recruits now coming in from the country will be useless without.

It is to no purpose I find, to depend upon imported arms—What you can furnish I must take in behalf of the Continent; and will upon notice, send some gentleman to receive them. Will it be prudent to apply to such of the Militia as are going away, for their arms? leaving it optional in them cannot be amiss, but will the necessity of the case justify the policy of detaining them? I ask for Information—being with great truth and esteem &c.[1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 14 January, 1776.

Sir,

I am exceedingly sorry, that I am under the necessity of applying to you, and calling the attention of Congress to the State of our Arms, which is truly alarming. Upon the dissolution of the old Army, I was apprehensive that the new, would be deficient in this instance, and that the want might be as inconsiderable as possible, I gave it in orders that the arms of such men as did not reinlist, should be (or such of them as were good) retained at the prices which should be affixed by persons appointed to inspect and value them: and that we might be sure of them, I added, that there would be a Stoppage of pay of the months of Nov. and Decr. from those, that should carry their Firelocks away, without their being first examined.—By these precautions I hoped to have procured a considerable number; But, Sir, I find with much concern, that from the badness of the arms, and the disobedience of too many in bearing them off without a previous inspection, that very few were collected.—Neither are we to expect that many will be brought in by the new recruits—the officers who are out inlisting having reported that few men who have Arms will engage in the Service, and that they are under the disagreeable alternative of taking men without arms, or of getting none.—Unhappy situation indeed and much to be deplored! Especially when we know that we have to contend with a formidable Army, well provided of every necessary, and that there will be a most vigorous exertion of Ministerial vengeance against us, as soon as they think themselves in condition for it. I hope it is in the power of Congress to afford us relief; If it is not, what must, what can be done?

Our Treasury is almost exhausted and the demands against it, very considerable; a constant supply of money to answer every claim and exigency, would much promote the good of the Service; In the common affairs of life, it is useful; in War, it is absolutely necessary and essential.—I would beg leave too, to remind you of Tents, and of their importance; hoping if an opportunity has offered, you have procured them.

I fear that our Army will not be raised to the new establishment in any reasonable time, if ever; the Inlistments go on so very slow, that they seem almost at an end.

In my letter of the 4 Inst., I wrote you, that I had received certain Intelligence from a Mr. Hutchinson and others, that 2 of the 5 Regimts from Cork, now arrived at Hallifax 1 at Boston, and the other 2 had sailed for Quebec, and had not been heard of.—I am now assured as a matter to be relied on by four Captains of Ships who left England about the 2d of Novr, and who appear to be men of veracity, that the whole of these Regiments (except the three Companies, which arrived at Boston some time ago) when they sailed, were at Milford Haven, where they had been obliged to put in by a violent storm the 19th of October,—that they would not be able to leave it for a

considerable time, being under the necessity of repairing their Vessels and taking some new ones up.—Such is the Incertainty and contradiction in what I now hear that it is not possible to know, what to believe or disbelieve.

I wrote to the General Court yesterday and to the Convention at New Hampshire immediately on being acquainted with the great deficiency in our Arms, praying that they would Interest themselves in the matter and furnish me with all in their power. Whether I shall get any or what quantity, I cannot determine having not received their answers. the same application will be made to the Governments of Connecticut and Rhode Island.

I do myself the honor to send you Sundry Newspapers I received from the above mentioned Captains, as they may be later than any you have seen, and contain some Interesting Intelligence.[1](#)

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 14 January, 1776.

Dear Sir,

The bearer presents an opportunity to me of acknowledging the receipt of your favor of the 30th ultimo, (which never came to my hands till last night,) and, if I have not done it before, of your other of the 23d preceding.

The hints you have communicated from time to time not only deserve, but do most sincerely and cordially meet with my thanks. You cannot render a more acceptable service, nor in my estimation give a more convincing proof of your friendship, than by a free, open, and undisguised account of every matter relative to myself or conduct. I can bear to hear of imputed or real errors. The man, who wishes to stand well in the opinion of others, must do this; because he is thereby enabled to correct his faults, or remove prejudices which are imbibed against him. For this reason, I shall thank you for giving me the opinions of the world, upon such points as you know me to be interested in; for, as I have but one capital object in view, I could wish to make my conduct coincide with the wishes of mankind, as far as I can consistently; I mean, without departing from that great line of duty, which, though hid under a cloud for some time, from a peculiarity of circumstances, may nevertheless bear a scrutiny. My constant attention to the great and perplexing objects, which continually rise to my view, absorbs all lesser considerations, and indeed scarcely allows me time to reflect, that there is such a body in existence as the General Court of this colony, but when I am reminded of it by a committee; nor can I, upon recollection, discover in what instances (I wish they would be more explicit) I have been inattentive to, or slighted them. They could not, surely, conceive that there was a propriety in unbosoming the secrets of an army to them; that it was necessary to ask their opinion of throwing up an intrenchment, forming a battalion, &c., &c. It must, therefore, be what I before hinted to you; and how to remedy it I hardly know, as I am acquainted with few of the members, never go out of my own lines, or see any of them in them.

I am exceeding sorry to hear, that your little fleet has been shut in by the frost. I hope it has sailed ere this, and given you some proof of the utility of it, and enabled the Congress to bestow a little more attention to the affairs of this army, which suffers exceedingly by their overmuch business, or too little attention to it. We are now without any money in our treasury, powder in our magazines, arms in our stores. We are without a brigadier (the want of which has been twenty times urged), engineers, expresses (though a committee has been appointed these two months to establish them), and by and by, when we shall be called upon to take the field, shall not have a tent to lie in. Apropos, what is doing with mine?

These are evils, but small in comparison of those, which disturb my present repose. Our enlistments are at a stand; the fears I ever entertained are realized; that is, the

discontented officers (for I do not know how else to account for it) have thrown such difficulties or stumbling-blocks in the way of recruiting, that I no longer entertain a hope of completing the army by voluntary enlistments, and I see no move or likelihood of one, to do it by other means. In the last two weeks we have enlisted but about a thousand men; whereas I was confidently bid to believe, by all the officers I conversed with, that we should by this time have had the regiments nearly completed. Our total number upon paper amounts to about ten thousand five hundred; but as a large portion of these are returned not joined, I never expect to receive them, as an ineffectual order has once issued to call them in. Another is now gone forth, peremptorily requiring all officers under pain of being cashiered, and recruits as being treated as deserters, to join their respective regiments by the 1st day of next month, that I may know my real strength; but if my fears are not imaginary, I shall have a dreadful account of the advanced month's pay. In consequence of the assurances given, and my expectation of having at least men enough enlisted to defend our lines, to which may be added my unwillingness of burthening the cause with unnecessary expense, no relief of militia has been ordered in, to supply the places of those, who are released from their engagements to-morrow, and on whom, though many have promised to continue out the month, there is no security for their stay.

Thus am I situated with respect to men. With regard to arms I am yet worse off. Before the dissolution of the old army, I issued an order directing three judicious men of each brigade to attend, review, and appraise the good arms of every regiment; and finding a very great unwillingness in the men to part with their arms, at the same time not having it in my power to pay them for the months of November and December, I threatened severely, that every soldier, who carried away his firelock without leave, should never receive pay for those months; yet so many have been carried off, partly by stealth, but chiefly as condemned, that we have not at this time one hundred guns in the stores, of all that have been taken in the prize-ship and from the soldiery, notwithstanding our regiments are not half complete. At the same time I am told, and believe it, that to restrain the enlistment to men with arms, you will get but few of the former, and still fewer of the latter, which would be good for any thing.

How to get furnished I know not. I have applied to this and the neighboring colonies, but with what success time only can tell. The reflection on my situation, and that of this army, produces many an uneasy hour when all around me are wrapped in sleep. Few people know the predicament we are in, on a thousand accounts; fewer still will believe, if any disaster happens to these lines, from what causes it flows. I have often thought how much happier I should have been, if, instead of accepting of a command under such circumstances, I had taken my musket on my shoulder and entered the ranks, or, if I could have justified the measure to posterity and my own conscience, had retired to the back country, and lived in a wigwam. If I shall be able to rise superior to these and many other difficulties, which might be enumerated, I shall most religiously believe, that the finger of Providence is in it, to blind the eyes of our enemies; for surely if we get well through this month, it must be for want of their knowing the disadvantages we labor under.

Could I have foreseen the difficulties, which have come upon us; could I have known, that such a backwardness would have been discovered in the old soldiers to the

service, all the generals upon earth should not have convinced me of the propriety of delaying an attack upon Boston till this time. When it can now be attempted, I will not undertake to say; but thus much I will answer for, that no opportunity can present itself earlier than my wishes. But as this letter discloses some interesting truths, I shall be somewhat uneasy until I hear it gets to your hands, although the conveyance is thought safe.

We made a successful attempt a few nights ago upon the houses near Bunker's Hill. A party under Major Knowlton crossed upon the mill-dam, the night being dark, and set fire to and burnt down eight out of fourteen which were standing, and which we found they were daily pulling down for fuel. Five soldiers, and the wife of one of them, inhabiting one of the houses, were brought off prisoners; another soldier was killed; none of ours hurt.¹

Having undoubted information of the embarkation of troops, somewhere from three to five hundred, at Boston, and being convinced they are designed either for New York government (from whence we have some very disagreeable accounts of the conduct of the Tories) or Virginia, I despatched General Lee a few days ago, in order to secure the city of New York from falling into their hands, as the consequences of such a blow might prove fatal to our interests. He is also to inquire a little into the conduct of the Long-Islanders, and such others as have, by their conduct and declarations, proved themselves inimical to the common cause.

To effect these purposes, he is to raise volunteers in Connecticut, and call upon the troops of New Jersey, if not contrary to any order of Congress.

By a ship just arrived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, we have London prints to the 2d of November, containing the addresses of Parliament, which contain little more than a repetition of the speech, with assurances of standing by his Majesty with lives and fortunes. The captains (for there were three or four of them passengers) say, that we have nothing to expect but the most vigorous exertions of administration, who have a dead majority upon all questions, although the Duke of Grafton and General Conway have joined the minority, as also the Bishop of Peterborough. These captains affirm confidently, that the five regiments from Ireland cannot any of them have arrived at Halifax, inasmuch as that by a violent storm on the 19th of October, the transports were forced, in a very distressful condition, into Milford Haven (Wales) and were not in a condition to put to sea when they left London, and the weather has been such since, as to prevent heavy loaded ships from making a passage by this time. One or two transports, they add, were thought to be lost; but these arrived some considerable time ago at Boston, with three companies of the 17th regiment.

Mr. Sayre has been committed to the Tower, upon the information of a certain Lieutenant or Adjutant Richardson (formerly of your city) for treasonable practices; an intention of seizing his Majesty, and possessing himself of the Tower, it is said in "The Crisis."¹ But he is admitted to bail himself in five hundred pounds, and two sureties in two hundred and fifty pounds each.

What are the conjectures of the wise ones with you, of the French armament in the West Indies? But previous to this, is there any certainty of such an armament? The captains, who are sensible men, heard nothing of this when they left England; nor does there appear any apprehensions on this score in any of the measures or speeches of administration. I should think the Congress will not, ought not, to adjourn at this important crisis. But it is highly necessary, when I am at the end of a second sheet of paper, that I should adjourn my account of matters to another letter. I shall, therefore, in Mrs. Washington's name, thank you for your good wishes towards her, and with her compliments, added to mine, to Mrs. Reed, conclude, dear Sir, your sincere and affectionate servant.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Cambridge, 16 January, 1776.

Dear Sir,

Your favor of the 5th instant, enclosing copies of General Montgomery's and General Wooster's letters, I received; for which I return you my thanks.^{[1](#)}

It was from a full conviction of your zealous attachment to the cause of our country, and abilities to serve it, that I repeatedly pressed your continuance in command; and it is with much concern, Sir, that I find you have reason to think your holding the place you do, will be of prejudice and incompatible with its interest. As you are of this opinion, the part you are inclined to take is certainly generous and noble. But will the good consequences you intend be derived from it? I greatly fear they will not. I shall leave the matter to yourself, in full confidence, that in whatever sphere you move, your exertions for your country's weal will not be wanting.

Whatever proof you may obtain, fixing or tending to support the charge against Mr. Prescott, you will please to transmit to me by the first opportunity.^{[1](#)} I am apt to believe the intelligence given to Dr. Wheelock, respecting Major Rogers, was not true^{[2](#)}; but being much suspected of unfriendly views to this country, his conduct should be attended to with some degree of vigilance and circumspection.

I confess I am much concerned for General Montgomery and Colonel Arnold; and the consequences which will result from their miscarriage, should it happen, will be very alarming; I fear, not less fatal than you mention. However, I trust that their distinguished conduct, bravery, and perseverance will meet with the smiles of fortune, and put them in possession of this important fortress. I wish their force was greater; the reduction would then be certain.

I am sorry that Ticonderoga and Fort George should be left by the garrisons, and that your recruiting officers meet such ill success. It is too much the case in this quarter, and from the slow progress made in enlisting, I despair of raising an army to the new establishment. Should it be effected, it will be a long time first.

Our Caghnawaga friends are not arrived yet. I will try to make suitable provision for them during their stay, and use every means in my power to confirm their favorable disposition towards us. They will not, I am fearful, have such ideas of our strength, as I could wish. This, however, shall be strongly inculcated.^{[1](#)}

If Quebec is in our possession, I do not see that any inconvenience will result from Mr. Gamble's going there upon his parole^{[2](#)}; but if it is not, however hurtful it may be to him, however disagreeable to me, to prejudice the interest of an individual, I cannot consent to his return. I am much distressed by applications of a like nature. If Mr.

Gamble's request is granted, others in the same situation will claim the same indulgence. Further, I think a partial exchange should not be made, and my proposition for a general one was rejected by Mr. Howe, or, what is the same, it was unnoticed. I could wish that his application had been to Congress. They might have complied with it, had they thought it reasonable. * * *

I am much pleased that the artillery was like to be got over the river, and am in hopes that Colonel Knox will arrive with it in a few days. It is much wanted. On reading the copy of General Wooster's letter, I was much surprised to find, that he had granted furloughs to the Connecticut troops under his command, in preference of discharges. What advantage could he imagine they would be of to the continent, when they were at their own homes? If he could not continue them in the service they were upon, their discharges would certainly have eased the country of a considerable expense. Giving you in return, the compliments of the season, and wishing you every happiness.

I Am, Dear Sir, &C.

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TO THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY.

Cambridge, 16 January, 1776.

Gentlemen,

Your several resolves, in consequence of my letters of the 10 and 15 instant have been presented to me by a committee of your honorable body. I thank you for the assurances of being zealously disposed to do every thing in your power to facilitate the recruiting of the American army; and, at the same time I assure you I do not entertain a doubt of the truth of it, I must beg leave to add, that I conceive you have mistaken the meaning of my letter of the 10th, if you suppose it ever was in my idea, that you should offer a bounty at the separate expense of this colony.

It was not clear to me, but that some coercive measures might be used on this as on former occasions, to draft men to complete the regiments upon the Continental establishment. But as this is thought unadvisable, I shall rely on your recommending to the selectmen and committees of correspondence, &c. to exert themselves in their several towns, to promote the enlistments for the American army.^{[1](#)}

In the mean while, as there is no appearance of this service going on but slowly, and it is necessary to have a respectable body of troops here as soon as possible, to act as circumstances shall require, I must beg that you will order in, with as much expedition as the nature of the case will admit of, seven regiments, agreeable to the establishment of this army, to continue in service till the 1st of April, if required. You will be pleased to direct, that the men come provided with good arms, blankets, kettles for cooking, and if possible with twenty rounds of powder and ball.

With respect to your other resolve relative to arms, I am quite ready to make an absolute purchase of such as shall be furnished either by the colony or individuals. I am also ready to engage payment for all the arms, which shall be furnished by the recruits, if lost in the public service; but I do not know how far I could be justified in allowing for the use of them, when I know it to be the opinion of Congress, that every man shall furnish his own arms, or pay for the use of them if put into his hands. To do otherwise is an indirect way of raising the pay. I again wish, that the honorable Court could advise some method of purchasing.

I beg leave to return my thanks for the kind offer of fifty thousand pounds for the Continental use. I will accept of a loan, upon the terms mentioned, of half that sum to secure payment of the militia, whose time of service will be up the last of this month; till when I shall not have occasion to make use of the money.

I Am, With Great Respect, &C.^{[1](#)}

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TO MATTHEW THORNTON.¹

Cambridge, 16 January, 1776.

Sir,

The alarming and almost defenceless state of our lines, occasioned by the slow progress in raising recruits for the new army, and the departure of a great number of the militia, which had been called in for their support until the 15th instant, rendered it necessary for me to summon the general officers in council, to determine on proper measures to be adopted for their preservation. For this purpose they met at Head Quarters yesterday and to day, and finding that it was with the utmost difficulty and persuasion, that such of the latter as are now here, have been prevailed on to continue till the last of the month, after which there is not the remotest probability of their staying a moment, they have judged it expedient and absolutely necessary, that thirteen regiments should be forthwith raised, equal to those of the new establishment, to be officered according to the usual mode of their respective governments; which are to repair to this camp by the last instant if possible, to be in readiness to act in such manner, till the 1st of April, as circumstances may require. Of this number they apprehend the Massachusetts should furnish seven, Connecticut four, and your government two, being agreeable to the proportion settled by Congress.

In order that each regiment may consist of a proper number of officers and men, I have enclosed you a list for their regulation, and of the Continental pay.

I must earnestly solicit your attention and regard to arms, ammunition, blankets, kettles, and clothing, that they may come as well provided with these necessities as possible, particularly the first; as from the amazing deficiency here I shall not have it in my power to supply them.

The situation and exigency of our affairs calling for this assistance, I have the most pleasing assurance that your honorable body will exert themselves for complying with all possible despatch.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Cambridge, 18 January, 1776.

Dear Sir,

I received your favor of the 13th instant with its enclosures, and am heartily sorry and most sincerely condole with you upon the fall of the brave and worthy Montgomery, and those gallant officers and men, who have experienced a like fate.

In the death of this gentleman, America has sustained a heavy loss, having approved himself a steady friend to her rights, and of ability to render her the most essential services. I am much concerned for the intrepid and enterprising Arnold, and greatly fear, that consequences of the most alarming nature will result from this well intended but unfortunate attempt.

It would give me the greatest pleasure, if I could be the happy means of relieving our fellow citizens now in Canada, and preventing the ministerial troops from exulting long, and availing themselves of the advantages arising from this repulse. But it is not in my power. Since the dissolution of the old army, the progress in raising recruits for the new has been so very slow and inconsiderable, that five thousand militia have been called in for the defence of our lines. A great part of these have gone home again, and the rest induced to stay with the utmost difficulty and persuasion, though their going would render the holding of them truly precarious and hazardous, in case of an attack. In short I have not a man to spare.

In order that proper measures might be adopted, I called a council of general officers, and upon Mr. John Adams, and other members of influence of the General Court to attend, and laid before them your letter and proposition.¹ After due consideration of their importance, they determined that the Colonies of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut should each immediately raise a regiment to continue in service for one year, and to march forthwith to Canada, agreeably to the route proposed in your letter to Congress. This determination, with a copy of your letter and the several enclosures, will be immediately transmitted to the different governments for raising these regiments, which I have reason to believe will be directly complied with, from the assurances I have received from such of the members of the General Court as attended in council, and the general officers promising to exert their utmost interest and influence in their respective colonies. If these regiments should not be raised so soon as I could wish, yet I would willingly hope, from the accounts we have received, that Colonel Arnold and his corps will be joined by a number of men under Colonel Warner, and from Connecticut, who, it is said, marched immediately on getting intelligence of this melancholy affair. If this account be true, I trust they will be in a situation to oppose and prevent Mr. Carleton from regaining possession of what he has lost, and that, upon the arrival of the reinforcement, to be sent from these colonies, the city of Quebec will be reduced to our possession. This must be effected

before the winter is entirely over, otherwise it will be exceedingly difficult, if not impracticable, as the enemy will undoubtedly place a strong garrison there. Should this desirable work be accomplished, our conquest in that quarter will be complete; but yet the loss of the brave Montgomery will ever be remembered.

It gives me pleasure to find, that you will continue in service, and afford your assistance to relieve your country from the distresses, which at present threaten her in the North.[1](#) * * *

None of the letters gives an account how this unfortunate affair ended. In Colonel Campbell's letter of the 31st ultimo, the division which Col. Greene was in he seems to think was in a very disagreeable situation; and drawing it off at night, or throwing in a party to sustain it, was an object he had much in view. Here his information stops. In his letter of the 2d instant he says nothing about it; but I dread further intelligence of the matter.[1](#)

General Putnam is of opinion, that it will be better for the troops, which may be raised in the western part of Connecticut, to go to Albany, than the route you have mentioned by Number Four,[2](#) and that you pointed out this way upon a supposition, that the reinforcement would be detached from this army. If you concur in sentiment with him, please to inform Governor Trumbull of it by letter, that he may give the necessary orders. I am, dear Sir, yours, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 19 January, 1776.

Sir,

Taking it for granted, that General Schuyler has not only informed you of the fall of the brave and much-to-be-lamented General Montgomery, but of the situation of our affairs in Canada, (as related by General Wooster, Colonel Arnold, Colonel Campbell, and others,) I shall not take up much more of your time on this subject, than is necessary to enclose you a copy of his letter to me, with the result thereon, as appears by the council of war, which I immediately summoned on the occasion, and at which Mr. Adams, by my particular desire, was good enough to attend.

It may appear strange, Sir, as I had not men to spare from these lines, that I should presume, without first sending to Congress, and obtaining an express direction, to recommend to the governments of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, to raise each a regiment, on the Continental account, for this service. I wish most ardently, that the urgency of the case would have admitted of the delay. I wish, also, that the purport of General Schuyler's letter had not, unavoidably as it were, laid me under an indispensable obligation to do it; for, having informed you in his letter, (a copy of which he enclosed me,) of his dependence on this quarter for men, I thought you might also have some reliance on my exertions. This consideration, added to my fears of the fatal consequences of delay, to an information of your having designed three thousand men for Canada, to a belief, founded chiefly on General Schuyler's letters, that few or none of them were raised, and to my apprehensions for New York, which led me to think, that no troops could be spared from that quarter, induced me to lose not a moment's time in throwing in a force there; being well assured, that General Carleton will improve to the utmost the advantages gained, leaving no artifices untried to fix the Canadians and Indians, (who, we find, are too well disposed to take part with the strongest,) in his interest.

If these reasons are not sufficient to justify my conduct in the opinion of Congress, if the measure contravenes any resolution of theirs, they will please to countermand the levying and marching of the regiments as soon as possible, and do me the justice to believe, that my intentions were good, if my judgment has erred.¹

The Congress will please also to observe, that the measure of supporting our posts in Canada appeared of such exceeding great importance, that the general officers, (agreeing with me in sentiment, and unwilling to lay any burden which can possibly be avoided, although it may turn out an ill-timed piece of parsimony,) have resolved, that the three regiments for Canada shall be part of the thirteen militia regiments, which were requested to reinforce this army, as appears by the minutes of another council of war, held on the 16th instant.¹ I shall, being much hurried and fatigued, add no more in this letter, than my duty to Congress, and that I have the honor to be,

&c. P. S. I enclose you a copy of my letter to the governments of Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Hampshire, also a copy of a resolution of this colony in answer to an application of mine for arms.

Since writing the above I have been informed by a message from the General Court of Massachusetts that they have a resolution upon the raising of a regiment for Canada, and appointed the field officers for it in the western parts of this government. I am also informed by express from Governor Trumbull that he and his Council of Safety had agreed upon the raising of a regiment for the same purpose which was anticipating my application to that government.

If commissions (and they are applied for) are to be given by Congress to the three regiments going to Canada, you will please to have them forwarded, as I have none by me for the purpose.¹

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TO THE NEW ENGLAND GOVERNMENTS.

Cambridge, 19 January, 1776.

Gentlemen,

The enclosures, herewith sent, convey such full accounts of the sad reverse of our affairs in Canada, as to render it unnecessary for me, in my present hurry, to add aught to the tale.

Your spirited colony will, I have no doubt, be sufficiently impressed with the expediency of a vigorous exertion to prevent the evils, which must follow from the repulse of our troops. It does not admit of a doubt, but that General Carleton will improve this advantage to the utmost; and, if he should be able to give another current of sentiments to the Canadians and Indians, than those they seem inclined to adopt, words are unnecessary to describe the melancholy effect, which must inevitably follow.

I am persuaded, therefore, that you will exert yourselves to the utmost to throw in the reinforcements, by the route mentioned in General Schuyler's letter, that is now required of your colony; as the doing of it expeditiously may prove a matter of the utmost importance.

You will perceive, by the minutes of the council of war enclosed, that the regiment, asked of you for Canada, is one of the seven applied for in my letter of the 16th instant, and that the only difference, with respect to the requisition, is the length of time, and place of service; as no good would result from sending troops to Canada, for a shorter period than the Continental army is raised for, to wit, till the 1st of January, 1777. I am, Gentlemen, &c.

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TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Cambridge, Jany 21st, 1776.

Sir,

In the hurry of my last dispatches to you of the 19 Instt. I forgot to Intimate, that for the Encouragement of the Regimt destin'd for Canada, a months advanced pay will be allowed Officers and Soldiers by me, in behalf of the Congress—At the same time I think it but right that you should be Apprized of the Intention of this Government to advance their Regiment another month's pay to enable the men to provide for so long and fatiguing a march, and in the mean time have something for their Families to subsist on during their absence.

I have no doubt but that this last advance will be pleasing to Congress and that the money will be speedily refunded, but as I have no authority to direct, and would not appear by any act of mine, to put those three Regmts for Canada, upon a different footg from those, which have been raising for this Army, I only give you a hint of the Intention of this Government, if you think proper, that the Regiment from your Colony may be placed upon the same footing, as I know all kind of distinctions are considered by troops with an evil and jealous Eye.

Such necessaries as are absolutely requisite for the March of this Regiment you will please to have provided upon the best terms you can, and a regular account with vouchers thereof kept, that payment may be made.

The importance of dispatch will I am persuaded, appear in so urgent and pressing a light to you, that I need add nothing on this head, but shall be glad to hear what progress you make in the business, being with the sincerest regard and esteem &c. [1](#)

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL LEE.

Cambridge, 23 January, 1776.

Sir,

I received your favor of the 16th instant, and am exceedingly sorry to hear, that Congress countermanded the embarkation of the two regiments intended against the Tories on Long Island.¹ They, I doubt not, had their reasons; but to me it appears, that the period is arrived, when nothing less than the most decisive and vigorous measures should be pursued. Our enemies, from the other side of the Atlantic, will be sufficiently numerous; it highly concerns us to have as few internal ones as possible.

As Congress seem to have altered their views in this instance, and the men, which went with you from Connecticut, are upon a very different footing from what I expected, it will be right to give Congress the earliest notice of your proceeding, and to disband your troops as soon as you think circumstances will admit of it.²

In consequence of the melancholy reverse of our affairs in Canada, an application was made to me for succour, and happy should I have been, if the situation of this army could have afforded it. All I could do was to lay the matter before this and the governments of Connecticut and New Hampshire, and urge the expediency and necessity of their sending thither a reinforcement of three regiments there immediately. Mr. Trumbull and his Council of Safety had anticipated my request. The other two colonies have adopted the measure. The three regiments are now raising, and, I would willingly hope, will arrive in time to reinstate matters in that quarter, and give them a more agreeable aspect than they now have.

I shall be much obliged by your pressing Colonel McDougall to forward the shells mentioned in his letter of the 2d instant, as they are much wanted, and also to spare me some powder if he possibly can.¹ You know our stock of this necessary article is small and inconsiderable, and you know, too, that we have a demand for a further supply.

The progress in raising recruits for the new army being very slow, I have applied to this colony, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, for ten regiments of militia, to continue in service till the 1st of April next, which they have granted me. As soon as they come in, and I can get provided with proper means, I am determined to attempt something. Of this I would have you take no notice.

Within a few days past several persons have come out of Boston. They all agree, that General Clinton has gone upon some expedition. Some say he has between four and five hundred men, others, part of two regiments. What his force consists of is not precisely known; but I am almost certain he has gone with some. His destination must be south of this, and very probably for New York. I thought it necessary to give you

this information, that you may be on your guard, and prepared to receive him as well as you can.

I shall be glad to hear from you frequently, and to be informed of any occurrences you may think material. I am, dear Sir, with great regard, &c.

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 23 January, 1776.

Dear Sir,

Real necessity compels me to ask you, whether I may entertain any hopes of your returning to my family? If you can make it convenient, and will hint the matter to Colonel Harrison, I dare venture to say, that Congress will make it agreeable to you in every shape they can. My business increases very fast, and my distresses for want of you along with it. Mr. Harrison is the only gentleman of my family, that can afford me the least assistance in writing. He and Mr. Moylan, whose time must now be solely employed in his department of commissary, have heretofore afforded me their aid; and I have hinted to them in consequence of what you signified in some former letter, that, (as they have really had a great deal of trouble,) each of them should receive one third of your pay, reserving the other third contrary to your desire for yourself. My distress and embarrassment are in a way of being very considerably increased by an occurrence in Virginia, which will, I fear, compel Mr. Harrison to leave me, or suffer considerably by his stay. He has wrote, however, by the last post to see if his return cannot be dispensed with. If he should go, I shall really be distressed beyond measure, as I know no persons able to supply your places, (in this part of the world,) with whom I would choose to live in unbounded confidence. In short for want of an acquaintance with the people hitherward, I know of none which appear to me qualified for the office of secretary.

The business, as I hinted to you before, is considerably increased, by being more comprehensive, and at this time, (from the great changes which are happening every day) perplexed; so that you would want a good writer and a methodical man, as an assistant, or copying clerk. Such a one I have no doubt will be allowed, and the choice I leave to yourself, as he should be a person in whose integrity you can confide, and on whose capacity, care, and method you can rely. At present, my time is so much taken up at my desk, that I am obliged to neglect many other essential parts of my duty. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, for me to have persons that can think for me, as well as execute orders. This it is that pains me when I think of Mr. White's expectation of coming into my family if an opening happens. I can derive no earthly assistance from such a man, and my friend Baylor is much such another, although as good and obliging a person as any in the world.

As it may be essential that the pay of the undersecretary should be fixed, that you may, if you incline to return and should engage one, know what to promise him, I have wrote to Colonel Harrison and Mr. Lynch on this subject.

The interruption of the post has prevented the receipt of any letters from the southward since this day week, so that we have but little knowledge of what is passing in that quarter. The unfortunate repulse of our troops at Quebec, the death of the brave

and much to be lamented General Montgomery, and wounding of Col. Arnold, will, I fear, give a very unfavorable turn to our affairs in that quarter, as I have no opinion at all of W[ooste]r's enterprising genius.¹

Immediately upon the receipt of the unfortunate intelligence, and General Schuyler's intimation of his having no other dependence than upon me for men, I addressed Massachusetts, Connecticut, and N. Hampshire (in behalf of the Continent) for a regiment each, to be marched forthwith into Canada, and there continued, if need be, till the 1st. of January, upon the same establishment as those raising for these lines. It was impossible to spare a man from hence, as we want eight or nine thousand of our establishment, and are obliged to depend upon militia for the defence of our works: equally improper did it appear to me to wait (situated as our affairs were) for a requisition from Congress, after several day's debate, perhaps, when in the meantime all might be lost. The urgency of the case, therefore, must apologize to Congress for my adoption of this measure. Governor Trumbull, indeed, anticipated my request, for he and his Council of Safety had voted a regiment before my request had reached him. The General Court here have also voted another, and I have no doubt of New Hampshire's doing the like, and that the whole will soon be on their march. I have this instant received a letter from New Hampshire, in answer to mine, informing me that they have fully complied with my request of a regiment, appointed the field-officers, and will have the whole in motion as soon as possible. Col. Warner, and others, we are told, are already on their march, so that it is to be hoped, if these bodies have but a good head, our affairs may still be retrieved in Canada, before the king's troops can get reinforced.

They are pulling down the houses in Boston as fast as possible, and we have lately accounts from thence which it is said may be relied on, that General Clinton is actually sailed from thence with a detachment (no accounts making it more than 500) for the southward; some say Virginia, others New York, but all in conjecture. Whether this is the fleet that has been making up for some time at Nantasket, or another, I cannot with certainty say. In my last I informed you, I think, of the expedition I had sent General Lee on to New York. Should Clinton steer his course thither, I hope he will meet with a formidable and proper reception. I shall conclude with informing you that we should have had a formidable work on Letchmore's Point long ago, if it had not been for the frost, and that if Congress mean that we should do any thing this winter, no time must be lost in forwarding powder. I have ordered in militia to take advantage of circumstances, but I see no appearances as yet of a bridge. I am, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 24 January, 1776.

Sir,

The Commissary General being at length returned from a long and painful illness, I have it in my power to comply with the requisition of Congress in forwarding an estimate of the expence attending his office, as also that of the Quartermaster General. You will please to observe that the Commissary, by his account of the matter, has entered into no special agreement with any of the persons he has found occasion to employ (as those to whose names sums are annexed are of their own fixing) but left it to Congress to ascertain their wages: I shall say nothing therefore on this head further than relates to the proposition of Mr. Miller, to be allowed $\frac{1}{8}$ for his trouble and the delivery of the other $\frac{7}{8}$ of provisions, which to me appears exorbitant in the extreme, however, conformable it may be to custom and usage. I therefore think that reasonable stipends had better be fixed upon. Both the Quartermaster and Commissary generals assure me that they do not employ a single person uselessly, and as I have too good an opinion of them to think they would deceive me, I believe them.

I shall take the liberty of recommending the expediency, indeed the absolute necessity, of appointing fit and proper persons to settle the accounts of this army. To do it with precision requires time, care, and attention. The longer it is left undone, the more intricate they will be, the more liable to error, and difficult to explain and rectify; as also the persons in whose hands they are, if disposed to take undue advantage, will be less subject to detection. I have been as attentive, as the nature of my office would admit of, in granting warrants for money on the pay-master; but it would be absolutely impossible for me to go into an examination of all the accounts incident to this army, and the vouchers appertaining to them, without devoting so large a portion of my time to the business, as might not only prove injurious, but fatal to it in other respects. This ought, in my humble opinion, to be the particular business of a select committee of Congress, or one appointed by them, who, once in three months at farthest, should make a settlement with the officers in the different departments.

Having met with no encouragement from the governments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, as to my application for arms, and expecting no better from Connecticut and Rhode Island, I have, as the last expedient, sent one or two officers from each regiment into the country, with money to try if they can buy. In what manner they succeed, Congress shall be informed as soon as they return. Congress, in my last, would discover my motives for strengthening these lines with the militia; but whether, as the weather turns out exceedingly mild, (insomuch as to promise nothing favorable from ice,) and as there is no appearance of powder, I shall be able to attempt any thing decisive, time only can determine. No man upon earth wishes more ardently to

destroy the nest in Boston, than I do; no person would be willing to go greater lengths than I shall, to accomplish it, if it shall be thought advisable. But if we have neither powder to bombard with, nor ice to pass on, we shall be in no better situation than we have been in all the year; we shall be worse, because their works are stronger.

I have accounts from Boston, which I think may be relied on, that General Clinton, with about four or five hundred men, has left that place within these four days. Whether this is part of the detachment, which was making up (as mentioned in my letter of the fourth instant, and then at Nantasket) or not, it is not in my power to say. If it is designed for New York or Long Island, as some think, throwing a body of troops there may prove a fortunate circumstance. If they go farther south, agreeably to the conjectures of others, I hope there will be men to receive them. Notwithstanding the positive assertions of the four captains from Portsmouth, noticed in my letter of the 14th, I am now convinced from several corroborating circumstances, the accounts of deserters and of a Lieut. Hill of Lord Percy's regiment, who left Ireland the 5 of November, and was taken by a privateer from Newburyport, that the 17th and 55th regiments are arrived in Boston, and other troops at Halifax, agreeable to the information of Hutchinson and others. Lieut. Hill says that the transports of two regiments only were forced into Milford Haven.

Congress will think me a little remiss, I fear, when I inform them, that I have done nothing yet towards raising the battalion of marines; but I hope to stand exculpated from blame, when they hear the reason, which was, that already having twenty-six incomplete regiments, I thought it would be adding to an expense, already great, in officers, to set two entire corps of officers on foot, when perhaps we should not add ten men a week by it to our present numbers. In this opinion the general officers have concurred, which induced me to suspend the matter a little longer. Our enlistments, for the two last weeks, have not amounted to a thousand men, and are diminishing. The regiment for Canada, it is thought, will soon be filled, as the men are to choose all but their field-officers, who are appointed by the Court.

On Sunday evening, thirteen of the Caghnawaga Indians arrived here on a visit. I shall take care that they be so entertained during their stay, that they may return impressed with sentiments of friendship for us, and also of our great strength. One of them is Colonel Louis, who honored me with a visit once before.¹ I have, &c.²

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Cambridge, 27 January, 1776.

Dear Sir,

Your favor of the 22d enclosing Colonel Arnold's letter of the 2d, explaining the doubt we were in respecting his detachment, is received. Happy would it have been for our cause, if that party could have got out of the city of Quebec³; as I am much afraid by the complexion of the letters from that place, that there is little hope of Arnold's continuing the blockade without assistance from Wooster, which he is determined not to give, whether with propriety or not, I shall not at this distance undertake to decide.

The sad reverse of our affairs in that quarter calls loudly for every exertion in your power, to restore them to the promising aspect they so lately wore. For this reason, notwithstanding you think the necessity of troops from hence is in some measure superseded, I will not countermand the order and appointment of officers, which are gone forth from this government, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, for raising a regiment each, till Congress, (who are informed of it,) shall have decided upon the measure.

I consider, that the important period is now arrived, when the Canadians and consequently their Indians must take their side. Should any indecisive operations of ours, therefore, give the bias against us, it is much easier to foresee, than to rectify, the dreadful consequences, which must inevitably follow from it. I consider, also, that the reinforcement, under the command of Colonel Warner, and such other spirited men as have left the western parts of the New England governments, is only temporary, and may fail when most wanted; as we find it next to impossible to detain men, (not fast bound,) in service, after they get a little tired of the duties of it and homesick.

These, my dear Sir, are the great outlines which govern me in this affair. If Congress mark them as strongly as I do, they will not wish to starve the cause at so critical a period. If they think differently, they will direct accordingly, and I must stand corrected for the error my zeal hath led me into.

Colonel Porter, said to be an exceedingly active man, is appointed to the command of the regiment from this government; Colonel Burrell to the one from Connecticut; and Colonel Bedel to that from New Hampshire. The two last are represented to me as men of spirit and influence; so that, from these accounts, I have no doubt of their getting into Canada in a very short time, as I have endeavored to excite the spirit of emulation. I wish most ardently, that the state of your health may permit you to meet them there. The possession of Quebec, and entire reduction of Canada this winter, so as to have leisure to prepare for the defence of it in the spring, is of such great and

extensive importance to the well-being of America, that I wish to see matters under the direction,—but I will say no more, you will come at my meaning.

I am a little embarrassed to know in what manner to conduct myself with respect to the Caghnawaga Indians now here. They have, notwithstanding the treaty of neutrality, which I find they entered into with you the other day (agreeably to what appears to be the sense of Congress), signified to me a desire of taking up arms in behalf of the United Colonies. The Chief of them, and who I understand is now the first man of the nation, intends, as it is intimated, to apply to me for a commission, with the assurance of raising four or five hundred men when he returns. My embarrassment does not proceed so much from the impropriety of encouraging these people to depart from their neutrality, (accepting their own voluntary offer rather), as from the expense, which probably may follow. I am sensible that, if they do not desire to be idle, they will be for or against us. I am sensible, also, that no artifices will be left unassayed to engage them against us. Their proffered services, therefore, ought not to be rejected; but how far, with the little knowledge I have of these people's policy and real intentions, and your want of their aid, I ought to go, is the question that puzzles me. I will endeavor, however, to please them by yielding in appearance to their demands; reserving, at the same time, the power in you to regulate their numbers and movements, of which you shall be more fully informed when any thing is fixed.¹ At present what they have mentioned is a kind of out door talk. They expect and are waiting to see Col. Bedel (who promised to meet them here), before they open themselves fully.

What can you do in compliance with Arnold's request of mortars, &c? If Knox disfurnished you, I am almost sorry for it, as I believe I shall never get wherewithal to feed them here.

I congratulate you upon the success of your expedition into Tryon county. I hope General Lee will execute a work of the same kind on Long Island, &c. It is high time to begin with our internal foes, when we are threatened with such severity of chastisement from our kind parent without. That the Supreme Dispenser of every good may bestow health, strength, and spirit on you and your army, is the fervent wish of, dear Sir, your most affectionate and obedient servant.

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TO COLONEL BENEDICT ARNOLD.

Cambridge, 27 January, 1776.

Dear Sir,

On the 17th instant I received the melancholy account of the unfortunate attack on the city of Quebec, attended with the fall of General Montgomery and other brave officers and men, and your being wounded. This unhappy affair affects me in a very sensible manner, and I sincerely condole with you upon the occasion; but, in the midst of distress, I am happy to find, that suitable honors were paid to the remains of Mr. Montgomery; and our officers and soldiers, who have fallen into their hands, were treated with kindness and humanity.¹

Having received no intelligence later than the copy of your letter of the 2d to General Wooster, I would fain hope, that you are not in a worse situation than you then were; though, I confess, I have greatly feared, that those misfortunes would be succeeded by others, on account of your unhappy condition, and the dispirited state of the officers and men. If they have not, I trust, when you are joined by three regiments now raising in this and the governments of Connecticut and New Hampshire, and two others ordered by the Congress from Pennsylvania and the Jerseys, with the men already sent off by Colonel Warner, that these misfortunes will be done away, and things will resume a more favorable and promising appearance than ever.

I need not mention to you the great importance of this place, and the consequent possession of all Canada, in the scale of American affairs. You are well apprized of it. To whomsoever it belongs, in their favor, probably, will the balance turn. If it is in ours, success I think will most certainly crown our virtuous struggles. If it is in theirs, the contest at best will be doubtful, hazardous, and bloody. The glorious work must be accomplished in the course of this winter, otherwise it will become difficult, most probably impracticable; for administration, knowing that it will be impossible ever to reduce us to a state of slavery and arbitrary rule without it, will certainly send a large reinforcement there in the spring. I am fully convinced, that your exertions will be invariably directed to this grand object, and I already view the approaching day, when you and your brave followers will enter this important fortress, with every honor and triumph attendant on victory. Then will you have added the only link wanting in the great chain of Continental union, and rendered the freedom of your country secure.

Wishing you a speedy recovery, and the possession of those laurels, which your bravery and perseverance justly merit, I am, dear Sir, yours, &c.¹

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TO COMMODORE JOHN MANLY.

Cambridge, 28 January, 1776.

Sir,

I received your agreeable letter of the 26th instant, giving an account of your having taken and carried into Plymouth two of the enemy's transports. Your conduct in engaging the eight-gun schooner, with so few hands as you went out with, your attention in securing your prizes, and your general good behavior since you first engaged in the service, merit my own and your country's thanks.¹

You may be assured, that every attention will be paid to any reasonable request of yours, and that you shall have the command of a stronger vessel of war; but as it will take up some time before such a one can be fitted out, my desire is, that you continue in the Hancock until the end of the cruise. When that is out, you will come to Head-Quarters, and we will confer together on the subject of the other ship. I wish you could engage men at Plymouth to make your complement at least forty strong. It would enable you to encounter the small tenders, that may fall in your way; though I would rather have you avoid an engagement, until you have a ship, that will place you upon a more equal footing with your enemy. I need not recommend to you to proceed again and pursue your good fortune.

I wish you could inspire the captains of the other armed schooners under your command with some of your activity and industry. Can you not appoint stations for them, where they may have the best chance of intercepting supplies going to the enemy? They dare not disobey your orders, as it is mentioned in the instructions I have given to each of them, that they are to be under your command as commodore; and as such I desire that you will give them such instructions in writing, as to you will appear proper for the good of the service. I am, Sir, wishing you a continuance of success, yours, &c.¹

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 30 January, 1776.

Sir,

Your favors of the 6th and of the 20th instant I received yesterday, with the several resolves of Congress alluded to; for which I return you my thanks. Knowing the great importance Canada will be of to us, in the present interesting contest, and the relief our friends there stand in need of, I should be happy, were it in my power, to detach a battalion from this camp; but it cannot be done. On the 19th instant, I had the honor to write to you a letter, which will fully convey the resolutions of a council of war, and the sentiments of the general officers here, as to the propriety and expediency of sending troops from these lines, for the defence of which we have been and now are obliged to call in the militia; to which I beg leave to refer you.¹ You may rest assured, that my endeavors and exertions shall not be wanting, to stimulate the governments of Connecticut and New Hampshire to raise and forward reinforcements as fast as possible; nor in any other instance that will promote the expedition.²

I shall, in obedience to the order of Congress, though interdicted by General Howe, propose an exchange of Governor Skene¹ for Mr. Lovell and his family, and shall be happy to have an opportunity of putting this deserving man, (who has distinguished his fidelity and regard to his country to be too great for persecution and cruelty to overcome,) in any post agreeable to his wishes and inclination. I do not know, that there is any particular rank annexed to the office of aid-de-camp. Generally they are captains, and rank as such; but higher rank is often given on account of particular merit and particular circumstances. Aids to the King have the rank of colonels. Whether any distinction should be made between those of your Commander-in-chief, and the other generals, I really know not. I think there ought.¹

You may rely, that Connolly had instructions concealed in his saddle. Mr. Eustis,² who was one of Lord Dunmore's family, and another gentleman, who wishes his name not to be mentioned, saw them cased in tin, put in the tree, and covered over. He probably has exchanged his saddle, or withdrawn the papers when it was mended, as you conjecture. Those that have been discovered are sufficiently bad; but I doubt not of the others being worse, and containing more diabolical and extensive plans. I hope he will be taken proper care of, and meet with rewards equal to his merits.

I shall appoint officers in the places of those, who are in Canada, as I am fully persuaded they will wish to continue there, for making our conquest complete in that quarter. I wish their bravery and valor may be attended with the smiles of fortune.

It gives me great pleasure to hear of the measures Congress are taking for manufacturing powder. I hope their endeavors will be crowned with success. I too well know and regret the want of it. It is scarcely possible to describe the

disadvantages an army must labor under, when not provided with a sufficient supply of this necessary. It may seem strange after having received about 11 tons, added to about 5 tons which I found here, and no general action has happened that we should be so deficient in this article and require more. But you will please to consider besides its being in its nature subject to waste, and whilst the men lay in bad tents was unavoidably damaged by severe and heavy rains (which could not have been prevented, unless it had been entirely withdrawn from them, and an attack hazarded against us without ammunition in their hands), that the armed vessels, our own occasional firings, and some small supplies I have been obliged to afford the seaport towns threatened with destruction, to which may be added the supply to the militia, and going off of the old troops, have occasioned and ever will a large consumption of it, and waste, in spite of all the care in the world. The king's troops never have less than 60 rounds a man in their possession, independent of their stores. To supply an army of 20,000 in this manner would be near 400 barrels, allowing nothing for stores, artillery &c. I have been always afraid to place more than 12 or 15 rounds at a time in the hands of our men, lest any accident happening to it, we should be left destitute and be undone. I have been this particular not only to show our poverty, but to exculpate myself from even a suspicion of unnecessary waste.

I shall inform the Paymaster general of the resolution of Congress, respecting his drafts, and the mode and amount of them.

The companies at Chelsea and Malden are and have always been regimented. It was not my intention to replace with Continental troops the independent companies at Hingham, Weymouth and Braintree. These places are exposed, but not more so than Cape Ann, Beverly, Salem, Marblehead, &c. &c. &c.

Is it the intention of Congress that the officers of the army should pay postage? They are not exempted by the resolve of the 9th. inst.

The Congress will be pleased, I have no doubt, to recollect that the 500,000 dollars now coming are but little more than enough to bring us up to the first day of this month, that tomorrow will be the last of it, and by their resolve the troops are to be paid monthly.

I wish it was in my power to furnish Congress with such a general as they desire, to send to Canada.¹ Since the unhappy reverse of our affairs in that quarter, General Schuyler has informed me, that, though he had thoughts of declining the service before, he would now act. My letter of the 11th will inform them of General Lee's being at New York. He will be ready to obey their orders, should they incline to send him; but, if I am not greatly deceived, he or some other spirited, able officer will be wanted there in the spring, if not sooner; as we have undoubted intelligence, that General Clinton has sailed with some troops. The reports of their number are various, from between four and five hundred to nineteen companies of grenadiers and light infantry. It is also imagined, that the regiments, which were to sail the 1st of December, are intended for that place or Virginia. General Putnam is a most valuable man, and a fine executive officer; but I do not know how he would conduct in a separate department. He is a younger major-general than Mr. Schuyler, who, as I have

observed, having determined to continue in the service, will, I expect, repair into Canada. A copy of my letter to him on this and other subjects, I enclose to you, as it will explain my motives for not stopping the regiments from these governments.

When Captain Cochran arrives, I will give him every assistance in my power, in obedience to the orders of Congress; but I fear it will be the means of laying up our own vessels, as these people will not bear the distinction.¹ Should this be the consequence, it will be highly prejudicial to us, as we sometimes pick up their provision-vessels, and may continue to distress them in this way. Last week Captain Manly took a ship and a brig bound to Boston from White Haven, with coals chiefly and some potatoes for the army. I have, for his great vigilance and industry, appointed him commodore of our little squadron; and he now hoists his flag on board the schooner *Hancock*.

I congratulate you upon the recovery of Smith,¹ and am exceedingly glad to hear of the measures Congress are taking for the general defence of the continent. The clouds thicken fast; where they will burst, I know not; but we should be armed at all points.

I have not succeeded in my applications to these governments for arms. They have returned for answer, that they cannot furnish any. Whether I shall be more lucky in the last resource left me in this quarter, I cannot determine, having not received returns from the officers sent out to purchase of the people. I greatly fear, that but very few will be procured in this way, as they are exceedingly scarce, and but a small part of what there are, fit for service. When they make their port, you shall be informed.

The Quarter master general has just received from General Schuyler clothing for the soldiery, amounting to about £1700 York currency. It has come very seasonably, as they are in great want, and will contribute a little to their relief.

Since writing the above, I have seen Mr. Eustis; and mentioning that nothing had been found in the tree of Connolly's saddle, he told me there had been a mistake in the matter; that the instructions were artfully concealed on the two pieces of wood, which are on the mail-pillion of his portmanteau-saddle; that, by order of Lord Dunmore, he saw them contrived for the purpose, the papers put in, and first covered with tin, and over that with a waxed canvass cloth.² He is so exceedingly pointed and clear in his information, that I have no doubt of its being true. I could wish them to be discovered, as I think they contain some curious and extraordinary plans. In my letter of the 24th instant, I mentioned the arrival of thirteen of our Caghnawaga friends. They honored me with a talk to-day, as did three of the tribes of St. John's and Passamaquoddy Indians, copies of which I beg leave to enclose you. I shall write to General Schuyler respecting the tender of service made by the former, and not to call for their assistance, unless he shall at any time want it, or be under the necessity of doing it to prevent their taking the sides of our enemies.

I had the honor of writing to you on the 19th of November, and then I informed you of having engaged two persons to go to Nova Scotia on the business recommended in your letter of the 10th; and also that the state of the army would not then admit of a

sufficient force being sent, for carrying into execution the views of Congress respecting the dock-yards, &c. I would now beg leave to mention, that, if the persons sent for information should report favorably of the expediency and practicability of the measure, it will not be in my power to detach any men from these lines. The situation of our affairs will not allow it. I think it would be advisable to raise them in the eastern parts of this government. If it is attempted, it must be by people from the country. A Colonel Thompson, a member of the General Court from the province of Maine, and who is well spoken of by the Court, and a Captain O'Brien have been with me. They think the men necessary may be easily engaged there, and the measure practicable, provided there are not more than two hundred British troops at Halifax. They are willing and ready to embark in the matter, upon the terms mentioned in their plan, which I enclose to you. I wish you to advert to the considerations inducing them to the expedition, as I am not without apprehension, should it be undertaken upon their plan, that the innocent and guilty will be involved in one common ruin. I presume they do not expect to receive more from the Continent, than the five or ten thousand pounds mentioned in their scheme, and to be at every expense. If we had men to spare, it might be undertaken for less than either, I conceive. Perhaps, if Congress do not adopt their proposition, they will undertake to raise men for that particular purpose, who may be disbanded as soon as it is effected, and upon the same terms that are allowed the Continental troops in general. Whatever may be the determination of Congress upon the subject, you will please to communicate it to me immediately; for the season most favorable for the enterprise is advancing fast; and we may expect in the spring, that there will be more troops there, and the measure be more difficult to execute. I have the honor to be, &c. [1](#)

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL LEE.

Cambridge, 30 January, 1776.

Dear Sir,

I wrote to you the 23d instant, and then informed you, that General Clinton had gone upon some expedition with four or five hundred men. There is good reason to believe, that Tryon has applied for some troops, and that he would join them with a great number of inhabitants; so that you will see the necessity of your being decisive and expeditious in your operations in that quarter. The Tories should be disarmed immediately, though it is probable that they may have secured their arms on board the King's ships, until called upon to use them against us. However, you can seize upon the persons of the principals. They must be so notoriously known, that there will be little danger of your committing mistakes, and happy should I be if the Governor could be one of them.

Since writing the above, your favor of the 24th has come to hand, with the sundry enclosures, which I have with attention perused, and very much approve of your conduct. I sincerely wish that the letter you expect to receive from Congress may empower you to act conformable to your own and my sentiments on this occasion. If they should order differently, we must submit, as they doubtless will have good reasons for what they may determine.[1](#)

The Congress desire I should send an active general to Canada. I fancy, when they made the demand, that they did not think General Schuyler would continue in that station, which he has given me to understand, in some late letters from him, that he would. Should they not approve of the New York expedition, and think another general necessary for the northern department, it is probable they will fix on you to take the command there. I should be sorry to have you removed so far from this scene; but if the service there requires your presence, it will be a fine field for the exertion of your admirable talents. There is nothing new here. Let me hear often from you, and believe me, &c.[2](#)

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 31 January, 1776.

Dear Sir,

In my last, (date not recollected) by Mr. John Adams, I communicated my distresses to you on account of my want of your assistance. Since this I have been under some concern at doing of it, lest it should precipitate your return before you were ripe for it, or bring on a final resignation which I am unwilling to think of, if your return can be made convenient and agreeable. True it is, that from a variety of causes my business has been, and now is, multiplied and perplexed; whilst the means of execution is greatly contracted. This may be a cause for my wishing you here, but no inducement to your coming, if you hesitated before.

I have now to thank you for your favors of the 15th, 16th, and 20th inst., and for the several articles of intelligence, which they convey. The account given of your navy, at the same time that it is exceedingly unfavorable to our wishes, is a little provoking to me, inasmuch as it has deprived us of a necessary article, which otherwise would have been sent hither; but which a kind of fatality I fear will for ever deprive us of. In the instance of New York, we are not to receive a particle of what you expected would be sent from thence; the time and season passing away, as I believe the troops in Boston also will, before the season for taking the field arrives. I dare say they are preparing for it now, as we have undoubted intelligence of Clinton's leaving Boston with a number of troops, (by different accounts, from four or five hundred to 10 companies of grenadiers, and nine of light infantry), believed to be designed for Long Island, or New York, in consequence of assurances from Governor Tryon of powerful aid from the Tories there.

I hope my countrymen of Virginia will rise superior to any losses the whole navy of Great Britain can bring on them, and that the destruction of Norfolk, and the threatened devastation of other places, will have no other effect, than to unite the whole country in one indissoluble band against a nation which seems to be lost to every sense of virtue, and those feelings which distinguish a civilized people from the most barbarous savages. A few more of such flaming arguments, as were exhibited at Falmouth and Norfolk,¹ added to the sound doctrine and unanswerable reasoning contained in the pamphlet "*Common Sense*," will not leave numbers at a loss to decide upon the propriety of a separation.

By a letter of the 21st instant from Wooster, I find, that Arnold was continuing the blockade of Quebec on the 19th, which, under the heaviness of our loss there, is a most favorable circumstance, and exhibits a fresh proof of Arnold's ability and perseverance in the midst of difficulties. The reinforcements ordered to him will, I hope, complete the entire conquest of Canada this winter; and but for the loss of the gallant chief, and his brave followers, I should think the rebuke rather favorable than

otherwise; for had the country been subdued by such a handful of men, it is more than probable, that it would have been left to the defence of a few, and rescued from us in the spring. Our eyes will now be open not only to the importance of holding it, but to the numbers which are requisite to that end. In return for your two beef and poultry vessels from New York, I can acquaint you that our Commodore Manly has just taken two ships from White Haven to Boston, with coal and potatoes, and sent them into Plymouth, and fought a tender (close by the light house where the vessels were taken), long enough to give his prizes time to get off, in short, till she thought it best to quit the combat, and he to move off from the men-of-war, which were spectators of this scene.

In my last I think I informed you of my sending General Lee to New York, with the intention of securing the Tories of Long Island, and to prevent, if possible, the King's troops from making a lodgment there; but I fear the Congress will be duped by the representations from that government, or yield to them in such a manner as to become marplots to the expedition. The city seems to be entirely under the government of Tryon and the captain of the man-of-war.

Mrs. Washington desires I will thank you for the picture sent her. Mr. Campbell, whom I never saw, to my knowledge, has made a very formidable figure of the Commander-in-chief, giving him a sufficient portion of terror in his countenance.¹ Mrs. Washington also desires her compliments to Mrs. Reed, as I do, and, with the sincerest regard and affection, I remain, dear Sir, your most obedient servant.

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 1 Feby, 1776.

My Dear Sir,

I had wrote the letter herewith enclosed before your favor of the 21st came to hand. The account given of the behavior of the men under General Montgomery, is exactly consonant to the opinion I have formed of these people, and such as they will exhibit abundant proofs of, in similiar cases whenever called upon. Place them behind a parapet, a breast-work, stone wall, or any thing that will afford them shelter, and, from their knowledge of a firelock, they will give a good account of their enemy; but I am as well convinced, as if I had seen it, that they will not march boldly up to a work, nor stand exposed in a plain; and yet, if we are furnished with the means, and the weather will afford us a passage, and we can get in men, for these three things are necessary, something must be attempted. ¹ The men must be brought to face danger; they cannot always have an intrenchment or a stone wall as a safeguard or shield; and it is of essential importance, that the troops in Boston should be destroyed if possible before they can be reinforced or removed. This is clearly my opinion. Whether circumstances will admit of the trial, and, if tried, what will be the event, the All-wise Disposer of them alone can tell.

The evils arising from short, or even any limited inlistment of the troops, are greater, and more extensively hurtful than any person (not an eye-witness to them) can form any idea of. It takes you two or three months to bring new men in any tolerable degree acquainted with their duty; it takes a longer time to bring a people of the temper and genius of these into such a subordinate way of thinking as is necessary for a soldier. Before this is accomplished, the time approaches for their dismissal, and you are beginning to make interest with them for their continuance for another limited period; in the doing of which you are obliged to relax in your discipline, in order as it were to curry favor with them, by which means the latter part of your time is employed in undoing what the first was accomplishing, and instead of having men always ready to take advantage of circumstances, you must govern your movements by the circumstances of your Inlistment. This is not all; by the time you have got men arm'd and equip'd, the difficulty of doing which is beyond description, and with every new sett you have the same trouble to encounter, without the means of doing it.—In short, the disadvantages are so great and apparent to me, that I am convinced, uncertain as the continuance of the war is, that Congress had better determine to give a bounty of 20, 30, or even 40 Dollars to every man who will Inlist for the whole time, be it long or short. I intend to write my sentiments fully on this subject to Congress the first leizure time I have.

