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Thucydides, *The English Works, vol. VIII (The Peloponnesian War Part I)* [1839]



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
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Edition Used:

The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury; Now First Collected and Edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., (London: Bohn, 1839-45). 11 vols. Vol. 8.

Author: [Thucydides](#)

Translator: [Thomas Hobbes](#)

Editor: [Sir William Molesworth](#)

About This Title:

Vol. 1 of Hobbes' translation. Thucydides was one of the greatest of the ancient Greek historians because of his attention to accurate research. His account of the 5th century BC struggle between Athens and Sparta is one of the first works of history to combine political and ethical reflections with history writing.

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


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The merit of Hobbes' translation of Thucydides lies principally in the simplicity and force of the language: bearing in that respect some affinity to the original. Viewed merely as a translation, it will be found to contain, owing partly to the corrupt state of the Greek text of his day, partly to his habitual disregard of minute details so that accuracy were attained in essentials, manifold errors and omissions. As these defects disfigure the narrative, and sometimes perplex the reader, it has been considered worth while to attempt, by short notes, something towards their removal: without however affecting to offer a translation either critically correct or even free from many errors. In the performance of this task the interpretations of Goeller, Arnold, Thirlwall and others, have been followed wheresoever they were available: where such help failed, the editor had to rely on his own imperfect resources.

To render the work more useful to the English reader and those not deeply versed in Grecian history, some historical notes have been added, drawn for the most part in substance from Mueller's history of the Dorians, Hermann's Grecian Antiquities, Thirlwall's history of Greece, Niebuhr's history of Rome, &c. Wheresoever Aristotle is cited, his Politics will be understood to be the work referred to.

Several phrases having been marked by Hobbes himself with square brackets, to designate them as interpolations, the same marks have been added for the same purpose to other words and passages.

Those corrections of the Greek text by Bekker and others only have been noticed, which serve to explain the cause of Hobbes' departure in those instances from the right interpretation.

It has been considered useless to reprint the maps belonging to the original edition, and referred to in the Epistle to the Reader. These were unavoidably rude and imperfect, and have been long superseded both by the more general maps to be found in any modern Atlas, and the numerous maps and plans which have been published of late years for the particular illustration of this history. It has however been thought useful to append Goeller's map of the siege of Syracuse, which is accessible only in his edition of the text.

E. G.

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TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR WILLIAM CAVENDISH, Knight Of The Bath, Baron Of Hardwick, And Earl Of Devonshire.

Right Honourable, I take confidence from your Lordship's goodness in the very entrance of this Epistle, to profess, with simplicity and according to the faith I owe my master now in heaven, that it is not unto yourself, but to your Lordship's father that I dedicate this my labour, such as it is. For neither am I at liberty to make choice of one to whom I may present it as a voluntary oblation; being bound in duty to bring it in as an account to him, by whose indulgence I had both the time and ammunition to perform it. Nor if such obligation were removed, know I any to whom I ought to dedicate it rather. For by the experience of many years I had the honour to serve him, I know this: there was not any, who more really, and less for glory's sake favoured those that studied the liberal arts liberally, than my Lord your father did; nor in whose house a man should less need the university than in his. For his own study, it was bestowed, for the most part, in that kind of learning which best deserveth the pains and hours of great persons, history and civil knowledge: and directed not to the ostentation of his reading, but to the government of his life and the public good. For he read, so that the learning he took in by study, by judgment he digested, and converted into wisdom and ability to benefit his country: to which also he applied himself with zeal, but such as took no fire either from faction or ambition. And as he was a most able man, for soundness of advice and clear expression of himself, in matters of difficulty and consequence, both in public and private: so also was he one whom no man was able either to draw or jumble out of the straight path of justice. Of which virtue, I know not whether he deserved more by his severity in imposing it (as he did to his last breath) on himself, or by his magnanimity in not exacting it to himself from others. No man better discerned of men: and therefore was he constant in his friendships, because he regarded not the *fortune* nor *adherence*, but the *men*; with whom also he conversed with an openness of heart that had no other guard than his own integrity and that nil conscire. To his equals he carried himself equally, and to his inferiors familiarly; but maintaining his respect fully, and only with the native splendour of his worth. In sum, he was one in whom might plainly be perceived, that *honour* and *honesty* are but the same thing in the different degrees of persons. To him therefore, and to the memory of his worth, be consecrated this, though unworthy, offering.

And now, imitating in this *civil* worship the *religious* worship of the gentiles; who, when they dedicated any thing to their gods, brought and presented the same to their images: I bring and present this gift of mine, the history of thucydides, translated into English with much more diligence than elegance, to your Lordship; who are the image of your father, (for never was a man more exactly copied out than he in you), and who have in you the seeds of his virtues already springing up: humbly intreating your Lordship to esteem it amongst the goods that descend upon you, and in your due time to read it. I could recommend the author unto you, not impertinently, for that he had in his veins the blood of kings; but I choose rather to recommend him for his writings,

as having in them profitable instruction for noblemen, and such as may come to have the managing of great and weighty actions. For I may confidently say, that notwithstanding the excellent both examples and precepts of heroic virtue you have at home, this book will confer not a little to your institution; especially when you come to the years to frame your life by your own observation. For in history, actions of *honour* and *dishonour* do appear plainly and distinctly, which are which; but in the present age they are so disguised, that few there be, and those very careful, that be not grossly mistaken in them. But this, I doubt not, is superfluously spoken by me to your Lordship. Therefore I end with this prayer: that it will please God to give you virtues suitable to the fair dwelling he hath prepared for them, and the happiness that such virtues lead unto both in and after this world.

Your Lordship'S Most Humble Servant,

Tho: Hobbes.

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TO THE READERS.

Though this translation have already past the censure of some, whose judgments I very much esteem: yet because there is something, I know not what, in the censure of a multitude, more terrible than any single judgment, how severe or exact soever, I have thought it discretion in all men, that have to do with so many, and to me, in my want of perfection, necessary, to bespeak your candour. Which that I may upon the better reason hope for, I am willing to acquaint you briefly, upon what grounds I undertook this work at first; and have since, by publishing it, put myself upon the hazard of your censure, with so small hope of glory as from a thing of this nature can be expected. For I know, that mere translations have in them this property: that they may much disgrace, if not well done; but if well, not much commend the doer.

It hath been noted by divers, that Homer in poesy, Aristotle in philosophy, Demosthenes in eloquence, and others of the ancients in other knowledge, do still maintain their primacy: none of them exceeded, some not approached, by any in these later ages. And in the number of these is justly ranked also our Thucydides; a workman no less perfect in his work, than any of the former; and in whom (I believe with many others) the faculty of writing history is at the highest. For the principal and proper work of history being to instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of actions past, to bear themselves prudently in the present and providently towards the future: there is not extant any other (merely human) that doth more naturally and fully perform it, than this of my author. It is true, that there be many excellent and profitable histories written since: and in some of them there be inserted very wise discourses, both of manners and policy. But being discourses inserted, and not of the contexture of the narration, they indeed commend the knowledge of the writer, but not the history itself: the nature whereof is merely narrative. In others, there be subtle conjectures at the secret aims and inward cogitations of such as fall under their pen; which is also none of the least virtues in a history, where conjecture is thoroughly grounded, not forced to serve the purpose of the writer in adorning his style, or manifesting his subtlety in conjecturing. But these conjectures cannot often be certain, unless withal so evident, that the narration itself may be sufficient to suggest the same also to the reader. But Thucydides is one, who, though he never digress to read a lecture, moral or political, upon his own text, nor enter into men's hearts further than the acts themselves evidently guide him: is yet accounted the most politic historiographer that ever writ. The reason whereof I take to be this. He filleth his narrations with that choice of matter, and ordereth them with that judgment, and with such perspicuity and efficacy expresseth himself, that, as Plutarch saith, he maketh his auditor a spectator. For he setteth his reader in the assemblies of the people and in the senate, at their debating; in the streets, at their seditions; and in the field, at their battles. So that look how much a man of understanding might have added to his experience, if he had then lived a beholder of their proceedings, and familiar with the men and business of the time: so much almost may he profit now, by attentive reading of the same here written. He may from the narrations draw out lessons to himself, and of himself be able to trace the drifts and counsels of the actors to their seat.

These virtues of my author did so take my affection, that they begat in me a desire to communicate him further: which was the first occasion that moved me to translate him. For it is an error we easily fall into, to believe that whatsoever pleaseth us, will be in like manner and degree acceptable to all: and to esteem of one another's judgment, as we agree in the liking or dislike of the same things. And in this error peradventure was I, when I thought, that as many of the more judicious as I should communicate him to, would affect him as much as I myself did. I considered also, that he was exceedingly esteemed of the Italians and French in their own tongues: notwithstanding that he be not very much beholden for it to his interpreters. Of whom (to speak no more than becomes a candidate of your good opinion in the same kind) I may say this: that whereas the author himself so carrieth with him his own light throughout, that the reader may continually see his way before him, and by that which goeth before expect what is to follow; I found it not so in them. The cause whereof, and their excuse, may be this: they followed the Latin of Laurentius Valla, which was not without some errors; and he a Greek copy not so correct as now is extant. Out of French he was done into English (for I need not dissemble to have seen him in English) in the time of King Edward the Sixth: but so, as by multiplication of error he became at length traduced, rather than translated into our language. Hereupon I resolved to take him immediately from the Greek, according to the edition of Æmilius Porta: not refusing or neglecting any version, comment, or other help I could come by. Knowing that when with diligence and leisure I should have done it, though some error might remain, yet they would be errors but of one descent; of which nevertheless I can discover none, and hope they be not many. After I had finished it, it lay long by me: and other reasons taking place, my desire to communicate it ceased.

For I saw that, for the greatest part, men came to the reading of history with an affection much like that of the people in Rome: who came to the spectacle of the gladiators with more delight to behold their blood, than their skill in fencing. For they be far more in number, that love to read of great armies, bloody battles, and many thousands slain at once, than that mind the art by which the affairs both of armies and cities be conducted to their ends. I observed likewise, that there were not many whose ears were well accustomed to the names of the places they shall meet with in this history; without the knowledge whereof it can neither patiently be read over, perfectly understood, nor easily remembered: especially being many, as here it falleth out. Because in that age almost every city both in Greece and Sicily, the two main scenes of this war, was a distinct commonwealth by itself, and a party in the quarrel.

Nevertheless I have thought since, that the former of these considerations ought not to be of any weight at all, to him that can content himself with the few and better sort of readers: who, as they only judge, so is their approbation only considerable. And for the difficulty arising from the ignorance of places, I thought it not so insuperable, but that with convenient pictures of the countries it might be removed. To which purpose, I saw there would be necessary especially two: a general map of Greece, and a general map of Sicily. The latter of these I found already extant, exactly done by Philip Cluverius; which I have caused to be cut, and you have it at the beginning of the sixth book. But for maps of Greece, sufficient for this purpose, I could light on none. For neither are the tables of Ptolomy, and descriptions of those that follow him, accommodate to the time of Thucydides; and therefore few of the places by him

mentioned, therein described: nor are those that be, agreeing always with the truth of history. Wherefore I was constrained to draw one as well as I could myself. Which to do, I was to rely for the main figure of the country on the modern description now in reputation: and in that, to set down those places especially (as many as the volume was capable of) which occur in the reading of this author, and to assign them that situation, which, by travel in Strabo, Pausanias, Herodotus, and some other good authors, I saw belonged unto them. And to shew you that I have not played the mountebank in it, putting down exactly some few of the principal, and the rest at adventure, without care and without reason, I have joined with the map an index, that pointeth to the authors which will justify me where I differ from others. With these maps, and those few brief notes in the margin upon such passages as I thought most required them, I supposed the history might be read with very much benefit by all men of good judgment and education, (for whom also it was intended from the beginning by Thucydides), and have therefore at length made my labour public, not without hope to have it accepted. Which if I obtain, though no otherwise than in virtue of the author's excellent matter, it is sufficient.

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OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

We read of divers men that bear the name of Thucydides. There is Thucydides a Pharsalian, mentioned in the eighth book of this history; who was public host of the Athenians in Pharsalus, and chancing to be at Athens at the time that the government of the four hundred began to go down, by his interposition and persuasion kept asunder the factions then arming themselves, that they fought not in the city to the ruin of the commonwealth. There is Thucydides the son of Milesias, an Athenian, of the town of Alope, of whom Plutarch speaketh in the life of Pericles; and the same, in all probability, that in the first book of this history is said to have had the charge of forty galleys sent against Samos, about twenty–four years before the beginning of this war. Another Thucydides the son of Ariston, an Athenian also, of the town of Acherdus, was a poet; though of his verses there be nothing extant. But Thucydides the writer of this history, an Athenian, of the town of Halimus, was the son of Olorus (or Orolus) and Hegesypele. His father’s name is commonly written Olorus, though in the inscription on his tomb it was Orolus. Howsoever it be written, it is the same that was borne by divers of the kings of Thrace; and imposed on him with respect unto his descent from them. So that though our author (as Cicero saith of him, lib. ii. De Oratore,) had never written an history, yet had not his name not been extant, in regard of his honour and nobility. And not only Plutarch, in the life of Cimon, but also almost all others that have touched this point, affirm directly that he was descended from the Thracian kings: adducing this for proof, that he was of the house of Miltiades, that famous general of the Athenians against the Persians at Marathon; which they also prove by this, that his tomb was a long time extant amongst the monuments of that family. For near unto the gates of Athens, called Melitides, there was a place named Coela; and in it the monuments called *Cimoniana*, belonging to the family of Miltiades, in which none but such as were of that family might be buried. And amongst those was the monument of Thucydides; with this inscription, Thucydides Orolus Halimusius. Now Miltiades is confessed by all, to have descended from Olorus king of Thrace; whose daughter another Miltiades, grandfather to this, married and had children by. And Miltiades, that won the memorable victory at Marathon, was heir to goodly possessions and cities in the Chersonnesus of Thrace; over which also he reigned. In Thrace lay also the possessions of Thucydides, and his wealthy mines of gold: as he himself professeth in his fourth book. And although those riches might come to him by a wife (as is also by some affirmed) which he married in Scapte–Hyle, a city of Thrace; yet even by that marriage it appeareth, that his affairs had a relation to that country, and that his nobility was not there unknown. But in what degree of kindred Miltiades and he approached each other, is not anywhere made manifest. Some also have conjectured that he was of the house of the Peisistratides: the ground of whose conjecture hath been only this, that he maketh honourable mention of the government of Peisistratus and his sons, and extenuateth the glory of Harmodius and Aristogeiton; proving that the freeing of the state of Athens from the tyranny of the Peisistratides was falsely ascribed to their fact, (which proceeded from private revenge in a quarrel of love), by which the tyranny ceased not, but grew heavier to the state, till it was at last put down by the Lacedæmonians. But

this opinion, as it is not so well-grounded, so neither is it so well received as the former.

Agreeable to his nobility, was his institution in the study of eloquence and philosophy. For in philosophy, he was the scholar (as also was Pericles and Socrates) of Anaxagoras; whose opinions, being of a strain above the apprehension of the vulgar, procured him the estimation of an atheist: which name they bestowed upon all men that thought not as they did of their ridiculous religion, and in the end cost him his life. And Socrates after him for the like causes underwent the like fortune. It is not therefore much to be regarded, if this other disciple of his were by some reputed an atheist too. For though he were none, yet it is not improbable, but by the light of natural reason he might see enough in the religion of these heathen, to make him think it vain and superstitious; which was enough to make him an atheist in the opinion of the people. In some places of his history he noteth the equivocation of the oracles; and yet he confirmeth an assertion of his own, touching the time this war lasted, by the oracle's prediction. He taxeth Nicias for being too punctual in the observation of the ceremonies of their religion, when he overthrew himself and his army, and indeed the whole dominion and liberty of his country, by it. Yet he commendeth him in another place for his worshipping of the gods¹, and saith in that respect, he least of all men deserved to come to so great a degree of calamity as he did. So that in his writings our author appeareth to be, on the one side not superstitious, on the other side not an atheist.

In rhetoric, he was the disciple of Antiphon; one (by his description in the eighth book of this history) for power of speech almost a miracle, and feared by the people for his eloquence. Insomuch as in his latter days he lived retired, but so as he gave counsel to, and writ orations for other men that resorted to him to that purpose. It was he that contrived the deposing of the people, and the setting up of the government of the four hundred. For which also he was put to death, when the people again recovered their authority, notwithstanding that he pleaded his own cause the best of any man to that day.

It need not be doubted, but from such a master Thucydides was sufficiently qualified to have become a great demagogue, and of great authority with the people. But it seemeth he had no desire at all to meddle in the government: because in those days it was impossible for any man to give good and profitable counsel for the commonwealth, and not incur the displeasure of the people. For their opinion was such of their own power, and of the facility of achieving whatsoever action they undertook, that such men only swayed the assemblies, and were esteemed wise and good commonwealth's men, as did put them upon the most dangerous and desperate enterprizes. Whereas he that gave them temperate and discreet advice, was thought a coward, or not to understand, or else to malign their power. And no marvel: for much prosperity (to which they had now for many years been accustomed) maketh men in love with themselves; and it is hard for any man to love that counsel which maketh him love himself the less. And it holdeth much more in a multitude, than in one man. For a man that reasoneth with himself, will not be ashamed to admit of timorous suggestions in his business, that he may the stronglier provide; but in public deliberations before a multitude, fear (which for the most part adviseth well, though it

execute not so) seldom or never sheweth itself or is admitted. By this means it came to pass amongst the Athenians, who thought they were able to do anything, that wicked men and flatterers drave them headlong into those actions that were to ruin them; and the good men either durst not oppose, or if they did, undid themselves. Thucydides therefore, that he might not be either of them that committed or of them that suffered the evil, forbore to come into the assemblies; and propounded to himself a private life, as far as the eminency of so wealthy a person, and the writing of the history he had undertaken, would permit.

For his opinion touching the government of the state, it is manifest that he least of all liked the democracy. And upon divers occasions he noteth the emulation and contention of the demagogues for reputation and glory of wit; with their crossing of each other's counsels, to the damage of the public; the inconsistency of resolutions, caused by the diversity of ends and power of rhetoric in the orators; and the desperate actions undertaken upon the flattering advice of such as desired to attain, or to hold what they had attained, of authority and sway amongst the common people. Nor doth it appear that he magnifieth anywhere the authority of *the few*: amongst whom, he saith, every one desireth to be the chief; and they that are undervalued, bear it with less patience than in a democracy; whereupon sedition followeth, and dissolution of the government. He praiseth the government of Athens, when it was mixed of *the few* and *the many*; but more he commendeth it, both when Peisistratus reigned, (saving that it was an usurped power), and when in the beginning of this war it was democratical in name, but in effect monarchical under Pericles. So that it seemeth, that as he was of regal descent, so he best approved of the regal government. It is therefore no marvel, if he meddled as little as he could in the business of the commonwealth; but gave himself rather to the observation and recording of what was done by those that had the managing thereof. Which also he was no less prompt, diligent, and faithful by the disposition of his mind, than by his fortune, dignity, and wisdom able, to accomplish. How he was disposed to a work of this nature, may be understood by this: that when being a young man he heard Herodotus the historiographer reciting his history in public, (for such was the fashion both of that, and many ages after), he felt so great a sting of emulation, that it drew tears from him: insomuch as Herodotus himself took notice how violently his mind was set on letters, and told his father Olorus¹. When the Peloponnesian war began to break out, he conjectured truly that it would prove an argument worthy of his labour: and no sooner it began, than he began his history; pursuing the same not in that perfect manner in which we see it now, but by way of commentary or plain register of the actions and passages thereof, as from time to time they fell out and came to his knowledge. But such a commentary it was, as might perhaps deserve to be preferred before a history written by another. For it is very probable that the eighth book is left the same as it was when he first writ it: neither beautified with orations, nor so well cemented at the transitions, as the former seven books are¹. And though he began to write as soon as ever the war was on foot; yet began he not to perfect and polish his history, till after he was banished.

For notwithstanding his retired life upon the coast of Thrace, where his own possessions lay, he could not avoid a service to the state which proved to him afterwards very unfortunate. For whilst he resided in the isle Thasos, it fell out that

Brasidas the Lacedæmonian besieged Amphipolis; a city belonging to the Athenians, on the confines of Thrace and Macedonia, distant from Thasos about half a day's sail. To relieve which, the captain thereof for the Athenians sent to Thucydides, to levy a power and make haste unto him: for Thucydides was one of the Strategi, that is, had authority to raise forces in those parts for the service of the commonwealth². And he did accordingly; but he came thither one night too late, and found the city already yielded up. And for this he was afterwards banished; as if he had let slip his time through negligence, or purposely put it off upon fear of the enemy. Nevertheless he put himself into the city of Eion, and preserved it to the Athenians with the repulse of Brasidas; which came down from Amphipolis the next morning, and assaulted it. The author of his banishment is supposed to have been Cleon; a most violent sycophant in those times, and thereby also a most acceptable speaker amongst the people. For where affairs succeed amiss, though there want neither providence nor courage in the conduction; yet with those that judge only upon events, the way to calumny is always open, and envy, in the likeness of zeal to the public good, easily findeth credit for an accusation.

After his banishment he lived in Scapte-Hyle, a city of Thrace before mentioned, as Plutarch writeth; but yet so, as he went abroad, and was present at the actions of the rest of the war; as appeareth by his own words in his fifth book, where he saith, that he was present at the actions of both parts, and no less at those of the Peloponnesians, by reason of his exile, than those of the Athenians. During this time also he perfected his history, so far as is now to be seen; nor doth it appear that after his exile he ever again enjoyed his country. It is not clear in any author, where, or when, or in what year of his own age he died. Most agree that he died in banishment: yet there be that have written, that after the defeat in Sicily the Athenians decreed a general revocation of all banished persons, except those of the family of Peisistratus; and that he then returned, and was afterwards put to death at Athens. But this is very unlikely to be true, unless by *after* the defeat in Sicily, be meant *so long after*, that it was also after the end of the Peloponnesian war; because Thucydides himself maketh no mention of such return, though he outlived the whole war, as is manifest by his words in the fifth book. For he saith he lived in banishment twenty years after his charge at Amphipolis; which happened in the eighth year of this war: which, in the whole, lasted but twenty-seven years complete. And in another place he maketh mention of the razing of the long walls between Peiræus and the city; which was the last stroke of this war. They that say he died at Athens, take their conjecture from his monument which was there. But this is not a sufficient argument; for he might be buried there secretly, (as some have written he was), though he died abroad: or his monument might be there, and (as others have affirmed) he not buried in it. In this variety of conjecture, there is nothing more probable than that which is written by Pausanias, where he describeth the monuments of the Athenian city; and saith thus: "The worthy act of Cænobius in the behalf of Thucydides, is not without honour": meaning that he had a statue. "For Cænobius obtained to have a decree passed for his return; who returning was slain by treachery; and his sepulchre is near the gates called Melitides." He died, as saith Marcellinus, after the seven and fiftieth year of his age. And if it be true that is written by A. Gellius, of the ages of Hellanicus, Herodotus, and Thucydides, then died he not before the sixty-eighth year. For if he were forty when the war began, and lived (as he did certainly) to see it ended, he might be more when he died, but not less than

sixty–eight years of age. What children he left, is not manifest. Plato in Menone, maketh mention of Milesias and Stephanus, sons of a Thucydides of a very noble family; but it is clear they were of Thucydides the rival of Pericles, both by the name Milesias, and because this Thucydides also was of the family of Miltiades, as Plutarch testifieth in the life of Cimon. That he had a son, is affirmed by Marcellinus out of the authority of Polemon; but of his name there is no mention, save that a learned man readeth there in the place of θεο (which is in the imperfect copy), Timotheus. Thus much of the person of Thucydides.

Now for his writings, two things are to be considered in them: *truth* and *elocution*. For in *truth* consisteth the *soul*, and in *elocution* the *body* of history. The latter without the former, is but a picture of history; and the former without the latter, unapt to instruct. But let us see how our author hath acquitted himself in both. For the faith of this history, I shall have the less to say: in respect that no man hath ever yet called it into question. Nor indeed could any man justly doubt of the truth of that writer, in whom they had nothing at all to suspect of those things that could have caused him either voluntarily to lie, or ignorantly to deliver an untruth. He overtasked not himself by undertaking an history of things done long before his time, and of which he was not able to inform himself. He was a man that had as much means, in regard both of his dignity and wealth, to find the truth of what he relateth, as was needful for a man to have. He used as much diligence in search of the truth, (noting every thing whilst it was fresh in memory, and laying out his wealth upon intelligence), as was possible for a man to use. He affected least of any man the acclamations of popular auditories, and wrote not his history to win present applause, as was the use of that age: but for a monument to instruct the ages to come; which he professeth himself, and entitleth his book ΚΤΗΜΑ ΕΣ ΑΕΙ, *a possession for everlasting*. He was far from the necessity of servile writers, either to fear or flatter. And whereas he may peradventure be thought to have been malevolent towards his country, because they deserved to have him so; yet hath he not written any thing that discovereth such passion. Nor is there any thing written of them that tendeth to their dishonour as Athenians, but only as *people*; and that by the necessity of the narration, not by any sought digression. So that no word of his, but their own actions do sometimes reproach them. In sum, if the truth of a history did ever appear by the manner of relating, it doth so in this history: so coherent, perspicuous and persuasive is the whole narration, and every part thereof.

In the *elocution* also, two things are considerable: *disposition* or *method*, and *style*. Of the *disposition* here used by Thucydides, it will be sufficient in this place briefly to observe only this: that in his first book, first he hath, by way of exordium, derived the state of Greece from the cradle to the vigorous stature it then was at when he began to write: and next, declared the causes, both real and pretended, of the war he was to write of. In the rest, in which he handleth the war itself, he followeth distinctly and purely the order of time throughout; relating what came to pass from year to year, and subdividing each year into a summer and winter. The grounds and motives of every action he setteth down before the action itself, either narratively, or else contriveth them into the form of *deliberative orations* in the persons of such as from time to time bare sway in the commonwealth. After the actions, when there is just occasion, he giveth his judgment of them; shewing by what means the success came either to be furthered or hindered. Digressions for instruction's cause, and other such open

conveyances of precepts, (which is the philosopher's part), he never useth; as having so clearly set before men's eyes the ways and events of good and evil counsels, that the narration itself doth secretly instruct the reader, and more effectually than can possibly be done by precept.

For his *style*, I refer it to the judgment of divers ancient and competent judges. Plutarch in his book, *De gloria Atheniensium*, saith of him thus: "Thucydides aimeth always at this; to make his auditor a spectator, and to cast his reader into the same passions that they were in that were beholders. The manner how Demosthenes arranged the Athenians on the rugged shore before Pylus; how Brasidas urged the steersman to run his galley aground; how he went to the ladder or place in the galley for descent; how he was hurt, and swooned, and fell down on the ledges of the galley; how the Spartans fought after the manner of a land-fight upon the sea, and the Athenians of a sea-fight upon land: again, in the Sicilian war, how a battle was fought by sea and land with equal fortune: these things, I say, are so described and so evidently set before our eyes, that the mind of the reader is no less affected therewith than if he had been present in the actions." There is for his perspicuity. Cicero in his book entitled *Orator*, speaking of the affection of divers Greek rhetoricians, saith thus: "And therefore Herodotus and Thucydides are the more admirable. For though they lived in the same age with those I have before named," (meaning Thrasymachus, Gorgias, and Theodorus), "yet were they far from this kind of delicacy, or rather indeed foolery. For the one without rub, gently glideth like a still river; and the other" (meaning Thucydides) "runs stronglier, and in matter of war, as it were, bloweth a trumpet of war. And in these two (as saith Theophrastus) history hath roused herself, and adventured to speak, but more copiously, and with more ornament than in those that were before them." This commends the gravity and the dignity of his language. Again in his second book, *De Oratore*, thus: "Thucydides, in the art of speaking, hath in my opinion far exceeded them all. For he is so full of matter, that the number of his sentences doth almost reach to the number of his words; and in his words he is so apt and so close, that it is hard to say whether his words do more illustrate his sentences, or his sentences his words." There is for the pithiness and strength of his style. Lastly, for the purity and propriety, I cite Dionysius Halicarnassius: whose testimony is the stronger in this point, because he was a Greek rhetorician for his faculty, and for his affection, one that would no further commend him than of necessity he must. His words are these: "There is one virtue in eloquence, the chiefest of all the rest, and without which there is no other goodness in speech. What is that? That the language be pure, and retain the propriety of the Greek tongue. This they both observe diligently. For Herodotus is the best rule of the Ionic, and Thucydides of the Attic dialect." These testimonies are not needful to him that hath read the history itself; nor at all, but that this same Dionysius hath taken so much pains, and applied so much of his faculty in rhetoric, to the extenuating of the worth thereof. Moreover, I have thought it necessary to take out the principal objections he maketh against him; and without many words of mine own to leave them to the consideration of the reader. And first, Dionysius saith thus: "The principal and most necessary office of any man that intendeth to write a history, is to choose a noble argument, and grateful to such as shall read it. And this Herodotus, in my opinion, hath done better than Thucydides. For Herodotus hath written the joint history both of the Greeks and barbarians, to save from oblivion, &c. But Thucydides writeth one only war, and that neither honourable

nor fortunate; which principally were to be wished never to have been; and next, never to have been remembered nor known to posterity. And that he took an evil argument in hand, he maketh it manifest in his proeme, saying: *that many cities were in that war made desolate and utterly destroyed, partly by barbarians, partly by the Greeks themselves: so many banishments, and so much slaughter of men, as never was the like before, &c.*: so that the hearers will abhor it at the first propounding. Now by how much it is better to write of the wonderful acts both of the barbarians and Grecians, than of the pitiful and horrible calamities of the Grecians; so much wiser is Herodotus in the choice of his argument than Thucydides.”

Now let any man consider whether it be not more reasonable to say: That the principal and most necessary office of him that will write a history, is to take such an argument as is both within his power well to handle, and profitable to posterity that shall read it, which Thucydides, in the opinion of all men, hath done better than Herodotus: for Herodotus undertook to write of those things, of which it was impossible for him to know the truth; and which delight more the ear with fabulous narrations, than satisfy the mind with truth: but Thucydides writeth one war; which, how it was carried from the beginning to the end, he was able certainly to inform himself: and by propounding in his proeme the miseries that happened in the same, he sheweth that it was a great war, and worthy to be known; and not to be concealed from posterity, for the calamities that then fell upon the Grecians; but the rather to be truly delivered unto them, for that men profit more by looking on adverse events, than on prosperity: therefore by how much men’s miseries do better instruct, than their good success; by so much was Thucydides more happy in taking his argument, than Herodotus was wise in choosing his.

Dionysius again saith thus: “The next office of him that will write a history, is to know where to begin, and where to end. And in this point Herodotus seemeth to be far more discreet than Thucydides. For in the first place he layeth down the cause for which the barbarians began to injure the Grecians; and going on, maketh an end at the punishment and the revenge taken on the barbarians. But Thucydides begins at the good estate of the Grecians; which, being a Grecian and an Athenian, he ought not to have done: nor ought he, being of that dignity amongst the Athenians, so evidently to have laid the fault of the war upon his own city, when there were other occasions enough to which he might have imputed it. Nor ought he to have begun with the business of the Corcyræans, but at the more noble acts of his country, which they did immediately after the Persian war: which afterward in convenient place he mentioneth, but it is but cursorily, and not as he ought. And when he had declared those with much affection, as a lover of his country, then he should have brought in, how that the Lacedæmonians, through envy and fear, but pretending other causes, began the war: and so have descended to the Corcyræan business, and the decree against the Megareans, or whatsoever else he had to put in. Then in the ending of his history, there be many errors committed. For though he profess he was present in the whole war, and that he would write it all: yet he ends with the naval battle at Cynos-sema, which was fought in the twenty-first year of the war. Whereas it had been better to have gone through with it, and ended his history with that admirable and grateful return of the banished Athenians from Phile; at which time the city recovered her liberty.”

To this I say, that it was the duty of him that had undertaken to write the history of the Peloponnesian war, to begin his narration no further off than at the causes of the same, whether the Grecians were then in good or in evil estate. And if the injury, upon which the war arose, proceeded from the Athenians; then the writer, though an Athenian and honoured in his country, ought to declare the same; and not to seek nor take, though at hand, any other occasion to transfer the fault. And that the acts done before the time comprehended in the war he writ of, ought to have been touched but cursorily, and no more than may serve for the enlightening of the history to follow, how noble soever those acts have been. Which when he had thus touched, without affection to either side, and not as a lover of his country but of truth; then to have proceeded to the rest with the like indifferency. And to have made an end of writing, where the war ended, which he undertook to write; not producing his history beyond that period, though that which followed were never so admirable and acceptable. All this Thucydides hath observed.

These two criminations I have therefore set down at large, translated almost verbatim, that the judgment of Dionysius Halicarnassius may the better appear concerning the main and principal virtues of a history. I think there was never written so much absurdity in so few lines. He is contrary to the opinion of all men that ever spake of this subject besides himself, and to common sense. For he makes the scope of history, not profit by writing truth, but delight of the hearer, as if it were a song. And the argument of history, he would not by any means have to contain the calamities and misery of his country; these he would have buried in silence: but only their glorious and splendid actions. Amongst the virtues of an historiographer, he reckons affection to his country; study to please the hearer; to write of more than his argument leads him to; and to conceal all actions that were not to the honour of his country. Most manifest vices. He was a rhetorician; and it seemeth he would have nothing written, but that which was most capable of rhetorical ornament. Yet Lucian, a rhetorician also, in a treatise entitled, *How a history ought to be written*, saith thus: "that a writer of history ought, in his writings, to be a foreigner, without country, living under his own law only, subject to no king, nor caring what any man will like or dislike, but laying out the matter as it is."

The third fault he finds is this: that the method of his history is governed by the time, rather than the periods of several actions: for he declares in order what came to pass each summer and winter, and is thereby forced sometimes to leave the narration of a siege, or sedition, or a war, or other action in the midst, and enter into a relation of somewhat else done at the same time, in another place, and to come to the former again when the time requires it. This, saith he, causes confusion in the mind of his hearer, so that he cannot comprehend distinctly the several parts of the history.

Dionysius aimeth still at the delight of the *present* hearer; though Thucydides himself profess that his scope is not that, but to leave his work for a *perpetual possession for posterity*: and then have men leisure enough to comprehend him thoroughly. But indeed, whosoever shall read him once attentively, shall more distinctly conceive of every action this way than the other. And the method is more natural; forasmuch as his purpose being to write of one Peloponnesian war, this way he has incorporated all the parts thereof into one body; so that there is unity in the whole, and the several

narrations are conceived only as parts of that. Whereas the other way, he had sewed together many little histories, and left the Peloponnesian war, which he took for his subject, in a manner unwritten: for neither any part nor the whole could justly have carried such a title.

Fourthly, he accuseth him for the method of his first book: in that he deriveth Greece from the infancy thereof to his own time: and in that he setteth down the narration of the quarrels about Corcyra and Potidæa, before he entreateth of the true cause of the war; which was the greatness of the Athenian dominion, feared and envied by the Lacedæmonians.

For answer to this, I say thus. For the mentioning of the ancient state of Greece, he doth it briefly, insisting no longer upon it than is necessary for the well understanding of the following history. For without some general notions of these first times, many places of the history are the less easy to be understood; as depending upon the knowledge of the original of several cities and customs, which could not be at all inserted into the history itself, but must be either supposed to be foreknown by the reader, or else be delivered to him in the beginning as a necessary preface. And for his putting first the narration of the public and avowed cause of this war, and after that the true and inward motive of the same; the reprehension is absurd. For it is plain, that a cause of war divulged and avowed, how slight soever it be, comes within the task of the historiographer, no less than the war itself. For without a pretext, no war follows. This pretext is always an injury received, or pretended to be received. Whereas the inward motive to hostility is but conjectural; and not of that evidence, that a historiographer should be always bound to take notice of it: as envy to the greatness of another state, or fear of an injury to come. Now let any man judge, whether a good writer of history ought to handle, as the principal cause of war, proclaimed injury or concealed envy. In a word, the image of the method used by Thucydides in this point, is this: "The quarrel about Corcyra passed on this manner; and the quarrel about Potidæa on this manner": relating both at large: "and in both the Athenians were accused to have done the injury. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians had not upon this injury entered into a war against them, but that they envied the greatness of their power, and feared the consequence of their ambition." I think a more clear and natural order cannot possibly be devised.

Again he says, that he maketh a funeral oration (which was solemnly done on all occasions through the war) for fifteen horsemen only, that were slain at the brooks called Rheiti: and that for this reason only, that he might make it in the person of Pericles, who was then living, but before another the like occasion happened was dead.

The manner of the Athenians was, that they that were slain the first in any war, should have a solemn funeral in the suburbs of the city. During this war, they had many occasions to put this custom in practice. Seeing therefore it was fit to have that custom and the form of it known, and that once for all, the manner being ever the same; it was the fittest to relate it on the first occasion, what number soever they were that were then buried: which nevertheless is not likely to have been so few as Dionysius saith. For the funeral was not celebrated till the winter after they were slain: so that many

more were slain before this solemnity, and may all be accounted amongst the first. And that Pericles performed the office of making their funeral oration, there is no reason alledged by him why it should be doubted.

Another fault he finds, is this: that he introduceth the Athenian generals, in a dialogue with the inhabitants of the Isle of Melos, pretending openly for the cause of their invasion of that isle, the power and will of the state of Athens; and rejecting utterly to enter into any disputation with them concerning the equity of their cause, which, he saith, was contrary to the dignity of the state.

To this may be answered, that the proceeding of these generals was not unlike to divers other actions, that the people of Athens openly took upon them: and therefore it is very likely they were allowed so to proceed. Howsoever, if the Athenian people gave in charge to these their captains, to take in the island by all means whatsoever, without power to report back unto them first the equity of the islanders' cause; as is most likely to be true; I see then no reason the generals had to enter into disputation with them, whether they should perform their charge or not, but only whether they should do it by fair or foul means; which is the point treated of in this dialogue. Other cavils he hath touching the matter and order of this history, but not needful to be answered.

Then for his phrase, he carpeth at it in infinite places, both for obscure and licentious. He that will see the particular places he reprehendeth, let him read Dionysius himself, if he will: for the matter is too tedious for this place. It is true, that there be some sentences in him somewhat long: not obscure to one that is attentive: and besides that, they are but few. Yet is this the most important fault he findeth. For the rest, the obscurity that is, proceedeth from the profoundness of the sentences; containing contemplations of those human passions, which either dissembled or not commonly discoursed of, do yet carry the greatest sway with men in their public conversation. If then one cannot penetrate into them without much meditation, we are not to expect a man should understand them at the first speaking. Marcellinus saith, he was obscure on purpose; that the common people might not understand him. And not unlikely: for a wise man should so write, (though in words understood by all men), that wise men only should be able to commend him. But this obscurity is not to be in the narrations of things done, nor in the descriptions of places or of battles, in all which Thucydides is most perspicuous: as Plutarch in the words before cited hath testified of him. But in the characters of men's humours and manners, and applying them to affairs of consequence: it is impossible not to be obscure to ordinary capacities, in what words soever a man deliver his mind. If therefore Thucydides in his orations, or in the description of a sedition, or other thing of that kind, be not easily understood; it is of those only that cannot penetrate into the nature of such things, and proceedeth not from any intricacy of expression. Dionysius further findeth fault with his using to set word against word: which the rhetoricians call *antitheta*. Which, as it is in some kind of speech a very great vice, so is it not improper in characters: and of comparative discourses, it is almost the only style.

And whereas he further taxeth him for licentiousness in turning nouns into verbs, and verbs into nouns, and altering of genders, cases, and numbers; as he doth sometimes

for the more efficacy of his style, and without solœcism; I leave him to the answer of Marcellinus: who says, “That Dionysius findeth fault with this, as being ignorant” (yet he was a professed rhetorician) “that this was the most excellent and perfect kind of speaking.”

Some man may peradventure desire to know, what motive Dionysius might have to extenuate the worth of him, whom he himself acknowledgeth to have been esteemed by all men for the best by far of all historians that ever wrote, and to have been taken by all the ancient orators and philosophers for the measure and rule of writing history. What motive he had to it, I know not: but what glory he might expect by it, is easily known. For having first preferred Herodotus, his countryman, a Halicarnassian, before Thucydides, who was accounted the best; and then conceiving that his own history might perhaps be thought not inferior to that of Herodotus: by this computation he saw the honour of the best historiographer falling on himself. Wherein, in the opinion of all men, he hath misreckoned. And thus much for the objections of Denis of Halicarnasse.

It is written of Demosthenes, the famous orator, that he wrote over the history of Thucydides with his own hand eight times. So much was this work esteemed, even for the eloquence. But yet was this his eloquence not at all fit for the bar; but proper for history, and rather to be read than heard. For words that pass away (as in public orations they must) without pause, ought to be understood with ease, and are lost else: though words that remain in writing for the reader to meditate on, ought rather to be pithy and full. Cicero therefore doth justly set him apart from the rank of pleaders; but withal, he continually giveth him his due for history, (lib. ii. *De Oratore*): “What great rhetorician ever borrowed any thing of Thucydides? Yet all men praise him, I confess it, as a wise, severe, grave relator of things done: not for a pleader of causes at the bar, but a reporter of war in history. So that he was never reckoned an orator: nor if he had never written a history, had his name therefore not been extant, being a man of honour and nobility. Yet none of them imitate the gravity of his words and sentences; but when they have uttered a kind of lame and disjointed stuff, they presently think themselves brothers of Thucydides.” Again, in his book *De Optimo Oratore*, he saith thus: “But here will stand up Thucydides: for his eloquence is by some admired; and justly. But this is nothing to the orator we seek: for it is one thing to unfold a matter by way of narration; another thing to accuse a man, or clear him by arguments. And in narrations, one thing to stay the hearer, another to stir him.” Lucian, in his book entitled *How a history ought to be written*, doth continually exemplify the virtues which he requires in an historiographer by Thucydides. And if a man consider well that whole discourse of his, he shall plainly perceive that the image of this present history, preconceived in Lucian’s mind, suggested unto him all the precepts he there delivereth. Lastly, hear the most true and proper commendation of him from Justus Lipsius, in his notes to his book *De Doctrina Civili* in these words: “Thucydides, who hath written not many nor very great matters, hath perhaps yet won the garland from all that have written of matters both many and great. Everywhere for elocution grave; short, and thick with sense; sound in his judgments; everywhere secretly instructing and directing a man’s life and actions. In his orations and excursions, almost divine. Whom the oftener you read, the more you shall carry away; yet never be dismissed without appetite. Next to him is Polybius, &c.”

And thus much concerning the life and history of Thucydides.

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THE FIRST BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

The estate of Greece, derived from the remotest known antiquity thereof, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.—The occasion and pretexts of this war, arising from the controversies of the Athenians with the Corinthians concerning Corcyra and Potidæa.—The Lacedæmonians, instigated by the confederates, undertake the war; not so much at their instigation, as of envy to the greatness of the Athenian dominion.—The degrees by which that dominion was acquired.—The war generally decreed by the confederates at Sparta.—The demands of the Lacedæmonians.—The obstinacy of the Athenians; and their answer by the advice of Pericles.

1. Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians as 1 they warred against each other, beginning to write as soon as the war was on foot; with expectation it should prove a great one, and most worthy the relation of all that had been before it: conjecturing so much, both from this, that they flourished on both sides in all manner of provision; and also because he saw the rest of Greece siding with the one or the other faction, some then presently and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the greatest commotion that ever happened amongst the Grecians, reaching also to part of the barbarians 1, and, as a man may say, to most nations. For the actions that preceded this, and those again that are yet more ancient, though the truth of them through length of time cannot by any means clearly be discovered; yet for any argument that, looking into times far past, I have yet light on to persuade me, I do not think they have been very great, either for matter of war or otherwise.

To make it appear that this war was greater than any before it, the author showeth the imbecility of former times; describing three periods: 1. From the beginning of the Grecian memory to the war of Troy. 2. The war itself. 3. The time from thence to the present war which he writeth.

2. For it is evident that that which now is called Hellas 2, was not of old constantly inhabited; but that at first there were often removals, every one easily leaving the place of his abode to the violence always of some greater number. For whilst traffic was not, nor mutual intercourse but with fear, neither by sea nor land; and every man so husbanded the ground as but barely to live upon it, without any stock of riches 3, and planted nothing; (because it was uncertain when another should invade them and carry all away, especially not having the defence of walls); but made account to be masters, in any place, of such necessary sustenance as might serve them from day to day: they made little difficulty to change their habitations. And for this cause they were of no ability at all, either for greatness of cities or other provision. But the fattest soils were always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants; as that which is now called Thessalia, and Bœotia, and the greatest part of Peloponnesus, except Arcadia; and of the rest of Greece, whatsoever was most fertile. For the goodness of the land increasing the power of some particular men, both caused seditions, whereby they

The state of Greece before the Trojan war.

were ruined at home; and withal made them more obnoxious to the insidiation of strangers. From hence it is that Attica¹, from great antiquity for the sterility of the soil free from seditions, hath been inhabited ever by the same people². And it is none of the least evidences of what I have said, that Greece³, by reason of sundry transplantations, hath not in other parts received the like augmentation. For such as by war or sedition were driven out of other places, the most potent of them, as to a place of stability, retired themselves to Athens; where receiving the freedom of the city, they long since so increased the same in number of people, as Attica, being incapable of them itself, they sent out colonies into Ionia.

3. And to me the imbecility of ancient times is not a little demonstrated also by this [that followeth]. For before the Trojan war nothing appeareth to have been done by Greece in common; nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one name of Hellas; nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, was there any such name at all. But Pelasgicum¹ (which was the farthest extended) and the other parts, by regions, received their names from their own inhabitants. But Hellen and his sons being strong in Phthiotis, and called in for their aid into other cities; these cities, because of their conversing with them, began more particularly to be called Hellenes: and yet could not that name of a long time after prevail upon them all. This is conjectured principally out of Homer. For though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not anywhere that name in general; nor indeed to any but those that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis, and were the first so called: but in his poems he mentioneth Danaans, Argives, and Achæans. Nor doth he likewise use the word barbarians; because the Grecians², as it seemeth unto me, were not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppositely answerable unto them. The Grecians³ then, neither as they had that name in particular by mutual intercourse, nor after, universally so termed, did ever before the Trojan war, for want of strength and correspondence, enter into any action with their forces joined. And to that expedition they came together by the means of navigation, which the most part¹ of Greece had now received.

The original of the name of Hellas.

The name of Hellenes not given to all the Grecians in the time that Homer wrote his poems.

The Trojan war was the first enterprise where the Grecians combined their forces.

4. For Minos was the most ancient of all that by report we know to have built a navy. And he made himself master of the now Grecian Sea²; and both commanded the isles called Cyclades, and also was the first that sent colonies into most of the same, expelling thence the Carians and constituting his own sons there for governors; and also freed the seas of pirates as much as he could, for the better coming in, as is likely, of his own revenue.

Minos, king of Creta, the first that had a navy.

A digression touching the piracies and robberies of old time; with other notes of savageness.

5. For the Grecians in old time, and such barbarians as in the continent lived near unto the sea, or else inhabited the islands, after once they began to³ cross over one to another in ships, became thieves, and went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to enrich themselves and to fetch in maintenance for the weak; and falling upon towns unfortified and scatteringly⁴ inhabited, rifled them, and made this the best means of their living; being a matter at that time nowhere in disgrace, but rather carrying with it something of glory. This is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst whom, so it be performed nobly, it is still esteemed as an ornament. The same also is proved by some of the ancient poets, who introduce men questioning¹ of such as sail by, on all coasts alike, whether they be thieves or not; as a thing neither scorned by such as were asked, nor upbraided by those that were desirous to know. They also robbed one another within the main land. And much of Greece useth that old custom, as the Locrians called *Ozolæ*², the Acarnanians, and those of the continent in that quarter, unto this day. Moreover, the fashion of wearing iron remaineth yet with the people of that continent from their old trade of thieving.

Robbing had in honour.

6. For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed, because their houses were unfenced and travelling was unsafe; and accustomed themselves, like the barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their armour. And the nations of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same manner of life was anciently universal to all the rest. Amongst whom, the Athenians were the first that laid by their armour, and growing civil, passed into a more tender kind of life. And such of the rich as were anything stepped into years, laid away upon the same³ delicacy, not long after, the fashion of wearing linen coats and golden grasshoppers¹, which they were wont to bind up in the locks of their hair. From whence also the same fashion, by reason of their affinity, remained a long time in use amongst the ancient Ionians. But the moderate² kind of garment, and conformable to the wearing of these times, was first taken up by the Lacedæmonians; amongst whom also, both in other things and especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the most equality with the commons. The same were also the first, that when they were to contend in the Olympic games³, stripped themselves naked⁴ and anointed their bodies with ointment: whereas in ancient times, the champions did also in the Olympic games use breeches; nor is it many years since this custom ceased. Also there are to this day amongst the barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes propounded of fighting with fists and of wrestling, and the combatants about their privy parts wear breeches in the exercise. It may likewise by⁵ many other things be demonstrated, that the old Greeks used the same form of life that is now in force amongst the barbarians of the present age.

Continual wearing of armour in fashion.

The Athenians grew first civil.

7. As for cities, such as are of late foundation and since the increase of navigation, inasmuch as they have had since more plenty of riches, have been walled about and built upon the shore; and have taken up isthmi, [that is to say, necks of land between sea and sea], both for merchandise and for the better strength against confiners. But the old cities, men having been¹ in those times for the most part infested by thieves, are built farther up, as well in the islands as in the continent. For

The cities of Greece, how seated, and for what causes.

others² also that dwelt on the sea-side, though not seamen, yet they molested one another with robberies. And even to these times, those people are planted up high in the country.

8. But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islanders, namely, the Carians and the Phœnicians. For by them were the greatest part of the islands³ inhabited; a testimony whereof is this. The Athenians, when in this present war⁴ they hallowed the isle of Delos and had digged up the sepulchres of the dead, found that more than half of them were Carians⁵; known so to be, both by the armour buried with them, and also by their manner of burial at this day. And¹ when Minos his navy was once afloat, navigators had the sea more free. For he expelled the malefactors out of the islands, and in the most of them planted colonies of his own. By which means they who inhabited the sea-coasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings; of whom some, grown now rich, compassed their towns about with walls. For out of desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty with their wealth brought the lesser cities into subjection. And so it came to pass, that rising to power they proceeded afterward to the war against Troy.

The Carians and Phœnicians were those that committed the most robberies.

9. And to me it seemeth that Agamemnon² got together that fleet, not so much for that he had with him the suitors³ of Helena, bound thereto by oath to Tindareus, as for this, that he exceeded the rest in power. For they that by tradition of their ancestors know the most certainty of the acts⁴ of the Peloponnesians, say that first Pelops, by the abundance of his wealth which he brought with him out of Asia to men in want, obtained such power amongst them, as, though he were a stranger, yet the country was called¹ after his name; and that this power was also increased by his posterity. For Euristheus being slain in Attica by the Heracleides², Atreus, that was his uncle³ by the mother, and was then abiding⁴ with him as an exiled person for fear of his father for the death of Chrysippus⁵, and to whom Euristheus, when he undertook the expedition, had committed Mycenæ and the government thereof, for that he was his kinsman; when as Euristheus came not back, (the Mycenians being willing to it for fear of the Heracleides, and because he was an able man and made much of the common people), obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ, and of whatsoever else was under Euristheus, for himself; and the power of the Pelopides became greater than that of the Perseides⁶. To which greatness Agamemnon⁷ succeeding, and also far excelling the rest in shipping, took that war in hand, as I conceive it, and assembled the said forces, not so much upon favour as by fear. For it is clear, that he himself both conferred most ships to that action, and that some also he lent to the Arcadians. And this is likewise declared by Homer, (if any think his testimony sufficient); who, at the delivery of the sceptre unto him, calleth him¹, “of many isles and of all Argos King.” Now he could not, living in the continent, have been lord of the islands, other than such² as were adjacent, which cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. And by this expedition we are to estimate what were those of the ages before it.

The action of Troy.

Peloponnesus, so called from Pelops.

The increase of the power of the Pelopians.

Atreus king of Mycenæ after the death of Pelops.

10. Now seeing Mycenæ was³ but a small city, or if any other of that age seem but of light regard, let not any man for that cause, on so weak an argument, think that fleet to have been less than the poets have said, and fame reported it to be⁴. For if the city of Lacedæmon were now desolate, and nothing of it left but the temples and floors of the buildings, I think it would breed much unbelief in posterity long hence of their power in comparison of the fame. For although of five parts⁵ of Peloponnesus it possess two⁶, and hath the leading of the rest, and also of many confederates without; yet the city being not close built, and the temples and other edifices not costly, and because¹ it is but scatteringly inhabited after the ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to the report. Again, the same things happening to Athens, one would conjecture, by the sight of their city, that their power were double to what it is. We ought not therefore to be incredulous [concerning the forces that went to Troy], nor have in regard so much the external show of a city as the power: but we are to think, that that expedition was indeed greater than those that went before it, but yet inferior to those of the present age; if in this also² we may credit the poetry of Homer, who being a poet was like to set it forth to the utmost. And yet even thus it cometh short. For he maketh it to consist of twelve hundred vessels; those that were of Bœotians carrying one hundred and twenty men a-piece, and those which came with Philoctetes fifty: setting forth, as I suppose, both the greatest sort and the least; and therefore of the bigness of any of the rest, he maketh in his catalogue no mention at all: but declareth that they who were³ in the vessels of Philoctetes, served both as mariners and soldiers; for he writes, that they who were at the oar, were all of them archers. And for such as wrought not, it is not likely that many went along, except kings¹ and such as were in chief authority; especially being to pass the sea with munition of war, and in bottoms without decks, built after the old and piratical fashion. So then, if by the greatest and least one estimate the mean of their shipping, it will appear that the whole number of men considered as sent jointly from all Greece, were not very many.

Mycenæ, though no great city, yet was of great power.

The city of Sparta less, and the city of Athens greater, than for the proportion of their power.

A survey of the fleetsent to Troy.

11. And the cause hereof was not so much want of men, as of wealth. For, for want of victual they carried the lesser army, and no greater than they hoped² might both follow the war and also maintain itself. When upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight, (which is manifest; for else they could not have fortified their camp), it appears that from that time forward they employed not there their whole power, but that for want of victual they betook themselves, part of them to the tillage of Chersonesus, and part to fetch in booties; whereby divided, the Trojans the more easily made that ten years resistance, as being ever a match for so many as remained at the siege. Whereas¹, if they had gone furnished with store of provision, and with all their forces, eased of boot-haling and tillage, since they were masters of the field, they had also easily taken the city. But they strove not with their whole power, but only with such a portion of their army as at the several occasions chanced to be present; when as, if they had pressed the siege, they had won the place both in less time and with less labour. But through want of money, not only they were weak matters, all that preceded this enterprise; but also this, which is of greater name

The poverty of the Greeks was the cause why the Trojans could so long hold out.

than any before it, appeareth to be in fact beneath the fame and report, which by means of the poets now goeth of it.

12. For also after the Trojan war the Grecians continued still their shiftings and transplantations; insomuch as never resting, they improved not their power. For the late return of the Greeks from Ilium caused not a little innovation; and in most of the cities there arose seditions; and those which were driven out, built² cities for themselves in other places. For those that are now called Bœotians, in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy, expelled Arne by the Thessalians, seated themselves in that country, which now Bœotia, was then called Cadmeis. (But there was in the same country a certain portion of that nation before, of whom also were they that went to the warfare of Troy). And in the eightieth year, the Dorians¹ together with the Heracleides seized on Peloponnesus. And with much ado, after long time, Greece had constant rest; and shifting their seats no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. And the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the islands; and the Peloponnesians most of Italy¹ and Sicily, and also certain parts of the rest of Greece. But these colonies were all planted after the Trojan war.

The state of Greece after the Trojan war.

A. C. 1124. A. 1m. Ol. 347.

Bœotia, more anciently Cadmeis.

A. C. 1104. A. 1m. Ol. 327.

The Ionians were the colonies of the Athenians.

13. But when the power of Greece was now improved, and² the desire of money withal, their revenues being enlarged, in most of the cities there were erected tyrannies: (for before that time, kingdoms with honours limited were hereditary): and the Grecians built navies, and became more seriously addicted to the affairs of the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the first that changed the form of shipping³ into the nearest to that which is now in use; and at Corinth are reported to have been made the first⁴ gallies of all Greece. Now⁵ it is well known that Aminocles, the ship-wright of Corinth, built four ships at Samos: and from the time that Aminocles went to Samos until the end⁶ of this present war, are at the most but three hundred years. And the most ancient naval battle that we know of, was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyræans⁷; and from that battle to the same time, are but two hundred and sixty years. For Corinth, seated on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic; (because the Grecians of old, from within and without Peloponnesus, trading by land more than by sea, had no other intercourse one to another but through the Corinthians' territory); and was also wealthy in money, as appears by the¹ poets, who have surnamed this town the rich. And after the Grecians had² commerce also by sea, then likewise having furnished themselves with a navy, they scoured the sea of pirates; and affording traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased their city in revenue of money. After this, the Ionians, in the times of Cyrus first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got together a great navy; and making war on Cyrus, obtained for a

The difference between tyranny and regal authority.

At Corinth were made the first triremes, or gallies of three tire of oars one above another.

A. C. 704. Olymp. 19. 1.

A. C. 667. Olymp. 28. 2.

The means of the wealth of Corinth.

Corinth surnamed the rich.

The Ionians had a navy in Cyrus' time.

Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, had a navy in the time of Cambyses.

About A. C. 600. Olymp. 45.

time the dominion of that part of the sea that lieth on their own coast. Also Polycrates³, who in the time of Cambyses tyrannised in Samos, had a strong navy, wherewith he subdued divers of the islands; and amongst the rest having won Rhenea⁴, he consecrated the same to Apollo of Delos. The⁵ Phocæans likewise, when they were building the city of Marseilles, overcame the Carthaginians⁶ in a fight at sea.

14. These were the greatest navies extant. And yet even these, though many ages after the time of Troy, consisted, as it seems, but of a few galleys, and were made up with vessels¹ of fifty oars and with long boats, as well as those of former times. And it was but a little before the Medan war² and death of Darius, successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyræans had of galleys any number. For these³ last were the only navies worth speaking of in all Greece, before the invasion of the Medes. And the people of Ægina and the Athenians⁴ had but small ones, and the most of them consisting but of fifty oars a-piece; and that so lately⁵, as but from the time that the Athenians making war on Ægina, and withal expecting the coming of the barbarian, at the persuasion of Themistocles built those ships which they used in that war. And these also not all had decks.

The shipping of Greece very mean before this war.

A. C. 493. Ol. 71. 4.

15. Such were then the navies of the Greeks, both ancient and modern. Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval business gained by them no small power, both in revenue of money and in dominion over other people. For with their navies (especially those men that had not sufficient land, where they inhabited, to maintain themselves) they subdued the islands. But as for war by land, such as any state might acquire power by, there was none at all: and such as were, were only between borderer and borderer. For the Grecians had never yet gone out with any army to conquer any nation far from home; because the lesser cities neither brought in their forces to the great ones, as subjects, nor concurred as equals in any common enterprise; but such as were neighbours warred against each other hand to hand. For the war of old between the Chalcideans and the Eretrians¹ was it wherein the rest of Greece was most divided and in league with either party.

The causes why the Grecians never joined their forces in any great action.

16. As others by other means were kept back from growing great, so also the Ionians by this: that the Persian affairs prospering, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, after the defeat of Cræsus, made war upon all that lieth from the river Halys to the sea-side, and so subdued all the cities which they possessed in the continent: and Darius afterward, when he had overcome² the Phœnician fleet, did the like unto them in the islands.

The Ionians kept down by the Persians.

17. And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, who forecasted only for themselves, how with as much safety as was possible to look to their own persons and their own families, they resided for the most part in the cities¹ and did no action worthy of memory, unless it were against their neighbours. For as for the tyrants of Sicily², they were already arrived at greater

A. C. 548. Ol. 58. 1.

power. Thus was Greece for a long time³ hindered, that neither jointly it could do anything remarkable, nor the cities singly be adventurous.

18. But after that the tyrants, both of Athens⁴ and of the rest of Greece where tyrannies⁵ were, were the most and last of them, excepting those of Sicily, put down by the Lacedæmonians; (for Lacedæmon, after that it was built by the Dorians that inhabited⁶ the same, though it hath been longer troubled with seditions⁷ than any other city we know, yet hath it had for the longest time good laws, and been also always free⁸ from tyrants: for it is unto the end of this war four hundred years and something more, that the Lacedæmonians have used one and the same government, and thereby being of power themselves, they also ordered the affairs in the other cities); I say, after the dissolution of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought by the Medes against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon. And in the tenth year again after that, came the barbarian with the great fleet¹ into Greece, to subdue it. And Greece being now in great danger, the leading of the Grecians that leagued in that war was given to the Lacedæmonians, as to the most potent state. And the Athenians, who had purposed so much before and already stowed² their necessaries, at the coming in of the Medes went a ship-board³ and became seamen. When they had jointly beaten back the barbarian, then did the Grecians, both such as were revolted from the king and such as had in common made war upon him, not long after divide themselves into leagues, one part with the Athenians and the other with the Lacedæmonians; these two cities appearing to be the mightiest; for this had the power by land, and the other by sea. But this confederation lasted but awhile: for afterwards the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, being at variance⁴, warred each on other together with their several confederates. And the rest of Greece, where any discord chanced to arise, had recourse presently to one of these. In so much, that from the war of the Medes to this present war being continually [exercised] sometimes in peace sometimes in war, either one against the other or against revolted confederates, they arrived at this war, both well furnished with military provisions and also expert; because their practice was with danger.

The Lacedæmonians put down the tyrants through all Greece.

A. C. 510. Ol. 67. 2.

A. C. 804.

A. C. 490. Ol. 72. 3.

Olymp. 75. 1.

All Greece divided into two leagues; the Lacedæmonians and their league, and the Athenians and their league.

19. The Lacedæmonians governed not their confederates so as to make them tributaries, but only drew them by fair means to embrace the oligarchy, convenient to their own policy. But the Athenians, having with time taken into their hands the galleys of all those that stood out, (except the Chians and Lesbians), reigned¹ over them, and ordained every of them to pay a certain tribute of money. By which means, their own particular provision was greater in the beginning of this war, than when² in their flourishing time, the league between them and the rest of Greece remaining whole, it was at the most.

The manner how the Lacedæmonians dealt with their confederates.

The manner how the Athenians handled their confederates.

20. Such then I find to have been the state of things past; hard to be believed³, though one produce proof for every particular thereof. For¹ men receive the report of things,

though of their own country, if done before their own time, all alike, from one as from another, without examination.

For the vulgar sort of Athenians think that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton: and know not that Hippias had the government, as being the eldest son of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brethren; and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting that some of their complices had that day, and at that instant², discovered unto Hippias somewhat of their treason, did forbear Hippias as a man forewarned; and desirous to effect somewhat, though with danger, before they should be apprehended, lighting on Hipparchus slew him near the temple called Leocorium, whilst he was setting forth the Panathenaical³ show. And likewise divers other things now extant, and which time hath not yet involved in oblivion, have been conceived amiss by other Grecians; as that the kings of Lacedæmon, in giving their suffrages, had not single⁴, but double votes: and⁵ that Pitanate was a band of soldiers so called there; whereas there was never any such. So impatient of labour are the most men in search of truth, and embrace soonest the things that are next to hand.

Digression to show how negligently men receive the fame of things past, by the example of their error touching the story of Hippias the son of Pisistratus: which it seems he willingly mentions, both here and hereafter, on light occasion.

A. C. 514. Ol. 46. 2.

21. Now he¹, that by the arguments here adduced, shall frame a judgment of the things past, and not believe rather that they were such as the poets have sung, or prose-writers have composed, more delightfully to the ear than conformably to the truth, as being things not to be disproved, and by length of time turned for the most part into the nature of fables without credit; but shall think them here searched out by the most evident signs that can be, and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity; he, I say, shall not err. And though men always judge the present war wherein they live to be greatest, and when it is past, admire more those that were before it; yet if they consider of this war by the acts done in the same, it will manifest itself to be greater than any of those before mentioned².

22. What particular persons have spoken¹ when they were about to enter into the war or when they were in it, were hard² for me to remember exactly; whether they were speeches which I have heard myself, or have received at the second hand. But as any man seemed to me, that knew what was nearest to the sum³ of the truth of all that had been uttered, to speak most agreeably to the matter still in hand, so I have made it spoken here. But of the acts themselves done in the war, I thought not fit to write all that I heard from all authors, nor such as I myself did but think to be true; but only those whereat I was myself present, and those of which with all diligence I had made particular inquiry. And yet even of those things it was hard to know the certainty; because such as were present at every action, spake not all after the same manner; but as they were affected to the parts, or as they could remember.

The diligence of the author in the inquiry of the truth of what he wrote: both touching the orations and the actions.

To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it no fables, shall be perhaps not delightful. But he that desires to look

The use of this history.

into the truth of things done, and which (according to the condition of humanity) may be done again, or at least their like, he shall find⁴ enough herein to make him think it profitable. And it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession¹, than to be rehearsed for a prize.

23. The greatest action before this was that against the Medes²; and yet that, by two battles by sea and as many by land, was soon decided. But as for this war, it both lasted long, and the harm it did to Greece was such, as the like in the like space had never been seen before. For neither had there ever been so many cities expugned and made desolate, what by the barbarians³ and what by the Greeks warring on one another⁴; (and some cities there were, that when they were taken changed their inhabitants⁵); nor so much banishing and slaughter, some by the war some by sedition⁶, as was in this. And those things which concerning former time there went a fame of, but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible: as earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world, and most violent withal: eclipses of the sun, oftener than is reported of any former time: great droughts in some places, and thereby famine: and that which did none of the least hurt, but destroyed also its part⁷, the plague. All⁸ these evils entered together with this war: which began from the time that the Athenians and Peloponnesians brake the league, which immediately after the conquest of Eubœa had been concluded between them for thirty years. The causes why they brake the same, and their quarrels, I have therefore set down first, because no man should be to seek from what ground so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise. And the truest quarrel¹, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedæmonians into fear necessitated the war. But the causes of the breach of the league publicly voiced, were these.

The greatness of the present war.

Earthquakes, eclipses, famine, pestilence, concomitants of this war.

A. C. 415. Ol. 83. 3.
The causes of the war.

Fear necessitates the war in the Lacedæmonians.

24. Epidamnus² is a city situate on the right hand to such as enter into the Ionian Gulf. Bordering upon it are the Taulantii, barbarians, a people of Illyris³. This was planted by the Corcyræans⁴; but the captain of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidias, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, and, according to an⁵ ancient custom, called to this charge out of the metropolitan city. Besides that, the colony itself consisted in part of Corinthians, and others¹ of the Doric nation. In process of time the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; and² having for many years together been annoyed with sedition, was by a war, as is reported, made upon them by the confining barbarians, brought low and deprived of the greatest part of their power. But that which was the last accident before this war, was, that the nobility, forced by the commons to fly the city, went and joined with the barbarians, and both by land and sea robbed those that remained within. The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed in this manner, sent their ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother city, praying the Corcyræans not to see them perish, but to reconcile unto them those whom they had driven forth, and to put an end to the barbarian war. And this they entreated in the form of suppliants³, sitting down in the

The first pretext.

A. C. 627. Ol. 38. 2.

temple of Juno. But the Corcyræans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect.

25. The Epidamnians now despairing of relief from the Corcyræans, and at a stand how to proceed in their present affairs, sending to Delphi enquired at the oracle, whether it were not best to deliver up their city into the hands of the Corinthians as of their founders, and make trial what aid they should obtain from thence. And when the oracle had answered, that they should deliver it and take the Corinthians for their leaders, they went to Corinth, and according to the advice of the oracle gave their city¹ to them, and declared² how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them, entreating their help, and that they would not stand by beholding their destruction. And the Corinthians undertook their defence, not only for the equity of the cause, as thinking them no less their own than the Corcyræans' colony, but also for hatred of the Corcyræans; who being their colony yet contemned them, and allowed³ them not their due honour in public meetings, nor in the distribution of the sacrifice began at a Corinthian, as was the custom of other colonies; but being equal to the richest Grecians of their time for store of money, and¹ strongly furnished with ammunition of war, had them in contempt. Also they sticked not sometimes to boast how much they excelled in shipping; and that Corcyra had been once inhabited by the Phæaces², who flourished in glory of naval affairs: which was also the cause why they the rather provided themselves of a navy. And they were indeed not without power that way; for when they began this war, they had one hundred and twenty galleys.

The Epidamnians neglected by their mother city Corcyra, procure the protection of the Corinthians.

A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1.

A. C. 436. Ol. 85. 4./ 86. 1.

26. The Corinthians therefore having all these criminations against them, relieved Epidamnus willingly, not only giving leave to whosoever would to go and dwell there, but also sent thither a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and of their own citizens. Which succours, for fear the Corcyræans should have hindered their passage by sea, marched by land to Apollonia¹. The Corcyræans, understanding that new inhabitants and a garrison were gone to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered to the Corinthians, were vexed extremely at the same; and sailing presently thither with twenty-five galleys, and afterwards with another fleet, in an insolent² manner commanded them both to recall those whom they had banished, (for these banished³ men of Epidamnus had been now at Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors and claiming kindred, had entreated the Corcyræans to restore them), and to send away the garrison and inhabitants sent thither by the Corinthians. But the Epidamnians gave no ear to their commandments. Whereupon the Corcyræans with forty galleys, together with the banished men, (whom they pretended to reduce), and with the Illyrians, whom they had joined to their part, warred upon them; and having laid siege to the city, made proclamation, that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely, or otherwise were to be proceeded against as enemies.

The Corinthians send inhabitants to Epidamnus.

A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1.

The Corcyræans angry at the aids sent by the Corinthians, make war on Epidamnus.

A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1.
The Corcyræans besiege Epidamnus.

But when this prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they enclosed the city in on every side.

27. The Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus how it was besieged, presently made ready their army: and at the same time caused a proclamation to be made for the sending thither of a colony, and that such as would go should have equal and like privileges¹ with those that were there before: and that such as desired to be sharers in the same, and yet were unwilling to go along in person at that present, if they would contribute fifty Corinthian drachmas, might stay behind. And they were very many, both that went and that laid down their silver. Moreover they sent to the Megareans, for fear of being stopped in their passage by the Corcyræans, to aid² them with some galleys: who accordingly furnished out eight; the citizens of Pale in Cephalonia, four. They also required galleys of the Epidaurians, who sent them five: the citizens of Hermione, one: the Trœzenians, two: the Leucadians, ten: the Ambraciots, eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they required money: of the Eleans, both money and empty galleys. And of the Corinthians themselves, there were ready thirty galleys and three thousand men of arms³.

The Corinthians send an army to relieve it.

28. The Corcyræans, advertised of this preparation, went to Corinth in company of the ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians and of the Sicyonians, whom they took with them; and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and inhabitants which they had sent to Epidamnus, as being a city, they said, wherewith they had nothing to do; or if they had anything to¹ allege, they were content to have the cause judicially tried in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should both agree on; and they then should hold the colony, to whom the same should be adjudged. They said also, that they were content to refer their cause to the oracle at Delphi: that war they would make none; but if they must needs have it, they should, by the violence of them, be forced in their own defence to seek out better² friends than those whom they already had. To this the Corinthians answered, that if they would put off with their fleet and dismiss the barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then consult of the matter: for before they could not honestly do it; because whilst they should be pleading the case, the Epidamnians should be suffering the misery of a siege. The Corcyræans replied to this, that if they would call back those men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they also would do as the Corinthians had required them; or otherwise they were content to let the men on both sides stay where they were, and³ to suspend the war till the cause should be decided.

A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2.
The Corcyræans offer to stand to arbitrement.

The Corinthians unwilling to accept it, and not without cause.

A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2.
The Corinthian fleet.

A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2.
The Corcyræan fleet.

The Corcyræans have the victory at sea, and

29. The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propositions, since¹ their galleys were manned and their confederates present, having defied them first by a herald, put to sea with seventy-five galleys and two thousand² men of arms, and set sail for Epidamnus against the Corcyraeans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellicias, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes: and the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. After they were come as far as Actium, in the territory of Anactorium, (which is a temple of Apollo, and ground consecrated unto him), in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyraeans sent a herald to them at³ Actium, to forbid their coming on; and in the meantime manned out their fleet; and having repaired⁴ and made fit for service their old galleys, and furnished⁵ the rest with things necessary, shipped their munition and went aboard⁶. The herald was no sooner returned from the Corinthians with an answer not inclining to peace, but having¹ their galleys already manned and furnished to the number of eighty sail, (for forty² attended always the siege of Epidamnus), they put to sea, and arranging themselves came to a battle: in which the Corcyraeans were clearly victors; and on the part of the Corinthians there perished fifteen galleys. And the same day it happened likewise, that they that besieged Epidamnus had the same³ rendered unto them, with conditions, that the strangers therein found should be⁴ ransomed, and the Corinthians kept in bonds till such time as they should be otherwise disposed of.

on the same day take the city.

30. The battle being ended, the Corcyraeans, after they had set up their trophy⁵ in Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew their other prisoners, but kept the Corinthians still in bonds. After this, when the Corinthians⁶ with their vanquished fleet were gone home to Corinth, the Corcyraeans, masters now of the whole sea in those parts, went first and wasted the territory of Leucas⁷, a Corinthian colony; and then sailed to Cyllene, which is the arsenal of the Eleans, and burnt it, because they had both with money and shipping given aid to the Corinthians. And they were masters of those seas, and infested the confederates of Corinth, for the most part of that year; till such time as in the beginning of the summer¹ following the Corinthians sent a fleet and soldiers unto Actium, the which, for the more safe keeping of Leucas and of other cities their friends, encamped about Chimerium in Thesprotis²: and the Corcyraeans, both with their fleet and land soldiers, lay over against them in Leucimna. But neither part stirred against the other; but after they had lyen quietly opposite all the¹ summer, they retired in winter both the one side and the other to their cities.

A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2.

The Corcyraeans masters of the sea.

A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2.

A. C. 434. 3. Ol. 86. 3. 4. The Corinthians prepare a greater navy.

Both Corcyraeans and Corinthians send their ambassadors to Athens.

31. All this year, as well before as after the battle², the Corinthians, being vexed³ at the war with the Corcyræans, applied themselves to the building of galleys and to the preparing of a fleet, the strongest⁴ they were able to make, and to procure mariners⁵ out of Peloponnesus and all other parts of Greece. The Corcyræans having intelligence of their preparations, began to fear; and (because they had never⁶ been in league with any Grecian city, nor were in the roll of the confederates either of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians) thought it best now to send to Athens⁷, to see if they could procure any aid from thence. This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also sent their ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyræans might hinder them from carrying the war as they desired. And the assembly at Athens being met, they came to plead against each other; and the Corcyræans spake to this effect.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4.

32. “Men of Athens, it is but justice that such as come to implore the aid of their neighbours, (as now do¹ we), and cannot pretend by any great benefit or league some precedent merit, should, before they go any farther, make it appear, principally, that what they seek conferreth profit, or if not so, yet is not prejudicial at least to those that are to grant it: and next, that they will be constantly thankful for the same: and if they cannot do this, then not to take it ill though their suit be rejected. And the Corcyræans being fully persuaded that they can make all this appear on their own parts, have therefore sent us hither, desiring you to ascribe them to the number of your confederates. Now so it is, that we have had a custom, both unreasonable in respect of our suit to you, and also for the present unprofitable to our own estate. For having ever till now been unwilling to admit others into league with us, we are now not only suitors for league to others, but also left destitute by that means of friends in this our war with the Corinthians. And that which before we thought wisdom, namely, not to enter with others into league, because we would not at the discretion of others enter into danger, we now find to have been our weakness and imprudence. Wherefore, though alone we repulsed the Corinthians in the late battle by sea, yet since they are set to invade us with greater preparation out of Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece; and seeing with our own single power we are not able to go¹ through; and since also the danger, in case they subdue us, would be very great to all Greece: it is necessary that we seek the succours both of you and of whomsoever else we can; and we are also to be pardoned, though we make bold to cross our former custom of not having to do with other men, proceeding not from malice, but error of judgment.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4. oration of the
ambassadors of
corcyra.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4.

33. “Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this coincidence² on our part of need will on your part be honourable, for many reasons. First, in this respect, that you lend your help to such as have suffered, and not to such as have committed the injustice. And next, considering that you receive into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you shall so place³ your benefit as to have a testimony of it, if ever any can be so, indelible. Besides this, the greatest navy but your own, is ours. Consider then, what rarer hap, and of greater grief to your enemies, can befall you, than that that power, which you would have prized above any money or other requital, should come

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4.

voluntarily, and without all danger or cost present itself to your hands; bringing with it reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not¹ happened at once to many. And few there be of those that sue for league, that come not rather to receive strength and reputation, than to confer it. If any here think, that the war wherein we may do you service will not at all be, he is in an error, and seeth not how the Lacedæmonians, through fear of you, are already in labour of the war; and that the Corinthians, gracious with them and enemies to you, making way for their enterprize², assault us now in the way to the invasion of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the rest of their common enemies, but that they may be sure beforehand³, either to weaken us, or to strengthen their own estate. It must therefore be your⁴ part, we offering and you accepting the league, to begin with them, and to anticipate plotting rather than to counterplot against them.

34. “If they object injustice, in that you receive their colony, henceforth let them learn that all colonies, so long as they receive no wrong from their mother city, so long they honour her; but when they suffer injury from her, they then become alienate; for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay, but to be their equals. That they have done us the injury, is manifest; for when we offered them a judicial trial of the controversy touching Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute their quarrel rather by arms than judgment. Now let that which they have done unto us, who are their kindred, serve you for some argument, not to be seduced¹ by their demands, and made their instruments before you be aware. For he lives most secure, that hath fewest benefits bestowed upon him by his enemies to repent of.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4.

35. “As for the articles between you and the Lacedæmonians, they are not broken by receiving us into your league, because we are in league with neither party. For there² it is said, that whosoever is confederate of neither party, may have access lawfully to either. And sure it were very unreasonable, that the Corinthians should have the liberty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the league, and³ out of any other parts of Greece, and not the least out of places⁴ in your dominion; and we be denied both the league now propounded, and also all other help from whencesoever. And⁵ if they impute it to you as a fault, that you grant our request; we shall take it for a greater, that you grant it not. For therein you shall reject us that are invaded, and be none of your enemies; and them, who are your enemies and make the invasion, you shall not only not oppose, but also suffer to raise unlawful¹ forces in your dominions. Whereas you ought in truth, either not to suffer them to take up mercenaries in your states, or else to send us succours also, in such manner as you shall think good yourselves; but especially by taking us into your league, and so aiding us. Many commodities², as we said in the beginning, we show unto you, but this for the greatest; that whereas they are your enemies, (which is manifest enough), and not weak ones, but able to hurt those that stand up against them, we offer you a naval, not a terrestrial league; and the want of one of these is not as the want of the other. Nay rather, your principal aim, if it could be done, should be to let none at all have shipping but yourselves; or at least, if that cannot be, to make such your friends as are best furnished therewith.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4.

36. “If any man now think thus, that what we have spoken is indeed profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the league were thereby broken: let that man consider, that his fear joined with strength will make his enemies fear, and his confidence, having (if he reject us) so much the less strength, will so much the less be¹ feared. Let him also remember, that he is now in consultation no less concerning Athens than Corcyra; wherein he forecasteth none of the best, (considering the present state of affairs), that makes a question, whether against a war at hand and only not already on foot, he should join unto it or not that city, which with most important advantages or disadvantages will be² friend or enemy. For it lieth so conveniently for sailing into Italy and Sicily, that it can both prohibit any fleet to come to Peloponnesus from thence, and convoy any coming from Peloponnesus³ thither: and is also for divers other uses most commodious. And to comprehend all in brief, consider whether we be to be abandoned or not, by this. For Greece having but three navies of any account, yours, ours, and that of Corinth, if you suffer the other two to join in one by letting the Corinthians first seize us, you shall have to fight by sea at one time both against the Corcyraeans and the Peloponnesians; whereas by making league with us, you shall, with your¹ fleet augmented, have to deal against the Peloponnesians alone.”

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4.

Thus spake the Corcyraeans: and after them the Corinthians, thus.

37. “The Corcyraeans in their oration having made mention not only of your taking them into league, but also that they are wronged and unjustly warred on; it is also necessary for us first to answer concerning both those points, and then afterwards to proceed to the rest of what we have to say: to the end you may foreknow² that ours are the safest demands for you to embrace, and that you may upon reason reject the needy³ estate of those others. Whereas they allege in defence of their refusing to enter league with other cities, that the same hath proceeded from modesty, the truth is, that they took up that custom, not from any virtue, but mere wickedness; as⁴ being unwilling to have any confederate for a witness of their evil actions, and to be put to blush by calling them. Besides, their city being by the situation sufficient within itself, giveth them this point; that when they do any man a wrong, they themselves are the judges of the same, and not men appointed by consent. For going seldom forth against other nations, they intercept such as by necessity are driven into their harbour. And in this consisteth¹ their goodly pretext for not admitting confederates, not because they would not be content to accompany others in doing evil, but because they had rather do it alone; that where they were too strong, they might oppress; and when there should be none to observe them, the less of the profit might be shared from them; and that they might escape the shame, when they took any thing. But if they had been honest men, (as they themselves say they are), by how much the less they are obnoxious² to accusation, so much the more means they have, by giving and taking what is³ due, to make their honesty appear. 38. But they are not such, neither towards others nor towards us. For being our colony, they have not only been ever in revolt; but now they also make war upon us, and say they were not sent out to be injured by us. But we say again, that we did not send them forth to be scorned by them, but to have the leading of them, and to be regarded by them as is

oration of the
ambassadors of
corinth.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
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A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4.

fit. For⁴ our other colonies both honour and love us much: which is an argument, seeing the rest are pleased with our actions, that these have no just cause to be offended alone; and that without some manifest wrong, we should not have had colour¹ to war against them. But say we had been in an error, it had been well done in them to have given way to our passion, as it had been also dishonourable in us to have insulted over their modesty. But through pride and wealth they have done wrong, both in many other things, and also in this; that Epidamnus being ours, which whilst it was vexed with wars they never claimed, as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized by them, and so holden.

39. “They say² now, that before they took it, they offered to put the cause to trial of judgment. But you are not to think that such a one will stand to judgment, as hath advantage and is sure already of what he offereth to plead for; but rather he, that before the trial will admit equality in the matter itself as well as in the pleading. Whereas contrarily, these men offered not this specious pretence of a judicial trial, before they had besieged the city, but after, when they saw we meant not to put it³ up. And now hither they be come, not content to have been faulty in that business themselves, but to get in you; into their confederacy? no; but into their conspiracy; and to receive them in this name, that they are enemies to us. But they should have come to you then, when they were most in safety; not now, when we have the wrong, and they the danger; and when you, that never¹ partaked of their power, must² impart unto them of your aid, and having been free from their faults, must have an equal share from us of the blame. They should³ communicate their power before hand, that mean to make common the issue of the same; and they that share not in the crimes, ought also to have no part in the sequel of them.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4.

40. “Thus it appears, that we come for our parts with arguments of equity and right; whereas the proceedings of these other are nothing else but violence and rapine. And now we shall show you likewise, that you cannot receive them in point of justice. For although it be in the articles⁴, that the cities written with neither of the parties may come in to whether of them they please; yet it holds not for such as do so to the detriment of either; but only for those, that having revolted¹ from neither part, want protection, and bring not a war with them instead of peace to those (if they be wise²) that receive them. For³ you shall not only be auxiliaries unto these; but to us, instead of confederates, enemies. For if you go with them, it follows, they⁴ must defend themselves not without you. You should do most uprightly, to stand out of both our ways; and if not that, then to take our parts against the Corcyraeans; (for between the Corinthians and you there are articles of peace, but with the Corcyraeans you never had so much as a truce); and not to constitute a new law, of receiving one another’s rebels. For neither did we give our votes against you, when the Samians revolted, though the rest of Peloponnesus was divided in opinion⁵; but plainly alleged, that it was reason, that every one should have liberty to proceed against their own revolting confederates. And if you shall once receive and aid the doers of wrong, it will be seen that they will come over as fast from you to us; and you shall set up a law, not so much against us, as against yourselves.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3.
4.

A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.

41. “These are the points of justice we had to show you, conformable to the law of the Grecians. And now we come to matter of advice, and claim of favour; which (being not so much your enemies as to hurt you, nor such friends as to surcharge you) we say, ought in the present occasion to be granted us by way of requital. For when you had want of long barks against the Æginetæ, a little before the Medan war, you had twenty lent unto you by the Corinthians; which benefit of ours, and that other against the Samians, when by us it was that the Peloponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both of your victory¹ against the Æginetæ, and of the punishment of the Samians. And these things were done for you in a season, when men, going to fight against their enemies, neglect all respects but² of victory. For³ even a man’s domestic affairs are ordered the worse, through eagerness of present contention.

A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.

A. C. 491. Ol. 72. 2.

42. “Which benefits considering, and the younger sort taking notice of them from the elder, be you pleased to defend⁴ us now in the like manner. And have not this thought: that though in what we have spoken there be equity, yet, if the war should arise, the profit would be found in the contrary. For utility followeth those actions most, wherein we do the least wrong; besides that the likelihood of the war, wherewith the Corcyræans fighting you go about to draw you to injustice, is yet obscure, and not worthy to move you to a manifest and present hostility with the Corinthians; but it were rather fit for you, indeed, to take away our former jealousies¹ concerning the Megareans. For the last good turn done in season, though but small, is able to cancel an accusation of much greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be drawn on by the greatness of the navy which now shall be at your service by this league. For to do no injury to our equals, is a firmer power, than that addition of strength, which, puffed up² with present shows, men are to acquire with danger.

A. C. 433. Ol.86.3.4.

43. “And since we be come to this, which once before we said at Lacedæmon, that every one ought to proceed as he shall think good against his own confederates, we claim that liberty now of you; and that you that have been helped by our votes, will not hurt us now by yours, but render like for like; remembering, that now is that occasion, wherein he that aideth us is our greatest friend, and he that opposeth us our greatest enemy: and that you will not receive³ these Corcyræans into league against our wills, nor defend them in their injuries. These things if you grant us, you shall both do as is fit, and also advise the best for the good of your own affairs.”

This was the effect of what was spoken by the Corinthians.

44. Both sides having been heard, and the Athenian people twice assembled; in the former assembly they approved no less of the reasons of the Corinthians than of the Corcyræans. But in the latter they changed their minds; not so as to make a league with the Corcyræans both offensive and defensive, that the friends and enemies of the one should be so of the other; (for then, if the Corcyræans should have required them to go against Corinth, the peace had been broken with the Peloponnesians); but made it only defensive, that if any one should

A. C. 433. Ol.86.3.4.
A league defensive made between the Athenians and Corcyræans.

invade Corcyra or Athens, or any of their confederates, they were then mutually to assist one another. For they expected that even thus they should grow to war with the Peloponnesians, and were therefore unwilling to let Corcyra, that had so great a navy, to fall into the hands of the Corinthians; but rather, as much as in them lay, desired to break them one against another; that if need required, they might have to do with the Corinthians, and others that had shipping, when they should be weakened to their hands. And the island seemed also to lie conveniently for passing into Italy and Sicily.

45. With this mind the people of Athens received the Corcyraeans into league; and when the Corinthians were gone, sent ten galleys not long after to their aid. The commanders of them were Lacedaemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles; and 1 had order not to fight with the Corinthians, unless they invaded Corcyra, or offered to land there or in some other place of theirs: which, if they did, then with all their might to oppose them. This 1 they forbade, because they would not break the peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these galleys arrived at Corcyra.

They aid Corcyra with ten galleys.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

46. The Corinthians, when they were ready, made towards Corcyra with one hundred and fifty sail; of the Eleans ten, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots twenty-seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of their own.

The Corinthian fleet.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

The commanders of these were men chosen out of the said several cities, for the several parts of the fleet which they sent in; and over those of Corinth was Xenocleides the son of Euthicles, with four others. After they were all come 2 together upon the coast of the continent over against Corcyra, they sailed from Leucas, and came to Chimerium in the country of Thesprotis. In 3 this place is a haven, and above it, farther from the sea, the city of Ephyra, in that part of Thesprotis which is called Elæatis; and near unto it disbogueth into the sea the lake Acherusia, and into that (having first passed through Thesprotis) the river Acheron, from which it taketh the name. Also the river Thyamis runneth here, which divideth Thesprotis from Cestrine 4; betwixt which two rivers ariseth this promontory of Chimerium. To this part of the continent came 1 the Corinthians, and encamped.

47. The Corcyraeans understanding that they made against them, having ready one hundred and ten galleys under the conduct of Miciades, Æsimides, and Eurybatus, came and encamped in one of the islands called Sybota: and the ten galleys of Athens were also with them. But their land forces stayed in the promontory of Leucimna, and with them one thousand men of arms of the Zacynthians that came to aid them. The Corinthians also had in the continent the aids of many barbarians, which in those quarters have 2 been evermore their friends.

The Corcyraean fleet.

48. The Corinthians, after they were ready and had taken aboard three days' provision of victual, put off by night from Chimerium with purpose to fight; and about break of day, as they were sailing, descried the galleys of the Corcyraeans, which were also put off from Sybota and coming on to fight with the Corinthians 3. As soon as they had sight one of another, they put themselves into

The Corinthians set forward.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

order of battle. In the right wing⁴ of the Corcyraeans were placed the galleys of Athens; and the rest being their own⁵, were divided into three commands, under the three commanders, one under one. This was the order of the Corcyraeans. The Corinthians had in their right wing the galleys of Megara and of Ambracia; in the middle, other their confederates in order; and opposite to the Athenians and right wing of the Corcyraeans they were themselves placed, with such galleys as were best of sail, in the left.

49. The standard¹ being on either side lift up, they joined battle; having on both parts² both many men of arms and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion as yet somewhat unskilfully appointed. The battle was not so artificially as cruelly fought; near unto the manner of a fight at land. For after they had once³ run their galleys up close aboard one of another, they could not for the number and throng be easily gotten asunder again, but relied for the victory especially upon their men of arms, who fought where they stood whilst the galleys remained altogether without motion. Passages⁴ through each other they made none, but fought it out with courage and strength, rather than with skill. Insomuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and disorder: in which the Athenian galleys, being always, where the Corcyraeans were oppressed, at hand, kept the enemies in fear, but yet began no assault, because their commanders stood in awe of the prohibition of the Athenian people. The right wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress; for the Corcyraeans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs, and chased them dispersed to the continent; and sailing to their very camp, went aland, burnt their abandoned tents and took away their baggage. So that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the Corcyraeans had the victory. But in the left wing, where the Corinthians were themselves, they were far superior; because the Corcyraeans had twenty galleys of their number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase of the enemy. And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcyraeans were in distress, now aided them manifestly¹; whereas before, they had abstained from making assault upon any. But when once they fled outright, and that the Corinthians lay sore upon them, then every one fell to the business without making difference any longer: and it came at last to this necessity, that they undertook one another, Corinthians and Athenians.

The battle.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
The Corinthians have the better.
The Athenians and Corinthians fight.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

50. The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, staid not to fasten the hulls of the galleys they had sunk¹ unto their own galleys, that so they might tow them after; but made after the men, rowing up and down, to kill rather than to take alive; and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some of their own friends. For the galleys of either side being many and taking up a large space at sea, after they were once in the medley they could not easily discern who were of the victors, and who of the vanquished party. For this was the greatest naval battle, for number of ships, that ever had been before of Grecians against Grecians. When² the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they returned to take up the broken galleys

Sybota of the continent, a haven.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
A supply of twenty sail from Athens.

and bodies of their dead; which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota, where also lay the land-forces of the barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done, they reunited themselves, and made again to the Corcyræans. And they likewise, with such galleys as they had fit for the sea remaining³ of the former battle, together with those of Athens, put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon their territory. By this time the day was far spent, and the song¹ which they used to sing when they came to charge, was ended, when suddenly the Corinthians began to row astern: for they had descried twenty Athenian galleys², sent from Athens to second the former ten; for fear lest the Corcyræans (as it also fell out) should be overcome, and those ten galleys of theirs be too few³ to defend them.

51. When the Corinthians therefore had sight of these galleys, suspecting that they were of Athens and more in number than they were, by little and little they fell off. But the Corcyræans (because the course of these galleys was unto them more out of sight⁴) descried them not, but wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern; till at last some that saw them, said they were enemies⁵; and then retired also the Corcyræans. For by this time it was dark, and the Corinthians had turned about the heads of their galleys and dissolved themselves. And thus were they parted, and the battle ended¹ in night. The Corcyræans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian galleys, under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus, and Andocides the son of Leogorus, passing through the midst of the floating carcasses and wrecks, soon after they were descried arrived at the camp of the Corcyræans in Leucimna. The Corcyræans at first (being night) were afraid they had been enemies, but knew them afterwards; so they² anchored there.

The Corinthians fall off.

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52. The next day, both the thirty galleys of Athens and as many of Corcyra as were fit for service, went to the haven in Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight. But the Corinthians, when they had put off from the land and arranged themselves in the wide sea, stood quiet, not meaning of their own accord to begin the battle; both for that they saw the supply of fresh galleys from Athens, and for many difficulties that happened to them, both about the safe custody of their prisoners aboard, and also for that being in a desert place their galleys were not yet³ repaired; but took thought rather how to go home, for fear lest the Athenians, having the peace for already broken in that they had fought against each other, should not suffer them to depart. 53. They therefore thought good to send¹ afore unto the Athenians certain men without privilege of heralds, for to sound them, and to say in this manner: “Men of Athens, you do unjustly to begin the war and violate the articles: for whereas we go about to right us on our enemies, you stand in our way and bear arms against us: if therefore you be resolved to hinder our going against Corcyra or whatsoever place else we please, dissolve² the peace, and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us as enemies.” Thus said they: and the Corcyræans, as many of the army as heard them, cried out immediately to take and kill them. But the Athenians made answer thus: “Men of Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war nor break the peace; but we bring

The Corcyræans offer battle again.

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The Corinthians expostulate with the Athenians, to sound their purpose.

The answer of the Athenians.

aid to these our confederates, the Corcyraeans: if you please therefore to go any whither else, we hinder you not; but if against Corcyra, or any place belonging unto it, we will not [3](#) suffer you.”

54. When the Athenians had given them this answer, the Corinthians made ready to go home, and set up a trophy in Sybota of the continent. And the Corcyraeans also both took up the wreck and bodies of the dead, which carried every way by the waves and the winds that arose the night before, came driving to their hands; and, as if they had had the victory, set up a trophy likewise in Sybota the island. The victory was thus challenged on both sides upon these grounds. The Corinthians did set up a trophy, because in the battle they had the better all day, having [1](#) gotten more of the wreck and dead bodies than the other, and taken no less than a thousand prisoners, and sunk about seventy of the enemies' galleys. And the Corcyraeans set up a trophy, because they had sunk thirty [2](#) galleys of the Corinthians, and had, after the arrival of the Athenians, recovered the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by reason of the wind; and because the day before, upon sight of the Athenians, the Corinthians had rowed astern and went away from them: and lastly, for that when they [3](#) went to Sybota, the Corinthians came not out to encounter them. Thus each side claimed victory.

The Corinthians go home.

Both the Corcyraeans and Corinthians challenge the victory, and both set up trophies.

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55. The Corinthians in their way homeward took in Anactorium, a town seated in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, by deceit; (this town was common to them and to the Corcyraeans); and having put into it Corinthians only [4](#), departed and went home. Of the Corcyraeans, eight hundred that were servants [5](#), they sold; and kept prisoners two hundred and fifty, whom they used with very much favour, that they might be a means, at their return, to bring Corcyra into the power of the Corinthians; the greatest part of these being principal men of the city. And thus was Corcyra delivered [1](#) of the war of Corinth, and the Athenian galleys went from them. This was the first cause that the Corinthians had of war against the Athenians: namely, because they had taken part with the Corcyraeans in a battle by sea against the Corinthians, with whom they were comprised in the same articles of peace.

The Corinthians in their way home, take Anactorium, and keep two hundred and fifty of the best men prisoners, being Corcyraeans, and use them well.

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56. Presently after this, it came to pass that other differences arose between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, to induce the war. For whilst the Corinthians studied [2](#) to be revenged, the Athenians, who had their hatred in jealousy, commanded the citizens of Potidæa, a city seated in the Isthmus of Pallene [3](#), a colony of the Corinthians, but confederate and tributary to the Athenians, to pull down that part of the wall of their city that stood towards [4](#) Pallene, and to give them hostages, and also to send away and no more receive the Epidemiurgi [5](#), (magistrates so called), which were sent unto them year by year from Corinth; fearing lest through the persuasion of Perdiccas [1](#) and of the

The second pretext of the war:

Potidæa suspected.

Potidæa commanded to give hostages, and to pull down part of their wall.

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Corinthians they should revolt, and draw to revolt with them their other confederates in Thrace².

57. These things against the Potidæans, the Athenians had precontrived presently after the naval battle fought at Corcyra. For the Corinthians and they were now manifestly at difference; and Perdiccas, who before had been their confederate and friend, now warred³ upon them. And the cause why he did so was, that when his brother Philip and Derdas joined in arms against him, the Athenians had made a league with them. And therefore being afraid, he both sent to Lacedæmon to negotiate the

The Athenians give orders to the generals they were sending against Perdiccas, to secure their cities in those parts.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

Peloponnesian war, and also reconciled himself to the Corinthians the better to procure the revolt of Potidæa. And likewise he practised with the Chalcideans of Thrace, and with the Bottiæans, to revolt with them: for if he could make these confining cities his confederates, with the help of them he thought his war would be the easier. Which the Athenians perceiving, and intending to prevent the revolt of these cities, gave order to the commanders of the fleet, (for they were now sending thirty galleys with a thousand men of arms, under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, into the territories of Perdiccas), both to receive hostages of the Potidæans, and to demolish their walls¹; and also to have an eye to the neighbouring cities, that they revolted not.

58. The Potidæans having sent ambassadors to Athens, to try if they could persuade the people not to make any alteration amongst them; by other ambassadors, whom they sent along with the ambassadors of Corinth to Lacedæmon, dealt² with the Lacedæmonians at the same time, if need required, to be ready to revenge their quarrel. When after long solicitation at Athens and no good done, the fleet was sent away against them no less than against Macedonia: and when the magistrates of Lacedæmon had promised them, if the Athenians went to Potidæa, to invade Attica: then at last they revolted, and together with them the

The Potidæans seek the protection of the Lacedæmonians.

The revolt of Potidæa, Bottiæa, and Chalcidice, from the Athenians.

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Chalcideans and Bottiæans, all mutually sworn in the same conspiracy. For³ Perdiccas had also persuaded the Chalcideans to abandon and pull down their maritime towns, and to go up and dwell at Olynthus, and that one city to make strong: and unto those that removed, gave part of his own, and part⁴ of the territory of Mygdonia, about the lake Bolbe, to live on, so long as the war against the Athenians should continue. So when¹ they had demolished their cities, and were gone up higher into the country, they prepared themselves to the war.

59. The Athenian galleys, when they arrived in Thrace, found Potidæa and the other cities already revolted. And the commanders of the fleet conceiving it to be impossible, with their present forces, to make war both against Perdiccas and the towns revolted, set sail again for Macedonia, against which they had been at first sent out; and there staying, joined with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, that had invaded the country from above.

The Athenian fleet, finding Potidæa and other cities already lost, go into Macedonia.

60. In the meantime after Potidæa was revolted, and whilst the Athenian fleet lay on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians, fearing what might become of the city, and making the danger their own, sent unto it, both of their own city², and of other Peloponnesians which they hired, to the number of sixteen hundred men of arms and four hundred light³ armed. The charge of these was given to Aristeus the son of Adimantus, for whose sake⁴ most of the volunteers of Corinth went the voyage: for he had been ever a great favourer of the Potidæans. And they arrived in Thrace after the revolt of Potidæa forty days.

The Corinthians send their forces to Potidæa to defend it.

61. The news of the revolt of these cities was likewise quickly brought to the Athenian people; who hearing withal of the forces sent unto them under Aristeus, sent forth against the places revolted two thousand men of arms and forty galleys, under the conduct of Callias the son of Calliades¹. These coming first into Macedonia, found there the former thousand, who by this time had taken Therme², and were now besieging the city of Pydna; and staying, helped for a while to besiege it with the rest. But shortly after they took composition; and having made a necessary³ league with Perdicas, (urged thereto by the affairs of Potidæa, and the arrival there of Aristeus), departed from Macedonia. Thence coming to Berrhœa⁴, they attempted to take it: but when they could not do it, they turned back, and marched towards Potidæa by land. They were of their own number three thousand men of arms, besides many of their confederates; and of Macedonians that had served with Philip and Pausanias, six hundred horsemen. And their galleys, seventy in number, sailing by them along the coast⁵, by moderate journeys came in three days to Gignonus, and there encamped.

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Veria.

62. The Potidæans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus, in expectation of the coming of the Athenians, lay now encamped in the isthmus near unto¹ Olynthus, and had the market kept for them without² the city. And the leading of the foot the confederates had assigned to Aristeus, and of the horse to Perdicas: for he fell off again presently from the Athenians, and having left Iolaus governor in his place, took part with the Potidæans. The purpose of Aristeus was, to have the body of the army with himself within the isthmus³, and therewith to attend the coming on of the Athenians; and to have the Chalcideans and their confederates without the isthmus, and also the two hundred horse under Perdicas, to stay in Olynthus, and when the Athenians were⁴ passed by, to come on their backs and to inclose the enemy betwixt them. But Callias the Athenian general, and the rest that were in commission with him, sent out before them their Macedonian horsemen and some few of their confederates to Olynthus, to stop those within from making any sally from the town; and then dislodging marched on towards Potidæa. When they were come on as far as the isthmus, and saw the enemy make ready to fight, they also did the like; and not long after they joined battle. That wing wherein was Aristeus himself, with the chosen men of the Corinthians and others, put to flight that part of their enemies that stood opposite unto them, and followed execution a great way. But the rest of the army of the Potidæans and

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The Athenians and those with Aristeus prepare themselves for battle.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The victory falleth to the Athenians.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

Peloponnesians were by the Athenians defeated, and fled into the city. 63. And Aristeus, when he came back from the execution¹, was in doubt what way to take, to Olynthus or to Potidæa. In the end he resolved of the shortest² way, and with his soldiers about him ran as hard as he was able into Potidæa; and with much ado got in at the pier³ through the sea, cruelly shot at, and with the loss of a few, but the safety of the greatest part of his company. As soon as the battle began⁴, they that should have seconded the Potidæans from Olynthus, (for it is at most but sixty furlongs⁵ off, and in sight), advanced a little way to have aided them; and the Macedonian horse opposed themselves likewise in order of battle, to keep them back. But the Athenians having quickly gotten the victory, and the standards being taken¹ down, they retired again; they of Olynthus into that city, and the Macedonian horsemen into the army of the Athenians. So² that neither side had their cavalry at the battle. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and gave truce to the Potidæans for the taking up of the bodies of their dead. Of the Potidæans and their friends there died somewhat less than three hundred; and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, with Callias one of their commanders.

64. Presently upon this, the Athenians raised a wall before the city on the part towards³ the isthmus, which they kept with a garrison; but the part to Pallene-ward they left unwalled. For they thought themselves too small a number, both to keep a guard in the isthmus, and withal to go over and fortify in Pallene; fearing lest the Potidæans and their confederates should assault them when divided. When the people of Athens understood that Potidæa was unwalled on the part toward Pallene, not long after they sent thither sixteen hundred men of arms under the conduct of Phormio the son of Asopius: who arriving in Pallene, left⁴ his galleys at Aphytis, and marching easily to Potidæa wasted the territory as he passed through. And when none came out to give him battle, he raised a wall before the city on that part also that looketh towards Pallene. Thus was Potidæa on both sides strongly besieged; and also from the sea by the Athenian galleys, that came up and rode before it.

The Athenians begin to besiege Potidæa.

The Athenians send Phormio with sixteen hundred men of arms to Potidæa.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Potidæa straightly besieged on all sides.

The advice of Aristeus, to carry all the people but five hundred men out of the city, that their victual might the better hold out, refused.

Aristeus getteth out of the city, unseen of the Athenians.

And staying in Chalcidice, slew certain of the city of

65. Aristeus, seeing the city enclosed on every side, and without hope of safety save what might come from Peloponnesus or some other unexpected way, gave advice to all but five hundred, taking the opportunity of a wind, to go out by sea, that the provision might the longer hold out for the rest; and of them that should remain within offered himself to be one. But when his counsel took not place, being desirous to settle their business¹, and make the best of their affairs abroad, he got out by sea unseen of the Athenian guard; and staying amongst the Chalcideans, amongst other actions of the war², laid an ambush before Sermylus and slew many of that city, and solicited the sending of aid from Peloponnesus. And Phormio, after the siege laid to Potidæa, having with him his sixteen hundred men of arms, wasted the territory of the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, and some small towns he took in.

Sermylus by ambushment.

Phormio wasteth the territories of the Chalcideans and Bottiæans.

66. These were³ the quarrels between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. The Corinthians quarrelled the Athenians, for besieging Potidæa, and in it the men of Corinth and Peloponnesus. The Athenians quarrelled the Peloponnesians, for causing their confederate and tributary city to revolt; and for that they had come thither, and openly fought against them in the behalf of Potidæa. Nevertheless the war brake not openly forth as yet, and they yet abstained from arms; for this was but a particular action of the Corinthians. 67. But when Potidæa was once besieged, both for their men's sakes that were within, and also for fear to lose the place, they could no longer hold. But out of hand, they procured¹ of their confederates to go to Lacedæmon; and thither also they went themselves with clamours and accusations against the Athenians, that they had broken the league and wronged the Peloponnesians. The Æginetæ, though not openly by ambassadors for fear of the Athenians, yet privily instigated them to the war as much as any; alledging that they were not permitted to govern themselves according to their own laws, as by the articles² they ought to have been. So the Lacedæmonians having called together the confederates, and whosoever else had any injustice to lay to the charge of the Athenians, in the ordinary council³ of their own state commanded them to speak. Then presented every one his accusation; and amongst the rest the Megareans, besides many other their great differences, laid open this especially, that contrary to the articles they were forbidden the Athenian markets and havens¹. Last of all, the Corinthians, when they had suffered the Lacedæmonians to be incensed first by the rest, came in and said as followeth.

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The solicitation of the war by the Corinthians and other confederates of the Lacedæmonians.

Complaints exhibited against the Athenians in the council of Sparta.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

68. "Men of Lacedæmon, your own fidelity, both in matter of estate and conversation, maketh you the less apt to believe us, when we accuse others of the contrary². And hereby you gain indeed a reputation of equity³, but you have less experience in the affairs of foreign states. For although we have oftentimes foretold you, that the Athenians would do us a mischief; yet from time to time when we told it you, you never would take information of it; but have suspected rather, that what we spake hath proceeded from our own private

oration of the ambassadors of corinth.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

differences. And you have therefore called hither these confederates, not before we had suffered, but now when the evil is already upon us. Before whom our speech must be so much the longer, by how much our objections are the greater, in that we have both by the Athenians been injured, and by you neglected. If the Athenians lurking in some obscure place, had done these wrongs unto the Grecians, we should then have needed to prove the same before you as to men that knew it not. But now what cause have we to use long discourse, when you see already that some [1](#) are brought into servitude, and that they are contriving the like against others [2](#), and especially against our confederates; and are themselves, in case war should be made against them, long since prepared for it? For else they would never have taken Corcyra, and holden it from us by force, nor have besieged Potidæa; whereof the one was most commodious for any action against Thrace [3](#), and the other had brought unto the Peloponnesians a most fair navy.

69. “And of all this you are yourselves the authors, in that you suffered them upon the end of the Persian war to fortify their city, and again afterwards to raise their long walls; whereby you have hitherto deprived of their liberty, not only the states by them already subdued, but also your own confederates. For not he that bringeth into slavery, but he that being able to hinder it neglects the same, is most truly said to do it; especially if they assume the honour to be esteemed the deliverers of Greece [as you do]. And for all that, we are hardly yet come together, and indeed not yet with any certain resolution what to do. For the question [1](#) should not have been put, whether or not we have received injury, but rather in what manner we are to repair it. For they [2](#) that do the wrong, having consulted upon it beforehand, use no delay at all, but come upon them whom they mean to oppress, whilst they be yet irresolute. And we know, not only [3](#) that the Athenians have incroached upon their neighbours, but also by what ways they have done it. And as long as they think they carry it closely through your blindness, they are the less bold: but when they shall perceiue that you see, and will not see, they will then press us strongly indeed. For, Lacedæmonians, you are the only men of all Greece, that sitting still defend others, not with your forces, but with promises [4](#); and you are also the only men, that love to pull down the power of the enemy, not when it beginneth, but when it is doubled. You have indeed a report [5](#) to be sure; but yet it is more in fame that, than in fact. For we ourselves know, that the Persian came against [6](#) Peloponnesus from the utmost parts of the earth, before you encountered him as became your state. And also now you connive at the Athenians, who are not as the Medes, far off, but hard at hand; choosing rather to defend yourselves from their invasion, than to invade them; and by having to do with them when their strength is greater, to put yourselves upon the chance of fortune. And yet we [1](#) know that the barbarian’s own error, and in our war against the Athenians, their own oversights, more than your assistance, was the thing that gave us victory. For the hope of your aid hath been the destruction of some, that relying on you, made no preparation for themselves by other means. Yet let not any man think that we speak this out of malice, but only by way of expostulation: for expostulation is with friends that err, but accusation against enemies that have done an injury.

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70. “Besides, if there be any that may challenge to exprobate his neighbour, we think ourselves may best do it; especially on so great quarrels as these, whereof you neither seem² to have any feeling, nor to consider what manner of men, and how different from you in every kind the Athenians be, that you are to contend withal. For they love innovation, and are swift to devise, and also to execute what they resolve on. But you on the contrary are only apt to save your own; not devise any thing new, nor scarce³ to attain what is necessary. They again are bold beyond their strength, adventurous above their own reason, and in danger hope still the best. Whereas your actions are ever beneath your power, and you distrust even what your judgment¹ assures; and being in a danger, never think to be delivered. They are stirrers, you studiers; they love to be abroad, and you at home the most of any. For they make account by being abroad to add to their estate; you, if you should go forth against the state of another, would think to impair your² own. They, when they overcome their enemies advance the farthest, and when they are overcome by their enemies, fall off the least; and as for their bodies, they use them in the service of the commonwealth as if they were none of their own; but their minds, when they would serve the state, are right their own. Unless they take in hand³ what they have once advised on, they account so much lost of their own. And when they take it in hand, if they obtain any thing, they think lightly of it in respect of what they look to win by their prosecution. If they fail in any attempt, they do what is necessary for the present, and enter presently into other hopes.⁴ For they alone both have and hope for at once whatsoever they conceive, through their celerity in execution of what they once resolve on. And in this manner they labour and toil all the days of their lives. What they have, they have no leisure to enjoy, for continual getting of more: nor holiday esteem they any, but whereon they effect some matter profitable; nor think they ease with nothing to do, a less torment than laborious business. So that, in a word, to say they are men born neither to rest themselves, nor suffer others, is to say the truth. 71. Now notwithstanding, men of Lacedæmon, that this city, your adversary, be such as we have said, yet you still delay time; not knowing, that those only are they to whom it may suffice for the most part of their time to sit still¹, who, though they use not their power to do injustice, yet bewray a mind unlikely to swallow injuries; but placing equity belike in this, that you neither do any harm to others, nor receive it in defending of yourselves. But this is a thing you hardly could attain, though the states about you were of the same² condition. But, as we have before declared, your customs are in respect of theirs antiquated; and of necessity, as it happeneth in arts, the new ones will prevail. True it is, that for a city living for the most part in peace, unchanged customs are the best; but for such as be constrained to undergo many matters, many devices will be needful. Which is also the reason why the Athenian customs, through much experience, are more new to you than yours are to them³. Here therefore give a period to your slackness; and⁴ by a speedy invasion of Attica, as you promised, relieve both Potidæa and the rest: lest otherwise you betray your friends and kindred⁵ to their cruellest enemies; and lest we and⁶ others be driven through despair to seek out some other league. Which to do were no injustice, neither against the Gods, judges of men’s oaths, nor against men, the hearers¹ of them. For not they break the league, who being abandoned have recourse to others; but they that yield not their assistance to whom they have sworn it. But if you mean to follow the business seriously, we will stay; for else we should do irreligiously, neither should we find any other more conformable to

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our manners, than yourselves. Therefore deliberate well of these points; and take such a course, that Peloponnesus may not by your leading fall into worse estate, than it was left unto you by your progenitors.”

72. Thus spake the Corinthians. The Athenian ambassadors, who chanced to be residing at Lacedæmon upon their² business, when they heard of this oration, thought fit to present themselves before the Lacedæmonians, not to make apology for what they were charged with by the other cities, but to show in general³, that it was not fit for them in this case to take any sudden resolution, but farther time to consider. Also they desired to lay open the power of their city; to the elder sort, for a remembrance of what they knew already, and to the younger, for an information of what they knew not: supposing, that when they should have spoken, they would incline to quietness rather than to war. And therefore they presented themselves before the Lacedæmonians, saying, that they also, if they might have leave, desired to speak in the assembly; who willed them to come in. And the Athenians went into the assembly and spake to this effect.

The Athenian ambassadors residing in Lacedæmon upon their business, desire to make answer to the oration of the Corinthians.

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73. “Though our embassy was not to this end, that we should argue against our¹ confederates, but about such other affairs as the city was pleased to employ us in; yet having heard of the great exclamation against us, we came into the court, not to make answer to the criminations of the cities, (for to plead before you here, were not to plead before the judges either of them or us),

oration of the ambassadors of athens.

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but to the end you may not be drawn away to take the worse resolution at the persuasion of the confederates, in matters of so great importance: and withal, touching the sum of the oration made against us, to inform you that what we possess, we have it justly, and that our city deserveth reputation. But what need we now to speak of matters long past, confirmed more by hearsay, than by the eyes of those that are to hear us relate them? But our actions against the Persian, and such as you yourselves know as well as we, those, though it be tedious² to hear them ever objected, we must of necessity recite. For when we did them, we hazarded ourselves for some benefit, of which, as you had your parts in the substance³, so must we have ours (if that be any benefit) in the commemoration. And we shall make recital of them, not by way of deprecation, but of protestation¹ and declaration of what a city, in case you take ill advice, you have to enter the list withal. We therefore say, that we not only first and alone hazarded battle against the barbarian in the fields of Marathon, but also afterwards, when he came again, being unable to resist him by land, embarked ourselves, every man that was able to bear arms, and gave him battle amongst the rest by sea at Salamis; which was the cause that kept him back from sailing to Peloponnesus, and laying it waste city after city: for against so many galleys you were not able to give each other mutual succour. And the greatest proof of this is the Persian himself; who when his fleet was overcome, and that he had² no more such forces, went away in haste with the greatest part of his army.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

74. “Which being so, and evident that the whole state of the Grecians was embarked in their fleet, we conferred to the same³ the three things of most advantage; namely, the greatest number of galleys, the most prudent commander, and the most lively courage. For of four hundred galleys in the whole, our own were few less than two-thirds; and for commander Themistocles, who was the principal cause that the battle was fought in the strait⁴, whereby he clearly saved the whole business, and whom, though a stranger, you your selves have honoured for it more than any man that came unto you. And a forwardness we showed more adventurous than any other, in this, that when none of them had aided us by land before, and the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city and lose our goods; and even in that estate, not to betray the common cause of the confederates, or divided from them to be unuseful, but to put ourselves into our navy and undergo the danger with them; and that without passion against you for not having formerly defended us in the like manner. So that we may say, that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you, than we received it from you. You came indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited, and to the end you might still keep them so; and when you were afraid, not of our danger, but your own. Whereas¹ we, coming from a city no more being², and putting ourselves into danger for a city³ hopeless ever to be again, saved both you in⁴ part, and ourselves. But if we had joined with the Persian, fearing (as others did) to have our territories wasted; or afterwards, as men lost, durst not have put ourselves into our galleys, you must not have fought with him by sea, because your fleet had been too small; but his affairs had¹ succeeded as he would himself.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

75. “Therefore, men of Lacedæmon, we deserve not so great envy of the Grecians², for our courage at that time and for our prudence, and for the dominion we hold, as we now undergo. Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the confederates, when yourselves would not stay out the relics of the war against the barbarian, came in and entreated us to take the command of their own accord. So that at first we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is, out of the nature of the thing itself; as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit. For when we had the envy of many, and had reconquered some that had already revolted, and seeing you were no more our friends as you had been, but suspected and quarrelled us, we held it no longer a safe course, laying by our power to put ourselves into your danger³. For the revolts from us, would all have been made to you. Now it is no fault for men in danger, to order their affairs to the best. 76. For you also⁴, men of Lacedæmon, have command over the cities of Peloponnesus, and order them to your best advantage. And had you, when the time was¹, by staying it out, been envied in your command, as we know well, you would have been no less heavy to the confederates than we, you must have been constrained to rule imperiously, or to have fallen into danger. So that, though overcome by three the greatest things, honour, fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor beside the manner of men. Nor have we been the first in this kind, but it hath been ever a thing fixed, for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of the Athenians.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of the Athenians.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of the Athenians.

A. C. 432 Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of the Athenians.

Besides, we took the government upon us as esteeming ourselves worthy of the same; and of you also so esteemed, till having computed the commodity, you now fall to allegation of equity; a thing which no man that had the occasion to achieve anything by strength, ever so far preferred as to divert him from his profit. Those men are worthy of commendation, who following the natural inclination of man in desiring² rule over others, are juster than for their own power they need. And therefore if another had our power, we think it would best make appear our own moderation; and yet our moderation hath undeservedly incurred contempt³ rather than commendation. 77. For¹ though in pleas of covenants with our confederates, when in our own city we have allowed them trial by laws equal both to them and us, the judgment hath been given against us, we have then nevertheless been reputed contentious. None of them considering that² others, who in other places have dominion and are toward their subject states less moderate than we, yet are never upbraided for it. For they that have the power to compel, need not at all to go to law. And yet³ these men having been used to converse with us upon equal terms, if they lose anything which they think they should not, either by sentence or by the power of our government, they are not thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse part the little they forego, than if at first, laying law aside, we had openly taken their goods by violence. For in this kind also⁴ they themselves cannot deny, but the weaker must give way to the stronger. And men, it seems, are more passionate for injustice, than for violence. For that, coming as from an equal, seemeth rapine; and the other, because from one stronger, but necessity. Therefore when they suffered worse things under the Medes' dominion, they bore it; but think ours to be rigorous. And good reason; for to men in subjection, the present is ever the worst estate. Insomuch as you also, if you should put us down and reign yourselves, you would soon find a change of the love which they bear you now for fear of us, if you should do again as you did¹ for a while, when you were their commanders against the Medes. For not only your own institutions are different² from those of others, but also when any one of you comes abroad [with charge], he neither useth those of yours, nor yet those of the rest of Greece. 78. Deliberate therefore of this a great while, as of a matter of great importance; and do not upon the opinions and criminations of others procure your own trouble. Consider before you enter, how unexpected the chances of war be. For a long war for the most part endeth in calamity, from which we are equally far off; and whether part it will light on, is to be tried with uncertainty. And men, when they go to war, use many times to fall first to action, the which ought to come behind; and when they have taken harm, then they fall to reasoning. But since we are neither in such error ourselves, nor do find that you are, we advise you, whilst good counsel is in both our elections, not to break the peace nor violate your oaths; but according to the articles, let the controversy be decided by judgment; or else we call the gods you have sworn by to witness, that if you begin the war, we will endeavour to revenge ourselves the same way that you shall walk in before us."

79. Thus spake the Athenians. After the Lacedæmonians had heard both the complaints of the confederates against the Athenians, and the Athenians' answer, they put them every one out of the court¹, and consulted of the business amongst themselves. And the opinions of the greatest part concurred in

The Lacedæmonians amongst themselves take counsel how to proceed.

this; that the Athenians had done unjustly, and ought speedily to be warred on. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as followeth.

80. “Men of Lacedæmon, both I myself have the experience of many wars, and I see you of the same age with me to have the like; insomuch as you² cannot desire this war either through inexperience, as many do, nor yet as apprehending it to be profitable or safe. And whosoever shall temperately consider the war we now deliberate of, will find it to be no small one. For though in respect of the Peloponnesians and our neighbour states we have equal¹ strength, and can quickly be upon them; yet against men whose territory is remote, and are also expert seamen, and with all other things excellently furnished, as money, both private and public, shipping, horses, arms, and number, more than any one part of Greece besides; and that have many confederates paying them tribute: against such, I say, why should we lightly undertake the war? And since we are unfurnished, whereon relying should we make such haste to it? On our navy? But therein we are too weak: and if we will provide² and prepare against them, it will require time. On our money? But therein also we are more too weak³; for neither hath the state any, nor will private men readily contribute. 81. But it may be, some rely on this; that we exceed them in arms and multitude of soldiers, so that we may waste their territories with incursions. But there is much other land under their dominion, and by sea they are able to bring in whatsoever they shall stand in need of. Again, if we essay to alienate their confederates, we must aid them with shipping, because the most of them are islanders. What a war then will this of ours be? For unless we have the better of them in shipping, or take from them their revenue, whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most hurt to ourselves. And in this case to let fall the war again, will be no honour for us, when we are chiefly thought to have begun it. As¹ for the hope, that if we waste their country, the war will soon be at an end; let that never lift us up: for I fear we shall transmit it rather to our children. For it is likely the Athenians have the spirit not to be slaves to their earth; nor as men without experience, to be astonished at the war. 82. And yet I do not advise that we should stupidly suffer our confederates to be wronged, and not apprehend the Athenians in their plots against them; but only not yet to take up arms, but to send and expostulate with them, making no great show neither of war nor of sufferance: and in the mean time to make our provision, and make friends both of Greeks and barbarians, such as in any place we can get of power either in shipping or money; (nor are they to be blamed, that being laid in wait for, as we are by the Athenians, take unto them not Grecians only, but also barbarians for their safety); and withal to set forth² our own. If they listen to our ambassadors, best of all; if not, then two or three years passing over our heads, being better appointed, we may war³ upon them if we will. And when they see our preparation⁴, and hear words that import no less, they will perhaps relent the sooner; especially having their grounds unhurt, and consulting upon commodities extant and not yet spoiled. For we must think their territory to be nothing but an hostage, and so much the more, by how much the better husbanded. The which we ought therefore to spare as long as we may;

oration of
archidamus.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of
Archidamus.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of
Archidamus.

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Oration of
Archidamus.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of
Archidamus.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of
Archidamus.

lest making them desperate, we make them also the harder to expugn. For if unfurnished as we be, at the instigation of the confederates we waste their territory; consider if 1 in so doing we do not make the war both more dishonourable to the Peloponnesians, and also more difficult. For though accusations, as well against 2 cities as private men, may be cleared again, a war for the pleasure of some taken up by all, the success whereof cannot be foreseen, can hardly with honour be letten fall again. 83. Now let no man think it cowardice, that being many cities 3, we go not presently and invade that one city. For of confederates that bring them in money, they have more than we; and war is not so much war of arms as war of money, by means whereof arms are useful; especially when it is a war of land-men against sea-men. And therefore let us first provide ourselves of money, and not first raise the war upon the persuasion of the confederates. For we that must be thought the causers of all events, good or bad, have reason also to take some leisure in part to foresee them. 84. As for the slackness and procrastination wherewith 5 we are reproached by the confederates, be never ashamed of it; for the more haste you make to the war, you will 4 be the longer before you end it, for that you go to it unprovided. Besides, our city hath been ever free and well thought of: and this which they object, is rather to be called a modesty proceeding upon judgment. For by that it is, that we alone are neither arrogant upon good success, nor shrink so much as others in adversity. Nor are we, when men provoke us to it with praise, through the delight thereof moved to undergo danger more than we think fit ourselves; nor when they sharpen us with reprehension, doth the smart thereof a jot the more prevail upon us. And this modesty of ours maketh us both good soldiers, and good counsellors: good soldiers, because shame begetteth 1 modesty, and valour is most sensible of shame: good counsellors, in this, that we are brought up more simply than to disesteem the laws, and by severity more modestly than to disobey them: and also in that, we do not, like men exceeding wise in things needless, find fault bravely with the preparation of the enemy and in effect not assault him accordingly; but do think our neighbour's cogitations like our own, and that the events of fortune cannot be discerned by a speech 2; and do therefore always so furnish ourselves really against the enemy, as against men well advised. For we are not to build our hopes upon the oversights of them, but upon the safe foresight of ourselves. Nor must we think that there is much difference between man and man; but him only to be the best, that hath been brought up amongst the most difficulties 3. 85. Let us not therefore cast aside the institutions 1 of our ancestors, which we have so long retained to our profit; nor let us of many men's lives, of much money, of many cities, and much honour, hastily resolve in so small a part of one day, but at leisure; the which we have better commodity than any other to do, by reason of our power. Send to the Athenians about the matter of Potidæa; send about that wherein the confederates say they are injured; and the rather, because they be content to refer the cause to judgment; and one that offereth himself to judgment, may not lawfully be invaded as a doer of injury, before the judgment be given. And prepare withal for the war. So shall you take the most profitable counsel for yourselves, and the most formidable to the enemy."

Thus spake Archidamus. But Sthenelaidas, then one of the Ephori, stood up last of all and spake to the Lacedæmonians in this manner:

86. “For my part, I understand not the many words used by the Athenians; for though they have been much in their own praises, yet they have said nothing to the contrary but that they have done injury to our confederates and to Peloponnesus. And if they carried themselves well against the Medes, when time was, and now ill against us, they deserve a double punishment; because they are not good as they were, and because they are evil as they were not. Now are we the same we were²; and mean not (if we be wise) either to connive at the wrongs done to our confederates, or defer to repair them; for the harm they suffer, is not deferred. Others have much money, many galleys, and many horses; and we have good confederates, not to be betrayed to the Athenians, nor to be defended with words¹, (for they are not hurt in words), but to be aided with all our power and with speed. Let no man tell me, that after we have once received the injury we ought to deliberate. No, it belongs rather to the doers of injury to spend time in consultation. Wherefore, men of Lacedæmon, decree the war, as becometh the dignity of Sparta; and let not the Athenians grow yet greater, nor let us betray our confederates, but in the name of the Gods proceed against the doers of injustice.”

oration of
sthenelaidas.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of
Sthenelaidas.

87. Having thus spoken, being himself Ephor, he put it to the question in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians; and saying afterwards, that he could not discern whether was the greater cry, (for they used there to give their votes *viva voce*, and not with balls²), and desiring that it might be evident that their minds were inclined most to the war¹, he put it unto them again, and said, “to whomsoever of you it seemeth that the peace is broken and that the Athenians have done unjustly, let him arise and go yonder,” and withal he showed them a certain place: “and to whomsoever it seemeth otherwise, let him go to the other side”. So they arose and the room was divided; wherein far the greater number were those that held the peace to be broken.

The Lacedæmonians
by question conclude
that the Athenians had
broken the peace.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

Then calling in the confederates, they told them, that for their own parts their sentence was that the Athenians had done them wrong: but yet they desired to have all their confederates called together, and then to put it to the question again; that if they would, the war might be decreed by common consent². This done, their confederates went home: and so did also afterwards the Athenians, when they had dispatched the business they came about. This decree of the assembly that the peace was broken, was made in the fourteenth year of those thirty years, for which a peace had been formerly concluded after the actions past in Eubœa.

88. The Lacedæmonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates, as for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase. For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
The true cause of this
war being the fear the
Lacedæmonians had
of the power of
Athens, the author
digresseth to show
how that power grew
first up.

89. Now the manner how the Athenians came to the administration of those affairs by which they so raised themselves, was this. After that the Medes, overcome by sea and land, were departed, and such of them as had escaped by sea to Mycale¹ were there also utterly overthrown; Leotychides king of the Lacedæmonians, then commander of the Grecians at Mycale, with their confederates of Peloponnesus went home. But the Athenians with their confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, as many as were already revolted from the king, staid behind and besieged Sestus, holden then by the Medes; and when they had lain before it all the winter, they took it abandoned by the barbarians². And after this they set sail from the Hellespont, every one to his own city. And the body³ of the Athenians, as soon as their territory was clear of the barbarians, went home also, and fetched thither their wives and children, and such goods as they had, from the places where they had been put out to keep; and went about the reparation¹ of their city and walls. For there were yet standing some pieces of the circuit of their wall, and likewise a few houses (though the most were down) which the principal of the Persians had reserved for their own lodgings.