I am exceeding sorry to hear that Arnold's wound is in an unfavorable way; his letter to me of the 14th ulto. says nothing of this. I fancy Congress have given some

particular direction respecting Genl. Prescott. I think they ought for more reasons than one. I am, &c.

Be so good as to send the enclosed letter of Randolph's to the Post-office.[1](#)

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TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Cambridge, 8 February, 1776.

Sir,

I received your favors of the 2 and 5 Inst. and agreeable to your request have ordered payment of the ballance of the expences attending the journey of the two French gentlemen to Philadelphia to be made [to] Wm. Bacon Post rider, for your use, which I hope will come safe to hand.

I am happy to hear of your having received 12.500 dollars from Congress for the troops going upon the Canada expedition, and heartily wish that no other difficulties may occur to impede their march and prevent their giving early and timely succor to our friends there, which they certainly stand in great need of.

As to replacing the money advanced by your Colony to the regiments which served the last campaign, it is not in my power. It is what I did not expect and therefore have made no provision for it. I should have paid them in the same manner I did others, had I not been prevented by the Colonels, who expressed their inclination to receive the whole at one time, after the expiration of the service and on their return home. This being the case, I always imagined that the sum advanced by you, would be taken in when Congress came to form a general account against the colonies, and be applied to your credit which I presume they will shortly do, as I have wrote to them, and pointed out the necessity of having all the accounts respecting this Army adjusted and liquidated at proper periods. Had I conceived that this application for repayment would have been made to me, I should certainly have included the sum advanced by you in my estimates and taken care to have had a sufficiency of money to discharge it. But I did not. I am unprovided, and have not more than will answer the claims I was apprized of antecedent to the last day of December. They are large and numerous, and in a few days will drain our treasury of every Shilling now in it. I am exceedingly sorry that matters should be so circumstanced as to give you the least disappointment or trouble; But I doubt not Congress upon your application will refund what you have advanced, or settle it in such a way, as shall be perfectly agreeable to you.

I shall take care to have the three battallions of the militia paid which are coming here for the defence of our lines in the same manner, that the rest are when the time of their engagement expires. They certainly might have come thus far without the advance you have been obliged to give.

Having lately examined into the state of our powder and finding the deficiency to be much greater than what I had any idea of, and hearing that the militia from your Colony, and I fear from the others too, are coming without any, or with but very little, I cannot but confess my anxiety and concern to be very great. I therefore again repeat the request I made this morning, and beg and entreat your most strenuous and friendly

exertions to procure what we are told is important, or such part as you possibly can, and send it to me with the utmost expedition; I am already much alarmed on account of the scarcity, and the Militia coming in without a proper supply fills me with apprehensions of the most disagreeable nature—this I would mention in confidence, as It might give great uneasiness if it was generally known and trusting that nothing in your power will be wanting to relieve us at this alarming and important crisis, I am, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 9 February, 1776.

Sir,

In compliance with the resolves of Congress, I have applied to General Howe for the exchange of Mr. Lovell. A copy of my letter and his answer thereto you have inclosed.

Captain Waters and Captain Tucker, who command two of the armed schooners, have taken and sent into Gloucester a large brigantine laden with wood, 150 butts for water and 40 suits of bedding, bound from La Havre in Nova Scotia for Boston. She is one of the transports in the ministerial service. The captain says he was at Halifax the 17th January, and that General Massey was arrived there with two regiments from Ireland.

The different prizes were all libelled immediately on receipt of the resolves of Congress pointing out the mode, but none of them yet brought to trial, owing to a difference between the law passed in this Province, and the resolutions of Congress. The General Court are making an amendment to their law by which the difficulties that now occur will be removed, as I understand it is to be made conformable to your resolves. The unavoidable delay attending the bringing the captures to trial is grievously complained of by the masters of these vessels, as well as the captors. Many of the former have applied for liberty to go away without awaiting the decision, which I have granted them.

I beg leave to call the attention of Congress to their appointing a commissary in these parts, to attend the providing of necessaries for the prisoners who are dispersed in these provinces. Complaints are made by some of them, that they are in want of bedding, and many other things; as I understand that Mr. Franks has undertaken that business, I wish he was ordered to find a deputy immediately, to see that the prisoners get what is allowed them by Congress. Also to supply the officers with money as they may have occasion. It will save me much time and much trouble.

There are yet but few companies of the militia come in. This delay will, I am much afraid frustrate the intention of their being called upon, as the season is slipping fast away when they may be of service.

The demands of the army were so very pressing before your last remittance came to hand, that I was under the necessity of borrowing £25,000 lawful money from this province. They very cheerfully lent it, and passed a vote for as much more if required. I have not repaid the sum borrowed, as I may stand in need of it before the arrival of another supply, which the demands of the commissary general, Quartermaster general, and paying off the arrearages, will very soon require.

Your esteemed favor of the 29th ultimo is just come to hand. It makes me very happy to find my conduct hath met the approbation of Congress. I am entirely of your opinion that should an accommodation take place, the terms will be severe or favorable, in proportion to our ability to resist, and that we ought to be on a respectable footing to receive their armaments in the spring. But how far we shall be provided with the means, is a matter I profess not to know under my present unhappy want of arms, ammunition and I may add men, as our regiments are very incomplete. The recruiting goes on very slow, and will I apprehend be more so, if for other service the men receive a bounty, and none is given here.

I have tried every method I could think of to procure arms for our men. They really are not to be had in these governments belonging to the public, and if some method is not fallen upon in the southern governments to supply us, we shall be in a distressed situation for want of them. There are near 2000 men now in camp without firelocks. I have wrote to the committee of New York this day, requesting them to send me those arms, which were taken from the disaffected in that government. The Congress interesting themselves in this request will doubtless have a good effect. I have sent officers into the country with money to purchase arms in the different towns; some have returned and brought in a few; many are still out, what their success will be, I cannot determine.

I was in great hopes that the expresses resolved to be established between this place and Philadelphia would ere now have been fixt. It would, in my opinion, rather save than increase the expence, as many horses are destroyed by one man coming the whole way. It will certainly be more expeditious and safer than writing by the post, or private hands, which I am often under the necessity of doing. I am, &c.[1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 9 February, 1776.

Sir,

The purport of this letter will be directed to a single object. Through you I mean to lay it before Congress, and, at the same time that I beg their serious attention to the subject, to ask pardon for intruding an opinion, not only unasked, but, in some measure, repugnant to their resolves.

The disadvantages attending the limited enlistment of troops are too apparent to those, who are eyewitnesses of them, to render any animadversions necessary; but to gentlemen at a distance, whose attention is engrossed by a thousand important objects, the case may be otherwise.

That this cause precipitated the fate of the brave and much-to-be-lamented General Montgomery, and brought on the defeat, which followed thereupon, I have not the most distant doubt of; for, had he not been apprehensive of the troops leaving him at so important a crisis, but continued the blockade of Quebec, a capitulation, from the best accounts I have been able to collect, must inevitably have followed. And that we were not obliged at one time to dispute these lines, under disadvantageous circumstances, (proceeding from the same cause, to wit, the troops disbanding of themselves before the militia could be got in,) is to me a matter of wonder and astonishment, and proves, that General Howe was either unacquainted with our situation, or restrained by his instructions from putting any thing to hazard, till his reinforcements should arrive.

The instance of General Montgomery—I mention it, because it is a striking one,—for a number of others might be adduced proves, that, instead of having men to take advantage of circumstances, you are in a manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circumstances yield to a secondary consideration. Since the 1st of December, I have been devising every means in my power to secure these encampments; and though I am sensible that we never have, since that period, been able to act on the offensive, and at times not in a condition to defend, yet the cost of marching home one set of men, bringing in another, the havoc and waste occasioned by the first, the repairs necessary for the second, with a thousand incidental charges and inconveniences, which have arisen, and which it is scarce possible either to recollect or describe, amount to near as much, as the keeping up a respectable body of troops the whole time, ready for any emergency, would have done.

To this may be added, that you never can have a well disciplined army.

To bring men [to be] well acquainted with the duties of a soldier, requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination, not only requires time, but is a

work of great difficulty, and, in this army, where there is so little distinction between the officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect, then, the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits, as from veteran soldiers, is to expect what never did and perhaps never will happen. Men, who are familiarized to danger, meet it without shrinking; whereas troops unused to service often apprehend danger where no danger is. Three things prompt men to a regular discharge of their duty in time of action; natural bravery, hope of reward, and fear of punishment. The two first are common to the untutored and the disciplined soldier; but the last most obviously distinguishes the one from the other. A coward, when taught to believe, that, if he breaks his ranks and abandons his colors, will be punished with death by his own party, will take his chance against the enemy; but a man, who thinks little of the one, and is fearful of the other, acts from present feelings, regardless of consequences.

Again, men of a day's standing will not look forward; and from experience we find, that, as the time approaches for their discharge, they grow careless of their arms, ammunition, camp utensils, &c. Nay, even the barracks themselves have felt uncommon marks of wanton depredation, and lay us under fresh trouble and additional expense in providing for every fresh set, when we find it next to impossible to procure such articles, as are absolutely necessary in the first instance. To this may be added the seasoning, which new recruits must have to a camp, and the loss consequent thereupon. But this is not all. Men engaged for a short, limited time only, have the officers too much in their power; for, to obtain a degree of popularity in order to induce a second enlistment, a kind of familiarity takes place, which brings on a relaxation of discipline, unlicensed furloughs, and other indulgences incompatible with order and good government; by which means the latter part of the time, for which the soldier was engaged, is spent in undoing what you were aiming to inculcate in the first.

To go into an enumeration of all the evils we have experienced, in this late great change of the army, and the expenses incidental to it, to say nothing of the hazard we have run, and must run, between the discharging of one army and enlistment of another, (unless an enormous expense of militia is incurred,) would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter. What I have already taken the liberty of saying will serve to convey a general idea of the matter; and therefore I shall, with all due deference, take the freedom to give it as my opinion, that, if the Congress have any reason to believe, that there will be occasion for troops another year, and consequently for another enlistment, they would save money, and have infinitely better troops, if they were, even at a bounty of twenty, thirty, or more dollars, to engage the men already enlisted (till January next,) and such others as may be wanted to complete the establishment, for and during the war. I will not undertake to say, that the men can be had upon these terms; but I am satisfied, that it will never do to let the matter alone, as it was last year, till the time of service was near expiring. The hazard is too great, in the first place; in the next, the trouble and perplexity of disbanding one army and raising another at the same instant, and in such a critical situation as the last was, are scarcely in the power of words to describe, and such as no man, who has experienced them once, will ever undergo again.

If Congress should differ from me in sentiment upon this point, I have only to beg that they will do me the justice to believe, that I have nothing more in view, than what to me appears necessary to advance the public weal, although in the first instance it will be attended with a capital expense; and that I have the honor to be, &c. [1](#)

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 10 February, 1776.

Dear Sir,

Your obliging favors of the 28th ult. and 1st inst. are now before me, and claim my particular thanks for the polite attention you pay to my wishes in an early and regular communication of what is passing in your quarter.

If you conceive, that I took any thing wrong, or amiss, that was conveyed in any of your former letters, you are really mistaken. I only meant to convince you, that nothing would give more real satisfaction, than to know the sentiments, which are entertained of me by the public, whether they be favorable or otherwise; and I urged as a reason, that the man, who wished to steer clear of shelves and rocks, must know where they lay. I know—but to declare it, unless to a friend, may be an argument of vanity—the integrity of my own heart. I know the unhappy predicament I stand in; I know that much is expected of me; I know, that without men, without arms, without ammunition, without any thing fit for the accommodation of a soldier, little is to be done; and, which is mortifying, I know, that I cannot stand justified to the world without exposing my own weakness, and injuring the cause, by declaring my wants, which I am determined not to do, further than unavoidable necessity brings every man acquainted with them.

If, under these disadvantages, I am able to keep above water, (as it were) in the esteem of mankind, I shall feel myself happy; but if, from the unknown peculiarity of my circumstances, I suffer in the opinion of the world, I shall not think you take the freedom of a friend, if you conceal the reflections that may be cast upon my conduct. My own situation feels so irksome to me at times, that, if I did not consult the public good, more than my own tranquillity, I should long ere this have put every thing to the cast of a Dye. So far from my having an army of twenty thousand men well armed, I have been here with less than half of it, including sick, furloughed, and on command, and those neither armed nor clothed, as they should be. In short, my situation has been such, that I have been obliged to use art to conceal it from my own officers. The Congress, as you observe, expect, I believe, that I should do more than others,—for whilst they compel me to enlist men without a bounty, they give 40 to others, which will, I expect, put a stand to our Enlistments; for notwithstanding all the publick virtue which is ascrib'd to these people, there is no nation under the sun, (that I ever came across) pay greater adoration to money than they do—I am pleas'd to find that your Battalions are clothed and look well, and that they are filing off for Canada. I wish I could say that the troops here had altered much in Dress or appearance. Our regiments are little more than half compleat, and recruiting nearly at a stand—In all my letters I fail not to mention of Tents, and now perceive that notice is taken of yr. application. I have been convinced, by General Howe's conduct, that he has either been very ignorant of our situation (which I do not believe) or that he has received positive

orders (which, I think, is natural to conclude) not to put anything to the hazard till his reinforcements arrive; otherwise there has [not] been a time since the first of December, that we must have fought like men to have maintained these Lines, so great in their extent.

The party to Bunker's Hill had some good and some bad men engaged in it. One or two courts have been held on the conduct of part of it. To be plain, these people—among friends—are not to be depended upon if exposed; and any man will fight well if he thinks himself in no danger. I do not apply this only to these people. I suppose it to be the case with all raw and undisciplined troops. You may rely upon it, that transports left Boston six weeks ago with troops; where they are gone, unless driven to the West Indies, I know not. You may also rely upon General Clinton's sailing from Boston about three weeks ago, with about four or five hundred men; his destination I am also a stranger to. I am sorry to hear of the failures you speak of from France. But why will not Congress forward part of the powder made in your province? They seem to look upon this as the season for action, but will not furnish the means. I will not blame them. I dare say the demands upon them are greater than they can supply. The cause must be starved till our resources are greater, or more certain within ourselves.

With respect to myself, I have never entertained an idea of an accommodation, since I heard of the measures, which were adopted in consequence of the Bunker's Hill fight. The King's speech has confirmed the sentiments I entertained upon the news of that affair; and, if every man was of my mind, the ministers of Great Britain should know, in a few words, upon what issue the cause should be put. I would not be deceived by artful declarations, nor specious pretences; nor would I be amused by unmeaning propositions; but in open, undisguised, and manly terms proclaim our wrongs, and our resolution to be redressed. I would tell them, that we had borne much, that we had long and ardently sought for reconciliation upon honorable terms, that it had been denied us, that all our attempts after peace had proved abortive, and had been grossly misrepresented, that we had done every thing which could be expected from the best of subjects, that the spirit of freedom beat too high in us to submit to slavery, and that, if nothing else could satisfy a tyrant and his diabolical ministry, we are determined to shake off all connexions with a state so unjust and unnatural. This I would tell them, not under covert, but in words as clear as the sun in its meridian brightness.

I observe what you say, in respect to the ardor of the chimney-corner heroes. I am glad their zeal is in some measure abated, because if circumstances will not permit us to make an attempt upon B[oston], or if it should be made and fail, we shall not appear altogether so culpable. I entertain the same opinion of the attempt now, which I have ever done. I believe an assault would be attended with considerable loss, and I believe it would succeed, if the men should behave well. As to an attack upon B[unker's] Hill, (unless it could be carried by surprise,) the loss, I conceive, would be greater in proportion than at Boston; and, if a defeat should follow, it would be discouraging to the men, but highly animating if crowned with success. Great good, or great evil, would consequently result from it. It is quite a different thing to what you left, being by odds the strongest fortress they possess, both in rear and front.

The Congress have ordered all captures to be tried in the courts of admiralty of the different governments to which they are sent, and some irreconcilable difference arising between the resolves of Congress, and the law of this colony, respecting the proceedings, or something or another which always happens to procrastinate business here, has put a total stop to the trials, to the no small injury of the public, as well as the great grievance of individuals. Whenever a condemnation shall take place, I shall not be unmindful of your advice respecting the hulls, &c. Would to heaven the plan you speak of for obtaining arms may succeed. The acquisition would be great, and give fresh life and vigor to our measures, as would the arrival you speak of; our expectations are kept alive, and if we can keep ourselves so, and spirits up another summer, I have no fears of wanting the needful after that. As the number of our Inlisted men were too small to undertake any offensive operation, if the circumstances of weather, &c, should favor, I ordered in (by application to this Govt., Connecticut and New Hampshire) as many regiments of militia as would enable us to attempt something in some manner or other.—they were to have been here by the first of the month, but only a few straggling companies are yet come in. The Bay towards Roxbury has been froze up once or twice pretty hard, and yesterday single persons might have crossed, I believe, from Litchmore's Point, by picking his way;—a thaw, I fear, is again approaching.

We have had the most laborious piece of work at Lechmere's Point, on account of the frost, that ever you saw. We hope to get it finished on Sunday. It is within as commanding a distance of Boston as Dorchester Hill, though of a different part. Our vessels now and then pick up a prize or two. Our Commodore (Manly) was very near being caught about eight days ago, but happily escaped with vessel and crew after running ashore, scuttling, and defending her.

I recollect nothing else worth giving you the trouble of, unless you can be amused by reading a letter and poem addressed to me by Mrs. or Miss Phillis Wheatley. In searching over a parcel of papers the other day, in order to destroy such as were useless, I brought it to light again. At first, with a view of doing justice to her great poetical genius, I had a great mind to publish the poem; but not knowing whether it might not be considered rather as a mark of my own vanity, than as a compliment to her, I laid it aside, till I came across it again in the manner just mentioned. I congratulate you upon your election, although I consider it as the *coup de grace* to my expectation of ever seeing you a resident in this camp again.¹ I have only to regret the want of you, if that should be the case; and I shall do it the more feelingly, as I have experienced the good effects of your aid. I am, with Mrs. Washington's compliments to Mrs. Reed, and my best respects, added, dear Sir, your most obedient and affectionate servant.

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TO THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Cambridge, 10 February, 1776.

Gentlemen,

Notwithstanding I have taken every method my judgement could suggest to procure a sufficient number of firelocks for the soldiers of this Army, by application to the Assemblies and Conventions of those Governments, as well as by sending Officers out with money to purchase, I am constrained by necessity to inform you, that the deficiency is amazingly great, and that there are not nigh enough to arm the troops already here— It is true that all the officers gone upon the business are not yet returned, but from the small success of those who have made report, I cannot promise myself many more. I must therefore beg leave to solicit your kind attention to this interesting and important concern, and would submit it to your consideration whether if your honorable Court were to depute some of their Members to make applications to the different towns, they might not procure a considerable quantity. I will most cheerfully furnish them with money for the purpose or pay for them on their delivery here, as you shall think most advisable— I shall only add that I hope the exigency of our Affairs at this critical crisis will excuse this request, and my confidence of your readiness and zeal to do every thing in your power for promoting the public good and am, &c.

P. S. I have heard that there are several King's Muskets in the Country—for every good one with a Bayonet that have not been abused I will give 12 Dollars, and in proportion for other Guns fit for service.^{[1](#)}

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 14 February, 1776.

Sir,

Through you, I beg leave to lay before Congress the enclosed letter from Lord Drummond to General Robertson, which came to my hands a few days ago, in order to be sent into Boston.

As I never heard of his Lordship's being vested with power to treat with Congress upon the subject of our grievances, nor of his having laid any propositions before them for an accommodation, I confess it surprised me much, and led me to form various conjectures of his motives, and intended application to General Howe and Admiral Shulldham for a passport for the safe conduct of such deputies, as Congress might appoint for negotiating terms of reconciliation between Great Britain and us. Whatever his intentions are, however benevolent his designs may be, I confess that his letter has embarrassed me much; and I am not without suspicion of its meaning more than the generous purpose it professes.¹

I should suppose, that, if the mode for negotiation, which he points out, should be adopted (which I hope will never be thought of), it ought to have been fixed and settled previous to any application of this sort; and at best, that his conduct in this instance is premature and officious, and leading to consequences of a fatal and injurious nature to the rights of this country. His zeal and desire, perhaps, of an amicable and constitutional adjustment taking place, may have suggested and precipitated the measure. Be that as it may, I thought it of too much importance to suffer it to go in without having the express direction of Congress for that purpose; and that it was my indispensable duty to transmit to them the original, to make such interpretations and inferences as they may think right.

Messrs. Willard and Child, who were sent to Nova Scotia in pursuance of the resolve of Congress, have just returned, and made their report, which I do myself the honor to enclose. They have not answered the purposes of their commission by any means, as they only went a little way into that country, and found their intelligence upon the information of others. You will see the reasons they assign in excuse or justification of their conduct, in the report itself.

Last night a party of regulars, said to be about five hundred, landed on Dorchester Neck, and burned some of the houses there, which were of no value to us; nor would they have been, unless we take post there; they then might be of some service. A detachment went after them as soon as the fire was discovered; but before it could arrive, they had executed their plan, and made their retreat.¹

Inclosed is a letter for David Franks, Esqr. from Mr. Chamier in Boston, upon the subject of victualling such of the King's troops as may be prisoners within the limits of his contract, which I beg the favor of you to deliver him, and that proper agents may be appointed by him to see that it is done. I could wish too that Congress would fall upon some mode for supplying the officers with such money as they may really stand in need of, and depute proper persons for that purpose and furnishing the privates with such clothing as may be absolutely necessary; I am applied to and wearied by their repeated requests. In some instances I have desired the Committees to give the prisoners within their appointments what they should judge absolutely necessary for their support, as the only means in my power of relieving their distress. But I imagine that if there were persons to superintend this business, that their wants would be better attended to, and many exorbitant charges prevented and saved to the Continent, and the whole would then be brought into a proper account.[1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 18 February, 1776.

Sir,

The late freezing weather having formed some pretty strong ice from Dorchester Point to Boston Neck, and from Roxbury to the Common, thereby affording a more expanded and consequently a less dangerous approach to the town, I could not help thinking, notwithstanding the militia were not all come in, and we had little or no powder to begin our operation by a regular cannonade and bombardment, that a bold and resolute assault upon the troops in Boston, with such men as we had (for it could not take many men to guard our own lines, at a time when the enemy were attacked in all quarters), might be crowned with success; and therefore, seeing no certain prospect of a supply of powder on the one hand, and a certain dissolution of the ice on the other, I called the general officers together for their opinion, (agreeably to the resolve of Congress, of the 22d of December.)

The result will appear in the enclosed council of war¹; and, being almost unanimous, I must suppose it to be right; although, from a thorough conviction of the necessity of attempting something against the ministerial troops before a reinforcement should arrive, and while we were favored with the ice, I was not only ready, but willing, and desirous of making the assault, under a firm hope, if the men would have stood by me, of a favorable issue, notwithstanding the enemy's advantage of ground, artillery, &c.

Perhaps the irksomeness of my situation may have given different ideas to me, from those which influenced the gentlemen whom I consulted, and might have inclined me to put more to the hazard, than was consistent with prudence. If it had, I am not sensible of it, as I endeavored to give it all the consideration, that a matter of such importance required. True it is, and I cannot help acknowledging it, that I have many disagreeable sensations on account of my situation; for, to have the eyes of the whole continent fixed with anxious expectation of hearing of some great event, and to be restrained in every military operation, for want of the necessary means of carrying it on, is not very pleasing, especially as the means, used to conceal my weakness from the enemy, conceals it also from our friends, and adds to their wonder.

I do not utter this by way of complaint. I am sensible that all that the Congress could do, they have done; and I should feel most powerfully the weight of conscious ingratitude, were I not to acknowledge this. But as we have accounts of the arrival of powder by Captain Mason, I would beg to have it sent on in the most expeditious manner; otherwise we shall not only lose all chance of the benefits resulting from the season, but of the militia, who are brought in at a most enormous expense, upon a presumption that we should, long ere this, have been amply supplied with powder, under the contracts entered into with the committee of Congress.

The militia contrary to an express requisition are come and coming in without ammunition. To supply then alone with 24 rounds, which is less by 7ths than the regulars are served with will take between fifty and 60 barrels of powder, and to complete the other troops to the like quantity will take near as much more than about 60 barrels, besides a few rounds of cannon cartridges ready filled for use. This, Sir, Congress may be assured is a true state of powder, and will, I hope, bear some testimony of my incapacity for action in such a way as may do any essential service.

February 21st. When I began this letter I proposed to have sent it by express, but recollecting that all my late letters have been as expressive of my want of powder and arms as I could paint them, and that Mr. Hooper was to set off in a day or two, I thought it unnecessary to run the Continent to the expence of an express merely to repeat what I had so often done before when I am certain that Congress knowing our necessities will delay no time that can possibly be avoided in supplying them. My duty is offered to Congress, and with great respect and esteem, I have the honor &c

P. S. Hearing of the arrival of a small parcel of powder in Connecticut I have been able to obtain 3000 weight of it, which is in addition to the 60 barrels before mentioned.

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TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Cambridge, 19 February, 1776.

Sir,

I am grieved to find that instead of Six or Eight thousand weight of powder, which I fondly expected to receive from Providence (agreeable to your Letter), that I am likely to get only 4217 lbs, Including the 3000 Weight belonging to this Province, (if to be had).

1 My situation in respect to this Article is really distressing; and while common prudence obliges me to keep my want of it concealed, to avoid a discovery thereof to the Enemy; I feel the bad effect of that concealment from our friends; for not believing our distress equal to what it really is, they withhold such small supplies as are in their power to give. I am restrained in all my military movements, for want of these necessary supplies; that it is impossible to undertake any thing effectual; and whilst I am fretting at my own disagreeable situation, the world I suppose is not behind hand in censuring my inactivity.

A golden opportunity has been lost, perhaps to not be regained again, this year. The late freezing weather had formed some pretty strong ice from Dorchester to Boston Neck, and from Roxbury to the Common, which would have afforded a less dangerous approach to the town than through the lines or by water. The advantages of this, added to a thorough conviction of the importance of destroying the Ministerial troops in Boston before they can be reinforced, and to a belief that a bold and resolute assault, aided in some small degree by artillery and Mortars might be crowned with success, I proposed the attempt a day or two ago to the general officers, but they thought, and perhaps rightly, that such an enterprise in our present weak state of men (for the Militia are not yet half arrived) and deficiency of powder would be attended with too much hazard and therefore that we had better wait the arrival of the last, and then to begin a bombardment in earnest.

This matter is mentioned to you in confidence.—Your zeal, activity and attachment to the cause renders it unnecessary to conceal it from you, or our real stock of powder; which after furnishing the Militia (unfortunately coming in without and will require upwards of Fifty Barrells) and compleating our other troops to 24 rounds a man which are less by one half than the Regulars have, and having a few Rounds of Cannon Cartridges fitted for immediate use, will leave us not more than 160 Barrells in store for the greatest emergency inclusive of the 4217 lbs from Providence, if we get it.

This, my Dear Sir is melancholy! But it is a truth, and at the same time that it may serve to convey, some idea of my disagreeable feelings under a knowledge of it, will evince the necessity of vigorous exertions to throw without delay every oz. that can be procured into this camp: otherwise the great expence of sending in the Militia will be

entirely sunk without any possible good resulting from it; but much evil, as they will contribute not a little to the consumption of our ammunition, &c., &c.

For want perhaps of better information, I cannot help giving it as my opinion, that at a time when our military operations are entirely at a stand for want of powder principally and arms,^{[1](#)} it is inconsistent with good policy to hoard up town stocks with either. Better it is to fight an Enemy at a distance, than at one's door. Prudence, indeed, points out the expediency of providing for private as well as publick Exigencies. But if both are not to be done, I should think there can be no hesitation in the choice; as the army now raised and supported at a considerable expence can be of little use if it is not sufficient to prevent an Enemy from disturbing the quiet of the interior towns of these governments.

I Am, &c.^{[1](#)}

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 26 February, 1776.

Sir,

I had the honor of addressing you on the 18th and 21st Instt. by Mr. Hooper, since which nothing material has occurred.

We are making every necessary preparation for taking possession of Dorchester Heights as soon as possible with a view of drawing the enemy out.—How far our expectations may be answered, time can only determine: But I should think, if any thing will induce them to hazard an engagement, It will be our attempting to fortifie these heights; as on that event's taking place, we shall be able to command a great part of the town, and almost the whole harbor, and to make them rather disagreeable than otherwise, provided we can get a sufficient supply of what we greatly want.

Within three or four days, I have received sundry accounts from Boston of such movements there, such as taking the mortars from Bunker Hill, the putting them with several pieces of heavy ordnance on board of ships, with a quantity of bedding, the ships all taking in water, the baking a large quantity of biscuit, &c., as to indicate an embarkation of the troops from thence. A Mr. Ides who came out yesterday says that the inhabitants of the town generally believe that they are about to remove either to New York or Virginia, and that every vessel in the harbor on Tuesday last was taken up for Government's service and two months' pay advanced them. Whether they really intend to embark or whether the whole is a feint is impossible for me to tell. However I have thought it expedient to send an express to Genl. Lee to inform him of it, in order that he may not be taken by surprize if their destination should be against New York, and continued him on to you. If they do embark, I think the possessing themselves of that place and the North River is the object they have in view thereby securing the communication with Canada and rendering the intercourse between the Northern and Southern United Colonies exceedingly precarious and difficult. To prevent them from effecting their plan is a matter of the highest importance and will require a large and respectable army and the most vigilant and judicious exertions.

Since I wrote by Mr. Hooper some small parcels of powder have arrived from Connecticut, which will give us a little assistance.

On Thursday night, a party of our men at Roxbury made the Enemy's out Sentries, consisting of a Corporal and two privates prisoners, without firing a gun or giving the least alarm.

I shall be as attentive to the enemies' motions as I can, and obtain all the intelligence in my power, and if I find 'em embark, shall in the most expeditious manner detach a part of the light Troops to New York and repair thither myself if circumstances shall

require it. I shall be better able to judge what to do when the matter happens; at present I can only say that I will do every thing that shall appear proper and necessary.

Your letter of the 12th Inst by Coll Bull came to hand yesterday evening, and shall agreeable to your recommendation pay proper notice to him. The supply of cash came very seasonably as our Treasury was just exhausted and nothing can be done here without it.

P. S. This letter was intended to have been sent by Express but meeting with a private conveyance the Express was countermanded.[1](#)

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL LEE.

Cambridge, 26 February, 1776.

Dear Sir,

I received your esteemed favor of the 14th instant, which gave me great pleasure, being impatient to hear from you. I rejoice to find that you are getting better, and could not avoid laughing at Captain Parker's reasons for not putting his repeated threats into execution.²

I take notice of your intended dispositions for defence, which I request you will lose no time in putting into execution, as, from many corroborating accounts I have received, the enemy seem to prepare for their departure from Boston. They have removed the two mortars from Bunker's Hill, and carried them with a great part of their heavy brass cannon on board their ships. They have taken all the topsail vessels in the harbor into the service. They are ready watered, and their sails bent. All this show may be but a feint; but if real, and they should come your way, I wish you may be prepared to receive them. If I find that they are in earnest, and do go off, I will immediately send you a reinforcement from this camp, and, if necessary, march the main body to your assistance, as circumstances may require. I shall keep a good watch on their motions, and give you the speediest information possible.

Lechmere's Point is now very strong; I am sending some heavy cannon thither. The platform for a mortar is preparing to be placed in the works there; another at Lamb's Dam; and we are making the necessary disposition to possess ourselves of Dorchester Heights, which must bring them on if any thing will.¹ If they do not interrupt us in that work, I shall be confirmed in my opinion, that they mean to leave the town. A little time must now determine, whether they are resolved to maintain their present ground or look out for another post. I will now return to your letter.

The account you give of our New York brethren is very satisfactory. I should be glad to know how many men you are likely to have, that you can depend upon remaining with you. I very much fear, that the sailing of Clinton will keep back those, whom you expected from Pennsylvania. Let me hear from you upon this and every thing else that concerns you, as soon and as often as you possibly can. I shall pay due attention to your recommendations of Captain Smyth and Capt. Badlam. With respect to the Canada expedition, I assure you, that it was not my intention to propose your going there. I only meant what I thought would happen, that the Congress would make you that proposal. I am now of opinion that you will have work enough upon your hands where you are; and make no doubt but your presence will be as necessary there, as it would be in Canada.¹ I am glad that Colonel Ritzema is gone to Congress, and hope they will expedite an army thither, not only to preserve what we have already got, but also to possess ourselves of Quebec before it can be reinforced from Europe or elsewhere. It is an object of such vast importance, that it will be madness not to strain

every sinew for effecting that purpose. I am in some pain for our little fleet, as I am informed that the Asia and Phœnix are sailed in quest of them.¹ You doubtless had good reasons for the appointment you mention having made²; as it is temporary, it can have no bad effect. I am with great regard, &c.³

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TO MISS PHILLIS WHEATLEY.

Cambridge, 28 February, 1776.

Miss Phillis,

Your favor of the 26th of October did not reach my hands, till the middle of December. Time enough, you will say, to have given an answer ere this. Granted. But a variety of important occurrences, continually interposing to distract the mind and withdraw the attention, I hope will apologize for the delay, and plead my excuse for the seeming but not real neglect. I thank you most sincerely for your polite notice of me, in the elegant lines you enclosed; and however undeserving I may be of such encomium and panegyric, the style and manner exhibit a striking proof of your poetical talents; in honor of which, and as a tribute justly due to you, I would have published the poem, had I not been apprehensive, that, while I only meant to give the world this new instance of your genius, I might have incurred the imputation of vanity. This, and nothing else, determined me not to give it place in the public prints.

If you should ever come to Cambridge, or near head-quarters, I shall be happy to see a person so favored by the Muses, and to whom nature has been so liberal and beneficent in her dispensations. I am, with great respect, your obedient humble servant.[1](#)

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 3 March, 1776.

Dear Sir,

The foregoing¹ was intended for another conveyance, but being hurried with some other matters, and not able to complete it, it was delayed; since which your favors of the 28th of January, and 1st and 8th of February, are come to hand. For the agreeable accounts, contained in one of them, of your progress in the manufacture of powder, and prospect of getting arms, I am obliged to you; as there is some consolation in knowing, that these useful articles will supply the wants of some part of the Continental troops, although I feel too sensibly the mortification of having them withheld from me; Congress not even thinking it necessary to take the least notice of my application for these things.

I hope in a few nights to be in readiness to take post on Dorchester, as we are using every means in our power to provide materials for this purpose; the ground being so hard froze yet, that we cannot intrench, and therefore are obliged to depend entirely upon chandeliers, fascines, and screwed hay for our redoubts. It is expected that this work will bring on an action between the King's troops and ours.

General Lee's expedition to New York was founded upon indubitable evidence of General Clinton's being on the point of sailing. No place so likely for his destination as New York, nor no place where a more capital blow could be given to the interests of America than there. Common prudence, therefore, dictated the necessity of preventing an evil, which might have proved irremediable, had it happened. But I confess to you honestly, I had no idea of running the Continent to the expense, which was incurred, or that such a body of troops would go from Connecticut as did, or be raised upon the terms they were. You must know, my good Sir, that Captain Sears was here, with some other gentlemen of Connecticut, when the intelligence of Clinton's embarkation (at least the embarkation of the troops) came to hand. The situation of these lines would not afford a detachment. New York could not be depended upon; and of the troops in Jersey we had no certain information, either of their numbers or destination. What then was to be done? Why Sears and these other gentlemen assured me, that if the necessity of the case was signified by me, and General Lee should be sent, one thousand volunteers, requiring no pay, but supplied with provisions only, would march immediately to New York, and defend the place, till Congress could determine what should be done, and that a line from me to Governor Trumbull to obtain his sanction would facilitate the measure. This I accordingly wrote in precise terms, intending that these volunteers, and such of the Jersey regiments as could be speedily assembled, should be thrown into the city for its defence, and for disarming the Tories upon Long Island, who, I understood, had become extremely insolent and daring. When, behold, instead of volunteers, consisting of gentlemen without pay, the Governor directed men to be voluntarily

enlisted for this service upon Continental pay and allowance. This, you will observe, was contrary to my expectation and plan; yet, as I thought it a matter of the last importance to secure the command of the North River, I did not think it expedient to countermand the raising of the Connecticut regiments on account of the pay. If I have done wrong, those members of Congress, who think the matter ought to have been left to them, must consider my proceedings as an error of judgment, and that a measure is not always to be judged of by the event.

It is moreover worthy of consideration, that in cases of extreme necessity (as the present), nothing but decision can ensure success; and certain I am, that Clinton had something more in view by peeping into New York, than to gratify his curiosity, or make a friendly visit to his friend Mr. Tryon. However, I am not fond of stretching my powers; and if the Congress will say, "Thus far and no farther you shall go," I will promise not to offend whilst I continue in their service.

I observe what you say in respect to my wagon. I wanted nothing more, than a light travelling-wagon, such as those of New Jersey, with a secure cover, which might be under lock and key, the hinges being on one side, the lock on the other. I have no copy of the memorandum of the articles, which I desired you to provide for me, but think one dozen and a half of camp stools, a folding table, rather two, plates, and dishes, were among them. What I meant, therefore, was, that the bed of this wagon should be constructed in such a manner, as to stow these things to the best advantage. If you cannot get them with you, I shall despair of providing them here, as workmen are scarce, and most exorbitantly high in their charges. What I should aim at is, when the wagon and things are ready (which ought to be very soon, as I do not know how soon we may beat a march), to buy a pair of clever horses, of the same color, hire a careful driver, and let the whole come off at once; and then they are ready for immediate service. I have no doubt but that the treasury, by application to Mr. Hancock, will direct payment thereof, without any kind of difficulty, as Congress must be sensible, that I cannot take the field without equipage, and after I have once got into a tent I shall not soon quit it. I am, &c.[1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 7 March, 1776.

Sir,

On the 26th ultimo I had the honor of addressing you, and then mentioned that we were making preparations for taking possession of Dorchester Heights. I now beg leave to inform you, that a council of general officers having determined a previous bombardment and cannonade expedient and proper, in order to harass the enemy and divert their attention from that quarter, on Saturday, Sunday, and Monday nights last, we carried them on from our posts at Cobble Hill, Lechmere's Point, and Lamb's Dam.¹ Whether they did the enemy any considerable and what injury, I have not yet heard, but have the pleasure to acquaint you, that they greatly facilitated our schemes, and would have been attended with success equal to our most sanguine expectations, had it not been for the unlucky bursting of two thirteen and three ten inch mortars, among which was the brass one taken in the ordnance brig. To what cause to attribute this misfortune, I know not; whether to any defect in them, or to the inexperience of the bombardiers.

But to return; on Monday evening, as soon as our firing commenced, a considerable detachment of our men, under the command of Brigadier-General Thomas, crossed the neck, and took possession of the two hills, without the least interruption or annoyance from the enemy; and by their great activity and industry, before the morning, advanced the works so far as to be secure against their shot. They are now going on with such expedition, that in a little time I hope they will be complete, and enable our troops stationed there to make a vigorous and obstinate stand. During the whole cannonade, which was incessant the two last nights, we were fortunate enough to lose but two men; one, a lieutenant, by a cannon-ball taking off his thigh; the other, a private, by the explosion of a shell, which also slightly wounded four or five more.

Our taking possession of Dorchester Heights is only preparatory to taking post on Nook's Hill, and the points opposite to the south end of Boston. It was absolutely necessary, that they should be previously fortified, in order to cover and command them. As soon as the works on the former are finished, measures will be immediately adopted for securing the latter, and making them as strong and defensible as we can. Their contiguity to the enemy will make them of much importance and of great service to us.

As mortars are essential, and indispensably necessary for carrying on our operations, and for the prosecution of our plans, I have applied to two furnaces to have some thirteen-inch ones cast with all expedition imaginable, and am encouraged to hope, from the accounts I have had, that they will be able to do it. When they are done, and a proper supply of powder obtained, I flatter myself, from the posts we have just taken and are about to take, that it will be in our power to force the ministerial troops to an

attack, or to dispose of them in some way, that will be of advantage to us. I think from these posts they will be so galled and annoyed, that they must either give us battle or quit their present possessions. I am resolved that nothing on my part shall be wanting to effect the one or the other.

It having been the general opinion, that the enemy would attempt to dislodge our people from the hills, and force their works as soon as they were discovered, which probably might have brought on a general engagement, it was thought advisable, that the honorable Council¹ should be applied to, to order in the militia from the neighboring and adjacent towns. I wrote them on the subject, which they most readily complied with; and, in justice to the militia, I cannot but inform you, that they came in at the appointed time, and manifested the greatest alertness, and determined resolution to have acted like men engaged in the cause of freedom.²

When the enemy first discovered our works in the morning, they seemed to be in great confusion, and, from their movements, to have intended an attack. It is much to be wished, that it had been made. The event, I think, must have been fortunate, and nothing less than success and victory on our side, as our officers and men appeared impatient for the appeal, and to possess the most animated sentiments and determined resolution. On Tuesday evening, a considerable number of their troops embarked on board of their transports, and fell down to the Castle, where part of them landed before dark. One or two of the vessels got aground, and were fired at by our people with a field-piece, but without any damage. What was the design of this embarkation and landing, I have not been able to learn. It would seem as if they meant an attack; for it is most probable, that, if they make one on our works at Dorchester at this time, they will first go to the Castle, and come from thence. If such was their design, a violent storm that night, and which lasted till eight o'clock the next day, rendered the execution of it impracticable. It carried one or two of their vessels ashore, which they have since got off.¹

In case the ministerial troops had made an attempt to dislodge our men from Dorchester Hills, and the number detached upon the occasion had been so great as to have afforded a probability of a successful attack's being made upon Boston; on a signal given from Roxbury for that purpose, agreeably to a settled and concerted plan, four thousand chosen men, who were held in readiness, were to have embarked at the mouth of Cambridge River, in two divisions, the first under the command of Brigadier-General Sullivan, the second under Brigadier-General Greene; the whole to have been commanded by Major-General Putnam. The first division was to land at the powder-house, and gain possession of Beacon Hill and Mount Horem; the second at Barton's Point, or a little south of it, and, after securing that post, to join the other division, and force the enemy's gates and works at the neck, for letting in the Roxbury troops. Three floating batteries were to have preceded, and gone in front of the other boats, and kept up a heavy fire on that part of the town where our men were to land.

How far our views would have succeeded, had an opportunity offered for attempting the execution, it is impossible for me to say. Nothing less than experiment could determine with precision. The plan was thought to be well digested; and, as far as I could judge from the cheerfulness and alacrity, which distinguished the officers and

men, who were to engage in the enterprise, I had reason to hope for a favorable and happy issue.

The militia, who were ordered in from the adjacent towns, brought with them three days' provision. They were only called upon to act under the idea of an attack's being immediately made, and were all discharged this afternoon.

I beg leave to remind Congress, that three major-generals are essential and necessary for this army; and that, by General Lee's being called from hence to the command in Canada, the left division is without one. I hope they will fill up the vacancy by the appointment of another. General Thomas is the first brigadier, stands fair in point of reputation, and is esteemed a brave and good officer.¹ If he is promoted, there will be a vacancy in the brigadier-generals, which it will be necessary to supply by the appointment of some other gentleman that shall be agreeable to Congress; but justice requires me to mention, that William Thompson, of the rifle regiment, is the first colonel in this department, and, as far as I have had an opportunity of judging, is a good officer and a man of courage. What I have said of these two gentlemen, I conceive to be my duty, at the same time acknowledging, whatever promotions are made will be satisfactory to me.

March 9th. Yesterday evening a Captain Irvine who escaped from Boston the night before with six of his crew, came to head quarters and gave the following intelligence:—

That our bombardment and cannonade caused a good deal of surprize and alarm in town, as many of the soldiery said they never heard or thought we had mortars or shells; that several of the officers acknowledged they were well and properly directed; that they made much distress and confusion; that the cannon shot for the greatest part went thro' the houses, and he was told that one took off the legs and arms of six men lying in the barracks on the Neck; that a soldier who came from the lines there on Tuesday morning informed him that 20 men had been wounded the night before. It was reported that others were also hurt, and one of the light horse torn to pieces by the explosion of a shell. This was afterwards contradicted. That early on Tuesday morning Admiral Shulldham discovering the works our people were throwing up on Dorchester Heights, immediately sent an express to General Howe to inform him, and that it was necessary they should be attacked and dislodged from thence, or he would be under the necessity of withdrawing the ships from the harbor, which were under his command; that preparations were directly made for that purpose as it was said, and from twelve to two o'clock about 3000 men embarked on board the transport which fell down to the Castle with a design of landing on that part of Dorchester next to it, and attacking the works on the Heights at 5 o'clock next morning; that Lord Percy was appointed to command; that it was generally believed the attempt would have been made, had it not been for the violent storm which happened that night, as I have mentioned before; that he heard several of the privates and one or two sergeants say as they were embarking, that it would be another Bunker Hill affair. He further informs that the army is preparing to leave Boston, and that they will do it in a day or two; that the transports necessary for their embarkation were getting ready with the utmost expedition; that there had been great movements and confusion among the

troops the night and day preceding his coming out, in hurrying down their cannon, artillery and other stores to the wharves with the utmost precipitation, and were putting 'em on board the ships in such haste that no account or memorandum was taken of them; that most of the cannon were removed from their works and embarked or embarking; that he heard a woman say, which he took to be an officer's wife, that she had seen men go under the ground at the lines on the Neck without returning; that the ship he commanded was taken up, places fitted and fitting for officer's to lodge, and several shot, shells and cannon already on board; that the Tories were to have the liberty of going where they please, if they can get seamen to man the vessels, of which there was a great scarcity; that on that account many vessels could not be carried away and would be burnt; that many of the inhabitants apprehended the town would be destroyed, and that it was generally thought their destination is Halifax.

The account given by Captain Irvine, as to the embarkation, and their being about to leave the town, I believe true. There are other circumstances corroborating; and it seems fully confirmed by a paper signed by four of the selectmen of the town (a copy of which I have the honor to enclose to you), which was brought on yesterday evening by a flag, and delivered to Colonel Learned, by Major Bassett, of the tenth regiment, who desired it might be delivered me as soon as possible. I advised with such of the general officers upon the occasion as I could immediately assemble; and we determined it right (as it was not addressed to me, nor to any one else, nor authenticated by the signature of General Howe, or any other act obliging him to a performance of the promise mentioned on his part), that I should give it no answer; at the same time, that a letter should be returned, as going from Colonel Learned, signifying his having laid it before me; with the reasons assigned for not answering it. A copy of this is sent.¹

To-night I shall have a battery thrown up on Nook's Hill (Dorchester Point), with a design of acting as circumstances may require; it being judged advisable to prosecute our plans of fortification, as we intended before this information from the selectmen came.

It being agreed on all hands, that there is no possibility of stopping them in case they determine to go, I shall order look-outs to be kept upon all the head-lands, to discover their movements and course, and moreover direct Commodore Manly and his little squadron to dog them, as well for the same purpose, as for picking up any of their vessels, that may chance to depart their convoy. From their loading with such precipitancy, it is presumable they 'll not be in the best condition for sea.

If the ministerial troops evacuate the town and leave it standing, I have thoughts of taking measures for fortifying the entrance into the harbor, if it shall be thought proper, and the situation of affairs will admit of it. Notwithstanding the report from Boston, that Halifax is the place of their destination, I have no doubt but that they are going to the southward, and, I apprehend, to New York. Many reasons lead to this opinion. It is in some measure corroborated by their sending an express ship there, which, on Wednesday week, got on shore and bilged at Cape Cod. The despatches, if written, were destroyed when she was boarded. She had a parcel of coal, and about

four thousand cannon-shot, six carriage-guns, a swivel or two, and three barrels of powder.

I shall hold the riflemen and other parts of our troops in readiness to march at a moment's warning, and govern my movements by the events that happen, or such orders as I may receive from Congress, which I beg may be ample, and forwarded with all possible expedition.

On the 6th inst. a ship bound from London with stores for the ministerial army, consisting of coal, porter and krout, fell in with our armed vessels, four of them in company, and was carried into Portsmouth. She had had a long passage, and of course brought no papers of a late date. The only letters of importance or the least interesting that were found, I have enclosed.

I beg leave to mention to Congress that money is much wanted. The militia from these governments engaged till the first of April, are then to be paid, and if we march from hence, the expence will be very considerable, must be defrayed, and cannot be accomplished without it. The necessity of making the earliest remittance for these purposes is too obvious for me to add more.

When I wrote that part of this letter which is antecedent to this date, I fully expected it would have gone before now by Col. Bull, not deeming it of sufficient importance to send a special messenger, but he deferred his return from time to time, and never set off till to-day. These reasons I hope will excuse the delay and be received as a proper apology for not transmitting it sooner.¹

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 7 March, 1776.

Dear Sir,

The Rumpus which every body expected to see between the Ministerialists in Boston, and our troops, has detained the bearer till this time. On Monday night I took possession of the Heights of Dorchester with two thousand men under the command of General Thomas. Previous to this, and in order to divert the enemy's attention from the real object, and to harass, we began on Saturday night a cannonade and bombardment, which with intervals was continued through the night—the same on Sunday and on Monday, a continued roar from seven o'clock till daylight was kept up between the enemy and us. In this time we had an officer and one private killed, and four or five wounded; and through the ignorance, I suppose, of our artillerymen, burst five mortars (two thirteen inch and three ten inch) the "Congress," ¹ one of them. What damage the enemy has sustained is not known, as there has not been a creature out of Boston since. The cannonade, &c., except in the destruction of the mortars, answered our expectations fully; for although we had upwards of 300 teams in motion at the same instant, carrying on our fascines, and other materials to the Neck, and the moon shining in its full lustre, we were not discovered till daylight on Tuesday morning.

So soon as we were discovered, every thing seemed to be prepared for an attack, but the tide failing before they were ready, about one thousand only were able to embark in six transports in the afternoon, and these falling down towards the Castle, were drove on shore by a violent storm, which arose in the afternoon of that day, and continued through the night; since that they have been seen returning to Boston, and whether from an apprehension that our works are now too formidable to make any impression on, or from what other causes I know not, but their hostile appearances have subsided, and they are removing their ammunition out of their magazine, whether with a view to move bag and baggage or not I cannot undertake to say, but if we had powder, (and our mortars replaced, which I am about to do by new cast ones as soon as possible) I would, so soon as we were sufficiently strengthened on the heights to take possession of the point just opposite to Boston Neck, give them a dose they would not well like.

We had prepared boats, a detachment of 4000 men, &c., &c., for pushing to the west part of Boston, if they had made any formidable attack upon Dorchester. I will not lament or repine at any act of Providence because I am in a great measure a convert to Mr. Pope's opinion, that whatever is, is right, but I think everything had the appearance of a successful issue, if we had come to an engagement on that day. It was the 5th of March, which I recalled to their remembrance as a day never to be forgotten; an engagement was fully expected, and I never saw spirits higher, or more prevailing.¹

Your favor of the 18th ultimo came to my hands by post last night, and gives me much pleasure, as I am led to hope I shall see you of my family again. The terms upon which you come will be perfectly agreeable to me, and I should think you neither candid nor friendly, if your communications on this subject had not been free, unreserved, and divested of that false kind of modesty, which too often prevents the elucidation of points important to be known. Mr. Baylor seeming to have an inclination to go into the artillery, and Colonel Knox desirous of it, I have appointed Mr. Moylan and Mr. Palfrey my aids-decamp, so that I shall, if you come, have a good many writers about me.

I think my countrymen made a capital mistake, when they took Henry out of the senate to place him in the field; and pity it is, that he does not see this, and remove every difficulty by a voluntary resignation.¹ I am of opinion, that Colonel Armstrong, if he retains his health, spirits, and vigor, would be as fit a person as any they could send to Virginia, as he is senior officer to any now there, and I should think could give no offence; but to place Colonel Thompson there, in the first command, would throw every thing into the utmost confusion; for it was by mere chance that he became a colonel upon this expedition, and by greater chance that he became first colonel in this army. To take him then from another colony, place him over the heads of several gentlemen, under or with whom he has served in a low and subordinate character, would never answer any other purpose, than that of introducing endless confusion. Such a thing surely cannot be in contemplation; and, knowing the mischiefs it would produce, surely Colonel Thompson would have more sense, and a greater regard for the cause he is engaged in, than to accept of it, unless some uncommon abilities or exertions had given him a superior claim. He must know, that nothing more than being a captain of horse in the year 1759 (I think it was) did very extraordinarily give him the start he now has, when the rank was settled here. At the same time, he must know another fact, that several officers now in the Virginia service were much his superiors in point of rank, and will not I am sure serve under him. He stands first colonel here, and may, I presume, put in a very good and proper claim to the first brigade that falls vacant; but I hope more regard will be paid to the service, than to send him to Virginia.

The bringing of Colonel Armstrong into this army as major-general, however great his merit, would introduce much confusion. Thomas, if no more, would surely quit, and I believe him to be a good man. If Thomas supplies the place of Lee, there will be a vacancy for either Armstrong or Thompson; for I have heard of no other valiant son of New England waiting promotion, since the advancement of Frye, who has not, and I doubt will not, do much service to the cause; at present he keeps his room, and talks learnedly of emetics, cathartics, &c. For my own part, I see nothing but a declining life that matters him.¹

I am sorry to hear of your ill-fated fleet. We had it, I suppose because we wished it, that Hopkins had taken Clinton, and his transports. How glorious would this have been! We have the proverb on our side, however, that "a bad beginning will end well." This applies to land and sea service. The account given of the business of the commissioners from England seems to be of a piece with Lord North's conciliatory motion last year, built upon the same foundation, and, if true that they are to be

divided among the colonies to offer terms of pardon, it is as insulting as that motion²; and only designed, after stopping all intercourse with us, to set us up to view in Great Britain, as a people that will not hearken to any propositions of peace. Was there ever any thing more absurd, than to repeal the very acts, which have introduced all this confusion and bloodshed, and at the same time enact a law to restrain all intercourse with the colonies for opposing them? The drift and design are obvious; but is it possible that any sensible nation upon earth can be imposed upon by such a cobweb scheme, or gauze covering? But enough, or else upon a subject so copious I should enter upon my fifth sheet of paper. I have, if length of letter will do it, already made you ample amend for the silence which my hurry in preparing for what I hoped would be a decisive stroke, obliged me to keep. My best respects to Mrs. Reed, in which Mrs. Washington joins, concludes me, dear sir, &c.¹

March 9th.—Colonel Bull's still waiting to see a little further into the event of things gives me an opportunity of adding, that from a gentleman out of Boston, confirmed by a paper from the selectmen there, we have undoubted information of General Howe's preparing with great precipitancy to embark his troops; for what place we know not; Halifax, it is said. The selectmen, being under dreadful apprehensions for the town, applied to General Robertson to apply to General Howe, who through General Robertson has informed them, that it is not his intention to destroy the town, unless his Majesty's troops should be molested during their embarkation, or at their departure. This paper seems so much under covert, unauthenticated, and addressed to nobody, that I sent word to the selectmen, that I could take no notice of it; but I shall go on with my preparations as intended. The gentlemen above mentioned out of Boston say, that they seem to be in great consternation there, that one of our shot from Lamb's Dam disabled six men in their beds, and that the Admiral upon discovering our works next morning informed the General that, unless we were dispossessed of them, he could not keep the King's ships in the harbor; and that three thousand men, commanded by Lord Percy, were actually embarked for that purpose. Of the issue of it you have been informed before. I am, &c.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 13 March, 1776.

Sir,

In my letter of the 7th and 9th instant, which I had the honor of addressing you, I mentioned the intelligence I had received respecting the embarkation of the troops from Boston; and fully expected, before this, that the Town would have been entirely evacuated. Although I have been deceived, and was rather premature in the opinion I had then formed, I have little reason to doubt but the event will take place in a very short time, as other accounts, which have come to hand since, the sailing of a great number of transports from the harbor to Nantasket Road, and many circumstances corresponding therewith, seem to confirm and render it unquestionable. Whether the town will be destroyed is a matter of much uncertainty; but it would seem, from the destruction they are making of sundry pieces of furniture, of many of their wagons and carts, which they cannot take with them as it is said, that it will not; for, if they intended it, the whole might be involved in one general ruin.

Holding it of the last importance in the present contest, that we should secure New York, and prevent the enemy from possessing it, and conjecturing they have views of that sort, and their embarkation to be for that purpose, I judged it necessary, under the situation of things here, to call a council of general officers to consult of such measures, as might be expedient to be taken at this interesting conjuncture of affairs. A copy of the proceedings I have the honor to enclose to you.

Agreeable to the opinion of the council, I shall detach the rifle regiment to-morrow, under the command of Brigadier-General Sullivan, with orders to repair to New York with all possible expedition; and which will be succeeded the day after by the other five in one brigade, they being all that it was thought advisable to send from hence, till the enemy shall have quitted the town. Immediately upon their departure, I shall send forward Major-General Putnam, and follow myself with the remainder of the army, as soon as I have it in my power, leaving here such a number of men, as circumstances may seem to require.

As the badness of the roads at this season will greatly retard the march of our men, I have, by advice of the general officers, written to Governor Trumbull by this express, to use his utmost exertions for throwing a reinforcement of two thousand men into New York, from the western parts of Connecticut¹; and to the commanding officer there, to apply to the Provincial Convention or Committee of Safety of New Jersey, for a thousand more for the same purpose, to oppose the enemy and prevent their getting possession, in case they arrive before the troops from hence can get there; of which there is a probability, unless they are impeded by contrary winds. This measure, though it may be attended with considerable expense, I flatter myself will meet with the approbation of Congress. Past experience, and the lines in Boston and

on Boston Neck, point out the propriety, and suggest the necessity, of keeping our enemies from gaining possession and making a lodgment. Should their destination be further southward, or for Halifax, (as reported in Boston,) for the purpose of going into Canada, the march of our troops to New York will place them nearer the scene of action, and more convenient for affording succour.

We have not taken post on Nook's Hill, and fortified it, as mentioned that we should in my last. On hearing, that the enemy were about to retreat and leave the town, it was thought imprudent and unadvisable to force them with too much precipitation, that we might gain a little time and prepare for a march. To-morrow evening we shall take possession of it, unless they are gone.

As New York is of such importance, prudence and policy require that every precaution, that can be devised, should be adopted to frustrate the designs, which the enemy have of possessing it. To this end I have ordered vessels to be provided, and held ready at Norwich, for the embarkation and transportation of our troops thither. This I have done with a view not only of greatly expediting their arrival, as it will save several days' marching, but also that they may be fresh and fit for intrenching and throwing up works of defence, as soon as they get there, if they do not meet the enemy to contend with; for neither of which would they be in a proper condition, after a long and fatiguing march in bad roads. If Wallace, with his ships, should be apprized of the measure, and attempt to prevent it by stopping up the harbor of New London, they can but pursue their march by land.

You will please to observe, that it is the opinion of the general officers, if the enemy abandon the town, that it will be unnecessary to employ or keep any part of this army for its defence; and that I have mentioned, on that event happening, I shall immediately repair to New York with the remainder of the army not now detached, leaving only such a number of men here as circumstances may seem to require. What I partly allude to is, that,—as it will take a considerable time for the removal of such a body of men, and the divisions must precede each other in such order as to allow intermediate time sufficient for them to be covered and provided for, and many things done previous to the march of the whole, for securing and forwarding such necessaries, as cannot be immediately carried, and others which it may be proper to keep here,—directions might be received from Congress respecting the same, and as many men ordered to remain for that and other purposes, as they may judge proper. I could wish to have their commands upon the subject, and in time, as I may be under some degree of embarrassment as to their views.