The means by which the Athenians came to have the command of the common forces of Greece against the Persian, by which they raised their empire.

The Athenians return to their city.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. They repair their city, and wall it.

The Lacedæmonians advise them to the contrary for their own ends, pretending the common good.

Themistocles adviseth them to build on.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. His subtilty in deluding the Lacedæmonians.

The building hastened.

Themistocles goeth to Lacedæmon ambassador.

He adviseth the Lacedæmonians to send ambassadors to see if the wall went up or not.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. He sendeth letters to Athens secretly, to have those ambassadors stayed

90. The Lacedæmonians hearing what they went about, sent thither their ambassadors, partly because they would themselves have been glad that neither the Athenians nor any other had had walls; but principally as incited thereto by their confederates, who feared not only the greatness of their navy, which they had not before, but also their courage showed against the Persians: and entreated them not to build their walls, but rather to join with them in pulling down the walls of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them yet standing: not discovering their meaning, and the jealousy they had of the Athenians; but pretending this, that if the barbarian returned, he might find no fortified city to make the seat of his war, as he did² of Thebes: and that Peloponnesus was sufficient for them all whereinto to retire, and from whence to withstand the war. But the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, when the Lacedæmonian ambassadors had so said, dismissed them presently with this answer; that they would presently send ambassadors about the business they spake of to Lacedæmon. Now Themistocles willed them to send himself to Lacedæmon for one, and that as speedily as they could; but such as were chosen ambassadors with him, not to send away presently, but to stay them till the walls were so raised as to fight upon them from a sufficient height¹; and that all the men in the city, in the mean time, both they and their wives and children, sparing neither private nor public edifice that might advance the work, but pulling all down whatsoever, should help to raise it. When he had thus instructed them, adding that he would himself do the rest at Lacedæmon, he took his journey. And when he came to Lacedæmon he went not to the state², but delaying the time excused himself; and when any of those that were in office, asked him why he did not present himself to the state, answered, “that he stayed for his fellow-ambassadors, who upon some business that fell out were left behind, but he expected them very shortly and wondered they were not come already”. 91. Hearing this, they gave credit to Themistocles for the love they bore him; but when others coming thence averred plainly that the wall went up, and that it was come to good height already, they could not then choose but believe it. Themistocles, when he saw this, wished them not to be led by reports, but rather to send thither some of their own, such as were honest men, and having informed themselves would relate the truth: which they also did. And Themistocles sendeth privily to the Athenians about the same men, to take order for their stay with as little appearance of it as they could, and not to dismiss them till their own ambassadors were returned: (for by this time were arrived those that were joined with him, namely, Abronychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, and brought him word that the wall was of a sufficient height): for he feared lest the Lacedæmonians, when they knew the truth, would refuse to let them go. The Athenians therefore kept there those ambassadors, according as it was written to them to do. Themistocles coming now to his audience before the Lacedæmonians, said plainly, “that the city of Athens was already walled, and that sufficiently for the defence of those within: and that if it shall please the Lacedæmonians¹ upon any occasion to send ambassadors unto them, they were to send thenceforward as to men that understood what conduced both to their own, and also to the common good of all Greece. For when they thought it best to quit their city and put themselves into their galleys, he² said, they were bold to do it without asking the advice of them: and in

till the return of himself and his fellows from Lacedæmon.

And hearing that the walls were finished, he justifies it.

A. C. 478. Ol. 75. 3.

The Lacedæmonians dissembled their dislike.

common counsel, the advice of the Athenians was as good as the advice of them. And now at this time their opinion is, that it will be best, both for themselves in particular and for all the confederates in common, that their city should be walled. For that in strength¹ unequal, men cannot alike and equally advise for the common benefit of Greece. Therefore, said he, either must all the confederate cities be unwalled, or you must not think amiss of what is done by us.” The Lacedæmonians when they heard him, though they made no show of being angry with the Athenians; (for they had not sent their ambassadors to forbid them, but by way of advice, to admonish them not to build the wall² ; besides they bare them affection then, for their courage shown against the Medes); yet they were inwardly offended, because they missed of their will. And the ambassadors returned home of either side without complaint.

93. Thus the Athenians quickly raised their walls; the structure itself making manifest³ the haste used in the building. For the foundation consisteth of stones of all sorts; and those in some places unwrought, and as they were brought to the place. Many pillars also taken from sepulchres⁴ , and polished stones were piled together amongst the rest. For the circuit of the city was set every way farther out, and therefore hastening they took alike whatsoever came next to hand. Themistocles likewise persuaded them to build up the rest of Piræus⁵ ; for it was begun in the year that himself was archon of Athens; as conceiving the place both¹ beautiful, in that it had three natural havens, and that being now seamen, it would very much conduce to the enlargement of their power. For he was indeed the first man that durst tell them, that they ought to take upon them the command of the sea, and withal presently helped them in the obtaining it. By his counsel also it was, that they built the wall of that breadth about Piræus which is now to be seen. For two carts carrying stones² met and passed upon it one by another. And yet within it there was neither rubbish nor mortar [to fill it up], but it was made all of great stones, cut square³ and bound together with iron and lead. But for height, it was raised but to the half, at the most, of what he had intended. For he would have had it able to hold out the enemy both by the height and breadth; and that a few and the less serviceable men might have sufficed to defend it, and the rest have served in the navy. For principally he was addicted to the sea, because, as I think, he had observed that the forces of the king had easier access to invade them by sea than by land; and thought that Piræus was more profitable than the city above. And oftentimes he would exhort the Athenians, that in case they were oppressed⁴ by land, they should go down thither, and with their galleys make resistance against what enemy soever. Thus the Athenians built their walls, and fitted themselves in other kinds, immediately upon the departure of the Persians.

The walls of Athens built in haste.

A. C. 473. Ol. 76. 4.

Themistocles author to the Athenians of assuming the dominion of the sea, and of fortifying Piræus. A. C. 493. Ol. 71. 4.

The reason why Themistocles was most addicted to affairs by sea.

A. C. 478. Ol. 75. 3.

Pausanias sent general of the Greeks, to pursue the relics of the Persian war.

A. C. 477. Ol. 75. 3.

94. In the meantime was Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, sent from Lacedæmon commander of the Grecians with twenty galleys out of Peloponnesus; with which went also thirty sail of Athens, besides a multitude of other confederates; and making war on Cyprus, subdued the greatest part of the same: and afterwards, under the same commander, came before Byzantium¹, which they besieged and won. 95. But Pausanias being now grown insolent, both the rest of the Grecians, and especially the Ionians, who² had newly recovered their liberty from the king, offended with him, came unto the Athenians, and requested them for consanguinity's³ sake to become their leaders, and to protect them from the violence of Pausanias. The Athenians accepting the motion, applied themselves both to the defence of these, and also to the ordering of the rest of the affairs there in such sort as it should seem best unto themselves. In the mean time the Lacedæmonians sent for Pausanias home, to examine him of such things as they had heard against him. For great crimes had been laid to his charge by the Grecians that came from thence; and his government was rather an imitation of tyranny, than a command in war. And it was his hap to be called home at the same time that the confederates, all but the soldiers of Peloponnesus, out of hatred to him had turned to the Athenians. When he came to Lacedæmon, though he were censured¹ for some wrongs done to private men, yet of the greatest matters he was acquit; especially² of Medising, the which seemed to be the most evident of all. Him therefore they sent general no more; but Dorcis, and some others with him, with no great army; whose command the confederates refused; and they finding that, went their ways likewise. And after that the Lacedæmonians sent no more; because they feared lest such as went out, would prove the worse for the state, as they had seen by Pausanias; and also because they desired to be rid of the Persian war, conceiving the Athenians to be sufficient leaders and at that time their friends.

Pausanias growing insolent, the Ionians offended desire the protection of the Athenians.

Pausanias sent for home to answer to certain accusations.

A. C. 477. Ol. 75. 3. In his absence, the Grecians give the Athenians the leading of them.

Pausanias acquit, but sent general no more.

The Grecians refuse the command of Dorcis, sent from Sparta to be their general.

96. When the Athenians had thus gotten the command, by the confederates' own accord for the hatred they bare to Pausanias, they then set down an order, which cities should contribute money for this war against the barbarians, and which galleys. For they pretended to repair the injuries they had suffered, by laying waste the territories of the king. And then first came up amongst the Athenians the office of *Treasurers of Greece*, who were receivers of the tribute³; for so they called this money contributed. And the first tribute that was taxed, came to four hundred and sixty talents⁴. The treasury was at Delos¹, and their meetings were kept there in the temple.

A. C. 477. Ol. 75. 4.

The Athenians assess their confederates for the sustaining of the war. A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.

The original of the tribute paid to the Athenians.

A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. The history of the time between the Persian and

97. Now using their authority, at first, in such manner as that the confederates lived under their own laws, and were admitted to common council; by [the] war and administration of the common affairs of Greece from the Persian war to this, what against the barbarians, what against their own innovating confederates, and what against such of the Peloponnesians as chanced always in every war to fall in, they effected those great matters following. Which also I have therefore written, both because this place hath been pretermitted by all that have written before me: (for they have either compiled the Grecian acts before the invasion of the Persians, or that invasion only; of which number is Hellanicus, who hath also touched them in his Attic History, but briefly, and without exact mention of the times): and also because they carry with them a demonstration of how the Athenian empire grew up².

Peloponnesian war, pretermitted by other writers, briefly delivered by Thucydides.

98. And first, under the conduct of Cimon the son of Miltiades they took Eion³ upon the river Strymon from the Medes by siege, and carried away¹ the inhabitants captives. Then the isle Scyros, in the Ægean sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, the inhabitants whereof they also carried away captives, and planted therein a colony of their own. Likewise they made war on the Carystians alone without the rest of the Eubœans; and those also after a time came in by composition. After this they warred on the revolted Naxians, and brought them in by siege. And this was the first confederate city, which contrary to the ordinance² they deprived of their free estate; though afterwards, as it came to any of their turns, they did the like by the rest.

The steps of the Athenians towards their great dominion. The Athenians take Eion:

A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. and Scyros:

and Carystus: A. C. 467. Ol. 78. 2.

and Naxos, their confederate. A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3.

99. Amongst other causes of revolts, the principal was their failing to bring in their tribute and galleys, and their refusing (when they did so) to follow the wars³. For the Athenians exacted strictly, and were grievous to them, by imposing a necessity of toil which they were neither accustomed nor willing to undergo. They were also otherwise not so gentle in their government as they had been, nor followed the war upon equal terms; and could easily bring back to their subjection such as should revolt. And of this the confederates themselves were the causes. For⁴ through this refusal to accompany the army, the most of them, to the end they might stay at home, were ordered to excuse their galleys with money, as much as it came to: by which means the navy of the Athenians was increased at the cost of their confederates; and themselves unprovided and without means to make war, in case they should revolt.

The cause of revolts from the Athenians.

A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3.

The Athenians defeat the Persian upon the river of Eurymedon.

They war on Thasos. A. C. 465. Ol. 78. 3. 4.

100. After this it came to pass that the Athenians and their confederates fought against the Medes, both by land and by water, upon the river of Eurymedon in Pamphilia; and in one and the same day the Athenians had victory in both¹; and took or sunk all the Phœnician fleet, to the number of two hundred galleys. After this again happened the revolt of Thasos, upon a difference about the places of trade and about the mines they possessed in the opposite parts of Thrace². And the Athenians going thither with their fleet, overthrew them in a battle at sea, and landed in the island. But having about the same time sent ten thousand of their own and of their confederates' people unto the river of Strymon, for a colony to be planted in a place called then the Nine-ways, now Amphipolis; they won the said Nine-ways, which was held by the Eidonians; but advancing farther towards the heart of the country of Thrace, they were defeated³ at Drabescus, a city of the Eidonians, by the whole power of the Thracians, that were enemies to this new-built town of the Nine-ways. 101. The Thasians in the meantime, being overcome in divers battles and besieged, sought aid of the Lacedæmonians, and entreated them to divert the enemy by an invasion of Attica: which, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do, and also had done it, but by an earthquake that then happened they were hindered. In which earthquake their Helots¹, and of neighbouring towns² the Thuriatæ and Æthæans, revolted and seized on Ithome. Most of these Helots were the posterity of the ancient Messenians, brought into servitude in former³ times; whereby also it came to pass that they were called all Messenians. Against these had the Lacedæmonians now a war at Ithome. The⁴ Thasians in the third year of the siege rendered themselves to the Athenians, upon condition to raze their walls; to deliver up their galleys; to pay both the money behind and for the future, as much as they were wont; and to quit both the mines and the continent. 102. The Lacedæmonians, when the war against those in Ithome grew long, amongst other their confederates sent for aid to the Athenians; who also came with no small forces under the command of Cimon. They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural assaults, the long continuance of the siege seeming to require men of ability in that kind; whereby they might perhaps have gotten the place by force¹. And upon this journey, grew the first manifest dissension between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians. For the Lacedæmonians, when they could not take the place by assault, fearing lest the audacious and innovating humour of the Athenians, whom withal they esteemed of a contrary race², might, at the persuasion of those in Ithome, cause some alteration if they staid, dismissed them alone of all the confederates; not discovering their jealousy, but alleging that they had no farther need of their service. But the Athenians perceiving that they were not sent away upon good³ cause, but only as men suspected, made it a heinous matter; and conceiving that they had better deserved at the Lacedæmonians' hands, as soon as they were gone¹, left the league which they had made with the Lacedæmonians against the Persian, and became confederates with their enemies the

They take Amphipolis, and afterwards receive a great overthrow at Drabescus in Thrace.

A. C. 465. Ol. 78. 3. 4. The Lacedæmonians intending to invade Attica, are hindered by an earthquake.

A. C. 465.

A. C. 463. Ol. 79. 1. 2. Thasos rendered to the Athenians. The Lacedæmonians send for aid to the Athenians, in their war against Ithome. A. C. 461. Ol. 79. 3. 4.

The first dissension between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians.

The Athenians being had in suspicion by the Lacedæmonians, join with the Argives.

A. C. 461. Ol. 79. 3. 4.

Argives; and then both Argives and Athenians took the same oath and made the same league with the Thessalians.

103. Those in Ithome, when they could no longer hold out, in the tenth year of the siege rendered the place to the Lacedæmonians, upon condition of security to depart out of Peloponnesus, and that they should no more return; and whosoever should be taken returning, to be the slave of him that should take him. For the Lacedæmonians had before been warned by a certain answer of the Pythian oracle, to let go the suppliant of Jupiter Ithometes. So they came forth, they and their wives and their children. And the Athenians, for hatred they bore² to the Lacedæmonians, received them and put them into Naupactus; which city they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozolæ. The Megareans also revolted from the Lacedæmonians and came to the league of the Athenians, because they were holden down by the Corinthians with a war about the limits of their territories. Whereupon Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians; who built for the Megareans the long walls from the city to Nisæa, and maintained them with a garrison of their own. And from hence it was chiefly, that the vehement hatred grew of the Corinthians against the Athenians.

The Helots in Ithome, after ten years' siege, compound and quit Peloponnesus. A. C. 455. Ol. 81. 1. 2.

The Athenians receive them, and place them in Naupactus.

Megara revolteth from the Lacedæmonians to the Athenians.

A. C. 460. Ol. 80. 1. The Athenians send an army into Egypt, to aid the rebels against the king of Persia.

Cairo.

The Athenians fight by land, against the Corinthians and Epidaurians. A. C. 458. Ol. 80. 2. 3.

After that, against the Peloponnesians.

Then against the Æginetæ.

The Peloponnesians aid Ægina. A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4.

A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4.

The Corinthians receive a great loss in Megaris.

104. Moreover Inarus, the son of Psammetticus, an African¹, king of the Africans that confine on Egypt, making war from Mareia above Pharus, caused the greatest part of Egypt to rebel against the king Artaxerxes; and when he had taken the government of them upon himself, he brought in the Athenians to assist him; who chancing to be then warring on Cyprus with two hundred galleys, part their own and part their confederates, left Cyprus and went to him. And going from the sea up the river of Nilus, after they had made themselves masters of the river and of two parts of the city of Memphis, assaulted the third part, called the White-Wall. Within were of the Medes and Persians, such as had escaped, and of the Egyptians, such as had not revolted amongst the rest. 105. The Athenians came also with a fleet to Halias, and landing their soldiers fought by land with the Corinthians and Epidaurians; and the Corinthians had the victory. After this, the Athenians fought by sea against the fleet of the Peloponnesians at Cecryphaleia, and the Athenians had the victory. After this again, the war being on foot of the Athenians against the Æginetæ, a great battle was fought between them by sea upon the coast of Ægina, the confederates of both sides being at the same, in which the Athenians had the victory; and having taken seventy galleys landed their army and besieged the city, under the conduct of Leocrates the son of Stræbus. After this, the Peloponnesians desiring to aid the Æginetæ, sent over into Ægina itself three hundred men of arms, of the same that had before aided the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and with other forces¹ seized on the top of Geraneia. And the Corinthians and their confederates came down from thence into the territory of Megara; supposing that the Athenians, having much of their army absent in Ægina and in Egypt, would be unable to aid the Megareans, or if they did, would be forced to rise from before Ægina. But the Athenians stirred not from Ægina, but those that remained at Athens, both young and old, under the conduct of Myronides went to Megara; and after they had fought with doubtful victory, they parted asunder again, with an opinion on both sides not to have had the worse in the action. And the Athenians, who notwithstanding had rather the better, when the Corinthians were gone away erected a trophy. But the Corinthians having been reviled at their return by the ancient men of the city, about twelve days after came again prepared and set up their trophy likewise, as if the victory had been theirs. Hereupon the Athenians sallying out of Megara with a huge shout², both slew those that were setting up the trophy, and charging the rest got the victory. 106. The Corinthians being overcome, went their way; but a good part of them, being hard followed and missing their way, lighted into the enclosed ground of a private man, which fenced with a great ditch had no passage through. Which the Athenians perceiving, opposed them¹ at the place by which they entered with their men of arms, and encompassing the ground with their light armed soldiers killed those that were entered with stones. This was a great loss to the Corinthians; but the rest² of their army got home again.

A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4.

The Athenians build their long walls from both sides of the city to the sea.

A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4.

107. About this time the Athenians began the building of their long walls, from the city down to the sea, the one reaching to the haven called Phaleron, the other to Peiræus. The Phocæans also making war upon Bœum, Cytinium, and Erineus, towns that belonged to the Dorians³, of whom the Lacedæmonians are descended, and having taken one of them, the Lacedæmonians, under the conduct of Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus, in the place of Pleistoanactes son of king Pausanias, who was yet in his minority, sent unto the aid of the Dorians fifteen hundred men of arms of their own, and of their confederates ten thousand. And when they had forced the Phocæans upon composition to surrender the town they had taken, they went their ways again. Now if they would go home by sea through the Crisæan Gulf, the Athenians going¹ about with their fleet would be ready to stop them; and to pass over Geraneia they thought unsafe, because the Athenians had in their hands Megara and Pegæ. For Geraneia was not only a difficult passage of itself, but was also always guarded by the Athenians². They thought good therefore to stay amongst the Bœotians, and to consider which way they might most safely go through. Whilst³ they were there, there wanted not some Athenians, that privily solicited them to come to the city, hoping to have put the people out of government, and to have demolished the long walls then building. But the Athenians, with the whole power of their city, and a thousand Argives, and other confederates as they could be gotten together, in all fourteen thousand men, went out to meet them: for⁴ there was suspicion that they came thither to depose the democracy. There also came to the Athenians⁵ certain horsemen out of Thessaly, which in the battle turned to the Lacedæmonians. 108. They fought at Tanagra of Bœotia, and the Lacedæmonians had the victory; but the slaughter was great on both sides. Then the Lacedæmonians entering into the territories of Megara, and cutting down the woods before them, returned home by the way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. Upon the two—and—sixtieth day after this battle, the Athenians, under the conduct of Myronides, made a journey against the Bœotians and overthrew them at Ænophyta, and brought the territories of Bœotia and Phocis under their obedience; and withal razed the walls of Tanagra, and took of the wealthiest of the Locrians of Opus a hundred hostages; and finished also at the same time their long walls at home. After this, Ægina also yielded to the Athenians on these conditions: that they should have their walls pulled down, and should deliver up their galleys, and pay their taxed tribute for the time to come. Also the Athenians made a voyage about Peloponnesus¹ wherein they burnt the arsenal of the Lacedæmonians' navy, took Chalcis² a city of the Corinthians, and landing their forces in Sicyonia overcame in the fight those that made head against them.

The Lacedæmonians fight with the Athenians at Tanagra.

A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 4.

A. C. 456. Ol. 80. 4. The Athenians overthrow the Bœotians at Ænophyta, [that is to say, the vineyards], and subdue Bœotia and Phocis.

Ægina yielded to the Athenians.

The Athenians sail round Peloponnesus, and waste it.

A. C. 456. Ol. 80. 4. The end of the Athenian forces in Egypt.

109. All this while the Athenians stayed still in Egypt³, and saw much variety of war. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt: and the king of Persia sent one Megabazus, a Persian, with money to Lacedæmon, to procure the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and by that means to draw the Athenians out of Egypt. But when this took no effect, and money was spent to no purpose, Megabazus returned with the money he had left into Asia. And¹ then was Megabazus the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, sent into Egypt with great forces, and coming in by land overthrew the Egyptians and their confederates in a battle, drave the Grecians out of Memphis, and finally inclosed them in the isle of Prosopis². There he besieged them a year and a half, till such time as having drained the channel and turned the water another way, he made their galleys lie aground and the island for the most part continent, and so came over and won the island with land soldiers. 110. Thus was the army of the Grecians lost after six years' war; and few of many passing through Africa saved themselves in Cyrene: but the most perished. So Egypt returned to the obedience of the king, except only Amyrtæus, that reigned in the fens. For him they could not bring in, both because the fens are great, and the people of the fens³ of all the Egyptians the most warlike. But Inarus, king of the Africans, and author of all this stir in Egypt, was taken by treason and crucified. The Athenians moreover had sent fifty galleys more into Egypt, for a supply of those that were there already; which putting in at Mendesium, one of the mouths of Nilus, knew nothing of what had happened to the rest: and being assaulted from the land by the army, and from the sea by the Phœnician fleet, lost the greatest part of their galleys, and escaped home again with the lesser part. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their confederates into Egypt.

A supply of Athenians going to Egypt, defeated by the forces of the king.

A. C. 456. Ol. 80. 4.

111. Also Orestes the son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, driven out of Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And the Athenians, taking with them the Bœotians and Phœceans¹, their confederates, made war against Pharsalus², a city of Thessaly; and were masters of the field as far as they strayed not from the army³, (for the Thessalian horsemen kept them from straggling); but could not win the city nor yet perform anything else of what they came for, but came back again without effect, and brought Orestes with them. Not long after this, a thousand Athenians went aboard the galleys that lay at Pegæ, (for Pegæ was in the hands of the Athenians), under the command of Pericles the son of Xantippus, and sailed into Sicyonia⁴, and landing put to flight such of the Sicyonians as made head; and then presently took up forces in Achaia; and putting over made war on Cœnias⁵, a city of Acarnania, which they besieged. Nevertheless they took it not, but returned home.

The Athenians invade Thessaly.

A. C. 454. Ol. 81. 2. 3. The Athenians under Pericles besiege Cœniades.

Truce for five years between the Athenians and Peloponnesians.

The Athenians war on Cyprus.

112. Three years after this⁶, was a truce made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years. And the Athenians gave over the Grecian war; and with two hundred galleys, part their own, and part confederates, under the conduct of Cimon, made war on Cyprus. Of these there went sixty sail into Egypt, sent for by Amyrtæus that reigned in the fens; and the rest lay at the siege of Citium. But Cimon there dying and a famine arising in the army¹, they left Citium; and when they had passed Salamis² in Cyprus, fought at once both by sea and land against the Phœnicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians, and having gotten victory in both returned home, and with them the rest of their fleet, now come back from Egypt. After this, the Lacedæmonians took in hand the war called *the holy war*; and having won the temple at Delphi, delivered the possession thereof to the Delphians³. But the Athenians afterward, when the Lacedæmonians were gone, came with their army, and regaining it, delivered the possession to the Phœceans. 113. Some space of time after this, the outlaws of Bœotia being seized of Orchomenus and Chæroneia and certain other places of Bœotia, the Athenians made war upon those places, being their enemies, with a thousand men of arms of their own and as many of their confederates as severally came in, under the conduct of Tolmidas the son of Tolmæus. And when they had taken Chæroneia, they carried away the inhabitants⁴ captives, and leaving a garrison in the city departed. In their return, those outlaws that were in Orchomenus, together with the Locrians of Opus, and the Eubœan outlaws, and others of the same faction, set upon them at Coroneia¹, and overcoming the Athenians in battle some they slew and some they took alive. Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Bœotia, and made peace with condition to have their prisoners released. So the outlaws and the rest² returned, and lived again under their own laws. 114. Not long after revolted Eubœa from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already passed over into it with the Athenian army, there was brought him news that Megara was likewise revolted, and that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica; and that the Megareans had slain the Athenian garrison, except only such as fled into Nisæa. Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had gotten to their aid the Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sicyonians. Wherefore Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Eubœa; and the Lacedæmonians afterward brake into Attica, and wasted the country about Eleusine and³ Thriasium, under the conduct of Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, and came no farther on, but so went away. After which the Athenians passed again into Eubœa¹, and totally subdued it: the Hestîæans they put quite out, taking their territory into their own hands; but ordered the rest of Eubœa according to composition made. 115. Being returned from Eubœa, within a while after they made a peace with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates for thirty years; and rendered Nisæa, Achaia², Pegæ, and Trœzene, (for these places the Athenians held of theirs),

Cimon dieth. A. C. 449. Ol. 82. 3. 4.

The Holy War. A. C. 448. Ol. 82. 4./83. 1.

The Athenians recover Chæroneia, taken by the Bœotian outlaws

A. C. 448. Ol. 82. 4./83. 1. The Athenians defeated at Coroneia by the outlaws, lose Bœotia

Eubœa revolteth from the Athenians. A. C. 446. Ol. 83. 2. 3. Megara revolteth Ol. 83. 3.

A. C. 445 Ol. 83. 3. Eubœa subdued by the Athenians

Peace for thirty years between the Athenians and Peloponnesians.

A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.

The Athenians war upon Samos.

A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.

A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.

Samos yielded to the Athenians.

A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.

to the Peloponnesians. In the sixth year of this peace fell out the war between the Samians and Milesians, concerning Priene; and the Milesians being put to the worse, came to Athens and exclaimed against the Samians. Wherein also certain private men of Samos itself took part with the Milesians, out of desire to alter the form of government. Whereupon the Athenians went to Samos with a fleet of forty galleys, and set up the democracy there, and took of the Samians fifty boys and as many men for hostages; which when they had put into Lemnos, and set a guard upon them¹, they came home. But certain of the Samians (for some of them not enduring the popular government were fled into the continent) entering into a league with the mightiest of them in Samos, and with Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, who then was governor of Sardis, and levying about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, passed over into Samos in the evening, and first set upon the popular faction, and brought most of them into their power; and then stealing their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted, and delivered the Athenian guard and such captains as were there² into the hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make war against Miletus. With these also revolted the Byzantines. 116. The Athenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos sixty galleys, sixteen whereof they did not use; (for some of them went into Caria to observe the fleet of the Phœnicians, and some to fetch in succours from Chios and Lesbos); but with the forty–four that remained, under the command of Pericles and nine others, fought³ with seventy galleys of the Samians, (whereof twenty were such as served for the transport of soldiers), as they were coming altogether from Miletus; and the Athenians had the victory. After this came a supply of forty galleys more from Athens, and from Chios and Lesbos twenty–five. With these having landed their men, they overthrew the Samians in battle, and besieged the city; which they inclosed with a triple wall⁴, and shut it up by sea with their galleys. But Pericles taking with him sixty galleys out of the road, made haste towards Caunus and Caria, upon intelligence of the coming against them of the Phœnician fleet. For Stesagoras with five galleys was already gone out of Samos, and others out of other places, to meet the Phœnicians. 117. In the mean time, the Samians coming suddenly forth with their fleet and falling upon the harbour¹ of the Athenians, which was unfortified, sunk the galleys that kept watch before it, and overcame the rest² in fight; insomuch that they became masters of the sea near their coast for about fourteen days together, importing and exporting what they pleased. But Pericles returning shut them up again with his galleys. And after this, there came to him from Athens a supply of forty sail, with Thucydides³, Agnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles; and from Chios and Lesbos thirty more. And though the Samians fought against these a small battle at sea, yet unable to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege they rendered the city upon composition: namely, to demolish their walls, to give hostages, to deliver up their navy, and to repay the money spent by the Athenians in the war at days appointed. And the Byzantines also yielded, with condition to remain subject to them in the same manner as they had been before their revolt.

The business about Corcyra and Potidæa, before related.

118. Now not many years after this happened the matters before related, of the Corcyræans and the Potidæans, and whatsoever other intervenient¹ pretext of this war. These things done by the Grecians one against another or against the barbarians, came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at most, from the time of the departure of Xerxes to the beginning of this present war. In which time, the Athenians both assured their government over the confederates, and also much enlarged their own particular wealth. This the Lacedæmonians saw, and opposed not, save now and then a little; but, as men that had ever before been slow to war without necessity, and also for that they were hindered sometimes with domestic war, for the most part of the time stirred not against them: till now at last, when the power of the Athenians was advanced manifestly indeed, and that they had done injury to their confederates, they could forbear no longer; but thought it necessary to go in hand with the war with all diligence, and to pull down, if they could, the Athenian greatness. For which purpose it was² by the Lacedæmonians themselves decreed, that the peace was broken and that the Athenians had done unjustly: and also having sent to Delphi, and enquired of Apollo, whether they should have the better in the war or not; they received, as it is reported, this answer: “That if they warred with their whole power, they should have victory, and that himself would be on their side, both called and uncalled”. 119. Now when they had assembled their confederates again, they were to put it to the question amongst them, “whether they should make war or not”. And the ambassadors of the several confederates coming in, and the council set, as well the rest spake what they thought fit, most of them accusing the Athenians of injury, and desiring the war; as also the Corinthians, who had before entreated the cities every one severally to give their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidæa should be lost before help came, being then present spake last of all to this effect.

Between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, fifty years.

The oracle consulted by the Lacedæmonians, encourageth them to the war.

A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4.

Consultation of the Peloponnesians in general, whether they should enter into a war or not. A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4. / 87. 1.

120. “Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedæmonians, they having both decreed the war themselves¹, and also assembled us to do the same. For it is fit for them who have the command in a common league, as they are honoured of all before the rest, so also (administering their private affairs equally with others) to consider before the rest of the common business. And though as many of us as have already had our turns with the Athenians, need not be taught to beware of them: yet it were good for those that dwell up in the land, and not as we, in places of traffic on the sea side, to know, that unless they defend those below, they shall with a great deal the more difficulty both carry to the sea the commodities of the seasons, and again more hardly receive the benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; and also not to mistake¹ what is now spoken, as if it concerned them not; but to make account, that if they neglect those that dwell by the sea, the calamity will also reach to themselves; and that this consultation concerneth them no less than us; and therefore not to be afraid to change their peace for war. For

oration of the ambassadors of corinth.

A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./ 87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.

A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./ 87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.

A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./ 87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.

A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./ 87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.

though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet, unless they have wrong; yet it is the part of valiant men, when they receive injury, to pass from peace into war, and after success, from war to come again to composition: and neither to swell with the good success of war, nor to suffer injury through pleasure taken in the ease of peace. For he whom pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, shall quickly lose the sweetness of the ease that made him so. And he that in war is made proud by success, observeth not that his pride is grounded upon unfaithful confidence. For though many things ill advised, come to good effect against enemies worse advised; yet more, thought well advised, have fallen but badly out against well advised enemies². For no man comes to execute a thing with the same confidence he premeditates it. For we deliver opinions in safety, whereas in the action itself we fail through fear. 121. As for the war, at this time we raise it, both upon injuries done us and upon other sufficient allegations; and when we have repaired our wrongs upon the Athenians, we will also in due time lay it down. And it is for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory: first, because we exceed them in number¹; and next, because when we go to any action intimated, we shall be all of one fashion². And as for a navy, wherein consisteth the strength of the Athenians, we shall provide it, both out of every one's particular wealth, and with the money at Delphi and Olympia. For taking this at interest, we shall be able to draw from them their foreign mariners by offer of greater wages. For the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than domestic: whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting more in the persons of men than in money. And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in all probability they are totally vanquished. And if they hold out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves to naval affairs. And when we shall once have made our skill equal to theirs, we shall surely overmatch them in courage. For the valour that we have by nature, they shall never come unto by teaching; but the experience which they exceed us in, that must we attain unto by industry. And the money wherewith to bring this to pass, it must be all our parts to contribute. For else it were a hard case, that the confederates of the Athenians should not stick to contribute to their own servitude; and we should refuse to lay out our money to be revenged of our enemies and for our own preservation, and that the Athenians take not our money from us and even with that do us mischief. 122. We have also many other ways of war; as the revolt of their confederates, which is the principal means of lessening their revenue¹; the building of forts in their territory²; and many other things which one cannot now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing less than by the points of our account, but of itself contriveth most things upon the occasion. Wherein he that complies with it with most temper, standeth the firmest; and he that is most passionate, oftenest miscarries. Imagine we had differences each of us about the limits of our territory with an equal adversary; we must undergo them. But now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly, and every nation and city set to it unanimously, they will overcome us asunder without labour. And know, that to be vanquished (though it trouble you to hear it) brings with it no less than manifest³ servitude: which but to mention as a doubt, as if so many cities could suffer under one, were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus. For it must then be thought that we are either punished upon merit, or else that we endure it out of fear, and so appear degenerate from our ancestors. For by them the liberty of all Greece hath been restored: whereas we for our part assure not so much as our own; but claiming the reputation of having deposed tyrants in the

several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established amongst us. Wherein we know not how we can avoid¹ one of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. For certainly you avoid them not by imputing it to that which hath done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: for contempt, because it hath made too many men miscarry, hath gotten the name of foolishness.

123 “But to what end should we object matters past, more than is necessary to the business in hand? We must now by helping the present, labour for the future² : for it is peculiar to our country to attain honour by labour. And though you be now somewhat advanced in honour and power, you must not therefore change the custom: for there is no reason that what was gotten in want, should be lost by wealth. But we should confidently go in hand with the war, as for many other causes so also for this, that both the God hath by his oracle advised us thereto and promised to be with us himself: and also for that the rest of Greece, some for fear and some for profit¹ , are ready to take our parts. Nor are you they that first break the peace, which the God, inasmuch as he doth encourage us to the war, judgeth violated by them² ; but you fight rather in defence of the same. For not he breaketh the peace that taketh revenge, but he that is the first invader.

A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./
87. 1. Oration of the
Corinthians.

124. “So that seeing it will be every way good to make the war, and since in common we persuade the same; and seeing also that both to the cities and to private men it will be the most profitable course, put off no longer neither the defence of the Potidæans; who are Dorians, and besieged (which was wont to be contrary) by Ionians; nor the recovery of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. For it is a case that admitteth not delay, when they are some of them already oppressed, and others (after it shall be known we met and durst not right ourselves) shall shortly after undergo the like. But think, confederates, you are now at a necessity, and that this is the best advice: and therefore give your votes for the war, not fearing the present danger, but coveting the long peace proceeding from it. For though by war groweth the confirmation of peace; yet for love of ease to refuse the war, doth not likewise avoid the danger. But making account that a tyrant city set up in Greece, is set up alike over all, and reigneth over some already, and the rest in intention, we shall bring it again into order by the war¹ ; and not only live for the time to come out of danger ourselves, but also deliver the already enthralled Grecians out of servitude.” Thus said the Corinthians.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1./
86. 4. Oration of the
Corinthians.

125. The Lacedæmonians, when they had heard the opinion of them all, brought the balls to all the confederates present in order, from the greatest state to the least: and the greatest part gave their votes for the war. Now after the war was decreed, though it were impossible for them to go in hand with it presently, because they were unprovided, and every state thought good without delay severally to furnish themselves of what was necessary; yet there passed not fully a year in this preparation before Attica was invaded, and the war openly on foot.

The war decreed by
all the confederates.

The Lacedæmonians
send embassages to

126. In the mean time they sent ambassadors to the Athenians with certain criminations, to the end that if they would give ear to nothing, they might have all the pretext that could be for raising of the war. And first the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors to the Athenians, required them to banish such as were under curse of the goddess Minerva for pollution of sanctuary². Which pollution was thus. There had been one Cylon an Athenian, a man that had been victor in the Olympian exercises, of much nobility and power amongst those of old time, and that had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, in those days tyrant of Megara. To this Cylon, asking counsel at Delphi, the God answered, that on the greatest festival day¹ he should seize the citadel of Athens. He therefore having gotten forces of Theagenes, and persuaded his friends to the enterprise, seized on the citadel at the time of the Olympic holidays in Peloponnesus, with intention to take upon him the tyranny: esteeming the feast of Jupiter² to be the greatest, and to touch withal on his particular, in that he had been victor in the Olympian exercises. But whether the feast spoken of were meant to be the greatest in Attica, or in some other place, neither did he himself consider, nor the oracle make manifest³. For there is also amongst the Athenians the Diasia, which is called the greatest feast of Jupiter Meilichius, and is celebrated without the city; wherein in the confluence of the whole people many men offered sacrifices, not of living creatures, but such as was the fashion of the natives of the place⁴. But he, supposing he had rightly understood the oracle, laid hand to the enterprise. And when the Athenians heard of it, they came with all their forces out of the fields, and lying before the citadel besieged it. But the time growing long, the Athenians, wearied with the siege, went most of them away; and left both the guard of the citadel and the whole business to the nine archontes, with absolute authority to order the same as to them it should seem good. For at that time, most of the affairs of the commonweal were administered by those nine archontes¹. Now those that were besieged with Cylon, were for want of both victual and water in very evil estate; and therefore Cylon and a brother of his fled privily out; but the rest, when they were pressed and some of them dead with famine, sat down as suppliants by the altar that is in the citadel. And the Athenians, to whose charge was committed the guard of the place, raising them upon promise to do them no harm, put them all to the sword. Also they had put to death some of those that had taken sanctuary at the altars of the severe Goddesses, as they were going away¹. And from this the Athenians, both themselves and their posterity, were called accursed and sacrilegious persons. Hereupon the Athenians banished those that were under the curse: and Cleomenes, a Lacedæmonian, together with the Athenians in a sedition², banished them afterwards again: and not only so, but disinterred and cast forth the bodies of such of them as were dead. Nevertheless there returned of them afterwards again; and there are of their race in the city unto this day.

the Athenians about expiation of sacrileges, only to pick better quarrels for the war.

A. C. 612. Ol. 42. 1.

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127. This pollution therefore the Lacedæmonians required them to purge their city of: principally forsooth, as taking part with the gods; but knowing withal, that Pericles the son of Xantippus, was by the mother's side³ one of that race. For they thought if Pericles were banished, the Athenians would the more easily be

A. C. 612. Ol. 42. 1.

Pericles always adverse to the Lacedæmonians.

brought to yield to their desire. Nevertheless, they hoped not so much that he should be banished, as to bring him into the envy of the city; as if the misfortune of him were in part the cause of the war. For being the most powerful of his time, and having the sway of the state, he was in all things opposite to the Lacedæmonians; not suffering the Athenians to give them the least way, but inciting them to the war.

128. Contrariwise, the Athenians required the Lacedæmonians to banish such as were guilty of breach of sanctuary at Tænarus. For the Lacedæmonians, when they had caused their Helots, suppliants in the temple of Neptune at Tænarus, to forsake sanctuary, slew them: for which cause they themselves think it was, that the great earthquake happened afterwards at Sparta. Also they required them to purge their city of the pollution of sanctuary in the temple of Pallas Chalciœca; which was thus. After that Pausanias the Lacedæmonian was [1](#) recalled by the Spartans from his charge in Hellespont, and having been called in question by them was absolved, though he was no more sent abroad by the state, yet he went again into Hellespont in a galley of Hermione as a private man, without leave of the Lacedæmonians; to the Grecian war, as he gave out, but in truth to negociate with the king, as he had before begun, aspiring to the principality of Greece. Now the benefit that he had laid up with the king, and the beginning of the whole business, was at first from this. When after his return from Cyprus he had taken Byzantium; when he was there the first time, (which being holden by the Medes, there were taken in it some near to the king, and of his kindred), unknown to the rest of the confederates he sent unto the king those near ones of his which he had taken, and gave out they were run away. This he practised with one Gongylus, an Eretrian, to whose charge he had committed both the town of Byzantium and the prisoners. Also he sent letters unto him, which Gongylus carried, wherein, as was afterwards known, was thus written: “Pausanias, General of the Spartans, being desirous to do thee a courtesy, sendeth back unto thee these men, whom he hath by arms taken prisoners. And I have a purpose, if the same seem also good unto thee, to take thy daughter in marriage, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Greece into thy subjection. These things I account myself able to bring to pass, if I may communicate my counsels with thee. If therefore any of these things do like thee, send some trusty man to the sea-side, by whose mediation we may confer together.”

The Athenians require the Lacedæmonians to expiate the violation of sanctuary also on their parts.

A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3.

The occasion and manner of the death of Pausanias in the temple of Pallas Chalciœca.

A. C. 470. Ol. 77. 3.

Pausanias practiseth with the king of Persia against the state of Greece. A. C. 478.7. Ol. 75. 3.

The Letter of Pausanias to the king.

129. These were the contents of the writing. Xerxes being pleased with the letter, sends away Artabazus the son of Pharnaces to the sea-side, with commandment to take the government of the province of Dascylis [1](#), and to dismiss Megabates, that was governor there before: and withal, gives him a letter to Pausanias, which he commanded him to send over to him with speed to Byzantium, and to show him the seal, and well and faithfully to perform whatsoever in his affairs he should by Pausanias be appointed to do. Artabazus, after he arrived, having in other things done as he was commanded, sent over the letter; wherein was

A. C. 478.7. Ol. 75. 3.

The Letter of Xerxes to Pausanias.

written this answer: “Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias: For the men which thou hast saved and sent over the sea unto me from Byzantium, thy benefit is laid up in our house indelibly registered² for ever: and I like also of what thou hast propounded. And let neither night nor day make thee remiss in the performance of what thou hast promised unto me. Neither be thou hindered by the expense of gold and silver, or multitude of soldiers requisite, whithersoever it be needful to have them come³. But with Artabazus, a good man whom I have sent unto thee, do boldly both mine and thine own business, as shall be most fit for the dignity and honour of us both.”

130. Pausanias having received these letters, whereas he was before in great authority⁴ for his conduct at Platæa, became now many degrees more elevated; and endured no more to live after the accustomed manner of his country, but went apparelled at Byzantium¹ after the fashion of Persia; and when he went through Thrace, had a guard of Medes and Egyptians, and his table likewise after the Persian manner. Nor was he able to conceal his purpose; but in trifles made beforehand the greater matters he had conceived of the future. He became moreover difficult of access; and would be in such choleric² passions toward all men indifferently, that no man might endure to approach him; which was also none of the least causes why the confederates turned from him to the Athenians.

Pausanias groweth proud upon the receipt of these letters.

A. C. 478.7. Ol. 75. 3.

131 When the Lacedæmonians heard of it, they called him home the first time. And when being gone out the second time without their command in a galley of Hermione, it appeared that he continued still in the same practices; and after he was forced out of Byzantium by siege of the Athenians, returned not to Sparta, but news came that he had seated himself at Colonæ in the country of Troy, practising still with the barbarians, and making his abode there for no good purpose: then the ephori forebore no longer, but sent unto him a public officer with the scytale³, commanding him not to depart from the officer; and in case he refused, denounced war against him. But he, desiring as much as he could to decline suspicion, and believing that with money he should be able to discharge himself of his accusations, returned unto Sparta the second time. And first he was by the ephori committed to ward; (for the ephori¹ have power to do this to their king); but afterwards procuring his enlargement, he came forth, and exhibited himself to justice against such as had any thing to allege against him. 132. And though the Spartans had against him no manifest proof, neither his enemies nor the whole city, whereupon to proceed to the punishment of a man both of the race of their kings, and at that present in great authority: (for Plistarchus the son of Leonidas, being king and as yet in minority, Pausanias, who was his cousin-german, had the tuition of him yet): by his licentious behaviour, and affectation of the barbarian customs, he gave much cause of suspicion that he meant not to live in the equality of the present state². They considered also that he differed in manner of life from the discipline established: amongst other things by this, that upon the tripode at Delphi, which the Grecians had dedicated as the best of the spoil of the Medes, he had caused to be inscribed of himself in particular this elegiac verse¹:

A. C. 470. Ol. 77. 3.

A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.

Pausanias his ambition, in dedication of the Tripode at Delphi.

A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.

Pausanias, Greek General,
 Having the Medes defeated,
 To Phœbus in record thereof
 This gift hath consecrated.

But the Lacedæmonians then presently defaced that inscription of the tripode, and engraved thereon by name all the cities that had joined in the overthrow of the Medes, and dedicated it so². This therefore was numbered amongst the offences of Pausanias, and was thought to agree with his present design, so much the rather for the condition he was now in³. They had information farther, that he had in hand some practice with the Helots. And so he had: for he promised them, not only manumission, but also freedom of the city, if they would rise with him and co-operate in the whole business. But neither thus, upon some appeachment of the Helots, would they proceed against him, but kept the custom which they have in their own cases, not hastily to give a peremptory sentence against a Spartan without unquestionable proof. Till at length (as it is reported) purposing to send over to Artabazus his last letters to the king, he was betrayed unto them by a man of Argilus, in time past his minion⁴ and most faithful to him: who being terrified with the cogitation, that not any of those which had been formerly sent had ever returned, got him a seal like to the seal of Pausanias, (to the end that if his jealousy were false, or that he should need to alter anything in the letter, it might not be discovered), and opened the letter; wherein (as he had suspected the addition of some such clause) he found himself also written down to be murdered. 133. The ephori, when these letters were by him shown unto them, though they believed the matter much more than they did before, yet desirous to hear somewhat themselves from Pausanias his own mouth; the man being upon design¹ gone to Tænarus into sanctuary, and having there built him a little room with a partition in which he hid the ephori, and Pausanias coming to him and asking the cause of his taking sanctuary, they plainly heard the whole matter. For the man both expostulated with him for what he had written about him, and from point to point discovered all the practice: saying², that though he had never boasted unto him these and these services concerning the king, he must yet have the honour as well as many other of his servants to be slain. And Pausanias himself both confessed the same things, and also bade the man not to be troubled at what was past, and gave him assurance to leave sanctuary, intreating him to go on in his journey with all speed, and not to frustrate the business in hand.

Pausanias accused of practice with the Helots.

He sends letters to the king, which are opened by the way.

Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.

Pausanias by the art of the ephori made to betray himself.

134. Now the ephori, when they had distinctly heard him, for that time went their way; and knowing now the certain truth, intended to apprehend him in the city. It is said, that when he was to be apprehended in the street, he perceived by the countenance of one of the ephori coming towards him, what they came for: and when another of them had by a secret beck signified the matter for good will, he ran into the close of the temple¹ of Pallas Chalciœca, and got in before they overtook him; (now the temple itself was hard by); and entering into a house belonging to the temple, to avoid the

Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.

He flieth into sanctuary.

Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.

injury of the open air, there staid. They that pursued him, could not then overtake him: but afterwards they took off the roof and the doors of the house, and watching a time when he was within, beset the house and mured him up, and leaving a guard there famished him. When they perceived him about to give up the ghost, they carried him, as he was [1](#), out of the house, yet breathing; and being out he died immediately. After he was dead, they were about to throw him into the Cæada [2](#), where they use to cast in malefactors: yet afterwards they thought good to bury him in some place thereabouts. But the oracle of Delphi commanded the Lacedæmonians afterward, both to remove the sepulchre from the place where he died [3](#); (so that he lies now in the entry [4](#) of the temple, as is evident by the inscription of the pillar); and also (as having been a pollution of the sanctuary) to render two bodies to the goddess of Chalciœca for that one. Whereupon they set up two brazen statues, and dedicated the same unto her for Pausanias. 135. Now the Athenians, the god himself having judged this a pollution of sanctuary, required the Lacedæmonians to banish out of their city such as were touched with the same.

At the same time that Pausanias came to his end, the Lacedæmonians by their ambassadors to the Athenians accused Themistocles, for that he also had Medised together with Pausanias, having discovered it by proofs against [1](#) Pausanias; and desired that the same punishment might be likewise inflicted upon him. Whereunto consenting, (for he was at this time in banishment by ostracism [2](#), and though his ordinary residence was at Argos, he travelled to and fro in other places of Peloponnesus), they sent certain men in company of the Lacedæmonians, who were willing to pursue him, with command to bring him in wheresoever they could find him. 136. But Themistocles, having had notice of it beforehand, flieth out of Peloponnesus into Corcyra; to the people of which city he had formerly been beneficial. But the Corcyræans, alleging that they durst not keep him there, for fear of displeasing both the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, convey him into the opposite continent: and being pursued by the men thereto appointed, asking continually which way he went, he was compelled at a strait to turn in unto Admetus, king of the Molossians, his enemy. The king himself being then from home, he became a suppliant to his wife; and by her was instructed to take their son with him, and sit down at the altar of the house. When Admetus not long after returned, he made himself known to him, and desired him, that though he had opposed him in some suit in Athens, not to revenge it on him now in the time of his flight: saying, that being now the weaker, he must needs suffer under the stronger; whereas noble revenge is of equals upon equal terms: and that he had been his adversary but in matter of profit, not of life; whereas, if he delivered him up, (telling him withal, for what and by whom he was followed), he deprived him of all means of saving his life. Admetus having heard him bade him arise, together with his son whom he held as he sat: which is the most submiss supplication that is [1](#).

Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. Themistocles in the same treason

Themistocles, pursued by the Athenians and Peloponnesians, flieth to Corcyra.

Thence is put over to the main land, and goeth to the king of the Molossians.

Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 3.

Thence he is conveyed to Pydna.

137. Not long after came the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians: and though they alleged much to have him, yet he delivered him not, but sent him away by land to Pydna upon the other sea, (a city belonging to Alexander), because his purpose was to go to the king: where finding a ship bound for Ionia, he embarked, and was carried by foul weather upon the fleet² of the Athenians that besieged Naxos. Being afraid, he discovered to the master (for he was unknown) who he was, and for what he fled; and said, that unless he would save him, he meant to say that he had hired him to carry him away for money; and that to save him, there needed no more but this, to let none go out of the ship till the weather served to be gone; to which if he consented, he would not forget to requite him according to his merit. The master did so; and having lain a day and a night at sea upon the fleet³ of the Athenians, he arrived afterwards at Ephesus. And Themistocles having liberally rewarded him with money, (for he received there both what was sent him from his friends at Athens, and also what he had put out at Argos), he took his journey upwards in company of a certain Persian of the low countries, and sent letters to the king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, newly come to the kingdom, wherein was written to this purpose: “I, Themistocles, am coming unto thee, who, of all the Grecians, as long as I was forced to resist thy father that invaded me, have done your house the maniest damages; yet the benefits I did him were more, after once I with safety, he with danger was to make retreat. And both a good turn is already due unto me”, (writing here, how he had forewarned him of the Grecians’ departure¹ out of Salamis, and ascribing the then not breaking of the bridge falsely unto himself), “and² at this time to do thee many other good services, I present myself, persecuted by the Grecians for thy friendship’s sake. But I desire to have a year’s respite, that I may declare unto thee the cause of my coming myself.”

A. C. 466. Ol. 77. 3.

In danger to be cast upon the Athenian fleet at Naxos, he maketh himself known to the master of the ship.

A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3. He arriveth at Ephesus.

His Letter to Artaxerxes.

138. The king, as is reported, wondered what his purpose might be, and commanded him to do as he had said. In this time of respite he learned as much as he could of the language and fashions of the place. And a year after coming to the court, he was great with the king more than ever had been any Grecian before; both for his former dignity, and the hope of Greece, which he promised to bring into his subjection; but especially for the trial he gave of his wisdom. For Themistocles was a man in whom most truly was manifested the strength of natural judgment, wherein he had something worthy admiration different from other men. For by his natural prudence, without the help of instruction before or after, he was both of extemporary matters¹ upon short deliberation the best discerner, and also of what for the most part would be their issue the best conjecturer. What he was perfect in, he was able also to explicate: and what he was unpractised in, he was not to seek how to judge of conveniently. Also he foresaw, no man better, what was best or worst in any case that was doubtful. And (to say all in few words) this man, by the natural goodness of his wit, and quickness of deliberation, was the ablest of all men to tell what was fit to be done upon a sudden. But falling sick he ended his life: some say, he died voluntarily by poison, because he thought himself unable to perform what he had promised to the king. His monument

Post A. C. 466.

The praise of Themistocles.

His death. Post A. C. 464.

is in Magnesia² in Asia, in the market-place: for he had the government of that country, the king having bestowed upon him Magnesia, which yielded him fifty talents by the year, for his bread; and Lampsacus for his wine, (for this city was in those days thought to have store of wine³); and the city of Myus for his meat¹. His bones are said by his kindred, to have been brought home by his own appointment, and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians: for it was not lawful to bury one there, that had fled for treason. These were the ends of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian; the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time.

139. And this is that which the Lacedæmonians did command, and were commanded, in their first embassy, touching the banishment of such as were under the curse.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.

After this they sent ambassadors again to Athens, commanding them to levy the siege from before Potidæa and to suffer Ægina to be free; but principally and most plainly telling them, that the war should not be made in case they would abrogate the act concerning the Megareans: by which act they were forbidden both the fairs of Attica, and all ports within the Athenian dominion. But the Athenians would not obey them, neither in the rest of their commands nor in the abrogation of that act: but recriminated the Megareans for having tilled holy ground and unset out with bounds²; and for receiving of their slaves¹ that revolted. But at length, when the last ambassadors from Lacedæmon were arrived, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and spake nothing of that which formerly they were wont, but only this, that “the Lacedæmonians desire that there should be peace, which may be had if you will suffer the Grecians to be governed by their own laws”: the Athenians called an assembly, and propounding their opinions amongst themselves, thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give them an answer once for all. And many stood forth and delivered their minds on either side, some for the war, and some that this act concerning the Megareans ought not to stand in their way to peace, but to be abrogated. And Pericles the son of Xantippus, the principal man at that time of all Athens, and most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his advice in such manner as followeth.

The Lacedæmonians by ambassadors command the abrogation of the act against the Megareans.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
The last ambassadors from Lacedæmon require the Athenians to lay down their dominion.

The Athenians consult what to answer.

Oration of Pericles.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of Pericles.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of Pericles.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of Pericles.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of Pericles.

140. “Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion, not to give way to the Peloponnesians; (notwithstanding I know that men have not the same passions in the war itself, which they have when they are incited to it, but change their opinions with the events); but also I see, that I must now advise the same things, or very near to what I have before delivered. And I require of you with whom my counsel shall take place, that if we miscarry in aught, you will either make the best of it, as decreed by common consent; or if we prosper, not to attribute it to your own wisdom only. For it falleth out with the events of actions, no less than with the purposes of man, to proceed with uncertainty: which is also the cause, that when any thing happeneth contrary to our expectation, we use to lay the fault on fortune. That the Lacedæmonians, both formerly and especially now, take counsel how to do us mischief, is a thing manifest. For whereas it is said [in the articles], that in our mutual controversies we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in the meantime either side hold what they possess; they never yet sought any such trial themselves, nor will accept of the same offered by us. They will clear themselves of their accusations by war, rather than by words: and come hither no more now to expostulate, but to command. For they command us to arise from before Potidæa, and to restore the Æginetæ to the liberty of their own laws, and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans. And they that come last¹, command us to restore all the Grecians to their liberty. Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle, by not abrogating the act concerning Megara; (yet this by them is pretended most, and that for the abrogation of it war shall stay); nor retain² a scruple in your minds, as if a small matter moved you to the war. For even this small matter containeth the trial and constancy of your resolution. Wherein if you give them way, you shall hereafter be commanded a greater matter, as men that for fear will obey them likewise in that. But by a stiff denial, you shall teach them plainly to come to you hereafter on terms of more equality. 141. Resolve therefore from this¹ occasion, either to yield them obedience before you receive damage; or if we must have war, (which for my part I think is best), be the pretence weighty or light, not to give way, nor keep what we possess in fear. For a great and a little claim, imposed by equals upon their neighbours before judgment by way of command, hath one and the same virtue, to make subject. As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not like to have the worse, by hearing the particulars you shall now understand. The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour², without money either in particular or in common stock. Besides, in long wars and by sea they are without experience; for that the wars which they have had one against another, have been but short through poverty. And such men can neither man their fleets, nor yet send out their armies by land very often; because they must be far from their own wealth, and yet by that be maintained³, and be besides barred the use of the sea. It must be a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support the wars; and such as live by their labour, are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they make account that their bodies will outlive the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent¹; especially if the war (as it is likely) should last. So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the occasion; and having equality of vote and being of several races², every one will press his particular

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interest; whereby nothing is like to be fully executed. For some will desire to take revenge on some enemy, and others to have their estates least wasted. And being long before they can assemble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the common business, and the greater to dispatch their own private affairs. And every one supposeth, that his own neglect of the common estate can do little hurt, and that it will be the care of somebody else to look to that for his own good³: not observing how by these thoughts of every one in several, the common business is jointly ruined. 142. But their greatest hindrance of all, will be their want of money; which being raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay; which the occasions of war will not endure. As for their fortifying here and their navy, they are matters not worthy fear. For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own in time of peace to fortify in that manner; much less in the country of an enemy, and we no less fortified against them¹. And if they had a garrison here, though they might, by excursions and by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory: yet would not that be enough both to besiege us, and also to hinder us from sallying into their territories and from taking revenge with our fleet; which is the thing wherein our strength lieth. For we have more experience in land-service by use of the sea, than they have in sea-service by use of the land. Nor shall they attain the knowledge of naval affairs easily. For yourselves, though falling to it immediately upon the Persian war, yet have not attained it fully. How then should husbandmen, not seamen, whom also we will not suffer to apply themselves to it by lying continually upon them with so great fleets, perform any matter of value? Indeed, if they should be opposed but with a few ships, they might adventure, encouraging their want of knowledge with store of men: but awed by many, they will not stir that way; and not applying themselves to it, will be yet more unskilful, and thereby more cowardly. For knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other, and not to be attended at idle times and on the by; but requiring rather, that whilst it is a-learning, nothing else should be done on the by. 143. But say they should take the money at Olympia and Delphi, and therewith, at greater wages, go about to draw from us the strangers employed in our fleet; this indeed, if going aboard both ourselves and those that dwell amongst us¹, we could not match them, were a dangerous matter. But now we can both do this, and (which is the principal thing) we have steersmen and other necessary men for the service of a ship, both more and better of our own citizens, than are in all the rest of Greece. Besides that, not any of these strangers upon trial² would be found content to fly his own country, and withal upon less hope of victory, for a few days' increase of wages, take part with the other side.

“In this manner, or like to this, seemeth unto me to stand the case of the Peloponnesians: whereas ours is both free from what in theirs I have reprehended, and hath many great advantages besides. If they invade our territory by land, we shall invade theirs by sea. And when we have wasted part of Peloponnesus, and they all Attica; yet shall theirs be the greater loss. For they, unless by the sword, can get no other territory instead of that we shall destroy: whereas for us, there is other land both in the islands and continent. For the dominion of the sea is a great matter. Consider but this. If we dwelt in the islands, whether of us then were more inexpugnable? We must therefore now, drawing as near as can be to that imagination, lay aside the care of fields and villages¹; and not for the loss of them, out of passion, give battle to the Peloponnesians, far

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more in number than ourselves. For though we give them an overthrow, we must fight again with as many more: and if we be overthrown, we shall lose the help of our confederates, which are our strength; for when we cannot war upon them, they will revolt. Nor bewail ye the loss of fields or houses, but of men's bodies: for men may acquire these, but these cannot acquire men. And if I thought I should prevail, I would advise you to go out and destroy them yourselves; and show the Peloponnesians, that you will never the sooner obey them for such things as these.

144. “ There be many other things that give hope of victory, in case you do not², whilst you are in this war, strive to enlarge your dominion, and undergo other voluntary dangers; (for I am afraid of our own errors, more than of their designs); but they shall be spoken of at another time, in prosecution of the war itself. For the present, let us send away these men with this

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of Pericles.

A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
Oration of Pericles.

answer: ‘that the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and ports, if the Lacedæmonians will also make no banishment of us nor of our confederates as of strangers’: for neither our act concerning Megara, nor their banishment of strangers, is forbidden in the articles¹: ‘also, that we will let the Grecian cities be free, if they were so when the peace was made; and if the Lacedæmonians will also give leave unto their confederates to use their freedom, not as shall serve the turn of the Lacedæmonians, but as they themselves shall every one think good: also that we will stand to judgment according to the articles, and will not begin the war, but be revenged on those that shall’. For this is both just, and for the dignity of the city to answer. Nevertheless you must know, that of necessity war there will be; and the more willingly we embrace it, the less pressing we shall have our enemies; and that out of the greatest dangers, whether to cities or private men, arise the greatest honours. For our fathers, when they undertook the Medes, did from less beginnings, nay abandoning the little they had, by wisdom rather than fortune, by courage rather than strength, both repel the barbarian and advance this state to the height it now is at. Of whom we ought not now to come short, but rather to revenge us by all means upon our enemies; and do our best to deliver the state unimpaired by us to posterity.”

145. Thus spake Pericles. The Athenians liking best of his advice, decreed as he would have them; answering the Lacedæmonians according to his direction, both in particulars as he had spoken, and generally, “that they would do nothing on command, but were ready¹ to answer their accusations upon equal terms by way of arbitrement”. So the ambassadors went home; and after these there came no more.

The answer of the Athenians to the ambassadors of Lacedæmon.

146. These were the quarrels and differences on either side, before the war: which quarrels began presently upon the business of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless there was still commerce betwixt them, and they went to each other without any herald, though not without jealousy. For the things that had passed were but² the confusion of the articles, and matter of the war to follow.

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THE SECOND BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

The entry of the Theban soldiers into Plataea by the treason of some within.—Their repulse and slaughter.—The irruption of the Peloponnesians into Attica.—The wasting of the coast of Peloponnesus by the Athenian fleet.—The public funeral of the first slain.—The second invasion of Attica.—The pestilence in the city of Athens.—The Ambraciotes war against the Amphilochoi.—Plataea assaulted: besieged.—The Peloponnesian fleet beaten by Phormio before the strait of the Gulf of Crissa.—The same fleet repaired and reinforced; and beaten again by Phormio before Naupactus.—The attempt of the Peloponnesians on Salamis.—The fruitless expedition of the Thracians against the Macedonians. This in the first three years of the war.

1. The war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians beginneth now from the time¹ they had no longer commerce one with another without a herald, and that having once begun it they warred without intermission. And it is written in order by summers and winters, according as from time to time the several matters came to pass.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

2. The peace, which after the winning of Eubœa, was concluded for thirty years, lasted fourteen years. But in the fifteenth year, being the forty–eighth of the priesthood of Chrysis¹ in Argos: Ænesias being then ephor at Sparta, and Pythadorus, archon of Athens, having then two months of his government to come: in the sixth month after the battle at Potidæa and in the beginning of the spring, three hundred and odd² Thebans, led by Pythangelus the son of Phyleides, and Diemporus the son of Onetoridas, Bœotian rulers³, about the first watch of the night entered with their arms into Plataea, a city of Bœotia and confederate of the Athenians. They were brought in, and the gates opened unto them, by Naucleides and his complices, men of Plataea, that for

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Plataea surprised by the Thebans by treason.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

The Thebans execute not the design of the traitors:

but offer composition.

their own private ambition intended both the destruction of such citizens as were their enemies, and the putting of the whole city under the subjection of the Thebans. This they negotiated with one Eurymachus the son of Leontiadas, one of the most potent men of Thebes. For the Thebans foreseeing the war, desired to preoccupate Plataea, which was always at variance with them, whilst there was yet peace and the war not openly on foot. By which means they more easily entered undiscovered, there being no order taken before for a watch. And making a stand in their arms¹ in the market–place, they did not, as they that gave them entrance would have had them, fall presently to the business, and enter the houses of their adversaries; but resolved rather to make favourable proclamation, and to induce the city to composition and friendship. And the herald proclaimed, “that if any man, according to the ancient custom of all the Bœotians, would enter into the same league of war with them, he

should come and bring his arms to theirs”: supposing the city by this means would easily be drawn to their side.