Congress having been pleased to appoint Colonel Thompson a brigadier-general, there is a vacancy for a colonel in the regiment he commanded, to which I would beg leave to recommend Lieutenant-Colonel Hand. I shall also take the liberty of recommending Captain Hugh Stephenson, of the Virginia riflemen, to succeed Colonel Hand, and to be appointed in his place as lieutenant-colonel, (there being no major to the regiment, since the promotion of Major Magaw to be lieutenant-colonel of one of the Pennsylvania battalions, who is gone from hence.) He is, in my opinion, the fittest person in this army for it, as well as the oldest captain in the service, having

distinguished himself at the head of a rifle company all the last war, and highly merited the approbation of his superior officers.

Col. Mifflin informed me to day of his having received tent cloths from Mr. Barrell of Philadelphia, to the amount of £7500 Pennsylvania currency, and applied for a warrant for payment of it. But as our fund is low and many necessary demands against it which must be satisfied and our calls for money are and will be exceedingly great, I could not grant it, thinking it might be convenient for payment to be made in Philadelphia by your order on the treasury there. I have the honor, &c. [1](#)

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TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER AT NEW YORK.

Cambridge, 14 March, 1776.

Sir,

I have stronger reasons, since I last wrote to you, to confirm me in my opinion, that the army under General Howe is on its departure. All their movements pronounce it; but lest it be but a feint, I must continue on my guard, and not weaken my lines too much, until I have a certainty of their departure. It is given out, that they are bound to Halifax; but I am of opinion, that New York is the place of their destination. It is the object worthy of their attention, and it is the place that we must use every endeavor to keep from them. For should they get that town, and the command of the North River, they can stop the intercourse between the northern and southern colonies, upon which depends the safety of America. My feelings upon this subject are so strong, that I would not wish to give the enemy a chance of succeeding at your place. I shall, therefore, despatch a regiment, and some independent companies of riflemen this day; and to-morrow, or as soon as it conveniently can be done, five more regiments will set out from this camp. I cannot part with more while the enemy remain in sight; but I have wrote to Governor Trumbull to send you two thousand men, as soon as he possibly can. If you can get one thousand from New Jersey, with the militia of the country called in, (if not repugnant to the will of Congress,) I think you can make a sufficient stand, until I can with the main body of this army join you; which you may depend upon will be as soon as possible, after I can with any degree of certainty tell their route. The plan of defence formed by General Lee, is from what little I know of the place, a very judicious one. I hope, nay, I dare say, it is carrying into execution with spirit and industry. You may judge from the enemy's keeping so long possession of the town of Boston against an army superior in numbers, and animated with the noble spirit of liberty; I say, you may judge by that, how much easier it is to keep an enemy from forming a lodgment in a place, than it will be to dispossess them, when they get themselves fortified. As I have in my last told you, that the fate of this campaign, of course the fate of America, depends upon you and the army under your command, should the enemy attempt your quarter. I will dwell no more thereon, though the vast importance of the subject would make an apology for repetitions needless. I am, Sir, &c.[1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Cambridge, 19 March, 1776.

Sir,

It is with the greatest pleasure I inform you that on Sunday last, the 17th instant, about nine o'clock in the forenoon, the ministerial army evacuated the town of Boston, and that the forces of the United Colonies are now in actual possession thereof. I beg leave to congratulate you, Sir, and the honorable Congress, on this happy event, and particularly as it was effected without endangering the lives and property of the remaining unhappy inhabitants.¹

I have great reason to imagine their flight was precipitated by the appearance of a work, which I had ordered to be thrown up last Saturday night on an eminence at Dorchester, which lies nearest to Boston Neck, called Nook's Hill. The town, although it has suffered greatly, is not in so bad a state as I expected to find it; and I have a particular pleasure in being able to inform you, Sir, that your house has received no damage worth mentioning. Your furniture is in tolerable order, and the family pictures are all left entire and untouched. Captain Cazneau takes charge of the whole, until he shall receive further orders from you.

As soon as the ministerial troops had quitted the town, I ordered a thousand men (who had had the smallpox), under command of General Putnam, to take possession of the heights, which I shall endeavor to fortify in such a manner, as to prevent their return, should they attempt it. But, as they are still in the harbor, I thought it not prudent to march off with the main body of the army, until I should be fully satisfied they had quitted the coast. I have, therefore, only detached five regiments, besides the rifle battalion, to New York, and shall keep the remainder here till all suspicion of their return ceases.

The situation in which I found their works evidently discovered, that their retreat was made with the greatest precipitation. They have left their barracks and other works of wood at Bunker's Hill all standing, and have destroyed but a small part of their lines. They have also left a number of fine pieces of cannon, which they first spiked up, also a very large iron mortar; and, (as I am informed,) they have thrown another over the end of your wharf. I have employed proper persons to drill the cannon, and doubt not I shall save the most of them. I am not yet able to procure an exact list of all the stores they have left. As soon as it can be done, I shall take care to transmit it to you. From an estimate of what the quartermaster-general has already discovered, the amount will be twenty-five or thirty thousand pounds.

Part of the powder mentioned in yours of the 6th instant has already arrived. The remainder I have ordered to be stopped on the road, as we shall have no occasion for it here. The letter to General Thomas, I immediately sent to him. He desired leave, for

three or four days, to settle some of his private affairs; after which, he will set out for his command in Canada.¹ I am happy that my conduct in intercepting Lord Drummond's letter is approved of by Congress. I have the honor to be, &c.²

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PROCLAMATION ON THE EVACUATION OF BOSTON.

Whereas the ministerial army has abandoned the town of Boston, and the forces of the United Colonies under my command are in possession of the same; I have therefore thought it necessary for the preservation of peace, good order, and discipline, to publish the following orders, that no person offending therein may plead ignorance as an excuse for his misconduct.

All officers and soldiers are hereby ordered to live in the strictest peace and amity with the inhabitants; and no inhabitant, or other person, employed in his lawful business in the town is to be molested in his person or property, on any pretence whatever.

If any officer or soldier shall presume to strike, imprison, or otherwise ill-treat any of the inhabitants, he may depend on being punished with the utmost severity; and if any officer or soldier shall receive any insult from any of the inhabitants, he is to seek redress in a legal way, and no other.

Any non-commissioned officer or soldier, or others under my command, who shall be guilty of robbing or plundering in the town, are to be immediately confined, and will be most rigidly punished. All officers are therefore ordered to be very vigilant in the discovery of such offenders, and report their names and crime to the commanding officer in the town, as soon as may be.

The inhabitants and others are called upon to make known to the quartermaster-general, or any of his deputies, all stores belonging to the ministerial army, that may be remaining or secreted in the town; any person or persons whatsoever, that shall be known to conceal any of the said stores, or appropriate them to his or their own use, will be considered as an enemy to America, and treated accordingly.

The selectmen and other magistrates of the town are desired to return to the Commander-in-chief the names of all or any person or persons, they may suspect of being employed as spies upon the Continental army, that they may be dealt with accordingly.

All officers of the Continental army are enjoined to assist the civil magistrates in the execution of their duty, and to promote peace and good order. They are to prevent, as much as possible, the soldiers from frequenting tippling-houses, and strolling from their posts. Particular notice will be taken of such officers as are inattentive and remiss in their duty; and, on the contrary, such only as are active and vigilant will be entitled to future favor and promotion.

Given under my hand, at Head-Quarters, in Cambridge, the 21st day of March, 1776.[1](#)

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TO THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY.

Cambridge, 21 March, 1776.

Gentlemen,

Ere now, I was in hopes of congratulating you on the departure of the ministerial troops, not only from your capital, but country. That they still remain in the harbor, after having been five days embarked, affords matter of speculation, and, collected as their force is now, of apprehension. This circumstance, the security of Boston by a work on Fort Hill and the demolition of the lines on the Neck, and preservation of the stores for Continental use, belonging to the King by a proper search after them, rendered it indispensably necessary for me to throw some troops into the town immediately, it coming within the line of my duty. But, notwithstanding all the precaution, which I have endeavored to use, to restrain and limit the intercourse between the town and country and army for a few days, I greatly fear that the smallpox will be communicated to both.

So soon as the fleet sets sail, my attention must be turned to another quarter, and most of the Continental regiments now here must be marched off. It may be necessary, therefore, for you, Gentlemen, to consider the state of your harbor, and think of such works as may be found necessary for the defence of it, and the town also, in case another armed force, (which I by no means expect,) should be sent hither. I shall leave three or four regiments as circumstances may require for security of the stores, and throwing up works as shall be deemed necessary for the purposes above mentioned; and shall direct the officer commanding them to receive such instructions, in respect to the latter, as you may think proper to give. It has been suggested to me, that, in the town of Boston, there is a good deal of property belonging to refugees, and such other inimical persons as, from the first of the present dispute, have manifested the most unfriendly disposition to the American cause; and that part of this property is in such kind of effects, as can be easily transported, concealed, or changed. I submit to you, therefore, Gentlemen, the expediency of having an inquiry made into this matter, before it is too late for redress, leaving the decision thereupon (after the quantum, or value, is ascertained, and held in a state of durance) to the consideration of a future day. I have ordered, that no violence be offered by the soldiery, either to the property or persons of those people; wishing that the matter may be taken into consideration by your honorable body, and in such a way as you shall judge most advisable.¹

The enclosed came to me a few days ago, and I beg leave to recommend the purport of it to the consideration of the Court. I shall take the liberty to add, as my opinion, that the Congress expect nothing else, than that the field-officers of the Massachusetts regiments should receive the same pay, as those of the other colonies have done; and that they expected, at the time the pay was fixed, fifteen pounds to a colonel, twelve pounds to a lieutenant-colonel, and ten pounds to a major, was the actual establishment of this government. I could wish, therefore, they were allowed it, to

remove the jealousies and uneasiness which have arisen. I am, with great respect and esteem, Gentlemen, &c.[1](#)

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TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Cambridge, 21 March, 1776.

Sir,

I received your favour of the 18 Inst. and concur with you in opinion, that their women and children with the Tory Families will most probably goe to Halifax this is what I meant and alluded to, having never suspected that they (especially the latter) would goe to New York.

I am extreemly obliged by your friendly hint and shall ever receive them with pleasure. But I do not think that they were apprehensive of an attack from our side but rather preparing to make one; However let their designs have been what they may, I have the satisfaction to Inform you, that on Sunday morning last they totally evacuated the Town, and we are now in full possession; upon which event I beg leave to congratulate you, and more so, as the Town is in a much better situation than was expected, added to this, they have left by means of their precipitate retreat Stores of one kind & another to a pretty considerable amount, a particular detail of which or estimation of there value, I have not yet got.—Notwithstanding they have abandoned the Town, and there have been favorable winds for their departure, they are still lying with their fleet in Nantasket road, but for what purpose, is a matter of much conjecture, some suposing their Vessels to have been loaded with such hurry and confusion as to be unfit for sea and to require sundry things and arrangements to be settled previous to their goeing out; But for my own part, I cannot but suspect they are waiting for some opportunity to give us a stroke at a moment when they conceive us to be off our guard, in order to retrieve the honor they have lost, by their shamefull and scandalous retreat diminishing from that Lustre and renown which British armies were wont to boast and justly claimed as their right.—Suspecting them of such motives, I shall not detach any more of the Army than what is gone already; untill they have taken their departure and quitted the Coast.

I heartily thank you for your kind attention to my last requisition, and am glad that the Companies you have ordered are of the Militia; the trouble and inconveniences occasioned by them, being far less than what generally attend Volunteers—Nothing but necessity and the Importance of New York to us in the present contest could have induced the application and therefore as soon as they can be spared by the arrival of our Army, they will be at Liberty to return home to their common and necessary employments except such as may chuse to Inlist and continue in Service.

In compliance with your request, I shall direct the Troops or some of them that goe from hence after the ministerial Fleet are gone, to pursue their Rout on or near the Sea Coast, If they can be accommodated with Covering and provision; that they may be ready to oppose the Enemy in case they make any attempt upon your Colony about the time of their goeing; tho that is what I do not apprehend; I rather suppose when

they once set out, that they will repair to New York, or where ever bound with all possible dispatch to secure the place they are destined for by surprize, lest preparations shou'd be made to receive & prevent them. I am, Sir, &c.[1](#)

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Cambridge, 24 March, 1776.

Sir,

When I had the honor to address you on the 19th instant, upon the evacuation of the town of Boston by the ministerial army, I fully expected, as their retreat and embarkation were hurried and precipitate, that, before now, they would have departed the harbor, and been far on their passage to the place of destination. But, to my surprise and disappointment, the fleet is still in Nantasket Road. The purpose inducing their stay is altogether unknown; nor can I suggest any satisfactory reason for it. On Wednesday night last, before the whole of the fleet fell down to Nantasket, they demolished the Castle, and houses belonging to it, by burning them down, and the several fortifications. They left a great number of the cannon, but have rendered all of them, except a very few, entirely useless, by breaking off the trunnions, and those they spiked up, but may be made serviceable again; some are already done.

There are several vessels in the docks, which were taken by the enemy, some with and others without cargoes, which different persons claim as their property and right. Are they to be restored to the former owners, on making proof of their title, or to belong to the Continent, as captures made from the enemy? I wish Congress would direct a mode of proceeding against them, and establish a rule for decision. They appear to me to be highly necessary. In like manner, some of the cannon, which are in Boston, are said to have come from the Castle. Supposing them, with those remaining at the Castle, to have been purchased by and provided originally at the expense of this province, are they now to be considered as belonging to it, or to the public? I beg leave to refer the matter to the opinion of Congress, and pray their direction how I am to conduct respecting them.

It having been suggested to me, that there was considerable property &c. belonging to persons, who had, from the first of the present unhappy contest, manifested an unfriendly and inveterate disposition, in the town of Boston, I thought it prudent to write to the honorable General Court upon the subject, that it might be inquired after and secured. A copy of the letter I herewith send you, and submit it to Congress, whether they will not determine how it is to be disposed of, and as to the appropriation of the money arising from the sale of the same.

As soon as the town was abandoned by the enemy, I judged it advisable to secure the several heights, lest they should attempt to return; and, for this purpose, have caused a large and strong work to be thrown up on Fort Hill, a post of great importance, as it commands the whole harbor, and, when fortified, if properly supported, will greatly annoy any fleet the enemy may send against the town, and render the landing of their troops exceedingly difficult, if not impracticable. This work is almost done, and in a little time will be complete; and, that the communication between the town and

country may be free and open, I have ordered all the lines upon the Neck to be immediately destroyed, and the other works on the sides of the town facing the country, that the inhabitants from the latter may not be impeded, but afforded an easy entrance, in case the enemy should gain possession at any future time. These matters I conceived to be within the line of my duty; of which I advised the General Court, and recommended to their attention such other measures, as they might think necessary for securing the town against the hostile designs of the enemy.

I have just got an inventory of stores and property belonging to the Crown, which the enemy left in Boston, at the Castle, and Bunker's Hill, which I have the honor to transmit to you; and shall give strict orders, that a careful attention be had to any more that may be found. I shall take such precautions respecting them, that they may be secure, and turn to the public advantage, as much as possible, or as circumstances will admit of.

A Mr. Bullfinch from Boston who acted as clerk to Mr. —, having put into my hands a list of rations drawn the Saturday before the troops evacuated the town, I have enclosed it for your inspection. He says neither the staff officers or women are included in the list; from which it appears that their number was greater than we had an idea of.¹

Major-General Ward and Brigadier-General Frye are desirous of leaving the service, and, for that purpose, have requested me to lay the matter before Congress, that they may be allowed to resign their commissions.² The papers containing their applications you will herewith receive. These will give you a full and more particular information upon the subject, and, therefore, I shall take the liberty of referring you to them. I would mention to Congress that the Commissary of Artillery stores has informed me that whatever powder has been sent to the camp, has always come without any bill, ascertaining the number of casks or quantity. This it is probable has proceeded from forgetfulness or inattention in the persons appointed to send it, or to the negligence of those who brought it, tho' they have declared otherwise, and that they never had any. As it may prevent in some measure embezzlements (tho' I do not suspect any to have been made) and the Commissary will know what and how much to receive, and be enabled to discover mistakes, if any should happen, I shall be glad if you will direct a bill of parcels to be always sent in future. There have been so many accounts from England, all agreeing that Commissioners are coming to America, to propose terms for an accommodation, as they say, that I am inclined to think the time of their arrival not very far off. If they come to Boston, which probably will be the case, if they come to America at all, I shall be under much embarrassment respecting the manner of receiving them, and the mode of treatment, that ought to be used.¹ I therefore pray, that Congress will give me directions, and point out the line of conduct to be pursued; whether they are to be considered as ambassadors, and, to have a pass or permit for repairing through the country to Philadelphia, or to any other place; or whether they are to be restrained in any and what manner. I shall anxiously wait their orders and, whatever they are, comply with them literally. I have the honor, &c.¹

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TO JOSEPH REED.

Cambridge, 25 March, 1776.

My Dear Sir,

Since my last, things remain nearly *in statu quo*. The enemy have the best knack at puzzling people I ever met with in my life. They have blown up, burnt, and demolished the Castle totally, and are now all in Nantasket Road. They have been there ever since Wednesday. What they are doing, the Lord knows. Various are the conjectures. The Bostonians think their stay absolutely necessary to fit them for sea, as the vessels, neither in themselves nor their lading, were in any degree fit for a voyage, having been loaded in great haste and much disorder. This opinion is corroborated by a deserter from one of the transports, who says they have yards, booms, and bowsprits yet to fix. Others again think, that they have a mind to pass over the equinoctial gale before they put out, not being in the best condition to stand one; others, that they are a reinforcement, which I believe has arrived, as I have had an account of the sailing of fifteen vessels from the West Indies. But my opinion of the matter is, that they want to retrieve their disgrace before they go off, and I think a favorable opportunity presents itself to them. They have now got their whole force into one collected body, and no posts to guard. We have detached six regiments to New York, and have many points to look to, and, on Monday next, ten regiments of militia, which were brought in to serve till the first of April, will be disengaged.¹ From former experience, we have found it as practicable to stop a torrent, as these people, when their time is up. If this should be the case now, what more favorable opening can the enemy wish for, to make a push upon our lines, nay, upon the back of our lines at Roxbury, as they can land two miles from them and pass behind? I am under more apprehension from them now than ever, and am taking every precaution I can to guard against the evil; but we have a kind of people to deal with, who will not fear danger till the bayonet is at their breast, and then they are susceptible enough of it. I am fortifying Fort Hill in Boston, and demolishing the lines on the Neck there, as they are a defence against the country only, and making such other dispositions, as appear necessary for a general defence. I can spare no more men till I see the enemy's back fairly turned, and then I shall hasten towards New York.

You mention Mr. Webb in one of your letters for an assistant.¹ He will be agreeable enough to me, if you think him qualified for the business. What kind of a hand he writes, I know not. I believe but a cramped one; latterly none at all, as he has either the gout, or rheumatism, or both. He is a man fond of company and gayety, and is of a tender constitution. Whether, therefore, such a person would answer your purpose so well as a plodding, methodical person, whose sole business should be to arrange his papers in such order as to produce any one at any instant it is called for, and capable at the same time of composing a letter, is what you have to consider. I can only add, that I have no one in view myself, and wish you success in your choice; being with great truth and sincerity, dear Sir, your affectionate servant.

P. S. I have taken occasion to hint to a certain gentleman in this camp, without introducing names, my apprehensions of his being concerned in trade. He protests most solemnly that he is not, directly nor indirectly, and derives no other profit than the Congress allows him for defraying the expenses, to wit, 5 per cent. on the goods purchased.[2](#)

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TO COLONEL THOMAS MIFFLIN, QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

INSTRUCTIONS.

As the motions of the enemy, and the operations of the ensuing campaign, render it indispensably necessary, that a very large body of troops should be immediately assembled at or near New York, you will immediately proceed to Norwich in Connecticut, where you will, in concert with the Brigadier-Generals Heath and Sullivan, regulate the embarkation of the brigades under their command, and settle all such matters with the commissary-general of provisions, and contracts for the transports, as may be further necessary for expediting the march of the rest of the army with the stores, artillery, and camp equipage. This being done, you will proceed without delay to New York; where your first care will be to provide barracks for the troops, firing, forage, and quarters for the general officers. Fix upon a proper house or houses for a general hospital, and stabling for the Continental draught-horses. Intrenching tools must also be immediately provided, with a sufficient quantity of joists and planks for platforms, and timber for gun-carriages; in short, every article necessary for the public service, and which your experience in the last campaign convinces you will be wanted in that now approaching.

The variety of the business of your department renders it next to impossible to point out particularly every duty of your office. Therefore, a latitude is given you in these orders and instructions, which, together with the directions and advice of the commanding general at New York, must be the rule for the future regulation of your conduct; and I shall at present only recommend, that the same integrity, zeal, diligence, and activity, which has animated your past services, may govern that which is to come. Given at Head-Quarters, in Cambridge, this 24th day of March, 1776.¹

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ANSWER TO AN ADDRESS FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Gentlemen,

I return you my most sincere and hearty thanks for your polite address; and feel myself called upon by every principle of gratitude, to acknowledge the honor you have done me in this testimonial of your approbation of my appointment to the exalted station I now fill, and, what is more pleasing, of my conduct in discharging its important duties.

When the councils of the British nation had formed a plan for enslaving America, and depriving her sons of their most sacred and invaluable privileges, against the clearest remonstrances of the constitution, of justice, and of truth, and, to execute their schemes, had appealed to the sword, I esteemed it my duty to take a part in the contest, and more especially on account of my being called thereto by the unsolicited suffrages of the representatives of a free people; wishing for no other reward, than that arising from a conscientious discharge of the important trust, and that my services might contribute to the establishment of freedom and peace, upon a permanent foundation, and merit the applause of my countrymen, and every virtuous citizen.

Your acknowledgment of my attention to the civil constitution of this colony, whilst acting in the line of my department, also demands my grateful thanks. A regard to every Provincial institution, where not incompatible with the common interest, I hold a principle of duty and of policy, and it shall ever form a part of my conduct. Had I not learnt this before, the happy experience of the advantages resulting from a friendly intercourse with your honorable body, their ready and willing concurrence to aid and to counsel, whenever called upon in cases of difficulty and emergency, would have taught me the useful lesson.

That the metropolis of your colony is now relieved from the cruel and oppressive invasions of those, who were sent to erect the standard of lawless domination, and to trample on the rights of humanity, and is again open and free for its rightful possessors, must give pleasure to every virtuous and sympathetic heart; and its being effected without the blood of our soldiers and fellow-citizens must be ascribed to the interposition of that Providence, which has manifestly appeared in our behalf through the whole of this important struggle, as well as to the measures pursued for bringing about the happy event.

May that Being, who is powerful to save, and in whose hands is the fate of nations, look down with an eye of tender pity and compassion upon the whole of the United Colonies; may He continue to smile upon their counsels and arms, and crown them with success, whilst employed in the cause of virtue and mankind. May this distressed colony and its capital, and every part of this wide extended continent, through His divine favor, be restored to more than their former lustre and once happy state, and

have peace, liberty, and safety secured upon a solid, permanent, and lasting foundation.[1](#)

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL PUTNAM.

INSTRUCTIONS.

As there are the best reasons to believe, that the enemy's fleet and army, which left Nantasket Road last Wednesday evening, are bound to New York, to endeavor to possess that important post, and, if possible, secure the communication by Hudson's River to Canada, it must be our care to prevent them from accomplishing their designs. To that end, I have detached Brigadier-General Heath with the whole body of riflemen and five battalions of the Continental army, by the way of Norwich in Connecticut, to New York. These, by an express arrived yesterday from General Heath, I have reason to believe are in New York. Six more battalions under General Sullivan march this morning by the same route, and will, I hope, arrive there in eight or ten days at the farthest. The rest of the army will immediately follow in divisions, leaving only a convenient space between each division, to prevent confusion and want of accommodation upon their march.

You will no doubt make the best despatch in getting to New York. Upon your arrival there, you will assume the command, and immediately proceed in continuing to execute the plan proposed by Major-General Lee, for fortifying that city and securing the passes of the East and North Rivers. If, upon consultation with the brigadier-generals and engineers, any alteration in that plan is thought necessary, you are at liberty to make it; cautiously avoiding to break in too much upon his main design, unless where it may be apparently necessary so to do, and that by the general voice and opinion of the gentlemen above mentioned.

You will meet the quartermaster-general, Colonel Mifflin, and the commissary-general, at New York. As they are both men of excellent talents in their different departments, you will do well to give them all the authority and assistance they require; and should a council of war be necessary, it is my direction they shall assist at it. Your long service and experience will, better than any particular directions at this distance, point out to you the works most proper to be first raised; and your perseverance, activity, and zeal will lead you, without my recommending it, to exert every nerve to disappoint the enemy's designs.

Devoutly praying, that the Power, which has hitherto sustained the American arms, may continue to bless them with His divine protection, I bid you farewell. Given at Head-Quarters, in Cambridge, this 29th day of March, 1776.

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TO JOHN AUGUSTINE WASHINGTON.

Cambridge, 31 March, 1776.

Dear Brother,

Your letter of the 24th ultimo was duly forwarded to this camp by Colonel Lee, and gave me the pleasure of hearing that you, my sister, and family were well. After your post is established to Fredericksburg, the intercourse by letter may become regular and certain; and whenever time, little of which I have for friendly correspondence, will permit, I shall be happy in writing to you. I cannot call to mind the date of my last to you, but this I recollect, that I have written more letters than I have received from you.

The want of arms and powder is not peculiar to Virginia.¹ This country, of which doubtless you have heard large and flattering accounts, is more deficient in both than you can conceive. I have been here months together, with (what will scarcely be believed) not thirty rounds of musket cartridges to a man; and have been obliged to submit to all the insults of the enemy's cannon for want of powder, keeping what little we had for pistol distance. Another thing has been done, which, added to the above, will put it in the power of this army to say, what perhaps no other with justice ever could say. We have maintained our ground against the enemy, under this want of powder, and we have disbanded one army, and recruited another, within musket-shot of two and twenty regiments, the flower of the British army, whilst our force has been but little if any superior to theirs; and, at last, have beaten them into a shameful and precipitate retreat out of a place the strongest by nature on this continent, and strengthened and fortified at an enormous expense.

As some account of the late manœuvres of both armies may not be unacceptable, I shall, hurried as I always am, devote a little time to it. Having received a small supply of powder, very inadequate to our wants, I resolved to take possession of Dorchester Point, lying east of Boston, looking directly into it, and commanding the enemy's lines on Boston Neck. To do this, which I knew would force the enemy to an engagement, or subject them to be enfiladed by our cannon, it was necessary, in the first instance, to possess two heights (those mentioned in General Burgoyne's letter to Lord Stanley, in his account of the battle of Bunker's Hill), which had the entire command of the point. The ground at this point being frozen upwards of two feet deep, and as impenetrable as a rock, nothing could be attempted with earth. We were obliged, therefore, to provide an amazing quantity of chandeliers and fascines for the work; and, on the night of the 4th, after a previous severe cannonade and bombardment for three nights together, to divert the enemy's attention from our real design, we removed every material to the spot, under cover of darkness, and took full possession of those heights, without the loss of a single man.

Upon their discovery of the works next morning, great preparations were made for attacking them; but not being ready before the afternoon, and the weather getting very tempestuous, much blood was saved, and a very important blow, to one side or the other, was prevented. That this most remarkable interposition of Providence is for some wise purpose, I have not a doubt. But, as the principal design of the manœuvre was to draw the enemy to an engagement under disadvantages to them, as a premeditated plan was laid for this purpose, and seemed to be succeeding to my utmost wish, and as no men seem better disposed to make the appeal than ours did upon that occasion, I can scarcely forbear lamenting the disappointment, unless the dispute is drawing to an accommodation, and the sword going to be sheathed. But, to return, the enemy thinking, as we have since learnt, that we had got too securely posted, before the second morning, to be much hurt by them, and apprehending great annoyance from our new works, resolved upon a retreat, and accordingly on the 17th embarked in as much hurry, precipitation, and confusion, as ever troops did, not taking time to fit their transports, but leaving the King's property in Boston, to the amount, as is supposed, of thirty or forty thousand pounds in provisions and stores. Many pieces of cannon, some mortars, and a number of shot and shells are also left; and baggage-wagons and artillery-carts, which they have been eighteen months preparing to take the field with, were found destroyed, thrown into the docks, and drifted upon every shore. In short, Dunbar's destruction of stores after General Braddock's defeat, which made so much noise, affords but a faint idea of what was to be met with here.

The enemy lay from the 17th to the 27th in Nantasket and King's Roads, about nine miles from Boston, to take in water from the islands thereabouts, and to prepare themselves for sea. Whither they are now bound, and where their tents will be next pitched, I know not; but, as New York and Hudson's River are the most important objects they can have in view, as the latter secures the communication with Canada, at the same time that it separates the northern and southern colonies, and the former is thought to abound in disaffected persons, who only wait a favorable opportunity and support to declare themselves openly, it becomes equally important for us to prevent their gaining possession of these advantages; and, therefore, as soon as they embarked, I detached a brigade of six regiments to that government, and, when they sailed, another brigade composed of the same number; and to-morrow another brigade of five regiments will march. In a day or two more, I shall follow myself, and be in New York ready to receive all but the first.

The enemy left all their works standing in Boston and on Bunker's Hill; and formidable they are. The town has shared a much better fate than was expected, the damage done to the houses being nothing equal to report. But the inhabitants have suffered a good deal, in being plundered by the soldiery at their departure. All those who took upon themselves the style and title of government-men in Boston, in short, all those who have acted an unfriendly part in the great contest, have shipped themselves off in the same hurry, but under still greater disadvantages than the King's troops, being obliged to man their own vessels, as seamen enough could not be had for the King's transports, and submit to every hardship that can be conceived. One or two have done, what a great number ought to have done long ago, committed suicide. By all accounts, there never existed a more miserable set of beings, than these

wretched creatures now are. Taught to believe, that the power of Great Britain was superior to all opposition, and, if not, that foreign aid was at hand, they were even higher and more insulting in their opposition than the regulars. When the order issued, therefore, for embarking the troops in Boston, no electric shock, no sudden explosion of thunder, in a word, not the last trump could have struck them with greater consternation. They were at their wits' end, and, conscious of their black ingratitude, they chose to commit themselves, in the manner I have above described, to the mercy of the waves at a tempestuous season, rather than meet their offended countrymen.

I believe I may with great truth affirm, that no man perhaps since the first institution of armies ever commanded one under more difficult circumstances, than I have done. To enumerate the particulars would fill a volume. Many of my difficulties and distresses were of so peculiar a cast, that, in order to conceal them from the enemy, I was obliged to conceal them from my friends, and indeed from my own army, thereby subjecting my conduct to interpretations unfavorable to my character, especially by those at a distance, who could not in the smallest degree be acquainted with the springs that governed it. I am happy, however, to find, and to hear from different quarters, that my reputation stands fair, that my conduct hitherto has given universal satisfaction. The addresses, which I have received, and which I suppose will be published, from the General Court of this colony, and from the selectmen of Boston upon the evacuation of the town, and my approaching departure from the colony, exhibit a pleasing testimony of their approbation of my conduct, and of their personal regard, which I have found in various other instances, and which, in retirement, will afford many comfortable reflections.

The share you have taken in the public disputes is commendable and praiseworthy. It is a duty we owe our country; a claim which posterity has upon us. It is not sufficient for a man to be a passive friend and well-wisher to the cause. This, and every other cause of such a nature, must inevitably perish under such an opposition. Every person should be active in some department or other, without paying too much attention to private interest. It is a great stake we are playing for, and sure we are of winning, if the cards are well managed. Inactivity in some, disaffection in others, and timidity in many, may hurt the cause. Nothing else can; for unanimity will carry us through triumphantly, in spite of every exertion of Great Britain, if we are linked together in one indissoluble bond. This the leaders know, and they are practising every stratagem to divide us, and unite their own people. Upon this principle it is, that the restraining bill is passed, and commissioners are coming over. The device, to be sure, is shallow, the covering thin, but they will hold out to their own people, that the acts complained of are repealed, and commissioners sent to each colony to treat with us, and that we will attend to neither of them. This, upon weak minds among us, will have its effect. They wish for reconciliation; or, in other words, they wish for peace without attending to the conditions.

General Lee, I suppose, is with you before this. He is the first officer, in military knowledge and experience, we have in the whole army. He is zealously attached to the cause, honest and well-meaning, but rather fickle and violent, I fear, in his temper. However, as he possesses an uncommon share of good sense and spirit, I congratulate my countrymen upon his appointment to that department.¹ As I am now nearly at the

end of my eighth page, I think it time to conclude; especially, as I set out with prefacing the little time I had for friendly correspondences. I shall only add, therefore, my affectionate regards to my sister and the children, and compliments to friends; and that I am, with every sentiment of true affection, your loving brother and faithful friend.

end of vol. iii.

[1] On June 24th the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts appointed a committee to consider the steps “proper to be taken for receiving General Washington with proper respect, and to provide a house for him accordingly.” The report was made on the 25th but was not perfected until the next day. “*Resolved*, that Doct. Benjamin Church and Mr. Moses Gill, be a committee to repair to Springfield, there to receive Generals Washington and Lee, with every mark of respect due to their exalted characters and stations; to provide proper escorts for them, from thence, to the army before Boston, and the house provided for their reception at Cambridge; and to make suitable provision for them, in manner following, viz.: by a number of gentlemen of this colony from Springfield to Brookfield; and by another company raised in that neighborhood, from there to Worcester; and by another company, there provided, from thence to Marlborough; and from thence, by the troop of horse to that place, to the army aforesaid; and [to make suitable provision for] their company at the several stages on the road, and to receive the bills of expenses at the several inns, where it may be convenient for them to stop for refreshment, to examine them, and make report of the several sums expended at each of them, for that purpose, that orders may be taken by the Congress for the payment of them; and all innkeepers are hereby directed to make provision agreeably to the requests made by the said committee: and that General Ward be notified of the appointment of General Washington, as commander in chief of the American forces, and of the expectation we have, of his speedy arrival with Major General Lee, that he, with the generals of the forces of the other colonies, may give such orders for their honorable reception, as may accord with the rules and circumstances of the army, and the respect due to their rank, without, however, any expense of powder, and without taking the troops off from the necessary attention to their duty, at this crisis of our affairs.”

“I hope the utmost politeness and respect will be shown to these officers on their arrival. The whole army, I think, should be drawn up upon the occasion, and all the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war displayed;—*no powder burned, however.*” *John Adams to Gerry*, 18 June, 1775.

The cost of escorting and entertaining the generals from Springfield to Cambridge was twenty eight pounds, five shillings and ten pence, lawful money.

The appointment of Washington was soon known in the camp at Cambridge, and preparations were made to receive him. On the 26th of June the Provincial Congress had ordered that the “President’s [of the College] house in Cambridge, excepting one room reserved for the president for his own use, be taken, cleared, prepared and furnished, for the reception of General Washington and General Lee.” On June 29th, the word of parole in Cambridge Camp was *Washington*, and of countersign, *Virginia*.

July 1st the Congress directed the committee in whose charge the orders respecting the house had been placed, to “purchase what things are necessary that they cannot hire,” a matter of some delay and difficulty, as on the fifth the same committee was ordered to “complete the business.” General Washington arrived in Cambridge on Sunday, July 2d, about two o’clock in the afternoon. The first of the general orders issued is dated July 3d. On the 5th the Provincial Congress appointed some of its members to confer with Washington “on the subject of furnishing his table and know what he expects relative thereto.” Some question may have been raised on the general acceptableness of the President’s house for Washington’s purposes, as on the 6th the Congress directed the Committee of Safety to “desire General Washington to let them know if there is any house at Cambridge that would be more agreeable to him and General Lee than that in which they now are; and in that case the said Committee are directed to procure such house and put it in proper order for their reception.” The general thought a change expedient, and on the 8th the Committee of Safety directed that the house of John Vassall, subsequently known as the “Craigie house,” belonging to a refugee loyalist, should be immediately put in a proper condition for the reception of his excellency and his attendants. On the 7th the Provincial Congress directed the “committee appointed to procure a steward for General Washington” to “procure him two or three women, for cooks.” A report was made on the following, which was accepted, directing a “committee to make inquiry forthwith for some ingenious, active and faithful man to be recommended to Gen’l Washington as a steward; likewise, to procure and recommend to him some capable woman, suitable to act in the place of a housekeeper, and one or more good female servants.” Ebenezer Austin was soon after appointed steward, and remained in that capacity while the General was at Cambridge. When Washington moved into the Vassall house is uncertain, but Mr. Charles Deane, to whose careful study of the subject I am indebted for most of the above facts, conjectures it was in the month of July. On the 9th the Congress provided for supplying the General with such articles of household furniture as he had written for, and on the 15th is noted in Washington’s accounts an item for cleaning the house assigned to him for quarters. The Provincial Congress expired on the 19th, leaving the house still incompletely furnished, for its legislative successor, the House of Representatives on the 22d ordered the Committee of Safety to “complete the furnishing of General Washington’s house, and in particular to provide him four or five more beds.” See the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, September, 1872, 257.

[1] “We would not presume to prescribe to your excellency, but supposing you would choose to be informed of the general character of the soldiers who compose the army, beg leave to represent, that the greatest part of them have not before seen service; and although naturally brave and of good understanding, yet, for want of experience in military life, have but little knowledge of divers things most essential to the preservation of health and even life. The youth of the army are not possessed of the absolute necessity of cleanliness in their dress and lodging, continual exercise, and strict temperance, to preserve them from diseases frequently prevailing in camps, especially among those, who, from childhood, have been used to a laborious life.”—*From the Address of the Congress*. The entire address is printed in *Journals of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts*, 438.

[1] “The Hon: Artemas Ward, Charles Lee, Philip Schuyler, and Israel Putnam Esquires, are appointed Major Generals of the American Army, and due obedience is to be paid them as such. The Continental Congress not having compleated the appointments of the other officers in said army, nor had sufficient time to prepare and forward their Commissions; every officer is to continue to do duty in the Rank and Station he at present holds, untill further orders.

“Thomas Mifflin Esqr: is appointed by the General one of his Aid-de-Camps.—Joseph Reed Esqr is in like manner appointed Secretary to the General, and they are in future to be considered and regarded as such.

“The Continental Congress having now taken all the Troops of the several Colonies, which have been raised, or which may be hereafter raised, for the support and defence of the Liberties of America; into their Pay and Service: They are now the Troops of the United Provinces of North America; and it is hoped that all Distinctions of Colonies will be laid aside; so that one and the same spirit may animate the whole, and the only Contest be, who shall render, on this great and trying occasion, the most essential Service to the great and common cause in which we are all engaged.

“It is required and expected that exact discipline be observed, and due Subordination prevail thro’ the whole Army, as a Failure in these most essential points must necessarily produce extreme Hazard, Disorder and Confusion; and end in shameful disappointment and disgrace.

“The General most earnestly requires, and expects, a due observance of those articles of war, established for the Government of the army, which forbid profane cursing, swearing and drunkenness; And in like manner requires & expects, of all Officers, and Soldiers, not engaged on actual duty, a punctual attendance on divine Service, to implore the blessings of heaven upon the means used for our safety and defence.

“All Officers are required and expected to pay diligent Attention, to keep their Men neat and clean—to visit them often at their quarters, and inculcate upon them the necessity of cleanliness, as essential to their health and service. They are particularly to see, that they have Straw to lay on, if to be had, and to make it known if they are destitute of this article. They are also to take care that Necessarys be provided in the Camps and frequently filled up to prevent their being offensive and unhealthy. Proper Notice will be taken of such Officers and Men, as distinguish themselves by their attention to these necessary duties.” *Orderly Book*, 4 July, 1775.

“The General most earnestly recommends & requires of all the Officers, that they be exceeding diligent and strict in preventing all Invasions and Abuse of private property in their quarters, or elsewhere; he hopes, and indeed flatters himself, that every private Soldier will detest, and abhor such practices, when he considers, that it is for the preservation of his own Rights, Liberty and Property, and those of his Fellow Countrymen, that he is now called into service: that it is unmanly and sully’s the dignity of the great cause, in which we are all engaged, to violate that property, he is called to protect, and especially, that it is most cruel and inconsistant, thus to add to the Distresses of those of their countrymen, who are suffering under the Iron hand of

oppression.” 5 July, 1775.

“No Soldier, belonging to these posts, or elsewhere, to be suffered to straggle at a distance from their respective parade, on any pretence, without leave from his Officers: As an unguarded Hour, may prove fatal to the whole army, and to the noble Cause in which we are engaged. The Importance of which, to every man of common understanding, must inspire every good Officer and Soldier, with the noblest Ardour and strictest attention, least he should prove the fatal Instrument of our ruin. . . .

“The General has great Reason; and is highly displeased, with the Negligence and Inattention of those Officers, who have placed as Centries, at the out-posts, Men with whose Characters they are not acquainted. He therefore orders, that for the future, no Man shall be appointed to those important Stations, who is not a Native of this Country, or has a Wife, or Family in it, to whom he is known to be attached. This order is to be consider’d as a standing one and the Officers are to pay obedience to it at their peril.” 7 July, 1775.

[1] The council of war concluded that the enemy number 11,500 men; that the present posts occupied should be defended; that the American army should be raised to 22,000 men; that the Massachusetts regiments should be recruited, and the Provincial Congress should furnish a temporary reinforcement; and that the “Welch Mountains near Cambridge and in the rear of the Roxbury lines” was a suitable place for a rendezvous in case of a dissolution of the army or the positions should become untenable.

[1] “*Resolved*, That the Committee of Safety be directed to wait on General Washington, and inform him of the powers with which the Congress have vested them; and that the Committee of Supplies remain possessed of all those powers they have heretofore had; and to confer with the General with regard to the circumstances of the army, and to desire him to call in all that are out on furlough, and direct that all recruits be ordered to the camp as soon as made; and the said committee are further directed to issue their order for calling in such a number of militia from the several parts of this colony as the General shall request, not exceeding three thousand men.” *Massachusetts Provincial Congress*, 11 July, 1775. Washington thought that a temporary reinforcement of one thousand men, to be stationed at Medford would be sufficient for the existing exigency, and until the new levies then raising could be completed; but some intelligence from Boston received on the evening of the 12th, induced the General to decide that the proposed reinforcement could be dispensed with. “The time of harvest, the expected troops from the southward, and the repeated calls which have been made of the like nature from this Province, are strong reasons to postpone this measure, if consistent with safety.” *Reed to the Provincial Congress*, 12 July, 1775.

[1] Read before Congress, July 19th.

[2] The house and barn of Mr. Brown stood on the west side of the highway [Washington Street] near the present location of Franklin Square. On the 8th of July a party of volunteers from the Rhode Island and Massachusetts forces, under the

command of Majors Tupper and Crane attacked the post and drove in the guard and set fire to the buildings, but two attempts appear to have been necessary to accomplish this. *Jos. Trumbull to Eliph. Dyer*, 11 July, 1775. "This was the only armed conflict between the opposing armies which took place within the original limits of Boston." *Centennial Anniversary Evacuation of Boston*, 12.

[1] The original line of American fortification crossed what is now Washington Street, on the line of division between Boston and Roxbury, near the present Clifton Place.

[2] "Yesterday, as I was going to Cambridge, I met the Generals [Washington and Lee], who begged me to return to Roxbury again, which I did. When they had viewed the works, they expressed the greatest pleasure and surprise at their situation and apparent utility, to say nothing of the plan, which did not escape their praise." *General Knox to his wife*, 6 July, 1775. "General Washington fills his place with vast ease and dignity, and dispenses happiness around him." 9 July. "The new generals are of infinite service to the army. They have to reduce order almost from a perfect chaos. I think they are in a fair way of doing it." 11 July.

[1] "Ordered, that Mr. Wilson apply to the committee of the city and liberties of Philadelphia, and request them to make diligent enquiry what quantity of duck, Russia sheeting, tow-cloth, oznaburges and ticklenburgs can be procured in this city, and make return as soon as possible to this Congress." *Journals*, July 19th.

[1] Trumbull was appointed by Congress; and the naming of the other officers as well as of three brigade majors was left to Washington. *Journals*, July 19th.

[2] General Ward wrote to the Provincial Congress on the 7th, that "great numbers in the army are almost naked for want of shirts, breeches, stockings, shoes, and other clothing; and unless they can be immediately supplied, inconceivable difficulties and distrust will accrue to the army."

[1] "We arrived here on Sunday before dinner. We found everything exactly the reverse of what had been represented. We were assured at Philadelphia that the army was stocked with Engineers. We found not one. We were assured that we should find an expert train of artillery. They have not a single gunner, and so on. So far from the men being prejudiced in favour of their own officers, they are extremely diffident in them, and seem much pleased that we are arrived. The men are really very fine fellows, and had they fair play would be made an invincible army." *Charles Lee to Robert Morris*, 4 July, 1775. *Lee Papers*, i., 188.

"Until I visited headquarters at Cambridge, I never heard of the valor of Prescott at Bunker Hill, nor the ingenuity of Knox and Waters in planning the celebrated works at Roxbury. We were told here that there were none in our camp who understood the business of an engineer, or anything more than the manual exercise of the gun. This we had from great authority, and, for want of more certain intelligence, were obliged at least to be silent. There are many military geniuses at present unemployed and overlooked, who, I hope when the army is new modelled, will be sought after and

enlisted into the service of their country. They must be sought after, for modest merit declines to push itself into public view.” *Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry*, 26 September, 1775.

[1] “At the request of General Washington, *Resolved*, That no more commissions for the present be delivered to any officers of the Colony Army, those employed more particularly for the protection of the seacoasts, excepted.” *Massachusetts Provincial Congress*, 3 July, 1775.

[2] A remarkable memorial in favor of General Spencer is to be found in Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, ii., 1585. A letter from Samuel B. Webb to Silas Deane, 11 July, 1775, throws some light on Spencer’s conduct. *Collections Connecticut Historical Society*, ii., 285, 288, 290.

[3] “As Pomroy is now Absent, and at the distance of an hundred miles from the Army, if it can be consistent with your Excellencys Trust and the Service to retain his Commission untill you shall receive Advice from the Continental Congress, and we shall be able to prevail with Heath to make a concession Honourable to himself, and advantageous to the publick. We humbly conceive the way would be open to do Justice to Thomas.” *Jas. Warren and Joseph Hawley, to Washington*, 4 July, 1775.

[1] “*Resolved*, That General Thomas be appointed first brigadier-general in the army of the United Colonies, in the room of General Pomeroy, who never acted under the commission sent to him, and that General Thomas’s commission bear the same date that General Pomeroy’s did.” *Journals*, July 19th.

[2] A general return of the army is printed in Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, ii., 1630.

[1] On 10 July General Gates issued an order to be observed by the recruiting officers, who were immediately sent upon that service:—

“You are not to enlist any deserter from the Ministerial army, nor any stroller, negro, or vagabond, or person suspected of being an enemy to the liberty of America, nor any under eighteen years of age.

“As the cause is the best that can engage men of courage and principle to take up arms, so it is expected that none but such will be accepted by the recruiting officer. The pay, provision, &c., being so ample, it is not doubted but that the officers sent upon this service will, without delay, complete their respective corps, and march the men forthwith to camp.

“You are not to enlist any person who is not an American born, unless such person has a wife and family, and is a settled resident in this country. The persons you enlist must be provided with good and complete arms.” *Gaines’ Mercury*, July 24th.

[1] “*Resolved*, That such a body of troops be kept up in the Massachusetts Bay, as General Washington shall think necessary, provided they do not exceed twenty-two thousand men.”—*Journals*, July 21st. See note on p. 6.

[2] “Upon my soul the materials here (I mean the private men) are [admira]ble; had they proper uniforms, arms, and proper officers, their zeal, youth, bodily strength, good humor, [and dext]erity, must make ’em an invincible army. The Rhode [Islanders] are well off in the article of officers and the young [officers of] the other Provinces are willing, and with a little time do very well. But from the old big wigs [—libera] nos Domine. The abilities of their engineers are not [transcen]dant, I really believe not a single man of them is [capable] of constructing an oven.”—*Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush*, 20 July, 1775.

“Although in the Massachusetts part of the army there are divers brave and intrepid officers, yet there are too many, and even several colonels, whose characters, to say the least are very equivocal with respect to courage. There is much more cause to fear that the officers will fail in a day of trial, than the privates. I may venture to say, that if the officers will do their duty, there is no fear of the soldiery.”—*Joseph Hawley to Washington*, 5 July, 1775.

[1] On the 10th Washington wrote to Benjamin Harrison, but the letter is lost and its contents can only be guessed at by Harrison’s reply, printed in Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, ii., 1697. The more important matters are indicated by the following extracts: “Your fatigue and various kinds of trouble, I dare say are great; but they are not more than I expected, knowing the people you have to deal with by the sample we have here. . . . The want of engineers, I fear, is not to be supplied in America. Some folks here seemed much displeased at your report on that head. They affirm there are two very good ones with you—a Colonel Gridley, I think, is one. I took the liberty to say that they must be mistaken; they were certainly either not in camp, or could not have the skill they were pleased to say they had. This, in my soft way, put a stop to anything more on the subject. Indeed, my friend, I do not know what to think of some of these men; they seem to be exceeding hearty in the cause, but still wish to keep everything amongst themselves. . . . The Congress have given you the appointment of three brigade majors. Mr. Trumbull has the office you proposed for him. The appointments of the commissary of artillery, ditto of musters, and quartermaster-general, are also left to your disposal. . . . We have given the commission of first brigadier to Mr. Thomas. As Putnam’s commission was delivered, it would, perhaps have offended the old gentleman to have superceded him; the other I hope, will still act. The Congress have, from your account, a high opinion of him, and I dare say will grant anything in their power that he may hereafter require. Your hint for a remove of the Congress to some place nearer to you, will come on to-morrow. I think it will not answer your expectations if we should remove; you shall have the result in the close of this. The military chest, I hope, will be supplied soon; they begin to strike the bills this day, so that I hope some may be forwarded to you next week. . . . (21 July). The debate about our remove was taken yesterday, and determined in the negative. I proposed a committee, but could not carry it. I think the last method would have answered your purpose best, but the gentlemen could not think of parting with the least particle of their power.” (23 July.) This letter never

reached Washington, being intercepted by the British. It is printed in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1775. When Washington was in Congress there appears to have been some talk of removing to Connecticut, (*Silas Deane to his wife*, 16 June, 1775), and again in September (*Silas Deane to his wife*, September 22).

[1] At Bunker's Hill, on the 17th of June. According to a return published by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, the loss was one hundred and forty-five killed and missing, and three hundred and four wounded. About thirty of the first number were wounded and taken prisoners. By General Gage's official return, the killed and missing of the British were two hundred and twenty-six, and the wounded eight hundred and twenty-eight, in all one thousand and fifty four.—*Almon's Remembrancer*, vol. i., pp. 99, 179.

[1] "Eight transports with troops that have been at Sandy Hook since Thursday last are to sail from thence to day. Reports prevail that the men on board have mutinied, that they refused to go to Boston. Of this, however, I have not been able to get any certainty. Hand bills have been introduced amongst them to encourage them to quit on the first favorable opportunity a service which must render them odious to all honest men. Governor Tryon's conduct has hitherto been unexceptionable, and from the information I have been able to procure, some of which I put great confidence in, I have reason to believe that the line he has chalked out for himself is such as we would wish he should hold."—*General Schuyler to Washington*, 1 July, 1775.

"Notwithstanding Gov. Tryon's plausible behavior I recommended it to you to watch him narrowly and as any unlucky Change of Affairs on our Part may produce a Change in him of his *present unexceptionable conduct*, I expect you will on the first Appearance of such a Change pursue the advice given in my last Letter. The like Advice I give you respecting General Haldiman who is supposed by some to have gone to New York with a Design to counteract us in that Province. . . .

"The dispersing Hand Bills amongst the Troops at New York has my most hearty Approbation and may have a good Effect here. Our Enemies have attempted nothing against us since my arrival here—they are strongly posted on Bunkers Hill & are still busy in throwing up additional Works. We have thrown up several Lines and Redoubts between Mystick River & Dorchester Point to prevent their making Way into the Country and in a few Days shall be well prepared to receive them in Case a Sortiee is attempted.—*Washington to Schuyler*, 10 July, 1775.

"Since I did myself the honor of addressing you the 10th. instant, nothing material has happened in the camp. From some late and authentic advices of the state of the ministerial troops and the great inconvenience of calling in the militia at this season, I have been induced for the present to waive it; but in the meantime recruiting parties have been sent through this province to fill the regiments to the establishment of the Provincial Congress. . . . The great scarcity of fresh provisions in their army has led me to take every precaution to prevent a supply. For this purpose I have ordered all the cattle and sheep to be drove from the low grounds and farms within their reach. A detachment from General Thomas' camp on Wednesday night went over to Long Island, and brought from thence 20 cattle and a number of sheep, with about 15

laborers who had been put on by a Mr. Ray Thomas, in order to cut hay, &c. By some accident they omitted burning the hay, and returned the next day to complete it, which they effected amidst the firing of the shipping with the loss of one man killed, and another wounded. Last evening also a party of the Connecticut men [under Major Greateon] strolled down upon the marsh at Roxbury and fired upon a sentry, which drew on a heavy fire from the enemy's lines and floating battery, but attended with no other effect than the loss of one man killed by a shot from the enemy's lines."—*To the President of Congress, Cambridge, 14 July, 1775.*

"The General observing great remissness, and neglect, in the several Guards in and about the Camp, orders the Officers commanding any Guard to turn out his Guard immediately upon the near approach of The Commander in Chief or any of the General Officers, and upon passing the Guard; The Commander in Chief is to be received with *rested Arms*; the Officer to salute and the Drums to beat a march. The Majors General with *rested Arms*, the Officer to salute and the Drums to beat two Ruffles. The Brigadiers General with *rested Arms*, the Officer to salute and the Drums to beat one Ruffle.—There being something awkward, as well as improper, in the General Officers being stopp'd at the outposts; ask'd for passes by the Sentries, and obliged often to send for the Officer of the Guard (who it sometimes happens is as much unacquainted with the Persons of the Generals, as the private men) before they can pass in or out: It is recommended to both Officers and Men, to make themselves acquainted with the persons of all the Officers in General Command, and in the mean time to prevent mistakes: The General Officers and their Aids-de-Camp, will be distinguished in the following manner.

"The Commander in Chief by a light blue Ribband, wore across his breast, between his Coat and Waistcoat.

"The Majors and Brigadiers General, by a Pink Ribband wore in the like manner.

"The Aids-de-Camp by a green ribband."—*Orderly Book, 14 July, 1775.*

"Notwithstanding the Orders already given, the General hears with astonishment, that not only Soldiers, but Officers unauthorized, are continually conversing with the Officers and Sentries of the Enemy; any Officer Non Commissioned Officer or Soldier, or any Person whatsoever, who is detected holding any Conversation, or carrying on any Correspondence with any of the Officers or Sentries or the advanc'd posts of the enemy, will be immediately brought before a General Court Martial, and punished with the utmost severity. The General is alone to judge of the propriety of any intercourse with the enemy and no one else is to presume to interfere." 15 July, 1775.

"The Continental Congress having earnestly recommended, that 'Thursday next the 20th Instant, be observed by the Inhabitants of all the English Colonies upon this Continent; as a Day of public Humiliation, Fasting and Prayer; that they may with united Hearts & Voice, unfeignedly confess their Sins before God, and supplicate the all wise and merciful disposer of events, to avert the Desolation and Calamities of an unnatural War:' The General orders, that Day to be religiously observed by the Forces

under his Command, exactly in manner directed by the proclamation of the Continental Congress: It is therefore strictly enjoin'd on all Officers and Soldiers, (not upon duty) to attend Divine Service, at the accustomed places of worship, as well in the Lines, as the Encampments and Quarters; and it is expected, that all those who go to worship, do take their Arms, Ammunition and Accoutrements, & are prepared for immediate Action if called upon. If in the Judgment of the Officers, the Works should appear to be in such forwardness as the utmost security of the Camp requires, they will command their men to abstain from all Labour upon that solemn day.

“It was with much surprise and concern that the General in passing along the New Hampshire Lines yesterday, observed a most wanton, mischievous, and unprofitable Abuse of property, in the Destruction of many valuable Trees, which were standing along the side of the road, out of the way of our works or guns, he therefore orders, that an effective stop be put to such practices for the future, or severe punishment will fall upon the Transgressors of this order.”—*Orderly Book*, 16 July, 1775.

[1] Governor Trumbull was one of the firmest patriots and best men, that his country has produced. He was at this time sixty-five years old, having been born in the year 1710, yet no man engaged with more zeal and activity in the common cause. So true was he to the principles of liberty, and such was the confidence of his fellow citizens in his talents and integrity, that, although first appointed Governor in 1769, several years before the breaking out of the war, he was constantly chosen with great unanimity to the same station till the end of the revolution, when, at the age of seventy-three, he declined a further election. His services were of very great importance throughout the whole war, not only in regulating the civil affairs of Connecticut, but in keeping alive a military ardor among the people, and thus promoting efficiency and promptness of action in the forces contributed from time to time by that State. Governor Trumbull had written to Washington:

“Suffer me to join in congratulating you, on your appointment to be General and Commander-in-chief of the troops raised or to be raised for the defence of American liberty. Men, who have tasted of freedom, and who have felt their personal rights, are not easily taught to bear with encroachments on either, or brought to submit to oppression. Virtue ought always to be made the object of government; justice is firm and permanent.

“His Majesty’s ministers have artfully induced the Parliament to join in their measures, to prosecute the dangerous and increasing difference between Great Britain and these colonies with rigor and military force; whereby the latter are driven to an absolute necessity to defend their rights and properties, by raising forces for their security. The honorable Congress have, with one united voice, appointed you to the high station you possess. The Supreme Director of all events has caused a wonderful union of hearts and counsels to subsist amongst us. Now, therefore, be strong and very courageous. May the God of the armies of Israel shower down the blessings of his divine providence on you, give you wisdom and fortitude, cover your head in the day of battle and danger, add success, convince our enemies of their mistaken measures, and that all their attempts to deprive these colonies of their inestimable constitutional rights and liberties are injurious and vain.”

In reply Washington wrote on July 18th: “Allow me to return you my sincere thanks, for the kind wishes and favorable sentiments expressed in yours of the 13th instant. As the cause of our common country calls us both to an active and dangerous duty, I trust that Divine Providence, which wisely orders the affairs of men, will enable us to discharge it with fidelity and success. The uncorrupted choice of a brave and free people has raised you to deserved eminence. That the blessings of health, and the still greater blessing of long continuing to govern such a people, may be yours, is the sincere wish of, Sir, your, &c.”

[1] I am unable to trace this paper. Washington’s letter was intended to counteract Spencer’s effort to secure precedence over Putnam.

[2] “If after what has happened, the Enemy in Revenge of their late Loss, should dare to attempt forcing our Lines, The Army may be assured, that nothing but their own Indolence and Remissness, can give the least hope of success to so rash an Enterprise: It is therefore strongly recommended to the Commanding Officers of Corps, Guards and Detachments; that they be assiduously alert in parading their Men, at their several posts, half an hour before day break, and remain there, untill the Commanding Officers think proper to dismiss them:

“The General hears with Astonishment, the very frequent applications, that are made to him, as well by Officers as Soldiers for Furloughs: Brave Men, who are engaged in the noble Cause of Liberty; should never think of removing from their Camp, while the Enemy is in sight, and anxious to take every Advantage, any Indiscretion on our side may give them: The General doubts not, but the Commanding Officers of Corps will anticipate his wishes, and discourage those under them, from disgracefully desiring to go home, untill the Campaign is ended.”—*Orderly Book*, July 18, 1775.

[1] Two companies were added to each regiment of the colony before Boston and the army of observation was placed under the command of Washington. *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island*, vii., 354, 355.