3. The Plataeans, when they perceived that the Thebans were already entered and had surprised the city, through fear, and opinion that more were entered than indeed were, (for they could not see them in the night), came to composition, and accepting the condition rested quiet; and the rather, for that they had yet done no man harm¹. But whilst that these things were treating, they observed that the Thebans were not many; and thought that if they should set upon them, they might easily have the victory. For the Plataean commons were not willing to have revolted from the Athenians. Wherefore it was thought fit to undertake the matter; and they united themselves by digging through the common walls between house and house, that they might not be discovered as they passed the streets. They also placed carts in the streets without the cattle that drew them, to serve them instead of a wall; and every other thing they put in readiness, as they severally seemed necessary for the present enterprise. When all things according to their means were ready, they marched from their houses towards the enemies; taking their time whilst it was yet night, and a little before break of day; because they would not have to charge them when they should be emboldened by the light and on equal terms, but when they should by night be terrified, and inferior to them in knowledge of the places of the city. So they forthwith set upon them, and came quickly up to hand strokes. 4. And the Thebans seeing this, and finding they were deceived, cast themselves into a round figure, and beat² them back in that part where the assault was made: and twice or thrice they repulsed them. But at last, when both the Plataeans themselves charged them with a great clamour, and their wives also and families shouted and screeched from the houses, and withal threw stones and tiles amongst them; the night having been also very wet; they were afraid, and turned their backs and fled here and there about the city; ignorant for the most part, in the dark and dirt, of the ways out by which they should have been saved; (for this accident fell out upon the change of the moon); and pursued by such as were well acquainted with the ways to keep them in: insomuch as the greatest¹ part of them perished. The gate by which they entered, and which only was left open, a certain Plataean shut up again with the head² of a javelin, which he thrust into the staple instead of a bolt: so that this way also their passage was stopped. As they were chased up and down the city, some climbed the walls and cast themselves out, and for the most part died. Some came to a desert gate of the city, and with a hatchet given them by a woman cut the staple³, and got forth unseen: but these were not many; for the thing was soon discovered. Others again were slain dispersed in several parts of the city. But the greatest part, and those especially who had cast themselves before into a ring, happened into a great edifice adjoining to the wall¹; the doors whereof, being open, they thought had been the gates of the city, and that there had been a direct way through to the other side. The Plataeans seeing them now pent up, consulted whether

The Plataeans accept it.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

The Plataeans take heart:

and unite themselves by digging through the common walls of their houses.

They assault the Thebans.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The Thebans fly, but cannot get out.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The Thebans penned up in a house, which they entered into by mistaking the door for the city gate.

They yield to discretion.

they should burn them as they were, by firing the house, or else resolve of some other punishment. At length both these, and all the rest of the Thebans that were straggling in the city, agreed to yield themselves and their arms to the Plataeans at discretion. And this success had² they that entered into Plataea.

5. But the rest of the Thebans, that should with their whole power have been there before day, for fear the surprise should not succeed with those that were in, came so late with their aid that they heard the news of what was done by the way³. Now Plataea is from Thebes seventy furlongs, and they marched the slower for the rain which had fallen the same night. For the river Asopus was swollen so high, that it was not easily passable. So that what by the foulness of the way, and what by the difficulty of passing the river, they arrived not till their men were already some slain and some taken prisoners. When the Thebans understood how things had gone, they lay in wait for such of the Plataeans as were without: (for there were abroad in the villages both men and household stuff, as was not unlikely, the evil happening unexpectedly and in time of peace): desiring, if they could take any prisoners, to keep them for exchange for those of theirs within, which (if any were so) were saved alive. This was the Thebans' purpose. But the Plataeans, whilst they were yet in council, suspecting that some such thing would be done, and fearing their case without, sent a herald unto the Thebans: whom they commanded to say, that what they had already done, attempting to surprise their city in time of peace, was done wickedly; and to forbid them to do any injury to those without, and that otherwise they would kill all those men of theirs that they had alive; which, if they would withdraw their forces out of their territory, they would again restore unto them. Thus the Thebans say; and that the Plataeans did swear it. But the Plataeans confess not that they promised to deliver them presently, but upon treaty if they should agree; and deny that they swore it. Upon this the Thebans went out of their territory¹; and the Plataeans, when they had speedily taken in whatsoever they had in the country, immediately slew their prisoners. They that were taken were one hundred and eighty; and Eurymachus², with whom the traitors had practised, was one. 6. When they had done they sent a messenger to Athens, and gave truce to the Thebans to fetch away the bodies of their dead; and ordered the city as was thought convenient for the present occasion.

The news of what was done coming straightway to Athens, they instantly laid hands on all the Bœotians then in Attica; and sent an officer to Plataea, to forbid their farther proceeding with their Theban prisoners, till such time as they also should have advised of the matter: for they were not yet advertised of their putting to death. For the first messenger was sent away when the Thebans first entered the town; and the second, when¹ they were overcome and taken prisoners: but of what followed after they knew nothing. So that the Athenians when they sent, knew not

The whole power of Thebes come to rescue their fellows.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The Thebans seek to intercept the Plataeans in the villages.

The Plataeans send to the Thebans to be gone, and promise to release their prisoners.

The Thebans go off, and the Plataeans fetch in their men and goods, and kill their prisoners.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

The Athenians lay hands on such Bœotians as were in Attica.

They victual Plataea, and put a garrison into it, and take their unnecessary people.

what was done; and the officer arriving found that the men were already slain. After this, the Athenians sending an army to Plataea, victualled it and left a garrison in it; and took thence both the women and children, and also such men as were unserviceable for the war.

7. This action falling out at Plataea, and the peace now clearly dissolved, the Athenians prepared themselves for war; so also did the Lacedaemonians and their confederates; intending on either part to send ambassadors to the king, and to other barbarians, wheresoever they had hope of succours; and contracting leagues with such cities as were not under their own command. The Lacedaemonians² besides those galleys which they had in Italy and Sicily, of the cities that took part with them there, were ordered to furnish, proportionably to the greatness of their several cities, so many more as the whole number might amount to five hundred sail, and to provide a sum of money assessed; and in other things not to stir farther, but to receive the Athenians coming but with one galley at once, till such time as the same should be ready. The Athenians, on the other side, surveyed their present confederates, and sent ambassadors to those places¹ that lay about Peloponnesus, as Corcyra, Cephalonia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus; knowing that as long as these were their friends, they might with the more security² make war round about upon the coast of Peloponnesus.

8. Neither side conceived small matters, but put their whole strength to the war: and not without reason³. For all men in the beginnings of enterprises are the most eager. Besides, there were then in Peloponnesus many young men, and many in Athens, who for want of experience not unwillingly undertook the war. And not only the rest of Greece stood at gaze to behold the two principal states in combat; but many prophecies were told, and many sung by the priests of the oracles, both in the cities about to war and in others. There was also a little before this an earthquake in Delos, which in the memory of the Grecians never shook before¹; and was interpreted for, and seemed to be a sign of what was to come afterwards to pass. And whatsoever thing then chanced of the same nature, it was all sure to be inquired after.

Preparation of both sides for the war.

year 1. A. C 431. Ol. 87 1.

Prophecies and oracles preceding the war.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

But men's affections for the most part went with the Lacedaemonians; and the rather, for that they gave out they would recover the Grecians' liberty. And every man, both private and public person², endeavoured as much as in them lay both in word and deed to assist them; and thought the business so much hindered, as himself was not present at it. In such passion were most men against the Athenians; some for desire to be delivered from under their government, and others for fear of falling into it. And these were the preparations and affections brought unto the war.

The affections of the Grecians towards the combatant states.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The confederates of the Lacedaemonians.

9. But the confederates of either party, which they had when they began it, were these. The Lacedæmonians had all Peloponnesus within the isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans: (for these were in amity with both, save that the Pellenians at first, only of all Achaia, took their part; but afterwards all the rest did so likewise): and without Peloponnesus, the Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phoceans, Ambraciotes, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of which the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleians, Ambraciotes, and Leucadians found shipping: the Bœotians, Phoceans, and Locrians, horsemen: and the rest of the cities footmen. And these were the confederates of the Lacedæmonians. The Athenian confederates were these. The Chians, Lesbians, Plataëans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, Corcyræans, Zacynthians, and other cities their tributaries amongst those nations¹; also that part of Caria which is on the sea-coast, and the Dorians adjoining to them; Ionia, Hellepont, the cities bordering on Thrace²; all the islands from Peloponnesus to Crete on the east, and all the rest of the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera³. Of these the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyræans found galleys; the rest footmen and money. These were their confederates and the preparation for the war on both sides.

The confederates of the Athenians.

10. The Lacedæmonians, after the business of Plataëa, sent messengers presently up and down Peloponnesus, and to their confederates without, to have in readiness their forces, and such things as should be necessary for a foreign expedition, as intending the invasion of Attica. And when they were all ready, they came to the rendezvous in the isthmus at a day appointed, two-thirds of the forces of every city¹. When the whole army was gotten together, Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, general of the expedition, called together the commanders of the several cities, and such as were in authority and most worthy to be present; and spake unto them as followeth:

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The Lacedæmonian league meet in the isthmus.

11. “Men of Peloponnesus and confederates, not only our fathers have had many wars, both within and without Peloponnesus, but we ourselves also, such as are anything in years, have been sufficiently acquainted therewith; yet did we never before set forth with so great a preparation as at this present. And now, not only we are a numerous and puissant army, that invade; but the state also is puissant² that is invaded by us. We have reason therefore to show ourselves neither worse than our fathers, nor short of the opinion conceived of ourselves. For all Greece is up at this commotion, observing us: and through their hatred to the Athenians, do wish that we may accomplish whatsoever we intend. And therefore, though we seem to invade them with a great army, and to have much assurance that they will not come out against us to battle, yet we ought not for this to march the less carefully prepared; but of every city as well the captain as the soldier, to expect always some danger or other in that part wherein he himself is placed. For the accidents of war are uncertain; and for the most part the onset begins from the lesser number¹ and upon passion. And oftentimes the lesser number, being afraid, hath beaten back the greater with the more ease; for that through contempt they have gone unprepared. And in the land of an enemy, though the soldiers ought always to have

the oration of archidamus.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus.

bold hearts, yet for action, they ought to make their preparations as if they were afraid. For that will give them both more courage to go upon the enemy, and more safety in fighting with him². But we invade not now a city that cannot defend itself, but a city every way well appointed. So that we must by all means expect to be fought withal, though not now, because we be not yet there, yet hereafter, when they shall see us in their country wasting and destroying their possessions. For all men, when in their own sight and on a sudden they receive any extraordinary hurt, fall presently into choler; and the less they consider, with the more stomach they assault. And this is likely to hold in the Athenians somewhat more than in the others; for they think themselves worthy to have the command of others, and to invade and waste the territories of their neighbours, rather than to see their neighbours waste theirs. Wherefore, as being to war against a great city, and to procure both to your ancestors and yourselves a great fame, either good or bad as shall be the event; follow your leaders in such sort, as above all things you esteem of order and watchfulness¹. For there is nothing in the world more comely nor more safe, than when many men are seen to observe one and the same order.”

12. Archidamus, having thus spoken and dismissed the council, first sent Melesippus the son of Diacritus, a man of Sparta, to Athens, to try if the Athenians, seeing them now on their journey, would yet in some degree remit of their obstinacy. But the Athenians neither received him into their city, nor presented him to the state: for the opinion of Pericles had already taken place, not to receive from the Lacedæmonians neither herald nor ambassador, as long as their army was abroad. Therefore they sent him back without audience, with commandment to be out of their borders the self-same day; and that hereafter if they would any thing with them, they should return every one to his home, and send their ambassadors from thence. They sent with him also certain persons to convoy him out of the country, to the end that no man should confer with him; who, when he came to the limits and was to be dismissed, uttered these words: “This day is the beginning of much evil unto the Grecians”; and so departed. When he returned to the camp, Archidamus perceiving that they would not relent, dislodged¹ and marched on with his army into their territory. The Bœotians with their appointed part and with horsemen aided the Peloponnesians; but with the rest of their forces went and wasted the territory of Plataæ.

Archidamus sends before him an ambassador to the Athenians; and tries all other means to right his country, before war.

The ambassador from Archidamus convoyed back without conference.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. Archidamus marcheth forward.

Pericles imagining Archidamus might spare his grounds, promiseth, if he did, to give them to the state.

The speech of Pericles to the assembly at Athens,

13. Whilst the Peloponnesians were coming together in the isthmus, and when they were on their march, before they brake into Attica, Pericles the son of Xantippus, who with nine others was general of the Athenians, when he saw they were about to break in, suspecting that Archidamus, either of private courtesy or by command of the Lacedæmonians to bring him into jealousy, (as they had before for his sake commanded the excommunication), might oftentimes² leave his lands untouched, told the Athenians beforehand in an assembly, “that though Archidamus had been his guest, it was for no ill to the state; and howsoever, if the enemy did not waste his lands and houses as well as the rest, that then he gave them to the commonwealth”; and therefore desired “that for this he might not be suspected”. Also he advised them concerning the business in hand the same things he had done before; “that they should make preparations for the war, and receive their goods into the city; that they should not go out to battle, but come into the city and guard it; that they should also furnish out their navy, wherein consisted their power, and hold a careful hand over their confederates”: telling them, “how that in the money that came from these lay their strength, and that the victory in war consisted wholly¹ in counsel and store of money”. Farther he bade them be confident, “in that there was yearly coming into the state from the confederates for tribute, besides other revenue², six hundred talents; and remaining yet then in the citadel six thousand talents of silver coin:” (for the greatest sum there had been, was ten thousand talents wanting three hundred: out of which was taken that which had been expended upon the gate-houses³ of the citadel, and upon other buildings, and for the charges of Potidæa): “besides the uncoined gold and silver of private and public offerings; and all the dedicated vessels belonging to the shows and games, and the spoils of the Persian, and other things of that nature, which amounted to no less than five hundred talents”. He added farther, that “much money might be had out of other temples¹ without the city, which they might use; and if they were barred the use of all these², they might yet use the ornaments of gold about the goddess herself;” and said that “the image had about it the weight of forty talents of most pure gold, and which might all be taken off; but having made use of it for their safety”, he said, “they were to make restitution of the like quantity again”. Thus he encouraged them touching matter of money. “Men of arms”, he said, “they had thirteen thousand; besides the sixteen thousand that were employed for the guard of the city and upon the walls.” For so many at the first kept watch at the coming in of the enemy³, young and old together, and strangers that dwelt amongst them as many as could bear arms. For the length of the Phalerian wall, to that part of the circumference of the wall of the city where it joined, was thirty-five furlongs; and that part of the circumference which was guarded, (for some of it was not kept with a watch, namely, the part between the long wall and the Phalerian), was forty-three furlongs. And the length of the long walls down to Piræus, (of which there was a watch only on the outmost⁴), was forty furlongs. And the whole compass of Piræus together with Munychia, was sixty furlongs; whereof that part that was watched, was but half. He said farther, “they had of horsemen, accounting archers on horseback, twelve hundred; and sixteen hundred archers; and of galleys fit for the sea, three hundred.” All this and no less had the Athenians, when the invasion of the

touching the means of the war, &c.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The treasure of the people of Athens.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

The length of the walls to which the watchmen were appointed.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

Their galleys.

Peloponnesians was first in hand, and when the war began. These and other words spake Pericles, as he used to do, for demonstration that they were likely to outlast this war.

14. When the Athenians had heard him, they approved of his words; and fetched into the city their wives and children, and the furniture of their houses, pulling down the very timber of the houses themselves. Their sheep and oxen they sent over into Eubœa, and into the islands over against them. Nevertheless this removal, in respect they had most of them been accustomed to the country life, grieved¹ them very much.

The Athenians fetch in their wives and children and substance into the city.

15. This custom was from great antiquity more familiar with the Athenians, than any other of the rest of Greece. For in the time of Cecrops and the first kings, down to Theseus, the inhabitants of Attica had their several boroughs, and therein their common halls² and their governors; and, unless they were in fear of some danger, went not to the king¹ for advice, but every city administered their own affairs and deliberated by themselves. And some of them had also their particular wars; as the Eleusinians, who joined with Eumolpus against Erectheus. But after Theseus came to the kingdom, one who besides his wisdom was also a man of very great power, he not only set good order in the country in other respects, but also dissolved the councils and magistracies of the rest of the towns; and assigning them all one

The Athenians accustomed ever to live in the country.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

Theseus first brought the inhabitants of Attica to make Athens their capital city.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

hall and one council-house, brought them all to cohabit² in the city that now is; and constrained them, enjoying their own as before, to use this one for their city, which (now when they all paid their duties to it) grew great, and was by Theseus so delivered to posterity. And from that time to this day, the Athenians keep a holiday at the public charge to the goddess, and call it Synœcia. That which is now the citadel, and the part which is to the south of the citadel, was before this time the city. An argument whereof is this; that the temples of the gods are all set either in the citadel itself; or if without, yet in that quarter: as that of Jupiter Olympius, and of Apollo Pythius¹, and of Tellus, and of Bacchus² in Limnæ; (in honour of whom the old Bacchanals were³ celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Athesterion, according as the Ionians who are derived from Athens, do still observe them); besides other ancient temples situate in the same part. Moreover, they served themselves with water for the best uses of the fountain, which, now the *Nine-pipes*, built so by the tyrants⁴, was formerly, when the springs were open, called Callirhoe, and was near. And from the old custom, before marriages and other holy rites they ordain the use of the same water to this day. And the citadel, from the ancient habitation of it, is also by the Athenians still called *the city*.

The Athenians remove out of the borough towns into the city unwillingly.

16. The Athenians therefore had lived a long time governed by laws of their own country towns; and after they were brought into one, were nevertheless (both for the custom which most had, as well of the ancient time as since till the Persian⁵ war, to live in the country with their whole families; and also especially for that since the Persian war they had already¹ repaired their houses and furniture) unwilling to remove. It pressed them likewise, and was heavily taken, besides their houses to leave the things that pertained to their religion, (which, since their old form of government, were become patrial), and to change their manner of life, and to be no better than banished every man his city. 17.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

Athens thronged with the coming in of the country.

An old prophecy against dwelling in the Pelasgicum.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

After they came into Athens, there was habitation for a few, and place of retire, with some friends or kindred. But the greatest part seated themselves in the empty places of the city, and in temples and in all the chapels of the heroes; saving in such as were in the citadel, and the Eleusinium, and other places strongly shut up. The Pelasgicum² also under the citadel, though it were a thing accursed to dwell in it, and forbidden by the end of a verse in a Pythian oracle, in these words: *Best is the Pelasgicum empty*³: was nevertheless for the present necessity inhabited. And in my opinion, this prophecy now fell out contrary to what was looked for. For the unlawful dwelling there caused not the calamities that befell the city, but the war caused the necessity of dwelling there: which war the oracle not naming, foretold only that it should one day be inhabited unfortunately.

Many also furnished the turrets of the walls, and whatsoever other place they could any of them get. For when they were come in, the city had not place for them all: but afterwards they had¹ the long walls divided amongst them, and inhabited there, and in most parts of Piræus. Withal they applied themselves to the business of the war, levying their confederates, and making ready a hundred galleys to send about Peloponnesus. Thus were the Athenians preparing.

The Athenians make ready a hundred galleys to send about Peloponnesus.

18. The army of the Peloponnesians marching forward, came first to Cœnoe, a town of Attica, the place where they intended to break in; and encamping before it, prepared with engines and by other means to assault the wall. For Cœnoe lying on the confines between Attica and Bœotia, was walled about; and the Athenians kept a garrison in it, for defence of the country when at any time there should be war. For which cause they made preparation for the assault of it; and also spent much time about it otherwise.

The Peloponnesian army assault Cœnoe, a frontier town of Attica, in vain.

Archidamus taxed of backwardness and favour to the Athenians.

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1.

And Archidamus for this was not a little taxed, as thought to have been both slow in gathering together the forces for the war, and also to have favoured the Athenians in that he encouraged not the army to a forwardness in it. And afterwards likewise² his stay in the isthmus and his slowness in the whole journey was laid to his charge, but especially his delay at CEnoe. For in this time the Athenians retired into the city: whereas it was thought, that the Peloponnesians marching speedily, might but for this delay have taken them all without. So passionate was the army of

Archidamus with his army entereth into Attica:

and comes to Acharnas, and stays there long, cutting down their corn and trees.

Archidamus for his stay before CEnoe. But expecting that the Athenians, whilst their territory was yet unhurt, would relent and not endure to see it wasted, for that cause (as it is reported) he held his hand. 19. But after, when they had assaulted CEnoe, and tried all means, but could not take it; and seeing the Athenians sent no herald to them; then at length arising from thence, about eighty days after that which happened to the Thebans that entered Plataea, the summer and corn being now at the highest¹, they fell into Attica, led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. And when they had pitched their camp, they fell to wasting of the country, first about Eleusis, and then in the plain of Thriasia; and put to flight a few Athenian horsemen at the brooks called Rheiti². After this, leaving the Aegaleon on the right hand, they passed through Cecropia³, till they came unto Acharnas, which is the greatest town in all Attica of those that are called Demoi¹; and pitching there, both fortified their camp, and staid a great while wasting the country thereabout.

20. Archidamus was said to have staid so long at Acharnas with his army in battle array, and not to have come down all the time of his invasion into the champaign, with this intention. He hoped that the Athenians, flourishing in number of young men, and better furnished for war than ever they were before, would perhaps have come forth against him, and not endured to see their fields cut down and wasted; and therefore seeing they met him not in Thriasia², he thought good to try if they would come out against him lying now at Acharnas. Besides³, the place seemed unto him

year 1. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 1. The design of Archidamus in staying so long at Acharnas.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

commodious for the army to lie in; and it was thought also that the Acharnans being a great piece of the city, (for they were three thousand men of arms), would not have suffered the spoiling of their lands, but rather have urged the rest to go out and fight. And if they came not out against him at this invasion, they might hereafter more boldly both waste the champaign country, and come down even to the walls of the city. For the Acharnans, after they should have lost their own, would not be so forward to hazard themselves for the goods of other men: but there would be the thoughts of sedition in one towards another in the city. These were the cogitations of Archidamus, whilst he lay at Acharnas.

The Athenians hardly contain themselves from going out to fight.

21. The Athenians, as long as the army of the enemy lay about Eleusis and the fields of Thrius, and as long as they had any hope¹ it would come on no farther, remembering that also Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, when fourteen years before this war he entered Attica with an army of the Peloponnesians as far as Eleusis and Thriasia, retired again and came no farther; (for which he was also banished Sparta, as thought to have gone back for money); they stirred not. But when they saw the army now at Acharnas but sixty furlongs from the city, then they thought it no longer to be endured; and when their fields were wasted (as it was likely²) in their sight: which the younger sort had never seen before, nor the elder but in the Persian war; it was taken for a horrible matter, and thought fit by all, especially by the youth, to go out and not endure it any longer. And holding councils apart one from another, they were at much contention, some to make a sally, and some to hinder it. And the priests of the oracles giving out prophecies of all kinds, every one made the interpretation according to the sway of his own affection. But the Acharnians, conceiving themselves to be no small part of the Athenians¹, were they that, whilst their own lands were wasting, most of all urged their going out. Insomuch as the city was every way in tumult, and in choler against Pericles, remembering nothing of what he had formerly admonished them; but reviled him, for that being their general he refused to lead them into the field, and imputing unto him the cause of all their evil. 22. But Pericles, seeing them in passion for their present loss and ill advised, and being confident he was in the right touching not sallying, assembled them not nor called any council, for fear lest being together they might upon passion rather than judgment commit some error: but looked to the guarding of the city, and as much as he could to keep it in quiet. Nevertheless he continually sent out horsemen, to keep the scouts of the army from entering upon and doing hurt to the fields near the city. And there happened at Phrygii a small skirmish between one troop² of horse of the Athenians, with whom were also the Thessalians, and the horsemen of the Bœotians. Wherein the Athenians and Thessalians had not the worse, till such time as the Bœotians were aided by the coming in of their men of arms; and then they were put to flight, and a few of the Athenians and Thessalians slain; whose bodies, notwithstanding, they fetched off the same day without leave of the enemy. And the Peloponnesians the next³ day erected a trophy. This aid of the Thessalians was upon an¹ ancient league with the Athenians, and consisted of Larissæans, Pharsalians, Parasians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, Pheræans. The leaders of the Larissæans were Polymedes and Aristonus, men of contrary factions in their city: of the Pharsalians, Meno: and of the rest, out of the several cities several commanders.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

A skirmish between the Athenian and Bœotian horse.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

Archidamus removes from Acharnas.

The Athenians send a hundred galleys to infest the sea coast of Peloponnesus.

The Peloponnesians go home.

23. The Peloponnesians seeing the Athenians would not come out to fight, dislodging from Acharnas, wasted certain other villages² between the hills Parnethus and Brelissus. Whilst these were in Attica, the Athenians sent the hundred galleys which they had provided, and in them one thousand men of arms and four hundred archers, about Peloponnesus; the commanders whereof were Charcinus the son of Xenotimus, Proteus the son of Epicles, and Socrates the son of Antigenes; who thus furnished, weighed anchor and went their way. The Peloponnesians, when they had stayed in Attica as long as their provision lasted, went home through Bœotia, not the way they came in; but passing by Oropus, wasted the country called Peiraice³, which is of the tillage of the Oropians, subjects to the people of Athens. And when they were come back into Peloponnesus, they disbanded and went every man to his own city.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

24. When they were gone, the Athenians ordained watches both by sea and land, such as were to continue to the end of the war: and made a decree, to take out a thousand talents of the money in the citadel and set it by, so as it might not be spent, but the charges of the war be borne out of other moneys; and made it capital for any man to move or give his vote¹ for the stirring of this money for any other use, but only if the enemy should come with an army by sea to invade the city, for necessity of that defence. Together with this money they likewise set apart one hundred galleys, and those to be every year the best, and captains to be appointed over them; which were to be employed for no other use than the money was, and for the same danger, if need should require.

The Athenians set by 1000 talents and 100 galleys, for defence against an invasion by sea.

25. The Athenians that were with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, and with them the Corcyræans with the aid of fifty sail more, and certain others of the confederates thereabout, amongst other places which they infested in their course landed at Methone, a town of Laconia¹; and assaulted it, as being but weak and few² men within. But it chanced that Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Spartan, had a garrison in those parts; and hearing of it, succoured those of the town with one hundred men of arms.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The Athenians assault Methone.

Brasidas defendeth it.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. They take Pheia, a town of Elis.

Wherewith running through the Athenian army, dispersed in the fields, directly towards the town³, he put himself into Methone; and with the loss of few of his men in the passage he saved the place, and for this adventure was the first that was praised at Sparta in this war. The Athenians putting off from thence sailed along the coast, and put in at Pheia of Elis, where they spent two days in wasting the country, and in a skirmish overthrew three hundred choice men of the Lower Elis⁴, together with other Eleians thereabouts, that came forth to defend it. But the wind arising, and their galleys being tossed by the weather in a harbourless place, the most of them embarked, and sailed about the promontory called Icthus into the haven of Pheia. But¹ the Messenians, and certain others that could not get aboard, went by land to the town of Pheia and rifled it². And when they had done, the galleys, that now were come about, took them in, and leaving Pheia put forth to sea again. By which time a great army of Eleians was come to succour it; but the Athenians were now gone away, and wasting some other territory.

26. About the same time the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys about Locris; which were to serve also for a watch about Eubœa. Of these, Cleopompus the son of Clinias had the conduct; and landing his soldiers in divers parts, both wasted some places of the sea coast, and won the town of Thronium, of which he took hostages: and overcame in fight at Alope the Locrians that came out to aid it.

27. The same summer, the Athenians put the Æginetæ, man, woman and child, out of Ægina; laying to their charge that they were the principal cause of the present war. And it was also thought the safer course to hold Ægina, being adjacent to Peloponnesus, with a colony of their own people; and not long after they sent inhabitants into the same. When the Æginetæ were thus banished, the Lacedæmonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in³, and the occupation of the lands belonging unto it to live on: both upon hatred to the Athenians, and for the benefits received at the hands of the Æginetæ in the time of the earthquake and insurrection of the Helotes. This territory of Thyrea is in the border between Argolica and Laconica, and reacheth to the sea-side. So some of them were placed there: and the rest dispersed into other parts of Greece¹.

The inhabitants of Ægina removed by the Athenians:

and received by the Peloponnesians.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

28. Also the same summer, on the first day of the month according to the moon, (at which time it seems only possible), in the afternoon happened an eclipse of the sun. The which, after it had appeared in the form of a crescent, and withal some stars had been discerned, came afterwards again to the former brightness.

Eclipse of the sun: and stars discerned.

29. The same summer also the Athenians made Nymphodorus the son of Pythos, of the city of Abdera, (whose sister was married to Sitalces, and that was of great power with him), their host², though before they took him for an enemy; and sent for him to Athens, hoping by his means to bring Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, into their league. This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first that advanced the kingdom of the Odrysians above the power of the rest of Thrace³. For much of Thrace consisteth of free states. And Tereus that took to wife out of Athens Procne the daughter of Pandion, was no kin to this Teres, nor of the same part¹ of Thrace. But that Tereus was of the city of Daulia in the country now called Phocis, then inhabited by the Thracians. And the fact of the women concerning Itys, was done there; and by the poets, where they mention the nightingale, that bird is also called Daulias. And it is more likely that Pandion matched his daughter to this man, for vicinity and mutual succour, than with the other, that was so many days' journey off as Odrysæ. And Teres (which is also another name) was the first that seized on the kingdom of Odrysæ². Now Sitalces, this man's son, the Athenians got into their league, that they might have the towns lying on Thrace and Perdiccas to be of their party³. Nymphodorus, when he came to Athens, made this league between them and Sitalces, and caused Sadocus the son of Sitalces, to be made free of Athens; and also undertook to end the war in Thrace. For he would persuade Sitalces to send unto the

The Athenians seek the favour of Sitalces, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas, king of Macedonia.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

Sadocus the son of Sitalces, king of Thrace, made free of Athens.

Athenians a Thracian army of horsemen and targettiers. He likewise reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and procured of⁴ him the restitution of Therme. And Perdiccas presently aided the Athenians and Phormio in the war against the Chalcideans. Thus were Sitalces the son of Teres, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, made confederates with the Athenians.

30. The Athenians being yet with their hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, took Solium, a town that belonged to the Corinthians, and put the Palærenses only, of all the Acarnanians, into the possession both of the town and territory. Having also by force taken Astacus from the tyrant Euarchus, they drave him thence, and joined the place to their league. From thence they sailed to Cephalonia, and subdued it without battle: (this Cephalonia is an island lying over against Acarnania and Leucas; and hath in it these four cities, the Pallenses, Cranii, Samæi, and Pronæi¹ :) and not long after returned with their fleet to Athens.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The Athenians take Solium and Astacus, and the island of Cephalonia.

31. About the end of the autumn of this summer, the Athenians, both themselves and the strangers that dwelt amongst them², with the whole power of the city, under the conduct of Pericles the son Xantippus, invaded the territory of Megara. And those Athenians likewise that had been with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, in their return, being now at Ægina, hearing that the whole power of the city was gone into Megaris, went and joined them. And this was the greatest army that ever the Athenians had together in one place before¹; the city being now in her strength, and the plague not yet amongst them. For the Athenians themselves were no less than ten thousand men of arms, besides the three thousand at Potidæa: and the strangers that dwelt amongst them, and accompanied them in this invasion, were no fewer than three thousand men of arms more; besides other great numbers of light-armed soldiers. And when they had wasted the greatest part of the country, they went back to Athens. And afterwards, year after year during this war, the Athenians often² invaded Megaris, sometimes with their horsemen and sometimes with their whole army, until such time as they had won Nisæa.

The Athenians invade Megaris.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

The Athenians' greatest army.

The Athenians duly once a year invade Megaris.

32. Also in the end of this summer they fortified Atalante, an island lying upon the Locrians of Opus, desolate till then; for a garrison against thieves, which passing over from Opus and other parts of Locris might annoy Eubœa. These were the things done this summer after the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica.

The end of the first summer.

33. The winter following, Euarchus of Acarnania, desirous to return to Astacus, prevailed with the Corinthians to go thither with forty galleys and fifteen hundred men of arms, to re-establish him; to which he hired also certain other mercenaries for the same purpose. The commanders of this army were Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus, Timoxenes the son of Timocrates, and Eumachus the son of Chrysis. When they had re-established him, they endeavoured to

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. Euarchus the tyrant recovereth Astacus.

draw to their party some other places on the sea-coast of Acarnania; but missing their purpose, they set sail homeward. As they passed by the coast of Cephalonia, they disembarked in the territory of the Cranii; where, under colour of composition, they were deceived, and lost some part of their forces¹. For the assault made upon them by the Cranii being unexpected, they got off with much ado, and went home.

34. The same winter the Athenians, according to their ancient custom, solemnized a public funeral of the first slain in this war, in this manner. Having set up a tent, they put into it² the bones of the dead three days before the funeral: and every one bringeth whatsoever he thinks good to his own. When the day comes of carrying them to their burial, certain cypress¹ coffins are carried along in carts, for every tribe one, in which are the bones of the men of every tribe by themselves. There is likewise borne an empty hearse covered over, for such as appear not, nor were found amongst the rest when they were taken up. The funeral is accompanied by any that will², whether citizen or stranger; and the women of their kindred are also by at the burial, lamenting and mourning. Then they put them into a³ public monument, which standeth in the fairest suburbs of the city; in which place they have ever interred all that died in the wars, except those that were slain in the field of Marathon; who, because their virtue was thought extraordinary, were therefore buried thereright. And when the earth is thrown over them, some one thought to exceed the rest in wisdom and dignity, chosen by the city, maketh an oration, wherein he giveth them such praises as are fit: which done, the company depart. And this is the form of that burial: and for the whole time of the war, whensoever there was occasion, they observed the same⁴. For these first, the man chosen to make the oration was Pericles the son of Xantippus: who when the time served, going out of the place of burial into a high pulpit, to be heard the farther off by the multitude about him, spake unto them in this manner:

The manner of the Athenians in burying the bones of the first slain in the wars.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2.

35. “Though most that have spoken formerly in this place, have commended the man that added this oration to the law, as honourable for those that die in the wars; yet to me it seemeth sufficient, that they who have showed their valour by action, should also by an action have their honour¹, as now you see they have, in this their sepulture performed by the state; and not to have the virtue of many hazarded on one, to be believed as that one shall make a good or bad oration. For to speak of men in a just measure, is a hard matter: and though one do so, yet he shall hardly get the truth firmly believed². The favourable hearer, and he that knows what was done, will perhaps think what is spoken short of what he would have it, and what it was³: and he that is ignorant, will find somewhat on the other side which he will think too much extolled; especially if he hear aught above the pitch of his own nature. For to hear another man praised finds patience so long only, as each man shall think he could himself have done somewhat of that he hears. And if one exceed in their praises, the hearer presently through envy thinks it false. But since our ancestors have so thought good, I also, following the same ordinance, must endeavour to be answerable to the desires and opinions of every one of you, as far forth as I can.

the funeral oration made by pericles.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

36. “I will begin at our ancestors: being a thing both just and honest¹, that to them first be given the honour of remembrance in this kind. For they, having been always the inhabitants of this region², by their valour have delivered the same to succession of posterity, hitherto in the state of liberty. For which they deserve commendation, but our fathers deserve yet more: for that besides what descended on them, not without great labour of their own they have purchased this our present dominion, and delivered the same over to us that now are. Which in a great part also we ourselves, that are yet in the strength of our age here present, have enlarged; and so furnished the city with every thing, both for peace and war, as it is now all-sufficient in itself. The actions of war whereby all this was attained, and the deeds of arms both of ourselves and our fathers in valiant opposition to the barbarians or Grecians in their wars against us, amongst you that are well acquainted with the sum, to avoid prolixity I will pass over. But by what³ institutions we arrived at this, by what form of government and by what means we have advanced the state to this greatness, when I shall have laid open this, I shall then descend to these men’s praises. For I think they are things both fit for the purpose in hand, and profitable to the whole company, both of citizens and strangers, to hear related. 37. We have a form of government, not fetched by imitation from the laws of our neighbouring states; (nay, we are rather a pattern to others, than they to us); which, because in the administration it hath respect not to a few, but to the multitude, is called a democracy. Wherein, though there be an equality amongst all men in point of law for their private controversies; yet¹ in conferring of dignities one man is preferred before another to public charge, and that according to the reputation, not of his house, but of his virtue; and is not put back through poverty for the obscurity of his person, as long as he can do good service to the commonwealth. And we live not only free in the administration of the state, but also one with another void of jealousy touching each other’s daily course of life²; not offended at any man for following his own humour, nor casting on any man censorious looks, which though they be no punishment, yet they grieve. So that conversing one with another for the private without offence, we stand chiefly in fear to transgress against the public; and are obedient always to those that govern and to the laws, and principally to such laws as are written for protection against injury, and such unwritten, as bring undeniable shame to the transgressors. 38. We have also found out many ways to give our minds recreation from labour, by public institution of games and sacrifices for all the days of the year, with a decent pomp and furniture of the same by private men; by the daily delight whereof we expel sadness. We have this farther by the greatness of our city, that all things from all parts of the earth are imported hither; whereby we no less familiarly enjoy the commodities of all other nations, than our own. 39. Then in the studies of war, we excel¹ our enemies in this. We leave our city open to all men; nor was it ever seen, that by banishing of strangers² we denied them the learning or sight of any of those things, which, if not hidden, an enemy might reap advantage by; not relying on secret preparation and deceit, but upon our own courage in the action.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

He glanceth at the Lacedæmonians, because they ever looked sourly on soft and loose behaviour.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

They, in their discipline, hunt after valour presently from their youth with laborious exercise³; and yet we that live remissly, undertake as great dangers as they. For example; the Lacedæmonians invade not our dominion by themselves alone, but with the aid of all the rest. But when we invade our neighbours, though we fight in hostile ground, against such as in their own ground fight in defence of their own substance, yet for the most part we get the victory¹. Never enemy yet fell into the hands of our whole forces at once; both because we apply ourselves much to navigation, and by land also send many of our men into divers countries abroad². But when fighting with a part of it, they chance to get the better, they boast they have beaten the whole; and when they get the worse, they say they are beaten by the whole. And yet when from ease rather than studious labour, and upon natural rather than doctrinal valour, we come to undertake any danger, we have this odds by it, that we shall³ not faint beforehand with the meditation of future trouble, and in the action we shall appear no less confident than they that are ever toiling; 40. procuring admiration to our city as well in this as in divers other things. For we also give ourselves to bravery¹, and yet with thrift; and to philosophy, and yet without mollification of the mind. And we use riches rather for opportunities of action, than for verbal ostentation: and hold it not a shame to confess poverty, but not to have avoided it. Moreover there is in the same men, a care both of their own and the public affairs; and a sufficient knowledge of state matters², even in those that labour with their hands. For we only think one that is utterly ignorant therein, to be a man, not that meddles with nothing, but that is good for nothing. We³ likewise weigh what we undertake, and apprehend it perfectly in our minds; not accounting words for a hindrance of action, but that it is rather a hindrance to action to come to it without instruction of words before. For also in this we excel⁴ others; daring to undertake as much as any, and yet examining what we undertake; whereas with other men, ignorance makes them dare, and consideration dastards. And they are most rightly reputed valiant, who though they perfectly apprehend both what is dangerous and what is easy, are never the more thereby diverted from adventuring. Again, we are contrary to most men in matter of bounty. For we purchase our friends, not by receiving, but by bestowing benefits. And he that bestoweth a good turn, is ever the most constant friend; because¹ he will not lose the thanks due unto him from him whom he bestowed it on. Whereas the friendship of him that oweth a benefit, is dull and flat, as knowing his benefit not to be taken for a favour, but for a debt. So that we only do good to others, not upon computation of profit, but freeness of trust².

41. "In sum it may be said, both that the city is in general a school of the Grecians, and that the men here have, every one in particular, his person disposed to most diversity of actions, and yet all with grace and decency³. And that this is not now rather a bravery of words upon the occasion, than real truth, this power of the city, which by these institutions⁴ we have obtained, maketh evident. For it is the only power now, found greater in proof than fame; and the only power, that neither grieveth the invader, when he miscarries, with the quality of those he was hurt by, nor giveth cause to the subjected states to murmur, as being in subjection to men unworthy. For both with present and future ages we shall be in admiration, for a power not without testimony, but made evident by great arguments; and which needeth not either a Homer to praise it, or any other such, whose poems may indeed for the present bring delight, but the truth will afterwards confute the opinion

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

conceived of the actions. For we have opened unto us by our courage all seas and lands, and set up eternal monuments on all sides, both of the evil we have done to our enemies, and the good we have done to our friends.

“Such is the city for which these men, thinking it no reason to lose it, valiantly fighting have died. And it is fit that every man of you that be left, should be like minded to undergo any travail for the same. 42. And I have therefore spoken so much concerning the city in general, as well to show you that the stakes between us and them, whose city is not such, are not equal; as also to make known by effects, the worth of these men I am to speak of; the greatest part of their praises being therein already delivered. For what I have spoken of the city, hath by these, and such as these, been achieved. Neither would praises and actions appear so levelly concurrent in many other of the Grecians, as they do in these: the present revolution¹ of these men’s lives seeming unto me an argument of their virtues, noted in the first act thereof, and in the last confirmed. For even such of them as were worse than the rest, do nevertheless deserve, that for their valour shown in the wars for defence of their country they should be preferred before the rest². For having by their good actions abolished the memory of their evil, they have profited the state thereby more than they have hurt it by their private behaviour. Yet there was none of these, that preferring the further fruition of his wealth, was thereby grown cowardly; or that for hope to overcome his poverty at length and to attain to riches, did for that cause withdraw himself from the danger. For¹ their principal desire was not wealth, but revenge on their enemies; which esteeming the most honourable cause of danger, they made account through it both to accomplish their revenge and to purchase wealth withal; putting the uncertainty of success to the account of their hope; but for that which was before their eyes, relying upon themselves in the action; and therein choosing rather to fight and die, than to shrink and be saved, they fled from shame, but with their bodies they stood out the battle; and so in a moment, whilst fortune inclineth neither way, left their lives not in fear, but in opinion of victory.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

43. “Such were these men, worthy of their country. And for you that remain, you may pray for a safer fortune, but you ought not to be less venturously minded against the enemy; not weighing the profit by an oration only, which any man amplifying, may recount, to you that know as well as he, the many commodities that arise by fighting valiantly against your enemies; but contemplating the power of the city in the actions of the same from day to day performed¹, and thereby becoming enamoured of it. And when this power of the city shall seem great to you, consider then, that the same was purchased by valiant men, and by men that knew their duty, and by men that were sensible of dishonour when they were in fight; and by such men, as though they failed of their attempt, yet would not be wanting to the city with their virtue, but made unto it a most honourable contribution. For² having every one given his body to the commonwealth, they receive in place thereof an undecaying commendation and a most remarkable sepulchre; not wherein they are buried so much, as wherein their glory is laid up, upon all occasions both of speech and action to be remembered for ever. For to famous men all the earth is a sepulchre:

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol. 87. 2. The funeral oration made by Pericles.

and their virtues shall be testified, not only by the inscription in stone at home, but³ by an unwritten record of the mind, which more than of any monument will remain with every one for ever. In imitation therefore of these men, and placing happiness in liberty, and liberty in valour, be forward to encounter the dangers of war. For the miserable and desperate men, are not they that have the most reason to be prodigal of their lives; but rather such men, as if they live, may expect a change of fortune, and whose losses are greatest if they miscarry in aught. For to a man of any spirit, death, which is without sense, arriving whilst he is in vigour and common hope, is nothing so bitter as after a tender life to be brought into misery¹.

44. “Wherefore I will not so much bewail, as comfort you, the parents, that are present, of these men. For you know that whilst they lived, they were obnoxious to manifold calamities. Whereas whilst you are in grief, they only are happy that die honourably, as these have done²: and to whom it hath been granted, not only to live in prosperity, but to die in it. Though it be a hard matter to dissuade you from sorrow for the loss of that, which the happiness of others, wherein you also when time was rejoiced yourselves, shall so often bring into your remembrance; (for sorrow is not for the want of a good never tasted, but for the privation of a good we have been used to); yet such of you as are of the age to have children, may bear the loss of these in the hope of more. For the later children will both draw on with some the oblivion of those that are slain, and also doubly conduce to the good of the city, by population and strength. For it is not likely that they should equally give good counsel to the state, that have not children to be equally exposed to danger in it. As for you that are past having of children³, you are to put the former and greater part of your life¹ to the account of your gain; and supposing the remainder of it will be but short, you shall have the glory of these for a consolation of the same. For the love of honour never groweth old: nor doth that unprofitable part of our life take delight (as some have said) in gathering of wealth, so much as it doth in being honoured. 45. As for you that are the children or brethren of these men, I see you shall have a difficult task of emulation. For every man useth to praise the dead; so that with odds of virtue you will hardly get an equal reputation, but still be thought a little short. For men envy their competitors in glory, while they live; but to stand out of their way, is a thing honoured with an affection free from opposition². And since I must say somewhat also of feminine virtue, for you that are now widows, I shall express it in this short admonition. It will be much for your honour not to recede from your sex³: and to give as little occasion of rumour amongst the men, whether of good or evil, as you can.

year i. A. C. 431. Ol.
87. 2. The funeral
oration made by
Pericles.

46. “Thus⁴ also have I, according to the prescript of the law, delivered in word what was expedient; and those that are here interred, have in fact been already honoured; and further, their children⁵ shall be maintained till they be at man’s estate at the charge of the city; which hath therein propounded both to these, and them that live, a profitable garland in their matches of valour¹. For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there live the worthiest men. So now having lamented every one his own, you may be gone.”

year i. A. C. 431. Ol.
87. 2.

47. Such was the funeral made this winter; which ending, ended the first year of this war.

In the very beginning of summer, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, with two thirds of their forces as before, invaded Attica under the conduct of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamas, king of Lacedæmon: and after they had encamped themselves, wasted the country about them. They had not been many days in Attica, when the plague first began amongst the Athenians, said also to have seized² formerly on divers other parts, as about Lemnos and elsewhere; but so great a plague and mortality of men was never remembered to have happened in any place before. For at first neither were the physicians able to cure it, through ignorance of what it was¹, but died fastest themselves, as being the men that most approached the sick; nor any other art of man availed whatsoever. All supplications to the gods, and enquiries of oracles, and whatsoever other means they used of that kind, proved all unprofitable; insomuch as subdued with the greatness of the evil, they gave them all over. 48. It began, by report, first in that part of Æthiopia that lieth upon Egypt; and thence fell down into Egypt and Africa, and into the greatest part of the territories of the king. It invaded Athens on a sudden; and touched first upon those that dwelt in Peiræus; insomuch as they reported that the Peloponnesians had cast poison into their wells²; (for springs there were not any in that place). But afterwards it came up into the high city, and then they died a great deal faster. Now let every man, physician or other, concerning the ground of this sickness, whence it sprung, and what causes he thinks able to produce so great an alteration, speak according to his own knowledge. For my own part, I will deliver but the manner of it, and lay open only such things, as one may take his mark by to discover the same, if it come again; having been both sick of it myself, and seen others sick of the same.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. The second invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians.

The plague at Athens.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2.

It began in Æthiopia.

The Peloponnesians supposed to have poisoned their wells.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. The author sick of this disease.

The description of the disease:

ache of the head:
redness of the eyes:
sore throat: unsavoury
breath:

vomitings:

hickyexe:

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. livid pustules:
extreme heat of their
bodies:

insatiate thirst:

49. This year, by confession of all men, was of all other, for other diseases, most free and healthful. If any man were sick before, his disease turned to this¹ ; if not, yet suddenly, without any apparent cause preceding and being in perfect health, they were taken first with an extreme ache² in their heads, redness and inflammation of the eyes; and then inwardly, their throats and tongues grew presently bloody, and their breath noisome and unsavoury. Upon this followed a sneezing and hoarseness, and not long after the pain, together with a mighty cough, came down into the breast. And when once it was settled in the stomach, it caused vomit³ , and with great torment came up all manner of bilious purgation that physicians ever named. Most of them had also the hickyexe⁴ , which brought with it a strong convulsion, and in some ceased quickly, but in others was long before it gave over. Their bodies outwardly to the touch were neither very hot nor pale; but reddish, livid, and beflowered with little pimples and whelks¹ ; but so burned inwardly, as not to endure any the lightest clothes or linen garment to be upon them, nor anything but mere nakedness; but rather most willingly to have cast themselves into the cold water. And² many of them that were not looked to, possessed with insatiate thirst, ran unto the wells; and to drink much or little was indifferent, being still from ease and power to sleep as far as ever. As long as the disease was at its height, their bodies wasted not, but resisted the torment beyond all expectation; insomuch as the most of them either died of their inward burning³ in nine or seven days, whilst they had yet strength; or if they escaped that, then the disease falling down into their bellies, and causing there great exulcerations and immoderate⁴ looseness, they died many of them afterwards through weakness. For the disease, which took first the head, began above, and came down and passed through the whole body; and he that overcame the worst of it, was yet marked with the loss of his extreme parts¹ ; for breaking out both at their privy members, and at their fingers and toes, many with the loss of these escaped: there were also some that lost their eyes. And many, that presently upon their recovery were taken with such an oblivion of all things whatsoever, as they neither knew themselves nor their acquaintance. 50. For this was a kind of sickness which far surmounted all expression of words, and both exceeded human nature in the cruelty wherewith it handled each one; and appeared also otherwise to be none of those diseases that are bred amongst us, and that especially by this. For all, both birds and beasts, that use to feed on human flesh, though many men lay abroad unburied, either came not at them, or tasting perished² . An argument whereof as touching the birds, is the manifest defect of such fowl; which were not then seen, neither about the carcasses or any where else. But by the dogs, because they are familiar with men, this effect was seen much clearer.

want of sleep:

after seven or ten days, death:

disease in the belly:

looseness:

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. loss of the parts where the disease brake out:

oblivion of all things done before their sickness:

birds and beasts perished that fed on carcasses.

year ii. A C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. Want of attendance.

Dejection of mind.

51. So that this disease, (to pass over many strange particulars of the accidents that some had differently from others), was in general such as I have shown³; and for other usual sicknesses, at that time no man was troubled with any¹. Now they died, some for want of attendance, and some again with all the care and physic that could be used. Nor was there any, to say certain medicine, that applied must have helped them²; for if it did good to one, it did harm to another. Nor any difference of body, for strength or weakness, that was able to resist it; but it carried all away, what physic soever was administered. But the greatest misery of all, was the dejection of mind in such as found themselves beginning to be sick: (for they grew presently desperate, and gave themselves over without making any resistance): as also their dying thus like sheep, infected by mutual visitation; for the greatest mortality proceeded that way. For if men forebore to visit them for fear, then they died forlorn; whereby many families became empty, for want of such as should take care of them. If they forbore not, then they died themselves, and principally the honestest³ men. For out of shame they would not spare themselves, but went in unto their friends; especially after it was come to this pass, that even their domestics, wearied with the lamentations of them that died, and overcome with the greatness of the calamity, were no longer moved therewith. But those that were recovered, had much⁴ compassion both on them that died, and on them that lay sick; as having both known the misery themselves, and now no more subject to the danger. For this disease never took any man the second time, so as to be mortal. And these men were both by others counted happy; and they also themselves, through excess of present joy, conceived a kind of light hope never to die of any other sickness hereafter.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. No man sick of it mortally the second time.

52. Besides the present affliction, the reception of the country people and of their substance into the city, oppressed both them, and much more the people themselves that so came in. For having no houses, but dwelling at that time¹ of the year in stifling booths, the mortality was now without all form; and dying² men lay tumbling one upon another in the streets, and men half-dead about every conduit through desire of water. The temples also where they dwelt in tents, were all full of the dead that died within them. For oppressed with the violence of the calamity, and not knowing what to do, men grew careless both of holy and profane things alike. And the laws which they formerly used touching funerals, were all now broken; every one burying where he could find room³. And many for want of things necessary, after so many deaths before, were forced to become impudent in the funerals of their friends. For when one had made a funeral pile, another getting before him would throw on his dead, and give it fire. And when one was in burning, another would come, and having cast thereon him whom he carried, go his way again. 53. And the great licentiousness, which also in other kinds was¹ used in the city, began at first from this disease. For that which a man before would dissemble, and not acknowledge to be done for voluptuousness, he durst now do freely; seeing before his eyes such quick revolution, of the rich² dying, and men worth nothing inheriting their estates. Insomuch as they justified a speedy fruition of their goods, even³ for their pleasure; as men that thought

Men died in the streets.

Disorder in their funerals.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2.

Licentiousness of life justified.

Neglect of religion and law.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2.

they held their lives but by the day. As for pains, no man was forward in any action of honour to take any; because they thought it uncertain whether they should die or not before they achieved it. But what any man knew to be delightful, and to be profitable to pleasure⁴, that was made both profitable and honourable. Neither the fear of the gods, nor laws of men, awed any man: not the former, because they concluded it was alike to worship or not worship, from seeing that alike they all perished: nor the latter, because no man expected that lives would last till he received punishment of his crimes by judgment. But they thought, there was now over their heads some far greater judgment decreed against them; before which fell, they thought to enjoy some little part of their lives.

54. Such was the misery, into which the Athenians being fallen were much oppressed; having not only their men killed by the disease within, but the enemy also laying waste their fields and villages without. In this sickness also, (as it was not unlikely they would), they called to mind this verse, said also of the elder sort to have been uttered of old:

Predictions called to mind.

A Doric war shall fall,
And a great plague¹withal.

Now were men at variance about the word, some saying it was not λοιμός that was by the ancients mentioned in that verse, but λιμός. But upon the present occasion the word λοιμός deservedly obtained. For as men suffered, so they made the verse to say.

An ambiguous prophecy expounded by the event.

And I think, if after this there shall ever come another Doric war, and with it a famine, they are like to recite the verse accordingly.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2.

There was also reported by such as knew, a certain² answer given by the oracle to the Lacedæmonians, when they inquired whether they should make this war or not: *that if they warred with all their power, they should have the victory; and that the God³himself would take their parts.* And thereupon they thought the present misery to be a fulfilling of that prophecy. The Peloponnesians were no sooner entered Attica, but the sickness presently began; and never came into Peloponnesus, to speak of, but reigned principally in Athens, and in such other places afterwards as were most populous. And thus much of this disease.

55. After the Peloponnesians had wasted the champagne country, they fell upon the territory called Paralos¹, as far as to the mountain Laurius, where the Athenians had silver mines; and first wasted that part of it which looketh towards Peloponnesus, and then that also which lieth toward Andros and Eubœa. And Pericles, who was also then general, was still of the same mind

Pericles with 100 sail of Athenians about Peloponnesus.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2.

he was of in the former invasion, that the Athenians ought not to go out against them to battle. 56. Whilst² they were yet in the plain, and before they entered into the maritime country, he furnished a hundred galleys to go about Peloponnesus, and as soon as they were ready, put to sea. In these galleys he had four thousand men of arms; and in vessels then purposely first made to carry horses³, three hundred horsemen. The Chians and Lesbians joined likewise with him with fifty galleys. This fleet of the Athenians, when it set forth, left the Peloponnesians still in Paralia; and

coming before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponnesus¹, they wasted much of the country thereabout, and assaulting the city had a hope to take it, though it succeeded not. Leaving Epidaurus, they wasted the territories about of Trœzene, Halias, and Hermione, places all on the sea-coast of Peloponnesus. Putting off from hence, they came to Prasiæ, a small maritime city of Laconia; and both wasted the territory about it, and took and razed² the town itself. And having done this, came home, and found the Peloponnesians not now in Attica, but gone back.

57. All the while the Peloponnesians were in the territory of the Athenians, and the Athenians abroad with their fleet, the sickness, both in the army and city, destroyed many; insomuch as it was said that the Peloponnesians fearing the sickness, (which they knew to be in the city, both by fugitives and by seeing the Athenians burying³ their dead), went the sooner away out of the country. And yet they stayed there longer in this invasion than they had done any time before⁴; and wasted even the whole territory: for they continued in Attica almost forty days.

The Peloponnesians depart out of Attica.

58. The same summer Agnon the son of Nicias, and Cleopompus the son of Clinias, who were joint commanders with Pericles, with that army which he had employed before, went presently and made war upon the Chalcideans of Thrace, and against Potidæa, which was yet besieged. Arriving, they presently applied engines, and tried all means possible to take it; but neither the taking of the city, nor any thing else, succeeded worthy so great preparation. For the sickness coming amongst them, afflicted them mightily indeed, and even devoured the army. And the Athenian soldiers which were there before and in health, caught the sickness from those that came with Agnon. As for Phormio and his sixteen hundred, they were not now amongst the Chalcideans. And Agnon therefore came back with his fleet, having of four thousand men in less than forty days lost one thousand and fifty of the plague. But the soldiers that were there before, stayed upon the place and continued the siege of Potidæa.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3. The Athenian fleet returned from Peloponnesus, go to Potidæa with ill success by reason of the sickness.

59. After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians having their fields now the second time wasted, and both the sickness and war falling upon them at once, changed their minds, and accused Pericles¹ as if by his means they had been brought into these calamities, and desired earnestly to compound with the Lacedæmonians; to whom also they sent certain ambassadors, but they returned without effect. And being then at their wits' end, they kept a stir at Pericles. And he seeing them vexed with their present calamity and doing all those things which he had before expected, called an assembly (for he was yet general¹) with intention to put them again into heart, and assuaging their passion, to reduce their minds to a more calm and less dismayed temper. And standing forth, he spake unto them in this manner:

The Athenian people vexed at once both with the war and pestilence, grow impatient toward Pericles.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3.

Oration of Pericles.

60. “Your anger towards me cometh not unlooked for; for the cause of it I know. And I have called this assembly therefore, to remember you, and reprehend you for those things wherein you have either been angry with me, or given way to your adversity, without reason. For I am of this opinion, that the public prosperity of the city is better for private men, than if the private men themselves were in prosperity and the public wealth in decay. For a private man, though in good estate, if his country come to ruin, must of necessity be ruined with it; whereas he that miscarrieth in a flourishing commonwealth, shall much more easily be preserved. Since then the commonwealth is able to bear the calamities of private men, and every one² cannot support the calamities of the commonwealth, why should not every one strive to defend it: and not, as you now, astonished with domestic misfortune, forsake the common safety, and fall a censuring both me that counselled the war, and yourselves that decreed the same as well as I? And it is I you are angry withal: one, as I think myself, inferior to none, either in knowing what is requisite, or in expressing what I know, and a lover of my country and superior to money. For he that hath good thoughts and cannot clearly express them, were as good to have thought nothing at all. He that can do both, and is ill affected to his country, will likewise¹ not give it faithful counsel. And he that will do that too, yet if he be superable by money, will for that alone set all the rest to sale. Now if you followed my advice in making this war, as esteeming these virtues to be in me somewhat above the rest, there is sure no reason that I should now be accused of doing you wrong. 61. For though to such as have it in their own election, (being otherwise in good estate), it were madness to make choice of war; yet when we must of necessity either give way, and so without more ado be subject to our neighbours, or else save ourselves from it by danger; he is more to be condemned that declineth the danger, than he that standeth to it. For mine own part, I am the man I was, and of the mind I was; but you are changed, won to the war when you were entire, but repenting it upon the damage, and condemning my counsel in the weakness of your own judgment. The reason of this is, because you feel already every one in particular that which afflicts you; but the evidence of the profit to accrue to the city in general, you see not yet. And your minds dejected with the great and sudden alteration, cannot constantly² maintain what you have before resolved. For that which is sudden and unexpected, and contrary to what one hath deliberated, enslaveth the spirit; which by this disease principally, in the neck of the other incommodities, is now come to pass in you. But you that are born in a great city, and with education suitable, how great soever the affliction be, ought not to shrink at it and eclipse your reputation; (for men do no less condemn those that through cowardice lose the glory they have, than hate those that through impudence arrogate the glory they have not); but to set aside the grief of your private losses, and lay your hands to the common safety.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol.
87. 2. 3. Oration of
Pericles.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol.
87. 2. 3. Oration of
Pericles.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol.
87. 2. 3. Oration of
Pericles.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol.
87. 2. 3. Oration of
Pericles.

62. “As for the toil of the war, that it may perhaps be long and we in the end never the nearer to victory, though that may suffice which I have demonstrated¹ at other times touching your causeless suspicion that way; yet this I will tell you moreover, touching the greatness of your means for dominion, which neither you yourselves seem ever to have thought on, nor I touched in my former orations; nor would I also have spoken it now², but that I see your minds dejected more than there is cause for. That though you take your dominion to extend only to your confederates, I affirm that of the two parts of the world of manifest use, the land and the sea, you are of one of them entire masters; both of as much of it as you make use of, and also of as much more as you shall think fit yourselves. Neither is there any king or nation whatsoever of those that now are, that can impeach your navigation with the fleet and strength you now go¹. So that you must not put the use of houses and lands, wherein now you think yourselves deprived of a mighty matter, into the balance with such a power as this, nor take the loss of these things heavily in respect of it; but rather set little by them, as but a light ornament and embellishment of wealth; and think that our liberty as long as we hold fast that, will easily recover unto us these things again; whereas subjected once to others, even that which we possess besides will be diminished. Show not yourselves both ways inferior to your ancestors; who not only held this, (gotten by their own labours, not left them), but have also preserved and delivered the same unto us: (for² it is more dishonour to lose what one possesseth, than to miscarry in the acquisition of it): and encounter the enemy not only with magnanimity, but also with disdain. For a coward may have a high mind upon a prosperous ignorance; but he that is confident upon judgment to be superior to his enemy, doth also disdain him; which is now our case. And³ courage, in equal fortune, is the safer for our disdain of the enemy, where a man knows what he doth: for he trusteth less to hope, which is of force only in uncertainties, and more to judgment upon certainties, wherein there is a more sure foresight. 63. You have reason besides to maintain the dignity the city hath gotten for¹ her dominion, in which you all triumph: and either not decline the pains, or not also pursue the honour. And you must not think the question is now of your liberty and servitude only. Besides the loss of your rule over others, you must stand the danger you have contracted by offence given in the administration of it. Nor can you now give it over: (if any fearing at this present that that may come to pass, encourage himself with the intention of not to meddle hereafter²): for already your government is in the nature of a tyranny, which is both unjust for you to take up and unsafe to lay down. And such men as these, if they could persuade others to it, or lived in a free city by themselves, would quickly overthrow it. For the quiet life can never be preserved, if it be not ranged with the active life: nor is it a life conducible to a city that reigneth, but to a subject city, that it may safely serve. 64. Be not therefore seduced by this sort of men, nor angry with me, together with whom yourselves did decree this war, because the enemy invading you hath done what was likely he would, if you obeyed him not. And as for the sickness, the only thing that exceeded the imagination of all men, it was unlooked for: and I know you hate me somewhat the more for that; but unjustly, unless when anything falleth out above your expectation fortunate, you will also dedicate unto me that. Evils that come from heaven, you must bear necessarily; and such as proceed from your enemies, valiantly; for so it hath been the custom of this city to do heretofore, which custom let it not be your part to

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3. Oration of Pericles.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3. Oration of Pericles.

reverse. Knowing that this city hath a great name amongst all people for not yielding to adversity, and for the mighty power it yet hath after the expense of so many lives and so much labour in the war¹: the memory whereof, though we should now at length miscarry, (for all things are made with this law, to decay again), will remain with posterity for ever. How that being Grecians, most of the Grecians were our subjects; that we have abidden the greatest wars against them, both universally and singly, and have inhabited the greatest and wealthiest city. Now this, he with the quiet life will condemn; the active man will emulate; and they that have not attained to the like, will envy. But to be hated and to displease, is a thing that happeneth for the time to whosoever he be that hath the command of others; and he does well, that undergoeth hatred for matters of great consequence. For the hatred lasteth not; and is recompensed both with a present splendour and an immortal glory hereafter. Seeing then you foresee² both what is honourable for the future, and not dishonourable for the present, procure both the one and the other by your courage now. Send no more heralds to the Lacedæmonians, nor let them know the evil present does any way afflict you; for they whose minds least feel, and whose actions most oppose a calamity, both among states and private persons are the best.”