[1] “It is with inexpressible Concern that the General upon his first Arrival in the army, should find an Officer sentenced by a General Court Martial to be cashier’d for Cowardice—A Crime of all others, the most infamous in a Soldier, the most injurious to an Army, and the last to be forgiven; inasmuch as it may, and often does happen, that the Cowardice of a single Officer may prove the Destruction of the whole Army. The General therefore (tho’ with great Concern, and more especially, as the Transaction happened before he had the Command of the Troops) thinks himself obliged for the good of the service, to approve the Judgment of the Court Martial with respect to Capt: John Callender, who is hereby sentenced to be cashiered. Capt: John Callender is accordingly cashiered and dismissd: from all farther service in the Continental Army as an Officer.

“The General having made all due inquiries, and maturely consider’d this matter is led to the above determination not only from the particular Guilt of Capt Callenders, but the fatal Consequences of such Conduct to the army and to the cause of america.

“He now therefore most earnestly exhorts Officers of all ranks to shew an Example of Bravery and Courage to their men; assuring them that such as do their duty in the day of Battle, as brave and good Officers, shall be honor’d with every mark of distinction and regard; their names and merits made known to the General Congress and all America: while on the other hand, he positively declares that every Officer, be his rank what it may, who shall betray his Country, dishonour the Army and his General, by basely keeping back and shrinking from his duty in any engagement; shall be held up as an infamous Coward and punish’d as such, with the utmost martial severity; and no connections, Interest, or Intercessions in his behalf will avail to prevent the strict execution of Justice.”—*Orderly Book*, 7 July, 1775.

[1] “I am informed by his Excellency that the idea of colony troops is to be abolished, and that the whole army is to be formed into brigades, and the generals to be appointed by the Congress. . . . I wish that good and able men may be the objects of the Continental choice, rather than subjects of particular interests.” General Greene. *Life of Greene*, i., 103, 104.

[2] “Regularity and due Subordination, being so essentially necessary, to the good Order and Government of an Army, and without it, the whole must soon become a Scene of disorder and confusion. The General finds it indispensibly necessary, without waiting any longer for dispatches from the General Continental Congress, immediately to form the Army into three Grand Divisions, and of dividing each of those Grand Divisions into two Brigades: He therefore orders that the following Regiments vizt—

Genl Wards, Gen Thomas’s, Col Fellows, Col Cottons, Col Danielsons, Col Dad Brewer’s, compose one Brigade, and be under the Command of Brigadier General Thomas; that Genl Spencers, Col Parsons, Col Walkers, Col I. Reads, Col Lerneards, Independents, compose another Brigade, to be commanded by Brigadier Genl Spencer: That these two Brigades compose the right wing or division of the army; and be under the command of Major General Ward, and remain at Roxbury, and its Southern dependencies. That Col Starks, Col Poors, Col Reeds—New Hampshire; Col Nixons, Col. Mansfield, Col Doolittles—Massachusetts, be formed into another Brigade under the Command of Brigadier General Sullivan, and posted on Winter hill. That Col Varnums, Col Hitchcocks, Col Churchs—Rhode Island; Col Whitecombes, Col Gardners, Col I. Brewers, Col Littles—Massachusetts, be formed into another Brigade, and commanded by Brigadier Genl Green, and posted upon Prospect Hill; and these two Brigades compose the left wing or second division of the army under the Command of Major Genl Lee. That Genl Putnams, Col Glovers, Col Fryes, Col Bridges, Col Woodbridges, Col Serjeants, be formed into another Brigade, under the Command of the Senior Officer therein, and until the pleasure of the Continental Congress be known; These two Brigades to be under the Command of Major Genl Putnam, also a Corps-de-reserve, for the defence of the several posts, north of Roxbury, not already named.

“The arrangement now ordered to take place, is to be made as speedily as possible, and the Majors Generals are to see it done accordingly, some inconveniences may

arise to certain Individuals by this change, but as the good of the service requires it to be made an alert and ready compliance is expected.” Orderly Book, 22 July, 1775.

[1] See *Journals*, July 27th.

[1] By a vote of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress (April 26th), Mr. Richard Derby of Salem was empowered to fit out his vessel, as a packet, to carry intelligence of the Lexington battle to England, and all charges were to be paid by the colony. It was commanded by Captain John Derby, who arrived in London on the 29th of May, having taken with him several copies of the *Essex Gazette*, in which was contained the first published account of the affair at Lexington and Concord. This was reprinted and circulated in London the day after his arrival and gave the first notice of that event to the English public. Captain Derby was summoned before the Privy Council, the ministry having received no despatches from General Gage confirming such a report. Nor did his letters arrive till eleven days afterwards, although the vessel conveying them sailed four days previous to the departure of Captain Derby. Great excitement was produced throughout England, and the clamor grew loud against the ministers, because it was presumed that they concealed the official accounts, and wished to keep the people in ignorance. On the 10th of June, however, as soon as General Gage’s official report reached Whitehall, it was published.—*Journal of Massachusetts Provincial Congress*.—*MS. Papers in the State Paper Office, London*.

Captain Derby took with him the original affidavits of the people in Lexington and Concord respecting the battle, and a letter from the Provincial Congress to Dr. Franklin, agent in England for Massachusetts. These identical papers are now in the Library of Harvard University. When Captain Derby arrived in London Dr. Franklin had sailed for America, and he was at sea when the affair at Lexington took place. The papers were, therefore, handed to Arthur Lee, who was Dr. Franklin’s successor. He retained them, and recently they have been deposited in the Library of the university, with other manuscripts, by Mr. R. H. Lee, of Virginia.

[1] “Captain Darby’s accounts differ very essentially from the newspapers he brought. He says the general sentiment is against us, and even the London merchants who have petitioned, are at heart our enemies, which the ministry well know. The commencement of hostilities was the wonder of a day, and then little thought of. Stocks only fell 1½ per cent., which they often do on the slightest alarm. A minister never dreads a fall till it gets to 8 per cent.”—*Joseph Reed to Pettit*, “Life of Reed,” i., 117, 118.

“The news from America occasioned a great stir among us yesterday. . . . Gage’s account is not yet arrived. He sent his letters by a merchant ship laden with goods. The Bostonians sent their story by a ship in ballast, the master of which brought no letters whatever, but appeared in London yesterday morning with the account you will see printed, and a London Evening Post extraordinary was published last night to spread the alarm. It is strange to see the many joyful faces upon this event, thinking, I conclude, that Rebellion will be the means of changing the Ministry. . . . I have seen no Ministers, but I have seen Governor Hutchinson, and he agrees with me in opinion, and says the hurry they were in of sending a ship express from Salem convinces him

that the story is misrepresented for purposes of the faction there.”—*Lord George Germaine to General Irwin*, 30 May, 1775.

“We have received an account through the channel of a private ship sent on purpose, as we conceive, by the Provincial Congress assembled in Massachusetts Bay, of a skirmish between a detachment of the King’s troops and some rebel provincials in the neighborhood of Boston. This account, as you will readily believe, is made up with a view of creating alarm here, and answer the ends of faction; but as we have not yet any intelligence from General Gage, I can only say, with great satisfaction, that it has failed of its object, and has had no other effect than to excite that just indignation that every honest man feels at the measures adopted in North America for supporting by acts of open rebellion, a resistance to the laws and authority of this kingdom.”—*Earl of Dartmouth to Governor Franklin*, 7 June, 1775.

	April 29.	May 29.	June 28.
Bank stock	142¼	142¾	141¾
Four per cents	91⅛	91	90¾
Three per cent. consols	89⅛	89	Shut.
South sea stock	99½	99	Shut.

[1] A party of American troops, under Major Vose, set fire to the light-house, which stood on an island about nine miles from Boston. It was considered an enterprise of some merit, as a British man-of-war was stationed within a mile of the place. “Some of the brave men who effected this with their lives in their hands have just now applied to me to know whether it [what they captured at the light House] was to be considered as plunder or otherwise. I was not able to determine this matter, but told them that I would lay the matter before your excellency.”—*Heath to Washington*, 21 July, 1775.

[1] Mr. Hancock had written: “I must beg the favor, that you will reserve some berth for me, in such department as you may judge most proper; for I am determined to act under you, if it be to take the firelock and join the ranks as a volunteer.” In reply Washington wrote from Cambridge, 21 July: “I am particularly to acknowledge that part of your favor of the 10th instant, wherein you do me the honor of determining to join the army under my command. I need certainly make no professions of the pleasure I shall have in seeing you. At the same time I have to regret, that so little is in my power to offer equal to Colonel Hancock’s merits, and worthy of his acceptance. I shall be happy in every opportunity to show the regard and esteem with which I am, &c., &c.” The company of Cadets in Boston had been commanded by Mr. Hancock, with the rank of Colonel. He was dismissed from that command by General Gage. A curious correspondence on the subject is contained in the *Boston Gazette*, August 29th, 1774. It does not appear that he joined the army under Washington in any military capacity, as above proposed.

[2] Taken from Reed, *Life of Reed*, i, 109.

[1] “As the Continental Army have unfortunately no Uniforms, and consequently many inconveniences must arise, from not being able always to distinguish the

Commissioned Officers, from the non Commissioned, and the non Commissioned from the private; it is desired that some Badges of Distinction may be immediately provided, for Instance, the Field Officers may have *red or pink* colour'd Cockades in their Hatts: the Captains *yellow or buff*; and the Subalterns *green*. They are to furnish themselves accordingly—The Serjeants may be distinguished by an Epaulette, or stripe of *red Cloth*, sewed upon the right shoulder; the Corporals by one of *green*.”—*Orderly Book*, 23 July, 1777.

“You will, I presume, before this letter gets to hand, hear of my appointment to the command of the Continental army. I arrived at this camp the 2d instant.

“You must, no doubt, also have heard of the engagement on Bunker’s Hill the 17th ultimo; but as I am persuaded you will have a very erroneous account transmitted of the loss sustained on the side of the Provincials, I do assure you, upon my word, that our loss, as appears by the returns made to me since I came here, amounts to no more than one hundred and thirty-nine killed, thirty-six missing, and two hundred and seventy-eight wounded; nor had we, if I can credit the most solemn assurances of the officers, who were in the action, above one thousand five hundred men engaged on that day. The loss on the side of the ministerial troops, as I am informed from good authority, consisted of one thousand and forty-three killed and wounded, whereof ninety-two were officers.

“Enclosed I send you a second address from the Congress to the inhabitants of Great Britain; as also a declaration setting forth the causes and necessity of their taking up arms.”—*Washington to George William Fairfax*, 25 July, 1775.

“In my hurry, yesterday, I forgot the principal thing I had in view, when I sat down to write to you, and that was, to inform you of the indispensable necessity you must now be under of appointing another Attorney. The nature of the business I am now engaged in (which alone is full sufficient to engross the time and attention of any one Man) and the distance I am removed from your business, as well as my own, puts it absolutely out of my power to be of any further service to you in Virginia: It is a duty incumbent on me, therefore, to inform you of this circumstance, that you may, without delay, appoint some other Attorney to manage your Affairs; as it would be folly in the extreme, in me, to undertake to conduct your business at the distance of 600 Miles, when it is utterly out of my power (but by means of a third person) to Order and direct my own.”—*Washington to George William Fairfax*, 26 July, 1775.

[1] Gage in July found from a census of the city population, 6,573 civilians, and an army of 13,500.

[2] A goldsmith, Rolston, came out from Boston and reported “that the distress of the troops increases fast, their beef is spent, their malt and cider all gone; all the fresh provisions they can procure, they are obliged to give to the sick and wounded . . . that last week a poor milch cow was killed in town and sold for a shilling sterling a pound.”—*Pennsylvania Journal*, 2 August, 1775.

[1] When Parliament assembled in November, 1774, the opposition was largely in the minority and what strength it had was much weakened by divisions. It was known that New England was in a state of rebellion, while the violent conduct of local committees in other colonies was creating a prejudice against moderate councils. As early as November 18th the King wrote to Lord North that “blows must decide whether they are to be subjects to this country or independent.” “We must either master them,” he wrote the next day, “or totally leave them to themselves and treat them as aliens.” In his address to Parliament he declared his resolution to withstand every attempt to weaken or impair the supreme authority of the legislature over all his dominions, the maintenance of which he considered essential to the dignity, safety, and welfare of the Empire.—Adolphus, *History of England*, ii., 158. These sentiments were adopted by the Parliament, and the Ministry could always count upon handsome majorities for their measures. On May 26th the Parliament was prorogued, the King making a temperate speech in which he expressed the most perfect satisfaction with the conduct of that body at such an important crisis.

[1] “But on Tuesday three men of war and six transports sailed out of Boston harbour and stood a course about E. S. E. One Grover, who came out of Boston the same evening informed the officer at one of the outposts that the transports had on board 600 men, and were bound to Block Island, Fisher Island, and Long Island, to plunder them and bring off what cattle they may find. This fellow returned again into Boston under such suspicious circumstances that it has led me to doubt the truth of his intelligence. A deserter who came in afterwards informs me that it was given out in the camp they were either gone for Indians or fresh provisions, and that each transport had but twenty men on board. Upon this intelligence I immediately wrote to Governor Cooke of Rhode Island and to General Wooster, that they might take proper precautions for removing the cattle off those islands, and to prevent any surprise. As we are confirmed by every account in the great scarcity of fresh provisions in the enemies camp, and particularly by this deserter, who says they have had none since the battle of Lexington, it is very probable this voyage may be only intended for a supply. But as it may possibly be otherwise, I thought it best to transmit the intelligence to the honorable Congress, that they may either forward it to the southward, or take any other step which they may judge proper. Since writing the above three more deserters have come out, which makes four in twenty-four hours. Their accounts correspond with those of the first who came out.”—*Washington to the President of Congress, Cambridge, 27 July, 1775.*

“Yesterday a Deputation from the Provincial Congress of New Hampshire attended me with a Request that three Companies raised in their Province and now posted on Connecticut River at and between the two Colonies commanded by Capts. Timothy Rudle, James Osgood and John Parker might be continued for the Security of the Frontiers of that Province on the continental Establishment: As it did not appear to me that their request could be complied with and as I apprehend you may have more immediate Occasion for them than I have, I thought it proper to give you the earliest Notice where they are that if you think proper you may order them to join the Troops under your Command. In which Case you will please write to Matthew Thornton Esqr President of the Provincial Congress. Each Company consists of 65 Men including Officers and are reported to me as able bodied stout active Fellows used to the woods

capable of any Duty and having an Acquaintance with Canada—But you will please to remember that they must continue under their own Officers to whom they are attached and subject only to superior Command.—We have had no Transaction of any Consequence since I wrote you last. Our Army is in good Health and Spirits well supplied with all kinds of Provisions. The Situation of the Enemy is directly the Reverse and we have Reason to think Desertions will be very great. Four have come out within the last 24 Hours.”—*Washington to Schuyler*, 27 July, 1775.

[1]“One striking circumstance upon the first view of it [Lee’s letter] is that the rebels are more alarmed at the report of engaging the Indians than at any other measure. And I humbly think this letter alone shows the expediency of diligently preparing and employing that engine.”—*Burgoyne to Lord North*, in Fonblanque’s *Political and Military Episodes*, p. 178.

“The steps which you say the rebels have taken for calling in the assistance of the Indians, leave no room to hesitate upon the propriety of our pursuing the same measure. For this purpose I inclose to you a letter to Colonel Johnson, containing His Majesty’s commands for engaging a body of Indians.”—*Lord Dartmouth to General Gage*, August, 1775. The letter referred to is probably that printed in *Documents relating to the Colonial History of New York*, viii., 596. A journal of Johnson’s transactions with the Indians from May to November, 1775, is printed in the same collection, p. 658.

[1]“The unhappy controversy which has subsisted between the officers at Ticonderoga relative to the command, has, I am informed, thrown every thing into vast confusion: troops have been dismissed, others refused to serve, if this or that man commands.; the sloop is without either captain or pilot, both of which are dismissed or come away. . . . A very considerable waste or embezzlement [of provisions] has occurred.”—*Schuyler to the President of Congress*, 11 July, 1775. “Unfortunately not one earthly thing has been done to enable me to move hence. I have neither boats sufficient, nor any materials prepared for building them. The stores I ordered from New York are not yet arrived: I have therefore not a nail, no pitch, no oakum, and want a variety of articles indispensably necessary . . . An almost equal scarcity of ammunition subsists, no powder having yet come to hand; not a gun carriage for the few proper guns we have, and as yet very little provision; two hundred troops less than by my last return, these badly, very badly, armed indeed, and one poor armorer to repair their guns.”—*Schuyler to Congress*, 21 July, 1775.

[1]Gage was at this time considering the expediency of removing his force to New York, regarding Boston as “the most disadvantageous place for all operations, particularly when there is no diversion of the rebel forces, but all are collected into one point. Was this army in New York, that Province might, to all appearance be more easily reduced, and the friends of government be able to raise forces to join the troops.”—*Gage to Earl of Dartmouth*, 24 July, 1775.

So the ministry were beginning to look to New York as the proper center for operations, not only for military reasons, but also to recover the attachment and fidelity of that province.—*Earl of Dartmouth to Governor Tryon*, 1 July, 1775, and to

Gen. Gage, 2 August, 1775. Washington suspected such a movement was on foot as early as August 10th, and warned the New York Congress.

[2] In House of Representatives July 29, 1775—*Resolved*, that Doctr Church, Mr. Woodbridge and Mr. Sewall, with such as the Honble Board shall join, be a Committee to wait on his Excellency General Washington, & inform him of the distress'd Situation of the Inhabitants of the Eastern parts of the Colony; and know of him, if he can, Consistent with his Instructions, and the General Service, order a Detachment there, to prevent the Enemy from Ravaging the Country, and plundering the Inhabitants of their Cattle, Sheep, Wood &c; to Supply—themselves.

[1] This letter may not have satisfied the General, Court, for the Council on August 2d, ordered Mr. Greenleaf, Mr. Winthrop and Mr. Palmer to wait upon the General, and “to request him to inform this Board of the extent of the powers delegated to him by the Honorable Continental Congress.”

[2] Connecticut had recently determined to send fourteen hundred additional men to the camp. These were called *new levies*. “As the season is now advanced and the enemy considerably reinforced, we have the utmost reason to expect any attack that may be made will not be much longer delayed. I should, therefore, think it highly necessary the new raised troops should join the army with all possible expedition.”—*Washington to Governor Trumbull*, July, 1775.

[1] “The situation of the army as to ammunition is by no means what it ought to be. We have great reason to expect the enemy very soon intends to bombard our lines, and our stock of powder is so small as in a great degree to make our heavy artillery useless.”—*To the New Hampshire Committee of Safety*, 4 Aug., 1775. At a council held at Cambridge, August 3, 1775, the general communicated letters respecting the state of the ammunition which appears to be far short of the return made some time ago. The whole stock of the army at Roxbury and Cambridge and the adjacent posts consisting of only 90 bbls or thereabouts.

It was proposed to make an attempt on the magazine at Halifax where there is reason to suppose there is a great quantity of powder. The question was agreed to by a great majority, and a detachment for this enterprise consisting of 300 men was ordered.

Also to endeavor to collect a supply from the neighboring provinces of New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut.

“On the 3d of August a council was held at head quarters, and it was found that, owing to a mistake in the report of the Massachusetts committee, instead of four hundred and eighty-five quarter-casks of powder in the magazine, as had been supposed, there were only thirty-five half barrels, or not half a pound a man. When Washington heard the report he was so much struck by the danger ‘that he did not utter a word for half an hour; every one else was equally surprised. Messengers were despatched to all the southern colonies to call in their stores.’ ”—1 Greene, *Greene*, 109, 110. *Sullivan to New Hampshire Committee of Safety*, 5 August, 1775. The subject was reflected in the general orders of the 4th:—

“It is with indignation and shame to general observers, that notwithstanding the repeated orders which have been given to prevent the firing of guns, in and about the camp, that it is daily and hourly practised; that contrary to all orders, straggling soldiers do still pass the guard, and fire at a distance, where there is not the least probability of hurting the enemy, and where no other end is answered, but to waste ammunition, expose themselves to the ridicule of the enemy, and keep their own camps harrassed by frequent and continual alarms, to the hurt of every good soldier, who is thereby disturbed of his natural rest, and will at length never be able to distinguish between a real and a false alarm.

“For these reasons, it is in the most peremptory manner forbid any person or persons whatsoever, under any pretence, to pass the out guard, unless authorized by the commanding officer of that part of the lines, signified in writing, which must be shown to the officer of the guard as they pass. Any person offending in this particular, will be considered in no other light than as a common enemy, and the guard will have orders to fire upon them as such. The commanding officer of every regiment is to direct that every man in his regiment, is made acquainted with orders, to the end that no one may plead ignorance, and that all may be apprized of the consequence of disobedience. The colonels of regiments and commanding officers of corps, to order the rolls of every company to be called twice a day, and every man’s ammunition examined at evening roll calling, and such as are found to be deficient to be confined. The guard are to apprehend all persons firing guns near their posts, whether townsmen or soldiers.”—*Orderly Book*.

[1]“A committee was appointed to act during the recess of the General Assembly, with full powers; and among them they were ‘particularly empowered to employ the two armed vessels in the service of this colony, or either of them, in such a manner, and upon such voyage as they shall think conducive to the public interest.’”—*Records of the Colony of Rhode Island*, vii., 365.

[2]Mr. Bancroft says John Brown.

[1]“When any plunder is taken from the Enemy (not excepted by the Continental Articles of war) such plunder must be all surrender’d to the Commanding Officer, and as soon as convenient after his arrival at Head Quarters, public Notice must be made, that an Auction will be held in the front of the Encampment for the sale thereof the next day at noon, and the money arising therefrom, is to be equally divided between the Officers and Men, that took it. This Order is not to be construed to extend, to permitting unlawful and irregular plundering; as any Officer, or Soldier, who shall be found guilty thereof, will be punished with the greatest severity.”—*Orderly Book*, 3 August, 1775.

[1]Congress directed that a commission as colonel should be issued to Col. Gridley.

[1]general return of the united colonies commanded by genl washington, july 29th, 1775.

Massachusetts Bay regiments 26, & 4 Independent companies. Connecticut regiments 3. New Hampshire regiments 3. Rhode Island regiments 3.

Total of present commissioned officers, 30 Colonels. 31 Lt. Colonels. 35 Majors. 289 Captains. 511 Lieutenants. 73 Ensigns. Total of present Staff officers 14 Chaplains. 34 Adjutants. 35 2d Masters. 35 Surgeons. 30 Masters—Total of non commissioned officers, 1202 Serjeants. 612 Drums and fifes. Rank and file present fit for duty, 13899. Sick present 1330. Sick absent, 1690—on furlough. 287. On Command 692. Total rank and file 16898—Wanting to complete, 124 Serjeants. 105 Drums and fifes. 2079 privates. Colo Sargents regiment not included in the above return.

[1] Joseph Trumbull. The plan is reproduced in Winsor's "History of Boston," II., 80.

[1] The Indian's name was Louis. "He has all along appeared friendly to the New England people, is very intelligent, and has the character among the Indian traders of an honest fellow, who has always stood by and made good his word."—*Col. John Hurd to the New Hampshire Congress*, 27 July, 1775.

[1] Jacob Bayley (1728-1816), served in the French and Indian war; in 1776 commenced the military road designed to run from the Connecticut River to St. Johns (Canada), afterwards known as the Hazen road. He was commissary-general during a part of the Revolution, and held a commission from New York.

[2] Arnold had written to the Continental Congress on 13 June, that this tribe of Indians were determined not to assist the king's troops, and had decreed death to any member who should violate that conclusion.

[1] Read before Congress, Sept. 13th. Congress had adjourned on August 1 to meet on September 5th, but from the small attendance on that day a further adjournment was made to September 13th. The many important questions raised by Washington were such as Congress did not feel competent to pass upon without more definite information. To secure this it appointed a committee, consisting of Mr. Franklin, Mr. Harrison, and Mr. Lynch, to go to the camp and consult with the General.—*Journal*, September 29th and 30th.

[1] A delegate from New York to the Continental Congress.

[1] The original is in the possession of Mr. George Haven Putnam, who has kindly given me a copy.

[1] "It has been intimated to the general, that some officers, under pretence of giving furloughs to men recovering from sickness, send them to work upon their farms for their own private emolument, at the same time that the public is taxed with their pay, if not with their provisions. These insinuations being but obliquely made, the general is unwilling to believe that any officer can be so lost to all sense of honor as to defraud the public in so scandalous a manner, and, therefore, does not at present pay any further regard to the insinuation than to declare that he will show no favor to any officer who shall be found guilty of such iniquitous practices; but will do his utmost

endeavors to bring them to exemplary punishment, and the disgrace due to such mal-conduct.”—*Orderly Book*, August 8th.

[1] “It is a matter of exceeding great concern to the General to find, that at a time when the united efforts of America are exerting in defence of the common rights and liberties of mankind, that there should be in an army constituted for so noble a purpose, such repeated instances of officers, who lost to every sense of honor and virtue, are seeking by dirty and base means, the promotion of their own dishonest gain, to the eternal disgrace of themselves and dishonor of their country. Practices of this sort will never be overlooked, whenever an accusation is lodged; but the authors brought to the most exemplary punishment.”—*Orderly Book*, 10 August, 1775.

[2] “We have had no occurrence in the camp for several days worthy of notice; but by some advices from Boston, and several concurring circumstances, we have great reason to suspect a part or the whole of the ministerial troops, are about to remove. New York is the place generally talked of as their destination. I give you the intelligence as it came to me, but do not vouch for its authenticity.”—*Washington to New York Provincial Congress* 10 August, 1775.

[1] “Cambridge, August 9, 1775. We waited on General Washington, who I have the pleasure to inform you is much beloved and admired for his polite condescension and noble deportment. His appointment to the chief command has the general suffrage of all ranks of people here, which I think is no bad omen.”—Extract of a letter from a Philadelphian. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, August 23, 1775.

[2] Col. Thompson had proposed to raise a force of one thousand men, and a fleet of four armed vessels and eight transports; to proceed to Windsor, captivate the Tories, make all the proselytes possible, and then proceed to Halifax and destroy the King’s dockyard, if thought proper.

[1] The orders of the 12th announced the appointment of Stephen Moylan to be Muster Master General, and of the 14th, that of major Thomas Miffln, to be Quarter Master General. On the 15th, Edmund Randolph and George Baylor are named aides-de-camp to the commander-in-chief.

[1] “We sent in yesterday a most serious message to Gage, but I cannot give you a copy without G. Washington’s consent.”—*Charles Lee to Robert Morris*, 12 August, 1775. The reply was written, save the last paragraph, by General Burgoyne:—

“Boston, 13 August, 1775.

“To the glory of civilized nations, humanity and war have been compatible; and compassion to the subdued is become a general system. Britons ever preeminent in mercy, have outgone common examples, and overlooked the criminal in the captive. Upon these principles your prisoners, whose lives by the law of the land are destined to the cord, have hitherto been treated with care and kindness, and more comfortably lodged than the King’s troops in the hospitals; indiscriminately it is true, for I acknowledge no rank, that is not derived from the King.

“My intelligence from your army would justify severe recrimination. I understand there are of the King’s faithful subjects, taken some time since by the rebels, laboring, like negro slaves, to gain their daily subsistence, or reduced to the wretched alternative, to perish by famine or take arms against their King and country. Those who have made the treatment of the prisoners in my hands, or of your other friends in Boston, a pretence for such measures, found barbarity upon falsehood.

“I would willingly hope, Sir, that the sentiments of liberality, which I have always believed you to possess, will be exerted to correct these misdoings. Be temperate in political disquisition; give free operation to truth, and punish those who deceive and misrepresent; and not only the effects, but the causes, of this unhappy conflict will be removed. Should those, under whose usurped authority you act, control such a disposition, and dare to call severity retaliation, to God, who knows all hearts, be the appeal for the dreadful consequences. I trust that British soldiers, asserting the rights of the state, the laws of the land, the being of the constitution, will meet all events with becoming fortitude. They will court victory with the spirit their cause inspires; and, from the same motive, will find the patience of martyrs under misfortune.

“Till I read your insinuations in regard to ministers, I conceived that I had acted under the King, whose wishes, it is true, as well as those of his ministers, and of every honest man, have been to see this unhappy breach for ever closed; but, unfortunately for both countries, those who long since projected the present crisis, and influence the councils of America, have views very distant from accommodation. I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

“Thomas Gage.”

“George Washington, Esq.”

“On the day after General Gage’s letter was received, Mr. Reed wrote, by order of the Commander-in-Chief to the Council of Massachusetts, directing rigorous and retaliatory measures to be adopted towards the prisoners, though in a few days the order was revoked, and they were directed to show ‘every indulgence and civility to the prisoners, so long as they demean themselves with decency and good manners. As they have committed no hostility against the people of this country, they have a just claim to mild treatment; and the General does not doubt that your conduct towards them will be such as to compel their grateful acknowledgment that Americans are as merciful as they are brave.’ ”—Reed, *Life of Reed*, i., 115.

[1] General Gage wrote to the minister on August 17th that the ships had collected and brought in 1,300 sheep and 100 oxen—a very seasonable supply. “We owe it,” wrote Burgoyne to Lord George Germaine, “to the transports arrived and sent out by General Gage, and not to any assistance from the fleet.”

The complaints against Admiral Graves, the commander of the fleet, were loud and general. Burgoyne ridiculed his inactivity and “Quaker-like scruples”; W. Eden spoke of him as “a corrupt admiral without any shadow of capacity”; and as early as July 28th, the King wrote to Lord North: “I do think the Admiral’s removal as necessary, if

what is reported is founded, as the mild General's" (Gage). Captain Montague, who served under Graves, and was a prejudiced witness, wrote to the Earl of Dunmore on 9 August: "The G—l and A—l on bad terms, the latter universally, despised, his character prostituted in the basest manner, totally ignorant of the business he is employed on: he only turns his mind to find out ways of promoting his nephews."

[1] In consequence of the resolve of Congress (June 27th), authorizing General Schuyler to take possession of St. John's and Montreal, as soon as he should find it practicable, he had been making preparations for such an enterprise. He wrote to General Washington the 31st of July, from Ticonderoga:

"Since my last, I have been most assiduously employed in preparing materials for building boats to convey me across the Lake. The progress has hitherto been slow, as with few hands I had all the timber to cut, and mills to repair for sawing the plank; and my draft cattle extremely weak for want of feed, the drought having scorched up every kind of herbage. I have now one boat on the stocks, which I hope will carry near three hundred men. Another is putting up to-day. Provisions of the bread kind are scarce with me, and, therefore, I have not dared to order up a thousand men, that are at Albany, lest we should starve here."

[2] Printed in Force, *American Archives, Fourth Series*, iii., 12.

[3] "We have several St. Francis Indians here, very friendly, and well disposed to our interests. They are about 45 leagues from Quebec, and are the savages we had the most reason to fear. All Carleton's plans to stimulate them and the Canadians against us have ended in shame and disappointment."—*Reed to Bradford*, 21 August, 1775.

"Yesterday Sen-night arrived at the camp in Cambridge, Swashan, the Chief, with four other Indians of the St. François tribe, conducted thither by Mr. Reuben Colburn, who has been honorably recompensed for his trouble. The above Indians came hither to offer their service in the cause of American liberty, have been kindly received, and are now entered the service. Swashan says he will bring one half of his tribe and has engaged 4 or 5 other tribes if they should be wanted. He says the Indians of Canada in general, and also the French, are greatly in our favor, and determined not to act against us."—*Pennsylvania Gazette*, 30 August, 1775.

[1] Morgan and his company of riflemen from Virginia arrived in camp on the 6th.

[2] "Upon the application of Dr. Franklin to this Board for a quantity of gunpowder for the use of the troops under the command of Col. Schuyler, *Resolved*, that 2,244½ lbs. of gunpowder now in magazine, under the care of Mr. Robert Towers, be immediately sent, and that a proper team be provided to take said powder, and to be attended on the road by Thomas Aply, until he receives orders from Col. Schuyler." Towers reported that he had delivered to Aply, 382 lbs. of musket powder and 1,754 lbs. of cannon powder, which were sent forward on August 10th.—*Penn. Council of Safety*, 300, 301. The powder reached Albany on the 21st.

[1] In a letter of the 6th of August, General Schuyler complains of the tardiness of the New York Provincial Congress in raising men. He says: "Not a man from this colony has yet joined me, except those raised and paid by the Committee of Albany; nor have I yet received the necessary supplies, which I begged the New York Provincial Congress to send me, as long ago as the 3d of last month, and which the Continental Congress had desired them to do."

As soon as Ticonderoga was taken, the Albany Committee enlisted men to aid in holding that post. Two hundred and five men of this description were in service, when General Schuyler took command. Connecticut had sent a thousand troops under Colonel Hinman, who succeeded Ethan Allen and Arnold in the command, which he retained till the arrival of General Schuyler. By a mutual stipulation, Connecticut was to furnish troops, and New York provisions.—See *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, vol. i., pp. 53-60. *Journal of the N. Y. Prov. Congress for June and July, 1775*.

[2] *Journals of Congress*, 1 July, 1775.

[3] General Carleton, Governor of Canada.

[1] Genl. Schuyler soon after met a number of the Indians of the Six Nations and opened negotiations for a treaty. The Indians held back, being apprehensive that they would be asked to take up arms in the American cause. As it was a family quarrel, they said, they would not interfere, but remain neuter. "That Governor Carleton and his agents are exerting themselves to procure savages to act against us I have reason to believe from the various accounts I have received, but I do not believe he will have any success with the Canada tribes, tho' I make no doubt he is joined by some of the more remote Indians, who, I believe, will assist him, and who have already served him as scouts from St. Johns. I should, therefore, not hesitate one moment to employ any Indians that might be willing to join us."—*Schuyler to Washington*, 27 August, 1775.

[1] "General Washington's letter I think a very good one, but Gage certainly deserved a still stronger one, such as it was before it was softened."—*Charles Lee to Benja. Rush*, 10 October, 1775. I am unable to trace any copy or draft other than that printed. General Washington's first letter to General Gage (August 11th), and his answer, were published by the British government in the London *Gazette*, about six weeks after they were written; but the above reply was withheld.—*Remembrancer*, vol. i., p. 179; ii., 60. The three letters were published together by order of Congress in October.

[1] "The word *Powder* in a letter sets us all a tiptoe. We have been in a terrible situation, occasioned by a mistake in a return; we reckoned upon three hundred quarter casks and had but thirty-two barrels—not above nine cartridges to a man to the whole army, but the late supply from Philadelphia has relieved us. All our heavy artillery was useless, and even now we are compelled to a very severe economy. I suppose the Congress have directed a committee to forward any that may arrive. If they have not, those gentlemen who will do this necessary service will perform the most essential their country requires. It damps our spirits; we are just in the situation of a man with little money in his pocket, he will do twenty mean things to prevent his

breaking in upon his little stock. We are obliged to bear with the rascals on Bunker's Hill when a few shot now and then in return would keep our men attentive to their business, and give the enemy alarms."—*Reed to Bradford, 24 August, 1775.*

[1] From the collection of Dr. John S. H. Fogg, of Boston, to whom I am indebted for a copy.

[2] This letter is in reply to the following. It relates merely to the camp at Charlestown, then under the command of General Howe, and not to the British lines generally.

"Charlestown Camp, 22 August, 1775.

"Sir,

"The men under your command, having repeatedly fired upon the officers of his Majesty's troops, before they were returned to the outworks of this camp from parleys, that have been brought on by your desire, I am to request all further intercourse between the two camps may be at an end your own letters excepted, which will be received, if you are pleased to send them by a drummer. I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,

"W. Howe."

[1] Edmund Randolph.

[1] That Washington exercised this prerogative freely is shown by the record of the courts martial of the next few days. On September 2d, Captain Edward Crafts was ordered to be reprimanded for "using abusive language to his Major"; on the 5th, Captain Moses Hart was found guilty of "drawing for more provisions than he was entitled to, and for unjustly confining and abusing his men"; Captain Perry, on the 8th, was found guilty of "permitting persons to pass the lines on Boston Neck"; on the 11th, Ensign Brown was convicted of "absenting from his regiment without leave"; on the 13th, thirty-three men were tried for "disobedient and mutinous behavior" and found guilty, while on the 5th, a Col. Mansfield was convicted for "remissness and backwardness in the execution of his duty on the late engagement on Bunkers hill" and a soldier was sentenced to receive thirty lashes for "disobedience of orders and damning his officers." On the following day Sergeant Finley was found guilty of "expressing himself disrespectfully of the Continental association, and drinking General Gage's health," and was to be "deprived of his arms and accoutrements, put in a horse cart, with a rope round his neck, and drummed out of army and rendered forever incapable of serving in the Continental army."

[1] For a perfect copy of this interesting letter I gladly acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Joseph Packard, Jr., of Baltimore, who communicated it to me voluntarily, making the favor the more acceptable. A curious use is made of a part by Pollard in his *First Year of the War*, 1862, 383, 384. R. H. Lee is probably to be held accountable for the mutilated version of the letter that Sparks used, as in his life of

Richard Henry Lee he omitted nearly all that Sparks did.

To this part of the letter Mr. Lee replied as follows:

“I am greatly obliged to you for your favor of August the 29th, and you may be assured I shall pay great attention to it. When I mentioned securing the entrance of the harbor of Boston, it was more in the way of wishing it could be done, than as conceiving it very practicable. However, the reasons you assign are most conclusive against the attempt. I assure you, that so far as I can judge from the conversation of men, instead of there being any, who think you have not done enough, the wonder seems to be, that you have done so much. I believe there is not a man of common sense, and who is void of prejudice, in the world, but greatly approves the discipline you have introduced into the camp; since reason and experience join in proving, that, without discipline, armies are fit only for the contempt and slaughter of their enemies. Your labors are no doubt great, both of mind and body; but if the praise of the present and future times can be any compensation, you will have a plentiful portion of that. Of one thing you may certainly rest assured, that the Congress will do every thing in their power to make your most weighty business easy to you.

“I think you could not possibly have appointed a better man to his present office than Mr. Mifflin. He is a singular man, and you certainly will meet with the applause and support of all good men by promoting and countenancing real merit and public virtue, in opposition to all private interests and partial affection.”

[1] In Congress.

[2] The appointment of John Parke was announced in the orders of August 16th. In 1786 a volume of his poems was published in Philadelphia: *The Lyric Works of Horace translated into English Verse, to which are added a number of Original Poems. By a Native of America.*

[1] “Some advantages arose to our Colony by the Congress adopting the army raised in New England the last spring; but among other circumstances attending it, this was one, namely, that it being now a Continental army, the gentlemen of all the Colonies had a right to and put in for a share in behalf of their friends in filling up the various offices. By this means, it was thought, that military knowledge and experience as well as the military spirit, would spread through the colonies; and besides, that they would all consider themselves the more interested in the success of our army, and in providing for its support. But then there was less room for persons belonging to the Colonies which had first raised the army, who were well worthy of notice. Many of our friends were discontented, who did not advert to this as the true cause why they were not promoted.”—*Samuel Adams to Joseph Palmer, April, 1776.* From the collection of Dr. John S. H. Fogg.

[1] An attack on the Indian town of Kittaning, in Pennsylvania, September 8, 1756. A silver medal and piece of plate were presented to Colonel Armstrong, by the Corporation of Philadelphia, for his bravery and good conduct on this occasion. An intimacy of many years' standing subsisted between him and Washington.

[2] He had been at the siege of Louisburg, and was taken prisoner at Fort William Henry.

[3] Sept. 21, 1775.—The Congress proceeded to the election of a brigadier-general, and the ballots being determined, it was found that Colonel Armstrong and Colonel Fry had an equal number of votes.—*MS. Journal of Congress*. Col. Fry did not receive his appointment till January, 1776.

[1] Plowed Hill, now known as Mount Benedict.

[2] Simpson, of Pennsylvania. “This young man was visited and consoled during his illness, by General Washington in person, and by most of the officers of rank belonging to the army.”—Wilkinson, *Memoirs*, i., 17.

[1] On Tuesday last [*i.e.* from Aug. 31st] a letter from General Wooster to the New York Provincial Congress, written from Oyster Ponds on August 27th, was published and circulated as a hand bill through the city [N. Y.] In it is found the following sentence taken from a letter from Washington to Wooster, August 23d: “Yesterday I received advice from Boston, that a number of transports have sailed on a second expedition, for fresh provisions. As they may pursue the same course, only advancing farther, we think Montaug Point, or Long Island, a very probable place of their landing; I have therefore thought best to give you the earliest intelligence; but I do not mean to confine your attention or vigilance to that place; you will please to extend your views as far as the mischief may probably extend.”

[2] General Wooster had been stationed with a regiment of Connecticut troops at Haerlem. Recently he had gone over to Long Island, at the request of the New York Provincial Congress, with four hundred and fifty men, for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of that quarter from the threatened depredations of the British from Boston, who were sent out to procure from the island cattle and other provisions, which were accessible to their boats. Three companies had been raised on Long Island, as a part of the regiments voted by the New York Congress, which were placed on the Continental establishment. General Schuyler had ordered these companies to the northward; and as the people were thus left exposed to the ravages of the enemy, General Wooster wrote to the Commander-in-chief:

“The inhabitants here think that had General Schuyler known their very exposed situation he would not have ordered the companies away. The New York Congress suppose they have no right to counteract his orders. They might, indeed, have sent to him, and received an answer in season; but they are so refined in their policy, have so many private views to answer, and take such infinite pains to keep out of the plain path, conscious perhaps of their own superior wisdom, that they do nothing like other people.”—*General Wooster to Washington*, 29 August, 1775.

[1] General Wooster replied on the 28th of September, at Haerlem.—“I returned to this place immediately upon the receipt of your favor of the 2d instant; and, in pursuance of an order from the Continental Congress, I shall this afternoon embark with all the troops under my command for Albany, there to wait the orders of General

Schuyler.”

“If it [the fleet from Boston] has not yet arrived, we may conclude it has sailed to the eastward; if it has arrived, the issue will be known immediately; so that in either case the continuance of the new raised levies along the coast is unnecessary. You will, therefore, on receipt of this be pleased to order them to march immediately to this camp, directing the commanding officer, at the same time, to give me two or three days’ notice of the time, in which the troops will arrive, that suitable accommodations may be prepared. Their presence is the more necessary, as I may in confidence inform you, that I am about to detach one thousand or twelve hundred men on an expedition into Canada, by way of Kennebec River; from which I have the greatest reason to expect, either that Quebec will fall into our hands a very easy prey, or such a diversion be made as will open an easy passage to General Schuyler.

“We are now so well secured in our late advanced post on the hill, that the enemy have discontinued their cannonade. The men continue in good health and spirits.”—*Washington to Governor Trumbull*, 2 September, 1775.

“A detachment consisting of two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, thirty subalterns, thirty sergeants, thirty corporals, four drummers, two fifers, and six hundred and seventy six privates, to parade tomorrow morning at eleven o’clock, upon the common, in Cambridge, to go upon command with Col. Arnold of Connecticut; one company of Virginia rifle-men and two companies from Col. Thompson’s Pennsylvania rifle-men, to join the above detachment. . . . As it is imagined the officers and men sent from the regiments, both here and at Roxbury, will be such volunteers as are active woodsmen, and well acquainted with batteaus, so it is recommended that none but such will offer themselves for this service.”—*Orderly Book*, September 5th.

[2] In a letter to Governor Cooke, dated the 4th of August, it has been seen, that Washington suggested to him a plan for procuring powder from Bermuda. Two small armed vessels had already been fitted out by Rhode Island, and put under the command of Captain Abraham Whipple, with the design of protecting the bay and coast of that province from the depredations of the enemy. The plan was approved by the Governor and Committee of that province, and Captain Whipple agreed to engage in the affair, provided General Washington would give him a certificate under his own hand, that, in case the Bermudians would assist the undertaking, he would recommend to the Continental Congress to permit the exportation of provisions to those islands from the colonies; the captain pledging himself at the same time, that he would make no use of such a paper, unless he should be opposed by the inhabitants.

Captain Whipple sailed in the larger of the Rhode Island vessels, manned with sixty-one seamen. The vessel was manned by the agency of the Rhode Island Committee, and at the charge of that province. At this time a packet from England was daily expected at New York. It was thought desirable to intercept that packet, and Governor Cooke ordered Captain Whipple to cruise for it off the harbor of New York fourteen days, and, if he should not fall in with it during that period, then to proceed immediately on his voyage to Bermuda. But he had scarcely sailed from Providence,

before an account appeared in the newspapers of one hundred barrels of powder having been taken from Bermuda, by a vessel supposed to be from Philadelphia, and another from South Carolina. The facts were such, as to make it in the highest degree probable, that this was the same powder, which Captain Whipple had gone to procure. General Washington and Governor Cooke were both of opinion, that it was best to countermand his instructions. The other armed vessel of Rhode Island was immediately despatched in search of the captain, with orders, that, when he had finished the cruise in search of the packet, he should return to Providence. But it was too late. Captain Whipple had heard of the arrival of the packet at New York, and proceeded on his voyage to Bermuda.

He put in at the west end of the island. The inhabitants were at first alarmed, supposing him to command a King's armed vessel, and the women and children fled into the country; but, when he showed his commission and instructions, they treated him with cordiality and friendship. They had assisted in removing the powder, which was made known to General Gage, and he had sent a sloop of war to take away all the superfluous provisions from the island. They professed themselves hearty friends to the American cause, but as Captain Whipple was defeated in the object of his voyage he speedily returned to Providence.—*Gov. Cooke's MS. Letters.*

Soon afterwards the inhabitants of Bermuda petitioned Congress for relief, representing their great distress, in consequence of the non-importation agreement, which deprived them of the supplies, that usually came from the colonies. In consideration of their being friendly to the cause of America, it was resolved by Congress, that provisions in certain quantities might be exported to them.—*Journals of Congress*, Nov. 22d.

“August 26. A letter was this day received by Capt. George Ord of the Lady Catharine, from Henry Tucker, chairman of the Deputies of the several Parishes of Bermuda, enclosing an account for 1182 lbs. gunpowder, shipped by him on board said vessel, amounting to £161. 14. 8 that currency.”—*Penn. Council of Safety*, 321.

[1] “I need not mention to you the vast importance of gaining Intelligence of the Enemy's Motives and Designs as early as possible—The great saving to the Continent both of Blood and Money. A Detection of our secret & most dangerous Enemies with innumerable other Advantages would result from the Interception of their Correspondence at this Juncture. I have therefore thought proper to propose to you the seizing the Mail by the next Packet. She is hourly expected from England—her Force of Men and Guns inconsiderable: none but swivels and only manned with 18 Men. If the Vessel proposed to go to Bermudas should cruise for a few Days off Sandy Hook—I have no doubt she would fall in with her. In which Case she might with little or no Delay land the Mail in order to be forwarded to me and proceed on her Voyage. But if there any material Objections to this Mode, I am still so anxious upon the Subject that I would have it tried with another Vessel at the continental Expense and will for that End direct that any Charge which shall accrue in this Service shall be paid by the Paymaster here upon being duly liquidated. It will be necessary that some Person well acquainted with the Packets should be on Board our Vessel or the stopping inward bound Vessels indiscriminately will give the Alarm and she may be

apprized of her Danger. The Choice of a proper officer with the Care of providing a suitable Vessel &c. I must leave to you. Should it meet with the desired Success there can be no Doubt the Honble. Continental Congress will distinguish & reward the Officers & Men who shall have done so essential a Service. Nor shall I fail in making known to them how much the publick Service is indebted to you for your Zeal & Activity on all Occasions.”—*Washington to Deputy-Governor Cooke*, 6 September, 1775.

“As the remoteness of some of the regiments from Head Quarters renders it difficult to send invitations to the officers, the Commander in chief requests that, for the future, the field officer of the day, the officer of his own guard, and the adjutant of the day, consider themselves invited to dine at Head Quarters, and this general invitation they are desired to accept accordingly.”—*Orderly Book*, September 6th.

[1] The council of war met, in conformity with this notice, on the 11th of September, and after duly considering the proposition, and the reasons assigned, it was unanimously agreed, that, “considering the state of the enemy’s lines, and the expectation of soon receiving some important advices from England, it was not expedient to make the attempt.”

“The situation of the king’s troops and that of the rebels is nearly the same as when I had the honor of writing you last. They are entrenched upon every advantageous spot, and we are so strongly posted here that we wish to tempt them to attack us, which if they do not shortly do, perhaps we may try our fortune against them; but we are so well prepared upon these heights [Charlestown] that it would be imprudent to attack them before we give up their coming to us.”—*Sir William Howe to Governor Legge*, 4 September, 1775.

“Our situation is a consummation of inertness and disgrace. You will be told we are on the point of removing the blockade: I believe we are; and I doubt not the troops will recover their reputation. I am confident of their future ascendancy, but we have not a magazine of any sort, nor any provision or preparation whatever that can enable an army to advance twenty miles, nor do I see a possibility of remedying these defects *now*, except by great and sudden exertions in England.”—*Burgoyne to a friend*, August, 1775.

[1] “From the accounts General Schuyler gave us of the state of his army, I tremble for him in his expedition against St. Johns. He wants almost every thing necessary for the equipment of an army. He complains much of the dilatoriness of the York committee. His great dependence is upon the neutrality of the Canadians; if they do not assist Gov. Carleton, Schuyler has numbers sufficient to rout, badly disciplined and accoutred as they are.”—*Journal of Tench Tilghman*, 31 August, 1775. Tilghman was in Albany, acting as Secretary to the Indian Commissioners.

[1] See *Journals of Congress*, 18 July, 1775.

[1] General Gage writes to Governor Legge (Nova Scotia) that 1500 men had marched from Cambridge “intended for Canada.”

[1] Sparks said that this paper was printed in hand-bills before Arnold left Cambridge, with the view of having the copies distributed as soon as he should arrive in Canada, but it appears to have been sent after him.

“I should be glad the manifestos might be forwarded on by him [the express], if not sent. . . . P. S. Since writing the foregoing I have received a letter from Col. Reed with the manifestos.” *Benedict Arnold to Washington*, Fort Weston, 25 Sept. 1775.

Schuyler had already drawn up and sent into Canada a declaration announcing the approach of the American army, and calling upon Canadians to join it.

[1] This expedition was placed in charge of Valentine Crawford. The instructions prepared by Washington are in his own writing, and are given in full, as they afford a striking example of his extreme care in matters of business. They did not fall under my notice until the earlier volume was in print, or they would have appeared in their proper position chronologically.

30 March, 1774.

“You are to proceed without loss of time to your own settlement on Youghiogany, and there, if it is not already done, provide such, and so much provision, as you shall think necessary to take down with you to my lands on the Ohio. You are also to provide canoes for transporting of these provisions, the tools, and the workmen.

“You are to engage three good hands as laborers, to be employed in this business; you are to get them upon the best terms you can, and have them bound in articles to serve till the first of December, duely and truely, at the expiration of which time they shall receive their wages. Provisions and tools will be found them, but nothing else.

“You are also to engage a good hunter upon the best terms you can, for the purpose of supplying you with provisions. Let him have the skins, as I suppose he will engage the cheaper for it. Engage him either altogether for hunting, or to hunt and work as occasion requires, that there may be no dispute about it afterwards; so in like manner let every man else know what it is he has to trust to, that no disputes may arise thereafter. And the best way to prevent this, is to let all your hirelings know that they are not to consider this or that as their particular business, but to turn their hands to every thing, as the nature of the business shall require.

“As much depends upon your getting to the land early, in order that as much ground may be cleared, and put into corn as possible before the season is too far advanced, I do most earnestly request you to delay no time in prosecuting your trip down; and that as much ground as possible may be got in order for corn, and planted therewith, I would have you delay building and fencing until the season is too late for planting, and employ your whole force for clearing.

“Begin this operation at and on the upper tract and clear five acre fields, in handsome squares upon every other lot along the river bank (leaving the trees next the river standing, as a safeguard against freshets and ice). These fields may be so near together as to answer small tenements of about 100 acres in a lot, in case you cannot get them

surveyed. In short, allow each lot a breadth of about one hundred rods upon the river, running back for quantity agreeably to the plots given you.

“The same sized lots, that is lots of the same breadth upon the river, may be laid upon all the other tracts, and five acre fields cleared upon every other one, as above. But after the season has got too late for planting corn, then at each of these fields build a house, sixteen feet by 18, with an outside chimney, the lower part to be of logs (with diamond corners) and to be covered with three feet shingles. Also inclose and fence your corn at this time, or before, if necessary.

“You may then, that is after building houses to the fields already cleared, and fencing them in, carry your clearing, building and fencing, regularly on together, in the manner above described.

“After the time for planting the corn is over, in all of the bottoms you may be at work in, if there should be any grassy ponds, or places easily improved, and drained for meadow, it may be done, and inclosed, instead of preparing land for corn.

“Endeavor to get some rare-ripe corn to carry with you for your last planting and replanting. The corn which you do plant must be cultivated in any manner which may appear most advisable to you for my interest.

“If you can get, or I should send out peach stones, have them cracked and the kernals planted as soon as you get to the first land, and properly inclose them.

“It will be essentially necessary to have all the work done upon any one tract appraised before you move to the next field, if it be possible to have it done; such work, I mean, as can be injured by fire or other accidents. Otherwise I may labor in vain, as I shall have no allowance made for any thing that is not valued. In these appraisements you must let nothing go unnoticed, as it is necessary that every thing should be brought into account that will enhance the price.

“You should take care to have a pair of hand mill stones with you, as also a grindstone, for the benefit of your tools, with proper pecks.

“Keep a regular account of your tools, and call them over frequently, to see that none are missing. Make every man answerable for such as is put into his care. Keep a regular account also of the days lost by sickness, for I expect none will be lost by any other means, that an allowance may be made for it at settlement; and keep a regular and clear account of all expences, with proper vouchers, that matters may be settled without any difficulty at the end of the service.

“As I could wish to have my lands rented, if it be possible to do it, you may, if tenants should offer engage them upon the following terms, to wit: upon a rent of three pounds sterling (to be discharged in the currency of the country at the exchange prevailing at the time of payment,) for each lot which is to be laid off as described on the plot; leases to be given for three lives; four years rent free, where no improvement is made, and two only where there is a house built, and five acres of land cleared on the lot. Or, if it will be a greater inducement to tenants, I will grant leases for 21 years

upon the above rent, payable in the above manner; which leases shall be renewable for ever, upon paying at the end of the first 21 years, twenty shillings per annum additional rent for the next seven years; and in like manner the increased rent of 20s. sterling per annum for every seven years afterwards. But it is to be noted that I will not give leases for lives, and leases for the above term (renewable) in the same tract of land, as it might not be so convenient to have leases of different tenures mixed.

“As I have pointed out the distance along the water for the breadth of each lot (in measuring of which go strait) and as the course and distance from the river of each lot, is also particularly set down, you cannot be at a loss if you have a compass and chain to lay them off and mark them exactly. The back lines of the lots may be marked or not, just as it suits; the dividing lines must be marked at all events, and an account taken of the corner trees, in order to insert them in the leases, if any should be given. At the corner of each lot, upon the river, blaze a tree, and with a knife or chisel number them in the following manner, viz: at the upper corner of the first lot make the figure 1; at the corner which divides lots No. one and two, make these figures $\frac{1}{2}$; at the corner which divides lot No. two and three, make the figures ?, and so on with every lot, by which means the lots can always be distinguished the moment they are looked at, and no mistakes can happen.

“Build a house, and clear and fence five acres of land upon every other lot, in the manner described upon the plot, by which means should any one person incline to take two lots, they may be added together conveniently, and the improvements will be convenient to both.

“I have now mentioned every thing by way of instruction to you that I can at present recollect. Let me conclude then with observing that this business must even under the greatest good management and industry be attended with great expense, as it will be with equal injustice, if it is neglected; to this I am to add, that, as you are now receiving my money, your time is not your own, and that every day or hour misapplied, is a loss to me; do not, therefore, under a belief that, as a friendship has long subsisted between us, many things may be overlooked in you, that would not in another; devote any part of your time to other business, or to amusements; for be assured, that, in respect to our agreement, I shall consider you in no other light than as a man who has engaged his time and services to conduct and manage my interest on the Ohio, to the best advantage, and shall seek redress if you do not, just as soon from you as from an entire stranger.

“I wish you your health and success, and am &c.

“Note. As these instructions were begun some time ago, and at a time when I had little doubt of having my people moved over the mountains before the first of April; as also at a time when I had a scheme under contemplation of importing Palatines, in order to settle on these lands, which scheme I have now laid aside; those clauses which relate to the turning your whole force towards preparing land for corn, may be entirely, or in part laid aside, as circumstances may direct; and, if there should be any inconsistency between the first and latter clauses, pursue the directions of the last mentioned.

“If you should not receive an order of court (from Botetourt) for valuing the work done on my first tract, before you move to the second, have the work done thereon, appraised in the best manner you can by Stevens, &c., and an account thereof signed by them, in such a manner as they would swear to, if called upon.

“If it should happen that you are obliged to wait in your own neighborhood for vessels, provisions, or on any other account, let all the people which you carry out be employed in forwarding my mill work at Gilbert Simpson’s.”

[1] James Cleveland was to be placed in charge of this second attempt (see II., page 451), but he was unable to go and William Stevens succeeded him. His instructions are printed in II., page 459.

[1] “*By his Excellency George Washington, Commander in Chief of the Armies of the United Provinces of North America.*

“Whereas the necessities of the army under my command for ammunition are so great as to require all possible supplies, and Messrs. Clark & Nightingale, merchants of Providence, having represented to me that they will, at their own risk, undertake to procure from the West Indies or elsewhere, such quantities as may be purchased, provided they obtain my permission for this purpose, I do therefore hereby make known to all Committees and other persons whatsoever, that the voyage now proposed by the sloop *Fly* and the sloop *Neptune* are for the above purpose, and undertaken with my privity and approbation, under such restrictions and engagements as the honorable Governor Cooke, of Rhode Island, shall think proper, to prevent the same from being perverted to any other purpose than that above specified. And I do recommend it to all committees and other persons, not only to forbear molesting or intercepting them on the voyage aforesaid, but to give them all assistance and countenance within their power.”—19 September, 1775.

[1] The British men-of-war had been menacing the coasts of Connecticut, and Governor Trumbull, in addition to the militia near the seaboard, had ordered several companies of the new levies, raised for the Continental army, to be retained in the province, and stationed at places where the greatest danger was apprehended. Of this he had given notice to Washington in a letter of the 5th, but on the 8th the General sent an express order to have all the new levies marched to the army. The Governor complied with the order, though apparently not well pleased with the manner in which it was given. In his answer, dated the 15th, he says:—

“I am surprised that mine of the 5th instant was not received, or not judged worthy of notice, as no mention is made of it. Stonington had been attacked, and severely cannonaded, and by Divine Providence marvellously protected. New London and Norwich are still so menaced by the ministerial ships and troops, that the militia cannot be thought sufficient for their security, and it is necessary to throw up some intrenchments. We are obliged actually to raise more men for their security, and for the towns of New Haven and Lyme. I hoped some of the new levies might have been left here, till these dangers were over, without injury to any of your operations. I own that it must be left to your judgment. Yet it would have given me pleasure to have

been acquainted that you considered it. I thank Divine Providence and you for this early warning to great care and watchfulness, that so the union of the colonies may be settled on a permanent and happy basis.

“You may depend on our utmost exertions for the defence and security of the constitutional rights and liberty of the colonies, and of our own in particular. None has shown greater forwardness, and thereby rendered itself more the object of ministerial vengeance. I am, with great esteem and regard for your personal character,” etc.

[1] In reply, Governor Trumbull wrote October 9th;—“I have no disposition to increase the weight of your burdens, which, in the multiplicity of your business, must be sufficiently heavy, nor inclination to disturb the harmony so necessary to the happy success of our public operations. I am persuaded no such difficulty will any more happen. It is unhappy, that jealousies should be excited, or disputes of any sort litigated, between any of the colonies, to disunite them at a time, when our liberty, our property, our all is at stake. If our enemies prevail, which our disunion may occasion, our jealousies will then appear frivolous, and all our disputed claims of no value to either side.”