65. In this speech did Pericles endeavour to appease the anger of the Athenians towards himself, and withal to withdraw their thoughts from the present affliction. But they, though for the state in general they were won, and sent to the Lacedæmonians no more, but rather¹ inclined to the war; yet they were every one in particular grieved for their several losses: the poor, because entering the war with little, they lost that little; and the rich, because they had lost fair possessions, together with goodly houses and costly furniture in them, in the country; but the greatest matter of all was, that they had war instead of peace. And altogether, they deposed not their anger till they had first fined him in a sum of money. Nevertheless, not long after (as is the fashion of the multitude) they made him general again, and committed the whole state to his administration². For the sense of their domestic losses was now dulled; and for the need of the commonwealth, they prized him more than any other whatsoever. For as long as he was in authority in the city in time of peace³, he governed the same with moderation, and was a faithful watchman of it; and in his time it was at the greatest. And after the war was on foot, it is manifest that he therein also foresaw what it could do. He lived after the war began two years and six months. And his foresight in the war was best known after his death¹. For he told them, that if they would be quiet, and look to their navy, and during this war seek no further dominion, nor hazard the city itself, they should then have the upper hand. But they did contrary in all: and in such other things besides as seemed not to concern the war², managed the state, according to their private ambition and covetousness, perniciously both for themselves and their confederates. What succeeded well, the honour and profit of it came most to private men; and what miscarried, was to the city’s detriment in the war. The reason whereof was this: that being a man of great power both for his dignity and wisdom, and for bribes manifestly the most incorrupt, he freely controled the

Pericles fined in a sum of money.

Athens at the greatest in the time of Pericles.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3.

The death of Pericles. Sept A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

The commendation of Pericles.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 2. 3.

multitude; and was not so much led by them, as he led them. Because, having gotten his power by no evil arts, he would not humour them in his speeches, but out of his authority durst anger them with contradiction. Therefore, whensoever he saw them out of season insolently bold, he would with his orations put them into a fear; and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise erect their spirits and embolden them. It was in name, a state democratical; but in fact, a government of the principal man. But they that came after, being more equal amongst themselves, and affecting every one to be the chief, applied themselves to the people and let go the care of the commonwealth¹. From whence amongst many other errors, as was likely in a great and dominant city, proceeded also the voyage into Sicily; which² was not so much upon mistaking those whom they went against, as for want of knowledge in the senders of what was necessary for those that went the voyage. For through private quarrels about who should bear the greatest sway with the people, they both abated the vigour of the army, and then also first troubled the state at home with division. Being overthrown in Sicily, and having lost, besides other ammunition, the greatest part of their navy, and the city being then in sedition; yet they held out three years³, both against their first enemies and the Sicilians with them, and against most of their revolted confederates besides, and also afterwards against Cyrus the king's son, who took part with, and sent money to the Peloponnesians to maintain their fleet; and never shrunk till they had overthrown themselves with private dissensions. So much was in Pericles above other men at that time, that he could foresee by what means the city might easily have outlasted the Peloponnesians in this war¹.

66. The Lacedæmonians and their confederates made war the same summer with one hundred galleys against Zacynthus, an island laying over against Elis. The inhabitants whereof were a colony of Achæans of Peloponnesus, but confederates of the people of Athens. There went in this fleet a thousand men of arms, and Cnemus a Spartan for admiral; who landing, wasted the greatest part of the territory. But they of the island not yielding, they put off again and went home.

The Lacedæmonians war against Zacynthus.

67. In the end of the same summer, Aristeus of Corinth, and Aneristus, Nicolaus, Stratodemus, and Timagorus of Tegea, ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, and Pollis of Argos, a private man², as they were travelling into Asia to the king, to get money of him and to draw him into their league, took Thrace in their way, and came unto Sitalces the son of Teres, with a desire to get him also, if they could, to forsake the league with Athens, and to send his forces to Potidæa, which the Athenian army now besieged, and not to aid the Athenians any longer¹: and withal to get leave to pass through his country to the other side of the Hellespont, to go, as they intended, to Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, who would convoy them to the king. But the ambassadors of Athens, Learchus the son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, then resident with Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus the son of Sitalces, who was now a citizen of Athens, to put them into their hands, that they might not go to the king, and do hurt to the city whereof he himself was now a member². Whereunto condescending, as they journeyed through Thrace to take ship

A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 3. The Lacedæmonian ambassadors taken by the Athenian ambassadors in Thrace, and sent to Athens.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 3.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 3. The Athenians put them to death

to cross the Hellespont, he apprehended them³ before they got to the ship by such others as he sent along with Learchus and Ameiniades, with command to deliver them into their hands. And they, when they had them, sent them away to Athens. When they came thither, the Athenians, fearing Aristeus, lest escaping he should do them further mischief, (for he was manifestly the author⁴ of all the business of Potidæa and about Thrace), the same day put them all to death, unjudged and desirous to have spoken, and threw them into the pits; thinking it but just to take revenge of the Lacedæmonians that began it, and had slain and thrown into pits the merchants of the Athenians and their confederates, whom they took sailing in merchant-ships¹ about the coast of Peloponnesus. For in the beginning of the war, the Lacedæmonians slew as enemies whomsoever they took at sea, whether confederates of the Athenians or neutral, all alike.

68. About the same time, in the end of summer, the Ambraciotes², both they themselves and divers barbarian nations by them raised, made war against Argos of Amphilochia, and against the rest of that territory. The quarrel between them and the Argives, arose first from hence. This Argos and the rest of Amphilochia was planted by Amphilochus the son of Amphiarus, after the Trojan war; who at his return, misliking the then state of Argos, built this city in the Gulf of Ambracia, and called it Argos, after the name of his own country. And it was the greatest city, and had the most wealthy inhabitants of all Amphilochia. But many generations after, being fallen into misery, they communicated their city with the Ambraciotes, bordering upon Amphilochia: and then they first learned the Greek language now used from the Ambraciotes that lived among them. For the rest of the Amphilochians were barbarians¹. Now the Ambraciotes in process of time drove out the Argives, and held the city by themselves. Whereupon the Amphilochians submitted themselves to the Acarnanians, and both together called in the Athenians; who sent thirty galleys to their aid, and Phormio for general. Phormio being arrived, took Argos by assault, and making slaves of the Ambraciotes, put the town into the joint possessions of the Amphilochians and Acarnanians². And this was the beginning of the league between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciotes therefore, deriving their hatred to the Argives from this their captivity, came in with an army, partly of their own, and partly raised amongst the Chaonians and other neighbouring barbarians, now in this war. And coming to Argos, were masters of the field; but when they could not take the city by assault, they returned, and disbanding went every nation to his own. These were the acts of the summer.

The Ambraciotes war on Acarnania.

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 3.

The end of the second summer.

69. In the beginning of the winter, the Athenians sent twenty galleys about Peloponnesus under the command of Phormio; who coming to lie at Naupactus¹, guarded the passage, that none might go in or out from Corinth and the Crisæan gulf. And other six galleys under the conduct of Melesander, they sent into Caria and Lycia; as well to gather tribute in those parts, as also to hinder the Peloponnesian pirates, lying on those coasts², from molesting the navigation of such merchant-ships as they expected to come to them from Phaselis, Phœnicia, and that part of the continent. But Melesander, landing in

year ii. A. C. 430. Ol. 87. 3.

Lycia with such forces of the Athenians and their confederates as he had aboard, was overcome in battle and slain, with the loss of a part of his army.

70. The same winter, the Potidæans unable any longer to endure the siege, seeing the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians could not make them rise, and seeing their victual failed, and that they were forced, amongst divers other things done by them for necessity of food, to eat one another, propounded at length to Xenophon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son of Aristocleidas, and Phanomachus the son of Callimachus, the Athenian commanders that lay before the city, to give the same into their hands. And they, seeing both that the army was already afflicted by laying in that cold place, and that the state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege, accepted of it. The conditions agreed on were these: “to depart, they and their wives and children, and their auxiliar soldiers, every man with one suit of clothes¹, and every woman with two; and to take with them every one a certain sum of money for his charges by the way.” Hereupon a truce was granted them to depart; and they went, some to the Chalcideans, and others to other places, as they could get to. But the people of Athens called the commanders in question for compounding without them; conceiving that they might have gotten the city to discretion: and sent afterwards a colony to Potidæa of their own citizens. These were the things done in this winter. And so ended the second year of this war, written by Thucydides.

A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3.
Potidæa rendered to the Athenians.

year ii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3.

year iii. The siege of Plataea.

The Plataeans' Speech to Archidamus.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Plataeans' speech to Archidamus.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Answer of Archidamus to the Plataeans.

The Reply of the Plataeans.

The Answer of Archidamus to their Reply.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3.

The Plataeans reply again, and desire to

71. The next summer, the Peloponnesians and their confederates came not into Attica, but turned their arms against Plataea, led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians; who having pitched his camp, was about to waste the territory thereof. But the Plataeans sent ambassadors presently unto him, with words to this effect: “Archidamus, and you Lacedaemonians, you do neither justly, nor worthy yourselves and ancestors, in making war upon Plataea. For Pausanias of Lacedaemon, the son of Cleombrotus, having, together with such Grecians as were content to undergo the danger of the battle that was fought in this our territory, delivered all Greece from the slavery of the Persians, when he offered sacrifice in the market-place of Plataea to Jupiter *the deliverer*, called together all the confederates, and granted to the Plataeans this privilege: *that their city and territory should be free*¹: *that none should make any unjust war against them, nor go about to subject them: and if any did, the confederates then present should to their utmost ability revenge their quarrel*. These privileges your fathers granted us for our valour and zeal in those dangers. But now do you the clean contrary; for you join with our greatest enemies, the Thebans, to bring us into subjection. Therefore calling to witness the gods then sworn by, and the gods both of your and our country², we require you, that you do no damage to the territory of Plataea, nor violate those oaths; but that you suffer us to enjoy our liberty in such sort as was allowed us by Pausanias.” 72. The Plataeans having thus said, Archidamus replied and said thus: “Men of Plataea, if you would do as ye say, you say what is just. For as Pausanias hath granted to you, so also be you free; and help to set free the rest, who having been partakers of the same dangers then, and being comprised in the same oath with yourselves, are now brought into subjection by the Athenians. And this so great preparation and war, is only for the deliverance of them and others; of which if you will especially participate, keep your oaths; at least (as we have also advised you formerly) be quiet, and enjoy your own in neutrality; receiving both sides in the way of friendship, neither side in the way of faction¹.” Thus said Archidamus. And the ambassadors of Plataea, when they had heard him, returned to the city: and having communicated his answer to the people, brought word again to Archidamus: “that what he had advised, was impossible for them to perform without leave of the Athenians, in whose keeping were their wives and children; and that they feared also for the whole city, lest when the Lacedaemonians were gone, the Athenians should come and take the custody of it out of their hands²; or that the Thebans, comprehended in the oath of receiving both sides, should again attempt to surprise it.” But Archidamus to encourage them, made this answer: “Deliver you unto us Lacedaemonians your city and your houses, show us the bounds of your territory, give us your trees by tale, and whatsoever else can be numbered: and depart yourselves whither you shall think good, as long as the war lasteth: and when it shall be ended, we will deliver it all unto you again. In the mean time we will keep them as deposited, and will cultivate your ground, and pay you rent for it, as much as shall suffice for your maintenance.” 73. Hereupon the ambassadors went again into the city, and having consulted with the people, made answer “that they would first acquaint the Athenians with it, and if they would consent, they would then accept the conditions: till then, they desired a suspension of arms, and not to have their territory wasted.”

know the pleasure of the people of Athens.

The Athenians' message to the Plataeans.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Plataeans' last Answer to Archidamus from the wall.

Archidamus' Protestation.

Upon this he granted them so many days truce, as was requisite for their return: and for so long forebore to waste their territory. When the Plataean ambassadors were arrived at Athens, and had advised on the matter with the Athenians, they returned to the city with this answer: “The Athenians say thus: that neither in former times, since we were their confederates, did they ever abandon us to the injuries of any; nor will they now neglect us, but give us their utmost assistance. And they conjure us by the oath of our fathers, not to make any alienation¹ touching the league.” 74. When the ambassadors had made this report, the Plataeans resolved in their councils not to betray the Athenians; but rather to endure, if it must be, the wasting of their territory before their eyes, and to suffer whatsoever misery could befall them; and no more to go forth, but from the walls to make this answer: “that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedæmonians had required.” When they had answered so, Archidamus, the king, first made a protestation to the gods and heros of the country, saying thus: “All ye Gods and Heros, protectors of Plataeis¹, be witnesses, that we neither invade this territory (wherein our fathers after their vows unto you overcame the Medes, and which you made propitious for the Grecians to fight in) unjustly now in the beginning; because they have first broken the league they had sworn: nor what we shall further do, will be any injury; because, though we have offered many and reasonable conditions, they have yet been all refused: assent ye also to the punishment of the beginners of injury, and to the revenge of those that bear lawful arms.” 75. Having made this protestation to the gods, he made ready his army for the war.

A mount raised against Plataea.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3.

The Plataeans raise their wall higher against the mount by a frame of timber, in which they laid their bricks.

The Plataeans' device to draw the earth from the mount, thro' the wall.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Peloponnesians remedy that evil.

The Plataeans fetch the earth away from under the mount by a mine.

The Plataeans make another wall within

And first having felled trees, he therewith made a palisado about the town, that none might go out. That done, he raised a mount against the wall², hoping with so great an army all at work at once, to have quickly taken it. And having cut down wood in the hill Cithæron, they built a frame of timber, and wattled it about on either side, to serve instead of walls, to keep the earth from falling too much away³; and cast into it stones, and earth, and whatsoever else would serve to fill it up. Seventy days and nights continually they poured on, dividing the work between them for rest in such manner, as some might be carrying, whilst others took their sleep and food. And they were urged to labour by the Lacedæmonians that commanded the mercenaries of the several cities¹, and had the charge of the work. The Plataëans seeing the mount to rise, made the frame of a wall with wood, which having placed on the wall of the city in the place where the mount touched², they built it within full of bricks, taken from the adjoining houses, for that purpose demolished; the timber serving to bind them together, that the building might not be weakened by the height. The same was also covered with hides and quilts³, both to keep the timber from shot of wildfire, and those that wrought from danger. So that the height of the wall was great on one side, and the mount went up as fast on the other. The Plataëans used also this device; they brake a hole in their own wall where the mount joined⁴, and drew the earth from it into the city. 76. But the Peloponnesians, when they found it out, took clay, and therewith daubing hurdles of reeds, cast the same into the chink; which mouldering not, as did the earth, they could not draw it away¹. The Plataëans excluded here, gave over that plot; and digging a secret mine, which they carried under the mount from within the city by conjecture, fetched away the earth again; and were a long time undiscovered; so that still casting on, the mount grew still less, the earth being drawn away below and settling over the part where it was voided. The Plataëans nevertheless, fearing that they should not be able even thus to hold out, being few against many, devised this further. They gave over working at the high wall against the mount, and beginning at both ends of it where the wall was low², built another wall in form of a crescent, inward to the city; that if the great wall were taken, this might resist, and put the enemy to make another mount; and by coming further in, to be at double pains, and withal more encompassable with shot. The Peloponnesians, together with the rising of their mount, brought to the city their engines of battery. One of which, by the help of the mount, they applied to the high wall; wherewith they much³ shook it, and put the Plataëans into great fear. And others to other parts of the wall; which the Plataëans partly turned aside by casting ropes about them; and partly with great beams, which, being hung in long iron chains by either end upon two other great beams, jetting over and inclining from above the wall like two horns, they drew up to them athwart, and where the engine was about to light, slacking the chains and letting their hands go, they let fall with violence, to break the beak of it. 77. After this the Peloponnesians, seeing their engines availed not, and thinking it hard to take the city by any present violence, prepared themselves to besiege it¹. But first they thought fit to attempt it by fire, being no great city, and when the wind should rise, if they could, to burn it: for there was no way they did not think on, to have gained it without expense and long

that which was to the mount.

The Peloponnesians assault the wall with engines

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3. The Plataëans' defence against the engines.

The Peloponnesians throw faggots and fire into the town from the mount.

A great fire.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 3.

siege. Having therefore brought faggots, they cast them from the mount into the space between it and their new wall, which by so many hands was quickly filled; and then into as much of the rest of the city, as at that distance they could reach²: and throwing amongst them fire, together with brimstone and pitch, kindled the wood, and raised such a flame, as the like was never seen before made by the hand of man. For as for the woods in the mountains, the trees have indeed taken fire, but it hath been by mutual attrition, and have flamed out of their own accord. But this fire was a great one; and the Plataeans that had escaped other mischiefs, wanted little of being consumed by this. For¹ near the wall they could not get by a great way: and if the wind had been with it, (as the enemy hoped it might), they could never have escaped. It is also reported, that there fell much rain then with great thunder, and that the flame was extinguished, and the danger ceased by that.

78. The Peloponnesians, when they failed likewise of this, retaining a part of their army, and dismissing the rest², enclosed the city about with a wall; dividing the circumference thereof to the charge of the several cities. There was a ditch both within and without it, out of which they made their bricks; and after it was finished, which was about the rising of Arcturus, they left a guard for one half of the wall; (for the other was guarded by the Bœotians); and departed with the rest of their army, and were dissolved according to their cities. The Plataeans had before this sent their wives and children, and all their unserviceable men, to Athens. The rest were besieged, being in number, of the Plataeans themselves four hundred, of Athenians eighty, and a hundred and ten women to dress their meat³. These were all, when the siege was first laid; and not one more, neither free nor bond, in the city. In this manner was the city besieged.

In the beginning of September the siege laid to Plataea.

79. The same summer, at the same time that this journey was made against Plataea, the Athenians with two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horsemen, made war upon the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiæans, when the corn was at the highest, under the conduct of Xenophon the son of Euripides, and two others. These coming before Spartolus in Bottiæa, destroyed the corn; and expected that the town should have been rendered by the practice of some within. But such as would not have it so having sent for aid to Olynthus before¹, there came into the city for safeguard thereof a supply both of men of arms and other soldiers from thence. And these issuing forth of Spartolus, the Athenians put themselves into order of battle² under the town itself. The men of arms of the Chalcideans, and certain auxiliaries with them, were overcome by the Athenians, and retired within Spartolus. And the horsemen of the Chalcideans and their light-armed soldiers, overcame the horsemen and light-armed of the Athenians; but they had some few targettiers besides of the territory called Crusis³. When the battle was now begun⁴, came a supply of other targettiers from Olynthus. Which the light-armed soldiers of Spartolus perceiving, emboldened both by this addition of strength, and also as having had the better¹ before, with the Chalcidean horse and this new supply charged the Athenians afresh.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. The Athenians send an army against the Chalcideans.

The Athenians foughten with by the Chalcideans at Spartolus:

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

and overthrown, with the loss of three commanders.

The Athenians hereupon retired to two companies they had left with the carriages². And as oft as the Athenians charged, the Chalcideans retired; and when the Athenians retired, the Chalcideans charged them with their shot. Especially the Chalcidean horsemen rode up, and charging them where they thought fit, forced the Athenians in extreme affright to turn their backs; and chased them a great way. The Athenians fled to Potidæa; and having afterwards fetched away the bodies of their dead upon truce, returned with the remainder of their army to Athens. Four hundred and thirty men they lost, and their chief commanders all three. And the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, when they had set up a trophy and taken up their dead bodies, disbanded and went every one to his city.

80. Not long after this the same summer, the Ambraciotes and Chaonians, desiring to subdue all Acarnania and to make it revolt from the Athenians, persuaded the Lacedæmonians to make ready a fleet out of the confederate cities, and to send a thousand men of arms into Acarnania; saying, that if they aided them both with a fleet and a land army at once, the Acarnanians of the sea-coast being thereby disabled to assist the rest, having easily gained Acarnania they might be masters afterward both of Zacynthus and Cephalonia, and the Athenians hereafter less able to make their voyages about Peloponnesus; and that there was a hope beside to take Naupactus. The Peloponnesians assenting, sent thither Cnemus, who was yet¹ admiral, with his men of arms in a few galleys immediately; and withal sent word to the cities about, as soon as their galleys were ready, to sail with all speed to Leucas. Now the Corinthians were very zealous in the behalf of the Ambraciotes, as being their own colony. And the galleys which were to go from Corinth, Sicyonia, and that part of the coast, were now making ready; and those of the Leucadians, Anactorians, and Ambraciotes, were arrived before, and stayed at Leucas for their coming. Cnemus and his thousand men of arms, when they had crossed the sea undescried of Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, presently prepared for the war by land. He had in his army, of Grecians, the Ambraciotes, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with him; and of barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who have no king, but were led by Photius and Nicanor, which two being of the families eligible had now the annual government². With the Chaonians came also the Thesprotians, they also without a king. The Molossians and Atintanians were led by Sabylinthus, protector of Tharups their king, who was yet in minority. The Parauæans were led by their king Orædus; and under Orædus served likewise, by permission of Antiochus their king, a thousand Orestians. Also Perdicas sent thither, unknown to the Athenians, a thousand Macedonians; but these last were not yet¹ arrived. With this army began Cnemus to march, without staying for the fleet from Corinth. And passing through Argeia, they destroyed² Limnæa, a town unwall'd. From thence they marched towards Stratus, the greatest city of Acarnania; conceiving that if they could take this first, the rest would come easily in.

The Ambraciotes invade Acarnania, together with the Lacedæmonians.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

The army of the Ambraciotes and their confederates.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

They go toward Stratus: the greatest city of Acarnania.

81. The Acarnanians seeing a great army by land was entered their country already, and expecting the enemy also by sea, joined not to succour Stratus, but guarded every one his own, and sent for aid to Phormio. But he answered them, that since there was a fleet to be set forth from Corinth, he could not leave Naupactus without a guard. The Peloponnesians and their confederates, with their army divided into three, marched on towards the city of the Stratians, to the end that being encamped near it, if they yielded not on parley, they might presently assault the walls. So they went on, the Chaonians and other barbarians in the middle; the Leucadians and Anactorians, and such others as were with these, on the right hand; and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes on the left; each army at great distance, and sometimes out of sight of one another. The Grecians in their march kept their order; and went warily on, till they had gotten a convenient place to encamp in. But the Chaonians confident of themselves, and by the inhabitants of that continent accounted most warlike, had not the patience to take in any ground for a camp; but carried furiously on together with the rest of the barbarians, thought to have taken the town by their clamour¹, and to have the action ascribed only to themselves. But they of Stratus, aware of this whilst they were yet in their way², and imagining, if they could overcome these thus divided from the other two armies, that the Grecians also would be the less forward to come on, placed divers ambushes not far from the city; and when the enemies approached, fell upon them both from the city and from the ambushes at once; and putting them into affright, slew many of the Chaonians upon the place: and the rest of the barbarians seeing these to shrink, stayed no longer, but fled outright. Neither of the Grecian armies had knowledge of this skirmish, because they were gone so far before to choose (as they then thought) a commodious place to pitch in. But when the barbarians came back upon them running, they received them, and joining both camps together stirred no more for that day. And the Stratians assaulted them not, for want of the aid of the rest of the Acarnanians; but used their slings against them¹, and troubled them much that way: (for without their men of arms² there was no stirring for them): and in this kind the Acarnanians are held excellent. 82. When night came, Cnemus withdrew his army³ to the river Anapus, from Stratus eighty furlongs, and fetched off the dead bodies upon truce the next day. And whereas the city Ceniadæ was come in of itself, he made his retreat thither before the Acarnanians should assemble with their succours; and from thence went every one home. And the Stratians set up a trophy of the skirmish against the barbarians.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. Wariness of the Grecians.

Rashness of the Chaonians.

Stratagem of the Stratians.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

The Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes retire without effect.

Phormio with twenty galleys of Athens, overcometh forty-seven of the Peloponnesian galleys.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

83. In the meantime the fleet of Corinth and the other confederates, that was to set out from the Crisæan gulf and to join with Cnemus, to hinder the lower Acarnanians from aiding the upper, came not at all; but were compelled to fight with Phormio and those twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, about the same time that the skirmish was at Stratus. For as they sailed along the shore, Phormio waited on them till they were out of the strait, intending to set upon them in the open sea. And the Corinthians and their confederates went not as to fight by sea, but furnished rather for the land-service in Acarnania; and never thought that the Athenians with their twenty galleys durst fight with theirs, that were seven-and-forty. Nevertheless, when they saw that the Athenians, as themselves sailed by one shore, kept over against them on the other; and that now when they went off from Patræ in Achaia to go over to Acarnania in the opposite continent, the Athenians came towards them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and also knew that they had come to anchor there the night before¹: they found they were then to fight of necessity directly against the mouth of the strait. The commanders of the fleet, were such as the cities that set it forth had severally appointed; but of the Corinthians, these; Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ordered their fleet in such manner as they made thereof a circle, as great as, without leaving the spaces so wide as for the Athenians to pass through, they were possibly able, with the stems of their galleys outward, and sterns inward; and into the midst thereof received such small vessels as came with them, and also five of their swiftest galleys; the which were at narrow passages² to come forth in whatsoever part the enemy should charge. 84. But the Athenians with their galleys ordered one after one in file, went round them and shrunk them up together, by wiping them ever as they past and putting them in expectation of present fight. But Phormio had before forbidden them to fight, till he himself had given them the signal. For he hoped³ that this order of theirs would not last long, as in an army on land; but that the galleys would fall foul of one another, and be troubled also with the smaller vessels in the midst. And if the wind should also blow out of the gulf, in expectation whereof he so went round them, and which usually blew there every morning, he made account they would then instantly be disordered. As for giving the onset, because his galleys were more agile than the galleys of the enemy, he thought it was in his own election, and would be most opportune on that occasion. When this wind was up, and the galleys of the Peloponnesians, being already contracted into a narrow compass, were both ways troubled, by the wind, and withal by their own lesser vessels that encumbered them; and when one galley fell foul of another, and the mariners laboured to set them clear with their poles, and through the noise they made, keeping off and reviling each other, heard nothing neither of their charge nor of the galleys' direction¹; and through want of skill unable to keep up their oars in a troubled sea, rendered the galley untractable to him that sat at the helm: then and with this opportunity he gave the signal. And the Athenians charging, drowned first one of the admiral-galleys, and² divers others after it in the several parts they assaulted; and brought them to that pass at length, that not one applying himself to the fight they fled all towards Patræ and Dyme, cities³ of Achaia. The Athenians, after they had chased them, and taken twelve galleys, and slain¹ most of

The order of the Peloponnesian galleys.

The order of the Athenian galleys and the stratagem of Phormio.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

The Peloponnesians fly.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

the men that were in them, fell off and went to Molycreium; and when they had there set up a trophy, and consecrated one galley to Neptune, they returned with the rest to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians with the remainder of their fleet, went presently along the coast² of Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleians; and thither, after the battle at Stratus, came also Cnemus from Leucas, and with him those galleys that were there³, and with which this other fleet should have been joined.

85. After this the Lacedæmonians sent unto Cnemus to the fleet, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophon to be of his council⁴, with command to prepare for another better fight, and not to suffer a few galleys to deprive them of the use of the sea. For they thought this accident (especially being their first proof by sea) very much against reason⁵; and that it was not so much a defect of the fleet, as of their courage: never comparing the long practice of the Athenians with their own short study in these businesses. And therefore they sent these men thither in passion. Who being arrived with Cnemus⁶, intimated to the cities about to provide their galleys, and caused those they had before to be repaired. Phormio likewise sent to Athens, to make known both the enemy's preparation and his own former victory; and withal to will them to send speedily unto him as many galleys as they could make ready; because they were every day in expectation of a new fight. Hereupon they sent him twenty galleys; but commanded him that had the charge of them, to go first into Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortyna, the public host of the Athenians, had persuaded them to a voyage against Cydonia; telling them they might take it in, being now their enemy¹: which he did to gratify the Polichnitæ, that bordered upon the Cydonians. Therefore with these galleys he sailed into Crete, and together with the Polichnitæ wasted the territory of the Cydonians; where also, by reason of the winds and weather unfit to take sea in, he wasted not a little of his time.

Preparation for another fight.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

Twenty sail of Athenians, sent to aid Phormio, stay in Crete.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

86. In the meantime, whilst these Athenians were wind-bound in Crete, the Peloponnesians that were in Cyllene, in order of battle¹ sailed along the coast of Panormus of Achaia, to which also were their land-forces come to aid them. Phormio likewise sailed by the shore to Rhium Molycrium, and anchored without it with twenty galleys, the same he had used in the former battle.

The Peloponnesians sail by the coast of Panormus.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

Now this Rhium was of the Athenians' side, and the other Rhium in Peloponnesus lies on the opposite shore, distant from it at the most but seven furlongs of sea; and these two make the mouth of the Crisæan gulf. The Peloponnesians therefore came to an anchor at Rhium of Achaia with seventy-seven galleys, not far from Panormus where they left their land forces. After they saw the Athenians, and had lain six or seven days one against the other, meditating and providing for the battle², the Peloponnesians not intending to put off without Rhium into the wide sea, for fear of what they had suffered by it before; nor the other to enter the strait, because to fight within³ they thought to be the enemy's advantage. At last Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders of the Peloponnesians, desiring to fight speedily before a new supply should arrive from Athens, called the soldiers together; and seeing the most of

them to be fearful through their former defeat, and not forward to fight again, encouraged them first with words to this effect:

87. “Men of Peloponnesus, if any of you be afraid of the battle at hand for the success of the battle past, his fear is without ground. For you know, we were inferior to them then in preparation; and set not forth as to a fight at sea, but rather to an expedition by land. Fortune likewise crossed us in many things; and somewhat we miscarried by unskilfulness¹. So as the loss can no way be ascribed to cowardice: nor is it just, so long as we were not overcome by mere force, but have somewhat to allege in our excuse, that the mind should be dejected for the calamity of the event: but we must think, that though fortune may fail men, yet the courage of a valiant man can never fail, and not that we may justify cowardice in any thing by pretending want of skill, and yet be truly valiant². And yet you are not so much short of their skill, as you exceed them in valour. And though this knowledge of theirs, which you so much fear, joined with courage, will not be without a memory also, to put what they know in execution; yet without courage no art in the world is of any force in the time of danger. For fear confoundeth the memory, and skill without courage availeth nothing. To their odds therefore of skill, oppose your odds of valour; and to the fear caused by your overthrow, oppose your being then unprovided. You have further now a greater fleet, and to fight on your own shore with your aids at hand of men of arms: and for the most part, the greatest number and best provided get the victory. So that we can neither see any one cause in particular, why we should miscarry; and whatsoever were our wants¹ in the former battle, supplied in this, will now turn to our instruction. With courage therefore, both masters and mariners, follow every man in his order², not forsaking the place assigned him. And for us, we shall order the battle as well as³ the former commanders; and leave no excuse to any man of his cowardice. And if any will needs be a coward, he shall receive condign punishment; and the valiant shall be rewarded according to their merit.”

The Oration of Cnemus.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4. Oration of Cnemus.

88. Thus did the commanders encourage the Peloponnesians. And Phormio, he likewise doubting that his soldiers were but faint-hearted, and observing they had consultations apart and were afraid of the multitude of the enemy's galleys, thought good, having called them together, to encourage and admonish them upon the present occasion. For though he had always before told them, and predisposed their minds to an opinion, that there was no number of galleys so great, which setting upon them they ought not to undertake; and [also] most of the soldiers had of long time assumed a conceit of themselves, that being¹ Athenians they ought not to decline any number of galleys whatsoever of the Peloponnesians: yet when he saw that the sight of the enemy present had dejected them, he thought fit to revive² their courage, and having assembled the Athenians, said thus:

Phormio doubteth of the courage of his soldiers:

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

and encourageth them.

the oration of phormio.

89. “Soldiers, having observed your fear of the enemy’s number, I have called you together, not enduring to see you terrified with things that are not terrible. For first, they have prepared this great number and odds of galleys, for that they were overcome before, and because they are even in their own opinions too weak for us. And next, their present boldness proceeds only from their knowledge in land service, in confidence whereof (as if to be valiant were peculiar unto them) they are now come up: wherein having for the most part prospered, they think to do the same in service by sea³. But in reason the odds must be ours in this, as well as it is theirs in the other kind. For in courage they exceed us not: and as touching the advantage of either side, we may better be⁴ bold now than they. And the Lacedæmonians, who are the leaders of the confederates, bring them to fight for the greatest part (in respect of the opinion they have of us¹) against their wills. For else they would never have undertaken a new battle, after they were once so clearly overthrown. Fear not therefore any great boldness on their part. But the fear which they have of you, is far both greater and more certain, not only for that you have overcome them before, but also for this, that they would never believe you would go about to resist, unless you had some notable thing to put in practice upon them². For when the enemy is the greater number, as these are now, they invade chiefly upon confidence of their strength: but they that are much the fewer, must have some great and sure design when they dare fight unconstrained³. Wherewith these men now amazed⁴, fear us more for our unlikely preparation, than they would if it were more proportionable. Besides, many great armies have been overcome by the lesser through unskilfulness, and some also by timorousness; both which we ourselves⁵ are free from. As for the battle, I will not willingly fight it in the gulf, nor go in thither: seeing that to a few galleys with nimbleness and art against many without art, straitness of room is disadvantage. For neither can one charge with the beak of the galley as is fit, unless he have sight of the enemy afar off; or if he be himself over-pressed, again get clear. Nor is there any getting through them or turning to and fro at one’s pleasure¹, which are all the works of such galleys as have their advantage in agility; but the sea-fight would of necessity be the same with a battle by land, wherein the greater number must have the better. But of this, I shall myself take the best care I am able. In the meantime, keep you your order well in the galleys, and every man receive his charge readily; and the rather because the enemy is at anchor so near us². In the fight, have in great estimation order and silence, as things of great force in most military actions, especially in a fight by sea; and charge these your enemies according to the worth of your former acts. You are to fight for a great wager, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesian navies, or to bring the fear of³ the sea nearer home to the Athenians. Again, let me tell you, you have beaten them once already; and men once overcome, will not come again to the danger so well resolved as before.”

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol.
87. 4. Oration of
Phormio.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol.
87. 4. Oration of
Phormio.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol.
87. 4. The stratagem
of the
Peloponnesians.

90. Thus did Phormio also encourage his soldiers. The Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians would not enter the gulf and strait, desiring to draw them in against their wills, weighed anchor, and betime in the morning having arranged their galleys by four and four in a rank, sailed along¹ their own coast within the gulf; leading the way in the same order as they had lain at anchor, with their right wing. In this wing they had placed twenty of their swiftest galleys, to the end that if Phormio, thinking them going to Naupactus, should for safeguard of the town sail along his own coast² likewise within the strait, the Athenians might not be able to get beyond that wing of theirs and avoid the impression, but be inclosed by their galleys on both sides. Phormio fearing (as they expected) what might become of the town now without guard, as soon as he saw them from anchor, against his will and in extreme haste went aboard and sailed along the shore, with the land forces of the Messenians marching by to aid him. The Peloponnesians, when they saw them sail in one long file, galley after galley, and that they were now in the gulf and by the shore (which they most desired), upon one sign given turned suddenly³ every one as fast as he could, upon the Athenians, hoping to have intercepted them every galley. But of those the eleven foremost, avoiding that wing and the turn made by the Peloponnesians, got out into the open sea⁴. The rest they intercepted, and driving them to the shore, sunk⁵ them. The men, as many as swam not out, they slew; and the galleys, some they tied to their own, and towed them away empty, and one with the men and all in her they had already¹ taken. But the Messenian² succours on land, entering the sea with their arms, got aboard of some of them; and fighting from the decks recovered them again, after they were already towing away.

The Peloponnesians give the onset.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

91. And in this part the Peloponnesians had the victory, and overcame the galleys of the Athenians. Now the twenty galleys that were their right wing, gave chase to those eleven Athenian galleys, which had avoided them when they turned, and were gotten into the open sea³. These flying toward Naupactus, arrived there before the enemies, all save one; and when they came under the temple of Apollo, turned their beak-heads and put themselves in readiness for defence, in case the enemy should follow them to the land. But the Peloponnesians, as they came after, were pæanising as if they had already had the victory; and one galley which was of Leucas, being far before the rest, gave chase to one⁴ Athenian galley that was behind the rest of the Athenians. Now it chanced that there lay out into the sea a certain ship at anchor, to which the Athenian galley first coming fetched a compass about her, and came back full butt against⁵ the Leucadian galley that gave her chase, and sunk her. Upon this unexpected and unlikely accident they began to fear; and having also followed the chase, as being victors, disorderly, some of them let down their oars into the water and hindered the way of their galleys, (a matter of very ill consequence, seeing the enemy¹ was so near), and staid for more company: and some of them, through ignorance of the coast, ran upon the shelves. 92. The Athenians seeing this took heart again, and together with one clamour² set upon them; who resisted not long, because of their present

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

The Athenians have the victory.

Timocrates, a Lacedæmonian commander, slayeth himself.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

The end of the third summer.

errors committed and their disarray; but turned, and fled to Panormus from whence at first they set forth. The Athenians followed, and took from them six galleys that were hindmost, and recovered their own which the Peloponnesians had sunk by the shore and tied astern of theirs. Of the men, some they slew, and some also they took alive. In the Leucadian galley that was sunk near the ship, was Timocrates, a³ Lacedæmonian, who, when the galley was lost, ran himself through with his sword; and his body drave into the haven of Naupactus. The Athenians falling off, erected a trophy in the place from whence they set forth to this victory; and took up their dead and the wreck, as much as was on their own shore, and gave truce to the enemy to do the like. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy, as if they also had had the victory, in respect of the flight of those galleys which they sunk by the shore; and the galley which they had taken they consecrated to Neptune in Rhium⁴ of Achaia, hard by their trophy. After this, fearing the supply which was expected from Athens, they sailed by night into the Crisæan gulf and to Corinth, all but the Leucadians. And those Athenians with twenty galleys out of Crete, that should have been with Phormio before the battle, not long after the going away of the galleys of Peloponnesus arrived at Naupactus. And the summer ended.

93. But before the fleet, gone into the Crisæan gulf and to Corinth, was dispersed, Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the commanders of the Peloponnesians in the beginning of winter, instructed by the Megareans, thought good to make¹ an attempt upon Peiræus, the haven of the Athenians. Now it was without guard or bar; and that upon very good cause, considering how much they exceeded others in the power of their navy. And it was resolved that every mariner with his oar², his cushion, and one thong for his oar to turn in, should take his way by land from Corinth to the other sea that lieth to Athens; and going with all speed to Megara, launch forty galleys out of Nisæa, the arsenal of the Megareans, which then were there, and sail presently into Peiræus. For at that time there neither stood any galleys for a watch before it, nor was there any imagination that the enemies would on such a sudden come upon them: for they durst not have attempted it openly, though with leisure; nor if they had had any such intention, could it but have been discovered¹. As soon as it was resolved on, they set presently forward; and arriving by night, launched the said galleys of Nisæa, and set sail; not now towards Peiræus, as they intended, fearing the danger, (and a wind was also said to have risen that hindered them), but toward a² promontory of Salamis, lying out towards Megara. Now there was in it a little fort, and underneath in the sea lay three galleys, that kept watch to hinder the importation and exportation of any thing to or from the Megareans. This fort they assaulted, and the galleys they towed empty away after them: and being come upon the Salaminians unawares, wasted also other parts of the island. 94. By this time the fires signifying the coming of enemies³, were lifted up towards Athens; and affrighted them more than any thing that had happened in all this war. For they in the city, thought the enemies had been already in Peiræus: and they in Peiræus, thought the city of the Salaminians had been already taken, and that the enemy would instantly come into Peiræus; which, had they not been afraid¹, nor been hindered by the wind, they might also easily have done. But the Athenians, as soon as it was day,

The Peloponnesians resolve to attempt the surprise of Peiræus.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

The Peloponnesians dare not execute their design, but turn to Salamis.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

came with the whole strength of the city into Peiræus, and launched their galleys, and embarking in haste and tumult set sail toward Salamis, leaving for the guard of Peiræus an army of foot. The Peloponnesians upon notice of these succours, having now overrun most of Salamis, and taken many prisoners and much other booty, besides the three galleys from the fort of Budorus, went back in all haste to Nisæa. And somewhat they feared the more, for that their galleys had lain long in the water², and were subject to leaking. And when they came to Megara, they went thence to Corinth again by land. The Athenians likewise, when they found not the enemy at Salamis, went home; and from that time forward looked better to Peiræus, both for the shutting of the ports and for their diligence otherwise.

95. About the same time in the beginning of the same winter, Sitalces an³ Odrysian, the son of Teres, king of Thrace, made war upon Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and upon the Chalcideans bordering on Thrace; upon two promises; one of which he required to be performed to him, and the other he was to perform himself. For Perdiccas had promised somewhat unto him, for reconciling him to the Athenians, who had formerly oppressed him with war; and for not restoring his brother Philip to the kingdom, that was his enemy: which he never paid him¹. And Sitalces himself had covenanted with the Athenians, when he made league with them, that he would end the war which they had against the Chalcideans of Thrace. For these causes therefore he made this expedition; and took with him both Amyntas the son of Philip, (with purpose to make him king of Macedonia), and also the Athenian ambassadors then with him for that business, and Agnon the Athenian commander. For the Athenians ought also to have joined with him against the Chalcideans, both with a fleet, and with as great land forces as they could provide.

The king of Thrace maketh war on the king of Macedon.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

96. Beginning therefore with the Odrysians, he levied first those Thracians that inhabit on this side² the mountains Hæmus and Rhodope, as many as were of his own dominion, down to the shore of the Euxine Sea and the Hellespont. Then beyond Hæmus he levied the Getes, and all the nations between Ister and the Euxine Sea³. The Getes and the people of those parts, are borderers upon the Scythians, and furnished as the Scythians are; all archers on horseback. He also drew forth many of those Scythians⁴ that inhabit the mountains and are free states, all sword-men, and are called Dii; the greatest part of which are on the mountain Rhodope; whereof some he hired, and some went as voluntaries. He levied also the Agrianes and Lææans, and all other the nations of Pæonia in his own dominion. These are the utmost bounds of his dominion, extending to the Graæans and Lææans, nations of Pæonia, and to the river Strymon; which rising out of the mountain Scomius passeth through the territories of the Graæans and Lææans, who make the bounds of his kingdom toward Pæonia, and are subject only to their own laws¹. But on the part that lieth to the Triballians, who are also a free people, the Treres make the bound of his dominion, and the Tilatæans. These dwell on the north side of the mountain Scomius, and reach westward as far as to the river Oscius; which cometh out of the same hill Nestus and Hebrus doth; a great and desert hill, adjoining to Rhodope.

The description of Thrace.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

97. The dimensions of the dominion of the Odrysians by the sea-side, is from the city of the Abderites to the mouth of Ister in the Euxine Sea; and is, the nearest way, four days' and as many nights' sail for a round ship¹, with a continual fore wind². By land likewise the nearest way, it is from the city Abdera to the mouth of Ister eleven days' journey for an expedite footman. Thus it lay in respect of the sea. Now for the continent; from Byzantium to the Lææans and to the river Strymon, (for it reacheth this way farthest into the main land), it is for the like footman thirteen days' journey. The tribute they received from all the barbarian nations and from the cities of Greece, in the reign of Seuthes, (who reigned after Sitalces, and made the most of it), was in gold and silver, by estimation, four hundred talents by year³. And presents of gold and silver came to as much more: besides vestures, both wrought and plain, and other furniture, presented not only to him, but also to all the men of authority⁴ and Odrysian nobility about him. For they had a custom, which also was general to all Thrace, contrary to that of the kingdom of Persia, to receive rather than to give: and it was there a greater shame to be asked and deny, than to ask and go without. Nevertheless they held this custom long, by reason of their power¹: for without gifts, there was nothing to be gotten done amongst them. So that this kingdom arrived thereby to great power. For of all the nations of Europe that lie between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it was, for revenue of money and other wealth, the mightiest; though indeed for strength of an army and multitudes of soldiers, the same be far short of the Scythians. For there is no nation, not to say of Europe, but neither of Asia, that are comparable to this, or that as long as they agree, are able, one nation to one, to stand against the Scythians. And yet in matter of counsel and wisdom in the present occasions of life, they are not like² to other men.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

The great power of the Scythians.

98. Sitalces therefore, king of this great country, prepared his army, and when all was ready, set forward and marched towards Macedonia: first, through his own dominion; then over Cercine, a desert mountain dividing the Sintians from the Pæonians, over which he marched the same way himself had formerly made with timber³, when he made war against the Pæonians. Passing this mountain out of the country of the Odrysians, they had on their right hand the Pæonians, and on the left the Sintians and Medes; and beyond it they came to the city of Doberus in Pæonia. His army, as he marched, diminished not any way, except by sickness; but increased by the accession of many free nations of Thrace, that came in uncalled in hope of booty. Insomuch as the whole number is said to have amounted to no less than a hundred and fifty thousand men: whereof the most were foot; the horse being a third part, or thereabouts. And of the horse, the greatest part were the Odrysians themselves; and the next most, the Getes. And of the foot, those sword-men, a¹ free nation that came down to him out of the mountain Rhodope, were the most warlike. The rest of the promiscuous multitude were formidable only for their number.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

The beginning of the kingdom of Macedonia.

99. Being all together at Doberus, they made ready to fall in from the hill's side into the lower Macedonia, the dominion of Perdiccas. For² there are in Macedonia, the Lyncestians and the Elimeiotæ, and other highland nations, who though they be confederates and in subjection to the other, yet have their several kingdoms by themselves. But of that part of the now Macedonia which lieth toward the sea, Alexander, the father of this Perdiccas, and his ancestors the Temenidæ, who came out of Argos, were the first possessors and reigned in the same; having first driven out of Pieria the Pierians, which afterwards seated themselves in Phagres, and other towns beyond Strymon, at the foot of Pangæum; (from which cause that country is called the Gulf¹ of Pieria to this day, which lieth at the foot of Pangæum and bendeth toward the sea); and out of that which is called Bottia, the Bottiæans, that now border upon the Chalcideans. They possessed besides a certain narrow portion of Pæonia near unto the river Axius, reaching from above down to Pella and to the sea. Beyond Axius, they possess the country called Mygdonia as far as to Strymon, from whence they have driven out the Edonians. Furthermore, they drave the Eordians out of the territory now called Eordia; (of whom the greatest part perished, but there dwell a few of them yet about Physca); and the Almopians out of Almopia. The same Macedonians subdued also other nations, and hold them yet; as Anthemus, Crestonia, and Bisaltia, and a great part of the Macedonians themselves. But the whole is called Macedonia; and was the kingdom of Perdiccas the son of Alexander, when Sitalces came to invade it.

The Macedonian kings descended of the Temenidæ, a family in Argos of the Peloponnesians.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

100. The² Macedonians unable to stand in the field against so huge an army, retired all within their strongholds and walled towns, as many as the country afforded: which were not many then; but³ were built afterwards by Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, when he came to the kingdom, who then also laid out the highways straight, and took order both for matter of war, as horses and arms and for other provision, better than all the other eight kings that were before him. The Thracian army arising from Doberus, invaded that territory first which had been the principality of Philip, and took Eidomene by force; but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other towns he had yielded to him for the love of Amyntas the son of Philip, who was then in the army. They also assaulted¹ Europus, but could not take it. Then they went on further into Macedonia, on the part that lies on the right hand of Pella² and Cyrrihus; but within these, into Bottiæa and Pieria they entered not, but wasted Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. Now the Macedonians had never any intention to make head against them with their foot, but sending out their horsemen, which they had procured from their allies of the higher Macedonia, they assaulted the Thracian army in such places where, few against many, they thought they might do it with most convenience. And where they charged, none was able to resist them, being both good horsemen and well armed with breastplates; but enclosed by the multitude of the enemies, they fought against manifest odds of number: so that in the end they gave it over, esteeming themselves too weak to hazard battle against so many.

The Macedonians retire into their walled towns.

Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, the ninth king of Macedon, of the family of the Temenidæ.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

101. After this, Sitalces gave way to a conference with Perdiccas, touching the motives of this war. And forasmuch as the Athenians were not arrived with their fleet, (for they thought not that Sitalces would have made the journey, but had sent ambassadors to him with presents), he sent a part of his army against the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, wherewith having compelled them within their walled towns, he wasted and destroyed their territory. Whilst he stayed in these parts, the Thessalians southward, and the Magnetians, and the rest of the nations subject to the Thessalians¹, and all the Grecians as far as to Thermopylæ, were afraid he would have turned his forces upon them; and stood upon their guard. And northward, those Thracians that inhabit the champaign country beyond Strymon, namely the Panæans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersæans, all of them free states, were afraid of the same. He gave occasion also to a rumour, that he meant to lead his army against all those Grecians that were enemies to the Athenians, as called in by them to that purpose by virtue of their league. But whilst he stayed, he wasted the Chalcidean, Bottiæan, and Macedonian territories; and when he could not effect what he came for, and his army both wanted victual, and was afflicted with the coldness of the season, Seuthes the son of Spardocus, his cousin-german, and of greatest authority next himself, persuaded him to make haste away. Now Perdiccas had dealt secretly with Seuthes, and promised him his sister in marriage, and money with her: and Sitalces at the persuasion of him, after the stay of full thirty days, whereof he spent eight in Chalcidea, retired with his army with all speed into his own kingdom. And Perdiccas shortly after gave to Seuthes his sister Stratonica in marriage, as he had promised. This was the issue of this expedition of Sitalces.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. Sitalces and Perdiccas come to a conference about the motives of the war.

The Grecians, at the coming of this army, stand upon their guard, fearing they were called in by the Athenians to subdue them.

year iii. A. C. 429. Ol. 87. 4.

Seuthes corrupted by Perdiccas, persuadeth Sitalces to return.

102. The same winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians was dissolved, the Athenians that were at Naupactus, under the conduct of Phormio, sailed along the coast to Astacus, and disembarking marched into the inner parts of Acarnania. He had in his army four hundred men of arms that he brought with him in his galleys, and four hundred more Messenians. With these he put out of Stratus, Coronta, and other places, all those whose fidelity he thought doubtful. And when he had restored Cynes the son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned again to their galleys. For they thought they should not be able to make war against the Ceniades (who only of all Acarnania are¹ the Athenians' enemies) in respect of the winter. For the river Achelöus, springing out of the mountain Pindus, and running through Dolopia, and through the territories of the Agræans and the Amphilochians, and through most part of the champaign of Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, and falling into the sea by the city of the Ceniades, which also it moateth about with fens, by the abundance of water maketh it hard lying there for an army in time of winter. Also most of the islands Echinades lie just over against Cenia², hard by the mouth of Achelöus. And the river, being a great one, continually

A. C. 428. Ol. 87. 4. Phormio putteth suspected persons out of Stratus and Coronta.

year iii. A. C. 428. Ol. 87. 4.

The course of the river Achelons.

The fable of Alcmæon.

year iii. A. C. 428. Ol. 87. 4.

Acarnania whence so called.

heapeth together the gravel, insomuch that some of those islands are become continent already, and the like in short time is expected by the rest³. For not only the stream of the river is swift, broad, and turbidous, but also the islands themselves stand thick, and because⁴ the gravel cannot pass, are joined one to another; lying in and out, not in a direct line, nor so much as to give the water his course directly forward into the sea. These islands are all desert, and but small ones. It is reported that Apollo by his oracle did assign this place for an habitation to Alcmaeon the son of Amphiareus, at such time as he wandered up and down for the killing of his mother; telling him, “that he should never be free from the terrors that haunted him, till he had found out and seated himself in such a land, as when he slew his mother, the sun had never seen nor was then land, because all other lands were polluted by him.” Hereupon being at a nonplus, as they say, with much ado he observed this ground congested by the river Achelöus, and thought there was enough cast up to serve¹ his turn, already, since the time of the slaughter of his mother, after which it was now a long time that he had been a wanderer. Therefore seating himself in the places about the Ceniades, he reigned there, and named the country after the name of his son Acarnas. Thus goes the report, as we have heard it concerning Alcmaeon.

103. But Phormio and the Athenians leaving Acarnania, and returning to Naupactus, in the very beginning of the spring came back to Athens; and brought with them such galleys as they had taken, and the freemen they had taken prisoners in their fights at sea, who were again set at liberty by exchange of man for man. So ended that² winter, and the third year of the war written by Thucydides.

The end of the third year of the war.

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THE THIRD BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

Attica invaded by the Peloponnesians.—The Mytilenæans revolt, and are received by the Peloponnesians at Olympia into their league.—The Athenians send Paches to Mytilene, to besiege it.—Part of the besieged Plataeans escape through the fortifications of the enemy.—The commons of Mytilene armed by the nobility for a sally on the enemy, deliver the town to the Athenians.—The residue of the Plataeans yield to the besiegers, and are put to the sword.—The proceedings upon the Mytilenæans, and their punishment.—The sedition in Corcyra.—Laches is sent by the Athens into Sicily: and Nicias into Melos.—Demosthenes fighteth against the Ætolians unfortunately; and afterwards against the Ambraciotes fortuately.—Pythadorus is sent into Sicily, to receive the fleet from Laches.—This in other three years of this war.

1. The summer following, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, at the time when corn was at the highest, entered with their army into Attica under the conduct of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; and there set them down and wasted the territory about. And the Athenian horsemen, as they were wont, fell upon the enemy where they thought fit¹, and kept back the multitude of light-armed soldiers from going out before the men of arms¹, and infesting the places near the city. And when they had stayed as long as their victual lasted, they returned; and were dissolved according to their cities.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Peloponnesians invade Attica.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

2. After the Peloponnesians were entered Attica, Lesbos immediately, all but Methymne, revolted from the Athenians; which though they would have done before the war, and² the Lacedæmonians would not then receive them, yet even now they were forced to revolt sooner than they had intended to do. For they stayed to have first straitened the mouth of their haven with dams of earth, to have finished their walls and their galleys then in building, and to have gotten in all that was to come out of Pontus, as archers, and victual, and whatsoever else they had sent for. But the Tenedians, with whom they were at odds, and the Methymnæans, and of the Mytilenæans themselves certain particular men upon faction, being hosts to the Athenians, made known unto them that the Lesbians were forced to go all into Mytilene³; that by the help of the Lacedæmonians and their kindred⁴ the Bœotians, they hastened all manner of provision necessary for a revolt; and that unless it were presently prevented, all Lesbos would be lost.

The revolt of Lesbos.

The intention of the Lesbians to revolt discovered to the Athenians.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

3. The Athenians, afflicted with the disease, and with the war now on foot and at the hottest, thought it a dangerous matter that Lesbos, which had a navy and was of strength entire, should thus be added to the rest of their enemies; and at first received not the accusations, holding them therefore the rather feigned because they would not have them true. But after, when they had sent ambassadors to Mytilene, and could not persuade them to dissolve themselves and undo their preparation, they then feared the worst, and would have prevented them: and to that purpose suddenly sent out the forty¹ galleys made ready for

The Athenians send forty galleys to Lesbos.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Athenians imprison such of Mytilene as were at Athens, and stay their galleys

Peloponnesus, with Cleïppedes and two other commanders. For they had been advertised that there was a holiday of Apollo Maloeis to be kept without the city, and that to the celebration thereof the Mytilenæans were accustomed to come all out of the town; and they hoped, making haste, to take them there unawares. And if the attempt succeeded, it was well; if not, they might² command the Mytilenæans to deliver up their galleys, and to demolish their walls; or they might make war against them, if they refused. So these galleys went their way. And ten galleys of Mytilene which then chanced to be at Athens, by virtue of their league, to aid them, the Athenians stayed; and cast into prison the men that were in them. In the meantime a certain man went from Athens into Eubœa by sea, and then by land to Geræstus; and finding there a ship ready to put off, having the wind favourable, arrived in Mytilene three days after he set forth from Athens, and gave them notice of the coming of the fleet. Hereupon they not only went not out to Maloeis¹, as was expected, but also stopped the gaps of their walls and ports, where they were left unfinished, and placed guards to defend them.

4. When the Athenians not long after arrived and saw this, the commanders of the fleet delivered to the Mytilenæans what they had in charge: which not hearkened unto, they presently fell to the war. The Mytilenæans, unprovided and compelled to a war on such a sudden, put out some few galleys before the haven to fight: but being driven in again by the galleys of Athens, they called to the Athenian commanders to parley; desiring, if they could upon reasonable conditions, to get the galleys for the present sent away. And the Athenian commander allowed the conditions², he also fearing they should be too weak to make war against the whole island.

The Athenians give the Mytilenæans time to purge themselves at Athens.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Mytilenæans sent to Lacedæmon for aid.

The Mytilenæan ambassadors speed not at Athens.

They sally out upon the Athenians, but without success.

When a cessation of arms was granted, the Mytilenæans amongst others sent to Athens one of those that had given intelligence there of their design, and had repented him after of the same, to try if they could persuade them to withdraw their fleet from them, as not intending any innovation. Withal they sent ambassadors at the same time to Lacedæmon, undiscovered of the fleet of the Athenians, which was riding at anchor in Malea¹ to the north of the city; being without any confidence of their success at Athens. And these men, after an ill voyage through the wide sea, arriving at Lacedæmon, negotiated the sending of aid from thence. 5. But when their ambassadors were come back from Athens without effect, the Mytilenæans and the rest of Lesbos, save only Methymne, (for these together with the Imbrians, Lemnians, and some few other their confederates, aided the Athenians), prepared themselves for the war. And the Mytilenæans with the whole strength of the city made a sally upon the Athenian camp, and came to a battle: wherein though the Mytilenæans had not the worse, yet they lay not that night without the walls, nor durst trust to their strength; but retiring into the town, lay quiet there, expecting to try their fortune with the accession of such forces, as (if any came) they were to have from Peloponnesus. For there were now come into the city one Meleas a Laconian and Hermiondas a Theban, who having been sent out before the revolt, but unable to arrive before the coming of the Athenian fleet, secretly after the end of the battle entered the haven in a galley, and persuaded them to send another galley along with them, with other ambassadors to Sparta; which they did. 6. But the Athenians much confirmed by this the Mytilenæans' cessation, called in their confederates: (who, because they saw no assurance on the part of the Lesbians, came much sooner in than was thought they would have done¹): and riding at anchor to the south of the city, fortified two camps, on either side one, and brought their galleys before both the ports, and so quite excluded the Mytilenæans from the use of the sea². As for the land, the Athenians held so much only as lay near their camps, which was not much; and the Mytilenæans and other Lesbians, that were now come to aid them, were masters of the rest. For Malea served the Athenians for a station only for their galleys, and to keep their market in. And thus proceeded the war before Mytilene.

They lie still, expecting help from Peloponnesus.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Athenians send for the aids of their confederates.

7. About the same time of the same summer, the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys into Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Asopius the son of Phormio. For the Acarnanians had desired them to send some son or kinsman of Phormio, for general, into those parts. These, as they sailed by, wasted the maritime country of Laconia; and then sending back the greatest part of his fleet to Athens, Asopius himself with twelve galleys went on to Naupactus. And afterwards having raised the whole power of Acarnania, he made war upon the Cœniades, and both entered with his galleys into¹ the river of Achelöus, and with his land forces wasted the territory. But when the Cœniades would not yield, he disbanded his land forces, and sailed with his galleys to Leucas, and landed his soldiers of the territory of Neritum²; but in going off was by those of the country that came out to defend it, and by some few of the garrison soldiers there, both himself and part of his

The Athenians send Asopius the son of Phormio, with twenty galleys about Peloponnesus.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

Asopius slain.

company slain. And having upon truce received from the Leucadians their dead bodies, they went their ways³.

8. Now the ambassadors of the Mytilenæans, that went out in the first galley, having been referred by the Lacedæmonians to the general meeting of the Grecians at Olympia, to the end they might determine of them together with the rest of the confederates⁴, went to Olympia accordingly. It was that Olympiad wherein Dorieus of Rhodes was the second time victor. And when after the solemnity they were set in council, the ambassadors spake unto them in this manner:

The Mytilenæan ambassadors sent to Lacedæmon, are appointed to attend the general assembly of the Grecians at Olympia.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

9. “Men of Lacedæmon and confederates, we know the received custom of the Grecians. For they that take into league such as revolt in the wars and relinquish a former league, though they like them as long as they have profit by them, yet accounting them but traitors to their former friends, they esteem the worse of them in their judgment. And to say the truth, this judgment is not without good reason, when they that revolt, and they from whom the revolt is made, are mutually like-minded and affected, and equal in provision and strength, and no just cause of their revolt given. But now between us and the Athenians it is not so. Nor let any man think the worse of us, for that having been honoured by them in time of peace, we have now revolted in time of danger. 10. For the first point of our speech, especially now we seek to come into league with you, shall be to make good the justice and honesty of our revolt¹. For we know there can be neither firm friendship between man and man, nor any communion between city and city to any purpose whatsoever, without a mutual opinion of each other’s honesty, and also a similitude of customs otherwise: for in the difference of minds is grounded the diversity of actions.

oration of the ambassadors of mytilene.

“As for our league with the Athenians, it was first made when you gave over the Medan war, and they remained to prosecute the relics of that business. Yet we entered not such a league, as to be their helpers in bringing the Grecians into the servitude of the Athenians, but to set free the Grecians from the servitude of the Medes¹. And as long as they led us as equals, we followed them with much zeal: but when we saw they remitted their enmity against the Medes, and led us² to the subjugation of the confederates, we could not then but be afraid. And the confederates, through the multitude of distinct counsels unable to

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. Oration of the Mytilenæans.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. Oration of the Mytilenæans.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. Oration of the Mytilenæans.

unite themselves for resistance, fell all but ourselves and the Chians into their subjection. And we having still our own laws, and being in name a free state, followed them to the wars; but so, as by the examples of their former actions, we held them not any longer for faithful leaders. For it was not probable, when they had subdued those whom together with us they took into league, but that, when they should be able, they would do the like also by the rest. 11. It is true that if we were now in liberty all, we might be the better assured that they would forbear to innovate; but since they have under them the greatest part already, in all likelihood they will take it ill, to deal on equal terms with us alone, and the rest yielding, to let us

only stand up as their equals. Especially when by how much they are become stronger by the subjection of their confederates, by so much the more are we become desolate. But the equality of mutual fear is the only band of faith in leagues. For he that hath the will to transgress, yet when he hath not the odds of strength, will abstain from coming on. Now the reason why they have left us yet free, is no other, but that¹ they may have a fair colour to lay upon their domination over the rest; and because it hath seemed unto them more expedient to take us in by policy, than by force. For therein they made use of us for an argument, that having equal vote with them we would never have followed them to the wars, if those against whom they led us, had not done the injury: and thereby also they brought the stronger against the weaker, and reserving the strongest to the last, made them the weaker by removing the rest. Whereas if they had begun with us, when the confederates had had both their own strength and a side to adhere to, they had never subdued them so easily. Likewise our navy kept them in some fear; lest united and added to yours or to any other, it might have created them some danger. Partly also we escaped by our observance toward their commons, and most eminent men from time to time. But yet we still¹ thought we could not do so long, considering the examples they have showed us in the rest, if this war should not have fallen out. 12. What friendship then or assurance of liberty was this, when we received each other with alienated affections: when whilst they had wars, they for fear courted us; and when they had peace, we for fear courted them: and whereas in others good will assureth loyalty, in us it was the effect of fear? So² it was more for fear than love, that we remained their confederates; and whomsoever security should first embolden, he was first likely by one means or other to break the league. Now if any man think we did unjustly, to revolt upon the expectation of evil intended without staying to be certain whether they would do it or not, he weigheth not the matter aright. For if we were as able to contrive evil against them, and again to defer it, as they can against us, being thus equal, what needed us to be at their discretion? But seeing it is in their hands to invade at pleasure, it ought to be in ours to anticipate.