[2] Read in Congress September 29th.

[1] The Continental Articles of War, or as they were otherwise called, “Rules and Regulations for the Army,” may be seen in the *Journals of Congress*, 30 June, 1775.

[1] The Continental Congress resolved on the 14th of June, the day before the appointment of the Commander-in-chief, that six companies of expert riflemen should be raised in Pennsylvania, two in Maryland, and two in Virginia. On the 22d, it was again resolved, that two more companies should be raised in Pennsylvania, and that the eight together should make a battalion, to be commanded by such field-officers, captains, and lieutenants, as should be recommended by the Assembly or Convention of the colony. The above twelve companies were all filled up with surprising celerity. One company arrived in Cambridge on the 25th of July, and eight others before the 14th of August, so that within two months orders had gone out, the men had been enlisted and equipped, and the whole had marched from four to seven hundred miles to camp. Captain Daniel Morgan, so much celebrated during the war, commanded one of these companies. He marched his men from Frederic county in Virginia, a distance of six hundred miles, in three weeks.

Congress had fixed the number of each company at eighty-two. When they arrived at Cambridge, the number considerably exceeded that limit, and the Commander doubted whether he was authorized to pay the supernumeraries. When the committee of Congress afterwards visited the camp, and this subject was referred to them, it was decided that they should all receive pay, but that the General should select from each company such as were not marksmen, and dismiss them, with an allowance of pay to go home. These riflemen were enlisted for one year, and were the first troops ordered to be raised by the Continental Congress. The Pennsylvania battalion was commanded by Colonel William Thompson.

[1] “Resolved, That when the word month is used, the Congress means calendar month, by which the pay of the men in the service of the Continent is to be regulated.”—*Journals of Congress*, 2 October, 1775.

[2] See *Sullivan to the New Hampshire Committee of Safety*, 23 September, 1775, and the Committee’s reply, 28 September, in Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, iii., 779, 827.

[3] “On entering the camp near Boston, I was struck with the familiarity which prevailed among the soldiers and officers of all ranks; from the colonel to the private, I observed but little distinction; and I could not refrain from remarking to a young gentleman with whom I made acquaintance, that the military discipline of their troops was not so conspicuous as the civil subordination of the community in which I lived.”—Wilkinson, *Memoirs*, i, 16.

“There is one reason, and I think a substantial one, why a person born in the same town or neighborhood, should not be employed on public affairs of this nature in that town or neighborhood: it is, that the spirit of equality which reigns through this country will make him afraid of exerting that authority necessary for the expediting his business; he must shake every man by the hand, and desire, beg, and pray, do brother, do my friend, do such a thing; whereas a few hearty damns from a person who did not care a damn for them, would have a much better effect.”—*Moylan to Washington*, 24 October, 1775.

“Those ideas of equality, which are so agreeable to us natives of New England, are very disagreeable to many gentlemen in the colonies. They had a great opinion of the high importance of a continental general, and were determined to place him in an elevated point of light.”—*John Adams to E. Gerry*, 18 June, 1775.

[1] “Congress must give better pay to their officers, for the present miserable pittance will not tempt men of liberal notions to engage in the service. It is indeed a fortune to the low wretches who live like the common soldiers and with the common soldiers; but men who chuse to preserve the decent distance of officers must have a decent subsistence, and without this distance, no authority or respect can be expected.”—*Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush*, 10 October, 1775.

[2] The Continental commissions were issued on the 20th. It was published in the orders, that “no person is to presume to demand a Continental commission, who is not in actual possession of the like commission from the proper authority of the colony, which he is engaged to serve.”

[1] “A commissary with twenty thousand gaping mouths open full upon him, and nothing to stop them with, must depend on being devoured himself . . . now, to his surprise, finds a Paymaster, a Commissary, a Quarter-master, nominal nonentities; all of them not able to advance one shilling, . . . not one of them, the General, or any other person here, have power to draw on Philadelphia. . . . I must entreat you to exert yourself in this unhappy case, and to relieve me of the additional trouble, to the unavoidable ones of my office, of having my heart dunned out, and be for weeks

unable to pay for a bushel of potatoes. I wish the accursed cause of this difficulty no worse punishment than to be put in my situation for ten days past.”—*Joseph Trumbull to Col. Dyer*, 23 September, 1775.

[2] In consequence of this letter Congress determined to send a committee to camp to confer with the General and the New England executives “touching the most effectual method of continuing, supporting, and regulating a continental army.” Lynch and Dr. Franklin were chosen members of the committee, and “two other members having an equal number” of votes, a second balloting resulted in the selection of Harrison. A second committee, composed of Rutledge, Lee, Johnson, R. Livingston and Samuel Adams, was constituted to draw up instructions for the conference. The committee arrived in camp on October 15th. *Journals of Congress*, 29 and 30 September, 1775.

[1] A British officer, who was a prisoner at Hartford, having been sent there on parole by the Committee of Safety in Philadelphia.

Major Christopher French, ensign “in the ministerial army,” had been arrested at Gloucester, Penn., when on his way to join General Gage, by order of the Council of Safety, of that Province. He signed a parole not to bear arms against the colonies for twelve months and promised to proceed at once to Cambridge to submit himself to Washington’s directions.—*Penna. Council of Safety*, 302 et seq.

“General Gage has rejected, in very indecent and illiberal terms, a proposition made to him some time ago, respecting officers who were prisoners, so that your hopes of being exchanged, or even having an interview with any of your friends, would not be answered by proceeding to this place, as General Howe last week desired all intercourse between the two camps might be at an end. General Gage’s treatment of our officers, even of the most respected rank, would justify a severe retaliation. They have perished in a common jail, under the hands of a wretch who had never before been employed but in the diseases of horses. General Washington’s disposition will not allow him to follow so unworthy an example. You and your companions will be treated with kindness, and upon renewing your parole at Hartford, you will have the same indulgences as other gentlemen under the like circumstances.”—*Reed to Major French*, 3 September, 1775.

[1] That Major French was a man of spirit, and something of a Hotspur, is evident from this extract, as well as other parts of his letters. It is but fair, however, to introduce his reply (October 9th) to this paragraph.—“I was asked by Mr. Paine,” says he, “if I would not fight against the colonies if set at liberty, and I answered that I would, in which might have been included, that I would endeavour to reduce them, but I did not say so; and I must appeal to you, Sir, if the question need or should have been asked. The answer was obvious, and therefore it could only be asked with a design to have something to say. I told them, therefore, that I gloried in serving my king and country, and should always do so, and I glory even in repeating it to you. I am convinced, Sir, you will not think the worse of me for supporting my honor as a man, and a British officer, which, in all situations I am determined to do.”

[2] “Your favor of the 18th instant, and one from Major French on the same subject, have come safely to hand. From the general character of this gentleman, and the acknowledged politeness and attention of the Committee of Hartford to the gentlemen intrusted to their care, I flattered myself, that there would be a mutual emulation of civility, which would have resulted in the ease and convenience of both. I am extremely sorry to find it otherwise; and, upon a reperusal of former letters and papers, respecting these gentlemen, I cannot think there is any thing particular in their situation, which can challenge a distinction. If the circumstance of wearing their swords had created no dissatisfaction, I should not have interfered, considering it, in itself, as a matter of indifference; but, as it has given offence, partly, perhaps, by the inadvertent expressions, which have been dropped on this occasion, I persuade myself, that Major French, for the sake of his own convenience and ease, and to save me farther trouble, will concede what is not essential to either his comfort or happiness, farther than mere opinion makes it so.

“On the other hand, allow me to recommend a gentleness, even to forbearance, with persons so entirely in our power. We know not what the chance of war may be; but, let it be what it will, the duties of humanity and kindness will demand from us such a treatment, as we should expect from others, the case being reversed.”—*Washington to the Committee of Hartford*, 26 September, 1775.

“I now sit down to give a final answer to your application respecting your sword. Dr. Franklin confirms, what I before mentioned, that the privilege claimed was no part of the stipulation made at Philadelphia, as it was not discussed.

“Having made inquiry, I find the rule with regard to the indulgence in question is, that prisoners do not wear their swords. I therefore cannot approve of it, more especially as it gives such general dissatisfaction to the good people of the country.

“To your other request of removing to some place, where you can have the benefit of attending public worship in the church of England, I have not the least objection, provided the place is approved by Governor Trumbull, to whom, in this case, you will be pleased to apply. I wish you all the happiness consistent with your situation; and while the inhabitants of America treat you with humanity and kindness, I trust you will make a suitable return. It is not grateful to me to hear the respectable citizens of the town treated with incivility or contempt.”—*Washington to Major French*, 20 October, 1775.

[1] The Rev. Samuel Kirkland was missionary to the Oneida Indians, among whom he resided many years. See *Life of Ledyard*, 2d ed., p. 9.

Dr. Kirkland (b. 1742-d. 1808) had been educated in Dr. Wheelock’s Indian school, and had been employed among the Mohawk and Seneca tribes for many years. He was engaged by the Continental Congress, and accompanied General Sullivan in his expedition against the Indians of western New York. After the peace, he lived among the Oneidas, and was rewarded by the State with a grant of land where Kirkland now stands. His journey to Philadelphia was used effectively by Col. Johnson in his “talk” with the Indians, as described by the Mohawk chief, Abraham. “He [Johnson] also

said he had his eye on Mr. Kirkland; that he was gone to Philadelphia, and along the sea-coast; that he was become a great soldier and a leader. Is this a minister? says he; do you think your minister minds your soul? No. By the time he comes to Philadelphia he will be a great warrior, and when he returns he will be the chief of all the Five Nations.”

[1] “The Indian who accompanies Mr. Kirkland is an Oneida chief of considerable rank in his own country. He has come on a visit to the camp, principally to satisfy his curiosity; but as his tribe has been very friendly to the United Colonies, and his report to his nation at his return will have important consequences to the public interest, I have studiously endeavored to make his visit agreeable.”—*Washington to the General Court of Massachusetts*, 26 September, 1775.

[1] Read in Congress, October 25th.

[2] In a letter from General Carleton to General Gage, dated at Montreal, December 16th, he gives an account of the landing of the Americans in the woods near St. John’s, and says they were driven back to their boats by a party of Indians, and adds:—

“They then retired to the Isle aux Noix, where they remain, and send out emissaries to the Canadians and Indians, among whom they have been too successful. Many Indians have gone over to them, and large numbers of Canadians are with them at Chamblee. The people in general seem inclined that way, though the gentlemen, the clergy, and most of the bourgeois have manifested a fidelity to the King’s service. We have succeeded in raising only fourscore militia.

“Thus we are on the very eve of being overrun and subdued. I had great hopes of holding out for this year, though I seem abandoned by all the earth, had the savages remained firm. I cannot blame these poor people for securing themselves, as they see multitudes of the enemy at hand, and no succour from any part, though it is now four months since their operations against us first began.”—*MS. Letter*.

“Any officer, non commissioned officer, or soldier, who shall hereafter be detected playing at toss-up, pitch and hustle, or any other games of chance, in or near the camp or villages bordering on the encampments, shall without delay be confined and punished for disobedience of orders. . . . The general does not mean by the above order to discourage sports of exercise and recreation, he only means to discountenance and punish gaming.”—*Orderly Book*, October 3d.

[1] The rifle companies were raised by an express order of the Continental Congress, and on this ground the captains had an impression that they were not to be commanded by officers in the provincial ranks.

[1] This party consisted of two persons, named Getchell and Berry, who set off from Fort Western, on the Kennebec, September 1st. They advanced as far as the head-waters of the Dead River, where they met several Indians, who gave them such exaggerated accounts of the enemy on the Chaudière, that they did not venture to

proceed farther. Netanis, the last of the Norridgewocks, had a cabin in this quarter, and was in the interest of Governor Carleton. The intelligence brought back by these persons, in regard to the carrying-places and condition of the river, was of some service to Arnold.

[1] The news of Bunker's Hill was taken to England by the *Cerberus*, and arrived in London on July 25th. On the following day ex-Governor Hutchinson had a talk with Lord Dartmouth. "Some addition to the land force I think is determined to be made immediately, perhaps two thousand men; but such a force as they are now convinced is necessary, and which he says will most certainly go early in the spring, it is not practicable to provide so as to arrive before winter. . . . The next summer will no doubt determine the fate of America, and it is said, the same force will be employed as if the inhabitants were French or Spanish enemies." *Hutchinson to his son*, 26 July, 1775.

[2] Gage was recalled temporarily, as he supposed, "for consultation," but it is probable that the frequent charges of incompetency made by Burgoyne, Howe, and Clinton, were the real cause. He embarked Oct. 10th.

General Gage arrived in London on the 14th of November. The following entry in Hutchinson's Diary undoubtedly refers to him: "December 21st, [1775] G. G., who had been appointed Secretary of Georgia, came to me in the utmost distress, having received a letter from Mr. Pownall last Saturday, acquainting him that the King had no further occasion for his service, and had ordered the warrant for making out his commission to be superseded. He had wrote several letters to Boston, which had been opened: one to his wife, wherein he says, that Govt. was still pursuing the same cruel and unrighteous measures against America. I never saw a man more distressed; he having spent several years of time, and all his fortune, in solliciting a place, and now is ruined in an instant. He says Lord D [artmouth] advised him to come to me, and promised to speak to me. I told him I had it not in my power to serve him. I saw no possibility of explaining away his words. I cannot account for Lord D's sending him to me. I pity him under his misfortune. His wife's family, I suppose, are high Liberty people, and he had a mind to please them." Mrs. Gage was a Miss Kemble, of New Jersey.

The common estimation of General Gage's character was not favorable to its capacity to meet successfully the emergency now presented. "He [Gage] is come out with very extraordinary powers, and has wrote for me: It is a very fortunate circumstance, that the power both civil and military hath fallen into the hands of so moderate a man as General Gage; I hope he will gain great credit on this critical occasion; his abilities are good, and with respect to his heart, you who know him so well, will allow him to be possessed of one of the best kind." *Thomas Gamble to Charles Lee*, 10 June, 1774. "Surely a man so humane, so honorable, so independent in his circumstances, and so great from family expectations would never undertake a business fit only for an abandoned desperado, or a monster in human shape, a General Murray or a Ravilliac. . . . I have read with wonder and astonishment Gage's proclamations; surely this is not the same man you and I knew so well in days of yore." *Charles Lee to Gates*, 1 July, 1774. A curious letter of Lee to Gage is printed in the *Lee Papers*, i., 133. Lord

Loudoun thought Gage had not courage sufficient for his position. Hutchinson *Diary & Letters*, i., 364.

“The king having required General Gage’s presence at home to consult him upon the present state of America, I am invested in his absence with the command of the forces in North America on the side of the Atlantic; General Carleton having the same powers within his government and in the back country, and would take the command of the whole were we to meet. Our two commissions are to command in chief in our respective districts, wherein I shall be happy to render you every service in my power.” *Sir Wm. Howe to Governor Legge*, 28 September, 1775.

“General Gage goes home in the *Pallas*, a transport ship, and General Howe is advanced to the chief command, a man almost adored by the army, and one that with the spirit of a Wolfe possesses the genius of a Marlborough.”—*Samuel Paine to William Paine*, 2 October, 1775.

[1] Lord Dartmouth had early suggested to General Gage the importance of taking possession of Rhode Island, as a means of keeping up a communication between Boston and New York, and as a place easy to be defended, and one from which, in any exigency, succours might be derived. He had, also, expressed an opinion, that New York should be occupied. General Gage replied:—“As the King’s forces are too weak to act in more than one point, New York is the most eligible situation to hold. The friends of government could rally there, and, from every account, numbers would join them. That city could be easily defended, and supplied by a water communication. But there is much difficulty in leaving Boston. It requires secrecy and is of great detail. It is too important a step to be put in execution without knowing his Majesty’s pleasure. Preparations will however be made for it, not knowing but instructions to this effect may be given, in consequence of intimations in a former letter from me.”—*MS. Letter*, August 20th.

Gage’s views are fully shown in his letter to the Earl of Dartmouth, October, 1775, in Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, iii., 927.

Lord Dartmouth wrote again on the 5th of September, before he could have received the above letter, and recommended to General Gage to abandon Boston, dismantle Castle William, and repair with the troops either to New York, or to some other port to the southward, where the ships could lie in safety, and carry on operations securely during the winter. Many advantages, he thought, would result from such a change. This was answered by General Howe with arguments similar to those already advanced by General Gage, and his reasons for not complying with the recommendation of the minister were approved.

Another plan in agitation was to divide the forces, and endeavor to hold New York and Boston at the same time. General Howe discouraged this scheme, as in his opinion impracticable; and he said that Gage, Clinton, and Burgoyne agreed with him. Such a movement would require an additional force of not less than five thousand men to be left in Boston, and twelve thousand at New York, the latter to be employed in opening a communication with Canada, leaving five battalions for the defence of

New York. Three thousand regulars would then remain for Quebec, who, with three or four thousand Canadians, and some hundreds of Indians, would compose the army of Canada; but he could not say whether such a force would be sufficient in that quarter. The primary object of a communication with Canada by the Hudson being thus accomplished, and secured by posts, troops might take separate routes into Massachusetts and other parts of New England, as circumstances should point out.

It was the opinion of General Howe, at the same time, that Boston should be evacuated, and the force designed for that place removed to Rhode Island. The project of penetrating the country could more easily be executed from that point than from Boston, where little else could be done than to defend the post. The possession of Rhode Island would, moreover, put Connecticut in jeopardy, and induce that colony to keep its army at home for self-defence. Boston harbor might be blockaded after the evacuation by a small naval force, aided by a land party intrenched in the neighborhood of Nantasket Road.—*Letter to Lord Dartmouth*, October 9th.

[1] The conclusions of the council were: 1. Unanimously agreed that the army ought not to consist of less than 20,372 men; to be formed into twenty-six regiments (exclusive of riflemen and artillery); each regiment to consist of 728 men, officers included; each company to be officered with one captain, two lieutenants, one ensign, and to contain four sergeants, four corporals, two drums, or fifes, and seventy-six privates. This army was deemed sufficient for offensive and defensive measures. 2. That the pay cannot be reduced at present, the present allowance of provisions should stand, and compensation in money should be allowed for such articles as the Commissary could not furnish. 3. The men should be engaged to December 1, 1776, but to be sooner discharged if necessary. 4. That each general officer should clothe a man according to his own fancy and judgment, and a selection to be made from these models; the clothing to be supplied by the Continent, and paid for by stoppages of 10% per month. 5. As to manner of paying the troops the council was equally divided; Washington, Greene, Sullivan, Heath, and Lee were in favor of monthly payments; and Gates, Spencer, Thomas, Putnam, and Ward, of payments every three months. On the questions of regulating the forces and the selection of officers more time was requested. An additional query was laid before the meeting that has some interest: “Whether it will be advisable to enlist any negroes in the new army? or whether there be a distinction between such as are slaves and those that are free? Agreed unanimously, to reject all slaves, and, by a great majority, to reject negroes altogether.” See note to the letter to Congress, 31 December, 1775, *post*. The full proceedings of the council are printed in Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, iii., 1039.

October 3, 1775. *Resolved*, That General Washington may, if he thinks proper, for the encouragement of an attack on Boston, promise in case of success a month’s pay to the army, and to the representatives of such of our brave countrymen as may chance to fall; and in case success should not attend the attempt, a month’s pay to the representatives of the deceased. *MS. Journal of Congress*.

[1] James Wallace, Commander of his Majesty’s ship *Rose*, stationed at Newport.

[1] Having acknowledged the letter as deciphered to be correct, Dr. Church explained that the letter was intended to “impress the enemy with a strong idea of our strength and situation in order to prevent an attack at a time when the Continental army was in great want of ammunition, and in hopes of effecting some speedy accommodation of the present dispute, and made solemn asseverations of his innocence.”

[1] By the twenty-eighth article of war, whoever was convicted of holding correspondence with the enemy, or of giving intelligence, was to suffer such punishment as should be ordered by a general court-martial. There was no provision for referring such cases to Congress, or other civil authorities.

[2] The ship *Prince George* which sailed from Bristol July 19th, with provisions for Gage’s army.

[1] Washington sent word to every important town on the coast of this armament, that they might be on their guard.

[1] “No prospect yet of the militia being embodied here; nor do I think they will. General Carleton, I am apt to think, is afraid to give the order lest they should refuse to obey, and I believe this year will pass over without the Canadians doing anything in favor of government. . . . You must look for no diversion in favor of the army immediately under your Excellency’s command this year from Canada, the language here being only to defend the Province; and it’s generally thought here that if the rebels were to push forward a body of four or five thousand men, the Canadians would lay down their arms, and not fire a shot.”—*Thomas Gamble to General Gage*, Quebec, 6 September, 1775.

“Their minds [*i. e.* the Canadians] are all poisoned by emissaries from New England and the damned rascals of merchants here and at Montreal. . . . The Quebec bill is of no use, on the contrary the Canadians talk of that d—d abused word liberty.”—*Thomas Gamble to Major Sheriff*, 6 September, 1775.

General Gage wrote to Lord Dartmouth, on the 20th of August, that General Carleton did not find the Canadians so ready for war as he had hoped, and that some of the Indian tribes were backward. He said the minds of the Canadians had been poisoned by the enemy, but that a good force there would set them all in motion. He advised, that General Carleton should be reinforced with four thousand men, a supply of arms, military stores, and Indian goods.—*MS. Letter*.

[2] Read before Congress, October 13th.

[1] General Wooster was now advanced in life. He had served in the two preceding wars, having been present at the capture of Louisburg in 1745, and commanded a Connecticut regiment nearly the whole of the last French war. When the Connecticut troops were raised, in 1775, he was appointed to the command of the whole. The continental appointment, therefore, by which he was placed the third on the list of brigadiers, and Putnam raised over him to the rank of major-general, was by no means satisfactory. Yet he accepted the commission in a spirit which reflected much credit

upon his character.

When he went to the northward, General Washington had the impression, that he would assume the command in Canada, as higher in rank than Montgomery. But the fact was, he stood one degree lower, so that this difficulty was obviated. To prevent all chance of dispute, General Schuyler resolved to keep Wooster at Ticonderoga, and send forward his regiment. But the officers and men, who sympathized with their commander in his complaint of injustice, would not go without him. They had already refused to sign the articles of war, sent out by the Continental Congress, and their general was obliged to govern them by the military laws of Connecticut. This aspect of things gave some concern to General Schuyler, when the regiment arrived at Ticonderoga, and he wrote to General Wooster requesting to know precisely on what ground he considered himself to stand. The reply was that of an honorable and generous soldier, as well as a true patriot.

“My appointment in the Continental Army,” said General Wooster, “you are sensible could not be very agreeable to me; notwithstanding which, I never should have continued in the service, had I not determined to observe the rules of the army. No, Sir; I have the cause of my country too much at heart, to attempt to make any difficulty or uneasiness in the army, upon which the success of an enterprise of almost infinite importance to the country is now depending. I shall consider my rank in the army what my commission from the Continental Congress makes it, and shall not attempt to dispute the command with General Montgomery at St. John’s. You may depend, Sir, that I shall exert myself as much as possible to promote the strictest union and harmony among both officers and soldiers, and use every means in my power to give success to the expedition.”

“General Wooster is just arrived here. As he was appointed a major-general by the colony of Connecticut, and that I did not know his sentiments with respect to the rank he considered himself in the Continental army, my intentions were to have him remain at this post [Ticonderoga], but assuring me that his regiment would not move without him, and that although he thought hard of being superceded, yet he would most readily put himself under the command of General Montgomery, that his only views were the public service, and that no obstructions of any kind would be given by him. This spirited and sensible declaration I received with inexpressible satisfaction, and he moves to-morrow with the first division of his regiment.” *Schuyler to Congress*, 13 October, 1775. This harmony was soon threatened, as Schuyler wrote on the next day complaining that Wooster had ordered a court martial at Fort George, “which he by no means had a right to do,” and had discharged men from Hinman’s and Waterbury’s regiments. “I assure you, Sir, that I feel these insults from a general officer with all that keen sensibility that a man of honor ought; and I should be ashamed to mention them to Congress but that the critical situation of our public affairs at this period require that I should sacrifice a just resentment to them. And I would wish to have it remembered that to that cause only must be imputed that I have suffered a personal indignity to go unpunished.” *Schuyler to Congress*, 14 October, 1775.

He went forward with his regiment into Canada, put himself under General

Montgomery, and verified this declaration by his conduct, which was not marked, however, with much enterprise or efficiency.

[1] Probably Otway Byrd, who was appointed aid-de-camp to General Lee, on the 25th.

[1] “If any negro is found straggling after *taptoo* beating about the camp, or about any of the roads or villages near the encampments at Roxbury or Cambridge, they are to be seized and confined until sunrise in the guard, nearest to the place where such negro is taken up.” *Orderly Book*, October 9.

[1] The members of the committee, and delegates from the four colonies above mentioned, met in convention at Cambridge on the 18th of October, and continued their sittings daily till the 22d. The persons present, besides the committee, were Griswold and Wales from Connecticut; Governor Cooke from Rhode Island; Bowdoin, Otis, Sever, and Spooner from Massachusetts; Matthew Thornton from New Hampshire. General Washington was president of the board.

In a council of war, which had been assembled but a short time before, several of the points, put in charge of the committee by Congress, had been considered, and the opinions of the officers upon them expressed. These were generally confirmed and adopted by the delegates in conference. The mode of raising, arranging, clothing, and supplying a new army was determined. While the enemy remained in the same strength at Boston, it was unanimously agreed, that the American army ought not to consist of less than twenty thousand three hundred and seventy-two men, making twenty-six regiments, exclusive of riflemen and artillery, each regiment to be divided into eight companies. Efforts were to be made to reenlist as many soldiers as possible, among those already on the ground, and the vacancies were to be filled up by new levies. The delegates of the four colonies were respectively of opinion, that twenty thousand men might be raised in Massachusetts, eight thousand in Connecticut, three thousand in New Hampshire, and fifteen hundred in Rhode Island, if the pay remained the same as heretofore, and the time of service one year. *Minutes of the Conference*.

After settling what pertained to the army, the conference broke up, but the committee from Congress remained two or three days longer, and took many other topics into consideration, which had been suggested in General Washington's letters to Congress. The articles of war were revised, and changes recommended to Congress. Regulations for disposing of prizes and provisions captured at sea, exchange of prisoners, employment of Indians, local details in regard to the army, and many other particulars, were discussed, and certain definite principles or rules established. The conference was of great moment to General Washington, since the committee and the delegates from the colonies would be bound to sustain the measures there agreed upon. The affairs of the army were brought into a more systematic train, and the Commander-in-chief could act with more precision and confidence. The doings of the committee were in part confirmed by Congress, in a series of resolves after their return. The instructions given by Congress to its committee will be found in Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, iii., 848. The proceedings of the conference are given in the same volume, 1155.

“What Franklin, Harrison and Lynch are gone about to the camp before Boston, is matter of great speculation here in England. Some think it is to excite Washington to action before winter; others to reconcile Washington and Lee.” Hutchinson, *Diary and Letters*, i., 572.

The composition of this committee caused some expression of surprise, for it was a very critical period, when tact and knowledge were necessary. “Why were not the New England delegates sent to establish the plan for constitution of the new army? Why were strangers sent?” *General Greene to Samuel Ward*, 31 December, 1775.

[1] Intelligence had just been received by Congress of the sailing of two brigantines from England on the 11th of August, bound for Quebec, laden with powder and other stores, without convoy and of no force, and instructions were issued to Washington, that he should with all possible despatch fit out two armed vessels, at the Continental expense, to sail for the St. Lawrence, with the view of intercepting these brigantines. He was directed to procure the vessels from the government of Massachusetts; but, as there were no armed vessels belonging to that province, and the vessels of Rhode Island were not available, he equipped and sent off two of those, which were already employed in the public service. “These vessels [the *Lynch*, commanded by Nicholas Broughton, and the *Franklin*, commanded by Captain John Selman] were ordered to the river St. Lawrence to intercept an ammunition vessel bound to Quebec, but missing her, they took ten other vessels and Gov. Wright of St. Johns, all of which were released, as we had waged a ministerial war and not one against our most gracious sovereign.” *E. Gerry to John Adams*, 9 February, 1813. *Journals*, October 5th.

[2] Printed in Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, iii., 1075, 1076.

[1] Mr. Price was a merchant of Montreal. When that place capitulated to General Montgomery, he wrote:—“I have found Mr. Price so active and intelligent, and so warm a friend to the measures adopted by Congress, that I wish to have him mentioned in the strongest terms to Congress.” He was appointed deputy commissary-general of the army in Canada the spring following.

[2] “*Resolved*, That as the new army in Massachusetts Bay is calculated to oppose the army at Boston, it is not expected that the general should detach any part of it to New York or elsewhere, unless it appear to him necessary to do so for the common safety.” *Journals*, 30 November, 1775.

[1] William Cowley.

[2] Read before Congress October 21st.

[1] An account of the Convention is given in a letter from *George Mason to Washington*, 14 October, 1775.

[2] On the 18th of October, the officers were convened a second time to hold a council respecting an attack on Boston. There was a unanimous voice against it, but there is no record of what was Washington's opinion.

The question of attacking Boston had come before the committee of conference, the subject being thus stated by Washington:—

“The council of war, having, in consequence of an intimation from Congress, deliberated on the expediency of an attack upon the troops in the town of Boston, and determined that at present it was not practicable; the General wishes to know how far it may be deemed proper and advisable to avail himself of the season to destroy the troops who propose to winter in Boston, by bombardment (when the harbor is blocked up), or in other words, whether the loss of the town, and the property therein, are so to be considered, as that an attack upon the troops there should be avoided, when it evidently appears that the town must, of consequence, be destroyed.

The committee thought this too important to be determined by them. They, therefore, referred it to Congress, where it hung fire for a long time. “I mean not to anticipate your determination, but only to approve your design to hover like an eagle over your prey, always ready to pounce upon it when the proper time comes. I have not forgot your proposition relative to that city; I try to pave the way for it, and wait for the season, as you do.” *Lynch to Washington*, 13 November, 1775. It was not until December 22d that a resolution was reached, which appears in the printed journals, although marked “secret” in the manuscript journals.

“That if General Washington and his council of war should be of opinion, that a successful attack may be made on the troops in Boston, he do it in any manner he may think expedient, notwithstanding the town and property in it may be destroyed.” In communicating this resolve, President Hancock wrote:

“You will notice the resolution relative to an attack upon Boston. This passed after a most serious debate in a committee of the whole house, and the execution was referred to you. May God crown your attempt with success. I most heartily wish it, though individually I may be the greatest sufferer.” President Hancock possessed a valuable property in Boston.

It is a little remarkable, that each party had conclusive reasons for avoiding to attack the other. “It is inadvisable,” said General Gage in a letter to Lord Dartmouth, “to attempt penetrating the country from Boston. The enemy's forces are numerous, and such an attempt must be made under very great disadvantages; and even if successful, little would be gained by it, as neither horses, carriages, nor other means for moving forward could be procured. Our force is too small to be divided into detachments for this purpose, and success would answer no other end than to drive the rebels out of one strong-hold into another.” *MS. Letter*, August 20th. General Howe used the same arguments on the 9th of October.

[1] Dr. Jeremy Belknap visited the camp in October and has left a few notes on the generals. Ward appeared a “calm, cool, thoughtful man; Putnam, a rough, fiery

genius.” On the 21st October he dined with Mr. Mifflin, the Quartermaster-General. “The company present were Dr. Franklin, Mr. Lynch, and Colonel Harrison (a committee from the Congress), General Lee, etc. General Lee is a perfect original, a good scholar, and an odd genius, full of fire and passion, and but little good manners; a great sloven, wretchedly profane, and a great admirer of dogs, of which he had two at dinner with him, etc. General Washington was to have been at this dinner, but the weather prevented. He is said to be a very amiable gentleman, cool, sensible, and placid, and a resolute soldier.”

[1] Pearson Jones.

[1] “The General is so busily engaged with a Committee from ye Continental Congress and the governors of the adjacent colonies, that he cannot as he wished write to you himself.” *Horatio Gates to Wentworth, Chairman of the Committee of Portsmouth*, 20 October, 1775.

[2] Mr. Sparks exonerated the British Ministry from the charge thus seemingly laid against them, of wantonly ordering the destruction of the seaport towns. But there is no mention of the ministers in Mowat’s summons, nor does he give any source for his orders “to execute a just punishment upon the town of Falmouth.”

A detailed account of the burning of Falmouth by Lieutenant Mowat may be found in Williamson’s *History of Maine*, vol. ii., pp. 422, 434.

[1] There is a curious entry in Hutchinson’s *Diary*, i., 583: “It is generally believed that Falmouth in Casco Bay, is burnt by Capt. Mowat, and 2 or 3 more ships. The last time I saw Lord G[eorge] G[ermaine], he observed, that Adm. Graves had been put in mind of his remissness: and he imagined he would run to the other extreme.”

[2] General Schuyler had written (September 26th) from Ticonderoga: “The vexation of spirit under which I labor, that a barbarous complication of disorders should prevent me from reaping those laurels for which I have unweariedly wrought since I was honored with this command; the anxiety I have suffered since my arrival here, lest the army should starve, occasioned by a scandalous want of subordination and inattention to my orders in some of the officers, that I left to command at the different posts; the vast variety of vexations and disagreeable incidents, that almost every hour arise in some department or other; not only retard my cure, but have put me considerably back for some days past. If Job had been a general in my situation, his memory had not been so famous for patience. But the glorious end we have in view, and which I have a confident hope will be attained, will atone for all.”

[1] General Montgomery had likewise met with his full share of troubles. On the 13th of October, while investing the fort at St. John’s, he wrote to General Schuyler:—

“I had had a road cut to the intended ground, and some fascines made, when I was informed by Major Brown, that a general dissatisfaction prevailed; that unless something was undertaken in a few days, there would be a mutiny; and that the universal sense of the army was to direct all our attention to the east side. The

impatience of the troops to get home has prevented their seeing the impossibility of undertaking this business sooner, the duty being hard for the troops even on the present confined state of operations.

“When I mentioned my intentions, I did not consider that I was at the head of troops, who carry the spirit of freedom into the field, and think for themselves. Upon considering the fatal consequences, which might flow from a want of subordination and discipline, should this ill-humor continue, my unstable authority over troops of different colonies, the insufficiency of the military law, and my own want of power to enforce it, weak as it is, I thought it expedient to call the field-officers together. Enclosed I send you the result of our deliberations.

“I cannot help observing to how little purpose I am here. Were I not afraid the example would be too generally followed, and that the public service might suffer, I would not stay an hour at the head of troops, whose operations I cannot direct. I must say I have no hope of success, unless from the garrison’s wanting provision.”

[1] When a convention of the several townships of the New Hampshire grants met at Dorset, on July 26, 1775, to elect field and other officers, Ethan Allen expected to obtain the chief command, but to his great chagrin was defeated by Seth Warner, of Bennington, the vote in the convention being forty-one to five. Allen then joined General Schuyler, without holding a commission, and raising a company of Canadians, crossed the St. Lawrence with a small party below Montreal, where he was defeated and taken prisoner, after maintaining for some time, and with great courage, a very unequal conflict. He was put in irons and sent to Quebec, and thence to England where he arrived December 23d. After being a prisoner for nearly three years, transported from place to place, he was exchanged. He published, in 1779, a *Narrative* of the events of his capture and imprisonment.

[2] While Dr. Franklin was in camp, he paid over to a committee of the Massachusetts Assembly one hundred pounds sterling, which had been forwarded to him as a charitable donation from persons in England for the relief of those, who had been wounded in the battle of Lexington, and of the widows and children of those, who had been slain.—*Journal of the Assembly*, October 25th.

[1] “The continued accumulation of price and the scarcity which prevails through the camp, for the several articles of wood, hay, &c., oblige me to address your honourable Houses again upon this subject.

“The distress of the Army for these necessities, I fear, will be followed with the most dreadful effects to the general cause in which we are engaged, unless some speedy and effectual remedy is provided. I have the utmost reason to think the scarcity is artificial; and, that the General Court may have full satisfaction on this subject, three gentlemen, who have been employed in endeavouring to procure these articles, now wait on your honourable Houses, to give you such information as their inquiries and opportunities enable them to do. The importance and necessity of making such provision as to enable the troops to keep their post must be too obvious to make any argument necessary; and as this Province has ever been among the foremost in its

spirited exertions, I flatter myself such measures will be adopted as will remove the apprehensions and anxieties under which we now labor.” *Washington to the Council of Massachusetts*, 27 October, 1775.

“Your favor of the 25th instant came safely to hand. Captain Whipple’s voyage has been unfortunate, but it is not in our power to command success, though it is always our duty to deserve it. I hope he will be more successful in his intended voyage, if it is proposed in consequence of the direction of the Congress. I think it proper you should apprise him, that two schooners have sailed from hence to the mouth of St. Lawrence River upon the same service, commanded by Captain Broughton and Captain Sellman. The signal which they have agreed on to distinguish each other and to be known to their friends, is the ensign up to the main topping-lift. I agree with you, that the attachment of our Bermudian brethren ought to recommend them to the favorable regards of their friends of America, and I doubt not it will. I shall certainly take a proper opportunity to make their case known to the honorable Continental Congress.” *Washington to Deputy Governor Cooke*, 29 October, 1775.

[1]“As you will be fully informed of every matter and thing relative to the army, by your own committee, I should not have given you the trouble of a letter at this time, were it not on Colonel Reed’s account. He is, as I presume you may have heard, concerned in many of the principal causes now depending in the courts of Pennsylvania; and should those causes be pressed for trial by his brethren of the profession, it will not only do him a manifest injury in his practice and future prospects, but afford room for complaint of his having neglected his business as a lawyer. This he thinks may be avoided, if some of you gentlemen of the Congress, in the course of conversation with the chief-justice and others, would represent the disadvantages, which must result to him, in case his causes should be hurried to trial.

“That Colonel Reed is clever in his business and useful to me, is too apparent to mention. I should do equal injustice, therefore, to his abilities and merits, were I not to add, that his services here are too important to be lost, and that I could wish to have him considered in this point of view by your honorable body, when occasion shall favor.

“I shall take it kind of you to give me, from time to time, such authentic intelligence of the manœuvres of the ministry, as you think may be relied on. We get none but newspaper accounts here, and these very imperfect.”—*Washington to Richard Henry Lee*, 29 October, 1775.

Colonel Joseph Reed was secretary to General Washington. He left the camp for Philadelphia, on the 30th of October, and was absent till after the removal of the army to New York. During this period a constant and confidential correspondence was kept up between him and the Commander-in-chief. Robert Hanson Harrison, of Alexandria, a lawyer by profession, with whom Washington had been much acquainted, and who had been invited by him to become one of his aids, arrived in Cambridge shortly after the departure of Colonel Reed. He was immediately announced in the public orders as an aid to the Commander-in-chief. He received a colonel’s commission, and served as secretary to the General during a large portion of

the war. *Sparks*.

“As many officers, and others, have begun to enlist men for the Continental Army, without Orders from Head Quarters; The General desires, that an immediate Stop be put thereto; that the enlistments be return’d; and that no person for the future, presume to interfere in this matter, ’till there is a proper establishment of Officers, and those Officers authorised and instructed in what manner to proceed. Commissions in the new Army are not intended merely for those who can enlist the most men; but for such Gentlemen as are most likely to deserve them. The General would, therefore, not have it even supposed; nor our Enemies encouraged to believe, that there is a Man in this Army (except a few under particular circumstances) who will require to be twice asked to do what his Honour, his personal Liberty, the Welfare of his country and the Safety of his Family so loudly demand of him: When motives powerful as these, conspire to call Men into service, and when that service is rewarded with higher pay than private Soldiers ever yet met with in any former war: The General cannot, nor will not (until he is convinced to the contrary) harbour so despicable an Opinion of their understanding and zeal for the cause, as to believe they will desert it. As the Congress have been at so much pains to buy Goods, to cloath the Army, and the Quarter Master General, at great trouble to collect, upon the best terms he can, such Articles as are wanting for this purpose, he is directed to reserve those goods for those brave Soldiers, who are determin’d to stand forth in defence of their Country another year; and that he may be able to distinguish these, from such as mean to quit the Service, at the end of their present engagement, he will be furnished with the Enlistments—Any person therefore (Negroes excepted, which the Congress do not incline to enlist again) coming with a proper Order and will subscribe the Enlistment, shall be immediately supplied. That every non Commissioned officer and Soldier may know upon what Terms it is he engages, he is hereby inform’d—That he “is to be paid by the Kalendar Month, at the present Rates; *to wit*—Forty eight Shillings to the Serjeants, Forty four to the Corporals, Drums & Fifes, and Forty to the privates, which pay it is expected will be regularly distributed every month.

“That each man is to furnish his own Arms (and good ones) or if Arms is found him he is to allow Six Shillings for the use thereof during the Campaign.

“That he is to pay for his Cloathing, which will be laid in for him upon the best terms it can be bought; to do which, a Stoppage of Ten Shillings a month will be made, until the Cloathing is paid for.

“That Two Dollars will be allowed every one of them, who brings a good Blanket of his own with him, & will have Liberty to carry it away at the end of the Campaign.

“That the present allowance of provisions will be continued; And every man who enlists shall be indulged in a reasonable time, to visit his family in the course of the winter, to be regulated in such a manner, as not to weaken the Army or injure the service.”—*orderly Book*, 31 October, 1775.

[1]“The deputies from the Honorable Continental Congress having arrived in this camp, in order to confer with the General, the several Governors of Rhode Island and

Connecticut, the Council of Massachusetts Bay and the President and [of] the Convention of New Hampshire, on the continuing an army for the defence and support of America and its liberties; all officers who decline the further service of their country, and intend to retire from the army at the expiration of their present term of service, are to signify their intentions in writing to their colonel, which he is to deliver with his own, to the Brigadier General, the commanding officer of his brigade. Those *brave men* and *true patriots*, who are resolved to continue to serve and defend their brethren, privileges and property, are to consider themselves engaged to the last day of December, 1776, unless sooner discharged by the Hon: the Continental Congress, and will in like manner signify their intentions.”—*Orderly Book*, 22 October. “The times and the importance of the great cause we are engaged in, allow no room for hesitation or delay [in declaring intention to serve]. When life, liberty and property are at stake, when our country is in danger of being a melancholy scene of bloodshed and desolation, when our towns are laid in ashes, and innocent women and children driven from their peaceful habitations, exposed to the rigor of an inclement season, and to the hands of charity perhaps for their support: when calamities like these are staring us in the face, and a brutal, savage enemy (more so than was every yet found in a civilized nation), are threatening us, and every thing we hold dear, with destruction from foreign troops, it little becomes the character of a soldier to shrink from danger, and condition for new terms. It is the General’s intention to indulge both officers and soldiers who compose the *new* army with furloughs, to be absent a reasonable time, but it must be done in such a manner as not to injure the service, or weaken the army too much at once. The General also thinks that he can take upon him to assure the officers and soldiers of the new army, that they will receive their pay once a month regularly, after the terms of their present enlistment are expired.”—*Orderly Book*, 26 October.

[1] “I am happy to inform you that Congress has agreed to every recommendation of the Committee, and have gone beyond it, in allowing the additional pay to the officers. I rejoice at this, but cannot think with patience that pitiful wretches, who stood cavilling with you when entreated to serve the next campaign, should reap the benefit of this addition. They will now be ready enough, but hope you will be able to refuse them with the contempt they deserve, and to find better in their room. Could not some of the gentlemen at camp enlist the New England men who have been persuaded to leave you? Frazier told me he could. It would be a capital point to convince the world that it is not necessary to have bad officers of that country, in order to raise men there. I can scarce bear their tyranny.”—*Lynch to Washington*, 13 November, 1775.

[2] Read in Congress November 7.

“I sincerely wish this camp could furnish a good engineer. The Commissary-general can inform you how exceedingly deficient the army is of gentlemen skilled in that branch of business, and that most of the works, which have been thrown up for the defence of our several encampments, have been planned by a few of the principal officers of this army, assisted by Mr. Knox, a gentleman of Worcester. Could I afford you the desired assistance in this way, I should do it with pleasure.

“Herewith you will receive a copy of the proceedings held with the committee of Congress from Philadelphia. It ought to have been sent sooner, but I am at present without a secretary; Colonel Reed, having a call at home, left this place on Sunday last. I heartily congratulate you on the recovery of the Commissary-general [Mr. Joseph Trumbull, son of the Governor, who had been for some time ill in Connecticut], whose return, so soon as he can travel with safety, is much wished for.”—*Washington to Governor Trumbull*, 2 November, 1775.

[1] Edmund Randolph, who had served for a short time as an aid to General Washington.

[2] Peyton Randolph, president of the first Continental Congress. He died suddenly at Philadelphia on the 22d of October. A long and intimate friendship had existed between him and Washington. He had lately been absent from Congress to preside in the Virginia Convention, and his last letter to Washington was dated September 6th. It begins with the following paragraph:—

“I have it in command to transmit to you the thanks of the Convention of Virginia for your faithful discharge of the important trust reposed in you, as one of their delegates to the Continental Congress. Your appointment to an office of so much consequence to America, and incompatible with your attendance on this duty, was the only reason that could have induced them not to call you to the same service. Your brother delegates were unanimous in their acknowledgments, and you will believe it gives me the greatest satisfaction to convey to you the sentiments of your countrymen, and at the same time to give you every testimony of my approbation and esteem.”

[1] Although the election of a brigadier-general was appointed for November 23d, the journals contain no mention of any action taken until January 1776, when Joseph Fry was chosen for the army in Massachusetts, and Benedict Arnold for the army in the northern department.

[2] Proclamations issued by General Howe, on the 28th of October. The first was for prohibiting any person from leaving Boston, in which he says, “I do, by virtue of the power and authority vested in me by his Majesty, forbid any person or persons whatever, not belonging to the navy, to pass from hence by water or otherwise without my order or permission given in writing. Any person or persons detected in the attempt, or who may be retaken upon sufficient proof thereof, shall be liable to military execution, and those who escape shall be treated as traitors by seizure of their goods and effects.” The second proclamation prohibited any person from carrying more than five pounds in specie away from the city. The association was for embodying the citizens to defend the town. See *Remembrancer*, Vol. ii., p. 191. *Boston Gazette*, November 6th, 1775.

With this letter is the Royal Proclamation of 23 August, 1775, “for suppressing rebellion and sedition.”

[1] Read in Congress, November 13th.

[1] Mr. Quincy had suggested to General Washington a plan for blocking up Boston harbor, and taking the whole British army and fleet. Being thoroughly acquainted with the islands in the harbour, and the ship-channels, he conceived it practicable to construct such works at suitable points, as would prevent the egress of the shipping. He communicated his scheme to Dr. Franklin, who paid him a visit while attending the committee of conference at camp, and by whose advice he wrote at large on the subject to Washington.

[1] The situation of affairs in Canada at this time may be understood by the following extract from a letter, dated at Montreal, October 19th, and written by Brook Watson, an eminent merchant of that city, to Governor Franklin of New Jersey. The letter was intercepted by General Montgomery, and forwarded by him to General Schuyler.

“Such is the wretched state of this unhappy province,” says the writer, “that Colonel Allen, with a few despicable wretches, would have taken this city on the 25th ultimo, had not its inhabitants marched out to give them battle. They fought, conquered, and thereby saved the province for a while. Allen and his banditti were mostly taken prisoners. He is now in chains on board the *Gaspee*. This little action has changed the face of things. The Canadians before were nine tenths for the Bostonians. They are now returned to their duty: many in arms for the King and the parishes, who had been otherwise, and daily demanding their pardon and taking arms for the crown.”

This Mr. Watson went over to England in the same vessel, in which Allen and his associates were transported as prisoners and in irons. Allen’s wrists and ankles were heavily manacled. In his *Narrative* he speaks of having received much ill treatment from Watson during the voyage. Watson was afterwards Lord Mayor of London.

[1] “I received your favor of the 2d instant, and am very sorry it is not in my power to supply the necessities of the town of Falmouth. I have referred the gentlemen, who brought me your letter, to the General Court of this province, who, I hope, will fall upon some method for your assistance. The arrival of the *Cerberus* man-of-war is very alarming; I do not apprehend they will attempt to penetrate into the country, as you seem to fear. If they should attempt to land any of their men, I would have the good people of the country, by all means, make every opposition in their power; for it will be much easier to prevent their making a lodgment, than to force them from it, when they have got possession.

“I write by this conveyance to Colonel Phinny, who will give you every advice and assistance in his power. I sincerely sympathize with the people in the distress they are driven to; but it is in such times, that they should exert themselves in the noble cause of liberty and their country.”—*Washington to the Committee of Falmouth*, 6 November, 1775.

“*November 5th.*—As the Commander-in-Chief has been apprised of a design, formed for the observance of that ridiculous and childish custom of burning the effigy of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his surprise, that there should be officers and soldiers in this army so void of common sense, as not to see the impropriety of such a step at this juncture; at a time when we are soliciting and have really obtained the friendship

and alliance of the people of Canada, whom we ought to consider as brethren embarked in the same cause, the defence of the general liberty of America. At such a juncture and in such circumstances, to be insulting their religion is so monstrous, as not to be suffered or excused; indeed, instead of offering the most remote insult, it is our duty to address public thanks to these our brethren, as to them we are so much indebted for every late happy success over the common enemy in Canada.”—*Orderly Book*.

“Robert Hanson Harrison Esqr. is appointed Aid de Camp to His Excellency, the Commander in Chief; and all orders, whether written or verbal, coming from the General, through Mr. Harrison are to be punctually obeyed.

“Although the Men confined by Lieut. Col. Reed of the 26th Regt. were released upon Application to Head Quarters—The General, so far from being displeased with Col. Reed, for his endeavours to prevent an infringement of the General Orders; that he thanks the Colonel; as he shall every Officer, who pays strict obedience to orders, as without so doing, it is in vain to think of preserving order, and discipline, in an army—The disagreeableness of the weather, scarcity of wood, &c, inclined the General to overlook the Offence committed at that time, but he hopes, and expects, the Officers and Soldiers, will for the future, carefully avoid wantonly cutting the Trees, and committing waste upon the property of those already but too much distressed by the depredations of the Army.”—*Orderly Book*, 6 November, 1775.

[1] General Sullivan had already been employed several days at Portsmouth in giving directions about fortifying the town and harbor, having been sent there in consequence of the threat of Lieutenant Mowat at Falmouth, that all the towns on the sea-coast to the eastward of Boston would be burned. He also caused action to be taken against certain persons who were thought to be hostile to the cause of the colonies.—Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, iv., 19.

[1] John McPherson. “He proposes great things; is sanguine, confident, positive, that he can take or burn every man of war in America. It is a secret, he says, but he will communicate it to any one member of Congress, upon condition that it be not divulged during his life at all, nor after his death, but for the service of this country. He says that it is as certain as that he shall die, that he can burn any ship.”—John Adams, *Works*, ii., 424-428.

His scheme had been submitted to a committee of Congress (Hopkins, Randolph, and J. Rutledge) who thought it, in theory, practicable, and wished it to be tried in Boston harbor.

“July 28, 1775. Doctor Franklin delivered to this Board a letter from Capt. John MacPherson, offering his services for the defence of this country, for which Doctr. Franklin is desired to return the thanks of this Board to Capt. MacPherson.”—*Minutes of Penn. Council of Safety*.

[1] *Journals of Congress*, 25 November, 1775.

[2] The prisoners were ordered to Reading, Lancaster, and York, in Pennsylvania.

[1] Colonel Gridley had been appointed by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, April 26th, chief engineer in the army then beginning to be organized, with a salary of one hundred and seventy pounds a year while in service; and after the army should be disbanded, he was to receive annually one hundred and twenty-three pounds for life.—*MS. Journal of Prov. Congress*. The same provision of a life annuity was extended to the assistant-engineer. On the 20th of September, Colonel Gridley was commissioned to take command of the artillery of the Continental army, but was superseded by Colonel Knox in November. His advanced age was assigned by Congress, as a reason for superseding him. At the battle of Bunker's Hill he fought with conspicuous bravery in the intrenchments, which he had planned under Prescott, and in which he was wounded. Colonel Gridley was a soldier of long experience, having served in the two last wars, and been present at the taking of Louisburg, and in Wolfe's battle on the Plains of Abraham.—Swett's *Hist. of Bunker-Hill Battle*, pp. 11, 44, 54. Before the Revolution he received half-pay as a British officer. When Colonel Knox was appointed to his place in the artillery, 17 November, Congress voted to indemnify him for any loss of half-pay, which he might sustain in consequence of having been in the service of the United Colonies.

[1] The town of Falmouth seemed destined to suffer more than the usual calamities of war, as the victim of resentment, or the object of a bitter enmity. It had been burnt to the ground by the commander of one armed ship, and a fortnight afterwards its ashes were insulted by the following menace of another.

“Captain John Symons, commander of his Majesty's ship *Cerberus*, causeth it to be signified and made known to all persons whatever, in the town of Falmouth as well as the country adjacent; that, if after this public notice, any violences shall be offered to any officers of the crown, or other peaceably disposed subjects of his Majesty; or, if any bodies of men shall be raised and armed in the said town and country adjacent; or any military works erected, otherwise than by order of his Majesty, or those acting under his authority; or if any attempts shall be made to seize or destroy any public magazines of arms, ammunition, or other stores, it will be indispensably my duty to proceed with the most vigorous efforts against the said town, as in open rebellion against the King; and if after this signification the town shall persist in the rebellious acts above mentioned, they may depend on my proceeding accordingly.”

[1] “A Mr Lewis, who left Boston yesterday afternoon, informs me that, on account of the scarcity of wood and provisions in that place, General Howe has issued a proclamation, desiring such of the inhabitants as are inclined to leave the Town to give in their names, and a list of their effects, before twelve o'clock this day.

“As the caution necessary to be used with these people, to prevent a communication of the small-pox, and the proper care of them when out, are objects of exceeding great importance, I submit them to the consideration of your honorable body before its recess; and if the honorable Council should likewise adjourn, I must also recommend to your attention the necessity there is of constituting some court, before whom all persons inimical or suspected, to be inimical, to America, should be brought for

examination. My time is so much taken up with military affairs, that it is impossible for me to pay a proper attention to these matters. There will be sent you, amongst others, a James Smithwick, who, from an intercepted letter, appears to have resolved to get into Boston. There is a small trunk belonging to him now in my possession, which contains in gold and silver about fifty Pounds lawful money, which it is probable he intended to carry in with him. The owner and Captain of a small Coaster, put into Beverly in distress, bound from Boston to Nova Scotia, will appear before you. They have carried on a trade of supplying Boston with provisions, &c., for some time. I beg leave to refer them to your examination.”—*Washington to James Warren*, 9 November, 1775.

[2] The Virginia Convention had met on the 17th of July, and passed an ordinance for raising two regiments to act in defence of the colony, and two additional companies for protecting the western frontiers. By the same ordinance the province was divided into sixteen districts, and regulations were adopted for exercising all the militia as minute-men, and preparing for public service at a moment’s call.—See Hening’s *Stat.* vol. ix., p. 9. Patrick Henry was appointed colonel of the first regiment, and commander of all the forces to be raised for the defence of the colony. William Woodford was colonel of the second regiment.

The following letter from George Mason to Washington, dated October 14th, is characteristic of the writer, and contains some curious particulars in regard to the doings of the Convention.

“I hinted to you in my last the parties and factions, which prevailed at Richmond. I never was in so disagreeable a situation, and almost despaired of a cause, which I saw so ill conducted. During the first part of the Convention, parties ran so high, that we had frequently no other way of preventing improper measures, than by procrastination, urging the previous question, and giving men time to reflect. However, after some weeks, the babblers were pretty well silenced, a few weighty members began to take the lead, several wholesome regulations were made, and, if the Convention had continued to sit a few days longer, I think the public safety would have been as well provided for, as our present circumstances permit. The Convention, not thinking this a time to rely upon resolves and recommendations only, and to give obligatory force to their proceedings, adopted the style and form of legislation, changing the word *enact* into *ordain*. Their ordinances were all introduced in the form of bills, were regularly referred to a committee of the whole house, and underwent three readings before they were passed.

“I enclose you the ordinance for raising an armed force for the defence and protection of this colony. It is a little defaced by being handled at our district committee, but it is the only copy I have at present by me. You will find some little inaccuracies in it, but, upon the whole, I hope it will merit your approbation. The minute-plan I think is a wise one, and will in a short time furnish eight thousand good troops, ready for action, and composed of men in whose hands the sword may be safely trusted. To defray the expense of the provisions made by this ordinance, and to pay the charge of the last year’s Indian war, we are now emitting the sum of three hundred and fifty thousand pounds in paper currency. I have great apprehensions, that the large sums in bills of

credit now issuing all over the continent may have fatal effects in depreciating the value; and, therefore, I opposed any suspension of taxation, and urged the necessity of immediately laying such taxes as the people could bear, to sink the sum emitted as soon as possible; but I was able only to reduce the proposed suspension from three years to one.

“Our friend, the treasurer, was the warmest man in the convention for immediately raising a standing army of not less than four thousand men, upon constant pay. They stood a considerable time at three thousand, exclusive of the troops upon the western frontiers; but, at the last reading, as you will see by the ordinance, they were reduced to one thousand and twenty rank and file. In my opinion, a well judged reduction, not only from our inability to furnish at present such a number with arms and ammunition, but I think it extremely imprudent to exhaust ourselves before we know when we are to be attacked. The part we have to act at present seems to require our laying in good magazines, training our people, and having a good number of them ready for action.”

[1]“The General thanks Col. Thompson, and the other gallant Officers and Soldiers (as well of other Regiments as the Rifflers) for their alacrity yesterday, in pushing thro’ the water, to get to the Enemy on Letchmore’s point; he is inform’d that there were some (names as yet unknown) who discover’d a backwardness in crossing the causway—these will be marked if they can be discovered—The General was much surprised and concerned to see the order in which many of the Arms in several of the regiments appeared; he had not time to enquire the names of the particular Officers to whose Companies they belonged, but desires that this hint may be received, as an Admonition, by such officers as are conscious of their Neglect of this duty; as other methods will be fallen upon, if it is not.”—*Orderly Book*, 10th November, 1775.

[1]This act is remarkable as having been the first, which was passed by any of the colonies, for fitting out vessels of marque and reprisal, and for establishing a court to try and condemn the captured vessels of the enemy. See the Act, and some interesting remarks on the subject, in Austin’s *Life of Gerry*, vol. i., pp. 92, 505. See also Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, v., 436, 515.

[1]“These N. England men are a strange composition. Their commonalty is undoubtedly good, but they are so defective in materials for officers that it must require time to make a real good army out of ’em. Enclosed I send you the address of the generals to the soldiers. You must know that some officers who are discarded from the service are suspected of exerting themselves to dissuade the soldiers from reenlisting. To counteract their machinations was the design of this paper.”—*Charles Lee to Robert Morris*, 22 November, 1775. “We were some time apprehensive of losing every thing from the backwardness of the men in enlisting. It is supposed that the discarded officers labored to render the soldiers disaffected; but the men really have public spirits and recruiting goes on most swimmingly.”—*Same to same*, 9 December, 1775. “The zeal and alacrity of the militia who were summon’d on the supposition that our lines would be degarnished, prognosticate well, and do much honor to these Provinces. There is certainly much public spirit in the bulk of the people and I think they merit public eulogium. The N. England delegates I am told

have lately received so many rubs that they want a cordial. I beg therefore that you will administer one to those who are of your acquaintance in my name. I never saw a finer body than this militia.”—*Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush*, 12 December, 1775.

“The task [of disbanding army and forming new] was rendered very difficult by the reduction of eleven regiments and the discharge of such a number of officers who have done every thing to obstruct and retard the filling of the new army in hopes to ruin the establishment and bring themselves into place again.”—*General Greene to Governor Ward*.

“By letters from camp I find there is infinite difficulty in reinlisting the army. The idea of making it wholly Continental has induced so many alterations disgusting to both officers and men, that very little success has attended our recruiting orders. I have often told the Congress, that, under the idea of new modelling, I was afraid we should destroy our army. Southern gentlemen wish to remove that attachment, which the officers and men have to their respective colonies, and make them look up to the continent at large for their support or promotion. I never thought that attachment injurious to the common cause, but the strongest inducement to people to risk every thing in defence of the whole, upon the preservation of which must depend the safety of each colony. I wish, therefore, not to eradicate, but to regulate it in such a manner, as may most conduce to the protection of the whole.”—*Governor Ward to his brother*, 21 November, 1775.

[1] In writing to Colonel Reed a few days afterwards, Washington spoke in the following manner of this affair. “The alacrity of the riflemen and officers upon that occasion did them honor, to which Colonel Paterson’s regiment and some others were equally entitled, except in a few instances; but the tide, at that time, was so exceedingly high as to compel a large circuit before our men could get to the causeway, by which means the enemy, except a small covering party, distant from the dry land on this side near four hundred yards, had retreated or were about to embark. All the shot, therefore, that passed were at a great distance; however, the men went to and over the causeway spiritedly enough. This little manœuvre of the enemy is nothing more than a prelude. We have certain advice of a scoundrel from Marblehead, a man of property, having carried to General Howe a true state of the temper and disposition of the troops towards the new enlistment, and given him the strongest assurances of the practicability of making himself master of these lines in a very short time, from the disaffection of the soldiers to the service. I am endeavoring to counteract him; how effectually, time alone can show. I began our bomb battery at Lechmere’s Point last night; the working party came off in the morning without having met with any interruption. The weather favored our operations, the earth being clear of frost. There is not an officer in the army, who does not look for an attack. This has no effect upon the Connecticut regiments; they are resolved to go off.”

[2] Received by Congress, November 19th, and read the next day.

[3] William Palfrey was a native of Boston, born in 1741, and educated a merchant under the auspices of John Hancock. Before the revolution he was engaged in mercantile affairs in Boston, and towards the close of the year 1774 he sailed on a

voyage to South Carolina, and thence to England, in a vessel belonging to Hancock. From a journal, which he kept during his stay in London, and which I have seen, he appears to have been on terms of intimacy with some of the leaders of the high Whig party, and it is probable, that his visit to the metropolis of Great Britain had a political as well as commercial object. He returned to Massachusetts a few days before General Washington took command of the army, and was immediately employed on business of trust and importance. Assuming a military character, he was for some time aid to General Charles Lee, and afterwards to General Washington, and received a lieutenant-colonel's commission. On the 27th of April, 1776, he was by Congress appointed paymaster-general of the army, a station of great responsibility, which, for more than four years and a half, he filled in such a manner as to give universal satisfaction. During this period he had exhibited such proofs of his talents for business, fidelity, and devotedness to the cause of his country, that, on the 4th of November, 1780, he was elected Consul-General from the United States to France, an office at this time of much consideration, as it involved the duties of making extensive purchases of military and other supplies for the country, and an examination and settlement of all the accounts, in which the United States were concerned with public and private agents in Europe, and which had been multiplying and accumulating since the commencement of the war. He sailed for France, but the vessel in which he took passage was lost at sea, and every one on board was supposed to have perished,—*Sparks*.

[1]“I received your favor of the 6th inst: in which you give a detail of Doctor Cheney's case as it appeared before you and council, in which nothing but the fair side of his character appears. You may be assured sir that his Trial will be impartial,—that no insidious designs of his enemies will have weight, and that it will give me much pleasure to find he can acquit himself of the Crimes he is charged with—the evidences are hourly expected—on their arrival, the Trial will be no Longer delayed. Genl. Sullivan set out on the 12th Inst: for Portsmouth, New Hampshire. . . . As it is now very apparent that we have nothing to depend on in the present Contest, but our own strength, care, firmness, & union. Should not the same measures be adopted in yours and every other Government on the Continent? Would it not be prudent to seize on those Tories, who have been, are and that we know will be active against us? why should persons who are preying upon the vitals of their Country be suffered to stalk at large, whilst we know they would do us every mischief in their power? these, Sir, are points I beg to submit to your serious consideration.

“I congratulate you on the success of our arms, by the surrender of St. Johns which hope will be soon followed by the reduction of Canada.”

“P. S. by an express arrived from Philadelphia I received the following Resolve of the Continental Congress:

Resolved—That Doctor Church be close confined in some secure Goal in the Colony of Connecticut without the use of Pen, Inck and paper—and that no person be allowed to Converse with him except in the presence of a Magistrate or the Sherrieff of the County where he shall be confined, and in the English Language untill further orders from this or a future Congress.

“Sir, in consequence of the above resolve I now transmit to your Care Doctor Church under the Guard of Capt. Israel Putnam, a sergeant & seven men.

“You will please to comply in every particular with the above Resolution of Congress.”—*Washington to Governor Trumbull*, 15 November, 1775.

“In the General Orders of the 31st of October, it is declared that every Non-Commission’d Officer and Soldier, shall be paid by the Kalendar month, as follows. to a Serjeant forty-eight Shillings to the Corporals forty-four and forty to each private; which pay it is expected, will be regularly distributed every month— Each Non-Commissioned Officer, and Soldier, (Drums & Fifes excepted) is to furnish his own Arms; if arms are found him, he is to allow Six Shillings, at the end of the Campaign for the use thereof. New Cloathing will forthwith, be provided for every Non Commission’d Officer & Soldier, for which an easy stoppage, of only ten Shillings a month, will be made out of his pay, until the whole is paid. Two Dollars will be allowed to each Non-Commission’d Officer, and Soldier, who provides himself with a good Blanket, and Liberty to take it away at the end of the campaign; the present ample allowance of provisions will be continued, and those who inlist, will be indulged in a reasonable time, to visit their familys, in the course of the Winter, this to be regulated in such manner as not to weaken the army, or injure the service.

“To prevent such contentions as have arisen, from the same person being inlisted by different Officers, and for different Regiments, it is possitively ordered; upon pain of being cashiered, That no Officer knowingly presume to inlist any Soldier, who has been previously inlisted by another officer, where such a mistake happens undesignedly, the first Inlistment is to take place— The Officers are to be careful not to inlist any person, suspected of being unfriendly to the Liberties of America, or any abandon’d vagabond to whom all Causes and Countries are equal and alike indifferent—The Rights of mankind and the freedom of America, will have Numbers sufficient to support them, without resorting to such wretched assistance.—Let those who wish to put Shackles upon Freemen fill their Ranks, and place their confidence in such miscreants.

“Neither Negroes, Boys unable to bear Arms, nor old men unfit to endure the fatigues of the campaign are to be inlisted, the preferences being given to the present Army, The Officers are vigilantly to try, what number of men can be inlisted in the Course of this week, and make report thereof to their Colonels, who will report it to the General—This to be done every week, until the whole are compleated. The Regiments are to consist of eight Companies, each Company of a Captain, two Lieutenants, and an Ensign, four Serjeants, four Corporals, two Drums & Fifes and Seventy-six Privates; as the Regiments are compleated, they will be mustered, and then reviewed by the Commander in Chief; when a Roll of each Company, sign’d by the Captain, according to a form previously deliver’d by the Adjutant General; is to be delivered to his Excellency. The Colonel of each Regiment will receive a List of the Officers upon the New-establishment from his Brigadier General. The Commissioned, non Commissioned Officers and Soldiers of the present Army are, (notwithstanding their new engagement) to continue in the Regiment and Company they now belong to, until

further orders.—Upon any Soldiers being inlisted, from the present, into the New Establishment, the Regiment he now belongs to, with his Name, Town and Country, are to be enter'd in a Roll kept for that purpose, by each Officer; A Copy of this Roll sign'd, to be sent every Saturday morning, to the Colonel of each regiment.”—*Orderly Book*, 12 November, 1775.

“It is earnestly recommended to all the Officers of the old Regiments, to see that their men’s arms are always in good order and the men not suffered to straggle from Camp—nor on any Account, to quit their post when upon duty, but be ready to turn out at a moment’s warning; and they may rely upon it they will be suddenly called upon, whenever it happens.

“Very pointed Complaints having this day been made against the Commissary General, from several Field Officers, &c., of Genl. Sullivan’s brigade—The Commander in Chief assures the complainants, that the strictest examination shall be made into the Conduct of the Commissary General, as soon as he arrives in Cambridge, which is expected this week.

“Whereas the General has been informed that the orders of the 6th of Septembr. have been construed to permit any approv’d Sutler, to sell spirituous Liquors, to the Soldiers belonging to other Regiments, without the permission of the Commanding Officer of the regiment, to which such Soldier belongs. It is therefore ordered, that no Commanding Officer of a Regiment, shall authorise more than one Sutler to a Regiment, and such appointment shall be notified in Regimental Orders, and no person being authorised, shall presume to sell spirituous Liquors to any Soldiers belonging to any other Regiment, without leave in writing under the hand of the Commanding Officer to which such Soldier belongs.”—*Orderly Book*, 14 November, 1775.

[1] Knox’s journal of this expedition is printed in *New England Genealogical Register*, July, 1876.

The following order is so curious in itself, and so honorable to the persons concerned, that it deserves to be perpetuated. Colonel Whitcomb had served in the former war, in which he had borne a part in several engagements, and was a gentleman highly respected. He commanded one of the Massachusetts regiments, but, on account of his advanced age, he was omitted in arranging the new army. The soldiers of his regiment were so much dissatisfied, that they resolved not to enlist under any other officer. He exhorted them not to be influenced by such a motive, in a cause so important; and, to induce them to remain, he proposed to join them in the ranks.

“*November 16th.* Motives of economy rendering it indispensably necessary, that many of the regiments should be reduced, and the whole put upon a different establishment, several deserving officers, not from any demerit, but pure necessity, have been excluded in the new arrangement of the army. Among these, was Colonel Whitcomb; but the noble sentiments disclosed by that gentleman upon this occasion, the zeal he has shown in exhorting the men not to abandon the interest of their country at this important crisis, and his determination to continue in the service, even as a private

soldier, rather than by a bad example, when the enemy are gathering strength, to put the public affairs to hazard; when an example of this kind is set, it not only entitles a gentleman to particular thanks, but to particular rewards. Colonel Jonathan Brewer is entitled to no small share of credit, in readily giving up to Colonel Whitcomb the regiment, which he was appointed to command. Colonel Whitcomb, therefore, is henceforward to be considered as Colonel of that regiment, which was intended for Colonel Brewer; and Colonel Brewer will be appointed Barrack-Master, until something better worth his acceptance can be provided.” *Orderly Book*.

[1] Three companies of Loyalists were embodied in Boston on the 17th of November. The following is an extract from General Howe’s *Orderly Book* of that date:—

“Many of his Majesty’s loyal American subjects in Boston, with their adherents, having offered their service for the defence of the place, the Commander-in-chief has ordered them to be armed, and formed into three companies under the command of the honorable Brigadier-General Timothy Ruggles, to be called the ‘*Loyal American Associators*.’ They will be distinguished by a white sash around the left arm.”

“Representations having been made to the Continental Congress, of the great inequality in the pay of the Officers, and Soldiers of this Army; the first being lower than usual, and less than was ever given to Commission’d Officers, in any other service, whilst that of the Soldiers is higher. The Congress have been pleased to increase the pay of Captain to Twenty-six and ½ dollars—of a First Lieutenant to Eighteen Dollars, of a Second Lieutenant & Ensign, to thirteen & ½ Dollars pr Kalender Month each; to take place so soon as the New Regiments are compleated, to their full compliment of men. The Congress have given this encouragement to the Captains, and Subalterns, (whose pay was lower in proportion) with a view to impress upon their minds a due Sense of Gratitude; at the same time that it is intended to enable them to support the character and appearance of Gentlemen & Officers, which will add much to the reputation of the Regiments, and cannot but be pleasing to every man in it. It is expected, that the officers of the new formed Regiments, will exert themselves in the recruiting Service, and that they do not fail to report the number they have recruited, to their Colonels to morrow, that they may make returns thereof the day after, in order, that the Recruiting parties may be sent into the country, if any backwardness should appear here—When this happens, the Colonels of the Old Regiments are to be consulted, to prevent the Companies therein being left without officers.

“As Furloughs have been promised to the new inlisted men, none others can be indulged under any pretence whatsoever, and in order that these Furloughs may be given with some degree of Regularity, none but Colonels, or Commanding Officers of Regiments, upon the New Establishment are to grant them, and they respectively not to let more than fifty be absent at a time, beginning with those who inlisted first and going on in a regular Rotation, until all are indulged allowing each man ten days to be at home, and a sufficient time to go and return.”—*Orderly Book*, 17 November, 1775.

[1] Congress directed the general to “suspend the raising the two battalions of marines out of his present army,” and directed that they should be raised “independent of the

army already ordered for the service in Massachusetts Bay.” *Journals*, 27 November, 1775.

[2] Colonel Roger Enos commanded the rear division of the army under Arnold. When he arrived at the great Carrying-Place, between the Kennebec and Dead Rivers, he wrote to Colonel Arnold, who was then in advance, making inquiry about provisions. Arnold replied, that the stock was sufficient for twenty-five days. But before Enos got over the Carrying-Place, Major Bigelow was sent back from Colonel Greene’s division with ninety men for provisions. Enos supplied them, and marched onward till he overtook Colonel Greene fifty miles up the Dead River. Here he received orders from Arnold to furnish Colonel Greene with provisions enough for his men in their march to the settlements on the Chaudière River. After executing this order, he had no more than six days’ provisions left for his own troops. In this condition it was the opinion of the officers, that the rear division ought to return.

Such is Colonel Enos’s account, in his letter to Washington, and the court-martial acquitted him on the ground here assigned. But from Arnold’s letters since published, it would appear, that he did not represent the matter with perfect accuracy. On the 15th of October, Arnold wrote to him, that there were twenty-five days’ provisions. Arnold went forward, and wrote again on the 24th, from Chaudière Pond, that, on account of heavy rains, there had been a delay, and it would take twelve or fifteen days for the army to reach the inhabited country. He ordered Enos, therefore, and Greene, to select such a number of their best men, as could be supplied with fifteen days’ provisions, and send the others, with the sick, back to the commissary at Norridgewock. Instead of obeying this order, Enos gave his provisions to Greene, except enough for his division of the troops on their return to Norridgewock, and immediately retraced his steps with all his men.

Although he was acquitted by the court-martial, and received a lieutenant-colonel’s commission in the new army, yet he was not satisfied with the evidences he received of the good opinion of the Commander-in-chief, and in January he asked leave to resign. He was removed to Vermont, and in 1781 was appointed a general and commander of the militia of that state, and became somewhat conspicuous as an actor in public affairs.—*Collections of the Maine Hist. Soc.* vol. i., p. 364.—Ira Allen’s *Hist. of Vermont*, pp. 189, 206.

[1] “Resolved, that the 500,000 dollars lately ordered, be forwarded, with all possible expedition, to General Washington, that he may be enabled to pay such soldiers as will re-enlist, for the succeeding year, their wages for the months of October, November and December, and also advance them one month’s pay.” *Journals*, 1 December, 1775.

[2] Received and read in Congress November 27th.

[1] “The people on board the Brigantine *Washington* are, in general, discontented, and have agreed to do no duty on board said vessel; and say that they enlisted to serve in the army, and not as marines. . . . [These] people really appear to me to be a set of the most unprincipled, abandoned fellows I ever saw. . . . I am very apprehensive that

little is to be expected from fellows drawn promiscuously from the army for this business; but that if people were enlisted for the purpose of privateering, much might be expected from them.”—*William Watson to Washington*, 29 November, 1775.

[1] “As the General is informed that this is the season, in which the people of the four New England Governments lay in Provisions, Stores, &c. for the use of their families, he has recommended (in the strongest manner he is capable) the necessity of sending Money to Camp for the immediate payment of the Troops for the Months of October and November, and in order to enable those, who have again enlisted, and such others as are resolved to continue in service; to do this more effectually, he has also recommended them to the Congress, for one Months advanced pay, & has no doubt himself, of its being complied with, if money can be forwarded in time.

“No Soldier whenever dismissed, is to carry away any arms with him, that are good, and fit for service; if the Arms are his own private property, they will be appraised, and he will receive the full value thereof; Proper persons when necessary, will be appointed to inspect, and value, the arms so detained.”—*Orderly Book*, 20 November, 1775.

[1] The associate of Mr. Willard, on this mission, was Moses Child. These commissioners proceeded by land to the borders of Nova Scotia, where they were met by two proclamations of the Governor of that province; the one “warning all persons, that they do not in any manner, directly or indirectly, aid or assist with any supplies whatever any rebel or rebels, nor hold intelligence or correspondence with them, nor conceal, harbour, or protect any such offender, as they would avoid being deemed rebels and traitors, and proceeded against accordingly”; and the other, “forbidding any strangers to be in Halifax more than two hours, without making their business known to a justice of the peace, upon the pain and peril of being treated as spies.” The commissioners thought it prudent to return to Cambridge, where they reported little else, than that, “from their own knowledge, and the best information from others, about eight parts in ten of the inhabitants of Nova Scotia would engage in the common cause of America, could they be protected.” The grounds upon which they founded this opinion are not stated.

Another resolve was also passed by Congress, at the same time with the one cited in the above letter, by which General Washington was directed, “in case he should judge it practicable and expedient, to send into Nova Scotia a sufficient force to take away the cannon and warlike stores, and to destroy the docks, yards, and magazines, and to take and destroy any ships of war or transports there, belonging to our enemies.” No attempts were made to put this resolve in execution.

[1] Mr. Lund Washington was the agent for superintending General Washington’s plantations, and managing his business concerns, during the revolution. It was not known what degree of family relationship existed between them, though it was supposed, that they both descended from the same original stock. Their ancestors came to America at different times, doubtless emigrating from different parts of England, and the name is the only evidence of consanguinity, which either branch of the family possesses.

From the beginning to the end of the revolution, Lund Washington wrote to the General as often at least as two or three times a month, and commonly every week, detailing minutely all the events that occurred on the plantations, his purchases, sales, and payments of money, the kinds and quantity of produce, occupations of the laborers, and whatever else could tend to explain the precise condition and progress of the business in his hands. These letters were regularly answered by the General, even when the weight and embarrassment of public duties pressed most heavily upon him, and full instructions were returned for regulating the plans and conduct of the manager. Hardly any copies of this description of letters were recorded, if retained, and the originals have been lost or destroyed. But Lund Washington's letters are preserved, and they give evidence of the extraordinary attention bestowed by the Commander-in-chief on his domestic affairs, though several hundred miles from home, and bearing a burden of public cares, which alone was enough to distract and exhaust the firmest mind. *Sparks*.

[1] These breastworks, forming one of the strongest points in the American lines, were thrown up on the night of the 22nd, by Putnam and Knox, with the support of the regiments of William Bond and Eben Bridge.

[1] Congress had already provided for these measures, in the instructions given to a committee, R. T. Paine & Jno. Langdon, appointed to proceed to the northern army, for the purpose of conferring with General Schuyler on the affairs of his department. It is there stated, that "Congress desire you to exert your utmost endeavors to induce the Canadians to accede to a union with these colonies, and that they form from their several parishes a provincial convention, and send delegates to this Congress,"—and that "you use all the means in your power to perfect the raising of a regiment of Canadians." In fact General Montgomery had been beforehand with Congress in this respect, for he had said to the people, when he took possession of Montreal, on the 12th of November, that he "hoped to see such a provincial convention assembled, as would enter with zeal into every measure, that could contribute to set the civil and religious rights of that and her sister colonies on a permanent foundation." And he did not fail to use his best endeavors to induce as many Canadians as possible to join his standard. In this, however, he was less successful, than some sanguine persons had anticipated. Notwithstanding appearances, the Canadians proved themselves nowise inclined to be conquered into liberty.

"In whatever way the fate of this garrison may be determined, I flatter myself it will never depend on the assembling of Canadians, who must have rendered themselves equally contemptible to both parties." *Major Charles Preston to General Montgomery*, 1 November, 1775. Major Preston was the British commandant at St. Johns.

[1] An address from the general officers to the Continental soldiers, dated 24 November, 1775, is printed in Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, iii. 1666.

[1] See Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, iii., 1711-1713.

[1] “An express last night from General Montgomery, brings the joyful tidings of the Surrender of the City of Montreal, to the Continental Arms—The General hopes such frequent favors from divine providence will animate every American to continue to exert his utmost, in the defence of the Liberties of his country as it would now be the basest ingratitude to the Almighty and to their Country, to shew any the least backwardness in the public cause.”—*Orderly Book*, 28 November, 1775.

[2] Received in Congress, December 7th.

[1] “His Excellency is a great and good man. I feel the highest degree of respect for him. I wish him immortal honor. I think myself happy in an opportunity to serve under so good a general. My happiness will be still greater if fortune gives me an opportunity to contribute to his glory and my country’s good. But his Excellency, as you observe, has not had time to make himself acquainted with the genius of this people. They are naturally as brave and spirited as the peasantry of any other country; but you cannot expect veterans of a raw militia of only a few months’ service. The common people are exceedingly avaricious; the genius of the people is commercial, from their long intercourse with trade. The sentiment of honor, the true characteristic of a soldier, has not yet got the better of interest. His Excellency has been taught to believe the people here a superior race of mortals; and finding them of the same temper and dispositions, passions and prejudices, virtues and vices of the common people of other governments, they sink in his esteem. The country round here set no bounds to their demand for hay, wood and teaming. It has given his Excellency a great deal of uneasiness that they should take this opportunity to extort from the necessities of the army such enormous prices.”—*General Greene to Henry Ward*, 18 December, 1775.

[1] “As the troops are considered continental and not colonial, there must be some systematical plan for the payment without any reference to particular colonies; otherwise they will be partly continental and partly colonial. His Excellency has a great desire to banish every idea of local attachments. It is next to impossible to unhinge the prejudices that people have for places and things they have had a long connection with. But the fewer of those local attachments discover themselves in our plan for establishing the army the more satisfactory it must be to the Southern gentry. For my own part, I feel the cause and not the place. I would as soon go to Virginia as stay here. I can assure the gentlemen to the southward that there could not be any thing more abhorrent proposed, than a union of those [these] colonies for the purpose of conquering the southern colonies.”—*General Greene, to Governor Ward*, 16 October, 1775. It would have had great effect with the troops, who are exceedingly turbulent and even mutinous. My vexation and distress can only be alleviated by reflecting on the great public advantages, which must arise from my unparalleled good fortune. I shall clothe the troops completely, who engage again. I find with pleasure, that my politics have squared with the views of Congress, and shall lose no time in calling a convention, when my intended expedition is finished. Will not your health permit you to reside at Montreal this winter? I must go home, if I walk by the side of the lake, this winter. I am weary of power, and totally want that patience and temper, so requisite for such a command. I wish some method could be fallen upon of engaging *gentlemen* to serve. A point of honor, and more knowledge of the world to

be found in that class of men, would greatly reform discipline and render the troops much more tractable.

“The officers of the first regiment of Yorkers and artillery company were very near a mutiny the other day, because I would not stop the clothing of the garrison of St. John’s. I would not have sullied my own reputation, nor disgraced the Continental arms, by such a breach of capitulation, for the universe. There was no driving it into their heads, that the clothing was really the property of the soldier; that he had paid for it; and that every regiment, in this country especially, saved a year’s clothing to have decent clothes to wear on particular occasions.”

[1] General Montgomery wrote as follows to General Schuyler, the day after the capitulation of Montreal, 13 November:—

“I am exceedingly sorry that Congress have not favored me with a committee.

[1] “I cannot help complaining of distress when occasioned by man. There are a few in the army who monopolize, and distress us. A load of sea coal is just bought by them @ 10 dollars pr. chaldron, and we are forced to pay £3 5/ sterling for it. A quantity of rum was lately fairly purchased @ 2/8 pr. gallon; but it being in possession of the Admiral, the monopolizers gave ½ penny more and got it; and now rum is sold @ 9/ sterling by the hhd. A galled horse will not wince. I do not suppose the General knows of it.”—*Peter Oliver to Elisha Hutchinson*, 30 November, 1775.

[2] This capture of the brig *Nancy* was made by the schooner *Lee*, commanded by Captain Manly. The prize was taken to Cape Ann, “a very open harbor and accessible to large ships, which made me immediately send off Col. Glover and Mr. Palfrey with orders to raise the minute men and militia of that part of the country, to have the cargo landed without loss of time, and guarded up to this camp. This I hope they will be able to effect, before it is known to the enemy, what port she is carried into. . . . Manly has also taken a sloop in the ministerial service, and Capt. Adams, in the schooner *Warren* has taken a schooner laden with potatoes and turnips, bound to Boston and carried her into Portsmouth.” *Washington to Congress*, 30 November, 1775.

The *Nancy* contained among other stores 2000 muskets, 100,000 flints, 30,000 round shot, more than 30 tons of musket shot, eleven mortar beds, and a brass mortar weighing nearly 3000 pounds, to which Putnam gave the name Congress. *Centen. Evacuation*, 83 *Moylan to Reed*, 1, Reed, 133.

[3] “The fatal consequences which have at all times, and upon all occasions befallen Armies attacked at unawares, when men are scattered and remote from their posts, or negligent whilst at them, are too well known, and very often too unhappily felt, to stand in need of description; Whereas a handful of men prepared for an Attack, are seldom defeated. It is therefore ordered in the most express and preptory terms, that no non-commissioned officer or soldier, do presume under any pretence whatever, day or night, to be out of Drum call of his Alarm post, without leave of the Captain or commanding Officer of the Company he belongs to; and it is also as expressly

ordered, that no Non-Commissioned Officer, or Soldier, do pass from Cambridge, and the lines on this side the river to Roxbury, or come from thence hither, or go from either, to any other place in the neighbourhood, without a written pass from the Captain or Commanding Officer of the Company he belongs to, although he should not mean to stay more than an hour or two.

“The officers of each Regiment are to be subject to the same restraints, and to obtain leave in the same manner from the Colonel, or Commanding Officer of the Regiment they respectively belong to; and it is expected that all Officers, and Soldiers in this Army, will pay the strictest attention to this Order, as they shall answer the consequences. This order is not intended to change the mode of Giving Furloughs, (already pointed out in past orders) the sole design being to keep men to their duty, that they may be always ready to meet their enemy, upon the shortest notice.

“It is again, and again, expressly ordered, that an officer of each Company do, once a day, examine the Arms and Ammunition of the Company he belongs to, and see that they are fit for use. This and the foregoing orders, are to be frequently read to the men, and the usefulness of them strongly inculcated upon their minds; they are to be considered as standing orders till countermanded.”—*Orderly Book*, 1 December, 1775.

[1] J. Palmer on the part of the Council, and J. Warren and Col. Bowers, of the House of Representatives.

[2] “The behavior of our soldiers has made me sick; but little better could be expected from men trained up with notions of their right of saying how, and when, and under whom, they will serve; and who have, for certain dirty political purposes been tampered with by their officers, among whom no less than a *general* has been busy.”—*Silas Deane to his wife*, 15 December, 1775. the Information that was communicated to the Connecticut Troops of the Relief being ordered to supply their places, by the 10th of this Month; that many of them have taken their arms with them and gone off, not only without leave, but contrary to express orders, this is therefore to inform those who remain, that the General has sent an express to the Governor of Connecticut, with the names of such men as have left the Camp, in order that they may be dealt with in a manner suited to the Ignominy of their behaviour. The General also informs those who remain, that it is necessary for them to obtain a written discharge from the Commanding Officer of the Regt. they belong to, when they are dismissed on the 10th Instant that they may be distinguished from and not treated as Deserters.

“We had here exhibited the other day a scene pleasant enough. Some of the Connecticutians who were home sick could not be prevailed on to tarry, which means in New England dialect, to serve any longer. They accordingly marched off bag and baggage, but in passing through the lines of other regiments they were so horribly hissed, groaned at and pelted, that I believed they wished their aunts, grandmothers and even sweethearts, to whom the day before they were so much attached, at the Devil’s own palace.” *Chas. Lee to Benj. Rush*, 12 December, 1775. See i. *Greene’s Greene*, 139.

“The Colonels and commanding officers of the Connecticut Regiments, are to give in the Names of all those of their respective regiments for the purpose abovementioned.”—*Orderly Book*, 3 December, 1775.

“The General has been informed more than once or twice, that an Idea prevails amongst some of the First Lieutenants, upon the new establishment, that if their Captains do not recruit a company, the Command of it will be taken away, and given to such First Lieutenants, provided he can fill it up; which makes the First Lieutenants indifferent, and luke-warm, in the recruiting business, whence such an opinion could arise is not easy to say, but if it be possible, that there are any Officers in this army actuated by such principles, the General most positively assures them, that they not only deceive themselves, but if proof can be given of such a charge, such guilty enemies to their country, will with disgrace be dismissed from the Continental Army & service forever. The General thought it his duty to give them this public notice.”—*Orderly Book*, 22 November, 1775.

[1] Governor Trumbull wrote in reply:—“The late extraordinary and reprehensible conduct of some of the troops of this colony impresses me, and the minds of many of our people, with grief, surprise, and indignation; since the treatment they met with, and the order and request made to them, were so reasonable, and apparently necessary for the defence of our common cause, and safety of our rights and privileges, for which they freely engaged; the term they voluntarily enlisted to serve not expired, and probably would not end much before the time when they would be relieved, provided their circumstances and inclination should prevent their undertaking further.

“Indeed, there is great difficulty to support liberty, to exercise government, to maintain subordination, and at the same time to prevent the operation of licentious and levelling principles, which many very easily imbibe. The pulse of a New England man beats high for liberty; his engagement in the service he thinks purely voluntary; therefore, when the time of enlistment is out, he thinks himself not holden without further engagement. This was the case in the last war. I greatly fear its operation amongst the soldiers of the other colonies, as I am sensible this is the genius and spirit of our people. The union of the colonies and the internal union of each, are of the utmost importance. I determine to call the General Assembly of this colony to meet at New Haven on Thursday, the 14th instant. Please to notify me of any matters you think proper to suggest for consideration. You may depend on their zeal and ardor to support the common cause, to furnish our quota, and to exert their utmost strength for the defence of the rights of these colonies. Your candor and goodness will suggest to your consideration, that the conduct of our troops is not a rule whereby to judge of the temper and spirit of the colony.”

General Greene wrote that these Connecticut troops “met with such an unfavorable reception at home that many are returning to camp already. The people on the road expressed so much abhorrence at their quitting the army, that it was with difficulty they got provisions.”

[3] “It is with Surprise and Astonishment The General learns that notwithstanding

[1] “I am credibly informed that James Anderson, the consignee and part owner of the ship Concord and cargo, is not only unfriendly to American liberty, but actually in arms against us, being captain of the Scotch company at Boston. Whether your being acquainted with this circumstance will operate against the vessel and cargo, I will not take upon me to say; but there are many articles on board, so absolutely necessary for the army, that whether she is made a prize or not, we must have them.”—*Washington to the President of Congress*, 7 December, 1775.

[1] “I have by command of his Excellency General Washington, to inform you, that the Connecticut forces (deaf to the entreaties of their own as well as all other officers, and regardless of the contempt with which their own government threatens to treat them upon their return), have absolutely refused to tarry till the 1st. day of January, but will quit the lines on the 6th. of December. They have deceived us and their officers, by pretending there would be no difficulty with them, till they have got so near the close of their term, and now to their eternal infamy, demand a bounty to induce them to tarry only three weeks. This is such an insult to every American, that we are determined to release them, at the expiration of their term, at all hazards, and find ourselves obliged immediately to supply their place with troops from New Hampshire and Massachusetts Bay.”—*General Sullivan to the New Hampshire Committee of Safety*, 30 November, 1775.

[1] Mr. Lynch, who had been one of the committee of conference in camp, wrote to General Washington, after returning to Congress, in regard to the state of the army here described;—

“Providence favors us everywhere; our success in every operation exceeds our most sanguine expectations; and yet, when God is ready to deliver our oppressors into our hands, that men cannot be found willing to receive them, is truly surprising. With grief and shame it must be confessed, that the whole blame lies not with the army. You will find your hands straightened instead of strengthened. What the event will be, it is impossible to foresee; perhaps it is only intended to force the continent into their own terms, and to show that neither General nor Congress shall be permitted to control the army; perhaps to mortify the favorites of Congress. Be this as it may, resolution and firmness ought to rule our councils. A step yielded to improper and intemperate demands may be irretrievable.”

[1] Henry Babcock. “He has this day been very serviceable in assisting me in quelling a mutiny and bringing back a number of deserters.”—*Putnam to Washington*, 1 December, 1775.

[2] General Howe wrote to Lord Dartmouth, on the 3d of December, communicating intelligence of the loss of St. John’s and Montreal, and the retreat of General Carleton to Quebec, and expressing apprehensions that the entire province would fall into the hands of the invaders, as there was little reason to believe the capital would be able to withstand the expected attack. He added, also, that, supposing it possible the Americans might be encouraged by their successes in Canada, and the arms recently taken in the brigantine Nancy, and think of a project against Halifax, he should immediately send a reinforcement to that place. As the recovery of Canada was a

primary object, he recommended that the army for effecting it should consist of not less than twelve thousand fighting men, representing at the same time the inexpediency of abandoning the plan heretofore suggested of taking possession of Rhode Island and New York, since the enemy would be more distressed by an attack on this vulnerable side, than by any successes against them in Canada.—*M.S. Letter*.

The following intelligence was contained in a letter from General Howe, forwarded at the same time as the above. “The enclosed are original letters found in Mr. Cushing’s house. They are from Dr. Franklin and Mr. Stephen Sayre, and of a nature that points out the train carried on by these gentlemen to blow up this country into a rebellion.”

The troops in Boston suffered much for want of fuel. The following extraordinary order will show, that the destruction of houses to supply this want was far from being approved by the British commander.

“The frequent depredations committed by the soldiers in pulling down houses and fences, in defiance of repeated orders, have induced the Commander-in-chief to direct the Provost to go his rounds attended by the executioners, with orders to hang up, upon the spot, the first man he shall detect in the act, without waiting for further proof by trial.”—*General Howe’s Orderly Book*, December 5th.

[1] “I believe I told you that Broughton and Sellman were returned; they never entered the river St. Lawrence.”—*Moylan to Reed*, 2 January, 1776.

“My fears, that Broughton and Selman would not effect any good purpose, were too well founded. They are returned, and brought with them three of the principal inhabitants from the island of St. John’s. Mr. Callbeck, as president of the council, acted as governor. They brought the governor’s commission and the Province seal. As the captains acted without any warrant for such conduct, I have thought it but justice to discharge these gentlemen, whose families were left in the utmost distress.”—*Washington to the President of Congress*, 7 December, 1775.

Broughton and Selman commanded the two armed vessels heretofore mentioned, that had been despatched by Washington, in compliance with an order of Congress, to intercept in the River St. Lawrence two brigantines, which, it had been understood, were to sail from England to Quebec, laden with arms and ammunition, and without convoy. After a cruise of several days, the American captains discovered no such vessels, but they committed a very unjustifiable act in making a descent on the island of St. John’s, pillaging the defenceless inhabitants, and bringing away some of them prisoners. The gentlemen thus brought off, among whom was Mr. Callbeck, presented a memorial to General Washington, in which they stated, that the governor’s house and other private dwellings were broken open, and robbed of their plate, carpets, curtains, looking-glasses, table linen, wearing apparel, and whatever else was of value and could be taken away. This was done by the captains, of course, without a shadow of licence from their instructions, though apparently rather through ignorance of the customary rules of warfare, than by any conscious violation of the laws of equity and honor. Such conduct, however, could not fail to excite the indignation of the Commander-in-chief, and he released the captives immediately, treating them with all

possible kindness and respect. Orders were given for restoring the goods, which had been pillaged, and from the following note, written by Mr. Callbeck, it may be presumed, that he at least was satisfied.

“I should ill deserve the generous treatment, which your Excellency has been pleased to show me, had I not gratitude to acknowledge so great a favor. I cannot ascribe any part of it to my own merit, but must impute the whole to the philanthropy and humane disposition, that so truly characterize General Washington. Be so obliging, therefore, as to accept the only return in my power, that of my most grateful thanks.”

[1] “Manly is truly our hero of the sea; poor — [probably Martindale, commander of the Washington] is gone to England; his vessel was not at all calculated for the service; she was fitted out at an enormous expense, did nothing, and struck without firing a gun. Coit I look upon to be a mere blubber, and — — are indolent and inactive souls. Their time was out yesterday, and from frequent rubs they got from me (under the General’s wings) they feel sore, and decline serving longer.”—*Moylan to Reed*, 2 January, 1776.

[1] Received and read in Congress, 13 December, 1775.

[1] “It was mentioned to me yesterday in conversation that the militia of this government who were ordered in to supply the places of the Connecticut troops, are allowed 40/ per month of 28 days. The first I highly approved of, because I was unwilling to see any invidious distinction in pay, the never failing consequence of which is jealousy and discord. But, Sir, if the General Court of this Colony have resolved on the latter, you must give me leave to add, that it aims the most fatal stab to the peace of this army that ever was given, and that Lord North himself could not have devised a more effectual blow to the recruiting Service. Excuse me, Sir, for the strength of these expressions. If my information is wrong (I had it from General Heath, who says he had it from a member of your Court) they are altogether improper and I crave your pardon for them; if right my Zeal in the American cause must plead my excuse.”—*Washington to the President of the Council of Massachusetts Bay*, 6 December, 1775.

[1] “You entreat the general officers to recommend to Congress the giving of a bounty. But his Excellency General Washington has often assured us that the Congress would not give a bounty, and before they would give a bounty they would give up the dispute. The cement between the Northern and Southern colonies is not very strong if forty thousand lawful will induce the Congress to give us up.”—*General Greene to Governor Ward*.

[2] At this time the army at Cambridge was suffering much distress for the want of firewood and hay. The Assembly of Massachusetts undertook to supply these articles, by calling on the towns within twenty miles of Boston, to furnish at stated times specific quantities, according to the population of each town, and its distance from camp. This requisition was generally complied with by the selectmen and committees of the towns, although it was issued only in the form of a recommendation, and the wants of the army were effectually relieved. These supplies were furnished at the

charge of the colony. A committee of the Assembly was likewise authorized to procure wood from such woodlands as they thought proper, even without the consent of the owner, a reasonable price being paid for the wood thus taken away.—*Journal of the Assembly*, December 2d, 16th, and 23d.

[1] General Schuyler had written in the letter to which this is a reply;—“Nothing can surpass the impatience of the troops from the New England colonies to get to their firesides. Near three hundred of them arrived a few days ago, unable to do any duty; but as soon as I administered that grand specific, *a discharge*, they instantly acquired health, and rather than be detained a few days to cross Lake George, they undertook a march from here of two hundred miles with the greatest alacrity.

“Our army requires to be put on a different footing. Habituated to order, I cannot, without the most extreme pain, see that disregard of discipline, confusion, and inattention, which reign so generally in this quarter, and I am therefore determined to retire. Of this resolution I have advised Congress.”

[2] This was a favorite phrase with Washington. He uses it in his letter to Deputy Governor Cooke, p. 188 *ante*.

[1] On December 8th Congress appointed a standing committee, composed of one member from each Colony, to examine into and report upon the qualifications of such persons as might apply for offices in the Continental army. The names of the members are given in the *Journals*, 8 December, 1775, and 16 January, 1776.

“The General has great pleasure in thanking Col. Bridge and the Officers of the 27th. Regt. (who from a peculiarity of circumstances, or want of vacancies, have no appointment in the new established Army) for their polite address to him; he considers the assurances which they have given, of their determination to continue in service (if required) until the new Regiments are compleated, in a very favorable light, especially, as it is accompanied with further assurances, that the men of the 27th. Regt. are consenting thereto. Such a conduct, at this important crisis, cannot fail of giving pleasure to every well-wisher to his country, and next to engaging for another year, is the highest proof they can give, of their attachment to the noble cause of Liberty, at the same time that it reflects honor upon themselves, it may under providence give posterity reason to bless them, as the happy Instruments of their delivery from those chains which were actually forging for them.

“Four Companies of the New Hampshire Militia, are to march to Roxbury for the Reinforcement of that division; The Captain will receive Genl. Ward’s Orders what Regiments they are to be attached to; The rest of the New Hampshire Militia are to join the Brigades on Winter and Prospect hills, in Cambridge &c., and together with the Companies of Militia from Massachusetts, which are ordered to join Prescott’s, Greateon’s & Nixon’s Regiments are to be appointed to the new established Regiments, as the Majors and Brigadiers General shall think fit for the most equal distribution of them.

“The Captains of the several Militia Companies from the Massachusetts and New

Hampshire Governments, are to make exact Rolls of their Companies and return them signed without delay, to the Adjutant General.”—*Orderly Book*, 10 December, 1775.

[1]“There are limes, lemons and oranges on board, which, being perishable, you must sell immediately. The General will want some of each, as well of the sweetmeats and pickles that are on board, as his lady will be here today or tomorrow. You will please to pick up such things on board as you think will be acceptable to her, and send them as soon as possible; he does not mean to receive any thing without payment.”—*Moylan to William Bartlett*, 10 December, 1775.

[1]“I was much pleased to hear of the zeal of the people of Connecticut, and the readiness of the inhabitants of the several towns to march to this camp, upon their being acquainted with the behavior and desertion of their troops. I have nothing to suggest for the consideration of your Assembly; I am confident they will not be wanting in their exertions for supporting the just and constitutional rights of the colonies.”—*Washington to Governor Trumbull*, 15 December, 1775.

“I was in hopes that ours would not have deserted the cause of their country. But they seem to be so sick of this way of life, and so homesick, that I fear the greater part and the best of the troops from our colony would go home. The Connecticut troops are going home in shoals this day. Five thousand of the militia, three from this Province and two from New Hampshire are called in to take their place. There is great defection among their troops, but from the spirit and resolution of the people of that province, I make no doubt they will furnish their proportion without delay. New Hampshire behaves nobly; their troops engage cheerfully. . . . I sent home some recruiting officers, but they got scarcely a man, and report there are none to be had there.”—*General Greene to Governor Ward*, 10 December, 1775.

[1]“To reward and encourage Military Merit, The Congress thought proper to increase the pay of the Captains and Subalterns of the Continental Army; and as uniformity and decency in dress, are essentially necessary in Appearance & regularity of an Army His Excellency recommends it earnestly to the Officers to put themselves in a proper uniform—The Field Officers of each of the new Corps, will set the example, by cloathing themselves in a Regimental of their respective Corps, and it is not doubted but the Captains and Subalterns, will immediately follow the example: The General by no means recommends, or desires Officers to run into costly, or expensive Regimentals; no matter how plain, or coarse, so they are but uniform in their colour, Cut and Fashion; The officers belonging to those Regiments whose uniforms are not yet fixed upon, had better delay making their Regimentals until they are.”—*Orderly Book*, 11th December 1775:

[2]The proceedings of the court-martial are given in Force, *American Archives*, Fourth Series, iii., 1709.

[1]“A letter from General Washington dated 14th December being delivered by two strangers was read. *Resolved* that the same be committed to the Secret Committee, who are directed to confer with the bearers, and pursue such measures as they may

think proper for the interest of the United Colonies.”—*Journals of Congress* (MS.), 30 December, 1775.

[1] Congress determined on December 2 to send the recently equipped continental vessels against Lord Dunmore, and pilots were sent for from Virginia. Two of the best pilots, Edward Cooper and William Ballard, came up to Philadelphia soon after Christmas 1775, but the appearance of two British vessels in the Chesapeake, put an end to the attempt. *Richard Henry Lee to Arthur Lee*, 6 July, 1783.

[1] Henry Knox was appointed Colonel of the regiment of artillery by Congress, on the 17th of November.

[2] Conanicut is a small island opposite Newport, in Narraganset Bay. Captain Wallace landed on the island with a body of sailors and marines, burnt several houses, plundered the people's goods, and drove off the cattle.

[3] “I do myself the honor to address this letter to you by Mr. Prenet and another French gentleman, who arrived here [Providence] last night, with Captain Rhodes, from Cape François, who were despatched some time since from this place for powder. Mr. Prenet comes extremely well recommended to our committee, for providing powder, from a merchant of character, at the Cape. He hath proposals to make for supplying the United Colonies with arms and warlike stores. I am informed that the other gentleman is a person of some consequence.”—*Governor Cooke to Washington*, 11 December, 1775. “I have heard their proposals and plans for supplying the continent with arms and ammunition, which appear plausible, and to promise success. But not thinking myself authorized to enter into any contract respecting the same, and being not fully acquainted with the measures Congress have adopted for procuring these articles, I have prevailed upon them to go to Philadelphia, and recommended them, and a consideration of their plan, to that body, when the matter will be finally agreed upon, or rejected.”—*Washington to Governor Cooke*, 14 December, 1775.

Penet and Pliarne were merchants of Nantes in France, and were afterwards employed by Congress for furnishing military supplies. See note to the letter from *Washington to Congress*, 7 October, 1776, *post*.

[1] “Philadelphia, Nov. 22. Yesterday the Lady of his Excellency General Washington arrived here, upon her way to New England. She was met at the Lower Ferry by the officers of the different battalions, the troop of light horse, and the light infantry of the second battalion, who escorted her into the city.”—*Penn. Gazette*, 22 November, 1775.

“Philadelphia, November 29. On Monday last [the 27th], the Lady of His Excellency General Washington, the Lady of General Gates, J. Curtis, Esq; and Lady of Warner Lewis, Esq; set out for Cambridge. They were escorted by the Officers of the First and Second battalions, the Light Infantry of the First and Third battalions, and by the troop of horse.”—*Penn. Gazette*, November 29.

“New York, December 4. Wednesday evening [Nov. 29th] last arrived at Newark, in their way to the Provincial Camp at Cambridge, the Lady of his Excellency General Washington, the Lady of Adjutant-General Gates, John Custis, Esq; and his Lady, and Warner Lewis, Esq; they were escorted from Elizabeth-Town by the company of light horse, and most of the principal gentlemen of that borough; and on their arrival at Newark, the bells were set ringing, and Col. Allan’s company of minute men immediately mounted guard. About 10 o’clock on Thursday morning Lady Washington and Lady Gates, &c. escorted by a party of Elizabeth-Town light horse, and a great number of gentlemen and ladies from Newark, set out for Dobb’s Ferry, in order to pass the North-river at that place, in their way to the Provincial Camp.”—*Penn. Gazette*, December 6.

Mrs. Washington arrived in camp on the 11th of December. It seems, that some persons thought her in danger at Mount Vernon, which is accessible to armed ships of the largest size. Lund Washington had written to the General;—“Many people have made a stir about Mrs. Washington’s continuing at Mount Vernon, but I cannot think there is any danger. The thought I believe originated in Alexandria; from thence it got to Loudoun, and I am told the people of Loudoun talk of sending a guard to conduct her to Berkeley, with some of their principal men to persuade her to leave this place and accept their offer. Mr. John Augustine Washington wrote, pressing her to leave Mount Vernon. She does not believe herself in danger. Lord Dunmore will hardly himself venture up this river; nor do I believe he will send on that errand. Surely her old acquaintance, the attorney [John Randolph], who, with his family, is on board his ship, would prevent his doing any act of that kind. You may depend I will be watchful, and upon the least alarm persuade her to remove.”

[1] These jealousies were undoubtedly those exhibited between the Southern and New England delegates, of which some mention has already been made. Circumstances had tended to increase rather than diminish these jealousies, and as a result had seriously obstructed the action of Congress. The New Englanders were opposed to General Schuyler, while their democratic ideas were very displeasing to the South. When Harrison and Lynch visited the camp in October, what they heard not a little surprised them. “You ought, my friend to be a little more upon your guard in declaring your Republican sentiments to the Southern people. Virginians and Carolinians are not yet prepared for such doctrines. . . . They seem to me without exception to be exactly in the whimsical state of the prince of Liliput, hobbling with one high shoe and one low one—*homines qui nec totam servitatem pati possunt, nec totam libertatem*. . . . Poor Gates, who is as mad an enthusiast as Colonel Rumbold himself has frightened ’em out of their wits.”—*Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush*, 10 and 20 October, 1775. The prejudice was often personal. “One of our members of Congress [John Adams] sets out today for New England. Whether his intents be wicked or not, I doubt much; he should be watched.”—*Lynch to Washington*, 8 December, 1775. The decision to pay the troops by calendar months appears to have been a measure supported by the Southern colonies, as the New England colonies had already decided to pay by the lunar month; so also the opposition to a bounty came from the South. “You entreat the general officers to recommend to the Congress the giving of a bounty. But his Excellency, General Washington, has often assured us that the Congress would not give a bounty, and before they would give a bounty they

would give up the dispute. The cement between the Northern and Southern colonies is not very strong, if forty thousand lawful, will induce the Congress to give us up. Although I do not imagine that the necessity of allowing a bounty would have broken the Union, yet it was a sufficient intimation that the bare mention was disagreeable. . . . Most of the generals belong to the Northern governments; if the Congress refuse to hear their delegates, I apprehend they would the generals also.”—*General Greene to Samuel Ward*, 31 December, 1775. Also *John Adams to Joseph Hawley*, 25 November, 1775. The trade policy of Congress was regarded as bearing unequally on the different colonies, and was a subject of debate often and hotly. Behind all this was the contest between those who still hoped for a reconciliation with Britain, and those who were urging Congress to cut away all connection with the mother country. “It is almost impossible to move any thing [in Congress], but you instantly see private friendships and enmities, and provincial views and prejudices intermingle in the consultation.”—John Adams, II, 448. See also *General Greene to Samuel Ward*, 31 December, 1775.

[1] On November 7 Dunmore had issued a proclamation declaring the colony to be under martial law and summoning every person capable of bearing arms to resort to his Majesty’s standard, or be looked upon as traitors to his Majesty’s crown and government. But the part that gave the most offense to the colonists was the promise of freedom to all indentured servants, negroes and others “appertaining to rebels” who should join his troops. Congress interpreted this proclamation as one “tearing up the foundations of civil authority and government” within the colony of Virginia, and advised that such a form of government should be established as should best produce the happiness of the people and most effectually secure peace and good order in the colony during the continuance of the dispute with Britain. *Journals*, 4 December, 1775. A month before the proclamation was issued Dunmore had sworn “by the living God, that if any injury or insult was offered to himself, he would declare freedom to the slaves.” See John Adams, ii., 458.

[1] When Ethan Allen was captured at Montreal, he was taken before the British General, Prescott, who treated him not only with extreme rudeness, but cruelty. Allen writes, that, after receiving from him much personal abuse, “he ordered one of his officers to take me on board the Gaspee, schooner of war, and confine me, hands and feet, in irons, which was done the same afternoon I was taken.”—*Narrative, &c.*, p. 26. The account of this treatment was confirmed to General Montgomery, after he had taken Montreal; and when General Prescott fell into his hands, he gave notice to General Schuyler of his previous conduct.

[1] Alluding to Lord Howe, a brother of General Howe, who had been slain in the last war at the attack on Ticonderoga under General Abercromby. He was an officer of great merit, and extremely popular in the colonies. The province of Massachusetts caused a monument to be erected to his memory in Westminster Abbey.—Hutchinson’s *History of Massachusetts*, Vol. iii., p. 71.

[2] By sundry persons and accounts just from Boston, I am informed that the ministerial army is in very great distress for want of fresh provisions, and having received intelligence that there are two hundred fat cattle on Block Island, and some

transport vessels cruizing that way in quest of necessaries for the army, I must request you to have the cattle, &c., removed from thence, immediately; and from every other place where their ships can come and take them off. It is a matter of the utmost importance to prevent their getting a supply; if they can be hindered now, the advanced season of the year, and the inclement weather, which we may expect ere long, will put it out of their power.”—*Washington to Governor Cooke*, 17 December, 1775.

[3] The part of the above letter, concerning Colonel Allen, was written in consequence of an order from Congress. It had also been resolved by Congress, that an exchange of prisoners was proper, citizens for citizens, officers for officers of equal rank, and soldier for soldier.

General Howe in his reply, written on the 25th, after stating that Allen was in charge of General Carleton, and therefore outside of his command, added:—

“It is with regret, considering the character you have always maintained among your friends, as a gentleman of the strictest honor and delicacy, that I find cause to resent a sentence in the conclusion of your letter, big with invective against my superiors, and insulting to myself, which should obstruct any further intercourse between us.”

The day after receiving Washington’s letter, that is, on the 19th of December, General Howe wrote to Lord Dartmouth as follows:

“Mr. Washington, presuming upon the number and rank of the prisoners in his possession, has threatened retaliation in point of treatment to any prisoners of theirs in our power; and proposes an exchange, which is a circumstance I shall not answer in positive terms; nor shall I enter upon such a measure without the King’s orders. Your Lordship, has enclosed, a publication extracted from the minutes of the Continental Congress in reference to his Majesty’s proclamation of the 23d of August, on the principles of which Mr. Washington seems to have founded his threats.”—*MS. Letter*.

This proclamation declared the colonies to be in open rebellion against the crown, and all the King’s officers, civil and military, were ordered to give information of such persons as should be found aiding or abetting those, who were in arms against the government, or holding any correspondence with them, “in order to bring to condign punishment the authors, perpetrators, and abettors of such traitorous designs.” After considering this proclamation, the Congress declared and published, “that whatever punishment shall be inflicted upon any persons in the power of our enemies for favoring, aiding, or abetting the cause of American liberty, shall be retaliated in the same kind and the same degree upon those in our power, who have favored, aided, or abetted, or shall favor, aid, or abet the system of ministerial oppression. The essential difference between our cause, and that of our enemies, might justify a severer punishment; the law of retaliation will unquestionably warrant one equally severe.”—*Remembrancer*, Vol. i., p. 148.—*Journals of Congress*, December 6th, 1775.

[1] Colonel Kirkland was described by Lord Dunmore as an American “truly well-disposed to his Majesty’s service,” a man of “real worth and spirit.”

[2] See *Journals of Congress*, January, 1776. In the printed edition of these *Journals* two of the resolutions are omitted. I take them from *MS. Journal*. “*Resolved*, That the seizing and securing the barracks and castle of St. Augustine will greatly contribute to the safety of these Colonies, therefore, it is earnestly recommended to the Colonies of South Carolina, North Carolina and Georgia to undertake the reduction of St. Augustine, if it be thought practicable.

“*Resolved*, That the first resolution together with copies or extracts of such of the intercepted letters as tend to show the state of the forts and garrison at St. Augustine, be transmitted by express to Henry Middleton, and John Rutledge, Esqrs., members of Congress, to be by them laid before the committees directed to meet in consequence of the above resolution, and in case the enterprise be judged practicable, that immediate preparations be made by the joint force of the said Colonies and the expedition be undertaken without delay at the expence of the United Colonies.” The intercepted letters may be found in Force, *American Archives, Fourth Series*, iii.

[1] A hill on the west side of Boston.

[1] By the first resolve of Congress respecting these two battalions of marines, they were to be raised out of the army. Upon the representation of General Washington, that this would cause an interference with his arrangements, it was voted that the marines should be raised in addition to the proposed army. Congress had also empowered the Commander-in-chief to call out the militia in the New England colonies whenever he should find it necessary, and requested those colonies severally to afford him all the assistance in their power to effect this object.

[2] *Journals of Congress*, 5 January, 1776.

[3] Received by Congress, December 30. Referred to Lynch, Hooper, Wythe, Deane and J. Adams.

[1] “The evening before General Montgomery landed on the island of Montreal, Mr. Carleton embarked his garrison on board of some vessels and small craft, and made two attempts to pass our batteries near the mouth of the Sorel, but was driven back by Colonel Easton, who has behaved with bravery and much alertness. On the 19th Mr. Carleton, disguised as a Canadian, and accompanied by six peasants, found means to make his escape. Brigadier-General Prescott surrendered next day by capitulation.”—*General Schuyler’s Letter*.

[1] Major Rogers had been celebrated for his adventures and feats of valor in the French war as the companion of Putnam and Stark. He wrote a journal of those events, which is not without ability and interest. He was once governor of Michillimackinac. After the peace he lived in New Hampshire, and continued an officer on half-pay. Dr. Wheelock’s letter, from which the above is an extract, contains some other curious particulars about him; whether true or fabulous, the

reader must judge.

“On the 13th ultimo,” says Dr. Wheelock, “the famous Major Rogers came to my house, from a tavern in the neighbourhood where he called for refreshment. I had never before seen him. He was in but an ordinary habit for one of his character. He treated me with great respect; said he came from London in July, and had spent twenty days with the Congress in Philadelphia, and I forget how many at New York; had been offered and urged to take a commission in favor of the colonies; but, as he was now on half-pay from the crown, he thought proper not to accept it; that he had fought two battles in Algiers under the Dey; that he was now on a design to take care of some large grants of land made to him; that he was going to visit his sister at Moor’s Town, and then to return by Merrimac River to visit his wife, whom he had not yet seen since his return from England; that he had got a pass, or license to travel, from the Continental Congress; that he called to offer his services to procure a large interest for this college; that the reputation of it was great in England; that Lord Dartmouth and many other noblemen had spoken of it in his hearing, with expressions of the highest esteem and respect; that Captain Holland, surveyor-general, now at New York, was a great friend to me and the college, and would assist me in the affair; and that now was the most favorable time to apply for a large grant of lands for it.

“I thanked him for these expressions of his kindness; but, after I had shown some coldness in accepting it, he proposed to write to me on his journey, and let me know where I might reply to him; and he should be ready to perform any friendly office in the affair. He said he was in haste to pursue his journey that evening.”

About a month after visiting Dr. Wheelock, the Major appeared at Medford, near the camp, and wrote to General Washington requesting him to sign a certificate permitting him to travel unmolested in the country. Such a certificate or permit had been first granted by the Committee of Safety in Philadelphia, who, from suspicious circumstances, and because he was actually a British officer, had made him a prisoner, when he arrived in that place from England. The certificate was furnished to him in consequence of a parole, wherein he “solemnly promised and engaged on the honor of a gentleman and soldier, that he would not bear arms against the American United Colonies in any manner whatsoever, during the American contest with Great Britain”; and in his letter to Washington he says: “I love America; it is my native country and that of my family, and I intend to spend the evening of my days in it.” These professions being apparently sincere, Washington sent General Sullivan to examine him on certain points, and report the result. He owned the accuracy of Dr. Wheelock’s letter, except the part relating to Canada, which he denied, though he had been to the west of Albany. As no good reason appeared why he came to camp, or why he wished to travel through the country, the General did not think it expedient to receive a visit from him, nor to sign his permit; but as this had already been signed by the President of the New York Congress, and the Chairman of the New Hampshire Committee of Safety, he suffered the Major to depart at his option, and to enjoy such security as his papers, thus authenticated, might procure him.

There was a suspicion, strengthened by his subsequent conduct, that he was at this time a spy, or at least practising a very unworthy artifice for acquiring a confidence,

to which his political sentiments did not entitle him. Be this as it may, he soon after joined the enemy's ranks, and was raised to be a colonel in the British army, notwithstanding his parole of honor, and his love of America. It may be said, perhaps, in extenuation, that he considered his parole extorted from him at a time, when there were no just grounds for questioning his motives, and by an authority, which he did not feel bound to respect.—*Sparks*.

[1]“Should the force sailed from Boston, be destined for Rhode Island, I tremble for the consequences; as the colony, in its present exhausted state, cannot, without assistance defend the island. At their [the general committee] unanimous request, I apply to your excellency for a detachment from the Continental army of one regiment, to be stationed upon Rhode Island; and that you will please to appoint a general officer, to take command of the whole force there. They also desired me to inform you, that Gen. Lee would be very acceptable to the colony; and to request that the general officer who may be appointed, may set out immediately, to take command of the troops upon the island, and put it in the best posture of defence.”—*Governor Cooke to Washington*, 19 December, 1775.