13. Upon these pretensions therefore and causes, Men of Lacedæmon and confederates, we have revolted; the which are both clear enough for the hearers to judge upon, that we had reason for it, and weighty enough to affright, and compel us to take some course for our own safety: which we would have done before, when before the war we sent ambassadors to you about our revolt, but could not, because you would not then admit us into your league. And now when the Bœotians¹ invited us to it, we presently obeyed. Wherein we thought we made a double revolt² one from the Grecians, in ceasing to do them mischief with the Athenians, and helping to set them free; and another from the Athenians, in breaking first, and not staying to be destroyed by them hereafter. But this revolt of ours hath been sooner than was fit, and before we were provided for it. For which cause also the confederates ought so much the sooner to admit us into the league, and send us the speedier aid; thereby the better³, at once both to defend those you ought to defend, and to annoy your enemies. Whereof there was never better opportunity than at present. For the Athenians being both with the sickness and their great expenses consumed, and their navy divided, part upon your own coasts and part upon ours; it is not likely they should have many galleys spare, in case you

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. Oration of the Mytilenæans.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. Oration of the Mytilenæans.

again⁴ this summer invade them both by sea and land; but that they should either be unable to resist the invasion of your fleet, or be forced to come off from both our coasts. And let not any man conceive, that you shall herein at your own danger defend the territory of another. For though Lesbos seem remote, the profit of it will be near you. For the war will not be, as a man would think, in Attica; but there, from whence cometh the profit to Attica. This profit is the revenue they have from the confederates; which if they subdue us, will still be greater. For neither will any other revolt; and all that is ours will accrue unto them; and we shall be worse handled besides, than those that were under them before. But aiding us with diligence, you shall both add to your league a city that hath a great navy, the thing you most stand in need of; and also easily¹ overthrow the Athenians by subduction of their confederates, because every one will then be more confident to come in, and you shall avoid the imputation² of not assisting such as revolt unto you. And if it appear that your endeavour is to make them free, your strength in this war will be much the more confirmed. In reverence therefore of the hopes which the Grecians have reposed in you, and of the presence of Jupiter Olympius, in whose temple here we are in a manner suppliants to you, receive the Mytilenæans into league, and aid us. And do not cast us off, who (though, as to the exposing of our persons, the danger be our own) shall bring a common profit to all Greece, if we prosper, and a more common detriment to all the Grecians, if through your inflexibleness we miscarry. Be you therefore men such as the Grecians esteem you, and our fears require you to be.”

15. In this manner spake the Mytilenæans. And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, when they had heard and allowed their reasons, decreed not only a league with the Lesbians, but also again to make an invasion into Attica. And to that purpose, the Lacedæmonians appointed their confederates there present, to make as much speed as they could with two parts of their forces into the isthmus; and they themselves being first there, prepared engines in the isthmus for the drawing up of galleys, with intention to carry the navy from Corinth to the other sea that lieth towards Athens, and to set upon them both by sea and land. And these things diligently did they. But the rest of the confederates assembled but slowly, being busied in the gathering in of their fruits, and weary of warfare.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Mytilenæans taken into the Lacedæmonian league.

The Lacedæmonians prepare for the invasion of Attica, both by sea and land.

The Athenians to make show of their power, and to deter the enemy from their enterprize, send 100 galleys, not so much to waste Peloponnesus, as to confute the opinion which the Lesbian ambassadors had put into the Lacedæmonians of their weakness.

16. The Athenians perceiving all this preparation to be made upon an opinion of their weakness, and desirous to let them see they were deceived, as being able, without stirring the fleet at Lesbos, easily to master the fleet that should come against them out of Peloponnesus, manned out a hundred galleys, and embarked therein generally, both citizens (except those of the degree of Pentacosimedimni and Horsemen¹) and also strangers that dwelt amongst them: and sailing to the isthmus, made a show of their strength, and landed their soldiers in such parts of Peloponnesus as they thought fit. When the Lacedæmonians saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought it false which was spoken by the Lesbian ambassadors; and esteeming the action difficult, seeing their confederates were not arrived, and that news was brought of the wasting of the territory near their city¹ by the thirty galleys formerly sent about Peloponnesus by the Athenians, went home again; and afterwards prepared to send a fleet to Lesbos, and intimated to the cities rateably to furnish forty galleys, and appointed Alcidas, who was to go thither with them, for admiral. And the Athenians, when they saw the Peloponnesians gone, went likewise home with their hundred galleys.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

17. About¹ the time that this fleet was out, they had surely the most galleys (besides the beauty of them) together in action in these employments; yet in the beginning of the war, they had both as good, and more in number. For a hundred attended the guard of Attica, Eubœa, and Salamis; and another hundred were about Peloponnesus; besides those that were at Potidæa and other places: so that in one summer, they had in all two hundred and fifty sail. And this, together with Potidæa, was it that most exhausted their treasure. For the men of arms that besieged the city, had each of them two drachmes a day, one for himself and another for his man: and were three thousand in number that were sent thither at first and remained to the end of the siege; besides sixteen hundred more, that went with Phormio and came away before the town was won. And the galleys had all the same pay. In this manner was their money consumed², and so many galleys employed, the most indeed that ever they had manned at once.

The greatness of the Athenian navy, and occasion of their great expense of money

18. About the same time that the Lacedæmonians were in the isthmus, the Mytilenæans marched by land, both they and their auxiliaries, against Methymne, in hope to have had it betrayed unto them: and having assaulted the city, when it succeeded not the way they looked for, they went thence to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eressus: and after they had settled¹ the affairs of those places, and made strong their walls, returned speedily home. When these were gone, the Methymnæans likewise made war upon Antissa; but beaten² by the Antisæans and some auxiliaries that were with them, they made haste again to Methymne, with the loss of many of their soldiers. But the Athenians being advertised hereof, and understanding that the Mytilenæans were masters of the land, and that their own soldiers there were not enough to keep them in, sent thither, about the beginning of autumn, Paches, the son of Epicurus, with a thousand men of arms of their own city: who, supplying the place of rowers

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1. The Mytilenæans go with a power to Methymne, hoping to have it betrayed.

The Athenians send Paches with 1000 men of arms to Mytilene.

year iv. A. C. 428. Ol. 88. 1.

themselves, arrived at Mytilene, and ingirt it with a single wall: save³ that in some places, stronger by nature than the rest, they only built turrets, and placed guards in them. So that the city was every way strongly besieged, both by sea and land; and the winter began.

19. The Athenians standing in need of money for the siege, both contributed themselves, and sent thither¹ two hundred talents of this their first contribution, and also dispatched Lysicles and four others with twelve galleys, to levy money amongst the confederates. But Lysicles, after he had been to and fro and gathered money in divers places, as he was going up from Myus through the plains of Mæander in Caria as far as to the hill Sandius, was set upon there by the Carians and Anæitans²; and himself with a great part of his soldiers slain.

The end of the fourth summer.

20. The same winter the Plataeans, (for they were besieged by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians), pressed now with want of victual and hopeless of relief from Athens, and no other means of safety appearing, took counsel, both they and the Athenians that were besieged with them, at first all to go out, and if they could, to pass over the wall of the enemy by force. The authors of this attempt, were Theænetus the son of Tolmidas, a soothsayer, and Eupompidas the son of Daïmachus, one of their commanders. But half of them afterwards, by one means or other, for the greatness of the danger shrunk from it again: but two hundred and twenty or thereabouts voluntarily persisted to go out in this manner. They made them ladders, fit for the height of the enemy's wall; the wall they measured by the lays of brick, on the part toward the town where it was not plastered over; and divers men at once numbered the lays of bricks, whereof though some missed, yet the greatest part took the reckoning just; especially, numbering them so often, and at no great distance, but where they might easily see the part to which their ladders were to be applied; and so by guess¹ of the thickness of one brick, took the measure of their ladders. 21. As for the wall of the Peloponnesians, it was thus built. It consisted of a double circle, one towards Plataea, and another outward, in case of an assault from Athens. These two walls were distant one from the other about sixteen foot: and that sixteen foot of space which was betwixt them, was disposed and built into cabins for the watchmen, which were so joined and continued one to another, that the whole appeared to be one thick wall with battlements on either side. At every ten battlements stood a great tower, of a just breadth to comprehend both walls, and reach from the outmost to the inmost front of the whole; so that there was no passage by the side of a tower, but through the midst of it. And such nights as there happened any storm² of rain, they used to quit the battlements of the wall, and to watch under the towers: as being not far asunder, and covered beside overhead. Such was the form of the wall wherein¹ the Peloponnesians kept their watch. 22. The Plataeans, after they were ready, and had attended a tempestuous² night, and withal moonless, went out of

A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. The escape of 212 men out of Plataea, through the works of the enemy.

year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. They make the length of their ladders by conjecture upon counting the lays of brick.

The description of the fortification of the Peloponnesians about Plataea.

year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. The description of the Plataeans going over the enemy's walls.

year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1.

year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1.

the city; and were conducted by the same men that were the authors of the attempt. And first they passed the ditch that was about the town, and then came up close to the wall of the enemy³, who, because it was dark, could not see them coming; and the noise they made as they went⁴ could not be heard for the blustering of the wind. And they came on besides at a good distance one from the other, that they might not be betrayed by the clashing of their arms; and were but lightly armed, and not shod but on the left foot, for the more steadiness in the wet⁵. They came thus to the battlements in one of the spaces between tower and tower, knowing that there was now no watch kept there. And first came they that carried the ladders, and placed them to the wall: then twelve lightly armed, only with a dagger and a breastplate, went up, led by Ammeas the son of Corœbus, who was the first that mounted; and they that followed him, went up into either tower six. To these succeeded others lightly armed, that carried the⁶ darts, for whom they that came after carried targets at their backs, that they might be the more expedite to get up; which targets they were to deliver to them, when they came to the enemy. At length, when most⁷ of them were ascended, they were heard by the watchmen that were in the towers. For one of the Plataëans taking hold of the battlements, threw down a tile, which made a noise in the fall. And presently there was an alarm; and the army ran to the wall. For in the dark and stormy night, they knew not what the danger was; and the Plataëans that were left in the city, came forth withal, and assaulted the wall of the Peloponnesians on the opposite side to that where their men went over¹. So that though they were all in a tumult in their several places, yet not any of them that watched durst stir to the aid of the rest, nor were able to conjecture what had happened. But those three hundred that were appointed to assist the watch upon all occasions of need, went without the wall and made towards the place of the clamour. They also held up the fires by which they used to make known the approach of enemies, towards Thebes. But then the Plataëans likewise held out many other fires from the wall of the city, which for that purpose they had before prepared, to render the fires of the enemy insignificant; and that the Thebans apprehending the matter otherwise than it was, might forbear to send help till their men were over and had recovered some place of safety. 23. In the meantime those Plataëans, which having scaled the wall first and slain the watch were now masters of both the towers, not only guarded the passages by standing themselves in the entries, but also applying ladders from the wall to the towers, and conveying many men to the top, kept the enemies off with shot both from above and below. In the mean space, the greatest number of them having reared to the wall many ladders at once, and beaten down the battlements, passed quite over between the towers. And ever as any of them got to the other side, they stood still upon the brink of the ditch without, and with arrows and darts kept off those that came by the outside¹ of the wall to hinder their passage. And when the rest were over, then last of all², and with much ado, came they also down to the ditch which were in the two towers. And by this time, the three hundred that were to assist the watch, came and set upon them, and had lights with them; by which means the Plataëans that were on the further brink of the ditch, discerned them the better from out of the dark, and aimed their arrows and darts at their most disarmed parts: for³ standing in the dark, the lights of the enemy made the Plataëans the less discernible; insomuch as these last passed the ditch, though with difficulty and force. For the water in it was frozen over, though not so hard as to bear, but watery, and such as when the wind is at east rather than at north. And the snow which fell that night, together with so great a wind as that was, had

very much increased the water; which they waded through with scarce their heads above. But yet the greatness of the storm was the principal means of their escape.

24. From the ditch the Plataeans in troop took the way towards Thebes, leaving on the left hand the temple of Juno¹ built by Androcrates, both for that they supposed they would least suspect the way that led to their enemies, and also because they saw the Peloponnesians with their lights pursue that way, which by Mount Cithæron and the Oak-heads² led to Athens, The Plataeans, when they had gone six or seven furlongs, forsook the Theban way, and turned into that which led towards the mountain to Erythræ and Hysiæ; and having gotten the hills, escaped through to Athens, being two hundred and twelve persons of a greater number. For some of them returned into the city before the rest went over; and one of their archers was taken upon the ditch without. And so the Peloponnesians gave over the pursuit, and returned to their places. But the Plataeans that were within the city, knowing nothing of the event, and those that turned back having told them that not a man escaped, as soon as it was day sent a herald to entreat a truce for the taking up of their dead bodies; but when they knew the truth, they gave it over. And thus these men of Plataea passed through the fortification of their enemies, and were saved.

year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1.

25. About the end of the same winter Salæthus, a Lacedæmonian, was sent in a galley to Mytilene; and coming first to Pyrrha, and thence going to Mytilene by land, entered the city by the dry channel of a certain torrent which had a passage through the wall of the Athenians, undiscovered. And he told the magistrates that Attica should again be invaded, and that the forty galleys which were to aid them were coming; and that himself was sent afore, both to let them know it, and withal to give order in the rest of their affairs. Hereupon the Mytilenæans grew confident, and hearkened less to composition with the Athenians. And the winter ended, and the fourth year of this war written by Thucydides.

Salæthus a Lacedæmonian, entereth secretly into Mytilene, and confirmeth them with hope of speedy aid.

year iv. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1.

26. In the beginning of the summer, after they had sent Alcidas away with the forty-two¹ galleys, whereof he was admiral, unto Mytilene, both they and their confederates invaded Attica; to the end that the Athenians, troubled on both sides, might the less send supply against the fleet now gone to Mytilene. In this expedition Cleomenes was general instead of Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who being king was yet in minority², and Cleomenes was his uncle by the father. And they now cut down both what they had before wasted and began to grow again, and also whatsoever else they had before pretermitted: and this was the sharpest invasion of all but the second. For whilst they stayed to hear news from their fleet at Lesbos, which by this time they supposed to have been arrived, they went abroad and destroyed most part of the country. But when nothing succeeded according to their hopes, and seeing their corn failed, they retired again, and were dissolved according to their cities.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Attica the fourth time invaded.

Pausanias king of Lacedæmon.

27. The Mytilenæans in the meantime, seeing the fleet came not from Peloponnesus, but delayed the time, and their victuals failed, were constrained to make their composition with the Athenians upon this occasion. Salæthus, when he also expected these galleys no longer, armed the commons of the city, who were before unarmed¹, with intention to have made a sally upon the Athenians. But they, as soon as they had gotten arms, no longer obeyed the magistrates; but holding assemblies by themselves, required the rich men² either to bring their corn to light and divide it amongst them all, or else, they said, they would make their composition by delivering up the city to the Athenians. 28. Those that managed the state perceiving this and unable to hinder it, knowing also their own danger in case they were excluded out of the composition, they all jointly agreed to yield the city to Paches and his army with these conditions: “to be proceeded withal at the pleasure of the people of Athens, and to receive the army into the city; and that the Mytilenæans should send ambassadors to Athens about their own business: and that Paches, till their return, should neither put in bonds, nor make slave of, nor slay any Mytilenæan”. This was the effect of that composition. But such of the Mytilenæans as had principally practised with the Lacedæmonians, being³ afraid of themselves, when the army was entered the city durst not trust to the conditions agreed on, but took sanctuary at the altars. But Paches having raised them upon promise to do them no injury, sent them to Tenedos, to be in custody there till the people of Athens should have resolved what to do. After this he sent some galleys to Antissa, and took in that town; and ordered the affairs of his army as he thought convenient.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Salæthus arms the commons for a sally. They mutiny, and give up the town.

Some of the Mytilenæans fearing the worst take sanctuary:

whom Paches persuadeth to rise:

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. and sendeth them to be in custody at Tenedos.

The voyage of Alcidas with forty galleys into Ionia.

Alcidas with his fleet, at Embatus is assured of the loss of Mytilene.

The advice of Teutiaplus in the council of war.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

The advice of certain outlaws of Ionia and Lesbos.

The cowardly resolution of Alcidas.

29. In the meantime those forty galleys of Peloponnesus, which should have made all possible haste, trifled away the time about Peloponnesus; and making small speed in the rest of their navigation, arrived at Delos unknown to the Athenians at Athens. From thence sailing to Icarus and Myconus, they got first intelligence of the loss of Mytilene. But to know the truth more certainly, they went thence to Embatus¹ in Erythræa. It was about the seventh day after the taking of Mytilene, that they arrived at Embatus; where understanding the certainty, they went to council about what they were to do upon the present occasion; and Teutiaplus, an Eleian, delivered his opinion to this effect: 30. “Alcidas, and the rest that have command of the Peloponnesians in this army, it were not amiss, in my opinion, to go to Mytilene as we are, before advice be given of our arrival. For in all probability we shall find the city, in respect they have but lately won it, very weakly guarded, and to the sea (where they expect no enemy, and we are chiefly strong) not guarded at all. It is also likely that their land soldiers are dispersed, some in one house and some in another, carelessly as victors. Therefore if we fall upon them suddenly and by night, I think, with the help of those within, if any be left there that will take our part, we may be able to possess ourselves of the city. And we shall never fear the danger, if we but think this: that all stratagems¹ of war whatsoever are no more but such occasions as this, which if a commander avoid in himself, and take the advantage of them in the enemy, he shall for the most part have good success.” 31. Thus said he; but prevailed not with Alcidas. And some others, fugitives of Ionia and those Lesbians that were with him in the fleet, gave him counsel, that seeing he feared the danger of this, he should seize some city of Ionia, or Cume in Æolia; that having some town for the seat of the war, they might from thence force Ionia to revolt; whereof there was hope, because the Ionians would not be unwilling to see him there: and if² they could withdraw from the Athenians this their great revenue, and withal put them to maintain a fleet against them, it would be a great exhausting of their treasure. They said besides, that they thought they should be able to get Pissuthnes to join with them in the war. But Alcidas rejected this advice likewise, inclining rather to this opinion, that since they were come too late to Mytilene, they were best to return speedily into Peloponnesus. 32. Whereupon putting off from Embatus, he sailed by the shore to Myconus of the Teians, and there slew most of the prisoners he had taken by the way. After this he put in at Ephesus: and thither came ambassadors to him from the Samians of Anæa³, and told him that it was but an ill manner of setting the Grecians at liberty, to kill such as had not lift up their hands against him, nor were indeed enemies to the Peloponnesians, but confederates to the Athenians by constraint; and that unless he gave over that course, he would make few of the enemies his friends, but many now friends to become his enemies. Wherefore upon these words of the ambassadors he set the Chians and some others, all that he had left alive, at liberty¹. For when men saw their fleet, they never fled from it, but came unto them as to Athenians; little imagining that the Athenians being masters of the sea, the Peloponnesians durst have put over to Ionia. 33. From Ephesus Alcidas went away in haste, indeed fled; for he had been descried by the Salaminia and the Paralus², (which by chance were then in their course for Athens),

He killeth his prisoners.

The Samians sharply reprehend him.

III.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

Alcidas maketh haste from Ephesus homeward.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Paches pursueth the Peloponnesians, and is glad he overtaketh them not.

whilst he lay at anchor about Claros; and fearing to be chased, kept the wide sea; meaning by his good will to touch no land till he came into Peloponnesus. But the news of them came to Paches from divers places³, especially from Erythræa. For the cities of Ionia being unwall'd, were afraid extremely lest the Peloponnesians sailing by, without intention to stay, should have pillaged them as they passed. But the Salaminia and the Paralus having seen him at Claros, brought the news themselves¹. And Paches thereupon made great haste after, and followed him as far as Latmos² the island. But when he saw he could not reach him, he came back again; and thought he had a good turn, seeing he could not overtake those galleys upon the wide sea, that the same were not compelled, by being taken in some place near land, to fortify themselves, and so to give him occasion with guards and galleys to attend them.

34. As he came by in his return, he put in at Notium, a city of the Colophonians, into which the Colophonians came and inhabited, after the town above, through their own³ sedition, was taken by Itamanes and the barbarians. (This town was taken at the time when Attica was the second time invaded by the Peloponnesians). They then that came down and dwelt in Notium, falling again into sedition, the one part having procured some forces, Arcadians⁴ and barbarians, of Pissuthnes, kept them in a part of the town which they had severed from the rest with a wall; and there, with such of the Colophonians of the high town as being of the Medan faction entered with them, they governed the city at their pleasure¹: and the other part, which went out from these and were the fugitives, brought in Paches. He, when he had called out Hippias, captain of the Arcadians that were within the said wall, with promise, if they should not agree, to set him safe and sound within the wall again; and Hippias was thereupon come to him: committed him to custody, but without bonds; and withal assaulting the wall on a sudden, when they expected not, took it, and slew as many of the Arcadians and barbarians as were within: and when he had done, brought Hippias in again, according as he had promised; but after he had him there, laid hold on him and caused him to be shot to death: and restored Notium to the Colophonians, excluding only such as had medized. Afterwards the Athenians sent governors² to Notium of their own; and having gathered together the Colophonians out of all cities whatsoever, seated them there under the law of the Athenians.

Paches restoreth Notium to the Colophonians, driven out by sedition.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Paches parleyeth with Hippias:

his equivocation with Hippias, whom he put to death contrary to promise.

Paches taketh Pyrrha, and Eressus: he apprehendeth Salæthus in Mytilene.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. The Athenians slay Salæthus, though he offer to withdraw the Peloponnesians from the siege of Plataea.

35. Paches, when he came back to Mytilene, took in Pyrrha and Eressus: and having found Salæthus the Lacedæmonian hidden in Mytilene, apprehended him, and sent him, together with those men he had put in custody at Tenedos, and whomsoever else he thought author of the revolt, to Athens. He likewise sent away the greatest part of his army; and with the rest stayed and settled the state of Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, as he thought convenient. 36. These men, and Salæthus with them, being arrived at Athens, the Athenians slew Salæthus presently; though he made them many offers, and amongst other, to get the army of the Peloponnesians to rise from before Plataea; for it was yet besieged. But upon the rest they went to council; and in their passion decreed to put them to death, not only those men there present, but also all the men of Mytilene that were of age; and to make slaves of the women and children: laying to their charge the revolt itself, in that they revolted not being in subjection as others were: and withal the Peloponnesian fleet, which durst enter into Ionia to their aid, had not a little aggravated that commotion¹. For by that it seemed that the revolt was not made without much premeditation. They therefore sent a galley to inform Paches of their decree, with command to put the Mytilenæans presently to death. But the next day they felt a kind of repentance in themselves; and began to consider what a great and cruel decree it was, that not the authors only, but the whole city should be destroyed. Which when the ambassadors of the Mytilenæans that were there present, and such Athenians as favoured them, understood, they wrought with those that bare office², to bring the matter again into debate; wherein they easily prevailed, forasmuch as to them also it was well known, that the most of the city were desirous to have means to consult of the same anew. The assembly being presently met, amongst the opinions of divers others Cleon also, the son of Cleænetus, who in the former assembly had won to have them killed, being of all the citizens most violent and with the people at that time far the most powerful, stood forth and said in this manner:

The cruel decree of the Athenians in their passion against the Mytilenæans.

The Athenians repent of their decree, and consult anew.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Cleon most popular and most violent.

37. “I have often on other occasions thought a democracy uncapable of dominion over others; but most of all now for this your repentance concerning the Mytilenæans. For through your own mutual security and openness, you imagine the same also in your confederates; and consider not, that when at their persuasion you commit an error or relent upon compassion, you are softened thus to the danger of the commonwealth, not to the winning of the affections of your confederates: nor do you consider, that your government is a tyranny, and those that be subject to it are against their wills so, and are plotting continually against you; and obey you not for any good turn, which to your own detriment you shall do them, but only for that you exceed them in strength, and for no good will. But the worst mischief of all is this¹, that nothing we decree shall stand firm, and that we will not know, that a city with the worse laws, if immoveable, is better than one with good laws, when they be not binding; and that a plain wit accompanied with modesty, is more profitable to the state than dexterity with arrogance; and that the more ignorant² sort of men do, for the most part, better regulate a commonwealth than they that are wiser. For these love to appear wiser than

the oration of cleon.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Cleon.

the laws, and 1 in all public debates to carry the victory, as the worthiest things wherein to show their wisdom; from whence most commonly proceedeth the ruin of the states they live in. Whereas the other sort, mistrusting their own wits, are content to be esteemed not so wise as the laws, and not able to carp at what is well spoken by another: and so making themselves equal judges rather than contenders for mastery, govern a state for the most part well. We therefore should do the like; and not be carried away with combats of eloquence and wit, to give such counsel to your multitude as in our own judgments we think not good.

38. “For my own part, I am of the opinion I was before; and I wonder at these men that have brought this matter of the Mytilenæans in question again, and thereby caused delay, which is the advantage only of them that do the injury. For the sufferer by this means comes upon the doer with his anger dulled; whereas revenge 2, the opposite of injury, is then greatest when it follows presently. I do wonder also, what he is that shall stand up now to contradict me, and shall think to prove that the injuries done us by the Mytilenæans are good for us, or that our calamities are any damage to our confederates. For certainly he must either trust in his eloquence, to make you believe that that which was decreed, was not decreed; or moved with lucre, must with some elaborate speech endeavour to seduce you. Now of such matches [of eloquence] as these, the city giveth the prizes to others; but the danger that hence proceedeth, she herself sustaineth. And of all this you yourselves are the cause, by the evil institution of these matches, in that you use to be spectators of words, and hearers of actions; beholding future actions in the words of them that speak well, as possible to come to pass; and actions already past in the orations of such as make the most of them, and that with such assurance, as if what you saw with your eyes were not more certain than what you hear related 1. You are excellent men for one to deceive with a speech of a new strain, but backward to follow any tried advice; slaves to strange things, contemners of things usual. You 2 would every one chiefly give the best advice, but if you cannot, then you will contradict those that do. You would not be thought to come after with your opinion; but rather if any thing be acutely spoken, to applaud it first, and to appear ready apprehenders of what is spoken, even before it be out; but slow to preconceive the sequel of the same. You would hear, as one may say, somewhat else than what our life is conversant in; and yet you sufficiently understand not that that is before your eyes. And to speak plainly, overcome with the delight of the ear, you are rather like unto spectators sitting to hear the contentions of sophisters, than to men that deliberate of the state of a commonwealth. 39. To put you out of this humour, I say unto you, that the Mytilenæans have done us more injury than ever did any one city. For those that have revolted through the over-hard pressure of our government, or that have been compelled to it by the enemy, I pardon them. But they that were islanders and had their city walled, so as they needed not fear our enemies but only by sea; in which case also they were armed for them with sufficient provision of galleys; and they that were permitted to have their own laws and whom we principally honoured, and yet have done thus; what have they done but conspired against us, and

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The nature of the multitude in council, lively set forth.

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year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Cleon.

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rather warred upon us than revolted from us, (for a revolt is only of such as suffer violence), and joined with our bitterest enemies to destroy us? This is far worse than if they had warred against us for increasing of their own power¹. But these men would neither take example by their neighbour's calamity, who are, all that revolted, already subdued by us; nor could their own present felicity make them afraid of changing it into misery: but being bold against future events, and aiming at matters above their strength, though below their desires, have taken arms against us, and preferred force before justice. For no sooner they thought they might get the victory, but immediately, though without injury done them, they rose against us. But with cities that come to great and unexpected prosperity, it is usual to turn insolent: whereas most commonly that prosperity which is attained according to the course of reason, is more firm than that which cometh unhop'd for; and such cities¹, as one may say, do more easily keep off an adverse, than maintain a happy fortune. Indeed we should not formerly have done any honour more to the Mytilenæans than to the rest of our confederates; for then they had never come to this degree of insolence. For it is natural to men to condemn those that observe them, and to have in admiration such as will not give them way. Now therefore let them be punished according to their wicked dealing; and let not the fault be laid upon a few, and the people be absolved. For² they have all alike taken arms against us: and the commons, if they had been constrained to it, might have fled hither, and have recovered their city afterwards again. But they, esteeming it the safer adventure to join with the *few*, are alike with them culpable of the revolt. Have also in consideration your confederates: and if you inflict the same punishment on them that revolt upon compulsion of the enemy, that you do on them that revolt of their own accord, who, think you, will not revolt, though on light pretence; seeing that speeding they win their liberty, and failing their case is not incurable? Besides, that against every city we must be at a new hazard, both of our persons and fortunes. Wherein with the best success, we recover but an exhausted city, and lose that wherein our strength lieth, the revenue of it; but miscarrying, we add these enemies to our former, and must spend that time in warring against our own confederates, which we needed to employ against the enemies we have already.

40. "We must not therefore give our confederates hope of pardon, either impetrable by words or purchaseable by money, as if¹ their errors were but such as are commonly incident to humanity. For these did us not an injury unwillingly, but wittingly conspired against us; whereas it ought to be involuntary whatsoever is pardonable. Therefore both then at first, and now again I maintain, that you ought not to alter your former decree, nor to offend in any of these three most disadvantageous things to empire, *pity*, *delight in plausible speeches*, and *lenity*. As for pity, it is just to show it on them that are like us, and will have pity again; but not upon such as not only would not have had pity upon us, but must also of necessity have been² our enemies for ever hereafter. And for the rhetoricians that delight you with their orations, let them play their prizes in matters of less weight, and not in such wherein the city for a little pleasure must suffer a great damage, but they for their well speaking must well have³. Lastly for lenity, it is to be used towards those that will be our friends hereafter, rather than towards such, as⁴ being suffered to live, will still be as they are, not a jot the less our enemies. In sum I say only this, that if you follow my advice, you shall do

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that which is both just in respect of the Mytilenæans, and profitable for yourselves: whereas if you decree otherwise, you do not gratify them, but condemn yourselves. For if these have justly revolted, you must unjustly have had dominion over them. Nay¹ though your dominion be against reason, yet if you resolve to hold it, you must also, as a matter conducing thereunto, against reason punish them; or else you must give your dominion over, that you may be good without danger. But if you consider what was likely they would have done to you, if they had prevailed, you cannot but think them worthy the same punishment; nor be less sensible, you that have escaped, than they that have conspired; especially they having done the injury first. For such as do an injury without precedent cause, persecute most, and even to the death, him they have done it to; as jealous of the danger his remaining enemy may create him: for he that is wronged without cause, and escapeth, will commonly be more cruel than if it were against any enemy on equal quarrel. Let us not therefore betray ourselves, but in contemplation² of what you were near suffering, and how you once prized above all things else to have them in your power, requite them now accordingly. Be not softened at the sight of their present estate, nor forget the danger that hung over our own heads so lately. Give not only unto these their deserved punishment, but also unto the rest of our confederates a clear example, that death is their sentence whensoever they shall rebel. Which when they know, you shall the less often have occasion to neglect your enemies, and fight against your own confederates.”

41. To this purpose spake Cleon. After him Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who also in the former assembly opposed most the putting of the Mytilenæans to death, stood forth and spake as followeth.

42. “I will neither blame those who have propounded the business of the Mytilenæans to be again debated, nor commend those that find fault with often consulting in affairs of great importance. But I am of opinion that nothing is so contrary to good counsel as these two, *haste* and *anger*: whereof the one is ever accompanied with madness, and the other with want of judgment¹. And whosoever maintaineth that words are not instructors to deeds, either he is not wise, or doth it upon some private interest of his own. Not wise, if he think that future, and not apparent things, may be demonstrated otherwise than by words: interested, if desiring to carry an ill matter, and knowing that a bad cause will not bear a good speech, he go about to deter his opposers and hearers by a good calumnation. But they of all others are most intolerable, that² when men give public advice, will accuse them also of bribery. For if they charged a man with no more but ignorance, when he had spoken in vain, he might yet depart with the opinion of¹ a fool. But when they impute corruption also, if his counsel take place he is still suspected; and if it do not take place, he shall be held not only a fool, but also void of honesty. The commonwealth gets no good by such courses: for through fear hereof it will want counsellors. And the state would do their business for the most part well, if this kind of citizens were they that had least ability in speaking; for they should then persuade the city to the fewer errors. For a good statesman should not go about to terrify those that contradict him, but² rather to make good his counsel upon liberty of speech. And a wise state

the oration of diodotus.

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ought not either to add unto, or on the other side, to derogate from the honour of him that giveth good advice; nor³ yet punish, nay nor disgrace the man whose counsel they receive not. And then, neither would he that lighteth on good advice⁴, deliver anything against his own conscience, out of ambition of further honour and to please the auditory; nor he that doth not, covet thereupon, by gratifying the people some way or other, that he also may endear them⁵. 43. But we do here the contrary: and besides, if any man be suspected of corruption, though he give the best counsel that can be given, yet through envy, for this uncertain opinion of his gain, we lose a certain benefit to the commonwealth. And our custom is to hold good counsel, given¹ suddenly, no less suspect then bad: by which means, as he that gives the most dangerous counsel, must get the same received by fraud; so also he that gives the most sound advice, is forced by lying to get himself believed. So that the commonwealth is it alone, which by reason of these suspicious² imaginations, no man can possibly benefit by the plain and open way without artifice. For if any man shall do a manifest good unto the commonwealth, he shall presently be suspected of some secret gain unto himself in particular. We therefore, that in the most important affairs and amidst³ these jealousies do give our advice, have need to foresee further than you, that look not far; and the rather, because we stand accountable for our counsel⁴, and you are to render no account of your hearing it. For if the persuader and the persuaded had equal harm, you would be the more moderate judges. But now, according to the passion that takes you, when at any time your affairs miscarry, you punish the sentence of that one only that gave the counsel, not the many sentences of your own that were in fault as well as his.

44. "For my own part, I stood not forth with any purpose of contradiction in the business of the Mytilenæans, nor to accuse any man. For we contend not now, if we be wise, about the injury done by them, but about the wisest counsel for ourselves. For how great soever be their fault, yet I would never advise to have them put to death, unless it be for our profit; [nor yet would I pardon them¹,] though they were pardonable, unless it be good

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for the commonwealth. And in my opinion, our deliberation now is of the future, rather than of the present. And whereas Cleon² contendeth, that it will be profitable for the future, to put them to death, in that it will keep the rest from rebelling: I contending likewise for the future³, affirm the contrary. And I desire you not to reject the profit of my advice for the fair pretexts of his; which⁴ agreeing more with your present anger against the Mytilenæans, may quickly perhaps win your consent. We plead not judicially with the Mytilenæans so as to need arguments of equity, but we consult of them, which way we may serve ourselves of them to our most advantage hereafter. 45. I say therefore, that death hath been in states ordained for a punishment of many offences, and those not so great, but far less than this. Yet encouraged by hope, men hazard themselves: nor did any man ever yet enter into a practice, which he knew he could not go through with. And a city when it revolteth, supposeth itself to be better furnished, either of themselves or by their confederates, than it is, or else it would never take the enterprise in hand. They have it by nature, both men and cities, to commit offences; nor is there any law that can prevent it. For men have gone over all degrees of punishment, augmenting¹ them still, in hope to be less annoyed by malefactors. And it is likely that gentler punishments were inflicted of old, even upon

the most heinous crimes; but that in tract of time, men continuing to transgress, they were extended afterwards to the taking away of life; and yet they still transgress. And therefore either some greater terror than death must be devised, or death will not be enough for coercion. For poverty will always add boldness to necessity; and wealth, covetousness to pride and contempt. And the other [middle] fortunes, they also through human passion, according as they are severally subject to some insuperable one or other, impel men to danger. But hope and desire² work this effect in all estates. And this as the leader, that as the companion; this contriving the enterprize, that suggesting the success, are the cause of most crimes that are committed: and being least discerned, are more mischievous than evils seen. Besides these two, fortune also puts men forward as much as anything else¹. For presenting herself sometimes unlooked for, she provoketh some to adventure, though not provided as they ought for the purpose; and specially cities, because they venture for the greatest matters, as liberty and dominion over others; and amongst a generality, every one, though without reason, somewhat the more magnifies himself in particular². In a word, it is a thing impossible, and of great simplicity to believe, when human nature is earnestly bent to do a thing, that by force of law or any other danger it can be diverted.

46. “We must not therefore, relying on the security of capital punishment, decree the worst³ against them, nor make them desperate, as if there were no place to repent, and as soon as they can, to cancel their offence. For observe: if a city revolted should know it could not hold out, it would now compound, whilst it were able both to pay us our charges for the present and our tribute for the time to come. But the way that Cleon prescribeth, what city, think you, would not provide itself better than this did; and endure the siege to the very last, if to compound late and soon be all one? And how can it be but detriment to us, to be at charge of long sieges through their obstinacy, and when we have taken a city, to find it exhausted, and to lose the revenue of it for the future? And this revenue is the only strength we have against our enemies. We are not then to be¹ exact judges in the punishment of offenders, but to look rather how by their moderate punishment we may have our confederate cities, such as they may be able to pay us tribute; and not think to keep them in awe by the rigour of laws, but by the providence of our own actions. But we to the contrary, when we recover a city, which having been free and held under our obedience by force hath revolted justly², think now that we ought to inflict some cruel punishment upon them. Whereas we ought rather, not mightily to punish a free city revolted, but mightily to look to it before it revolt, and to prevent the intention of it; but³ when we have overcome them, to lay the fault upon as few as we can. 47. Consider also, if you follow the advice of Cleon, how much you shall offend likewise in this other point. For in all your⁴ cities the commonalty are now your friends, and either revolt not with the few, or if they be compelled to it by force, they presently turn enemies to them that caused the revolt: whereby when you go to war, you have the commons of the adverse city on your side. But if you shall destroy the commonalty of the Mytilenæans, which did neither partake of the revolt, and as soon as they were armed presently delivered the city into your hands: you shall first do unjustly, to kill such as have done you service; and you shall effect a work besides, which the great men do everywhere most desire. For when they have made a city to revolt, they shall have the people presently on their side; you having foreshewn

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Diodotus.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of Diodotus.

them by the example, that both the guilty and not guilty must undergo the same punishment. Whereas indeed though they were guilty, yet we ought to dissemble it; to the end that the only party now our friend, may not become our enemy. And for the assuring of our dominion, I think it far more profitable voluntarily to put up an injury, than justly to destroy such as we should not. And that same both *justice* and *profit* of revenge, alleged by Cleon, can never possibly be found together in the 1 same thing.

48. “You therefore, upon knowledge that this is the best course, not upon compassion or lenity, (for neither would I have you won by that), but upon consideration of what hath been advised, be ruled by me, and proceed to judgment at your own leisure against those whom Paches hath sent hither as guilty, and suffer the rest to enjoy their city. For that will be both good for the future, and also of present terror to the enemy. For he that consulteth wisely, is a sorer enemy than he that assaulteth with the strength of action unadvisedly.”

49. Thus spake Diodotus. After these two opinions were delivered, the one most opposite to the other, the Athenians were 2 at contention which they should decree; and at the holding up of hands they were both sides almost equal: but yet the sentence of Diodotus prevailed. Whereupon they presently in haste sent away another galley, lest not arriving before the former 1 they should find the city already destroyed. The first galley set forth before the second a day and a night. But the Mytilenæan ambassadors having furnished this latter with wine and barley cakes, and promised them great rewards if they overtook the other galley, they rowed diligently, at one and the same time both plying their oars, and taking their refection of the said barley cakes steeped in wine and oil; and by turns part of them slept 2, and the other part rowed. It happened also that there blew no wind against them; and the former galley making no great haste, as going on so sad an errand, whereas the former proceeded 3 in the manner before mentioned, arrived indeed first, but only so much as Paches had read the sentence, and prepared 4 to execute what they had decreed. But presently after came in the other galley, and saved the city from being destroyed. So near were the Mytilenæans to the danger.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. The sentence of Diodotus taketh place.

A galley sent out after the former, with a sentence of mercy.

The speed of this latter galley to overtake the former that carried the decree of death.

The commons of Mytilene very near destruction

50. But those whom Paches had sent home as most culpable of the revolt, the Athenians, as Cleon had advised, put to death; being in number somewhat above a thousand. They also razed the walls of Mytilene, and took from them all their galleys. After which they imposed on the Lesbians no more tribute, but having divided their land (all but that of the Methymnæans) into three thousand parts, three hundred of those parts [of the choicest land] they consecrated to the gods 1. And for the rest, they sent men by lot out of their own city to possess it; of whom the Lesbians at the rent of two minæ of silver yearly upon a lot, had the land again to be husbanded by themselves. The Athenians took in all such towns 2 also, as the Mytilenæans were masters of in the continent; which were afterwards made subjects to the people of Athens. Thus ended the business touching Lesbos.

About a thousand principal authors of the revolt executed.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

51. The same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, the Athenians, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, made war on Minoa, an island adjacent to Megara. For the Megareans had built a tower in it, and served themselves of the island for a place of garrison. But Nicias desired that the Athenians might keep their watch upon Megara in that island, as being nearer, and no more at Budorum and Salamis; to the end that the Peloponnesians might not go out thence with their galleys undescried, nor send out pirates, as they had formerly done, and to prohibit the importation of all things to the Megareans by sea. Wherefore when he had first taken two towers that stood out from Nisæa¹, with engines applied from the sea, and so made a free entrance for his galleys between the island and the firm land, he took it in with a wall also from the continent, in that part where it might receive aid by a bridge over the marshes; for it was not far distant from the main land. And, that being in few days finished, he built a fort in the island itself, and leaving there a garrison, carried the rest of his army back.

Nicias taketh Minoa, an island adjacent to Megara.

III.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

52. It happened also about the same time of this summer, that the Plataeans, having spent their victual and being unable longer to hold out, yielded their city in this manner to the Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesians assaulted the walls, but they within were unable to fight. Whereupon the Lacedæmonian commander, perceiving their weakness, would not take the place by force; (for he had command to that purpose from Lacedæmon, to the end that if they should ever make peace with the Athenians, with conditions of mutual restitution of such cities as on either side had been taken by war, Plataea, as having come in of its own accord, might not be thereby recoverable); but sent a herald to them, who demanded¹ whether or no they would give up their city voluntarily into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, and take them for their judges, with power to punish the offenders, but none without form of justice. So said the herald: and they (for they were now at the weakest) delivered up the city accordingly. So the Peloponnesians gave the Plataeans food for certain days, till the judges, which were five, should arrive² from Lacedæmon. And when they were come, no accusation was exhibited; but calling them man by man, they asked of every one only this question: *whether they had done to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates in this war any good service*. But the Plataeans having sued to make their answer more at large, and having appointed Astymachus the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon³ the son of Aeimnestus (who had been heretofore the host of the Lacedæmonians) for their speakers, said as followeth:

The Plataeans yield the city.

The Lacedæmonians refuse to take Plataea by force, but will have it by voluntary surrender.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

Unjust proceedings of the Lacedæmonians.

the oration of the plateans.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Oration of the Plataeans.

53. “Men of Lacedæmon, relying upon you we yielded up our city, not expecting to undergo this, but some more legal manner of proceeding; and we agreed not to stand to the judgment of others, (as now we do¹), but of yourselves only; conceiving we should so obtain the better justice. But now we fear we have been deceived in both. For we have reason to suspect, both that the trial is capital, and you the judges partial: gathering so much both from that, that there hath not been presented any accusation to which we might answer²; and also from this, that the interrogatory is short, and such, as if we answer to it with truth, we shall speak against ourselves, and be easily convinced, if we lie. But since we are on all hands in a strait, we are forced (and it seems our safest way) to try³ what we can obtain by pleading. For, for men in our case, the speech not spoken may give occasion to some to think, that spoken it had preserved us. But besides other inconveniences, the means also of persuasion go ill on our side. For if we had not known one another, we might have helped ourselves by producing testimony in things you knew not. Whereas now, all that we shall say, will be before men that know already what it is. And we fear, not that you mean, because you know us inferior in virtue to yourselves⁴, to make that a crime; but lest you bring us to a judgment already judged, to gratify somebody else. 54. Nevertheless, we will produce our reasons of equity against the quarrel of the Thebans, and withal make mention of our services done both to you and to the rest of Greece; and make trial, if by any means we can persuade you. As to that short interrogatory, *whether we have any way done good in this present war to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, or not*: if you ask us as enemies, we say, that if we have done them no good, we have also done them no wrong: if you ask us as friends, then we say, that they rather have done us the injury, in that they made war upon us¹. But in the time of the peace, and in the war against the Medes, we behaved ourselves well: for the one we brake² not first, and in the other, we were the only Bœotians that joined with you for the delivery of Greece. For though we dwell up in the land, yet we fought by sea at Artemisium; and in the battle fought in this our own territory, we were with you³; and whatsoever dangers the Grecians in those times underwent, we were partakers of all, even beyond our strength. And unto you, Lacedæmonians, in particular, when Sparta was in greatest affright after the earthquake, upon the rebellion of the Helotes and seizing of Ithome¹, we sent the third part of our power to assist you; which you have no reason to forget. 55. Such then we showed ourselves in those ancient and most important affairs. It is true, we have been your enemies since; but for that, you are to blame yourselves. For when oppressed by the Thebans we sought league of you, you rejected us; and bade us go to the Athenians that were nearer hand, yourselves being far off². Nevertheless, you neither have in this war, nor were to have suffered at our hands any thing that misbecame us. And if we denied to revolt from the Athenians when you bade us, we did you no injury in it. For they both aided us against the Thebans, when you shrunk from us; and it was now no more any honesty to betray them; especially having been well used by them, and we ourselves having sought their league, and being made denizens³ also of their city. Nay, we ought rather to have followed them in all their commands with alacrity. When you or the Athenians have the leading of the confederates, if evil be done, not they that follow are culpable, but you that lead to the evil.

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56. “The Thebans have done us many other injuries; but this last, which is the cause of what we now suffer, you yourselves know what it was. For we avenged us but justly of those that in time of peace, and upon the day of our *novilunial* sacrifice, had surprised our city; and by the law of all nations it is lawful to repel an assailing enemy; and therefore there is no reason you should punish us now for them. For if you shall measure justice by your and their present benefit in the war¹, it will manifestly appear, that you are not judges of the truth, but respecters only of your profit. And yet if the Thebans seem profitable to you now, we and the rest of the Grecians were more¹ profitable to you then, when you were in greater danger. For though the Thebans are now on your side, when you invade others; yet at that time when the barbarian came in to impose servitude on all, they were on his. It is but justice, that with our present offence (if we have committed any) you compare our forwardness then; which you will find both greater than our fault, and augmented also by the circumstance of such a season, when it was rare to find any Grecian that durst oppose his valour to Xerxes’ power; and when they were most commended, not that with safety helped to further his invasion², but that adventured to do what was most honest, though with danger. But we being of that number, and honoured for it amongst the first, are afraid lest the same shall be now a cause of our destruction; as having chosen rather to follow the Athenians justly, than you profitably. But you should ever have the same opinion in the same case; and think this only to be profitable, that doing what is useful for the present occasion, you reserve withal a constant acknowledgment of the virtue of your good confederates. 57. Consider also, that you are an example of honest dealing to the most of the Grecians. Now if you shall decree otherwise than is just, (for³ this judgment of yours is conspicuous, you that be praised, against us that be not blamed), take heed that they do not dislike that good men should undergo an unjust sentence, though at the hands of better men; or that the spoil of us that have done the Grecians service, should be dedicated in their temples. For it will be thought a horrible matter, that Plataea should be destroyed by Lacedaemonians; and that you, whereas your fathers in honour of our valour inscribed the name of our city on the tripod at Delphi, should now blot it out¹ of all Greece, to gratify the Thebans. For we have proceeded to such a degree of calamity, that if the Medes had prevailed, we must have² perished then; and now the Thebans have overcome us again in you, who were before our greatest friends; and have put us to two great hazards, one before, of famishing if we yielded not, and another now, of a capital sentence. And we Plataeans, who even beyond our strength have been zealous in the defence of the Grecians, are now abandoned and left unrelieved by them all. 58. But³ we beseech you for those gods’ sakes, in whose names once we made mutual league, and for our valour’s sake shown in the behalf of the Grecians, to be moved towards us; and, if at the persuasion of the Thebans you have determined aught against us, to change your minds, and reciprocally to require at the hands of the Thebans this courtesy, that whom you ought to spare, they would be contented not to kill, and so receive an honest benefit in recompense of a wicked one; and not to bestow pleasure upon others, and receive wickedness¹ upon yourselves in exchange. For though to take away our lives be a matter quickly done, yet to make the infamy of it cease will be work enough. For being none of your enemies, but

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well-willers, and such as have entered into the war upon constraint, you cannot put us to death with justice. Therefore if you will judge uncorruptly, you ought to secure our persons; and to remember that you received us by our own voluntary submission, and with hands upheld, (and it is the law among Grecians, not to put such to death), besides that we have from time to time² been beneficial to you. For look upon the sepulchres of your fathers, whom, slain by the Medes and buried in this territory of ours, we have yearly honoured at the public charge both with vestments³ and other rites, and of such things as our land hath produced, we have offered unto them the first fruits of it all, as friends in an amicable land, and confederates, use to do to those that have formerly been their fellows in arms. But now by a wrong sentence, you shall do the contrary of this. For consider this. Pausanias, as he thought, interred these men in amicable ground, and amongst their friends. But you, if you slay us, and of Plataeis make Thebais, what do you but leave your fathers and kindred, deprived of the honours they now have, in an hostile territory and amongst the very men that slew them? And moreover, put into servitude that soil whereon the Grecians were put into liberty? And make desolate the temples wherein they prayed when they prevailed against the Medes? And destroy the patrial sacrifices which were instituted by the builders and founders of the same?

59. “These things are not for your glory, men of Lacedæmon; nor to violate the common institutions of Greece and wrong your progenitors, nor to destroy us that have done you service for the hatred of another, when you have received no injury from us yourselves: but to spare our lives, to relent, to have a moderate compassion, in contemplation not only of the greatness of the punishment, but also of who we are that must suffer, and of the uncertainty where calamity may light, and that undeservedly. Which we¹, as becometh us and our need compelleth us to do, cry aloud unto the common gods of Greece to persuade you unto; producing the oath sworn by your fathers, to put you in mind; and also we become here sanctuary men at the sepulchres of your fathers, crying out upon the dead, not to suffer themselves to be in the power of the Thebans, nor to let their greatest friends be betrayed into the hands of their greatest enemies; remembering them of that day, upon which though we have done glorious acts in their company, yet we are in danger at this day of most miserable suffering. But to make an end of speaking, (which is, as necessary, so most bitter to men in our case, because the hazard of our lives cometh so soon after), for a conclusion we say, that it was not to the Thebans that we rendered our city, (for we would rather have died of famine, the most base perdition of all other), but we came out on trust in you. And it is but justice, that if we cannot persuade you, you should set us again in the estate we were in, and let us undergo the danger at our own election. Also we require¹ you, men of Lacedæmon, not only not to deliver us Plataeans, who have been most zealous in the service of the Grecians, especially being sanctuary men, out of your own hands and your own trust into the hands of our most mortal enemies the Thebans, but also to be our saviours, and not to destroy us utterly, you that set at liberty all other Grecians.”

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60. Thus spake the Plataeans. But the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedæmonians might relent at their oration, stood forth and said, that since the Plataeans had had the liberty of a longer speech, (which they thought they should not), than for answer to the

question was necessary, they also desired to speak; and being commanded to say on, spake to this effect:

61. “If these men had answered briefly to the question, and not both turned against us with an accusation, and also out of the purpose, and wherein they were not charged, made much apology and commendation of themselves in things unquestioned, we had never asked leave to speak. But as it is, we are to the one point to answer, and to confute the other, that neither the fault of us, nor their own reputation may do them good; but your sentence may be guided by hearing of the truth of both. The quarrel between us and them arose at first from this; that when we had built Plataea last¹ of all the cities of Bœotia, together with some other places which, having driven out the promiscuous nations, we had then in our dominion, they would not (as was ordained at first) allow us to be their leaders, but being the only men of all the Bœotians that transgressed the common ordinance of the country², when they should have been compelled to their duty they turned unto the Athenians, and together with them did us many evils; for which they likewise suffered as many from us. 62. But when the barbarian invaded Greece, then, say they, that they of all the Bœotians only also medized not. And this is the thing wherein they both glory most themselves, and most detract from us. Now we confess they medized not; because also the Athenians did not. Nevertheless, when the Athenians afterwards invaded the rest of the Grecians, in the same kind then of all the Bœotians they only Atticized. But take now into your consideration withal, what form of government we were in both the one and the other, when we did this. For then had we our city governed, neither by an oligarchy with laws common to all, nor by a democracy; but the state was managed by a few with authority absolute, than which there is nothing more contrary to laws and moderation, nor more approaching unto tyranny. And these few, hoping yet further, if the Medes prevailed, to increase their own power, kept the people under and furthered the coming in of the barbarian. And so did the whole city, but it was not then master of itself; nor doth it deserve to be upbraided with what it did when they had no laws [but were at the will of others]. But when the Medes were gone and our city had laws¹, consider now, when the Athenians attempted to subdue all Greece, and this territory of ours with the rest, wherein through sedition they had gotten many places already, whether by giving them battle at Coroneia and defeating them, we delivered not Bœotia from servitude then, and do not also now with much zeal assist you in the asserting of the rest, and find not more horses and more provision of war than any of the confederates besides. And so much be spoken by way of apology to our medizing.

the oration of the thebans.

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63. “And we will endeavour to prove now, that the Grecians have been rather wronged by you, and that you are more worthy of all manner of punishment. You became, you say, confederates and denizens of Athens, for to be righted against us. Against¹ us then only the Athenians should have come with you, and not you with them have gone to the invasion of the rest; especially when if the Athenians would have led you whither you would not, you

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had the league of the Lacedæmonians made with you against the Medes, which you so often object, to have resorted unto; which was sufficient not only to have protected you from us, but, which is the main matter, to have secured you to take what course you had pleased. But voluntarily, and without constraint, you rather chose to follow the Athenians. And you say, it had been a dishonest thing to have betrayed your benefactors. But it is more dishonest, and more unjust by far, to betray the Grecians universally, to² whom you have sworn, than to betray the Athenians alone; especially when these go about to deliver Greece from subjection, and the other to subdue it. Besides, the requital you make the Athenians is not proportionable, nor free from dishonesty. For you, as you say yourselves, brought in the Athenians to right you against injuries; and you cooperate with them in injuring others. And howsoever, it is not so dishonest to leave a benefit unrequited, as to make such a requital, as though justly due cannot be justly done¹. 64. But you have made it apparent, that even then it was not for the Grecians' sake that you alone of all the Bœotians medized not, but because the Athenians did not; yet now you that would do as the Athenians did, and contrary to what the Grecians did, claim favour of these, for what you did for the others' sake². But there is no reason for that: but as you have chosen the Athenians, so let them help you in this trial. And produce not the oath³ of the former league, as if that should save you now. For you have relinquished it: and contrary to the same, have rather helped the Athenians to subdue the Æginetæ and others⁴, than hindered them from it. And this you not only did voluntarily, and having laws the same you have now, and none forcing you to it, as there did us; but also rejected our last invitation, a little before the shutting up of your city, to quietness and neutrality. Who can therefore more deservedly be hated of the Grecians in general, than you, that pretend honesty¹ to their ruin? And those acts wherein formerly, as you say, you have been beneficial to the Grecians, you have now made apparent to be none of yours, and made true proof of what your own nature inclines you to. For with Athenians you have walked in the way of injustice. And thus much we have laid open touching our involuntary medizing, and your voluntary atticizing.

65. “And for this last injury you charge us with, namely, the unlawful invading of your city in time of peace and of your *new-moon*² sacrifice, we do not think, no not in this action, that we have offended so much as you yourselves. For though we had done unjustly, if we had assaulted your city or wasted your territory as enemies, of our own accord; yet when the prime men of your own city, both for wealth and nobility, willing to discharge you of foreign league, and conform you to the common institutions³ of all Bœotia, did of their own accord call us in, wherein lieth the injury then? For they that lead transgress, rather than they that follow. But as we conceive, neither they nor we have transgressed at all. But being citizens as well as you, and having more to hazard, they opened their own gates and took us into the city as friends, not as enemies, with intention to keep the ill-affected from being worse, and to do right to the good: taking upon them to be moderators of your councils; and not to deprive the city of your persons, but to reduce you into one body with the rest of your kindred; and not to engage you in hostility with any, but to settle you in peace with all. 66. And for an argument that we did not this as enemies; we did harm to no man, but proclaimed, that if any man were willing to have the city governed after the¹ common form of all

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Bœotia, he should come to us. And you came willingly at first, and were quiet². But afterwards, when you knew we were but few, though we might seem to have done somewhat more than was fit to do without the consent of your multitude, you did not by us as we did by you, first innovate nothing in fact, and then with words persuade us to go forth again; but contrary to the composition, assaulted us. And for those men you slew in the affray, we grieve not so much; for they suffered by a kind of law. But to kill those that held up their hands for mercy, whom taken alive you afterwards had promised to spare, was not this a horrible cruelty³? You committed in this business three crimes, one in the neck of another; first the breach of the composition, then the death that followed of our men, and thirdly the falsifying of your promise to save them, if we did no hurt to any thing of yours in the fields. And yet you say that we are the transgressors; and that you for your parts deserve not to undergo a judgment. But it is otherwise. And if these men judge aright, you shall be punished now for all your¹ crimes at once.

67. “We have herein, men of Lacedæmon, been thus large both for your sakes and ours: for yours, to let you see, that if you condemn them, it will be no injustice; for ours, that the equity of our revenge may the better appear. Be² not moved with the recital of their virtues of old, if any they had; which though they ought to help the wronged, should double the punishment of such as commit wickedness, because their offence doth not become them. Nor let them fare ever the better for their lamentation or your compassion, when they cry out upon your fathers’ sepulchres and their own want of friends. For we on the other side affirm, that the youth of our city suffered harder measure from them: and their fathers, partly slain at Coroneia in bringing Bœotia to your confederation, and partly alive and now old and deprived of their children, make far juster supplication to you for revenge. And pity belongeth to such as suffer undeservedly; but on the contrary, when men are worthily punished, as these are, it is to be rejoiced at. And for their present want of friends, they may thank themselves. For of their own accord they rejected the better confederates. And the law hath been broken by them, without precedent wrong from us, in that they condemned our men spitefully rather than judicially; in which point we shall now come short of requiting them: for they shall suffer legally, and not, as they say they do, with hands upheld from battle, but as men that have put themselves upon trial by consent. Maintain therefore, ye Lacedæmonians, the law of the Grecians against these men that have transgressed it; and give unto us, that have suffered contrary to the law, the just recompense of our alacrity in your service. And let not the words of these give us a repulse from you; but set up an example to the Grecians, by¹ presenting [unto these men] a trial, not of words, but of facts; which, if they be good, a short narration of them will serve the turn; if ill, compt orations do but veil them. But if such as have the authority, as you have now, would collect the matter to a head, and according as any man should make answer thereunto, so proceed to sentence², men would be less in the search of fair speeches, wherewith to excuse the foulness of their actions.”

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The Lacedæmonians proceed with their question.

68. Thus spake the Thebans. And the Lacedæmonian judges, conceiving their interrogatory to stand well, namely, *whether they had received any benefit by them or not, in this present war:* for they had indeed³ intreated them both at other times, according to the ancient league of Pausanias after the Median war, to stand neutral; and also a little before the siege the Plataeans had rejected their proposition, of being common friends to both sides according to the same league: taking themselves⁴, in respect of these their just offers, to be now discharged of the league, and to have received evil at their hands, caused them one by one to be brought forth, and having asked them again the same question, *whether they had any way benefited the Lacedæmonians and their confederates in this present war or not;* as they answered *Not*, led them aside and slew them, not exempting any. Of the Plataeans themselves they slew no less than two hundred; of the Athenians who were besieged with them, twenty-five. The women they made slaves; and the Thebans assigned the city for a year, or thereabouts, for a habitation to such Megareans as in sedition had been driven from their own, and to all those Plataeans which, living, were of the Theban faction. But afterwards, pulling it all down to the very foundation, they built a hospital¹ in the place, near the temple of Juno, of two hundred foot diameter, with chambers on every side in circle both above and below; using therein the roofs and doors of the Plataeans' buildings. And of the rest of the stuff that was in the city-wall, as brass and iron, they made bedsteads, and dedicated them to Juno; to whom also they built a stone chapel of a hundred foot over. The land they confiscated, and set it to farm afterwards for ten years to the Thebans. So far were the Lacedæmonians alienated from the Plataeans, especially, or rather altogether for the Thebans' sake², whom they thought useful to them in the war now on foot. So ended the business at Plataea, in the fourscore and thirteenth year after their league made with the Athenians.

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The Plataeans are put to death: twenty-five Athenians slain with them.

Plataea pulled down.

The Lacedæmonians in their sentence upon the Plataeans have more respect to their own profit, than to the merit of the cause.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

69. The forty galleys of Peloponnesus, which having been sent to aid the Lesbians fled, as hath been related, through the wide sea, chased by the Athenians and tossed by storms on the coast of Crete, came thence dispersed into Peloponnesus: and found thirteen galleys, Leucadians and Ambraciotes, in the haven of Cyllene, with Brasidas the son of Tellis, come hither to be of council with Alcidas. For the Lacedæmonians, seeing they failed of Lesbos, determined with their fleet augmented to sail to Corcyra, which was in sedition; (there being but twelve Athenian galleys about Naupactus); to the end they might be there before the supply of a greater fleet should come from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas employed themselves in that.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. The 40 galleys, with Alcidas, come weather-beaten home.

The sedition of Corcyra occasioned by the captives that come from Corinth:

70. The sedition in Corcyra began upon the coming home of those captives, which were taken in the battles by sea at Epidamnus, and released afterwards by the Corinthians, at the ransom, as was voiced, of eighty talents¹, for which they had given security to their hosts; but in fact, for that they had persuaded the Corinthians, that they would put Corcyra into their power. These men going from man to man, solicited¹ the city to revolt from the Athenians. And two galleys being now come in, one of Athens, another of Corinth, with ambassadors from both those states, the Corcyræans upon audience of them both, decreed to hold the Athenians for their confederates on² articles agreed on; but withal to remain friends to the Peloponnesians, as they had formerly been. There was one Peithias, voluntary host³ of the Athenians, and that had been principal magistrate of the people. Him these men called into judgment, and laid to his charge a practice to bring the city into the servitude of the Athenians. He again, being acquit, called in question five of the wealthiest of the same men, saying, they had cut certain stakes⁴ in the ground belonging to the temples both of Jupiter and of Alcinus; upon every of which there lay a penalty of a stater¹. And the cause going against them, they took sanctuary in the temples, to the end, the sum being great, they might pay it by portions [as they should be taxed]. But Peithias (for he was also of the senate) obtained that the law should proceed. These five being by the law excluded the senate², and understanding that Peithias, as long as he was a senator, would cause the people to hold for friends and foes the same that were so to the Athenians, conspired with the rest³, and armed with daggers suddenly brake into the senate-house, and slew both Peithias and others, as well private men as senators, to the number of about sixty persons; only a few of those of Peithias his faction, escaped in the Athenian galley that lay yet in the harbour. 71. When they had done this, and called the Corcyræans to an assembly, they told them, that what they had done was for the best, and that they should not be now in bondage to the Athenians: and for the future they advised them to be in quiet, and to receive neither party with more than one galley at once, and to take them for enemies if they were more. And when they had spoken, forced them to decree it accordingly. They also presently sent ambassadors to Athens, both to show that it was fit for them to do⁴ what they had done, and also to dissuade such Corcyræans as were fled thither of the other faction, from doing any thing to their prejudice, for fear the matter should fall into a relapse.

who persuade the renouncing of their league with Athens.

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Peithias, one of the Athenian faction, accused and absolved, accuseth some of the other faction.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

Peithias and others slain in the senate.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

72. When these arrived, the Athenians apprehended both the ambassadors themselves, as seditious persons, and also all those Corcyræans whom they had there prevailed with; and sent them to custody in Ægina. In the meantime, upon the coming in of a galley of Corinth with ambassadors from Lacedæmon, those that managed the state assailed the commons, and overcame them in fight. And night coming on, the commons fled into the citadel and the higher parts of the city; where they rallied themselves and encamped, and made themselves masters of the haven called the Hillaique haven. But the nobility seized on the marketplace,

The Lacedæmonian faction assail the commons

The commons overcome the oligarchicals.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

(where also the most of them dwelt), and on the haven on the side toward the continent¹. 73. The next day they skirmished a little with shot; and both parts sent abroad into the villages² to solicit the slaves with promise of liberty, to take their parts. And the greatest part of the slaves took part with the commons; and the other side had an aid of eight hundred men from the continent. 74. The next day but one they fought again, and the people had the victory, having the odds both in strength of places and in number of men. And the women also manfully assisted them, throwing tiles from the houses, and enduring the tumult even beyond the condition of their sex. The *few* began to fly about twilight³, and fearing lest the people should even with their shout¹ take the arsenal, and so come on and put them to the sword, to stop their passage set fire on the houses in circle about the market-place and upon others near it. Much goods of merchants was hereby burnt, and the whole city, if the wind had risen and carried the flame that way, had been in danger to have been destroyed. When the people had gotten the victory, the Corinthian galley stole away; and most of the auxiliaries gat over privily into the continent.