Washington replied on the 20th: “Under my present instructions, and more especially in my present situation, I could not justify the sending a regiment from this line to you, unless there was an apparent design of landing a body of ministerial troops on Rhode Island; at present I do not think this is to be apprehended, as a deserter out of Boston since my last, is particular in declaring that only four companies amounting to little more than 100 men, embarked as was said for Halifax; agreeing with others that invalids and the officers of the 18th and 59th Regiments who are going home to recruit, had sailed for England.

“The intention of my last containing the information, as it was received was only designed to put you upon your guard, not that I expected a visit was intended you. If any small body of troops move from hence southerly, I have no expectation of their stopping short of Virginia, unless it should be on a pillaging party.”

[1]“Notwithstanding the great pains taken by the quartermaster general to procure blankets for the army, he finds it impossible to procure a number sufficient. He has tried the different places to the southward, without success; as what were there, are engaged to supply the troops in each place. Our soldiers are in great distress; and I know of no other way to remedy the evil, than applying to you. Cannot some be got from the different towns? Most houses could spare one; some of them many.”—*Washington to Governor Cooke*, and President of the New Hampshire Convention, 23 December, 1775. One hundred and eighty blankets were thus collected “full as large a number as I expected to procure” the governor wrote.

[1]“The Indians delivered us a speech on the 12th, in which they related the substance of all the conferences Col. Johnson had with them the last summer, concluding with that at Montreal, where he delivered to each of the Canadian tribes a war belt and the hatchet, who accepted it. After which they were invited to feast on a Bostonian and drink his blood, an ox being roasted for the purpose, and a pipe of wine to drink. The war song was also sung. One of the chiefs of the Six Nations that

attended at that conference, accepted of a very large black war belt with a hatchet depicted in it, but would neither eat nor drink, nor sing the war song. This famous belt they have delivered up, and we have now a full proof that the ministerial servants have attempted to engage the savages against us.”—*Schuyler to Congress*, 14 December, 1775.

[1] Allen Cameron, Doctor John Smith (or Smyth) and John Connolly were apprehended at Hagers Town by the Committee of Frederick County, Maryland, and some incriminating documents found on them. Connolly had been commissioned by Gage to raise a company in the back country and Canada, and was arrested when on his way to the Delaware Indians bearing a speech from Dunmore to enlist their efforts against the colonists. Cameron was to be appointed a lieutenant, and Smith, a surgeon in the new company. Both were Scotchmen. Connolly was kept a prisoner till the end of the war. A narrative of his experiences is printed in the *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 1888 and 1889. See also note to the letter of *Washington to Congress*, 30 January, 1776, *post*.

[2] “A gross calculation of the sum wanted to pay off the army upon the old establishment and to pay one month’s pay advance to the new established regiments, with the other necessary contingent and incidental charges.

To the pay of 34 old regiments for the months of October, November and December, averaged at £3500 each regiment	£119,000	
To the regiment of artillery for the same time,	3,960	
To the pay of 27 regiments, new establishment, for the month of January, at 1618.12 each,	43,502	
To the regiments of artillery for January	1,979	: 16
To 1376 dollars advanced each of the new corps to blankets	11,145	: 15
To a company of artificers for 4 months	880	: 8
To purchase of arms for the new regiments	15,500	
To the pay of 5000 militia for six weeks	20,000	
To the demands of the commissary general	50,000	
To the demands of the quartermaster general	5,000	
To 4 months’ expense of general Hospital estimated at	4,000	
To 4 months’ expense of the General and Staff Officers, estimated at	3,260	: 16
Lawful money	£278,228	: 15
reduced to dollars amount to	927,429	?

N. B. The five Connecticut regiments upon the old establishment are not included in the above account, they being gone home, and will be cleared off by the colony.”—*Enclosure in letter to Congress*.

[1] Peleg Wadsworth.

[2] Intelligence had been received from Boston, that eight large ships and two small ones sailed out of the harbor on the 16th. Four days afterwards General Lee set off for Newport, attended by a guard and a party of riflemen. He went and returned through

Providence, and was absent from camp ten days. Besides giving directions respecting the fortifications and other means of defence at Newport, he called before him several obnoxious persons, and tendered to them the oath of fidelity to the country. Two custom-house officers and another person, refusing to take the oath, were put under guard and sent to Providence.

[\[3\]](#) Read 3 January, 1776.

[\[1\]](#) “As the time is just at hand, when the Massachusetts, New Hampshire & Rhode Island Troops (not again inlisted) will be released from their present Engagement, the General recommends to them to consider what may be the consequence of their abrupt departure from the lines; should any accident happen to them, before the New Army gets greater strength, they not only fix eternal disgrace upon themselves as soldiers, but inevitable Ruin perhaps upon their country and families.

“It is from no dislike to the Conduct of the Officers that the General requests the men to stay without them but in the first place because it is unnecessary to burthen the Continent with a greater number of officers than are requisite to the men; and in the next, because it retards the forming and the proper Government of the new regiments. Those non-commissioned Officers & Soldiers therefore, who have their Countries welfare so much at heart, as to stay ’till the last of January, if Necessary, may join any Company in any of the new Established Regiments they please, provided they do not increase the number of Rank & File in such Company, to more than Seventy-six men, more than which no Company is to exceed—All the Officers & Soldiers at present of other regiments, but appointed to, or inlisted in Cols. Learned’s, Parson’s, Joseph Read’s, Huntingdon’s, Ward’s, Wyllys’ and Bailey’s Regiments, are to join them tomorrow, at which time any Officer or Soldier, in either of those regiments which belongeth to other regiments under the new Establishment are to join. In like manner all the Officers & Soldiers (under the new establishment) who belong to Colonels Prescott, Glover’s, Patterson’s, Sergeant’s, Phinney’s, Arnold’s, Greaton’s & Baldwin’s Regiments, are to join on Saturday next; when any Officers or Soldiers in either of those Regiments, belonging to other Regiments, are also to remove to them. On Sunday the same change is to take place with respect to Colonels James Read, Nixon’s, Stark’s, Whitcomb’s, Ross’, Varnum’s Hitchcock’s, Little’s, Webb’s, Bond’s, and Hutchinson’s Regiment.

“It is recommended to the Colonels of each of the above nam’d Regiments, to send officers at the time appointed to receive and march the men from the Regiments they are inlisted out of, to those they are to join, that it may be effected with more regularity and ease, and the change made with as little confusion as possible. It is expected of such men as are determined not to continue in the Service, another Campaign, that they will sell their Blankets to those who do, and are in want of them, the same thing is also recommended to the Militia.

“In appraising the Arms, the General expects that they be numbered and marked, in such manner, as the owners of them and the prices, may at any time be ascertained, upon the delivery of them by the Commissary of the stores. All Arms thus appraised, and taken for the use of the public must be delivered into the care of the Commissary

of the Ordnance Stores but may be redrawn immediately, if the Colonel will pass his Receipt for them and account for the delivery to his men.”—*Orderly Book*, 28 December, 1775.

[1] “I have the opportunity of acquainting you that Congress has just received a letter from General Washington enclosing a copy of an application of our General Assembly to him to order payment to four companies stationed at Braintree, Weymouth and Hingham. The General says they were never regimented, and he cannot comply with the request of the Assembly without the direction of Congress. A committee is appointed to consider the letter, of which I am one. I fear there will be a difficulty, and therefore I shall endeavor to prevent a report on this part of the letter, unless I see a prospect of justice being done to the Colony, till I can receive from you authentic evidence of those companies having been actually employed by the Continental officers, as I conceive they have been in the service of the Continent. I wish you would inform me whether the two companies stationed at Chelsea and Malden were paid out of the Continent’s chest. I suppose they were; and if so, I cannot see reason for any hesitation about the payment of these.”—*Samuel Adams to John Adams*, 15 and 16 January, 1776.

[1] “The General was in great hopes that a sufficient sum of money would have been sent from Philadelphia to have paid the troops for the months of October, November & December, but is sorry to inform them, that there is no more yet arrived than will allow one months pay, the advance pay to the New Army and Blanket Money, furnishing at the same time the Commissary & Qr. Mr. Generals, with such sums as are necessary for conducting business. The General has already wrote express to Congress for more money and hopes speedily to be furnished with a sufficient sum to pay them in full.”—*Orderly Book*, 29 December, 1775.

[1] *Journals of Congress*, 16 January, 1776.

[1] General Gates’ order (given on page 17 of this volume), excluded negroes from enlistments. On September 26 Edward Rutledge in Congress moved the discharge of all the negroes in the army, being strongly supported by many of the southern delegates; but the motion was lost. *Bancroft*. The conference committee considered the question “Ought not negroes to be excluded from the new enlistment, especially such as are slaves? All were thought improper by the council of officers.” And the decision was: “*Agreed*, that they be rejected altogether.”

The following extract from the *Orderly Book* is indicative of the spirit that prevailed in enlisting the new army.

“November 12th. To prevent such contentions, as have arisen from the same person being enlisted by different officers and for different regiments, it is positively ordered, upon pain of being cashiered, that no officer knowingly presume to enlist any soldier, who has been previously enlisted by another officer. When such a mistake happens undesignedly, the first enlistment is to take place. The officers are to be careful not to enlist any person suspected of being unfriendly to the liberties of America, or any abandoned vagabond to whom all causes and countries are equal and alike indifferent.

The rights of mankind and freedom of America will have numbers sufficient to support them, without resorting to such wretched assistance. Let those, who wish to put shackles upon freemen, fill their ranks with such miscreants, and place their confidence in them. Neither negroes, boys unable to bear arms, nor old men unfit to endure the fatigues of the campaign, are to be enlisted.”

This step was taken at the very time that Lord Dunmore in Virginia was promising freedom to all slaves who should repair to his standard and take up arms for the King. “As the general is informed that numbers of free negroes are desirous of enlisting, he gives leave to the recruiting officers to entertain them and promises to lay the matter before the Congress, who, he doubts not, will approve of it.”—*General Orders*, 30 December, 1775. On the 16th of January, 1776, Congress resolved: “That the free negroes, who have served faithfully in the army at Cambridge, may be re-enlisted therein, but no others.”

[1] Congress directed that Col. Gridley should be continued chief engineer in the army at Cambridge, if the General “thought proper,” and fixed the pay of assistants at 26? dollars a month.

[1] “Of the people on board is a member of their Provincial Congress, two other persons of note, whom Lord Dunmore had taken prisoners and ordered to Boston to be tried, it is supposed for their lives.”—*Anonymous Letter, Beverly*, 10 December, 1775. Matthews was a captain of the minute men. The *London Gazette*, 26 December, 1775, gives the name of the member of the Congress as Robinson.

[1] “He [Lee] has taken the Tories in hand and sworn them by a very solemn oath that they would not, for the future, grant any supplies to the enemy, directly or indirectly, nor give them any kind of intelligence, nor suffer it to be done by others, without giving information.”—*Greene Life of Greene*, 1., 125.

[2] Congress adopted this second suggestion, and fixed the pay at 33? dollars a month.

[1] Received in Congress January 15th. Referred to Wythe, Adams and Wilson.

“This day giving commencement to the new army, which, in every point of view is entirely Continental; The general flatters himself, that a laudable Spirit of emulation, will now take place, and pervade the whole of it; without such a Spirit, few Officers have ever arrived to any degree of Reputation, nor did any Army ever become formidable. His Excellency hopes that the Importance of the great Cause we are engaged in, will be deeply impressed upon every man’s mind, and wishes it to be considered, that an Army without Order, Regularity, Discipline, is no better than a Commissioned Mob; Let us therefore, when every thing dear and valuable to Freemen is at stake; when our unnatural Parent is threatening of us with destruction from every quarter, endeavour by all the Skill and Discipline in our power, to acquire that knowledge, and conduct, which is necessary in war. Our men are brave and good; men who with pleasure it is observed, are addicted to fewer vices than are commonly found in Armies, but it is subordination and Discipline (the life and soul of an Army) which next under providence is to make us formidable to our enemies, honourable in

our selves, and respected in the world; and herein is to be shown the goodness of the officer.

“In vain is it for a General to issue orders, if orders are not attended to, equally vain is it for a few officers to exert themselves if the same spirit does not animate the whole, it is therefore expected, (it is not insisted upon) that each Brigadier, will be attentive to the discipline of his Brigade, to the exercise of, and the conduct observed in it, calling the Colonels and Field Officers of every Regiment, to severe account for neglect, or disobedience of orders—The same attention is to be paid by the Field officers to their respective Companies of their Regiments, by the Captains to their subalterns and so on: and that the plea of Ignorance, which is no excuse for the neglect of orders (but rather an aggravation) may not be offer’d, it is ordered and directed, that not only every regiment, but every company do keep an Orderly Book, to which frequent recourse is to be had it being expected that all standing orders be rigidly obeyed, until altered or countermanded, It is also expected, that all orders which are necessary to be communicated to the men, be regularly read and carefully explained to them. As it is the first wish of the General to have the business of the Army conducted without punishment, to accomplish which, he assures every officer Soldier, that as far as it is in his power, he will reward such as particularly distinguish themselves, at the same time he declares that he will punish every kind of neglect or misbehavior, in an exemplary manner. As the great variety of occurrences and the multiplicity of business, in which the General is necessarily engaged, may withdraw his attention from many objects and things which might be improved to advantage, he takes this opportunity of declaring, that he will thank any officer, of whatsoever Rank, for any useful hints, or profitable Informations, but to avoid trivial matters; as his time is very much engrossed, he requires that it may be introduced through the channel of a General Officer, who is to weigh the importance before he communicates it.

“All standing orders heretofore issued for the Government of the late Army, of which every Regiment has, or ought to have copies, are to be strictly complied with, until changed or countermanded.”—*Orderly Book*, 1 January, 1776.

“It was with no small degree of surprise, that the General yesterday saw, after the repeated orders, that had been given for having the Tents (as soon as the Barracks were fit to be enter’d) returned to the Qr. Mr. General, several of them standing uninhabited and in a disgraceful ruinous situation, and moreover hears, that others serve only for bedding, the officers who have suffered this neglect, are informed that this is the last admonition that will be given on this head.

“It is expected that the commanding officers of Regiments, will be exceedingly attentive to the training, exercising and disciplining their men, bringing them as soon as possible, acquainted with the different Evolutions and Manœuvres, necessary to be practiced, and as nothing reflects more disgrace upon an officer or is more pernicious or dangerous in itself than suffering Arms to be in bad order; the General assures the Officers and men that he will never overlook, or pardon, a neglect of this kind. There are many practices in *regular service* highly worthy of Imitation but none more essential than this, and keeping soldiers always clean and neat; The first, is absolutely necessary for self preservation; the other for health and appearance; for if a Soldier

cannot be induced to take pride in his person he will soon become a Sloven, and indifferent to everything else, Whilst we have men therefore who in every respect are superior to mercenary Troops, that are fighting for *two pence* or *three pence* a day; why cannot we in appearance also be superior to them, when we fight for Life, Liberty, Property and our Country?”—*Orderly Book*, 3 January, 1776.

[1] Left blank in the original to guard against the danger of miscarriage. Read, “*without powder.*”

[1] The British commander had no design of taking immediate possession of Rhode Island or New York, as we have seen by former reference to his correspondence, although both these purposes were in prospect. The forces, that sailed from Boston, in the month of January, under command of General Clinton, were bound to North Carolina, with the intention to join Lord Cornwallis in a grand enterprise against that colony, which the ministry had planned several months before, in consequence of the reports and solicitation of Governor Martin. It was supposed, that there would be a general rising among the loyalists in that country, when supported by a formidable force, and supplied with arms, and thus a secure hold would be gained on all the southern provinces. The affair turned out to be a signal failure, as did most of those undertaken at the suggestion of the colonial governors and zealous partisans of the crown, whose wishes and hopes betrayed them into a deplorable ignorance of the state of the country and character of the people.

On the 13th of December, Governor Tryon wrote a letter to General Howe, dated on board his Majesty’s ship *Duchess of Gordon*, in the harbor of New York, informing him, that the spirit of rebellion was decreasing in that colony, and that five thousand regular troops only were wanting to restore commerce and the old government; that many counties were well affected, and in others were friends, who called for protection from the insults of the insurgents. If General Clinton, or some other officer, would come with a suitable force, Governor Tryon was ready to take the field under him, and believed he could collect a body of two or three thousand loyalists, provided he were authorized to put them on the establishment of regulars. At all events, he requested three thousand firearms, and one hundred thousand cartridges; but, in his present condition, he saw no prospect of getting ashore to resume his government.

General Howe replied, that it was impossible to send the force required at that time, as the army in Boston could not be divided, but he might expect the earliest assistance in the spring. Meantime he advised, that the willingness of the friends of the crown to take up arms should not be known, but rather that the insurgents should receive the impression of their neutrality, or even of their being dissatisfied with the government, since no troops had been sent to their support. In this idea he declined forwarding the arms and ammunition, because such a step, before they could be used, would only serve to alarm the insurgents. If it could be supposed possible to gain and keep possession of New York, with the force desired, it should be despatched without delay; but of such a result there could be no just hope.—*MS. Letters.*

[1] Read in Congress January 13th.

[1] “Notwithstanding the equipping of this fleet [ordered by Congress in October, 1775], the necessity of a common national flag seems not to have been thought of, until Doctor Franklin, Mr. Lynch, and Mr. Harrison were appointed to consider the subject and assembled at the camp at Cambridge. The result of their conference was the retention of the king’s colors or union jack representing the yet recognized sovereignty of England, but coupled to thirteen stripes alternate red and white emblematic of the union of the thirteen colonies against its tyranny and oppression, in place of the hitherto loyal red ensign.” Preble, *Origin and Progress of the Flag of the United States*, 152. The same work gives much interesting information on this raising of the flag, taken from American and English sources.

[1] Sparks says: “At this time Governor Tryon, who was on ship-board in the harbour of New York, had spies in Philadelphia, who informed him of every occurrence. They even obtained extracts from the journals of Congress, wrote down the resolves, the appointment and doings of committees, the opinions of many of the delegates, their conversations, projects, and aims, all of which were forwarded through Governor Tryon and General Howe to the British ministry. In this way General Howe was made acquainted with the details of the fitting out of the fleet at Philadelphia, about to sail under Commodore Hopkins. Each vessel was minutely described, with the number of guns, weight of metal, number of men, names of the officers, and other particulars.” James Brattle, who had formerly lived with Tryon, was now a servant of James Duane, a member of the Continental Congress, whose minutes he was in the habit of copying and sending to the British.—Force, *American Archives, Fourth Series*, v., 44.

[1] “The regimentals which have been made up, and drawn for, may be delivered to the respective Colonels by the Qr. Mr. General, to the Order of those Colonels, who drew them at such prices, as they have cost the Continent, which is much cheaper than could otherwise be obtained.—As nothing adds more to the appearance of a man, than dress, and a proper degree of cleanliness in his person, the General hopes and expects that each Regiment will contend for the most Soldierlike appearance.

“He is also very desirous of having the men instructed, as speedily as possible in all parts of their duty, and recommends it to all the Colonels, to be very careful in the choice of their non-commissioned officers, and to their Captains, to divide their companies into small squads, appointing a Sergeant and Corporal to each, from whom the utmost dilligence is expected. Those Sergeants and Corporals are by no means to suffer the Arms and Accoutrements of any man in their Squads, to be dirty or unfit for use, and as far as in them lies, to make the men appear neat, clean, and soldier-like.—Neglect of duty in these Instances, they may rely upon it will reduce them to the ranks.—These Orders are not intended to exempt the commissioned officers of the Companies, from the strictest attention to these things; on the contrary, as it serves to show the General’s solicitude in having the men, and their arms appear in the best order, it is hoped they will double their dilligence.”—*Orderly Book*, 5th January, 1776.

[1] Wallace had made himself very unpopular by interrupting the trade of the port, stopping and detaining vessels, and even taking possession of private property. When provisions were withheld from his vessels by the townspeople he intercepted ferries,

market and fish boats, and thereby reduced Newport to a state of so great distress that the Assembly permitted it to make an arrangement with Wallace for supplying the fleet with provisions on condition that he would not interfere with the town. (October, 1775.) This arrangement was continued, and could not but call out criticism. *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island*, vii, 381, 389, 420, 460. The Assembly authorized a certain allowance of beef and beer to be supplied “so long as he [Wallace] shall remain peaceably within the colony, without committing any depredations upon the islands, or upon any of the lands of the colony.” Do. 439. Mr. Ward, one of the Rhode Island delegates in the Continental Congress, to which body the matter was referred, wrote: “We should not do justice to the benevolence of Congress, or to the distressed situation of the town, if we did not acquaint you, that all the gentlemen who spoke in this debate, expressed the most tender regard for the distressed people; and gave it as their opinion, that, as long as the ships of war now in our harbor, could be supplied with fresh provisions, beer and such like necessaries, merely for their own immediate support, consistently with the great principles of the general good and safety of America, the town ought to be permitted to furnish them; the greatest care being taken by government, that no more than the barely necessary supplies be furnished them from time to time, lest the common enemy in other parts of the continent, should through them obtain provisions.” In consequence of this partial endorsement the Assembly voted to continue the supplies; but as Wallace might “cannonade, and even burn the town, a discretionary power, by a private vote, which it is designed should be kept a profound secret, is given to the commander of the forces on Rhode Island, to permit supplies, in cases of imminent danger, until the next session.”—*Governor Cooke to Washington*, 21 January, 1776.

[1] “You will excuse me for reminding you of our conversation the other evening, when I informed you, that General Lee’s departure for New York is advisable upon the plan of his letter, and, under the circumstances I then mentioned, ought not to be delayed. In giving me your opinion of this matter, I have no doubt of your taking a comprehensive view of it; that is, you will not only consider the propriety of the measure, but of the execution; whether such a step, though right in itself, may not be looked upon as beyond my line.

“If it could be made convenient and agreeable to you to take pot-luck with me to-day, I shall be very glad of your company, and we can talk the matter over at large. Please to forward General Lee’s letter to me.”—*Washington to John Adams*, 7 January, 1776.

[2] Washington wrote to the Committee of Safety of New York on the following day;—

“I have thought it expedient to despatch Major-General Lee, with such volunteers as he can quickly assemble on his march (for I have not troops to spare from hence, if the distance and time would admit of it), to put the city of New York in the best posture of defence, which the season and circumstances will admit of. To his instructions, which I have desired him to lay before you, I beg leave to refer; firmly persuaded, that your honorable body will give every assistance in their power to facilitate the end of his coming, as there needs no other argument, than a retrospective

view of the conduct of the ministerial troops in Boston, and the consequences resulting from it, to prove what a fatal stab it would give to the interests of America, to suffer the city of New York to fall into the hands of our enemies.”

[1] General Lee was just returned to camp from Newport, and had written to the Commander-in-chief;—“New York must be secured, but it will never, I am afraid, be secured by due order of the Congress, for obvious reasons. They find themselves awkwardly situated on this head. You must step in to their relief. I am sensible that no men can be spared from the lines, under present circumstances; but I would propose that you should detach me into Connecticut, and lend your name for collecting a body of volunteers. I am assured that I shall find no difficulty in assembling a sufficient number for the purposes wanted. This body, in conjunction (if there should appear occasion to summon them) with the Jersey regiment, under the command of Lord Stirling now at Elizabethtown, will effect the security of New York, and the expulsion or suppression of that dangerous banditti of tories, who have appeared on Long Island with the professed intention of acting against the authority of the Congress. Not to crush these serpents, before their rattles are grown, would be ruinous.

“This manœuvre I not only think prudent and right, but absolutely necessary to our salvation; and if it meets, as I ardently hope it will, with your approbation, the sooner it is entered upon the better; indeed, the delay of a single day may be fatal.”

Mr. Adams replied in writing to General Washington’s letter, highly approving the plan, and spoke on one point of inquiry as follows.—“That it is within the limits of your Excellency’s command, is, in my mind, perfectly clear. Your commission constitutes you Commander of all the forces now raised, and of all others who shall voluntarily offer their service, and join the army for the defence of American liberty, and for repelling every hostile invasion thereof; and you are vested with full power and authority to act as you shall think for the good and welfare of the service.”

[1] See *Journals of Congress*, 3 January, 1776.

[2] Captain Sears had been most zealous and efficient among the *sons of liberty* in New York, and had acted a conspicuous part in that city during the excitements occasioned by the Boston Port-Bill, and afterwards. He had also been a member of the New York Provincial Congress. At this time he was in Washington’s camp, and was sent forward in advance of General Lee to promote the raising of volunteers in Connecticut.—See *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, Vol. i. pp. 65, 74.

[1] “The General thanks Major Knolton, and the Officers and Soldiers, who were under his command last night, for the spirit, Conduct and Secrecy, with which they burnt the Houses, near the enemy’s works, upon Bunkers-Hill. The General was in a more particular manner pleased, with the resolution the party discovered in not firing a Shot, as nothing betrays greater signs of fear, and less of the Soldier, than to begin a loose undirected and unmeaning Fire, from whence no good can result, nor any valuable purposes answer’d.

“It is almost certain, that the enemy will attempt to revenge the Insult, which was cast

upon them last night, for which reason the greatest Vigilance, and Care, is recommended, as it also is, that the out-posts be always guarded by experienced Officers, and good Soldiers who are to be considered in other duties. It is also again, and again ordered that the men are not suffered to ramble from or lie out of their quarters contrary to repeated orders, on this head, and that their Arms, and Accoutrements be always in order.

“To remove present doubts and prevent future mistakes, it is hereby expressly ordered and directed, that no person do proceed to discharge the duty of any Office, with-out a regular appointment by Commission from the Congress Warrant or General Order from the Commander in Chief; no allowance will be made to any one, who acts contrary to this order: All Persons therefore for their own-sakes are desired to take notice of it, and govern themselves accordingly, that no Complaints may hereafter be exhibited for services unwarranted.”—*Orderly Book*, 9 January, 1776.

[1] William Alexander, known by the title of the Earl of Stirling, was born in New York. He served in a military capacity, during the former war, under General Shirley, and passed several years in England. While there, he made a claim to the Scottish earldom of Stirling, which he was believed to have legally established, but the decision of the House of Lords was unfavorable. By courtesy, however, the title was always afterwards granted to him. On his return to America, he took up his residence in New Jersey. He was by Congress appointed colonel of the first battalion of New Jersey troops, on the 7th of November, 1775, and in March following was raised to the rank of brigadier-general. A brief and well written sketch of the life of Lord Stirling may be found in Sedgwick’s *Memoir of the Life of William Livingston*, p. 213.

[1] Read in Congress January 22.

[1] The following order, issued by General Howe, presents a somewhat curious picture of the habits and appearance of the soldiers under his command in Boston.

“The commanding officer is surprised to find the necessity of repeating orders, that long since ought to have been complied with, as the men on all duties appear in the following manner, viz. hair not smooth and badly powdered, several without slings to their firelocks, hats not bound, pouches in a shameful and dirty condition, no frills to their shirts, and their linen very dirty, leggings hanging in a slovenly manner about their knees, some men without uniform stocks, and their arms and accoutrements by no means so clean as they ought to be. These unsoldierlike neglects must be immediately remedied.”—*General Howe’s Orderly Book*, January 13th.

In this state of discipline it required some assurance in General Howe to write to Lord Dartmouth, as he did a short time before: “We are not under the least apprehension of an attack upon this place from the rebels by surprise or otherwise, as taken notice of in your Lordship’s letter; on the contrary, it were to be wished, that they would attempt so rash a step, and quit those strong intrenchments to which they may attribute their present safety.”

“His Excellency the commander in Chief, having been pleased to order an

Advertisement in the several newspapers of this, and the adjoining Colonies commanding ‘all officers, non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers now absent upon any leave or pretence whatsoever to join their respective Regiments at Roxbury & Cambridge, by the First day of February next, and all officers neglecting to pay due obedience thereto, will be forthwith cashiered, and every non-commissioned officer, or soldier failing therein to be tryed and punished as Deserters.’ The Colonels and commanding officers of Regiments, and Corps, are now positively ordered, not to grant any more furloughs, or leaves of absence to any officers, non-commissioned officers, or soldiers, any former Order, or permission heretofore given notwithstanding. His Excellency therefore expects every Colonel & Commanding Officer of Regiments & Corps, will direct all those absent from their Regiments or Corps, to pay strict obedience to this Order, that no person may plead, or be allowed to plead Ignorance thereof.”—*Orderly Book*, 12 January, 1776.

[1] A letter of same tenor to Gov. Cooke and Matthew Thornton.

“We are obliged to retain their guns, whether private or public property. They are prized and the owners paid; but as guns last spring were very high, the committee that values them sets them much lower than the price they were purchased at. This is looked upon to be both tyrannical and unjust. I am very sorry that necessity forces his Excellency to adopt any measures disagreeable to the people. But the army cannot be provided for in any other way.”—*General Greene*. On January 4 he again wrote: “Undoubtedly the detaining of arms being private property is repugnant to many principles of civil and natural law, and hath disgusted many. But the great law of necessity must justify the expedient till we can be otherwise furnished.

[1] Read in Congress January 25th. Referred to the Committee of Correspondence.

[1] See Moore, *Diary of the Revolution*, i., 193.

[1] “On the oath of one Richardson, an American and an officer, who swore that Sayre, a late patriot and banker of bad credit, had come to him in the Tower, and taking him into a private room, had offered him 1500*l.* to assist him in seizing the Tower, and the King as he went to the House of Lords, and then force him to call a new Parliament, they held a council and sent for Lord Mansfield and the Attorney-General; the first was afraid to appear, and the latter would not, laughing at the folly of the charge, as everybody did the moment they heard it. They could get nobody but blind Justice Fielding and his clerk. However, on so absurd an allegation, supported but by one witness, Lord Rochford sent messengers the next morning to Sayre’s house, who, for fear he should escape, told a lie, and said they had got a forged note of hand to talk to him about. He came to them, and they seized him and carried him before Lord Rochford, where he behaved very civilly, but first sent for Reynolds, Wilkes’s lawyer, for his counsel. As he had been sheriff, they pretended that in compliment to the city they committed him to the Tower, allowing nobody but his wife to have access to him. Richardson, the evidence, proved to have a very bad character. The Ministers, it was supposed to justify their proceedings had intercepted treasonable letters of Sayre to America. That this man . . . had talked indiscreetly, was probable. 23 October, 1775, 28th. Sayre was carried by Habeas Corpus before Lord

Mansfield, whose dastardly spirit again displayed itself by his profuse civility to Sayre, whom he allowed to be bailed.”—Walpole, *Journal of the Reign of King George the Third*, i., 508, 515.

[1] General Schuyler had written to Washington, intimating his desire and intention to leave the army, and closing his remarks on the subject as follows:

“I have already informed you of the disagreeable situation I have been in during the campaign; but I would waive that, were it not that it has chiefly arisen from prejudice and jealousy; for I could point out particular persons of rank in the army, who have frequently declared, that the general, commanding in this quarter, ought to be of the colony from whence the majority of the troops came. But it is not from opinions or principles of individuals, that I have drawn the following conclusion, *that troops from the colony of Connecticut will not bear with a general from another colony*; it is from the daily and common conversation of all ranks of people from that colony, both in and out of the army. And I assure you, that I sincerely lament, that people of so much public virtue should be actuated by such an unbecoming jealousy, founded on such a narrow principle; a principle extremely unfriendly to our righteous cause, as it tends to alienate the affections of numbers in this colony, in spite of the most favorable constructions, that prudent men and real Americans amongst us attempt to put upon it. And although I frankly avow, that I feel a resentment, yet I shall continue to sacrifice it to a nobler object,—the weal of that country in which I have drawn the breath of life, resolved ever to seek with unwearied assiduity for opportunities to fulfil my duty to it.”

[1] Respecting General Prescott’s harsh treatment of Ethan Allen, and the prisoners taken with him at Montreal.

[2] That is, in regard to his having been with the enemy in Canada.

[1] The Caghnawagas were a tribe of Indians, residing on the River St. Lawrence, a few miles above Montreal. A party of them had visited General Schuyler, and proposed to go forward to the camp at Cambridge.

[2] Mr. Gamble was a deputy quartermaster-general in the British army, and made prisoner with General Prescott after the capitulation of Montreal. He had solicited permission to go to Quebec on his parole.

[1] “I think the service has suffered and the enlistments been embarrassed, by the low state in which you keep your treasury here. Had the general been able to have paid off the old army to the last of December, when their term expired, and to give assurances for the pay of the militia when their continuance in the army should end, it might have produced many good effects—among others added some thousands to the army. You will be surprised, perhaps, when I tell you there is but about 10,000 dollars here; and that left by the necessary parsimony of the general, not knowing what occasion there might be for a little. The time for which our militia came in, ends to-morrow. We have presumed so much on the public spirit of our countrymen as to make no other provision, though everything depends on their staying, and they wish to be at home.

Our house adjourned yesterday morning, and the members went down among them to use their influence. I flatter myself most of them will stay to the last of this month.”—*James Warren to Samuel Adams*, 14 January, 1776. (Massa. Hist. Soc. Proc. xiv., 277.

[1] The views of the British commander in Boston, respecting the state of affairs at this time, may be known by the following extract from a letter, dated on the 16th of January, and written by him to Lord Dartmouth.

“From what I can learn of the designs of the leaders of the rebels,” says General Howe, “they seem determined, since the receipt of the King’s speech among them, to make the most diligent preparations for an active war; and it is my firm opinion, that they will not retract until they have tried their fortune in a battle, and are defeated. But I am under the necessity of repeating to your Lordship, that the apparent strength of the army for the spring does not flatter me with the hopes of bringing the rebels to a decisive action. With a proper army of twenty thousand men, having twelve thousand at New York, six thousand at Rhode Island, and two thousand at Halifax, exclusive of an army for the province of Quebec, the present unfavorable appearance of things would probably wear a very different aspect before the end of the ensuing campaign. With fewer troops, the success of any offensive operations will be very doubtful, the enemy possessing advantages that will not readily be overcome by a small force; neither is their army by any means to be despised, having in it many European soldiers, and all or most of the young men of spirit in the country, who are exceedingly diligent and attentive to their military profession.”

[1] President of the New Hampshire.

[1] The proposition was, that General Washington should send, with all possible despatch, a reinforcement of three thousand men into Canada, by the way of Onion River and Lake Champlain.

[1] Congress had already resolved, before the news of the failure of the attack on Quebec reached them, that nine battalions should be kept up and maintained the present year for the defence of Canada. Among these was included a battalion of Canadians, to be commanded by Colonel James Livingston. It was likewise determined to raise a second Canadian regiment, to consist of one thousand men divided into four battalions, and commanded by a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and four majors. Moses Hazen was appointed colonel. Both he and Livingston were residents in Canada, and took an active part with the colonies at the beginning of the contest. Hazen was a captain on half pay, and Congress agreed to indemnify him for any loss he might sustain by entering into their service. The *Articles of War* were translated into French, and printed copies sent to Canada.—*Journals of Congress*, January 8th, 22d, 23d.

[1] The repulse of the American forces in Canada aroused Congress to a little more energy in considering the needs and situation of the army. The pressing emergency being provided for so far as “resolves” could provide for it, attention was directed to the future conduct and determination of military matters, and the expediency of

establishing a “war office” was suggested. A committee of seven was appointed on January 24 to report on the matter, and the members chosen were Lynch, Franklin, Rutledge, Harrison, Ward, Samuel Adams, and Morris. The report was handed into Congress on April 18th, but was not adopted until June 12, when the name of the proposed Board was made “Board of War and Ordnance.” On the following the members were chosen: John Adams, Sherman, Harrison, Wilson and E. Rutledge.

[2] Now Charlestown, in New Hampshire, on the Connecticut River.

[1] When the Congress took this letter into consideration, they resolved that the conduct of the General in calling for these troops “was prudent, consistent with his duty, and a farther manifestation of his commendable zeal for the good of his country.”—*Journals*, January 20th.

[1] A council of war was convened on the 16th of January, in which the General stated it to be “in his judgment indispensably necessary to make a bold attempt to conquer the ministerial troops in Boston before they could be reinforced in the spring, if the means could be provided, and a favorable opportunity should offer,” and he desired the opinion of the council. It was agreed that such an attempt ought to be made, but that the present force was inadequate; and the council advised the Commander-in-chief to request of the neighboring colonies thirteen regiments of militia, to serve till the 1st of April; that is, from Massachusetts seven regiments, Connecticut four, and New Hampshire two. Rhode Island was exempted from this call, “on account of the repeated insults of the enemy’s ships of war, and the exposed situation of the sea-coast of that colony.”

On the 16th, another council was held to consider the letters received the evening before from Canada, conveying intelligence of the fall of Montgomery and the disaster at Quebec. When the question was put, it was resolved to be inexpedient, in the present weakened state of the lines, to send a detachment from the main army to Canada; but it was determined to request Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire to raise three regiments of 728 men each, with all possible despatch for the Canada expedition, whose time of service should continue till the 1st of January following; and it was decided, that these three regiments should be considered as a part of the thirteen already required, leaving ten only for the army at Cambridge.

[1] Read January 27th. Referred to Lynch, Wythe, Sherman, Ward and S. Adams. Lynch did not serve on the Committee although his name is endorsed on the letter.

[1] “The Colonel or Commanding Officer of each Regiment, is forthwith to send out one, or two prudent and sensible officers, to buy up such arms as are wanted for his regiment, These officers to be also good Judges of arms, and they are directed to purchase none, but such as are proper and in the best repairs, and if possible to get them with Bayonets, but not to refuse a good firelock without— The officers going upon this duty, are to be furnished with cash from their respective Colonels, or Commanding Officers, out of the money designed for the month’s advance pay, for the Recruits, which money will be replaced as wanted.—The names of the officers sent upon this business, with sums advanced them, are to be, immediately returned to

the Adjutant General by the Colonels—These officers are not to be absent longer, than the 4th of February next.

“All Recruits who shall furnish their own arms (provided they are good) shall be paid one dollar for the use of them, shall have the Privilege of carrying them away when their time is out, and in case they are lost (through no default of their own) shall be paid for them, at the end of the campaign.”—*Orderly Book*, 21st January, 1776.

[1] See *Journal of Congress*, January 3d and 10th.

[2] For an account of General Lee’s proceedings in New York, see the *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, vol. i., pp. 74-88.

[1] In June, 1775, the New York Provincial Congress had formed a scheme for raising a battalion, to consist of four regiments, and on the 30th of that month Alexander McDougall was appointed colonel of the first regiment. He had been extremely zealous in the cause of liberty, acting at an early hour a bold and decided part, by a correspondence with leaders in the other colonies, and by promoting efficient measures in New York. Two or three years before, he had been imprisoned by the old colonial Assembly, on suspicion of writing and publishing his sentiments too freely concerning the character and deliberations of that body. His principles and conduct throughout the war accorded with these early pledges of fidelity to his country’s interests.

[1] “Knox tells me he is convinced from Schuyler’s conversation that he wishes to be excused acting as general, and Worcester [Wooster], it is upon all hands agreed, is too inferior for that service.”—*Gates to Charles Lee*, 22 Jan’y, 1776. *Lee Papers*, i., 251.

[1] “1776, January 24, Wednesday. Began my journey to Philadelphia. Dined at C. Mifflin’s, at Cambridge, with G. Washington and Gates and their ladies, and half a dozen sachems and warriors of the French Caghnawaga tribe, with their wives and children. Williams is one who was captured in his infancy and adopted. There is a mixture of white blood, French or English, in most of them. Louis, their principal, speaks English and French, as well as Indian. It was a savage feast, carnivorous animals devouring their prey; yet they were wondrous polite. The General introduced me to them as one of the grand council fire at Philadelphia, upon which they made me many bows and a cordial reception.”—John Adams’ *Diary*, *Works*, ii., 431.

[2] Read in Congress, February 9th. Referred to Chase, J. Adams, Penn, Wythe, and Rutledge.

“Neither Provisions, nor the Value of them, are to be issued to Officers or Soldiers when upon Furlough, Furloughs are always considered as injurious to the service, but too often granted for the gratification of Individuals—The General therefore, was not a little surprised to find, that it had contrary to custom and common Justice, become a question, whether absentees, were not entitled to the same allowance of provisions, as if they were present and actually doing duty.”—*Orderly Book*, 24 January, 1776.

[3] The party of troops that attacked the city under Arnold, the most of whom were taken prisoners.

[1] General Schuyler replied in regard to these Indians: “It is extremely difficult to determine what should be done, in what you mention respecting the offer made by the Caghnawaga Indians; but if we can get decently rid of their offer, I would prefer it to employing them. The expense we are at in the Indian department is now amazing; it will be more so when they consider themselves as in our service; nor would their intervention be of much consequence, unless we could procure that of the other nations. The hauteur of the Indians is much diminished since the taking of Montreal; they evidently see that they cannot get any supplies but through us.”

“On the 27th Ultio. I had the pleasure of writing to you and then mentioned my being under some embarrassment respecting the application which I expected from our Caghnawaga friends— I have now the pleasure to inform you that in a talk they honored me with yesterday, they put the matter upon the footing I wished; that is to join the forces in Canada whenever you shall call for their Assistance. They requested me to certify my approbation of the treaty they had concluded with you, which I did. Upon the occasion they expressed much satisfaction and said, that they were now happy that a firm peace was made between them and their Brothers and that they were now like the New England people. I heartily wish that this union may be lasting and that nothing may cast up to interrupt it. The expediency of calling upon them I shall leave to you— Circumstances and policy will suggest the occasion.”—*Washington to General Schuyler*, 1 February, 1776.

[1] During the night of the attack on Quebec there was a tempestuous snowstorm. The bodies of the persons slain under the cliff of Cape Diamond were not discovered till morning, when they were found nearly enveloped in snow. They were taken into the city on a sled. Three of them were known to be officers, and from the initials R. M. written in a fur cap, picked up at the place of the bloody catastrophe, it was conjectured to have belonged to General Montgomery. His features were disfigured by a wound, which he had received in the lower part of the head and neck. At length a woman and a boy were brought, who had lately come into the city from the American camp, and who had often seen the principal officers. They identified the bodies of Montgomery, Captain McPherson, Captain Cheeseman, and an orderly sergeant.

Mr. Cramahé, an officer in the British army, and for a time lieutenant-governor of Canada, had served in the late war with Montgomery, and entertained for him a warm personal attachment. He asked permission of General Carleton to bury his friend with marks of honor and respect. This was granted in part, and a coffin lined and covered with black was provided. But the Governor did not consent to the reading of the funeral service, probably not deeming this indulgence conformable to military rules. But when the time of burial approached, Mr. Cramahé invited a clergyman to be present, who read the service privately and unmolested. The other officers were buried at a short distance from their general, but without coffins, and in the military manner. All the graves were within the walls of the city, and near the Port of St. Louis.

These particulars were communicated to me by Mr. William Smith of Quebec, who had received them from several persons acquainted with them at the time, and especially from Mr. Thompson, who assisted at the burial of Montgomery, and who pointed out the place of his grave a few years ago, when his remains were taken up and removed to New York.—*Sparks*.

[1]“Government being fully convinced of these Facts, will most assuredly send a strong and considerable Reinforcement to Quebec, early in the Spring, which will render the reduction of it, exceedingly difficult, if not impracticable. The great and important work must then be accomplished in the course of the present Winter, or the rights of America may be lost forever. I must therefore intreat you, in case General Schuyler’s indisposition should not permit him to act, to exert yourself upon the occasion, as much as you possibly can, and to give every assistance in your power for compleating our conquest in that quarter.”—*Washington to General Wooster*, 27 January, 1776.

[1]“Captain Manley took two prizes last week and to save himself, was obliged to run his vessel ashore at North River and left her; the enemy boarded her, but Manly gave them such heavy fire that they were obliged to quit her, taking nothing, save one swivel gun, which gun he sometime before borrowed of them.”—*General Artemas Ward to Congress*, 3 February, 1776.

[1]“As the General is consenting to and desirous of the militia drawing the same pay, as the Continental Troops, the officers of those Companies are hereby informed, that since the first of January, their pay will be the same as those officers (of equal Rank) upon the new establishment but before that date, no more than what was drawn under the old establishment, can be allowed them, of this they are to take particular notice, that no mistake may happen.

“When the militia are discharged the colonels or commanding officers, of the Regiments with whom they have done duty are to take special care that every ounce of Ammunition is received from them (belonging to the public) as also such men as joined their Regiments for a month. If any man attempts to carry off a single grain of ammunition not known to be his own, he will be pursued, brought back and severely punished.

“The Colonels, or commanding Officers of Regiments, are requested to buy any good arms which the militia may voluntarily incline to sell. They are also to make out pay-abstracts, for those men who joined their Regiments for the month of January, confining it to that month that warrants may issue accordingly.”—*Orderly Book*, 28 January, 1776.

[1]*Journals of Congress*, 19 January, 1776.

[2]The generous and humane conduct of General Carleton, in regard to the persons taken at the unfortunate assault on Quebec, ought not to be overlooked. Although he had acquiesced in the harsh treatment of Ethan Allen, yet the prisoners who fell into his hands on the above disastrous occasion, according to their own account, met with

a usage in every respect as good as that of the British soldiers, except in the necessary restraints of confinement. This was declared in a letter to Washington from Major Meigs, when he returned on his parole the summer following. The soldiers were confined in the Jesuits' College, and the officers in the Seminary. The latter, after the siege was raised, had permission to walk in a large garden adjoining their quarters. Major Meigs left three hundred prisoners in Quebec, about the middle of May. When they were released for exchange, General Carleton supplied them with articles of clothing, in which they were deficient. It was said, that when some of his officers spoke to him of this act, as an unusual degree of lenity towards prisoners of war, he replied,—“Since we have tried in vain to make them acknowledge us as brothers, let us at least send them away disposed to regard us as first cousins.” Having been informed, that many persons suffering from wounds and various disorders were concealed in the woods and obscure places, fearing that if they appeared openly they would be seized as prisoners and severely treated, he issued a proclamation commanding the militia officers to search for such persons, bring them to the general hospital, and procure for them all necessary relief at the public charge. He also invited all such persons to come forward voluntarily, and receive the assistance they needed, assuring them, “that as soon as their health should be restored, they should have free liberty to return to their respective provinces.”

Posterity has done justice to the humane character of General Carleton. Few names, that stand out in the history of the events in which he was concerned, are remembered with more respect, even in the country of his foes.—*Sparks*.

[1] Philip Skene entered the British army in 1736 and served in European wars until he came to America in 1756. He became a captain in the 27th regiment in 1757, major of brigade in 1759, and commanded at Crown Point in October of the same year. In 1762 he participated in the West Indian expedition and was one of the first to enter the breach at the storming of Havana. Returning to New York (1763) he obtained (1765) a patent for the township of Skenesboro (now Whitehall), and resided there after 1770, running a line between Canada and the Colonies, and superintending the settlement of the then uninhabited border country. In 1773 he applied to Lord Dartmouth to recommend him to the King for the appointment of Governor of that region. The appointment was given and he was empowered to raise a regiment in America, functions that brought him to the attention of the Continental Congress and led to his arrest in Philadelphia, in June 1775. (*Journals of Congress*, June 8, 1775.) In October 1776 he was exchanged, joined Burgoyne as commander of a loyal American regiment, and was again captured at Saratoga, his property being confiscated by New York in 1779. Returning to England, he died 9 October 1810. *Vermont Records*, i., 153; MS. *Memorial in the State Paper Office, London*.

[1] These four words are in Washington's writing, added after the letter had been written. By a vote of Congress, the Commander-in-chief was allowed three aides-de-camp, who were to rank as lieutenant-colonels; and the major-generals two aides each, to rank as majors.

[2] John Eustace, who had been in Lord Dunmore's charge for three years. "The only fault I know in him (if fault it can be called in a boy) is that he is a little too volatile."—*Dunmore to General Howe*, 2 December, 1775.

[1] *Journals of Congress*, 20 January, 1776.

[1] Capt. Cochran had come to Philadelphia from South Carolina to recruit seamen for that colony. Congress referred him to Washington. *Journals of Congress*, 19 January, 1776.

[1] One of Connolly's associates, who had escaped, but had been recaptured.

[2] "My instructions and commission were concealed in the sticks of my servant's mail pillion, artfully contrived for the purpose . . . My servant, who was a man of great fidelity and adroitness, was not confined; and as he had gathered some slight intimation that matters of importance were in the pillion sticks, and observing the saddle and its appendages suspended in an adjoining shed, after having undergone a severe but fruitless scrutiny by the committee, he seized a favorable moment in the dead of night, opened the sticks, examined their contents by the light of a fire, and finding of what importance they were, destroyed them all, except my commission. This he sealed up, and conveyed to me, with a note informing me of what he had done, by means of a negro girl, that had before been proved to be faithful."—*Connolly's Narrative*.

[1] Read in Congress, February 9th. Referred to Chase, J. Adams, Penn, Wythe and Edward Rutledge.

[1] General Lee was now at Stamford, in Connecticut, where he was preparing to enter New York with such troops as he had collected. In his letter to Congress from Stamford, he had strongly urged the expediency of disarming the Tories, requiring an oath of them to act offensively and defensively in support of the common rights, and a pledge of one half of their property as a security for their good behavior. Congress appointed a committee (Harrison, Lynch and Allen) to repair to New York, to consult and advise with the council of safety and General Lee on the defence of the city. *Journals of Congress*, 26 January, 1776.

[2] Lee arrived in New York on February 4th "almost at the same instant" with Clinton. "He (Clinton) has brought no troops with him, and pledges his honor that none are coming. He says it is merely a visit to his friend Tryon. If it is really so, it is the most whimsical piece of civility I ever heard of. He informs us that his intention is for North Carolina, where he expects five regiments from England; that he only brought two companies of light infantry from Boston. This is certainly a droll way of proceeding; to communicate his full plan to the enemy is too novel to be credited." *Lee to Washington*, 5 February, 1776. It would appear, however, that Clinton spoke truly. "I have furnished him (Clinton) with such information of the southward colonies as I am hopeful may be of some service." *Governor Tryon to the Earl of Dartmouth*, 8 February, 1776.

[1] The town of Norfolk, in Virginia, had been bombarded and burnt by Lord Dunmore on the 1st of January.

[1] This mezzotinto is described by Baker (*Engraved Portraits of Washington*), and represented Washington in “full figure in uniform and cocked hat, on horseback, advancing to the right. A drawn sword in the right hand is held across the body, a battle in the right distance.” Mr. Baker concludes that “in every sense they [the Campbell portraits of Washington] may be classed among the fictitious portraits. . . . The presumption is that the portrait or portraits . . . were manufactured at the beginning of the revolutionary war, for some enterprising publisher either in London or on the Continent, for the express purpose of being engraved, in anticipation of a demand which it was felt must arise.”

[1] “I think then we might have attacked ’em long before this and with success, were our troops differently constituted; but the fatal persuasion has taken deep root in the minds of the Americans from the highest to the lowest order that they are no match for the Regulars, but when covered by a wall or breast work. This notion is still further strengthened by the endless works we are throwing up. In short unless we can remove the idea (and it must be done by degrees) no spirited action can be ventured on without the greatest risk.”—*Charles Lee to Benj. Rush*, 19 September, 1775.

[1] “The Continental Congress having been pleased to order, and direct, that there shall be one Chaplain to two Regiments and that the pay of each Chaplain shall be *Thirty-three dollars & one third*, pr. Kalendar Month. The Revd. Abiel Leonard is appointed Chaplain to the Regiment of Artillery, under the command of Col. Knox, and to the 20th Regiment, at present commanded by Lt. Col. Durkee.

“As there can be but fourteen Chaplains under this establishment, to the 28 Regiments (including the Artillery & Riffle Regiments) and as preference will be given to those Chaplains who served last year, provided their conduct, and attendance, have been unexceptionable; The Brigadiers are to enquire into this matter and with the Colonels and Commanding Officers of the several Regiments, arrange them agreeable to the above direction, and make report thereof that orders may issue accordingly.

“The Commanding Officers of the regiments upon the new establishment are each of them to apply to Commissary Cheever, to morrow Morning; for *one* Barrel of powder, with a proportionable quantity of Ball and Cartridge-paper; which they are to order to be immediately made up in cartridges, and put up in a proper manner, according to the directions Commissary Cheever will give. This Ammunition, the Commanding Officers are to keep in a safe place, under their immediate Care, to be ready to be delivered, when occasion may call for its being distributed.”—*Orderly Book*, 7 February, 1776.

[1] Received February 22nd. On the 23d a committee composed of Paine, Wilson, Huntington, Lee and Lewis Morris, was named to contract for the making of muskets and bayonets, and to consider of farther means of promoting and encouraging the manufacture of fire arms in all parts of the united colonies. The secret committee was also authorized to export a certain amount of produce to be exchanged for arms. It

was not until March 14th that a general resolution recommending the disarming of the “notoriously disaffected” throughout the colonies was adopted, the arms taken to be paid for.

[1] Read in Congress, February 22. Referred to the Committee of the Whole.

“Many attempts have been made to get a bounty for the New England troops, but without effect. The Congress are resolved you shall abandon the lines and give up their country to be ravaged, if they will not defend it upon the same terms as those enlisted here, (such as march to Canada only excepted).”—*Reed to Washington*, 3 March, 1776.

“The truth is I never opposed the raising of men during the war. . . But I contended that I knew the number to be obtained in this manner would be very small in New England, from whence almost the whole army was derived. A regiment might possibly be obtained, of the meanest, idlest, most intemperate and worthless, but no more. A regiment was no army to defend this country. We must have tradesmen’s sons, and farmers’ sons, or we should be without defence, and such men certainly would not enlist during the war, or for long periods, as yet. The service was too new; they had not yet become attached to it by habit. Was it credible that men who could get at home better living, more comfortable lodgings, more than double the wages, in safety, not exposed to the sickness of the camp, would bind themselves during the war? I knew it to be impossible. In the Middle States, where they imported from Ireland and Germany, so many transported convicts and redemptioners, it was possible they might obtain some. Let them try. . . But I warned them against depending on so improbable a resource for the defence of the country. Congress confessed the unanswerable force of this reasoning.”—John Adams, *Autobiography*, iii., 48.

[1] At a special election held on January 26th, Reed, then chairman of the Committee of Safety, was elected a member of the Assembly.

[1] “I imagine that there are several belonging to the Colony, and have been informed of many Tories being disarmed and therefore expect, that It will be in their power to Obtain me a considerable supply.”—*Washington to New York Committee*, 10 February, 1776.

“The General being informed that several of the militia are coming in without arms, orders that the Brigadiers, to whose Brigades they are joined, do examine into this matter and discharge every Man who has not Arms as they come in, keeping an account thereof, to deliver when called for.

“It is with no small degree of astonishment, that the General observes by the returns of last week, that seventeen men have been dismissed the service out of which number Col Whitcomb alone has discharged seven: he is therefore called upon, to be at Head Quarters to-morrow morning, at ten O’Clock, to account for his conduct in this Instance; at the same time it is declared and particular attention will be paid to it, that if any Colonel, or Commanding Officer of a Regiment, presume in future to

discharge a man without proper Authority, for so doing, he will be put in arrest and tried for disobedience of orders. To have men inlisted one day, and discharged as it were the next, without any action, or apparent cause, to disqualify men for service, must have a bad appearance in the returns sent to Congress, especially when the list of Deserters, comes to be added to it.

“To remedy these evils, as far as possible, it is directed, in cases where discharges are really necessary, that the Commanding Officer of the regiment do produce the man, (solliciting the discharge) to the Brigadier Genl. of his brigade, who is to examine accurately into the Matter, and not to give a discharge for Sickness of a temporary duration. In case of desertion, the Commanding Officer of the regiment or Corps, is immediately to report the Deserter, or Deserters, to his Brigadier General, giving an exact description of the man, the town he comes from &c.—who is to cause proper Steps to be taken for apprehending them—A Reward of Five dollars, will be paid to any person, or persons, who shall apprehend and bring a Deserter into the Camp upon obtaining a certificate from the Brigadier of the service performed.”—*Orderly Book*, 12 February, 1776.

[1] Two attempts were made by Lord Drummond to propose a plan of reconciliation between Great Britain and the colonies. The first notice of the matter is contained in a letter from Mr. Lynch to General Washington, dated at Philadelphia, 16 January, 1776, in which he says:

“A gentleman well known in Maryland, Lord Drummond, just from England, tells me, that he has had many conversations with the ministry, and showed me a paper approved by each of them, and which he is sure will be supported in both Houses. The substance of it is,—America to be declared free in point of taxation and internal police; judges to be approved by the judges of England, and commissioned during good behaviour, upon stated and sufficient support to be statedly assigned them by the colonies; all charters to be held sacred; that of Boston to be restored; Britain to regulate trade *sub modo*; all duties laid for the purpose of regulation to be paid into the colony treasury where they arise, applicable to its uses by its own legislature, in lieu of which, America shall by duties on such articles as will probably keep pace in its consumption with the rise or declension of the colony, laid by each legislature by permanent act of Assembly, grant towards the general support of the empire annual sums in proportion to five thousand pounds sterling for this colony. As this sum is little more than half of what did arise by duties heretofore paid in this place, I doubted his information, but was assured that ministry wanted nothing but a show of revenue to hold up to Parliament, as they are afraid to propose reconciliation without saving what the stiff old Englishmen call the honor of the nation. His Lordship came hither through Halifax, Boston, and New York, where I fancy he saw what induced him to hint once or twice at beginning with a suspension of arms, to which I turned a very deaf ear, well knowing that the season of winter is ours, and that much may be done by April next. I sincerely wish I had your sentiments on those heads. I shall propose them to the consideration of Congress as soon as the most urgent affairs are over. I think they merit it.”

Three weeks afterwards, when Mr. Lynch was in New York, as one of a committee

from Congress to consult with General Lee respecting the fortifications and defence of that city, he there met Lord Drummond, and wrote again to General Washington:—

“I mentioned to you some time ago certain propositions, which Lord Drummond had been talking to me of. General Robertson writes to him by Clinton, that he (Clinton) is very desirous of being instrumental in bringing about the same end. It is mysterious to me how such a man should be sent on such an errand. Be it as it may, it will not produce any remission of our using the present moment to strengthen ourselves and weaken our enemies. Lord Drummond’s great point is to get some member of Congress to go home, to inform the cabinet of the real desires and intentions of that body respecting the reestablishment of peace. To promote this purpose he has desired me to enclose you a letter, which, after you have read it, if you think it can do no harm, you will be so kind as to forward to Robertson, and to send his answer to his Lordship under your cover. Robertson will doubtless send it open to you.”

The letter was as follows:

“Just as I was sitting down to write to you, I received yours by General Clinton, but have not as yet had an opportunity of seeing him. During the very few months I was with you at Boston, I expressed my wish of being able to make known at Philadelphia the disposition in England towards an accommodation upon liberal terms, and such as were founded in equity and candor.

“You then concurred with me in thinking, that however much these gentlemen, whose province it now is to think for the public, might be held up as aiming at a total separation, they had as their sole object such a reconciliation as would give a constitutional security to their children. In this opinion I think we were not deceived. From all the conversation I had at Philadelphia with those gentlemen, who allow me, I hope, to rank among the number of their friends, I have every reason to think them most seriously disposed towards reconciliation; nor am I without hopes of success. Should such an event take place, it is not impossible but a deputation from hence may be found expedient, and in that case a passport requisite for a security against English cruisers. Such a passport must be left blank, for filling up names, and sent by the same conveyance that this passes through. It will be needless to caution you against delay. My slight acquaintance with General Howe and Admiral Shulldham will furnish you with an apology for not making a more direct application.

“P. S. Let me guard you against letting this get to the public, till we see how far my hopes are well grounded.” *Drummond to Robertson*, 5 February, 1776.

This letter was forwarded to General Washington at Cambridge, with the view of its being sent by him into Boston, but he enclosed it to Congress. Congress instructed their President to inform the Commander-in-chief that they highly approved his care and attention in stopping Lord Drummond’s letter, and entirely concurred with him, in regard to his Lordship’s officious and unwarrantable zeal. Hence the letter never found its way to General Robertson.

“The letter from Lord Drummond which seemed to derive importance from the

transmission of it by General Washington, was a fire engine to play cold water on the fire of independence. They [opponents of independence] set it in operation with great zeal and activity. It was indeed a very airy phantom, and ought not to have been sent us by the General, who should only have referred Lord Drummond to Congress. But there were about head-quarters some who were as weak and wavering as our members. . . . In short, it [Lord Drummond's letter] was so flimsy a veil, that the purblind might see through it. But yet it was made instrumental of much delay and amusement to members." *John Adams' Autobiography*, iii., 31-33.

[1] In describing this adventure, General Howe wrote to Lord Dartmouth, that, it being understood the enemy intended to take possession of Dorchester Point, or Neck, a detachment was ordered from Castle William under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie, and another of grenadiers and light infantry commanded by Major Musgrave, with directions to pass over the ice and destroy every house and every kind of cover on the peninsula, which was executed, and six of the enemy's guards taken prisoners.

[1] Read in Congress February 29th. Referred to Chase, J. Adams, Penn, Wythe, and Rutledge.

"All the Regiments are immediately to be compleated, to Twenty four rounds of Ammunition a man, The Colonel, or Commanding Officer of each, is to pass his receipt to the Commissary for the Cartridges, or Powder & Lead necessary, to do this; and to take receipts from their several Captain, for the total quantity in each Company. The Captains are to do the like from each of their men, who are to account satisfactorily, for every load they have passed their receipt for, or pay Four-pence for each deficient. The Colonels or Commanding officers of Regiments are to take special care that this Order is strictly complied with, that those Fines are charged without fail to the delinquent Soldiers, and credit given for them in making out the pay abstracts, This order is to be read to, and impressed upon the minds of every man by their officers.

"The General is surprised to find the Militia applying for Cartouch Boxes and other Accoutrements, when he had not a doubt, but they would have come compleatly equipt. As the case, however, is otherwise, he directs that they should be served with Powder-horns and Shot pouches, in lieu of Cartouch Boxes, and that every thing which is delivered to them be charged to the Regiment that received it, that it may be redelivered, or paid for at the expiration of the term for which they stand engaged, and to this the Qr. Mr. Genl. and Commissary of Stores, are to give particular Attention, without further direction upon this head."—*Orderly Book*, 16 February, 1776.

[1] The return of February 10th, showed a force of 8,797 men fit for duty, besides officers and 1,405 men on command who might be ordered to join their respective regiments immediately. The militia from the New England governments, arrived or about to arrive in camp, would, if the regiments were complete, number 7,280, officers included. The intelligence from Boston indicated an active force of only 5,000. A stroke at this time might put an end to the war, but from the lack of powder, the main reliance must be had in the small arms, and not in cannon and mortars. The

closing of the ice afforded a path for an assault, and it should be made before the expected reinforcements were arrived. These considerations were laid before a council of war, held on the 16th, but were not deemed sufficient to warrant an assault, on the grounds, that there was not force enough for such an attempt, that the army was deficient in arms and powder, and that the impression of the field-officers generally was unfavorable to such a measure. It was, however, resolved, that a cannonade and bombardment would be advisable as soon as there should be a proper supply of powder, and that in the meantime preparations ought to be made for taking possession of Dorchester Heights, and of Noddle's Island also, if it could be effected.

On the 26th, writing to Joseph Reed, he said: "I proposed it [an assault] in council; but behold, though we had been waiting all the year for this favorable event, the enterprise was thought too dangerous. Perhaps it was; perhaps the irksomeness of my situation led me to undertake more than could be warranted by prudence. I did not think so, and I am sure yet, that the enterprise, if it had been undertaken with resolution, must have succeeded; without it, any would fail; but it is now at an end, and I am preparing to take post on Dorchester, to try if the enemy will be so kind as to come out to us. Ten regiments of militia, you must know, had come to strengthen my hands for offensive measures; but what I have here said respecting the determinations in council, and the possessing of Dorchester Point, is spoken under the rose."

[\[1\]](#) Read in Congress March 6th.

[\[1\]](#) "Notwithstanding I have adopted every measure which my Judgement directed for procuring arms in these Governments for the Army under my command, as well by applications to the sev'l Assemblies and Conventions, as by sending Officers to the several Towns to purchase, I am under the disagreeable & melancholy necessity of Informing you that there is at this Important crisis a very great deficiency, and that there is now a considerable number of men at these Encampments without any in their hands; nor do I know that there is any prospect or probability of providing them—Can you, my Dear Sir, assist me with any from your parts? If you can procure or purchase any in the Towns fit for use, I beg that you will do It, and have them forwarded with all possible expedition to me, I will pay for them immediately on delivery and the charges for bringing them. I am told that a Major Duncan at Schenactady has about 300 Kings Arms, these or such of them as are good & serviceable will be of great use, and I doubt not may be readily, procured; If they can, I request—that they may & be forwarded with any others that you may get with the price—I would not be thus pressing & thus Importunate, were It not for my situation which is truly alarming & distressing: To be within Musquet shot of a formidable Army well provided with every necessary, without having the means on my part of maintaining even a defensive war."—*Washington to Schuyler*, 25 February, 1776.

[\[1\]](#) "As it is necessary that every Regiment should be furnished with colors, and that those colors should, if it can be done, bear some kind of similitude to the uniform of the regiment to which they belong, the colonels with their respective Brigadiers and the Qr. Mr. Genl. may fix upon such as are proper, and, can be procured. There must be to each Regiment, the standard (or Regimental colors) and Colors for each Grand Division, the whole to be small and light. The Number of the Regiment is to be

mark'd on the colors, and such a Motto, as the colonel may choose, in fixing upon which, the General advises a consultation amongst them.

“The Colonels are to delay no time, in getting this matter fixed, that the Qr. Mr. Genl. may provide the colors as soon as possible. They are also to consider what Camp-Equipage may be further necessary, that no time may be lost in providing it, as the season is fast approaching for taking the field.

“The General cannot again help urging it in the strongest terms to the colonels the necessity of the strictest attention to the discipline of their men, learning them to march and perform all the different evolutions and manœuvres; which is of more essential service, than dwelling too long upon the Manual Exercise. He also recommends to the colonels a proper attention to the cloathing of their officers and men, that they may appear in a soldierlike manner.”—*Orderly Book* 20 February, 1776.

“The General having the credit of this army, much at heart, and anxious that it should not only behave well, but look well; recommends it to, and does expect that, every Officer from the highest to the lowest, doth exert himself to accomplish those ends; to attain which, the Brigadiers are desired to be attentive to every matter, and thing, relative to their Brigades, & when Orders are not, or cannot be complied with, immediately to report the reason thereof.

“From henceforward it is expected, that the Weekly Returns of every Regiment will, before they are brought into the commander in Chief, be examined and certified by the Brigadier, to whose Brigade they respectively belong, who is also to direct his Major of Brigade, to keep a Book, and have them regularly entered, always comparing the Return to be made, with the one preceding, and enquiring minutely into the cause of every change, or alteration from the last,—The colonel, or Commanding Officer of every Regiment is to observe the same conduct with respect to the Returns of his companies, and keep a book for the regular entry thereof—These precautions are taken to prevent the many Blunders and Mistakes, which have heretofore happen'd in making out the Pay Abstracts, all of which, for the future, are to be inspected by the Brigadiers, compared with their books, and certified by them; before a Warrant will be granted. A very strict attention will be expected to this order, for if these books are called for, and do not correspond with this order, the Officer neglecting will meet with no favor.

“The commanding Officer of each Regiment, may apply for a warrant for five-hundred dollars, to put into the hands of such Officers as they send into the country, on the recruiting Service, to buy arms, but such as are good, and fit for immediate use. King's Musquets, or Guns as near that quality as can be had, should be got, and with Bayonets, if possible. As there is a committee in each of the counties of the Massachusetts-Bay, appointed by the General Court, to purchase arms for this army, the Officers are to take care, not to raise the price by bidding against each other.”—*Orderly Book*, 24 February, 1776.

“It being a matter of too much importance, to intrust the wounds and lives, of Officers

and Soldiers to unskillful Surgeons; The General requests the Director General, and the Surgeons of the Hospital, taking also to their Assistance, such Regimental Surgeons, as upon examination they approve of; will sit and examine the Surgeons, & Mates, of the whole Army, and give certificates to those, who are found qualified to discharge the Duties of their Office, in Order that they may receive commissions.—Gentlemen of candor, and knowledge in their profession, will see the utility of this measure, and approve of it, none but those who are conscious of their inability will decline the examination.

“The Surgeon of every Regiment, is immediately to report, to the Director General of the Hospital, in what manner he, and his mate, are at present furnished with Instruments, Medicines, Bandages &c. that the true state and condition, may be known. The first Court of examination will sit on Tuesday next, at the convalescent Hospital, in Cambridge, at eleven in the forenoon at which all the Surgeons and their Mates, of Genl. Sullivan’s Brigade are to attend.”—*Orderly Book*, 25 February, 1776.

[1] Read in Congress March 6th. Referred to Chase, J. Adams, Penn, Wythe, and Rutledge.

[2] General Lee had written February 14th: “The governor, and the captain of a man-of-war, had threatened perdition to the town, if the cannon were removed from the batteries and wharves; but I ever considered their threats as a *brutum fulmen*, and even persuaded the town to be of the same way of thinking. We accordingly conveyed them to a place of safety in the middle of the day, and no cannonade ensued. Captain Parker publishes a pleasant reason for his passive conduct. He says that it was manifestly my intention, and that of the New England men under my command, to bring destruction on this town, so hated for its loyal principles, but that he was determined not to indulge us; so remained quiet out of spite. The people here laugh at his nonsense, and begin to despise the menaces, which formerly used to throw em into convulsions. To do em justice, the whole show a wonderful alacrity; and, in removing the cannon, men and boys of all ages worked with the greatest zeal and pleasure. I really believe that the generality are as well affected as any on the continent.”

A little different story was given by Governor Tryon: “The ice keeping the ships of war so near within shore, that he [Parker] was of opinion he could not bring the ships under his command to lay off the fort and battery where the artillery and chief part of the stores were deposited without great risk to the king’s ships from the ice at that severe season. The destruction, therefore, of the city where there were so many friends to government, with the loss of all their property and the consideration of preserving the town for the king’s army, were thought to be too great sacrifices to make for only retarding the removal of the artillery and stores.” *Governor Tryon to Lord George Germaine*, 6 April, 1776.

[1] “As I am making all possible preparation to take possession of the Heights of Dorchester, (which I expect I shall be able to accomplish by the latter end of this week,) it is expected that this, if any thing can, will bring the enemy out of Boston to oppose, as at Charlestown, our erecting any works there. To weaken our lines on the north side of Cambridge River, to strengthen those of Dorchester before any

movement is made that way by the enemy, may neither be consistent with prudence nor good policy; and to delay it till after an attack is begun, would be too late, as the contest will soon be decided for or against us, after this happens. Under this state of the matter, and to avoid putting an affair of so much importance to a doubtful issue, when under Providence it may be reduced to a certainty, I submit it to the wisdom of your Board, whether it might not be best to direct the militia of certain towns, most contiguous to Dorchester and Roxbury, to repair to the lines at those places, with their arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, instantly upon a signal given. If you approve of this, you will please to fix with General Thomas (who waits on you for that purpose), upon the signal to be given, and issue your notices accordingly.”—*Washington to the Council of Massachusetts Bay*, 26 February, 1776.

[1] By a resolve of Congress on the 17th of February, General Lee was ordered to take the command in Canada, and General Schuyler to take his place in New York. But “from an undoubted authority that it [the south] will be a principal scene of action,” this arrangement was changed, before it was carried into effect. On the 27th of February, Congress formed what were called the middle and southern military departments; the former consisting of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland; and the latter of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. General Lee was directed, March 1st, to take command of the southern department, and on the 7th he left New York, in compliance with that order. Six brigadiers, John Armstrong, William Thompson, Andrew Lewis, Robert Howe, Lord Stirling, and James Moore, were appointed the same day, of whom four (Armstrong, Lewis, Howe, and Moore) were likewise ordered to that department.

“I was just about to congratulate you on your appointment to the command in Canada, when I received the account that your destination was altered. As a Virginian, I must rejoice at the change; but as an American, I think you would have done more essential service to the common cause in Canada. For, besides the advantage of speaking and thinking in French, an officer who is acquainted with their manners and customs, and has travelled in their country, must certainly take the strongest hold of their affection and confidence.” *Washington to Lee*, 14 March, 1776.

[1] “The ships of war which were here have been frightened away. The Asia lies between Nutter’s and Bedloe’s Island; the Duchess of Gordon, with his Excellency Govr. Tryon, is under her stern; the Phoenix is stationed a league below the Narrows; the Mercury and General Clinton must inevitably fall into the hands of our fleet, unless they are asleep.”—*Lee to Washington*, 19 February, 1776.

[2] In General Lee’s letter he had said: “You must pardon me for a liberty I have taken. You know that Sears was to collect our volunteers in Connecticut, but he thought he could not succeed, unless he had some nominal office and rank. I accordingly most impudently, by virtue of the power deputed by you to me (which power you never deputed), appointed him adjutant-general, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, for the expedition. It can have no bad consequences. The man was much tickled, and it added spurs to his *hat*. He is a creature of much spirit and public virtue, and ought to have his back clapped.”

[3] “All officers, non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers are positively forbid playing at cards, and other games of chance. At this time of public distress men may find enough to do in the service of their God, and their Country, without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality.”—*Orderly Book*, 26 February, 1776.

“It gives me great pleasure to hear that you are Improving in your health, before long I most sincerely hope you will be so recovered, as to be able to goe to the Army in Canada, where I am Convinced you are much wanted, and would be of the highest service at this Important crisis. I doubt not of there being a good deal of confusion and disorder in that quarter which I flatter myself wou’d in a great measure subside & be composed by your presence. It is natural enough that Mr. Walker’s resentment should be up for the wrongs he has suffered. It is incident to humanity, but yet the passions of Individuals ought never to prevail so far as to Injure the State.

“I am Sorry to find that the quantity of Artillery and Military Stores is so small and Inconsiderable as appears by the Return, I had hoped that you were better provided with the former, and also with much more amunition than you have; particularly powder and that the distresses no where else were equal to mine for want of this Capital necessary. Would Fortune but give you possession of Quebec, there would our wants be mostly supplied,—may she smile propitious and your virtuous struggles be crowned with success.—The reduction of this Fortress would be attended with consequences of the most happy and Salutary nature to our Great Cause, and as General Arnold with a handful of men has been able to maintain the Blockade I look forward with a pleasing confidence to the day when you being properly reinforced, will Oblidge It to Surrender. . . .

“When I sent Colo. Knox in pursuit of Artillery I did not design that you should have been disfurnished, I only meant that he should have brought from Canada such Ordinance as you could conveniently spare; but from your Letter and the Return, I am led to think that you are in want:—I have been informed that Genl. Lee hath Lately secured a large Number of Heavy Cannon & that that were at New York, from whence I imagine you may get a supply of what you want which you cannot be supplied with else where. If you will acquaint me, I will most readily give you every assistance in my power & deem myself happy if I can contribute to relieve your necessitys in any manner.”—*Washington to Schuyler*, 27 February, 1776.

“As the season is now fast approaching when every man must expect to be drawn into the field of action, it is highly necessary that he should prepare his mind, as well as every thing necessary for it. It is a noble Cause we are engaged in, it is the cause of virtue and mankind, every temporal advantage and comfort to us, and our posterity depends upon the Vigor of our exertions; in short, Freedom or Slavery must be the result of our conduct, there can therefore be no greater Inducement to men to behave well. But it may not be amiss for the Troops to know, that if any man in action shall presume to skulk, hide himself, or retreat from the enemy, without the orders of his commanding officer, he will be *instantly shot down*, as an example of Cowardice: Cowards having too frequently disconcerted the best formed Troops, by their dastardly behaviour.

“Next to the favor of divine providence nothing is more essentially necessary to give this Army the victory of all its enemies, than Exactness of discipline, unless the Arms are kept clean and in good firing Order, it is impossible to vanquish the enemy, and Cleanliness of the person gives health, and soldier-like appearance. That no confusion may ensue when the Troops are called to action; the General has ordered all the posts, and guards of the lines, and redoubts, to be so fix’d and regulated, as every officer and soldier may know his place, and his duty, and to confirm the order and discipline, the General orders, that the officers and men, who are to mount guard, do parade every morning at eight o’clock, upon their regimental parades, where they are to be reviewed by the adjutant, in the presence of a Field Officer, who is to see that their Arms, ammunition and accoutrements are compleat, and the men dressed in a soldier-like manner. The Adjutant is then to march them to the parade of the brigade, and deliver them over to the Major of brigade, who is very minutely to inspect the whole, and then march them to the grand-parade, where the Brigadier, with the Field Officers of the day, will attend, to see all the Guards paraded and march to their several destinations. With the Brigadier will constantly mount, his Major of brigade, who is always to make up the guards upon the grand parade, and report all extraordinaries to his Brigadier General.—The Brigadier of the day, will give his orders to the Field Officers of the day, at what time he would have them to go to the visiting and grand rounds; and half an hour before day, order all the guards to be under Arms, and properly posted, visit the outposts, see that the guards are properly placed, and that every thing is in good order for defence, in case of an attack. All Officers commanding guards, are to report to the Brigadier of the day, who is to report to the Commander in Chief. The Guards to be made up on the grand parade are, Letchmore point. Cobble-hill, Plough’d Hill, White-house, main guard on Prospect hill, the South, North & Middle Redoubts, Letchmore’s point-bridge, and the main Guard for Cambridge, and Winter-hill—All other Guards are to be sent from the Brigade-parades (the Quarter Guard of the Regiments excepted) who are paraded on their Regimental parades.”—*Orderly Book*, 27 February, 1776.

[1] Phillis Wheatley was born in Africa, and brought to Boston in a slave-ship, in the year 1761, then between seven and eight years of age. She was purchased by Mr. Wheatley, but she soon discovered qualities so interesting and peculiar, that she was treated more as an inmate of the family, than as a slave. She made an extraordinary progress in acquiring the English language, and, without any advantage from schools, learned reading and writing, and manifested the greatest eagerness for gleanng knowledge. Her taste inclined to poetry; she read and relished the best authors, and soon began to compose verses. Meantime the attention of the community was turned to so singular a phenomenon, and she was visited and noticed by people of the first character. Her correspondence was sought, and it extended to persons of distinction even in England, among whom may be named the Countess of Huntingdon, Whitefield, and the Earl of Dartmouth. In 1773, when she was nineteen years of age, a volume of her poems was published in London, some of which had been written five or six years. This volume is dedicated to the Countess of Huntingdon, and in the preface are the names of the Governor of Massachusetts, and several other eminent gentlemen, bearing testimony to their belief of her having been the genuine writer of the poems. She was married, in 1778, to Mr. John Peters, a man of her own color, whom tradition reports to have been little qualified for conferring happiness on so

gifted a companion. She died at Boston, December 5th, 1784, aged thirty-one years.

The following Letter and Verses, were written by the famous Phillis Wheatley, the African Poetess, and presented to his Excellency Gen. Washington.

Sir,

I have taken the freedom to address your Excellency in the enclosed poem, and entreat your acceptance, though I am not insensible of its inaccuracies. Your being appointed by the Grand Continental Congress to be Generalissimo of the armies of North America, together with the fame of your virtues, excite sensations not easy to suppress. Your generosity, therefore, I presume, will pardon the attempt. . . Wishing your Excellency all possible success in the great cause you are so generously engaged in. I am,

Your Excellency'S Most Obedient Humble Servant

Phillis Wheatley. *Providence, Oct. 26, 1775. His Excellency Gen. Washington.*

Celestial choir! enthron'd in realms of light,
Columbia's scenes of glorious toils I write.
While freedom's cause her anxious breast alarms,
She flashes dreadful in refulgent arms.
See mother earth her offspring's fate bemoan,
And nations gaze at scenes before unknown!
See the bright beams of heaven's revolving light
Involved in sorrows and the veil of night!
The goddess comes, she moves divinely fair.
Olive and laurel binds her golden hair:
Wherever shines this native of the skies,
Unnumber'd charms and recent graces rise.
Muse! bow propitious while my pen relates
How pour her armies through a thousand gates;
As when Eolus haven's fair face deforms,
Enwrapp'd in tempest and a night of storms;
Astonish'd ocean feels the wild uproar,
The refluent surges beat the sounding shore;
Or thick as leaves in Autumn's golden reign,
Such, and so many, moves the warrior's train.
In bright array they seek the work of war,
Where high unfurl'd the ensign waves in air.
Shall I to Washington their praise recite?
Enough thou know'st them in the field of fight,
Thee first in place and honours,—we demand
The grace and glory of thy martial land.
Fam'd for thy valour, for thy virtues more,
Hear every tongue thy guardian aid implore!

One century scarce performed its destin'd round,
When Gallic powers Columbia's fury found;
And so may you, whoever dares disgrace
The land of freedom's heaven-defended race!
Fix'd are the eyes of nations on the scales,
For in their hopes Columbia's arm prevails.
Anon Britannia droops the pensive head,
While round increase the rising hills of dead.
Ah! cruel blindness to Columbia's state!
Lament thy thirst of boundless power too late.
Proceed, great chief, with virtue on thy side,
Thy ev'ry action let the goddess guide.
A crown, a mansion, and a throne that shine,
With gold unfading, Washington! be thine.

(From the *Pennsylvania Magazine*, for April, 1776, page 193.)

The *Evening Post and General Advertiser* in October, 1779, published proposals for printing by subscription a volume of poems and letters by Phillis Peters, and this ode to Washington was to be included. The volume was never issued.

[1] Letter of 26 February, 1776.

[1] "No Officer, or Soldier, under any pretence is to be absent from his post, without leave in writing from his Brigadier General, who is not to grant liberty of running backwards & forwards, from hence to Roxbury, but in very especial cases.

"As it is not unlikely but a contest may soon be brought on, between the ministerial Troops, and this Army; The General flatters himself, that every Officer, and Soldier, will endeavour to give, such distinguish'd proofs of his conduct, and good behaviour, as becomes men, fighting for everything that is dear, and valuable to Freemen; remembering at the same time what disgraceful punishment will attend a contrary behaviour.—Every man's conduct will be marked and rewarded, or punished accordingly and cowardice in a most exemplary manner.—The Colonels, or commanding Officers of regiments are to see that their several Regiments are properly told off, and the supernumerary Officers so posted as to keep the men to their duty; particular care is to be taken to prevent their firing at too great a distance, as one Fire well aim'd does more execution than a dozen at long shot. . . .

"As it has been suggested to the General that many of the towns-people &c.—influenced by a zeal for the cause of their country, are inclined to *throw* aid, in case the Army should be called to action—The General desires that they will, (to prevent any kind of confusion, or disorder) join different Companies in the several regiments, as they shall choose, or form themselves into a distinct Corps, under Officers of their own choosing, and put themselves under the immediate command of some Brigadier, that they may not be considered or act, as an independent Company."—*Orderly Book*, 3 March, 1776.

[1]“On the 23 Augt. 1775, the work of fortifying Lamb’s Dam was begun, and upon the completion of that work, the line of fortification was advanced to a point a little south of the present Northampton Street. Lamb’s Dam extended from about the junction of Hampden and Albany Sts. to a point near the present Walnut place. It was originally built to keep the tide from overflowing the marshes, and followed very nearly the present line of Northampton Street, diverging slightly to the southward as it neared the highway. At the termination of the Dam, on the upland, a strong breastwork was constructed, and from that the intrenchments extended across the highway. The works were completed Sept. 10, 1775.”—*Centen. Evacuation*, 12.

[1]The Council of the Massachusetts legislature.

[2]“His Excellency the General, returns his thanks to the Militia of the surrounding districts, for their spirited and alert march to Roxbury, last Saturday and Sunday, and for the noble ardor they discovered in defence of the cause of Liberty and their country.”—*Orderly Book*, 8 March, 1776.

[1]“On the 2d inst. at night they began a cannonade upon the town; the same was repeated on the evening of the 3d and 4th. On the 5th in the morning it was discovered that the enemy had thrown up three very extensive works with strong abatties on the commanding hills on Dorchester Neck, which must have been the employment of at least 12,000 men. In a situation so critical I determined upon immediate attack; the ardour of the troops encouraged me in this hazardous enterprise, and regiments were expeditiously embarked on board transports to fall down the harbour; but the wind unfortunately coming contrary and blowing very hard the ships were not able to get to their destination. . . . The weather continuing boisterous the next day and night gave the enemy time to improve their works, to bring up their cannon, and to put themselves into such a state of defence that I could promise myself little success by attacking them under such disadvantages; wherefore I judged it most advisable to prepare for the evacuation of the town. . . . This operation was effected on the 7th, and all the rear guard embarked at 9 o’clock in the morning, without the least loss, irregularity or accident.”—*General Howe to the Earl of Dartmouth*, 21 March, 1776.

[1]Born in Marshfield, Mass., 1725, and died in Chamblee, 2 June, 1776. “By the way, I must do justice to Thomas; he is a good officer, and is esteemed. We have no trouble with his camp; it is always in good order, and things are conducted with dignity and spirit in the military style.”—*James Warren to Samuel Adams*, 21 June, 1775.

[1]The evacuation of Boston by the British troops, after having held possession of the town for eleven months, was a source of no less joy in America, than of astonishment in England. Intelligence of this event was published by the ministry on the 3d of May, in a short paragraph, which merely announced, that “his Majesty’s forces had embarked from Boston with the greatest order and regularity, and without the least interruption from the rebels,” and were destined for Halifax. Parliament being then in session, the subject was called up by the Duke of Manchester, on the 10th of May, who proposed a motion for an address to his Majesty, that he would be pleased to order the late despatches of General Howe and Admiral Shuldham to be laid before

the House of Lords. A long and warm debate ensued, in which the ministers were severely censured for the recent occurrences in America.

The Duke of Manchester said: “To come now, my Lords, to that which has cast the deepest stain on the glory of the British arms, to that which must rouse the indignation of all, who feel for her disgrace; the army of Britain, equipped with every possible essential of war, a chosen army, with chosen officers, backed by the power of a mighty fleet, sent to correct revolted subjects, sent to chastise a resisting city, sent to assert Britain’s authority, has for many tedious months been imprisoned within that town by the provincial army, who, their watchful guards, permitted them no inlet to the country, who braved all their efforts, and defied all that their skill and abilities of war could ever attempt. One way indeed of escape is left; the fleet is still respected; to the fleet the army has recourse; and British generals, whose names never met with a blot of dishonor, are forced to quit that town, which was the first object of the war, the immediate cause of hostilities, the place of arms, which has cost this nation more than a million to defend. We are informed of this extraordinary event by a gazette, published by authority from government, in which it is related, that General Howe had quitted Boston; no circumstances mentioned to palliate the event, no veil but that of silence to cast over the disgrace. But, my Lords, though the government account is short and uncircumstantial, yet private intelligence, public report, on which, till it is with authenticity denied, I must rely, informs us, that General Howe quitted not Boston of his own free will; but that a superior enemy, by repeated efforts, by extraordinary works, by the fire of their batteries, rendered the place untenable.”

The Earl of Suffolk, in defence of the ministry, told the House that there was nothing extraordinary in the evacuation of Boston, that it was not intended to pursue the war in Massachusetts since the disaffection had become general, that orders had been sent out for a removal of the troops when the commander should think proper, and that he had resolved on this step ten days before it actually took place. “The noble Duke,” he added, “says there must have been a convention between General Howe and the rebel commander, which, I do assure his Grace, was by no means the case; no convention, stipulation, concession, or compromise whatever, having been made. The General thought proper to *shift his position*, in order, in the first place, to protect Halifax, and, after that object was secured, to penetrate by that way into the interior country and pursue his future intended operations.” The Marquis of Rockingham replied, after stating certain particulars, which had come through a private channel: “If those accounts are true, of which I have very little doubt, your Lordships will perceive, though possibly there might have been no formal convention or capitulation signed, which I understood was avoided by the generals on both sides for particular reasons, that, in whatever manner the business might have been negotiated, it had every substantial requisite of a treaty or compromise, as much as if it had been ever so solemnly authenticated or subscribed. The troops were permitted to evacuate the town without interruption, because they engaged on the other hand not to burn or destroy it, either previous to their departure, or after they had got on board their ships.” The same sentiments were expressed by Lord Shelburne, and other Lords in the opposition, but the minister persisted that he had no knowledge or belief of such a matter.

The facts in the case, however, prove to have been very nearly as represented by the Marquis of Rockingham. The inhabitants of Boston, fearing the consequences of an attack, as General Howe had prepared to set the town on fire in such an event, were very anxious to avert a calamity, that would involve them in ruin. An informal statement was drawn up, signed by the Selectmen, addressed to nobody, but intended for General Washington. An exact transcript from the original is here inserted.

“Boston, 8 March, 1776.

“As his Excellency General Howe is determined to leave the town with the troops under his command, a number of the respectable inhabitants, being very anxious for its preservation and safety, have applied to General Robertson for this purpose, who at their request has communicated the same to his Excellency General Howe, who has assured him, that he has no intention of destroying the town, unless the troops under his command are molested during their embarkation or at their departure, by the armed force without; which declaration he gave General Robertson leave to communicate to the inhabitants. If such an opposition should take place, we have the greatest reason to expect the town will be exposed to entire destruction. Our fears are quieted with regard to General Howe’s intentions. We beg we may have some assurance, that so dreadful a calamity may not be brought on by any measures without. As a testimony of the truth of the above, we have signed our names to this paper, carried out by Messrs. Thomas and Jonathan Amory and Peter Johonnot, who have at the earnest entreaties of the inhabitants, through the Lieutenant-Governor, solicited a flag of truce for this purpose.

“John Scollay, “Timothy Newell, “Thomas Marshall, “Samuel Austin.”

This paper was taken to the lines at Roxbury, and given to Colonel Learned, who carried it to head-quarters. He returned, and handed to the messengers, who had been the bearers of it the following letter:—

“Roxbury, 9 March, 1776.

“Gentlemen,

“Agreeably to a promise made to you at the lines yesterday, I waited upon his Excellency General Washington, and presented to him the paper handed to me by you, from the Selectmen of Boston. The answer I received from him was to this effect;—‘That, as it was an unauthenticated paper, without an address, and not obligatory upon General Howe, he would take no notice of it.’ I am, with esteem and respect, Gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

“Ebenezer Learned.”

“To Messrs. Amory And Johonnot.”

Notwithstanding this apparently uncompromising answer, yet, as the paper evidently conveyed the dispositions of General Howe, and as Washington could have no wish to destroy the town, but on the contrary the strongest motives for preserving it, no direct annoyance was afterwards offered to the British troops, and this mutual understanding doubtless saved much destruction of property and much bloodshed.

[1] Read in Congress, March 15th.

[1] Known by the British as “the old sow.” Putnam named it the “Congress” when it had been brought to Boston from Ticonderoga.

[1] The anniversary of the so-called “Boston Massacre.”

[1] On August 5, 1775, the Convention of Virginia had elected Henry, colonel of the first regiment of regulars, and commander-in-chief of all the Virginia forces raised for the defense of that colony, but he was expressly enjoined to obey the orders of the Convention and the Committees of Safety. When the first occasion for fighting occurred,—the march against Dunmore,—this latter body, distrusting Henry’s military capacity, passed him over, and appointed a subordinate, Colonel Woodford, to the command. This slight was resented by Henry, and was followed by others, such as the refusal of Woodford to give attention to his orders, the transfer of the command to Robert Howe of North Carolina, and finally, when the regiments were turned over to the Continent, the issue of a colonel’s commission, and not as he had hoped, an appointment as brigadier-general. He resigned his military offices 28 February, 1776.

[1] “Poor Fry! heaven and earth were moved to get him in; now I suppose we shall hear no more of him.”—*Reed to Washington*, 15 March, 1776.

[2] It was at first reported, that it was the design of the British government to send over a large number of commissioners to America, and that they were to make advances to the colonies separately.

[1] “That there may not be the least pretext for delay (as the General is determined to march the whole, or any part of this Army, the instant occasion shall require) His Excellency desires that not a moment’s time may be lost in preparing for the march. The Colonels will pay particular attention to the cloathing of their men. To prevent any unnecessary preparations, the General informs the officers and soldiers that it is his desire and expectation, that they encumber themselves with as little baggage as possible, as apart from the enormous expence to the Continent, Teams cannot be procured for superfluous Articles, it will be well if sufficient can be found to answer all requisite services—The Nature of the service we are engaged in, is such as require light Troops, ready at all times, and upon all occasions, for forced marches, the less baggage therefore, officers and men are encumbered with, the better.

“The recruiting Service is to be continued, but the recruits, and all the men upon furlough, are to join their respective regiments immediately.

“The General being desirous of selecting a particular number of men as a Guard for himself, and baggage. The Colonel, or Commanding Officer, of each of the established Regiments, (the Artillery and Riflemen excepted) will furnish him with four, that the number wanted may be chosen out of them. His Excellency depends upon the Colonels for good men, such as they can recommend for their sobriety, honesty, and good behavior; he wishes them to be from five feet, eight Inches high, to five feet, ten Inches; handsomely and well made, and as there is nothing in his eyes more desirable, than Cleanliness in a Soldier, he desires that particular attention may be made, in the choice of such men, as are neat, and spruce. They are all to be at Head Quarters tomorrow precisely at twelve, at noon, when the Number wanted will be fixed upon. The General neither wants men with uniform, or arms, nor does he desire any man to be sent to him, that is not perfectly willing, and desirous, of being of this guard. They should be drilled men.”—*Orderly Book*, 11 March, 1776.

[1] In his letter to Governor Trumbull, after speaking of the “shameful retreat” the British were making from Boston, Washington wrote:—

“You are sensible, Sir, of the great importance of a strenuous, exertion at this critical period,—a period which may in its consequences determine the fate of America. The zeal and activity heretofore shown by the good people of your Government in defence of the liberties of America, leaves me no room to doubt their readiness on the present occasion.”—*Washington to Governor Trumbull*, 14 March, 1776.

[1] Read in Congress March 22nd.

“As the Ministerial Troops in Boston both from information and appearance, are preparing to evacuate that Town, The General expressly orders, that neither Officer, or Soldier, presume to go into Boston, without leave from the General in Chief at Cambridge, or the commanding General at Roxbury; as the enemy with a malicious assiduity, have spread the infection of the smallpox through all parts of the town, nothing but the utmost caution on our part, can prevent that fatal disease from spreading thro’ the army, and country, to the infinite detriment of both, His Excellency expressly commands every officer, to pay the exactest obedience to this order.

“If upon the retreat of the Enemy any person whatsoever, is detected in pillaging, he may be assured the severest punishment will be his lot. The unhappy Inhabitants of that distress’d Town, have already suffer’d too heavily from the Iron hand of oppression!—Their Countrymen surely will not be base enough to add to their misfortune:

“After Orders. His Excellency the Commander in Chief orders, that the Rifle Battalion, with Stark’s, Webb’s, Patterson’s, Greaton’s, and Bond’s Regiments, be immediately relieved from duty, and hold themselves in readiness to march, on Friday

Morning next, except the Rifle Battalion, which marches tomorrow,”—*Orderly Book*, 13 March, 1776.

[1] Lord Stirling took the command at New York, on General Lee’s departure for the southward, March 7th, and this letter was received by him. He replied on the 20th:—

“I am happy to find, that the aid I called in from New Jersey and Connecticut exactly concurs with your sentiments. The two regiments of Connecticut now here, consisting of about five hundred rank and file each, are impatient to go home, as many of them are farmers who want to make out their summer’s work. The time of their engagement with General Lee ends next Monday. I have used my best endeavors to prevail on them to stay, till their places are supplied from that quarter, but it is still doubtful whether they will consent to it. Of this I have apprized Governor Trumbull, and have requested him to make up the whole two thousand from that colony. From New Jersey I have requested one thousand men; about two hundred of them are come in. About one thousand are ordered from the northern counties of this province. None of them is yet arrived.

“We have now in this place and on Long Island about two thousand five hundred men, including the above two Connecticut regiments. The militia in town amount to about as many more. Near one half of the whole are on fatigue every day, carrying into execution the plan of defence formed by General Lee. They go on with great spirit and industry. The Congress have ordered eight thousand men for the defence of this city and province. The corps to make up this number are four regiments from Pennsylvania, one from New Jersey, and four from this province, none of which is yet arrived, and most of them are incomplete and unfit to march, especially those of this province, of whom not above two hundred are yet in town; and some of them I find are to be employed on Hudson’s River, and in the northern parts of the province.”

“The Regiments and Companies of Artillery, mentioned in Yesterday’s Orders, are not to march before Sun-rise tomorrow morning, when everything belonging to them is to be ready to move off. The men are not to put their packs in the carts; their provisions being carried for them, the General expects the whole to carry their own packs. Any Officer or Soldier, who is known to commit any waste, or destruction to any of the barracks, or barrack utensils, upon their removing, will be punished with the utmost severity. The Qr. Mr General to order his assistants, to see every Article taken proper care of, when the Troops march.”—*Orderly Book*, 15 March, 1776.

“As the weather is so bad, and the roads so mirey the Regiments and Companies of Artillery, ordered to march this morning, are to halt until tomorrow morning.”—*Orderly Book*, 16 March, 1776.

[1] “I have the pleasure to inform you, that this morning the ministerial troops evacuated the town of Boston, without destroying it, and that we are now in full possession; upon which event, I beg leave to congratulate you, and I sincerely wish, if the ministry persevere in the same unconstitutional and despotic measures, which too long have marked their conduct, that our opposition and resistance, in every quarter, may be crowned with the success they have been here. Where their destination is, or

what plans they have in view, is altogether unknown here. Most probably the next attempt will be against New York, or some more southern colony. However, I should think, though I do not believe they have any design against Rhode Island, that it will be advisable to keep a strict look-out; and I submit it to you, whether it may not be proper, against the time you apprehend they might arrive, to call in a number of the militia, and have them posted in proper places. I do not mean to direct the measure, but only to mention it for your consideration. To me it appears worthy of attention.”—*Washington to Governor Cooke*, 17 March, 1776.

“We saw the ships under way about 8 in the morning and the River full of boats armed with soldiers. This gave an alarm and some suspected they were about to land at Dorchester, but having a full view of them with a glass from Plowed Hill, I found they were going on board the ships. I then took my horse, and rode down to Charlestown Neck, where I had a clear view of Bunker’s Hill. I saw the sentrys standing as usual with their firelocks shouldered, but finding they never moved, I soon suspected what regiment they belonged to; and upon taking a clear view with my glass, found they were only effigies set there by the flying enemy. This convinced me that they were actually fled, for if they meant to decoy us, they would have taken away every appearance of man. By this time, I was joined by Colo. Mifflin, who, with my Brigade Major agreed to go up, sending two persons round the works to examine whether there was any of them in the rear of the works, while we went up in the front. I at the same time sent for a strong party to follow us on to the hill to assist us in running away (if necessary). We found no person there and bravely took the fortress defended by lifeless sentries. I then brought on a party to secure what we had so bravely won, and went down to the other works where we found all abandoned, but the works not injured in any part. We hailed the ferry boat, which came over and informed us that they had abandoned the town. We then gave information to the general, who ordered me with the troops under my command to take possession of Charlestown, and General Putnam with 2000 men to take possession of the works in Boston; and on Monday Morning his Excellency made his entry into Boston, and repaired to Mr. Hancock’s house, where we found his furniture left without injury or diminution.”—*Sullivan to John Adams*, 19 March, 1776.

The fleet of the British consisted of seventy eight vessels, and carried all of Howe’s army, about 8,900 men, and more than 1100 refugees.

“A few hours after the British retreated, the Rev. Mr. Leonard preached at Cambridge, an excellent sermon in the audience of his Excellency the General, and others of distinction, well adapted to the interesting event of the day, from Exodus, xiv, 25; ‘and they took off their chariot wheels, that they drave them heavily; so that the Egyptians said, Let us flee from the face of Israel, for the Lord fighteth for them against the Egyptians.’ ”—*Pennsylvania Evening Post*, 30 March, 1776.

[1] On the 6th of March, Congress promoted General Thomas from the rank of brigadier to that of major-general, and appointed him to command in Canada thus superseding General Wooster, who had commanded there since the death of Montgomery.

[\[2\]](#) Read in Congress March 25th.

“The night of the 4th instant we possessd ourselves of Dorchester Heights, which alarmd the enemy so much that they made their dispositions to engage us, which was what I most earnestly wishd for, but a violent Storm coming on the evening of the 5th gave us time to strengthen our works, and cooled the enemies ardor, from that moment they made all possible diligence in preparing to move off. Our advancing still closer to them on the 16th by taking post on an eminence calld Nooks Hill which commands their works on the neck of Land, which seperates the town from Roxboro’, also commands the South part of Boston, has obliged the enemy to take to their ships, which rather precipitately they effectd the 17th in the morning, Leaving behind them about 30 pieces of excellent Cannon and two Mortars spiked, a number of Ball, some Shells, the Chief part of their Light Horse forage, 20,000 bushels of wheat, 2500 Chaldrons of Coal, Salt, Rugs, blankets with many other articles too tedious to mention—the Ships now lie below the Castle extending themselves to Nantasket road, about nine miles. I do not expect that they will pay us another visit, tho’ as a number of transports have apeard this morning to have joind them, they may be tempted, which will prevent my sending off any more troops until they quit the Harbor.”—*Washington to Schuyler*, 19 March, 1776.

“I have the pleasure to inform you, that on the morning of the 17 Instant General Howe with his army abandon’d the Town of Boston without destroying It, an event of much importance and which must be heard with great satisfaction, and that we are now in full possession—Their embarkation and retreat were hurried and precipitate, and they have left behind ’em stores of one thing or another to a pretty considerable amount, among which are several pieces of Heavy Cannon and one or two Mortars which are spiked—The Town is in a much better situation and less Injured, than I expected from the reports I have received, tho’ to be sure it is much damaged and many Houses despoiled of their valuable furniture.

The Fleet is still in King and Nantasket Roads and where they intend to make a descent next, is altogether unknown, but supposing New York to be an object of much importance and to be in their view, I must recommend your most strenuous and active exertions in preparing to prevent any designs or attempts they may have against it. I have detached the Riflemen and Five Batallions from home to your assistance, which will be followed by others as circumstances will allow. These, with what forces you have & can assemble, if there shou’d be an occasion, I trust it will be sufficient to hinder the Enemy from possessing the City or making a Lodgement, ’till the main body of this army can arrive.”—*Washington to Lord Sterling*, 19 March, 1776.

“All Officers, Soldiers and others, are positively forbid going into the Town of Boston without a pass, or being sent expressly upon duty; As soon as the Select Men report the Town to be cleansed from Infection, liberty will be given to those who have business there, to go in. The Inhabitants belonging to the Town may be permitted to return to their habitations, proper persons being appointed at the neck and at Charles-Town ferry, to grant them passes.”—*Orderly Book*, 19 March, 1776.

“Whitcomb’s, Phinney’s, and Huchinson’s Regiments are to march into Boston this

day, and remain there until further orders, they are to guard the Town and public stores there, and do all such fatigue, and other duties, as the General commanding there, thinks proper to order—Every possible precaution will be taken to destroy the Infection of the small-pox. The Troops now in Boston are to march out, and join their respective Regiments, upon being relieved by the Regiments that are to march in. The Posts on Bunker's-hill, Breed's hill, and Charles-Town Ferry, are to be garrisoned by Col. Waldron's Regt., who is to take especial care that the Abbatis, picketting &c. are preserved entire. The Qr. Mr. Genl. is to see that Fire wood, or Coals, is immediately laid in for the supply of those posts. The Commissary Genl. has Orders, immediately to lay in a proper supply of provision, for the Garrisons of Boston, Bunkers-hill & Dorchester Heights.”—*Orderly Book*, 20 March, 1776.

[1] Printed in fac-simile in Winsor, *History of Boston*, ii., 181.

[1] The whole number of refugees, who left Boston with the British army, was more than a thousand. The following statement is taken from the official return, made to the government, and now deposited in the public offices in London. Members of the council, commissioners, custom-house officers, and other persons who had been in some official station, one hundred and two; clergy, eighteen; persons from the country, one hundred and five; merchants and other inhabitants of Boston, two hundred and thirteen; farmers, traders, and mechanics, three hundred and eighty-two; total, nine hundred and twenty-four. All these returned their names on their arrival in Halifax. About two hundred others did not return their names.

On the 25th of April, General Howe wrote from Halifax to Lord George Germaine: “Many of the principal inhabitants of Boston under the protection of the army, having no means of subsistence here, apply to me to find them a passage to Europe, which they cannot otherwise get than at a most exorbitant rate. They have my assurance, that the first transport that can be spared shall be given up for this purpose. I am sorry to inform your Lordship, that there is an absolute necessity of issuing provisions to the whole of them, about eleven hundred, from the King's stores, without any prospect of stopping it. It must be confessed, that many, having quitted the whole of their property and estates, some of them very considerable in value, are real objects of his Majesty's most gracious attention.” *MS. Letter*.

[1] “Col. James Reed's, Nixon's, Poor's, Prescott's Arnold's and Baldwin's Regiments, are the first to march, under Brigadier Genl. Sullivan; they are to be ready at a moment's warn'g.

“The General flatters himself that the Commanding Officer of each of these, and the other Corps, will exert themselves (as they are going to join the Troops of other Colonies) in sprucing up their men, that they may look as soldier-like and reputable, as possible. This, and a proper attention to the good and orderly behavior of the men, and a proper care of their arms, ammunition and accoutrements, are qualifications essentially necessary to every Commanding Officer, therefore for their own Honor, and the Honor of the New England Colonies, it is hoped they will diligently exert themselves at this time.

“Two Companies of Artillery, with such light brass Ordnance, and Stores, as the Commanding Officer of the Artillery shall direct, are to march with Genl. Sullivan.

“Col. Gridley is to apply to Genl. Ward for such men, as are necessary for the Demolition of the Lines, on Boston Neck, who is to see the work executed as fast as possible. The Pickets, and other useful materials, to be preserved, and placed so as to be ready when called for, under the care of Sentries, such parts of these works as may be of service for our defence, are to be preserved.

“Col Knox will immediately lay out a Battery upon Charles-Town point, to be executed under the direction of Lieut. Col. Mason of the Artillery. A Field Officer with all the men off duty, of Col. Robinson’s Regiment, to march at sun-rise tomorrow morning to Charles-Town point as a working party.”—*Orderly Book*, 21 March, 1776.

“Since my last to you of the 19th instant, I had the pleasure to receive your favor of the 15th, it gives me vast satisfaction to find you are makeing such preparations as will prevent the enemy from makeing any Lodgment there, the reinforcement gon to you from this Camp, will put you on so respectable a footing; that I have no doubt, but you will be able to strengthen your works in such a manner that even if Genl. Howe should arrive before this Army, you will be able to prevent his taking post. . . . While they remain in sight I must stay here to watch their motions, with the Army under my Command. When they move from hence, if nothing unforeseen happens, I shall make the best of my way to New York where I shall have great pleasure in takeing your Lordship by the hand, You omitted sending the paper you refer to in your last, it will be a satisfaction to me to receive it in your next: if this shoud reach ere the departure of the powder from your place you will do well to keep it with you.”—*Washington to Lord Sterling*, 24 March, 1776.

[1] “The peculiar situation of Rhode Island and its extensive sea coast had not escaped my mind. I well know the enemy have it in their power to do it considerable damage, unless there is a sufficient force to repel their attempts. But it is the opinion of the general officers here, that their destination is against New York, the importance of which, as it seems the free and only communication between the northern and southern colonies, which will be entirely cut off by their possessing it, and give them the command of Hudson’s River, and an easy pass into Canada, makes it absolutely and indispensably necessary for the whole of this army, which is but inconsiderable, except that part of it which will be left to secure the stores, barracks and other public property, to be marched from hence for its defence with all possible expedition. It is an object that should command our first attention, and if lost, will be of the most fatal consequence to us in the present unhappy and interesting struggle.”—*Washington to Governor Cooke*, 21 March, 1776.

[1] This return shows a total of 7,579.

[2] These resignations were accepted by Congress 23 April, 1776.

[1] *In Congress May 6th.*—“Resolved, that General Washington be informed, that Congress suppose, if Commissioners are intended to be sent from Great Britain to treat for peace, that the usual practice in such cases will be observed, by making previous application for the necessary passports or safe conduct; and on such application being made, Congress will then direct the proper measures for the reception of such Commissioners.”

“It will be observed how long this trifling business had been depending, but it cannot be known from the journal how much debate it had occasioned. It was one of those delusive contrivances by which the party in opposition to us endeavored, by lulling the people with idle hopes of reconciliation into security, to turn their heads and thoughts from independence. They endeavored to insert in the resolution ideas of reconciliation; we carried our point for inserting peace. They wanted powers to be given to the General to receive the Commissioners in ceremony; we ordered nothing to be done till we were solicited for passports. Upon the whole, we avoided the snare, and brought the controversy to a close, with some dignity. But it will never be known how much labor it cost us to accomplish it.” *John Adams’ Autobiography*, iii., 43.

[1] Read in Congress April 2nd. Referred to Johnson, Jay, and Wilson.

“The enemy still continuing in the harbour, without any apparent cause for it, after Winds and Weather have favoured their sailing, leaves abundant reason to suspect, that they may have some design of aiming a blow at us before they depart. The General therefore in the strongest terms imaginable recommends to the commanding Officer, of every corps, to prevent his men that are off duty, from straggling, but to have them ready to turn out at a moment’s warning with their Arms, & Ammunition in good order. For this purpose a strict attention is to be paid to Roll-calling, and all delinquents severely punished.

“The General officers in their several departments, are to take care that proper Alarm posts are assigned every corps, that no confusion or disorder may ensue, in case we should be called out: In a particular manner General’s Putnam and Sullivan, are to attend to those of the Center, and Left division: As the Enemy’s evacuation of Boston, will render a new disposition proper, they are to meet and consult on this point without delay. Genl. Greene will dispose of the Regiments in Boston, to the best advantage.

“The floating Batteries to be man’d (if they have guns on board) and sent down to Charles-town point, for the purpose of defence in case of need.

“The guard Boats are to patrol constantly and be very attentive to every movement of the enemy, and good look outs kept at, and from, the posts from Chelsea, round Squantum, and the earliest information given of a hostile appearance.

“All the flat-bottom, and whale boats, not in immediate, and necessary use, are to be brought from Boston, and Charlestown, where they are beating against the wharves, and secured in Cambridge river: Mr. Sylvanus Drew is appointed to take charge of the boats, and to make a return thereof to the Commander in Chief. Such hands as he shall

find necessary to get these Boats together, Genl. Putnam will order him.

“The public Horses, and some other Articles, will be sold on the Common in Cambridge, to morrow at eleven o’clock.”—*Orderly Book*, 24 March, 1776.

The points raised by General Washington were not readily answered by Congress. On April 30th, it was resolved “that the vessels . . . ought to be restored to their former owners, being inhabitants of these colonies, on their making proof of their title, unless the said parties so claiming, shall have been voluntarily active against the rights of the United Colonies, by affording aid and assistance to the British fleet and army,”—commissioners appointed by Massachusetts to pass upon claims. On May 2d, the report on the letter was referred to a new committee, consisting of Dickinson, W. Livingston, and Rutledge, not one member of the old committee being retained, and on the 4th, a part of the new report was adopted providing that any cannon or stores in Boston that had been purchased by or provided at the expense of any colony, should be considered as belonging to the colony so furnishing them; “and that all other cannon left in the colony of Massachusetts-Bay, by the British forces, be presented to the said colony.” By a subsequent resolve, such of the cannon brought from Ticonderoga, as had not been removed by General Washington was “lent for the defence of the town and harbor of Boston” (May 7th).

[1] “I now beg leave to inform you, that I have just received intelligence that the whole of the ministerial fleet, besides three or four ships, got under way this evening in Nantasket Road, and were standing out for sea; in consequence of which, I shall detach a brigade of six regiments immediately for New York, under the command of Brigadier-General Sullivan (Brigadier-General Heath having gone with the first), which will be succeeded by another in a day or two; and, directly after, I shall forward the remainder of the army, except four or five regiments, which will be left for taking care of the barracks and public stores, and fortifying the town, and erecting such works for its defence as the honorable General Court may think necessary; and then follow myself.

“Apprehending that General Thomas will stand in need of some artillerists in Canada, I have ordered two companies of the train to march immediately; and two mortars, with a quantity of shells and shot, to be sent to him. He set out on the 21st instant.”—*Washington to the President of Congress*, 27 March, 1776.

[1] Samuel B. Webb.

[2] Probably Mifflin, as the Quartermaster-General was allowed five per cent. on purchases.

[1] “I beg leave to transmit to you the copy of a petition from the inhabitants of Nova Scotia, brought me by Jonathan Eddy, mentioned therein, who is now here with an Acadian; from this it appears, they are in a distressed situation; and, from Mr. Eddy’s account, they are exceedingly apprehensive, that they will be reduced to the disagreeable alternative of taking up arms and joining our enemies, or to flee their country, unless they can be protected against their insults and oppressions. He says

that their committees think many salutary and valuable consequences would be derived from five or six hundred men being sent there, as it would not only quiet the minds of the people from the anxiety and uneasiness they are now filled with, and enable them to take a part in behalf of the colonies, but be the means of preventing the Indians, (of which there are a good many,) from taking the side of government, and the ministerial troops from getting such supplies of provisions from thence as they have done. How far these good purposes would be answered, if such a force was sent, as they ask for, it is impossible to determine in the present uncertain state of things. For, if the army from Boston is going to Halifax, as reported by them before their departure, that, or a much more considerable force would be of no avail; if not, and they possess the friendly disposition to our cause, suggested in the petition and declared by Mr. Eddy, it might be of great service, unless another body of troops should be sent thither by administration, too powerful for them to oppose. It being a matter of some importance, I judged it prudent to lay it before Congress for their consideration; and, requesting their direction upon the subject, shall only add, if they determine to adopt it, that they will prescribe the number to be sent, and whether it is to be from the regiments, which will be left here. I shall wait their decision, and, whatever it is, will endeavour to have it carried into execution.”—*Washington to the President of Congress*, 27 March, 1776.

There seems to have been in Nova Scotia a strong spirit of opposition to the government, and a tendency to join with the other colonies in open resistance, particularly among the Acadians. The petition above-mentioned was dated on the 8th of February, and signed by twelve persons, resident in Cumberland county, and members of different committees, who had acted, it would appear, with some degree of secrecy, and under fear of the government. Threatening proclamations had been issued, and measures adopted for raising a military force. The petitioners say: “We agreed in our committees, that nothing should be done publicly, as it might instigate the others to fall upon us sooner than they intended, and as we could not tell what was the intention of the Continental Congress concerning us. Therefore we pray ardently, that your Excellency will please to relieve us, that we may be able to express our sentiments publicly, and join our little strength with the other colonies in preventing the ensigns of slavery from being set up in any part of this great empire. We further desire, that this our request may be kept a secret for the present.”

A member of one of the committees also wrote a private letter to Washington, in which he said: “The great contest between Britain and America has hitherto been only treated speculatively among us. I presume a sympathy with our brethren on the continent reigns in the breasts of the generality of the inhabitants. With gladness would we be active in the glorious struggle, if our situation and circumstances were such, as to afford the least glimpse of success; but our remoteness from the other colonies and our form of government, joined with the indigence of the inhabitants, render it in a manner impossible without succour from some other quarter. As to the Acadians, I have dwelt among them near twenty years, and am well acquainted with their manners and ways. They are to a man wholly inclined to the cause of America. There are but about two hundred regular troops in Halifax, including raw recruits from Newfoundland and other places. Had we at present two or three hundred men, they would secure all that part of the province between this place and Halifax.”

As the British army, lately embarked from Boston, had sailed for Halifax, it was of course inexpedient for Congress to attempt any relief to the petitioners by sending troops to Nova Scotia.

[1] “March 28.—This day, the Thursday lecture, which was established and has been observed from the first settlement of Boston without interruption until within these few months past [January], was opened by the Rev. Dr. Eliot. His Excellency Gen. Washington, and the other general officers and their suites, having been previously invited, met in the Council Chamber, from whence preceded by the sheriff with his wands attended by the members of the council, who have had the small-pox, the committee of the House of Representatives, the selectmen, the clergy, and many other gentlemen, they repaired to the old brick meeting-house, where an excellent and well-adapted discourse was delivered from those words in the 33d. chap. of Isaiah and 20th verse.

“After divine service was ended, his Excellency, attended and accompanied as before, returned to the Council Chamber, from whence they proceeded to the Bunch of Grapes tavern, where an elegant dinner was provided at the public expense; after which many proper and pertinent toasts were drank. Joy and gratitude sat in every countenance and smiled in every eye.”—*Pennsylvania Evening Post*, 9 April, 1776.

[1] The people on the Chesapeake Bay, and the rivers emptying into it, had been alarmed during the winter by reports, that the enemy were about to ascend with their ships and water-craft, and lay waste the country. To escape the threatened danger, many of the inhabitants retired to the interior, taking with them such parts of their property as could be removed. General Washington’s residence on the banks of the Potomac was accessible to the approach of the largest ships, and it was rumored that the enemy intended paying it a visit. Mr. Lund Washington wrote to him from Mount Vernon: “Alexandria is much alarmed, and indeed the whole neighborhood. The women and children are leaving the town and stowing themselves in every hut they can find, out of the reach of the enemy’s cannon. Every wagon, cart, and pack-horse, that can be got, is employed. The militia are all up, but not in arms, for indeed they have none, or at least very few. I could wish, if we are to have our neighborhood invaded, that they would send a tender or two among us, that we might see how the people would behave on the occasion. They say they are determined to fight. I am about packing up your China and glass in barrels, and other things into chests, trunks, and bundles, and I shall be able at the shortest notice to remove them out of the way. I fear the destruction will be great, although the best care has been taken. Every body I see tells me, that if the people could have notice they would immediately come and defend your property, so long as they have life, from Loudoun, Prince William, Fauquier, and this county.”

[1] General Lee, who was now at Williamsburg, wrote to Washington a letter dated April 5th, complimenting him on the evacuation of Boston in the following language.

“I most sincerely congratulate you, I congratulate the public, on the great and glorious event, your possession of Boston. It will be a most bright page in the annals of

America, and a most abominably black one in those of the beldam Britain. Go on, my dear General, crown yourself with glory, and establish the liberties and lustre of your country on a foundation more permanent than the Capitol Rock. My situation is just as I expected. I am afraid I shall make a shabby figure, without any real demerits of my own. I am like a dog in a dancing-school. I know not where to turn myself. The circumstances of the country intersected by navigable rivers, the uncertainty of the enemy's designs and motions, who can fly in an instant to any spot they choose with their canvass wings, throw me, and would throw Julius Cæsar, into this inevitable dilemma. I may possibly be in the north, when, as Richard says, I should serve my sovereign in the west. I can only act from surmise, and I have a very good chance of surmising wrong. I am sorry to grate your ears with a truth, but must at all events assure you, that the Provincial Congress of New York are angels of decision, when compared with your countrymen, the Committee of Safety assembled at Williamsburg. Page, Lee, Mercer, and Payne are indeed exceptions; but from Pendleton, Bland, the Treasurer, and company, *libera nos, Domine.*"