75. The next day Nicostratus, the son of Diitrephes, an Athenian commander, came in with twelve galleys and five hundred Messenian men of arms from Naupactus; and both negotiated a reconciliation, and induced them (to the end they might agree) to condemn ten of the principal authors of the sedition, (who presently fled), and to let the rest alone, with articles both between themselves and with the Athenians, to esteem friends and enemies the same the Athenians did. When he had done this, he would have been gone; but the² people persuaded him before he went, to leave behind him five of his galleys, the better to keep their adversaries from stirring, and to take as many of theirs, which they would man with Corcyræans and send with him. To this he agreed; and they made a list of those that should embark, consisting altogether of their enemies¹. But these, fearing to be sent to Athens, took sanctuary in the temple of Castor and Pollux. But Nicostratus endeavoured to raise them, and spake to them to put them into courage². But when he could not prevail, the people, arming themselves, on pretence that their diffidence to go along with Nicostratus proceeded from some evil intention, took away their arms out of their houses; and would also have killed some of them such as they chanced on, if Nicostratus had not hindered them. Others also when they saw this, took sanctuary in the temple of Juno; and they were in all above four hundred. But the people fearing some innovation, got them by persuasion to rise: and conveying them into the island that lieth over against the temple of Juno, sent them their necessaries thither.

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76. The sedition standing in these terms, the fourth or fifth day after the putting over of these men into the island arrived the Peloponnesian fleet from Cyllene, where since their voyage of Ionia they had lain at anchor, to the number of three and fifty sail. Alcidas had the command of these, as before; and Brasidas came with him as a counsellor. And having first put in at Sybota, a haven of the continent, they came on the next morning by break of day toward Corcyra. 77. The Corcyræans, being in great tumult and fear both of the seditious within and of the invasion without, made ready threescore galleys; and still as any of them

Alcidas and the Peloponnesians arrive and fight at sea against the Corcyræans.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

were manned, sent them out against the enemy: whereas the Athenians had advised them to give leave to them to go forth first, and then the Corcyræans to follow after with the whole fleet together. When their galleys came forth thus thin, two of them presently turned to the enemy; and in others, they that were aboard were together by the ears amongst themselves: and nothing was done in due order. The Peloponnesians seeing their confusion, opposed themselves to the Corcyræans with twenty galleys only; the rest they set in array against the twelve galleys of Athens, whereof the Salamina and the Paralus were two. 78. The Corcyræans having come disorderly up, and by few at once, were on their 1 part in much distress; but the Athenians, fearing the enemy's number, and doubting to be environed, would never come up to charge the enemy where they stood thick, nor would set upon the galleys that were placed in the midst, but charged one end of them, and drowned one of their galleys. And when the Peloponnesians afterwards had put their fleet into a circular figure, they then went about and about it, endeavouring to put them into disorder. Which they that were fighting against the Corcyræans perceiving, and fearing such another chance as befel them formerly at Naupactus, went to their aid; and uniting themselves, came upon the Athenians all together. But they retiring rowed astern, intending that the Corcyræans should take that time to escape in; they themselves in the meantime going as leisurely back as was possible, and keeping the enemy still a-head. Such was this battle, and it ended about sunset.

79. The Corcyræans, fearing lest the enemy in pursuit of their victory should have come directly against the city, or take aboard the men which they had put over into the island, or do them some other mischief, fetched back the men into the temple of Juno again, and guarded the city. But the Peloponnesians, though they had won the battle, yet durst not invade the city; but having taken thirteen of the Corcyræan galleys, went back into the continent from whence they had set forth. The next day they came not unto the city, no more than before, although it was in great tumult and affright, and though also Brasidas (as it is reported) advised Alcidas to it, but had not equal authority; but only landed soldiers at the promontory of Leucimna, and wasted their territory.

Alcidas a coward

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2. Threescore sail of Athenians come to aid the Corcyræan commons.

The Peloponnesians depart with their fleet.

The people, upon the coming in of the Athenians, most cruelly put to death whomsoever they can of the contrary faction.

80. In the meantime the people of Corcyra, fearing extremely lest those galleys should come against the city, not only conferred with those in sanctuary and with the rest, about how the city might be preserved, but also induced some of them to go aboard. For notwithstanding the sedition they manned thirty galleys, in expectation that the fleet of the enemy should have entered¹. But the Peloponnesians, having been wasting of their fields till it was about noon, went their ways again. Within² night the Corcyraeans had notice by fires of threescore Athenian galleys coming toward them from Leucas; which the Athenians, upon intelligence of the sedition and of the fleet to go to Corcyra under Alcidas, had sent to aid them, under the conduct of Eurymedon the son of Thucles. 81. The Peloponnesians therefore, as soon as night came, sailed speedily home, keeping still the shore, and causing their galleys to be carried over at the isthmus of Leucas¹, that they might not come in sight as they went about. But the people of Corcyra hearing of the Attic galleys coming in, and the going off of the Peloponnesians, brought into the city those Messenians² which before were without, and appointing the galleys which they had furnished, to come about into the Hillaique haven, whilst accordingly they went about, slew all the contrary faction they could lay hands on; and also afterwards threw overboard, out of the same galleys, all those they had before persuaded to embark, and so went thence³. And coming to the temple of Juno, they persuaded fifty of those that had taken sanctuary, to refer themselves to a legal trial; all which they condemned to die. But the most of the sanctuary men, that is, all those that were not induced to stand to trial by law, when they saw what was done, killed one another there—right in the temple; some hanged themselves on trees, every one as he had means made himself away¹. And for seven days together that Eurymedon stayed there with his sixty galleys, the Corcyraeans did nothing but kill such of their city as they took to be their enemies; laying² to their charge a practice to have everted the popular government. Amongst whom, some were slain upon private hatred, and some by their debtors, for the money which they had lent them. All forms of death were then seen; and (as in such cases it usually falls out) whatsoever had happened at any time, happened also then, and more³. For the father slew his son; men were dragged out of the temples, and then slain hard by; and some immured in the temple of Bacchus, died within it. So cruel was this sedition; and seemed so the more, because it was of these the first. 82. For afterwards all Greece, as a man may say, was in commotion; and quarrels arose everywhere between the patrons of the commons, that sought to bring in the Athenians, and the few, that desired to bring in the Lacedaemonians. Now in time of peace, they could have had no pretence, nor would have been so forward to call them in; but being war, and confederates to be had for either party, both to hurt their enemies and strengthen themselves, such as desired alteration easily got them to come in¹. And many and heinous things happened in the cities through this sedition, which though they have been before, and shall be ever as long as human nature is the same, yet² they are more calm, and of different kinds, according to the several conjunctures. For in peace and prosperity, as well cities as private men are better minded, because they be not plunged into necessity of doing any thing against their will. But war, taking away the affluence of daily necessaries, is a most violent master, and

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

Description of the behaviour of the people in this sedition.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

The manners of the seditious.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

conformeth most men's passions to the present occasion. The cities therefore being³ now in sedition, and those that fell into it later having heard what had been done in the former, they far exceeded the same in newness of conceit, both for the art of assailing and for the strangeness of their revenges. The received value of names imposed for signification of things, was changed into arbitrary⁴. For inconsiderate boldness, was counted true-hearted⁵ manliness: provident deliberation, a handsome fear: modesty, the cloak of cowardice: to be wise in every thing, to be lazy in every thing. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour. To re-advise for the better security, was held for a fair pretext of tergiversation. He that was¹ fierce, was always trusty; and he that contraried such a one, was suspected. He that did insidiate, if it took, was a wise man; but he that could smell out a trap laid, a more dangerous² man than he. But he that had been so provident as not to need to do the one or the other, was said to be a dissolver of society³, and one that stood in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip another in the doing of an evil act, or that could persuade another thereto that never meant it, was commended. To be kin to another, was not to be so near as to be of his society: because these were ready to undertake any thing, and not to dispute it. For these societies were not made upon prescribed laws of profit, but for rapine⁴, contrary to the laws established. And as for mutual trust amongst them, it was confirmed not so much by divine law, as by the communication of guilt. And what was well advised of their adversaries, they received with an eye to their actions, to see whether they were too strong for them or not, and not ingenuously⁵. To be revenged was in more request than never to have received injury. And for oaths (when any were) of reconciliation, being administered in the present for necessity, were of force to such as had otherwise no power; but upon opportunity, he that first durst⁶ thought his revenge sweeter by the trust, than if he had taken the open way. For they did not only put to account the safeness of that course, but having circumvented their adversary by fraud, assumed to themselves withal a mastery in point of wit. And dishonest men for the most part are sooner called able, than simple men honest¹: and men are ashamed of this title, but take a pride in the other.

The cause of all this is² *desire of rule*, out of *avarice* and *ambition*; and the zeal of contention from those two proceeding.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

For such as were of authority in the cities, both of the one and the other faction, preferring under decent titles, one *the political equality of the multitude*, the other *the moderate aristocracy*; though in words they seemed to be servants of the public, they made it in effect but the prize of their contention: and striving by whatsoever means to overcome, both ventured on most horrible outrages, and³ prosecuted their revenges still farther, without any regard of justice or the public good, but limiting them, each faction, by their own appetite: and stood ready, whether by unjust sentence, or with their own hands, when they should get power, to satisfy their present spite. So that neither side made account to have any thing the sooner done for religion [of an oath], but he was most commended, that could pass a business against the hair with a fair oration⁴. The neutrals of the city were destroyed by both factions; partly because they would not side with them, and partly for envy that they should so escape.

In seditions and confusion, they that

83. Thus was wickedness on foot in every kind throughout all Greece by the occasion of their sedition. Sincerity¹ (whereof there is much in a generous nature) was laughed down: and it was far the best course, to stand diffidently against each other, with their thoughts in battle array, which no speech was so powerful, nor oath terrible enough to disband. And being all of them, the more they considered, the more desperate of assurance, they rather contrived how to avoid a mischief than were able to rely on any man's faith. And for the most part, such as had the least wit had the best success: for² both their own defect, and the subtlety of their adversaries, putting them into a great fear to be overcome in words, or at least in pre-insidiation, by their enemies' great craft, they therefore went roundly to work with them with deeds. Whereas the other, not caring though they were perceived, and thinking they needed not to take by force what they might do by plot, were thereby unprovided, and so the more easily slain³.

distrust their wits, suddenly use their hands, and defeat the stratagems of the more subtle sort.

84. In¹ Corcyra then were these evils for the most part committed first; and so were all other, which either such men as have been governed with pride rather than modesty by those on whom they take revenge, were like to commit in taking it; or which such men as stand upon their delivery from long poverty, out of covetousness, chiefly to have their neighbours' goods, would contrary to justice give their voices to: or which men, not for covetousness, but assailing each other on equal terms, carried away with the unruliness of their anger would cruelly and inexorably execute. And the common course of life being at that time confounded in the city, the nature of man, which is wont even against law to do evil, gotten now above the law, showed itself with delight to be too weak for passion, too strong for justice, and enemy to all superiority. Else they would never have preferred revenge before innocence, nor lucre (whensoever the envy of it was without power to do them hurt) before justice. And for the laws common to all men in such cases, (which, as long as they be in force, give hope to all that suffer injury), men desire not to leave them standing against the need a man in danger may have of them, but by their revenges on others to be beforehand in subverting them.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

85. Such were the passions of the Corcyraeans, first of all other Grecians, towards one another in the city: and Eurymedon and the Athenians departed with their galleys. Afterwards, such of the Corcyraeans as had fled, (for there escaped about five hundred of them), having seized on the forts in the continent, impatronized themselves of their own territory on the other side, and from thence came over and robbed the islanders and did them much hurt; and there grew a great famine in the city. They likewise sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon and Corinth, concerning their reduction¹; and when they could get nothing done, having gotten boats and some auxiliary soldiers, they passed, awhile after, to the number of about six hundred into the island. Where when they had set fire on their boats, that they might trust to nothing but to make themselves masters of the

The Athenian fleet goes away. Five hundred of the nobility that escaped, seize on such places as belonged to the Corcyraeans in the continent.

They come over and fortify themselves in Istone.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. 2.

field, they went up into the hill Istone; and having there fortified themselves with a wall, infested those within¹, and were masters of the territory.

86. In the end of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty galleys into Sicily, under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus, and Charœadas the son of Euphiletus: for the Syracusians and the Leontines were now warring against each other. The² confederates of the Syracusians were all the Doric cities, except the Camarinæans; which also in the beginning of this war were reckoned in the league of the Lacedæmonians, but had not yet aided them in the war. The confederates of the Leontines, were the Chalcidique cities together with Camarina. And in Italy, the Locrians were with the Syracusians; but the Rhegians, according to their consanguinity, took part with the Leontines. Now the confederates³ of the Leontines, in respect of their ancient alliance with the Athenians, as also for that they were Ionians, obtained of the Athenians to send them galleys; for that the Leontines were deprived by the Syracusians of the use both of the land and sea. And so the people of Athens sent aid unto them, pretending propinquity, but intending both to hinder the transportation of corn from thence into Peloponnesus, and also to test the possibility of taking the states of Sicily into their own hands. These arriving at Rhegium in Italy, joined with the confederates and began the war. And so ended this summer.

A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 2.
The Athenians send twenty galleys into Sicily, in pretence to aid the Leontines, but with intention to hinder the coming of corn from thence into Peloponnesus, and to spy out the possibility of subduing that island.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 2.

The end of the fifth summer.

88. The next winter, the sickness fell upon the Athenians again, (having indeed never totally left the city, though there was some intermission); and continued above a year after; but the former lasted two years: insomuch as nothing afflicted the Athenians, or impaired their strength more than it. For the number that died of it, of men of arms enrolled¹ were no less than four thousand four hundred; and horsemen, three hundred; of the other multitude, innumerable. There happened also at the same time many earthquakes, both in Athens and Eubœa, and also amongst the Bœotians; and in Bœotia², chiefly at Orchomenus.

The plague again at Athens.

88. The Athenians and Rhegians that were now in Sicily, made war the same winter on the islands called the islands of Æolus, with thirty galleys. For in summer, it was impossible to war upon them for the shallowness³ of the water. These islands are inhabited by the Liparæans, who are a colony of the Cnidians, and dwell in one of the same islands, no great one, called Lipara; and thence they go forth and husband the rest, which are Didyme, Strongyle, and Hieria. The inhabitants of those places have an opinion, that in Hieria Vulcan exerciseth the craft of a smith. For it is seen to send forth abundance of fire in the day time, and of smoke in the night¹. These islands are adjacent to the territory of the Siculi and Messanians, but were confederates of the Syracusians. When the Athenians had wasted their fields, and saw they would not come in, they put off again and went to Rhegium. And so ended this winter, and the fifth year of this war written by Thucydides.

The Athenians invade the Liparæans, and islands called the isles of Æolus.

year v. A. C. 427. Ol. 88. 2.

89. The next summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates came as far as the isthmus, under the conduct of Agis the son of Archidamus, intending to have invaded Attica; but by reason of the many earthquakes that then happened they turned back, and the invasion proceeded not. About the same time, (Eubœa being then troubled with earthquakes), the sea came in at Orobiæ on the part which then was land, and being impetuous withal, overflowed most part of the city, whereof part it covered, and part it washed down, and made lower in the return²; so that it is now sea which before was land. And the people, as many as could not prevent it by running up into the higher ground, perished. Another inundation like unto this happened in the isle of Atalanta, on the coast of Locris of the Opuntians, and carried away part of the Athenians' fort there; and of two galleys that lay on dry land, it brake one in pieces. Also there happened at Peparethus a certain rising¹ of the water, but it brake not in: and a part of the wall, the town-house, and some few houses besides, were overthrown by the earthquakes². The cause of such inundation, for my part, I take to be this: that the earthquake, where it was very great, did there send off the sea; and the sea returning on a sudden, caused the water to come on with greater violence. And it seemeth unto me, that without an earthquake such an accident could never happen.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88.2. 3.

Earthquakes about Eubœa, and inundations.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

The natural cause of inundations given by the author.

90. The same summer divers others, as they had several occasions, made war in Sicily: so also did the Sicilians amongst themselves, and the Athenians with their confederates. But I will make mention only of such most memorable things, as were done either by the confederates there with the Athenians, or against the Athenians by the enemy.

Charœades the Athenian general being slain by the Syracusians, Laches, who was now sole commander of the fleet, together with the confederates made war on Mylæ, a town belonging to Messana. There were in Mylæ two companies³ of Messanians in garrison, the which also laid a certain ambush for those that came up from the fleet. But the Athenians and their confederates both put to flight those that were in ambush, with the slaughter of the most of them; and also assaulting their fortification, forced them on composition both to render the citadel, and to go along with them against Messana. After this, upon the approach of the Athenians and their confederates, the Messanians compounded likewise; and gave them hostages, and such other security as was requisite.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. The Athenians win Mylæ.

and Messana.

The Athenians send Demosthenes with thirty galleys about Peloponnesus:

and Nicias with sixty galleys into the island of Melos.

91. The same summer the Athenians sent thirty galleys about Peloponnesus, under the command of Demosthenes the son of Alkisthenes, and Proclus the son of Theodorus; and sixty galleys more with two thousand men of arms, commanded by Nicias the son of Niceratus, into Melos. For the Athenians, in respect that the Melians were islanders, and yet would neither be their subjects nor of their league, intended to subdue them. But when upon the wasting of their fields they still stood out, they departed from Melos, and sailed to Oropus in the opposite continent¹.

The army of Nicias, and another army from the city of Athens, meet upon a sign given at Tanagra in Bœotia.

They overcome the Tanagrians in battle.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

Being there arrived within night, the men of arms left the galleys, and marched presently by land to Tanagra in Bœotia. To which place, upon a sign given, the Athenians that were in the city of Athens came also forth with their whole forces, led by Hipponnicus the son of Callias, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, and joined with them; and pitching their camp, spent the day in wasting the territory of Tanagra, and lay there the night following. The next day, they defeated in battle such of the Tanagrians as came out against them, and also certain succours sent them from Thebes; and when they had taken up the arms of those that were slain and erected a trophy, they returned back; the one part to Athens, the other to their fleet. And Nicias with his sixty galleys, having first sailed along the coast of Locris and wasted it, came home likewise.

92. About the same time, the Peloponnesians erected the colony of Heracleia in Trachinia, with this intention. The Melians in the whole contain these three parts: Paraliens, Hierans, and Trachinians¹. Of these the Trachinians being afflicted with war from the Cætæans their borderers, thought at first to have joined themselves to the Athenians; but fearing that they would not be faithful unto them, they sent to Lacedæmon; choosing for their ambassador Tisamenus. And the Dorians, who are the mother nation to the Lacedæmonians, sent their ambassadors likewise with him with the same requests: for they also were infested with war from the same Cætæans. Upon audience of these ambassadors the Lacedæmonians concluded to send out a colony, both intending the reparation of the injuries done to the Trachinians and to the Dorians; and conceiving withal, that the town would stand very commodiously for their war with the Athenians; inasmuch as they might thereby have a navy ready, where the passage was but short, against Eubœa; and it would much further their conveyance of soldiers into Thrace. And they had their mind wholly bent to the building of the place.

The Lacedæmonians build the city Heracleia.

The commodious seat of this new city for the war.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

First therefore they asked counsel of the oracle in Delphi¹. And the oracle having bidden them do it, they sent inhabitants thither, both of their own people and of the neighbours about them²; and gave leave also to any that would, to go thither, out of the rest of Greece, save only to the Ionians, Achæans, and some few other nations. The conductors of the colony were three Lacedæmonians; Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. Who taking it in hand, built the city which is now called Heracleia, from the very foundation³; being distant from Thermopylæ forty furlongs, and from the sea twenty. Also they made houses for galleys to lie under⁴, beginning close to Thermopylæ against the very strait, to the end to have them the more defensible.

93. The Athenians, when⁵ this city was peopled, were at first afraid, and thought it to be set up especially against Eubœa; because from thence to Cenæum, a promontory of Eubœa, the passage is but short. But it fell out afterwards otherwise than they imagined; for they had no great harm by it: the reason whereof was this. That the Thessalians who had the towns of those parts in their power, and upon whose ground it was built⁶, afflicted these new planters with a continual war, till they had worn them out: though they were many indeed in the beginning. For being the foundation of the Lacedæmonians, every one went thither boldly, conceiving the city to be an assured one. And¹ chiefly the governors themselves sent hither from Lacedæmon, undid the business, and dispeopled the city by frightening most men away; for that they governed severely, and sometimes also unjustly: by which means their neighbours more easily prevailed against them.

The Thessalians infest the new city with continual war, for fear they should be too great.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

The severity of of the Lacedæmonian government dispeopled the city of Heracleia, and frightened men from it. The Lacedæmonians always severe, not always just.

94. The same summer, and about the same time that the Athenians stayed in Melos, those other Athenians that were in the thirty galleys about Peloponnesus, slew first certain garrison-soldiers in Ellomenus, a place of Leucadia, by ambushment. But afterwards with a greater fleet, and with the whole power of the Acarnanians; who followed the army, all (but the Ceniades) that could bear arms; and with the Zacynthians, and Cephalonians, and fifteen galleys of the Corcyræans, made war against the city itself of Leucas. The Leucadians, though they saw their territory wasted by them, both without the isthmus and within, where the city of Leucas standeth and the temple of Apollo; yet they durst not stir, because the number of the enemy was so great. And the Acarnanians entreated Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to wall them up, conceiving that they might easily be expugned by a siege, and desiring to be rid of a city their continual enemy. But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messenians, that seeing so great an army was

Demosthenes warreth on Leucas.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. Demosthenes invadeth Ætolia at the persuasion of the Messenians.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. The ambition of Demosthenes the chief cause of his unfortunate enterprise in Ætolia.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

together, it would be honourable for him to invade the Ætolians; principally, as being enemies to Naupactus: and that if these were subdued, the rest of the continent thereabouts would easily be added to the Athenian dominion. For they alleged, that though the nation of the Ætolians were great and warlike, yet their habitation was in villages unwalled, and those at great distances; and were but light-armed, and might therefore, with no great difficulty, be all subdued before they could unite themselves for defence. And they advised him to take in hand first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians, and after them the Eurytians; (which are the greatest part of Ætolia, of a most strange language, and that are reported to eat raw flesh¹); for these being subdued, the rest would easily follow. 95. But he, induced by the Messenians, whom he favoured, but especially because he thought, without the forces of the people of Athens, with the confederates¹ only of the continent and with the Ætolians to invade Bœotia by land, going first through the Locri Ozolæ, and so to Cytinium of Doris, having Parnassus on the right hand till the descent thereof into the territory of the

Phoceans; which people, for the friendship they ever bore to the Athenians, would, he thought, be willing to follow his army, and if not, might be forced; and upon the Phoceans bordereth Bœotia: putting off therefore with his whole army, against the minds of the Acarnanians, from Leucas, he sailed unto Solium by the shore. And there having communicated his conceit with the Acarnanians, when they would not approve of it because of his refusal to besiege Leucas, he himself with the rest of his army, Cephalonians², Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenians the soldiers³ of his own fleet, (for the fifteen galleys of Corcyra were now gone away) warred on the Ætolians; having Æneon, a city of Locris, for the seat of his war. Now these Locrians called Ozolæ, were confederates of the Athenians; and were to meet them with their whole power in the heart of the country. For being confiners on the Ætolians, and using the same manner of arming, it was thought it would be a matter of great utility in the war to have them in their army; for that they knew their manner of fight, and were acquainted with the country.

96. Having lain the night with his whole army in the temple of Jupiter Nemeius, (wherein the poet Hesiodus is reported by them that dwell thereabout to have died, foretold by an oracle, that he should die in Nemea), in the morning betimes he dislodged, and marched into Ætolia. The first day he took Potidania; the second day, Crocyleium; the third, Teichium. There he stayed, and sent the booty he had gotten to Eupalium in Locris. For he purposed, when he had subdued the rest, to invade the Ophionians afterwards (if they submitted not) in his return to Naupactus. But the Ætolians knew of this preparation when it was first resolved on. And afterwards, when the army was entered, they were¹ united into a mighty army to make head: insomuch as that the farthest off of the Ophionians, that reach out to the Melian Gulf, the Bomians and Callians, came in with their aids.

Hesiod the poet said to have died in this temple of Jupiter Nemeius.

The Ætolians unite against the invasion of Demosthenes.

97. The Messenians gave the same advice to Demosthenes that they had done before; and alleging that the conquest of the Ætolians would be but easy, willed him to march with all speed against them, village after village, and not to stay till they were all united and in order of battle against him, but to attempt always the place which was next to hand. He, persuaded by them and confident of his fortune, because nothing had crossed him hitherto, without tarrying for the Locrians that should have come in with their aids, (for his greatest want was of darters light-armed), marched to Ægitium: which approaching¹ he won by force, the men having fled secretly out, and encamped themselves on the hills above it: for it stood in a mountainous place, and about eighty furlongs from the sea. But the Ætolians (for by this time they were come with their forces to Ægitium) charged the Athenians and their confederates; and running down upon them, some one way and some another, from the hills, plied them with their darts. And when the army of the Athenians assaulted them, they retired; and when it retired, they assaulted. So that the fight, for a good while, was nothing but alternate chase and retreat; and the Athenians had the worst in both.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

The Ætolians give Demosthenes a great overthrow.

98. Nevertheless, as long as their archers had arrows, and were able to use them, (for the Ætoli-ans, by reason they were not armed², were put back still with the shot), they held out. But when upon the death of their captain the archers were dispersed, and the³ rest were also wearied, having a long time continued the said labour of pursuing and retiring, and the Ætoli-ans continually afflicting them with their darts, they were forced at length to fly; and lighting into hollows without issue, and into places they were not acquainted withal, were destroyed. For Chromon a Messenian, who was their guide for the ways, was slain. And the Ætoli-ans pursuing them still with darts, slew many of them quickly whilst they fled, being swift of foot and without armour. But the most of them missing their way and entering into a wood which had no passage through, the Ætoli-ans set it on fire and burnt it about them. All kinds of shifts to fly, and all kinds of destruction were that day in the army of the Athenians. Such as remained, with much ado got to the sea and to Ceneon, a city of Locris, from whence they first set forth. There died very many of the confederates, and a hundred and twenty men of arms of the Athenians; that was their number, and all of them able men¹: these men of the very best died in this war. Procles also was there slain, one of the generals. When they had received the bodies of their dead from the Ætoli-ans under truce, and were gotten again to Naupactus, they returned with the fleet to Athens. But they left Demosthenes about Naupactus and those parts; because he was afraid of the Athenian people for the loss that had happened.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

Demosthenes afraid to come home.

99. About the same time, the Athenians that were on the coast of Sicily, sailed unto Locris, and landing overcame such as made head; and took in Peripolium², situate on the river Halex.

The Athenian fleet in Sicily sail to Locris and take Peripolium.

100. The same summer, the Ætoli-ans having³ sent their ambassadors, Tolophus an Ophionian, Boryades an Eurytanian, and Tisander an Apodotian, to Corinth and Lacedæmon, persuaded them to send an army against Naupactus: for that it harboured the Athenians against them. And the Lacedæmonians, towards the end of autumn, sent them three thousand men of arms of their confederates; of which five hundred were of Heracleia, the new-built city of Trachinia. The general of the army was Eurylochus a Spartan; with whom Macarius and Menedæus went also along, Spartans likewise. 101. When the army was assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Locrians of Ozolæ, both because their way lay through them to Naupactus, and also because he desired to make them revolt from the Athenians. Of all the Locrians, the Amphissians co-operated with him most, as standing most in fear for the enmity of the Phocæans. And they first giving hostages, induced others who likewise were afraid of the coming in of the army, to do the like: the Myoneans first, being their neighbours; for this way is Locris of most difficult access: then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritæans, Chalæans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and the Ceantheans. All these went with them to the war. The Olpæans gave them hostages, but followed not the army. But the Hyæans would give them no hostages, till they had taken a village of theirs called Polis.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3. The Ætoli-ans and Peloponnesians make a journey against Naupactus.

102. When every thing was ready, and he had sent the hostages away to Cytinium in Doris, he marched with his army towards Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians. And as he marched, he took Œneon, a town of theirs, and Eupalium; because they refused to yield unto him. When they were come into the territory of Naupactus, the Ætolians being there already to join with them, they wasted the fields about; and took the suburbs of the city, being unfortified. Then they went to Molycreium, a colony of the Corinthians, but subject to the people of Athens, and took that. Now Demosthenes the Athenian, (for ever since the Ætolian business he abode about Naupactus), having been pre-advertised of this army and being afraid to lose the city, went amongst the Acarnanians, and with much ado, because of his departure from before Leucas, persuaded them to relieve Naupactus; and they sent along with him in his galleys a thousand men of arms. Which entering, were the preservation of the city; for there was danger, the walls being of a great compass and the defendants few, that else they should not have been able to make them good¹. Eurylochus and those that were with him, when they perceived that those forces were entered and that it was impossible to take the city by assault, departed thence, not into Peloponnesus, but to Æolis, now called Calydon, and to Pleuron² and other places thereabouts, and also to Proschion in Ætolia. For the Ambraciotes coming to them, persuaded them to undertake, together with themselves, the enterprise against Argos and the rest of Amphilochia, and Acarnania; saying withal, that if they could overcome these, the rest of that continent would enter into the league of the Lacedæmonians. Whereunto Eurylochus assented; and dismissing the Ætolians lay quiet in those parts with his army, till such time as the Ambraciotes being come with their forces before Argos he should have need to aid them. And so this summer ended.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

Demosthenes relieveth Naupactus.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. 3.

The end of the sixth summer.

103. The Athenians that were in Sicily, in the beginning of winter, together with the Grecians of their league, and as many of the Siculi, as having obeyed the Syracusans by force, or¹ being their confederates before, had now revolted, warred jointly against Nessa, a town of Sicily, the citadel whereof was in the hands of the Syracusans. And they assaulted the same; but when they could not win it, they retired. In the retreat, the Syracusans that were in the citadel, sallied out upon the confederates that retired later than the Athenians; and charging, put a part of the army to flight, and killed not a few. After this, Laches and the Athenians landed² some time at Locris; and overcame in battle by the river Caicinus about three hundred Locrians, who with Proxenus the son of Capaton came out to make resistance; and when they had stripped them of their arms, departed.

A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. The Athenians in Sicily assault Nessa.

Delos hallowed.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. An edict, that none should be suffered to be born or die in Delos.

104. The same winter also the Athenians hallowed the isle of Delos, by the admonition indeed of a certain oracle. For Pisistratus also, the tyrant, hallowed the same before; not all, but only so much as was within the prospect of the temple. But now they hallowed it all over in this manner. They took away all sepulchres whatsoever of such as had died there before; and for the future, made an edict that none should be suffered to die, nor any woman to bring forth child in the island; but [when they were near the time, either of the one or the other] they should be carried over into Rheneia. This Rheneia is so little a way distant from Delos, that Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, who was once of great power by sea and had the dominion of the other islands, when he won Rheneia dedicated the same to Apollo of Delos, tying it unto Delos with a chain¹. And now after the hallowing of it, the Athenians instituted the keeping, every fifth year, of the Delian games.

Rheneia an island, tied to Delos with a chain, and dedicated to Apollo of Delos.

The Athenians institute the quinquennial games at Delos.

There had also in old time been great concourse in Delos, both of Ionians and of the islanders round about². For they then came to see the games, with their wives and children, as the Ionians do now the games at Ephesus. There were likewise matches set of bodily exercise and of music; and the cities did severally set forth dances. Which things to have been so, is principally declared by Homer in these verses of his hymn to Apollo:

But thou, Apollo, takest most delight
In Delos. There assemble in thy sight
The long-coat Ions, with their children dear
And venerable bedfellows; and there
In matches set of buffets, song, and dance,
*Both show thee pastime and thy name advance*³.

That there were also matches of music, and that men resorted thither to contend therein, he again maketh manifest in these verses of the same hymn. For after he hath spoken of the Delian dance of the women, he endeth their praise with these verses, wherein also he maketh mention of himself:

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

But well: let Phœbus and Diana be
Propitious; and farewell you, each one.
But yet remember me when I am gone:
And if of earthly men you chance to see
Any toil'd pilgrim, that shall ask you, Who,
O damsels, is the man that living here
Was sweet'st in song, and that most had your ear?
Then all, with a joint murmur, thereunto
Make answer thus: A man deprived of seeing;
*In the isle of sandy Chios is his being*¹.

So much hath Homer witnessed touching the great meeting and solemnity celebrated of old in the isle of Delos. And the islanders

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

and the Athenians, since that time, have continued still to send dancers along with their sacrificers²; but the games and things of that kind were worn out, as is likely, by adversity: till now that the Athenians restored the games, and added the horse race, which was not before.

105. The same winter the Ambraciotes, according to their promise made to Eurylochus when they retained his army, made war upon Argos in Amphilochia with three thousand men of arms: and invading Argeia they took Olpæ, a strong fort on a hill by the sea-side, which the Acarnanians had fortified and used for the place of their common meetings for matters of justice, and is distant from the city of Argos, which stands also on the sea-side, about twenty-five furlongs. The Acarnanians, with part of their forces, came to relieve Argos; and with the rest they encamped in that part of Amphilochia which is called Crenæ, to watch the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus, that they might not pass through to the Ambraciotes without their knowledge; and sent to Demosthenes, who had been leader of the Athenians in the expedition against the Ætolians, to come to them and be their general. They sent also to the twenty Athenian galleys, that chanced to be then on the coast of Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Aristoteles the son of Timocrates, and Hierophon the son of Antimnestus. In like manner the Ambraciotes that were at Olpæ sent a messenger to the city of Ambracia, willing them to come to their aid with their whole power; as fearing that those with Eurylochus would not be able to pass by the Acarnanians, and so they should be either forced to fight alone, or else have an unsafe retreat. 106. But the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus, as soon as they understood that the Ambraciotes were come to Olpæ, dislodging from Proschion went with all speed to assist them: and passing over the river Achelôus, marched through Acarnania, which, by reason of the aids sent to Argos, was now disfurnished. On their right hand they had the city of Stratus, and that garrison; on the left, the rest of Acarnania. Having passed the territory of the Stratians, they marched through Phytia, and again by the utmost limits of Medeon; then through Limnæa; then they went into the territory of the Agræans, which are out of Acarnania, and their friends: and getting to the hill Thiamus, which is a desert hill, they marched over it, and came down into Argeia when it was now night; and passing between the city of the Argives and the Arcarnanians that kept watch at [the] *Wells*, came unseen and joined with the Ambraciotes at Olpæ. 107. When they were altogether, they sat down about break of day at a place called Metropolis, and there encamped. And the Athenians not long after with their twenty galleys arrived in the Ambracian gulf, to the aid of the Argives: to whom also came Demosthenes, with two hundred Messenian men of arms and threescore Athenian archers. The galleys lay at sea, before the hill upon which the fort of Olpæ standeth. But the Acarnanians, and those few Amphilochians (for the greatest part of them the

The Ambraciotes and Peloponnesians make war against the Acarnanians and Amphilochians unfortunately. They take Olpæ.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. The Acarnanians make Demosthenes their general.

The Ambraciotes at Olpæ send to the Ambraciotes at home, to come to their aid.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

Demosthenes chosen general.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

The battle between the Ambraciotes and Acarnanians.

The Ambraciotes and Peloponnesians fly.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

Ambraciotes kept back by force) that were come already together at Argos¹, prepared themselves to give the enemy battle; and chose Demosthenes, with their own commanders, for general of the whole league. He, when he had brought them up near unto Olpæ, there encamped. There was between them a great hollow. And for five days together they stirred not; but the sixth day both sides put themselves into array for the battle. The army of the Peloponnesians reached a great way beyond the other, for indeed it was much greater²; but Demosthenes, fearing to be encompassed, placed an ambush in a certain hollow way and³ fit for such a purpose, of armed and unarmed soldiers, in all to the number of four hundred; which, in that part where the number of the enemies overreached, should in the heat of the battle rise out of ambush and charge them on their backs. When the battles were in order on either side, they came to blows. Demosthenes, with the Messenians and those few Athenians that were there, stood in the right wing; and the Acarnanians (as they could one after another be put in order) and those Amphilochean darters which were present, made up the other¹. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciotes were ranged promiscuously, except only the Mantineans, who stood together most of them² in the left wing, but not in the utmost part of it; for Eurylochus and those that were with him made the extremity of the left wing, against Demosthenes and the Messenians. 108. When they were in fight, and that the Peloponnesians with that wing overreached and had encircled the right wing of their enemies, those Acarnanians that lay in ambush coming in at their backs, charged them and put them to flight: in such sort as they endured not the first brunt; and besides, caused the greatest part of the army through affright to run away³. For when they saw that part of it defeated which was with Eurylochus, which was the best of their army, they were a great deal the more afraid. And the Messenians that were in that part of the army with Demosthenes, pursuing them, dispatched the greatest part of the execution. But the Ambraciotes⁴ that were in the right wing, on that part had the victory, and chased the enemy unto the city of Argos. But in their retreat, when they saw that the greatest part of the army was vanquished, the rest of the Acarnanians setting upon them, they had much ado to recover Olpæ in safety. And many of them were slain, whilst they ran into it out of array and in disorder; save only the Mantineans: for these made a more orderly retreat than any part of the army. And so this battle ended, having lasted till the evening.

109. The next day, Menedaius (Eurylochus and Macarius being now slain) taking the command upon him, and¹ not finding how, if he stayed, he should be able to sustain a siege, wherein he should both be shut up by land and also with those Attic galleys by sea, or if he should depart, how he might do it safely, had speech with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian captains, both about a truce for his departure and for the receiving of the bodies of the slain. And they delivered unto them their dead; and having erected a trophy took up their own dead, which were about three hundred. But for their departure they would make no truce openly [nor] to all: but secretly Demosthenes with his Acarnanian fellow-commanders made a truce with the Mantineans, and with Menedaius and the rest of the Peloponnesian captains and men of most worth, to be gone as speedily as they could; with purpose to disguard the Ambraciotes and multitude of mercenary strangers, and withal to use this as a means

Demosthenes suffereth the principal Peloponnesians to retire from Olpæ secretly; to disguard the Ambraciotes of their aid, and procure the Peloponnesians the hatred of the nations thereabouts.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

to bring the Peloponnesians into hatred with the Grecians of those parts, as men that had treacherously advanced their particular interest. Accordingly they took up their dead, and buried them as fast as they could¹; and such as had leave, consulted secretly touching how to be gone.

110. Demosthenes and the Acarnanians had now intelligence that the Ambraciotes from the city of Ambracia, according to the message sent to them before from Olpæ [which was that they should bring their whole power through Amphilochia to their aid], were already on their march² (ignorant of what had passed here) to join with those at Olpæ. And hereupon he sent a part of his army presently forth, to beset the ways with ambushment, and to pre-occupate all places of strength; and prepared withal to encounter³ with the rest of his army.

Demosthenes sendeth part of his army to lie in ambush by the ways by which the Ambraciote supplies were to come from the city.

111. In the meantime, the Mantineans and such as had part in the truce, going out on pretence to gather potherbs and firewood, stole away by small numbers: and as they went, did indeed gather such things as they pretended to go forth for; but when they were gotten far from Olpæ, they went faster away. But the Ambraciotes and others that came forth in the same manner, but in greater troops⁴, seeing the others go quite away, were eager to be gone likewise, and ran outright, as desiring to overtake those that were gone before. The Acarnanians at first thought they had gone all without a truce alike, and pursued the Peloponnesians: and threw darts at their own captains for forbidding them and for saying that they went away under truce, as thinking themselves betrayed. But at last they let go the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew the Ambraciotes only. And there was much contention and ignorance, of which was an Ambraciote and which a Peloponnesian. So they slew about two hundred of them; and the rest escaped into Agraïs, a bordering territory, where Salynthius, king of the Agræans and their friend, received them.

The Mantineans retire from Olpæ.

The Ambraciotes go after them, and are slain to the number of two hundred.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

The rest escape to Salynthius, king of the Agræans.

112. The Ambraciotes out of the city of Ambracia were come as far as Idomene. Idomene are two high hills; to the greater whereof, came first undiscovered that night they whom Demosthenes had sent afore from the camp, and seized it: but the Ambraciotes got first to the lesser, and there encamped the same night. Demosthenes after supper, in the twilight, marched forward with the rest of the army, one half whereof himself took with him for the assault of the camp, and the other half he sent about through the mountains of Amphilochia¹. And the next morning before day, he invaded the Ambraciotes whilst they were yet in their lodgings and knew not what was the matter, but thought rather that they had been some of their own company. For Demosthenes had placed the Messenians on purpose in the foremost ranks, and commanded them to speak unto them as they went in the Doric dialect, and to make the sentinels secure; especially, seeing their faces could not be discerned, for it was

Demosthenes goeth out to meet the supply of Ambraciotes that came from the city.

The Ambraciotes surprised in their lodgings.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. The Ambraciotes put to flight.

yet night. Wherefore they put the army of the Ambraciotes to flight at the first onset, and slew many upon the place: the rest fled as fast as they could towards the mountains. But the ways being beset, and the Amphilochians being well acquainted with their own territory and armed but lightly, against men in armour unacquainted and utterly ignorant which way to take; they lit into hollow ways and to the places forelaid with ambushes, and perished. And having been put to all manner of shifts for their lives, some fled towards the sea¹; and when they saw the galleys of Athens sailing by the shore, (this accident concurring with their defeat), swam to them, and chose rather in their present fear, to be killed² of those in the galleys, than by the barbarians and their most mortal enemies the Amphilochians. The Ambraciotes with this loss came home, a few of many, in safety to their city. And the Acarnanians, having taken the spoil of the dead and erected their trophies, returned unto Argos.

113. The next day there came a herald from those Ambraciotes which fled from Olpæ into Agraïs, to demand leave to carry away the bodies of those dead which were slain after the first battle, when without truce they went away together with the Mantineans, and with those that had truce. But when the herald saw the armours of those Ambraciotes that came from the city, he wondered at the number: for he knew nothing of this last blow, but thought they had been armours of those with them. Then one asked him, what he wondered at, and how many he thought were slain: for he that asked him the question, thought, on the other side, that he had been a herald sent from those at Idomene. And he answered, about two hundred. Then he that asked, replied and said: “then these are not the armours of them¹; but of above a thousand”.—“Then,” said he again, “they belong not to them that were in battle with us”. The other answered: “yes, if you fought yesterday in Idomene.”—“But we fought not yesterday at all, but the other day in our retreat.”—“But we yet fought yesterday with those Ambraciotes that came from the city to aid the rest.” When the herald heard that, and knew that the aid from the city was defeated, he burst out into Aimees: and astonished with the greatness of the present loss, forthwith went his way without his errand, and required the dead bodies no farther. For this loss was greater than, in the like number of days, happened to any one city of Greece in all this war. I have not written the number of the slain; because it was said to be such as is incredible for the quantity of the city. But this I know: that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, as Demosthenes and the Athenians would have had them, would have subdued Ambracia, they might have done it even with the shout of their voices. But they feared now, that if the Athenians possessed it, they would prove more troublesome neighbours unto them than the other.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3. The conference of the herald from the Ambraciotes in Agraïs, with one of Demosthenes his army, about the number of the slain.

The Acarnanians will not let the Athenians subdue the Ambraciotes utterly, because they thought the Ambraciotes better neighbours than the Athenians.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

114. After this, having bestowed the third part of the spoils upon the Athenians, they distributed the other two parts according to the cities. The Athenians' part was lost by sea. For those three hundred complete armours which are dedicated in the temples in Attica, were picked out for Demosthenes [himself]; and he brought them away with him. His return was withal the safer for this action, after his defeat in Ætolia. And the Athenians that were in the twenty galleys returned to Naupactus.

The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, when the Athenians and Demosthenes were gone, granted truce at the city of the Ceniades to those Ambraciotes and Peloponnesians that were fled to Salynthius and the Agræans, to retire; the Ceniades being gone over to Salynthius, and the Agræans likewise¹. And for the future, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a league with the Ambraciotes for a hundred years, upon these conditions:

League for a hundred years between the Ambraciotes and Acarnanians.

year vi. A. C. 426. Ol. 88. 3.

“That neither the Ambraciotes with the Acarnanians should make war against the Peloponnesians; nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciotes against the Athenians: that they should give mutual aid to one another’s country: that the Ambraciotes should restore whatsoever towns or bordering fields² they held of the Amphilochians: and that they should at no time aid Anactorium, which was in hostility with the Acarnanians”. And upon this composition, the war ended. After this, the Corinthians sent a garrison of about three hundred men of arms of their own city to Ambracia, under the conduct of Xenocleides the son of Euthycles; who with much difficulty passing through Epirus, at length arrived. Thus passed the business in Ambracia.

115. The same winter the Athenians that were in Sicily, invaded Himeræa by sea, aided by the Sicilians¹ that invaded the skirts of the same by² land. They sailed also to the islands of Æolus. Returning afterwards to Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, [with certain galleys], come to receive charge of the fleet commanded by Laches. For the Sicilian confederates had sent to Athens, and persuaded the people to assist them with a greater fleet. For though the Syracusans were masters by land, yet seeing they hindered them but with few galleys from the liberty of the sea, they³ made preparation, and were gathering together a fleet with intention to resist them. And the Athenians furnished out forty galleys to send into Sicily, conceiving that the war there would the sooner be at an end, and desiring withal to train their men in naval exercise. Therefore Pythodorus, one of the commanders, they sent presently away with a few of those galleys, and intended to send Sophocles the son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, with the greatest number afterwards. But Pythodorus having now the command of Laches his fleet, sailed in the end of winter unto a certain¹ garrison of the Locrians which Laches had formerly taken; and overthrown in a battle there by the Locrians, retired.

A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The Athenian fleet in Sicily invade Himeræa.

Pythodorus sent to take the fleet from Laches.

year vi. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

116. The same spring, there issued a great stream of fire out of the mountain Ætna, as it had also done in former times; and burned part of the territory of the Catanæans, that dwell at the foot of Ætna, which is the highest mountain of all Sicily. From the last time that the fire brake out before, to this time, it is said to be fifty years. And² it hath now broken out thrice in all, since Sicily was inhabited by the Grecians. These were the things that came to pass this winter. And so ended the sixth year of this war written by Thucydides.

The fire breaketh out of Ætna, and burneth the fields of Catana.

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THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

The Athenians take and fortify Pylus in Messenia.—The Lacedæmonians, to recover it, put over four hundred of their best men into the island Sphacteria: whom the Athenians, having overcome the Lacedæmonian fleet, do there besiege.—The Athenians and Syracusans fight in the Strait of Messana.—Cleon engageth himself rashly to take or kill the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria within twenty days: and by good fortune performeth it.—The sedition ceaseth in Corcyra.—Nicias invadeth Peloponnesus.—The Sicilians agreeing, take from the Athenians their pretence of sailing upon that coast with their fleet.—The Athenians take Nisæa, but fail of Megara.—The overthrow of the Athenians at Delium.—The cities on the confines of Thrace, upon the coming of Brasidas, revolt to the Lacedæmonians.—Truce for a year.—And this in three years more of the same war.

1. The spring following, when corn began to be in the ear, ten galleys of Syracuse and as many of Locris went to Messana in Sicily, called in by the citizens themselves, and took it; and Messana revolted from the Athenians. This was done by the practice chiefly of the Syracusans, that saw the place to be commodious for invasion¹ of Sicily, and feared lest the Athenians, some time or other hereafter making it the seat of their war, might come with greater forces into Sicily and invade them from thence; but partly also of the Locrians, as being in hostility with the Rhegians and desirous to make war upon them on both sides¹. The Locrians had now also entered the lands of the Rhegians with their whole power; both because they would hinder them from assisting the Messanians, and because they were solicited thereunto by the banished men of Rhegium that were with them. For they of Rhegium had been long in sedition, and were unable for the present to² give them battle: for which cause they the rather also now invaded them. And after they had wasted the country, the Locrians withdrew their landforces; but their galleys lay still at the guard of Messana, and more were setting forth, to lie in the same harbour, to make the war on that side.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3. Messana
revolteth from the
Athenians.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.

The Locrians waste
the territory of
Rhegium.

The fifth invasion of
Attica.

The Athenians send
forty galleys into
Sicily:

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3. who are to
put in by the way at
Corcyra, being still in

2. About the same time of the spring, and before corn was at full growth, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, under the conduct of Agis the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, invaded Attica; and there lay and wasted the country about. And the Athenians sent forty galleys into Sicily, the same which they had provided before for that purpose; and with them the other two generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. For Pythodorus, who was the third in that commission, was arrived in Sicily before. To these they gave commandment also to take order, as they went by, for the state of those Corcyræans that were in the city, and were pillaged by the outlaws in the mountain; and threescore galleys of the Peloponnesians were gone out to take part with those in the mountain; who because there was a great famine in the city, thought they might easily be masters of that state. To Demosthenes also, who ever since his return out of Acarnania had lived privately, they gave authority, at his own request, to make use of the same galleys, if he thought good so to do, about Peloponnesus.

sedition, the outlaws holding the field, and the commons the city.

3. As they sailed by the coast of Laconia, and had intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Eurymedon and Sophocles hasted¹ to Corcyra; but Demosthenes willed them to put in first at Pylus, and when they had done what was requisite there, then to proceed in their voyage. But whilst they denied to do it, the fleet was driven into Pylus by a tempest that then arose by chance. And presently Demosthenes required them to fortify the place, alleging that he came with them for no other purpose, and showing how there was great store of timber and stone, and that the place itself was naturally strong, and desert, both it and a great deal of the country about. For it lieth from Sparta about four hundred furlongs, in the territory that, belonging once to the Messenians, is called by the Lacedæmonians *Coryphasion*. But they answered him, that there were many desert promontories in Peloponnesus, if they were minded to put the city to charges in taking them in. But there appeared unto Demosthenes a great difference between this place and other places; because there was here a haven, and the Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof, speaking the same language the Lacedæmonians did, would both be able to annoy them much by excursions thence, and be also faithful guardians of the place. 4. When he could not prevail, neither with the generals nor with the soldiers, having also at last communicated the same to the captains¹ of companies, he² gave it over; till at last, the weather not serving to be gone, there came upon the soldiers lying idle a desire, occasioned by dissension, to wall in the place of their own accord. And falling in hand with the work, they performed it, not with iron tools to hew stone, but picked out such stones as they thought good, and afterwards placed them as they would severally fit. And for mortar, where it needed, for want of vessels they carried it on their backs, with their bodies inclining forward so as it might best lie, and their hands clasped behind to stay it from falling; making all possible haste to prevent the Lacedæmonians, and to finish the most assailable parts before they came to succour it. For the greatest part of the place was strong by nature, and needed no fortifying at all.

Demosthenes urgeth to put in at Pylus.

The fleet driven into Pylus by weather.

The commodity of Pylus.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

The Athenians build the fort of Pylus.

5. The Lacedæmonians were [that day] celebrating a certain holiday, and when they heard the news, did set lightly by it; conceiving, that whensoever it should please them to go thither, they should find them either already gone, or easily take the place by force. Somewhat also they were retarded, by reason that their army was in Attica. The Athenians having in six days finished the wall to the land and in the places where was most need, left Demosthenes with five galleys to defend it, and with the rest hastened on in their course for Corcyra and Sicily. 6. The Peloponnesians that were in Attica, when they were advertised of the taking of Pylus, returned speedily home: for the Lacedæmonians and Agis their king took this accident of Pylus to concern their own particular. And the invasion was withal so early, corn being yet green, that the most of them were scanted with victual. The army was also much troubled with the weather, which was colder than for the season. So as for many reasons it fell out, that they returned sooner now than at other times they had done, and this invasion was the shortest: for they continued in Attica in all but fifteen days.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The Lacedæmonians at home regard the taking of Pylus but lightly.

The Lacedæmonian army and Agis take it more to heart.

7. About the same time, Simonides an Athenian commander, having drawn a few Athenians together out of the garrisons and a number of the confederates of those parts, took the city of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendæans, that was their enemy, by treason: but was presently again driven out by the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, that came to succour it: and lost many of his soldiers.

The Athenians take Eion in Thrace, and lose it again.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The Lacedæmonians by sea and land seek to recover Pylus.

Demosthenes sends to call back the fleet to help him.

The Lacedæmonians prepare themselves to assault the fort.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

The situation of the isle of Sphacteria.

The Lacedæmonians put over four hundred and twenty men of arms, besides their servants, into the isle

8. When the Peloponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of the city of Sparta, and of other the neighbouring towns¹, went presently to the aid of Pylus; but [the rest of] the Lacedæmonians came slower on, as being newly come from the former expedition. Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of the Peloponnesus, to require their assistance with all speed at Pylus; and also to their threescore galleys that were at Corcyra: which, transported over the isthmus of Leucas², arrived at Pylus unseen of the Athenian galleys lying at Zacynthus. And by this time their army of foot was also there. Whilst the Peloponnesian galleys were coming toward Pylus, Demosthenes sent two galleys secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, in all haste³, to tell them that they must come presently to him, for as much as the place was in danger to be lost. And according as Demosthenes his message imported, so the fleet made haste. The Lacedæmonians in the mean time prepared themselves to assault the fort both by sea and land; hoping easily to win it, being a thing built in haste and not many men within it. And because they expected the coming of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus, they had a purpose, if they took not the fort before, to bar up the entries of the harbour¹. For the island called Sphacteria, lying just before and very near to the place, maketh the haven safe, and the entries straight; one of them, nearest to Pylus and to the Athenian fortification, admitting passage for no more but two galleys in front; and the other, which lieth against the other part of the continent, for not above eight or nine. The island, by being desert, was all wood and untrodden; in bigness, about fifteen furlongs over. Therefore they determined with their galleys thick set, and with the beak-heads outward, to stop up the entries of the haven. And because they feared the island, lest the Athenians [putting men into it] should make war upon them from thence, they carried over men of arms into the same, and placed others likewise along the shore of the continent. For by this means the Athenians at their coming should find the island their enemy, and no means of landing in the continent. For the coast of Pylus itself without these two entries, being to the sea harbourless, would afford them no place from whence to set forth to the aid of their fellows: and they in all probability might by siege, without battle by sea or other danger, win the place; seeing there was no provision of victual within it, and that the enemy took it but on short preparation. Having thus resolved, they put over into the island their men of arms, out of every band by lot. Some also had been sent over before by turns: but they which went over now last and were left¹ there, were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helotes that were with them. And their captain was Epitadas the son of Molobrus.

of Sphacteria over against Pylus.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

9. Demosthenes, when he saw the Lacedæmonians bent to assault him both from their galleys and with their army by land, prepared also to defend the place. And when he had drawn up his galleys, all that were left him, unto the land, he placed them athwart the fort²; and armed the mariners that belonged to them with bucklers, though bad ones, and for the greatest part made of osiers. For they had no means in a desert place to provide themselves of arms. Those they had³, they took out of a piratical boat of thirty oars and a light-horseman of the Messenians, which came by chance. And the men of arms of the Messenians were about forty, which he made use of amongst the rest. The greatest part therefore, both of armed and unarmed, he placed

Demosthenes prepareth himself to keep the Lacedæmonians from landing on the shore.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

on the parts of the wall toward the land which were of most strength⁴, and commanded them to make good the place against the landforces, if they assaulted it. And he himself, with sixty men of arms chosen out of the whole number, and a few archers, came forth of the fort to the sea-side, in that part where he most expected their landing; which part was of troublesome access, and stony, and lay to the wide sea. But because their wall was there the weakest, he thought they would be drawn to adventure for that. For neither did the Athenians think they should ever have been mastered with galleys, which caused them to make the place [to the seaward] the less strong; and¹ if the Peloponnesians should by force come to land, they made no other account but the place would be lost. Coming therefore in this part to the very brink of the sea, he put in order his men of arms²; and encouraged them with words to this effect:

10. “You that participate with me in the present danger, let not any of you in this extremity go about to seem wise, and reckon every peril that now besetteth us; but let him rather come up to the enemy with little circumspection and much hope, and³ look for his safety by that. For things that are come once to a pinch, as these are, admit not debate, but a speedy hazard. And [yet] if we stand it out, and betray not our advantages with fear of the number of the enemy, I see well enough that most things are with us. For I make account, the⁴ difficulty of their landing makes for us: which, as long as we abide ourselves, will help us: but if we retire, though the place be difficult, yet when there is none to impeach them they will land well enough⁵. For whilst they are in their galleys, they are most easy to be fought withal; and in their disembarking being but on equal terms, their number is not greatly to be feared; for though they be many, yet they must fight but by few, for want of room to fight in. And for an army to have odds by land, is another matter than when they are to fight from galleys, where they stand in need of so many accidents to fall out opportunely from the sea. So that I think their great difficulties do but set them even with our small number. And for you, that be Athenians, and by experience of disembarking against others know, that if a man stand it out, and do not for fear of the sowsing of a wave or the menacing approach of a galley give back of himself, he can never be put back by violence; I expect that you should keep your ground, and by fighting it out upon the very edge of the water preserve both yourselves and the fort.”

the oration of demosthenes.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. Oration of Demosthenes.

The Athenians take heart.

The Lacedæmonians assault the fort by land, and seek to force landing from their galleys.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3.

The valour of Brasidas.

11. Upon this exhortation of Demosthenes the Athenians took better heart, and went down and arranged themselves close by the sea. And the Lacedæmonians came and assaulted the fort, both with their army by land, and with their fleet, consisting of three-and-forty galleys; in which was admiral Thrasymelidas the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he made his approach where Demosthenes had before expected him. So the Athenians were assaulted on both sides, both by sea and by land. The Peloponnesians dividing their galleys into small numbers, because they could not come near with many at once, and resting between, assailed them by turns; using all possible valour and mutual encouragement, to put the Athenians back and gain the fort. Most eminent of all the rest was Brasidas. For having the command of a galley, and seeing other captains of galleys and steersmen, (the place being hard of access), when there appeared sometimes possibility of putting ashore, to be afraid and tender of breaking their galleys; he would cry out unto them, saying, “they did not well, for sparing of wood to let the enemy fortify in their country”: and [to the Lacedæmonians] he gave advice to force landing with the breaking of their galleys; and prayed the confederates, that in requital of many benefits they would not stick to bestow their galleys at this time upon the Lacedæmonians, and running them ashore to use any means whatsoever to land, and to get into their hands both the men [in the isle] and the fort. 12. Thus he urged others; and having compelled the steersman of his own galley to run her ashore, he came to the ladders, but attempting to get down was by the Athenians put [1](#) back; and after he had received many wounds, swooned; and falling upon the ledges [2](#) of the galley, his buckler tumbled over into the sea. Which brought to land, the Athenians took up, and used afterwards in the trophy which they set up for this assault. Also the rest endeavoured with much courage to come aland; but the place being ill to land in, and the Athenians not budging, they could not do it. So that at this time fortune came so much about, that the Athenians fought from the land, Laconique land, against the Lacedæmonians in galleys; and the Lacedæmonians from their galleys fought against the Athenians, to get landing in their own now hostile territory. For at that time there was an opinion far spread, that these were rather landmen and expert in a battle of foot; and that in maritime and naval actions the other excelled [1](#) .

Brasidas swooneth by reason of his wounds.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.

The Lacedæmonians, after three days' assault without effect, give over that course.

The Athenian fleet return from Zacynthus to aid the Athenians in Pylus.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.

The Athenians overcome the Peloponnesian fleet in the haven of Pylus.

13. This day then and a part of the next, they made sundry assaults; and after that gave over. And the third day they sent out some galleys to Asine, for timber wherewith to make engines: hoping with engines to take that part of the wall that looketh into the haven; which, though it were higher, yet the landing to it was easier. In the meantime arrive the forty² Athenian galleys from Zacynthus; for there were joined with them certain galleys of the garrison of Naupactus, and four of Chios. And when they saw both the continent and the island full of men of arms, and that the galleys that were in the haven would not come forth; not knowing where to cast anchor they sailed for the present to the isle Prote, being near and desert; and there lay for that night. The next day, after they had put themselves in order, they put to sea again with purpose to offer them battle, if the other would come forth into the wide sea against them; if not, to enter the haven upon them. But the Peloponnesians neither came out against them, nor had stopped up the entries of the haven, as they had before determined; but lying still on the shore manned out their galleys, and prepared to fight, if any entered, in the haven itself, which was no small one. 14. The Athenians understanding this, came in violently upon them at both the mouths of the haven, and most of the Lacedæmonian galleys, which were already set out and opposed them, they charged and put to flight: and in following the chase, which was but short, they brake many of them, and took five, whereof one with all her men in her: and they fell in also with them that fled to the shore¹. And the galleys which were but in manning out, were torn and rent before they could put off from the land. Others they tied to their own galleys, and towed them away empty². Which the Lacedæmonians perceiving, and extremely grieved with the loss, because their fellows were hereby intercepted in the island, came in with their aid [from the land]; and entering armed into the sea took hold of the galleys with their hands, to have pulled them back again: every one conceiving the business to proceed the worse, wherein himself was not present. So there arose a great affray about the galleys, and such as was contrary to the manner of them both. For the Lacedæmonians, out of eagerness and out of fear, did (as one may say) nothing else but make a sea-fight from the land; and the Athenians, who had the victory and desired to extend their present fortune to the utmost, made a land-fight from their galleys. But at length, having wearied and wounded each other, they fell asunder; and the Lacedæmonians recovered all¹ their galleys, save only those which were taken at the first onset. When they were on both sides retired to their camps, the Athenians erected a trophy, delivered to the enemy their dead, and possessed the wreck; and immediately went round the island with their galleys, keeping watch upon it as having intercepted the men within it. The Peloponnesians in the meantime, that were in the continent and were by this time assembled there with their succours from all parts of Peloponnesus, remained upon the place at Pylus.

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Ol. 88. 3.

The Athenians getting the victory besiege the men cut off from the army in the island.

The magistrates of Sparta come to view the state of the camp, and conclude there to send to Athens about peace.

15. As soon as the news of what had passed² was related at Sparta, they thought fit, in respect the loss was great, to send the magistrates down to the camp, to determine, upon view of the state of their present affairs there, what they thought requisite to be done³. These, when they saw there was no possibility to relieve their men, and were not willing to put them to the danger either of suffering by famine or of being forced by multitude, concluded amongst themselves to take truce with the Athenian commanders, as far as concerned the particulars of Pylus, if they also would be content; and to send ambassadors to Athens about agreement, and to endeavour to fetch off their men as soon as they could. 16. The Athenian commanders accepting the proposition, the truce was made in this manner:

Truce between the armies, till ambassadors might be sent to Athens.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.

That the Lacedæmonians should deliver up, not only those galleys wherein they fought, but also bring to Pylus and put into the Athenians' hands whatsoever vessels of the long form of building were anywhere else in Laconia: that they should not make any assault upon the fort, neither by sea nor land.—That the Athenians should permit the Lacedæmonians that were in the continent, to send over to those in the island a portion of ground corn agreed on, to wit, to every one two Attic chœnicks of meal¹, and two cotyles of wine, and a piece of flesh; and to every of their servants, half that quantity: that they should send this the Athenians looking on; and not send over any vessel by stealth.—That the Athenians should nevertheless continue guarding of the island, provided² that they landed not in it; and should not invade the Peloponnesian army neither by land nor sea.—That if either side transgressed in any part³ thereof, the truce was then immediately to be void; otherwise to hold good till the return of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors from Athens. — That the Athenians should convoy them in a galley unto Athens and back.—That at their return the truce should end, and the Athenians should restore them their galleys in as good estate as they had received them.

the articles of the truce.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3. The articles of the truce.

Thus was the truce made, and the galleys were delivered to the Athenians, to the number of about three score: and the ambassadors were sent away; who arriving at Athens, said as followeth:

17. “Men of Athens, the Lacedæmonians have sent us hither concerning our men in the island, to see if we can persuade you to such a course, as being most profitable for you, may, in this misfortune, be the most honourable for us that our present condition is capable of. We will not be longer in discourse than standeth with our custom, being the fashion with us, where few words suffice, there indeed not to use many; but yet to use more, when the occasion requireth that by words we should make plain that which is to be done in actions of importance¹. But the words we shall use, we pray you to receive not with the mind of an enemy, nor as if we went about to instruct you as men ignorant; but for a remembrance to you of what you know, that you may deliberate wisely therein. It is now in your power to assure your present good fortune with reputation, holding what

the oration of the lacedæmonians.

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Ol. 88. 3. Oration of the Lacedæmonians.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3. Oration of the Lacedæmonians.

you have, with the addition of honour and glory besides: and to avoid that which befalleth men upon extraordinary success; who through hope aspire¹ to greater fortune, because the fortune they have already came unhop'd for. Whereas they that have felt many changes of both fortunes, ought indeed to be most suspicious of the good. So ought your city, and ours especially, upon experience in all reason to be. 18. Know it, by seeing this present misfortune fallen on us; who being of greatest dignity of all the Grecians, come to you to ask that, which before we thought chiefly in our own hands to give². And yet we are not brought to this through weakness, nor through insolence upon addition of strength; but³ because it succeeded not with the power we had as we thought it should; which may as well happen to any other as to ourselves. So that you have no reason to conceive, that for your power and purchases⁴, fortune also must be therefore always yours. Such wise men as safely reckon their prosperity in the account of things doubtful, do most wisely also address themselves towards adversity; and not think that war will so far follow and no further, as one shall please more or less to take it in hand, but rather so far as fortune shall lead it. Such men also seldom miscarrying, because they be not puffed up with the confidence of success, choose then principally to give over, when they are in their better fortune. And so it will be good for you, men of Athens, to do with us; and not, if rejecting our advice you chance to miscarry, (as many ways you may), to have it thought hereafter that all your present successes were but mere fortune: whereas, on the contrary, it is in your hands without danger¹ to leave a reputation to posterity both of strength and wisdom.

19. "The Lacedæmonians call you to a peace and end of the war; giving you peace, and alliance, and much other friendship and mutual familiarity; requiring for the same [only] those their men that are in the island; though² also we think it better for both sides, not to try the chance of war, whether it fall out that by some occasion of safety offered they escape by force, or being expugned by siege should be more in your power than they be³. For we are of this mind, that great hatred is most safely cancelled, not when one that having beaten his enemy and gotten much the better in the war, brings him through necessity to take an oath, and to make peace on unequal terms; but when having it in his power lawfully so to do if he please, he overcome him likewise in goodness, and, contrary to what he expects, be reconciled to him on moderate conditions⁴. For in this case, his enemy being obliged, not to seek revenge as one that had been forced, but to requite his goodness, will, for shame, be the more inclined to the conditions agreed on. And¹ naturally, to those that relent of their own accord, men give way reciprocally with content; but against the arrogant, they will hazard all, even when in their own judgments they be too weak. 20. But for us both, if ever it were good to agree, it is surely so at this present, and before any irreparable accident be interposed. Whereby we should be compelled, besides the common, to bear you a particular² eternal hatred; and you be deprived of the commodities we now offer you. Let us be reconciled while matters stand undecided, and whilst you have gained reputation and our friendship, and we not suffered dishonour, and but indifferent loss. And we shall³ not only ourselves prefer peace before war, but also give a cessation of their miseries to all the rest of the Grecians; who will acknowledge it rather from you, than us. For they make war, not knowing whether side begun; but if an end be made, which is now

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Ol. 88. 3. Oration of
the Lacedæmonians.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.

for the most part in your own hands, the thanks will be yours. And by decreeing the peace, you may make the Lacedæmonians your sure friends, inasmuch as they call you to it, and are therein not forced, but gratified. Wherein consider how many commodities are like to ensue. For if we and you go one way, you know the rest of Greece, being inferior to us, will honour us in the highest degree¹ .”

21. Thus spake the Lacedæmonians; thinking that in times past the Athenians had coveted peace, and been hindered of it by them; and that being now offered, they would gladly accept of it. But they, having these men intercepted in the island, thought they might compound at pleasure, and aspired to greater matters. To this they were set on for the most part by Cleon the son of Cleænetus, a popular man at that time, and of greatest sway with the multitude. He persuaded them to give this answer: “That they in the island ought first to deliver up their arms, and come themselves to Athens; and when they should be there, if the Lacedæmonians would make restitution of Nisæa, and Pegæ, and Trœzen, and Achaia”,—the which they had not won in war, but had received by former treaty, when the Athenians² being in distress, and at that time in more need of peace than now [yielded them up into their hands]—“then they should have their men again, and peace should be made for as long as they both should think good”.

The insolent demand of the people of Athens, by the advice of Cleon.

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22. To this answer they replied nothing; but desired that commissioners might be chosen to treat with them, who by alternate speaking and hearing, might quietly make such an agreement as they could persuade each other unto. But then Cleon came mightily upon them, saying, he knew before that they had no honest purpose; and that the same was now manifest, in that they refused to speak before the people, but sought to sit in consultation only with a few: and willed them, if they had aught to say that was real, to speak it before them all. But the Lacedæmonians finding that although they had a mind to make peace with them upon this occasion of adversity, yet it would not be fit to speak in it before the multitude, lest speaking and not obtaining they should incur calumny with their confederates; and seeing withal that the Athenians would not grant what they sued for upon reasonable conditions, they went back again without effect.

The Lacedæmonians desire to speak before a private committee.

23. Upon their return, presently the truce at Pylus was at an end; and the Lacedæmonians, according to agreement, demanded restitution of their galleys. But the Athenians, laying to their charge an assault made upon the fort, contrary to the articles, and other matters of no great importance, refused to render them: standing upon this, that it was said that the accord should be void upon whatsoever the least transgression of the same. But the Lacedæmonians denying it, and protesting this detention of their galleys for an injury, went their ways and betook themselves to the war. So the war at Pylus was on both sides renewed with all their power: the Athenians went every day about the island with two galleys, one going one way, another another way, and lay at anchor about it every night with their whole fleet, except on that part which lieth to the open sea; and that,

The ambassadors return without effect, and the truce endeth.

The Athenians cavil, and keep the galleys of the Lacedæmonians.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 3. The war at Pylus goes on.

only when it was windy; (from Athens also there came a supply of thirty galleys more, to guard the island; so that they were in the whole threescore and ten): and the Lacedæmonians¹ made assaults upon the fort, and watched every opportunity that should present itself to save their men in the island.

24. Whilst these things passed, the Syracusians and their confederates in Sicily, adding to those galleys that lay in garrison at Messana the rest of the fleet which they had prepared, made war out of Messana; instigated thereto chiefly by the Locrians, as enemies to the Rhegians, whose territory they had also invaded with their whole forces by land: and seeing the Athenians had but a few galleys present, and hearing that the greater number which were to come to them were employed in the siege of the island, desired to try with them a battle by sea. For if they could get the better with their navy, they hoped, lying before Rhegium both with their land-forces on the field side and with their fleet by sea, easily to take it into their hands, and thereby strengthen their affairs. For Rhegium a promontory of Italy, and Messana in Sicily lying near together, they might both hinder the Athenians from lying at anchor there against them, and make themselves masters of the strait¹. This strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messana, where Sicily is nearest to the continent; and is that which is called Charybdis, where Ulysses is said to have passed through. Which, for that it is very narrow, and because the sea falleth in there from two great mains, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and is rough, hath therefore not without good cause been esteemed dangerous.

The Syracusians and Athenians fight in the strait between Messana and Rhegium.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.

25. In this strait then the Syracusians and their confederates, with somewhat more than thirty galleys, were constrained in the latter end of the day to come to a sea-fight, having been drawn forth about the passage of a certain boat to undertake sixteen galleys of Athens and eight of Rhegium: and being overcome by the Athenians, fell off with the loss of one galley, and went speedily each² [side] to their own camp at Messana and Rhegium; and the night overtook them in the action. After this the Locrians departed out of the territory of the Rhegians; and the fleet of the Syracusians and their confederates came together to an anchor at Peloris¹, and had their land-forces by them. But the Athenians and Rhegians came up to them, and finding their galleys empty of men fell in amongst them; and by means of a grapnel cast into one of their galleys they² lost that galley, but the men swam out. Upon this the Syracusians went aboard, and whilst they were towed along the shore towards Messana, the Athenians came up to them again; and the Syracusians opening³ themselves, charged first and sunk another of their galleys. So the Syracusians passed on to the port of Messana, having had the better in their passage by the shore and in the sea-fight, which were both together in such manner as is declared.

The Syracusians and Athenians fight at sea.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.

The Messanians war on the city of Naxos, and receive a great loss.

The Athenians, upon news that Camarina should by Archias and his complices be betrayed to the Syracusians, went thither. In the meantime the Messanians, with their whole power by land and also with their fleet, warred on Naxos, a Chalcidique city and their borderer. The first day having forced the Naxians to retire within their walls, they spoiled their fields; the next day they sent their fleet about into the river Acesine, which spoiled the country [as it went up the river]; and with their landforces assaulted⁴ the city. In the meantime many of the Siculi, mountaineers, came down to their assistance against the Messanians: which when they of Naxos perceived, they took heart, and encouraging themselves with an opinion that the Leontines, and all the rest of the Grecians their confederates, had come to succour them, sallied suddenly out of the city and charged upon the Messanians, and put them to flight with the slaughter of a thousand of their soldiers; and the rest hardly escaping home. For the barbarians fell upon them, and slew the most part of them in the highways. And the galleys that lay at¹ Messana, not long after divided themselves, and went to their several homes. Hereupon the Leontines and their confederates, together with the Athenians, marched presently against Messana, as being now weakened; and assaulted it, the Athenians with their fleet by the haven, and the land-forces at² the wall to the field. But the Messanians, and certain Locrians with Demoteles, who after this loss had been left there in garrison, issuing forth and falling suddenly upon them, put a great part of the Leontines' army to flight, and slew many. But the Athenians seeing that, disembarked and relieved them; and coming upon the Messanians now in disorder, chased them again into the city. Then they erected a trophy, and put over to Rhegium. After this, the Grecians of Sicily warred one upon another without the Athenians.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.

The Athenians and Leontines attempt to take Messana.

26. All this while the Athenians at Pylus besieged the Lacedæmonians in the island; and the army of the Peloponnesians in the continent remained still upon the place. This keeping of watch was exceedingly painful to the Athenians, in respect of the want they had both of corn and water: for there was no well but one, and that was in the fort itself of Pylus, and no great one. And the greatest number turned up the gravel¹, and drank such water as they were like to find there. They were also scanted of room for their camp; and their galleys not having place to ride in, they were forced by turns, some to stay ashore, and others to take their victual and lie off at anchor². But their greatest discouragement was, the time which they had stayed there longer than they had thought to have done; for they thought to have famished them out in a few days, being in a desert island and having nothing to drink but salt water. The cause hereof were the Lacedæmonians, who had proclaimed that any man that would, should carry in meal, wine, cheese, and all other esculents necessary for a siege, into the island, appointing for the same a great reward of silver: and if any Helot should carry in any thing, they promised him liberty. Hereupon divers with much danger imported victual; but especially the Helotes, who putting off from all parts of Peloponnessus, wheresoever they chanced to be, came in at the parts of the island that lay to the wide sea. But they had a care above all to take such a time as to be brought in with the wind. For when it blew from the sea, they

The Athenians much troubled to watch the island.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.

The shift of the Lacedæmonians to relieve the besieged with victual.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 3.

could escape the watch of the galleys easily³ : for they could not then lie round about the island at anchor. And the Helotes were nothing tender in putting ashore; for they ran their galleys on ground, valued at a price in money: and the men of arms also watched at all the landing places of the island. But as many as made attempt when the weather was calm, were intercepted. There were also such as could dive, that swam over into the island through the haven, drawing after them in a string bottles¹ filled with poppy tempered with honey, and pounded linseed: whereof some at the first passed unseen, but were afterwards watched. So that on either part they used all possible art: one side to send over food, the other to apprehend those that carried it.

27. The people of Athens being advertised of the state of their army, how it was in distress, and that victual was transported into the island, knew not what they should do to it, and feared lest winter should overtake them in their siege; fearing² not only that to provide them of necessaries about Peloponnesus, and in a desert place withal, would be a thing impossible, but also that they should be unable to send forth so many things as were requisite, though it were summer; and again, that the parts thereabout being without harbour, there would be no place to lie at anchor in against them; but that the watch there ceasing of itself, the men would by that means escape, or in some foul weather be carried away in the same boats that brought them meat. But that which they feared most was, that the Lacedæmonians seemed to have some assurance of them already¹ , because they sent no more to negotiate about them. And they repented now that they had not accepted of the peace. But Cleon knowing himself to be the man suspected for hindering the agreement, said, that they who brought the news reported not the truth. Whereupon, they that came thence advising them, if they would not believe it, to send to view the estate of the army, he and Theogenes were chosen by the Athenians to view it. But when he saw that he must of force either say as they said whom he before calumniated, or saying the contrary be proved a liar: he advised the Athenians, seeing² them inclined of themselves to send thither greater forces than they had before thought to do, that it was not fit to send to view the place, nor to lose their opportunity by delay; but if the report seemed unto them to be true, they should make a voyage against those men: and glanced at Nicias the son of Niceratus, then general, upon malice and with language of reproach: saying it was easy, if the leaders³ were men, to go and take them there in the island; and that himself, if he had the command, would do it.

A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.
The Athenians are angry that their army is detained so long in the siege of the island.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

Cleon to avoid the envy of hindering the peace, engageth himself, ere he was aware, to fetch those that were besieged in the island home to Athens.

Cleon undertaketh to fetch those in the island prisoners to Athens.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

Cleon taken at his word, would have declined the employment, but cannot.

A glorious boast of Cleon well taken.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

28. But Nicias, seeing the Athenians to be in a kind of tumult against Cleon, for that when he thought it so easy a matter he did not presently put it in practice; and seeing also he had upbraided him, willed him to take what strength he would that¹ they could give him, and undertake it. Cleon supposing at first that he gave him this leave but in words, was ready to accept it; but when he knew he would give him the authority in good earnest, then he shrunk back; and said, that not he, but

Nicias was general; being now indeed afraid, and hoping that he durst not have given over the office to him. But then Nicias again bade him do it, and gave over² his command [to him] for so much as concerned Pylus; and called the Athenians to witness it. They, (as is the fashion of the multitude), the more Cleon declined the voyage and went back from his word, pressed Nicias so much the more to resign his power to him, and cried out upon Cleon to go. Insomuch as not knowing how to disengage himself of his word, he undertook the voyage; and stood forth, saying, that he feared not the Lacedæmonians, and that he would not carry any man with him out of the city, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that then were present, and those targettiers that were come to them from Ænus, and four hundred archers out of other places: and with these he said, added to the soldiers that were at Pylus already, he would within twenty days either fetch away the Lacedæmonians alive, or kill them upon the place. This vain speech moved amongst the Athenians some laughter, and³ was heard with great content of the wiser sort. For of two benefits, the one must needs fall out; either to be rid of Cleon, (which was their greatest hope), or if they were deceived in that, then to get those Lacedæmonians into their hands.

29. Now when he had dispatched with the assembly, and the Athenians had by their voices decreed him the voyage, he joined unto himself Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylus, and presently put to sea¹. He made choice of Demosthenes for his companion, because he heard that he also of himself and a purpose to set his soldiers aland in the isle. For the army having suffered much by the straitness of the place, and being rather the besieged than the besieger, had a great desire to put the matter to the hazard of a battle: confirmed² therein the more, for that the island had been burnt. For having been for the most part wood, and (by reason it had lain ever desert) without path, they³ were before [the more] afraid, and thought it the advantage of the enemy; for assaulting them out of sight, they might annoy a very great army that should offer to come aland. For their errors being in the wood, and their preparation could not so well have been discerned⁴: whereas all the faults of their own army should have been in sight: so that the enemy might have set upon them suddenly, in what part soever they had pleased; because the onset had been in their own election. Again, if they should by force come up to fight with the Lacedæmonians at hand in the thick woods, the fewer and skilful of the ways, he thought, would be too hard for the many and unskilful. Besides, their own army being great it might receive an overthrow before they could know of it; because they could not see where it was needful to relieve one another. 30. These things came into his head especially from the loss he received in Ætolia; which in part¹ also happened by occasion of the woods. But the soldiers, for want of room, having been forced to put in at the outside of the island to dress their dinners with a watch before them, and one of them having² set fire on the wood, [it burnt on by little and little], and the wind afterwards rising, the most of it was burnt before they were aware. By this accident, Demosthenes the better discerning that the Lacedæmonians were more than he had imagined, having³ before by victual sent unto them thought them not so many, did now prepare himself for the enterprise, as a matter deserving the Athenians' utmost care, and as having better commodity of landing in the island than before he had; and

The reason why Demosthenes durst not land in the island to subdue the besieged by fight.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

The wood of the island burnt by accident.

Cleon arriveth at Pylus.

both sent for the forces of such confederates as were near, and put in readiness every other needful thing. And Cleon, who had sent a messenger before to signify his coming, came himself also with those forces which he had required unto Pylus.

When they were both together, first they sent a herald to the camp in the continent, to know if they would command those in the island to deliver up themselves and their arms without battle, to be held with easy imprisonment till some agreement were made touching the main war. 31. Which when they refused, the Athenians for one day held their hands; but the next day, having put aboard upon a few galleys all their men of arms, they put off in the night, and landed a little before day on both sides of the island, both from the main and from the haven, to the number of about eight hundred men of arms; and marched upon high speed towards the foremost watch of the island. For thus the Lacedæmonians lay quartered. In this foremost watch, were about thirty men of arms: the middest and evenest part of the island, and about the water¹, was kept by Epitadas their captain with the greatest part of the whole number: and another part of them, which were not many, kept the last guard towards Pylus, which place to the seaward was on a cliff, and least assailable by land. For there was² also a certain fort which was old, and made of chosen [not of hewn] stones; which they thought would stand them in stead in case of violent retreat. Thus they were quartered.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Athenians invade the island:

32. Now the Athenians presently killed those of the foremost guard, which they so ran to, in their cabins, and as they were taking arms. For³ they knew not of their landing; but thought those galleys had come thither to anchor in the night according to custom, as they had been wont to do. As soon as it was morning, the rest of the army also landed, out of somewhat more than seventy galleys, every one with such arms as he had, being all [that rowed] except only the Thalamii¹; eight hundred archers; targetiers as many; all the Messenians that came to aid them; and as many of them besides as held any place about Pylus, except only the garrison of the fort itself. Demosthenes then disposing his army by two hundred and more in a company, and in some less, [at certain distances], seized on all the higher grounds; to the end that the enemies, compassed about on every side, might the less know what to do, or against what part to set themselves in battle, and be subject to the shot of the multitude from every part; and when they should make head against those that fronted them, be charged behind; and when they should turn to those that were opposed to their flanks, be charged at once both behind and before. And which way soever they marched, the light-armed and such as were meanliest provided of arms followed² them at the back with arrows, darts, stones, and slings; who have courage enough afar off, and could not be charged, but would overcome flying, and also press the enemies when they should retire. With this design Demosthenes both intended his landing at first, and afterwards ordered his forces accordingly in the action. 33. Those that were about Epitadas, who were the greatest part of those in the island, when they saw that the foremost guard was slain

and kill those that were in the first and most remote watch from Pylus.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Athenians divide themselves into many troops against the main body of the Lacedæmonian soldiers.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

The fight between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians in the middle of the island.

and that the army marched towards them, put themselves in array, and went towards the men of arms of the Athenians with intent to charge them: for these were opposed to them in front, and the light-armed soldiers on their flanks and at their backs. But they could neither come to join with them, nor any way make use of their skill. For both the light-armed soldiers kept them off with shot from either side, and¹ the men of arms advanced not. Where the light-armed soldiers approached nearest, they were driven back; but returning, they charged them afresh, being men armed lightly, and that easily got out of their reach by running, especially the ground being uneasy and rough by having been formerly desert; so that the Lacedæmonians in their armour could not follow them.

34. Thus for a little while they skirmished one against another afar off. But when the Lacedæmonians were no longer able to run out after them where they charged, these light-armed soldiers seeing them less earnest in chasing them, and taking courage chiefly from their sight, as being many times their number, and having also been used to them so much as not to think them now so dangerous as they had done, for that they had not received so much hurt at their hands as their subdued minds, because they were to fight against the Lacedæmonians, had at their first landing prejudged, contemned them; and with a great cry ran all at once upon them, casting stones, arrows, and darts, as to every man came next to hand. Upon this cry and assault they were much terrified, as not accustomed to such kind of fight; and withal a great dust of the woods lately burnt mounted into the air; so that by reason of the arrows and stones, that together with the dust flew from such a multitude of men, they could hardly see before them. Then the battle grew sore on the Lacedæmonians' side: for their jacks¹ now gave way to the arrows, and the darts that were thrown stuck broken in them; so as they could not handle themselves, as neither seeing before them, nor hearing any direction given them for the greater noise of the enemy; but danger being on all sides, were hopeless to save themselves upon any side by fighting.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Lacedæmonians retire to the fort, where the last guard was placed.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians assault them there.

Some of the Athenians climb up behind the Lacedæmonians unseen, and appear at their backs.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

35. In the end, many of them being now wounded, for that they could not shift their ground, they made their retreat in close order to the² last guard of the island, and to the watch that was there. When they once gave ground, then were the light-armed soldiers much more confident than before, and pressed upon them with a mighty noise: and as many of the Lacedæmonians as they could intercept in their retreat, they slew; but the most of them recovered the fort, and together with the watch of the same put themselves in order to defend it in all parts that were subject to assault. The Athenians following could not now encompass and hem them in, for the strong situation of the place; but assaulting them in the face, sought only how to put them from the wall. And thus they held out a long time, the better part of a day, either side tired with the fight, and with thirst, and with the sun: one endeavouring to drive the enemy from the top, the other to keep their ground. And the Lacedæmonians defended themselves easilier now than before, because they were not now encompassed upon their flanks. 36. When there was no end of the business, the captain of the Messenians said unto Cleon and Demosthenes, that they spent their labour there in vain: and that

if they would deliver unto him a part of the archers and light-armed soldiers, to get up by such a way as he himself should find out, and come behind upon their backs, he thought the entrance might be forced. And having received the forces he asked, he took his way from a place out of sight to the Lacedæmonians, that he might not be discovered; making his approach under the cliffs of the island, where they were continual¹; in which part, trusting to the natural strength thereof, they kept no watch; and with much labour and hardly unseen, came behind them: and appearing suddenly from above at their backs, both terrified the enemies with the sight of what they expected not, and much confirmed the Athenians with the sight of what they expected. And the Lacedæmonians, being now charged with their shot both before and behind, were in the same case (to compare small matters with great) that they were in at Thermopylæ. For then they were slain by the Persians, shut up on both sides in a narrow path¹: and these now being charged on both sides, could make good the place no longer; but fighting few against many, and being weak withal for want of food, were at last forced to give ground: and the Athenians by this time were also masters of all the entrances.

37. But Cleon and Demosthenes, knowing that the more they gave back, the faster they would be killed by their army², staid the fight and held in the soldiers: with desire to carry them alive to Athens, in case their spirits were so much broken and their courage abated by this misery, as upon proclamation made they would be content to deliver up their arms. So they proclaimed, that they³ should deliver up their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be disposed of as to them should seem good. 38. Upon hearing hereof the most of them threw down their bucklers, and shook their hands above their heads; signifying their acceptation of what was proclaimed. Whereupon a truce was made, and they came to treat, Cleon and Demosthenes of one side, and Styphon the son of Pharax on the other side. For of them that had command there⁴, Epitadas, who was the first, was slain; and Hippagretes¹, who was chosen to succeed him, lay amongst the dead, though yet alive; and this man was the third to succeed in the command by the law, in case the others should miscarry. Styphon, and those that were with him, said they would send over to the Lacedæmonians in the continent, to know what they there would advise them to. But the Athenians letting none go thence, called for heralds out of the continent: and the question having been twice or thrice asked, the last of the Lacedæmonians that came over from the continent brought them this answer: *The Lacedæmonians bid you take advice touching yourselves, such as you shall think good; provided you do nothing dishonourably.* Whereupon having consulted, they yielded up themselves and their arms. And the Athenians attended them that day and the night following with a watch: but the next day, after they had set up their trophy in the island, they prepared to be gone; and committed the prisoners to the custody of the captains of the galleys. And the Lacedæmonians sent over a herald, and took up the bodies of their dead. The number of them that were slain and taken alive in the island, was thus. There went over into the island in all, four hundred and twenty men of arms; of these were sent away alive, three hundred wanting eight; and the rest slain. Of those that lived, there

The Lacedæmonians yield.
year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88 4.
The Lacedæmonians yield up their arms, and are carried prisoners to Athens.
The number of the slain, and of the prisoners.
year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

were of the city itself of Sparta¹, one hundred and twenty. Of the Athenians there died not many; for it was no standing fight.

39. The whole time of the siege of these men in the island, from the fight of the galleys to the fight in the island, was seventy-two days; of which for twenty days victual was allowed to be carried to them, that is to say, in the time that the ambassadors were away that went about the peace; in the rest, they were fed by such only as put in² thither by stealth; and yet there was both corn and other food left in the island. For their captain Epitadas had distributed it more sparingly than he needed to have done. So the Athenians and the Peloponnesians departed from Pylus, and went home both of them with their armies. And the promise of Cleon, as senseless as it was, took effect: for within twenty days he brought home the men as he had undertaken.

40. Of all the accidents of this war, this same fell out the most contrary to the opinion of the Grecians. For they expected that the Lacedæmonians should never, neither by famine nor whatsoever other necessity, have been constrained to deliver up their arms, but have died with them in their hands, fighting as long as they had been able: and would not believe that those that yielded, were like to those that were slain. And when one afterwards of the Athenian confederates asked one of the prisoners, by way of insulting, if they which were slain were valiant men³: he answered, that a spindle (meaning an arrow) deserved to be valued at a high rate, if it could know what was a good man; signifying that the slain were such as the stones and arrows chanced to light on.

The yielding of the Lacedæmonians was contrary to the opinion had of their virtue.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

41. After the arrival of the men, the Athenians ordered that they should be kept in bonds till there should be made some agreement; and if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, then to bring them forth and kill them. They took order also [in the same assembly] for the settling of the garrison at Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus, having sent thither such men of their own as were fittest for the purpose, as to their native country; (for Pylus is in that country which belonged once to the Messenians¹); infested Laconia with robberies, and did them much other mischief, as being of the same language. The Lacedæmonians, not having in times past been acquainted with robberies and such war as that, and because their Helotes ran over to the enemy, fearing also some greater innovation in the country, took the matter much to heart; and though they would not be known of it to the Athenians, yet they sent ambassadors, and endeavoured to get the restitution both of the fort of Pylus and of their men. But the Athenians aspired to greater matters; and the ambassadors, though they came often about it, yet were always sent away without effect. These were the proceedings at Pylus.

The Lacedæmonian prisoners kept in bonds at Athens to be made use of in making the peace, or else upon the first invasion of Attica to be slain.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

42. Presently after this, the same summer, the Athenians with eighty galleys, two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horse in boats built for transportation of horses, made war upon the territory of Corinth. There went also with them Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, of their confederates. The general of the whole army was Nicias the son of Niceratus, with two others in commission with him. Betimes¹ in a morning they put in at a place between Chersonesus and Rheitus, on that shore above which standeth the hill Solygeius, whereon the Dorians in old time sat down to make war on the Corinthians in the city of Corinth, that were then Æolians, and upon which there standeth now a village, called also Solygeia. From the shore where the galleys came in, this village is distant twenty¹ furlongs, and the city of Corinth sixty, and the isthmus twenty. The Corinthians, having long before from Argos had intelligence that an army of the Athenians was coming against them, came all of them with their forces to the isthmus, save only such as dwelt without the isthmus and five hundred garrison soldiers absent in Ambracia and Leucadia: all the rest of military age came forth to attend the Athenians, where they should put in. But when the Athenians had put to shore in the night unseen, and that advertisement thereof was given them by signs put up into the air, they left the one half of their forces in Cenchreia, lest the Athenians should go against Crommyon: and with the other half made haste to meet them. 43. Battus, one of their commanders, (for there were two of them present at the battle), with one squadron went toward the village of Solygeia, being an open one, to defend it; and Lycophron with the rest charged the enemy. And first they gave the onset on the right wing of the Athenians, which was but newly¹ landed, before Chersonesus: and afterwards they charged likewise the rest of the army. The battle was hot, and at hand-strokes. And the right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for of these consisted their utmost files) sustained the charge of the Corinthians: and with much ado drave them back. But as they retired they came up (for the place was all rising ground) to a dry wall, and from thence, being on the upper ground, threw down stones at them; and after having sung the Pæan, came again close to them¹; whom when the Athenians abode, the battle was again at handstrokes. But a certain band of Corinthians that came in to the aid of their own left wing, put the right wing of the Athenians to flight, and chased them to the sea-side: but then from their galleys they turned head again, both the Athenians and the Carystians. The other part of their army continued fighting on both sides, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron fought against the left wing of the Athenians: for they expected that the Athenians would attempt to go to Solygeia. 44. So they held each other to it a long time, neither side giving ground. But in the end (for that the Athenians had horsemen², which did them great service, seeing the other had none) the Corinthians were put to flight, and retired to the hill: where they laid down their arms and descended no more, but there rested. In this retreat, the greatest part of their right wing was slain³, and amongst others Lycophron, one of the generals. But the rest of the army being in this manner neither much urged, nor retiring in much haste, when they could do no other, made their retreat up the hill and there sat down. The

Nicias warreth in the territory of Corinth with good fortune.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

The Corinthians hearing of their coming, assemble their forces to hinder their landing.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

The Athenians and Corinthians fight.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

The Corinthians are put to flight.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

Athenians seeing them come no more down to battle, rifled the dead bodies of the enemy, and took up their own; and presently erected a trophy on the place. That half of the Corinthians that lay at Cenchreia, to watch the Athenians that they went not against Crommyon, saw not this battle for the hill Oneius; but when they saw the dust, and so knew what was in hand, they went presently to their aid. So did also the old men of Corinth from the city, when they understood how the matter had succeeded. The Athenians, when all these were coming upon them together, imagining them to have been the succours of the neighbouring cities of Peloponnesus, retired speedily to their galleys; carrying with them the booty, and the bodies of their dead; all save two, which not finding they left. Being aboard, they crossed over to the islands on the other side: and from thence sent a herald, and fetched away those two dead bodies which they left behind¹. There were slain in this battle, Corinthians, two hundred and twelve; and Athenians, somewhat under fifty.

45. The Athenians putting off from the islands, sailed the same day to Crommyon in the territory of Corinth, distant from the city a hundred and twenty furlongs: where anchoring, they wasted the fields and stayed all that night. The next day they sailed along the shore, first to the territory of Epidaurus, whereinto they made some little incursion from their galleys: and then went to Methone, between Epidaurus and Trœzen; and there took in the isthmus of Chersonesus¹ with a wall, and placed a garrison in it, which afterwards exercised robberies in the territories of Trœzen, Halias, and Epidaurus. And when they had fortified this place, they returned home with their fleet.

The Athenians waste other parts of the same coast.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

The execution of the Corcyræan banished men, and end of that sedition.

Truce granted to the banished men, with condition that the same should be void if any of them offered to make an escape.

The fraud of the Corcyræans to entrap the banished men.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.

The truce broken and the outlaws put into the hands of the commons.

The Corcyræans take the outlaws out by

46. About the same time that these things were in doing, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after their departure from Pylus with the Athenian fleet towards Sicily, arriving at Corcyra, joined with those of the city, and made war upon those Corcyraeans which lay encamped upon the hill Istone, and which after the sedition had come over, and both made themselves masters of the field and much annoyed the city: and having assaulted their fortification, took it. But the men all in one troop escaped to a certain high ground, and thence made their composition; which was this: that they should deliver up the strangers that aided them; and that they themselves, having rendered their arms, should stand to the judgment of the people of Athens. Hereupon the generals granted them truce, and transported them to the island of Ptychia, to be there in custody till the Athenians should send for them; with this condition, that if any one of them should be taken running away, then the truce to be broken for them all. But the patrons of the commons of Corcyra, fearing lest the Athenians would not kill them when they came thither, devise against them this plot. To some few of those in the island they secretly send their friends, and instruct them to say, as if forsooth it were for good will, that it was their best course with all speed to get away; and withal, to offer to provide them of a boat; for that the Athenian commanders intended verily to deliver them to the Corcyraean people. 47. When they were persuaded to do so, and that a boat was treacherously prepared, as they rowed away they were taken; and the truce being now broken, were all given up into the hands of the Corcyraeans. It did much further this plot, that to make the pretext seem more serious and the agents in it less fearful, the Athenian generals gave out that they were nothing pleased¹ that the men should be carried home by others, whilst they themselves were to go into Sicily, and the honour of it be ascribed to those that should convoy them. The Corcyraeans having received them into their hands, imprisoned them in a certain edifice: from whence afterwards they took them out by twenty at a time, and made them pass through a lane of men of arms, bound together and receiving strokes and thrusts from those on either side, according as any one espied his enemy. And to hasten the pace of those that went slowliest on, others were set to follow them with whips. 48. They had taken out of the room in this manner, and slain, to the number of three-score, before they that remained knew it; who thought they were but removed, and carried to some other place. But when they knew the truth, some or other having told them, they then cried out to the Athenians, and said, that if they would themselves kill them they should do it; and refused any more to go out of the room: nor would suffer, they said, as long as they were able, any man to come in. But neither had the Corcyraeans any purpose to force entrance by the door: but getting up to the top of the house uncovered the roof, and threw tiles and shot arrows at them. They in prison defended themselves as well as they could, but¹ many also slew themselves with the arrows shot by the enemy, by thrusting them into their throats, and strangled themselves with the cords of certain beds that were in the room, and with ropes made of their own garments rent in pieces. And having continued most part of the night (for night overtook them in the action) partly strangling themselves by all such means as they found, and partly shot at from above, they [all] perished. When day came, the Corcyraeans laid them one across another² in carts, and carried them out of the city. And of their wives, as many as

scores, and make them pass the pikes.

The outlaws refuse to go out to execution.

year vii. A. C. 425. Ol. 88. 4.

They kill themselves.

The miserable end of the banished men, which was also the end of the sedition.

were taken in the fortification, they made bondwomen. In this manner were the Corcyraeans that kept the hill, brought to destruction by the commons. And thus ended this far-spread sedition, for so much as concerned this present war: for of other³ seditions there remained nothing worth the relation. And the Athenians being⁴ arrived in Sicily, whither they were at first bound, prosecuted the war there together with the rest of their confederates of those parts.

49. In the end of this summer, the Athenians that lay at Naupactus¹, went forth with an army and took the city of Anactorium, belonging to the Corinthians and lying at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, by treason. And when they had put forth the Corinthians, the Acarnanians held it with a colony sent thither from all parts of their own nation. And so this summer ended.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians take Anactorium from the Corinthians, and put it into the hands of the Acarnanians. The end of the seventh summer.

50. The next winter, Aristides the son of Archippus, one of the commanders of a fleet which the Athenians had sent out to gather tribute from their confederates, apprehended Artaphernes, a Persian, in the town of Eion upon the river Strymon, going from the king to Lacedaemon. When he was brought to Athens, the Athenians translated his letters out of the Assyrian language² into Greek, and read them: wherein, amongst many other things that were written to the Lacedaemonians, the principal was this: "that he knew not what they meant; for many ambassadors came, but they spake not the same thing: if therefore they had any thing to say certain, they should send somebody to him with this Persian". But Artaphernes they send afterwards away in a galley, with ambassadors of their own, to Ephesus. And there encountering the news, that king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, was lately dead, (for about that time he died), they returned home.

Artaphernes, an ambassador from the king of Persia to the Lacedaemonians, intercepted, and brought to Athens, and his letters read. The king of Persia's letters to the Lacedaemonians translated into Greek, and read at Athens.

51. The same winter also, the Chians demolished their new wall by command of the Athenians, upon suspicion that they intended some innovation; notwithstanding¹ they had given the Athenians their faith and the best security they could, to the intent they should let them be as they were. Thus ended this winter; and the seventh year of this war written by Thucydides.

year vii. A. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4. The Chians are suspected and forced to pull down their new-built walls.

52. The next summer, in the very beginning, at a change in the moon the sun was eclipsed in part; and in the beginning of the same month, happened an earthquake.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Lesbian outlaws make war upon the Athenian dominions in the continent near Lesbos.

At this time the Mytilenæan and other Lesbian outlaws, most of them residing in² the continent, with mercenary forces out of Peloponnesus and some which they levied where they were, seize on Rhœteium; and for two thousand Phocæan staters render it again, without doing them other harm. After this they came with their forces to Antander, and took that city also by treason. They had likewise a design to set free the rest of the cities called Actææ³, which were in the occupation formerly of the Mytilenæans, but subject to the Athenians: but above all the rest Antander, which when they had once gotten, (for there they might easily build galleys, because there was store of timber; and Mount Ida was above their heads), they might issue from thence with other their preparation and infest Lesbos, which was near, and bring into their power the Æolic towns in the continent. And this were those men preparing.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Athenians led by Nicias, subdue Cythera, an island over against Laconia and inhabited by Lacedæmonians.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Cythereans yield to Nicias, referring themselves to the people of Athens for any thing but death.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 88. 4. The Athenians remove them from their seats.

The Lacedæmonians begin to be dejected with their great losses.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Athenians waste the coast of Laconia.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 88. 4.

The Athenians burn Thyrea, slay and make prisoners of all the inhabitants being Æginetæ.

53. The Athenians the same summer, with sixty galleys, two thousand men of arms, and a few horsemen, taking with them also the Milesians and some other of their confederates, made war upon Cythera, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus the son of Diotrephe, and Autocles the son of Tolmæus. This Cythera is an island upon the coast of Laconia, over against Malea. The inhabitants be Lacedæmonians, of the [1](#) same that dwell about them. And every year there goeth over unto them from Sparta a magistrate called *Cytherodikes*. They likewise sent over men of arms from time to time, to lie in the garrison there; and took much care of the place. For it was the place where their ships used to put in from Egypt and Libya, and by which Laconia was the less infested by thieves from the sea, being that way only subject to that mischief [2](#). For the island lieth wholly out into the Sicilian and Cretic seas. 54. The Athenians arriving with their army, with ten of their galleys and two thousand men of arms of the Milesians [1](#) took a town lying to the sea, called Scandeia; and with the rest of their forces, having landed in the parts of the island towards Malea, marched into the city itself of the Cythereans, lying likewise to the sea [2](#). The Cythereans they found standing all in arms prepared for them. And after the battle began, the Cythereans for a little while made resistance; but soon after turned their backs, and fled into the higher part of the city; and afterwards compounded with Nicias and his fellow-commanders, that the Athenians should determine of them whatsoever they thought good, but death. Nicias had had some conference with certain of the Cythereans before; which was also a cause that those things which concerned the accord both now and afterwards, were both the sooner and with the more favour dispatched. For the Athenians did but [1](#) remove the Cythereans, and that also because they were Lacedæmonians, and because the island lay in that manner upon the coast of Laconia. After this composition, having as they went by received Scandeia, a [2](#) town lying upon the haven, and put a guard upon the Cythereans, they sailed to Asine and most of the towns upon the sea-side. And going sometimes aland, and staying where they saw cause, wasted the country for about seven days together. 55. The Lacedæmonians, though they saw the Athenians had Cythera, and expected withal that they would come to land in the same manner in their own territory, yet came not forth with their united forces to resist them; but distributed a number of men of arms into sundry parts of their territory, to guard it wheresoever there was need: and were otherwise also exceedingly watchful, fearing lest some innovation should happen in the state; as having received a very great and unexpected loss in the island, and the Athenians having gotten Pylus and Cythera, and as being on all sides encompassed with a busy and unavoidable [1](#) war. In so much that contrary to their custom they ordained four hundred horsemen, and some archers. And if ever they were fearful in matter of war, they were so now: because it was contrary to their own way to contend in a naval war, and against Athenians, who thought they lost whatsoever they not attempted. Withal, their so many misfortunes in so short a time, falling out so contrary to their own expectation, exceedingly affrighted them. And fearing lest some such calamity should again happen as they had received in the island, they durst the less to hazard battle; and thought that whatsoever they should go about would miscarry, because their minds, not used formerly to losses, could now

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 88. 4.

Tantulus a
Lacedæmonian
captain carried
prisoner to Athens.

The decree of the
Athenian people
concerning the
Cythereans, the
Æginetæ taken in
Thyrea, and Tantulus
a Lacedæmonian that
was amongst them.

The Æginetæ put to
death.

warrant them nothing. 56. As the Athenians therefore wasted the maritime parts of the country, and disbarked near any garrison, those of the garrison for the most part stirred not, both as knowing themselves singly to be too small a number, and as being in that manner dejected. Yet² one garrison fought about Cortyta and Aphrodisia, and frighted in the stragglng rabble of light-armed soldiers; but when the men of arms had received them, it retired again with the loss of a few; whom they also rifled of their arms: and the Athenians, after they had erected a trophy, put off again and went to Cythera. From thence they sailed about to Epidaurus, called Limeræ; and having wasted some part of that territory, came to Thyrea; which is of the territory called Cynuria, but is nevertheless the middle border between Argeia¹ and Laconia. The Lacedæmonians, possessing this city, gave the same for an habitation to the Æginetæ, after they were driven out of Ægina; both for the benefit they had received from them about the time of the earthquake and of the insurrection of the Helotes, and also for that, being subject to the Athenians, they had nevertheless gone ever the same way with the Lacedæmonians. 57. When the Athenians were coming towards them, the Æginetæ left the wall which they happened to be then building toward the sea-side; and retired up into the city above where they dwelt, and which was not above ten furlongs from the sea. There was also with them one of those garrisons, which the Lacedæmonians had distributed into the several parts of the country: and these, though they helped them to build the fort below, yet would not now enter with them into the town², though the Æginetæ entreated them; apprehending danger in being cooped up within the walls; and therefore retiring into the highest ground, lay still there, as finding themselves too weak to give them battle. In the meantime the Athenians came in, and marching up presently with their whole army, won Thyrea; and burnt it, and destroyed whatsoever was in it. The Æginetæ, as many as were not slain in the affray, they carried prisoners to Athens; amongst whom Tantalus also, the son of Patroclus, captain of such Lacedæmonians as were amongst them¹, was wounded and taken alive. They carried likewise with them some few men of Cythera, whom for safety's sake they thought good to remove into some other place. These therefore, the Athenians decreed, should be placed in the islands: and that the rest of the Cythereans at the tribute of four talents should inhabit their own territory: that the Æginetæ, as many as they had taken, (out of former inveterate hatred), should be put to death: and that Tantalus should be put in bonds, amongst those Lacedæmonians that were taken in the island.

58. In Sicily the same summer² was concluded a cessation of arms, first between the Camarinæans and the Geloans: but afterwards the rest of the Sicilians, assembling by their ambassadors out of every city at Gela, held a conference amongst themselves for making of a peace. Wherein, after many opinions delivered by men disagreeing and requiring satisfaction, every one as he thought himself prejudiced, Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a Syracusian, who also prevailed with them the most, spake unto the assembly to this effect:

A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The Sicilians make a general peace by advice of Hermocrates, and so dismiss the Athenians, that waited to take advantage of their discord.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. the oration

59. “Men of Sicily, I am neither of the least city nor of the most afflicted with war, that am now to speak, and to deliver the opinion which I take to conduce most to the common benefit of all Sicily. Touching war, how calamitous a thing it is, to what end should a man, particularising the evils thereof, make a long speech before men that already know it? For neither doth the not knowing of them necessitate any man to enter into war; nor the fear of them divert any man from it, when he thinks it will turn to his advantage. But rather it so falls out, that the one thinks the gain greater than the danger; and the other prefers danger before present loss. But lest they should both the one and the other do it unseasonably, exhortations unto peace are profitable; and will be very much worth to us, if we will follow them at this present. For it was out of a desire that every city had to assure their own, both that we fell ourselves into the war, and also that we endeavour now, by reasoning the matter, to return to mutual amity. Which if it succeed not so well, that we may depart satisfied every man with reason, we will be at wars again¹ . 60. Nevertheless you must know that this assembly, if we be wise, ought not to be only for the commodity of the cities in particular, but how to preserve Sicily in general, now sought to be subdued (at least in my opinion) by the Athenians. And you ought to think, that the Athenians are more urgent persuaders of the peace than any words of mine; who having of all the Grecians the greatest power, lie here with a few galleys to observe our errors, and by a lawful title of alliance, handsomely to accommodate their natural hostility to their best advantage. For if we enter into a war, and call in these men, who are apt enough to bring their army in uncalled, and if we weaken ourselves at our own charges, and withal cut out for them the dominion here; it is likely, when they shall see us spent, they will sometime hereafter come upon us with a greater fleet, and attempt to bring all these states into their subjection. 61. Now, if we were wise, we ought rather to call in confederates and undergo dangers for the winning of somewhat that is none of ours, than for the impairing of what we already have: and to believe that nothing so much destroys a city as sedition, and that Sicily, though we the inhabitants thereof be insidiated by the Athenians as one body, is nevertheless city against city in sedition within itself. In contemplation whereof, we ought, man with man, and city with city, to return again into amity; and with one consent, to endeavour the safety of all Sicily: and not to have this conceit, that though the Dorians be the Athenians’ enemies, yet the Chalcideans are safe, as being of the race of the Ionians. For they invade not these divided races upon hatred of a side, but upon a covetous desire of those necessities¹ which we enjoy in common. And this they have proved themselves, in their coming hither to aid the Chalcideans¹ . For though they never received any aid by virtue of their league from the Chalcideans, yet have they on their part been more forward to help them than by the league² they were bound unto. Indeed the Athenians, that covet and meditate these things, are to be pardoned. I blame not those that are willing to reign, but those that are most willing to be subject: for it is the nature of man everywhere to command such as give way, and to be shy of such as assail. We are to blame, that know this and do not provide accordingly, and make it our first care of all, to take good order against the common fear³ . Of which we should soon be delivered, if we would agree amongst ourselves: (for the Athenians come not amongst us out of their own country, but from theirs here that have called them in); and so, not war by war, but all our quarrels shall be ended by peace without

of hermocrates for peace.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Hermocrates.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Hermocrates.

trouble: and those that have been called in, as they came with fair pretence to injure us, so shall they with fair reason be dismissed by us without their errand.

62. “And thus much for the profit that will be found, by advising wisely concerning the Athenians. But when peace is confessed by all men to be the best of things, why should we not make it also in respect of ourselves? Or do you think perhaps, if any of you possess a good thing or be pressed with an evil, that peace is not better than war, to remove the latter or preserve the former, to both: or that it hath not honours and eminence more free from danger, or whatsoever else one might discourse at large concerning war? Which things considered, you ought not to make light of my advice, but rather make use of it, every one to provide for his own safety. Now if some man be strongly conceited to go through with some design of his, be it by right or by violence, let him take heed that he fail not, so much the more to his grief as it is contrary to his hope¹: knowing that many men ere now, hunting after revenge on such as had done them injury, and others trusting, by some strength they have had, to take away another’s right; have, the first sort, instead of being revenged been destroyed, and the other, instead of winning from others, left behind them what they had of their own. For revenge succeeds not according to justice, as that because an injury hath been done, it should therefore prosper; nor is strength therefore sure, because hopeful. It is the instability of fortune, that is most predominant in things to come; which though it be the most deceivable of all things, yet appears to be the most profitable. For whilst every one fear it alike, we proceed against each other with the greater providence. 63. Now therefore terrified doubly, both with the implicit fear of the uncertainty of events, and with the terror of the Athenians present, and taking² these for hindrances sufficient to have made us come short of what we had severally conceived to effect, let us send away our enemies that hover over us; and make an eternal peace amongst ourselves, or if not that, then a truce at least for as long as may be, and put off our private quarrels to some other time. In sum, let us know this: that following my counsel, we shall every of us have our cities free; whereby being masters of ourselves, we shall be able to remunerate according to their merit such as do us good or harm: whereas rejecting it and following the counsel of others, our contention shall no more be how to be revenged, or at the best, [if it be], we must be forced to become friends to our greatest enemies, and enemies to such as we ought not.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. Oration of
Hermocrates.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. Oration of
Hermocrates.

64. “For my part, as I said in the beginning, I bring to this the greatest city, and which is rather an assailant than assailed; and yet foreseeing these things, I hold it fit to come to an agreement, and not so to hurt our enemies, as to hurt ourselves more. Nor yet through foolish spite¹ will I look to be followed as absolute in my will, and master of fortune, which I cannot command; but will also give way where it is reason. And so I look the rest should do as well as I; and that of yourselves, and not forced to it by the enemy. For it is no dishonour to be overcome by kinsmen of kinsmen, one Dorian of another Dorian; and one Chalcidean of another of his own race; or in sum, any one by another of us, being neighbours and cohabiters of the same region, encompassed by the sea, and all called by one name, Sicilians. Who, as I conceive, will both war when it happens, and again by common conferences make peace by our own selves. But

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. Oration of
Hermocrates.

when foreigners invade us, we shall, if wise, unite all of us to encounter them; inasmuch as being weakened singly, we are in danger universally. As for confederates, let us never hereafter call in any, nor arbitrators. For so shall Sicily attain these two benefits, to be rid of the Athenians and of domestic war, for the present; and to be inhabited by ourselves with liberty, and less insidiated by others, for the time to come.”

65 Hermocrates having thus spoken, the Sicilians followed his advice; and agreed amongst themselves, that the war should cease, every one retaining what they then presently enjoyed; and that the Camarinæans should have Morgantina, paying for the same unto the Syracusians a certain sum of money then assessed. They that were confederates with the Athenians, calling such of the Athenians unto them as were in authority, told them that they also were willing to compound, and be comprehended in the same peace¹. And the Athenians approving it, they did so; and hereupon the Athenians departed out of Sicily. The people of Athens, when their generals came home, banished two, namely Pythodorus and Sophocles; and laid a fine upon the third, which was Eurymedon: as men that might have subdued the estates of Sicily, but had been bribed to return. So great was their fortune at that time, that they thought nothing could cross them; but that they might have achieved both easy and hard enterprises, with great and slender forces alike. The cause whereof was the unreasonable prosperity of most of their designs, subministering strength unto their hope¹.

The substance of the conditions of the peace in Sicily.

The Athenians depart Sicily, and their commanders punished as suspected to have left Sicily for a bribe.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

The Athenians attempt to take Megara by treason.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. The heads of the commons, to hinder the return of the outlaws, plot the betraying of the city to the Athenians.

The plot laid by the traitors for the putting of the Athenians into the town.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

The plot of the traitors, to give the Athenians the long walls.

66. The same summer the Megareans in the city of Megara: pinched both by the war of the Athenians, who invaded their territory with their whole forces every year twice, and by their own outlaws from Pegæ², who in a sedition driven out by the commons grievously afflicted them with robberies: began to talk one to another, how it was fit to call them home again, and not to let their city by both these means to be ruined. The friends of those without perceiving the rumour, they also, more openly now than before, required to have it brought to council. But the patrons of the commons, fearing that they with the commons, by reason of the miseries they were in, should not be able to carry it against the other side¹, made an offer to Hippocrates, the son of Ariphton, and Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, commanders of the Athenian army, to deliver them the city; as esteeming that course less dangerous for themselves than the reduction of those whom they had before driven out. And they agreed, that first the Athenians should possess themselves of the long-walls, (these were about eight furlongs in length, and reached from the city to Nisæa their haven); thereby to cut off the aid of the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, in which (the better to assure Megara to their side) there lay no other soldiers in garrison but they: and then afterwards, that these men would attempt to deliver them the city above; which would the more easily succeed², if that were effected first. 67. The Athenians therefore, after all was done and said on both sides, and every thing ready, sailed away by night to Minoa, an³ island of the Megareans, with six hundred men of arms led by Hippocrates; and sat down in a certain pit, out of which bricks had been made for the walls, and which was not far off. But they that were with the other commander Demosthenes, light-armed Plataeans and others called peripoli¹, lay in ambush at the temple of Mars, not so far off as the former. And none of the city perceived any thing of this, but only such as had peculiar care to know the passages of this same night². When it was almost day, the Megarean traitors did thus. They had been accustomed long, as men that went out for booty, with leave of the magistrates, of whom they had obtained by good offices the opening of the gates, to carry out a little boat, such as wherein the watermen used an oar in either hand; and to convey it by night down the ditch to the sea-side in a cart, and³ in a cart to bring it back again and set it within the gates: to the end that the Athenians which lay in Minoa, might not know where to watch for them, no boat being to be seen in the haven. At this time was that cart at the gates, which were opened according to custom as for the boat. And the Athenians seeing it, (for so it was agreed on), arose from their ambush, and ran with all speed to get in before the gates should be shut again, and to be there whilst the cart was yet in the gates and kept them open¹. And first those Plataeans and peripoli that were with Demosthenes, ran in, in that same place where the trophy is now extant; and fighting presently within the gates, (for those Peloponnesians that were nearest heard the stir), the Plataeans overcame those that resisted; and made good the gates for the Athenian men of arms that were coming after. 68. After this the Athenian soldiers, as they entered, went up every one to the wall. And a few of the Peloponnesians that were of the garrison, made head at first and fought, and were some of them slain; but the most of them took their heels; fearing in the night, both the enemy that charged them, and also the traitors of the Megareans that fought against them, apprehending that all the Megareans in general had betrayed them². It chanced also that the Athenian herald of

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. The
Athenians win the
long walls.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. The traitors
give advice to open
the gates and give
battle.

The treason
discovered.

his own discretion made proclamation, that if any Megarean would take part with the Athenians, he should come and lay down his arms³. When the Peloponnesians heard this, they stayed no longer: but seriously believing that they jointly warred upon them, fled into Nisæa. As soon as it was day, the walls⁴ being now taken and the Megareans being in a tumult within the city, they that had treated with the Athenians, and with them the rest, as many as were conscious, said it was fit to have the gates opened, and to go out and give the enemy battle. Now it was agreed on between them, that when the gates were open, the Athenians should rush in: and that themselves would be easily known from the rest, to the end they might have no harm done them; for that they would besmear themselves with some ointment¹. And the opening of the gates would be for their greater safety: for the four thousand men of arms of Athens and six hundred horsemen, which according to the appointment were to come to them, having marched all night were already arrived. When they had besmeared themselves and were now about the gates, one of those who were privy discovered the conspiracy to the rest that were not. These joining their strength came all together to the gates, denying that it was fit to go out to fight; for that neither in former times when they were stronger than now, durst they do so: or to put the city into so manifest danger: and said, that if they would not be satisfied, the battle should be thereright. Yet they discovered not that they knew of the practice, but only, as having given good advice, meant to maintain it. And they stayed at the gates², insomuch as the traitors could not perform what they intended.

69. The Athenian commanders, knowing some cross accident had happened, and that they could not take the city by assault, fell to enclosing of Nisæa with a wall: which if they could take before aid came, they thought Megara would the sooner yield. Iron was quickly brought unto them from Athens, and masons, and whatsoever else was necessary. And beginning at the wall they had won, when they had built cross over to the other side, from thence both ways they drew it on to the sea on either side Nisæa: and having distributed the work amongst the army, as well the wall as the ditch, they served themselves of the stones and bricks of the suburbs, and having felled trees and timber, they supplied what was defective with a strong palisado¹. The houses also themselves of the suburbs, when they had put on battlements, served them for a fortification. All that day they wrought: the next day about evening they had within very little finished. But then they that were in Nisæa, seeing themselves to want victual, (for they had none but what came day by day from the city above), and without hope that the Peloponnesians could quickly come to relieve them; conceiving also that the Megareans were their enemies; compounded with the Athenians on these terms: to be dismissed every one at a certain ransom in money; to deliver up their arms; and the Lacedæmonians, both the captain and whosoever of them else was within, to be at discretion of the Athenians. Having thus agreed, they went out. And the Athenians, when they had broken off¹ the long walls from the city of Megara, and taken in Nisæa, prepared for what was further to be done.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. The Athenians failing of Megara take Nisæa, and demolish the long walls.

year viii A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas saveth Megara from

70. Brasidas the son of Tellus, a Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, preparing of an army to go into Thrace. And when he heard of the taking of the long walls, fearing what might become of the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be won, sent unto the Bœotians, willing them to meet him speedily with their forces at Tripodiscus, a village of Megaris so called at the foot of the hill Geraneia; and marched presently himself with two thousand seven hundred men of arms of Corinth, four hundred of Phlius, six hundred of Sicyon, and those of his own all that he had yet levied; thinking to have found Nisæa yet untaken. When he heard the contrary, (for he set forth towards Tripodiscus in the night), with three hundred men chosen out of the whole army, before news should arrive of his coming, he came unseen of the Athenians that lay by the sea-side to the city of Megara; pretending in word, and intending also in good earnest if he could have done it, to attempt upon Nisæa; but desiring² to get into Megara to confirm it; and required to be let in, for that he was, he said, in hope to recover Nisæa. 71. But the Megarean factions being afraid, one, lest he should bring in the outlaws and cast out them, the other, lest the commons out of this very fear should assault them; whereby the city being at battle within itself, and the Athenians lying in wait so near, would be lost: received him not, but resolved on both sides to sit still and attend the success. For both the one faction and the other expected, that the Athenians and these that came to succour the city would join battle: and¹ then they might with more safety, such as were the favoured side, turn unto them that had the victory. And Brasidas, not prevailing, went back to the rest of the army. 72. Betimes in the morning arrived the Bœotians, having also² intended to come to the aid of Megara before Brasidas sent, as esteeming the danger to concern themselves, and were then with their whole forces come forward as far as Platæa. But when they had received also this message, they were a great deal the more encouraged: and sent two thousand two hundred men of arms and two hundred horse to Brasidas, but went back with the greater part of their army. The whole army being now together of no less than six thousand men of arms; and the Athenian men of arms lying indeed in good order about Nisæa and the sea-side, but the light-armed straggling in the plains: the Bœotian horsemen came unexpectedly upon the light-armed soldiers, and drove them towards the sea; for in all this time till now, there had come no aid at all to the Megareans from any place. But when the Athenian horse went likewise out to encounter them, they fought, and there was a battle between the horsemen of either side that held long; wherein both sides claimed the victory. For the Athenians slew the general of the Bœotian horse and some few others, and rifled them, having themselves been first chased by them to Nisæa¹: and having these dead bodies in their power they restored them upon truce, and erected a trophy. Nevertheless, in respect of the whole action, neither side went off with assurance²; but parting asunder, the Bœotians went to the army, and the Athenians to Nisæa.

being rendered to the Athenians.

Brasidas desireth to put himself into the city.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

Brasidas goeth back to Tripodiscus.

The Bœotians come with their forces, and join with Brasidas.

The Bœotian and Athenian horse skirmish.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

73. After this, Brasidas with his army came down nearer to the sea and to the city of Megara: and having seized on a place of advantage, set his army in battle array and stood still. For they thought the Athenians would be assailants, and knew the Megareans stood observing whether side should have the victory: and that it must needs fall out well for them both ways; first, because they should not be the assailant, and voluntarily begin the battle and danger; since having showed themselves ready to fight, the victory must also justly be attributed to them without their labour: and next it must fall out well in respect of the Megareans; for if they should not have come in sight, the matter had not been any longer in the power of fortune, but they had without all doubt been presently deprived of the city, as men conquered: whereas now, if haply the Athenians declined battle likewise, they should obtain what they came for without stroke stricken: which also indeed came to pass. For³ the Megareans—when the Athenians went out and ordered their army without the long walls, but yet, because the enemy charged not, stood also still: their commanders likewise considering, that if they should begin the battle against a number greater than their own, after the greatest part of their enterprise was already achieved, the danger would be unequal; for if they should overcome, they could win but Megara, and if they were vanquished, must lose the best part of their men of arms; whereas the enemy, who out of the whole power and number that was present in the field did adventure but every one a part, would in all likelihood put it to the hazard: and so for a while affronted each other, and, neither doing any thing, withdrew again, the Athenians first into Nisæa, and afterwards the Peloponnesians to the place from whence they had set forth— then, I say, the Megareans, such as were the friends of the outlaws, taking heart because they saw the Athenians were unwilling to fight, set open the gates to Brasidas as victor, and to the rest of the captains of the several cities; and when they were in, (those that had practised with the Athenians being all the while in a great fear¹), they went to council. 74. Afterwards Brasidas, having dismissed his confederates to their several cities, went himself to Corinth in pursuit of his former purpose to levy an army for Thrace. Now the Megareans that were in the city, (when the Athenians also were gone home), all that had chief hand in the practice with the Athenians, knowing themselves discovered, presently slipt away: but the rest, after they had conferred with the friends of the outlaws, recalled them from Pegæ, upon great oaths administered unto them, no more to remember former quarrels, but to give the city their best advice. These, when they came into office, took a view of the arms; and disposing bands of soldiers in divers quarters of the city¹ , picked out of their enemies, and of those that seemed most to have co-operated in the treason with the Athenians, about a hundred persons; and having constrained the people to give their sentence upon them openly, when they were condemned slew them; and established in the city the estate almost of an oligarchy. And this change of government, made by a few upon sedition, did nevertheless continue for a long time after.

The whole army on either side face one another, but neither side willing to begin.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

The Megareans receive Brasidas and his army.

The Megarean outlaws recalled, and sworn to forget former quarrel.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

The outlaws being in authority, put to death a hundred of the adverse faction.

75. The same summer, when Antandros was to be furnished by the Mytilenæans as they intended, Demodicus and Aristides, captains of certain galleys set forth by the Athenians to fetch in tribute, being then about Hellespont, (for Lamachus that was the third in that commission, was gone with ten galleys into Pontus), having notice of the preparation made in that place; and thinking it would be dangerous to have it happen² there as it had done in Anæa over against Samos, in which the Samian outlaws having settled themselves, aided the Peloponnesians in matters of the sea by sending them steersmen, and both bred trouble within the city and entertained such as fled out of it, levied an army amongst the confederates, and marched¹ to it: and having overcome in fight those that came out of Antandros against them, recovered the place again. And not long after, Lamachus that was gone into Pontus, as he lay at anchor in the river Calex in the territory of Heracleia, much rain having fallen above in the country and the stream of a land flood coming suddenly down, lost all his galleys; and came himself and his army through the territory of the Bithynians (who are Thracians dwelling in Asia on the other side) to Chalcedon, a colony of the Megareans in the mouth of Pontus Euxinus, by land.

The Mytilenæan outlaws lose the city of Antandros: which they had intended to fortify and make the seat of their war.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

Lamachus loseth his ten galleys by a sudden landflood in Pontus.

76. The same summer likewise Demosthenes, general of the Athenians, with forty galleys, presently after his departure out of Megaris, sailed to Naupactus. For certain men in the cities thereabouts, desiring to change the form of the Bœotian government, and to turn it into a democracy according to the government of Athens, practised with him and Hippocrates to betray unto him the estates of Bœotia; induced thereunto principally by Ptœodorus, a Theban outlaw: and they ordered the design thus. Some had undertaken to deliver up Siphæ: (Siphæ is a city of the territory of Thespiæ, standing upon the sea-side in the Crissæan gulf): and Chæroneia, which was a town that paid duties to Orchomenus, (called heretofore Orchomenus in Minyeia, but now Orchomenus in Bœotia¹), some others of Orchomenus were to surrender into their hands. And the Orchomenian outlaws had a principal hand in this, and were hiring soldiers to that end out of Peloponnesus. This Chæroneia is the utmost town of Bœotia towards Phanotis in the country of Phocis; and some Phoceans also dwelt in it. [On the other side], the Athenians were to seize on Delium, a place consecrated to Apollo in the territory of Tanagra, on the part toward Eubœa. All this ought to have been done together upon a day appointed, to the end that the Bœotians might not oppose them² with their forces united, but might be troubled every one to defend his own. And if the attempt succeeded, and that they once fortified Delium, they easily hoped, though no change followed in the state of the Bœotians for the present, yet being possessed of those places, and by that means continually fetching in prey out of the country, because there was for every one a place at hand to retire unto, that it could not stand long at a stay; but that the Athenians joining with such of them as rebelled, and the Bœotians not having their forces united, they might in time order the state to their own liking. Thus was the plot laid. 77. And Hippocrates himself, with

Demosthenes goeth to Naupactus upon design against the Bœotians.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The plot laid between certain Bœotians and the Athenians, how to bring Bœotia into the power of the Athenians.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

the forces of the city, was ready when time should serve to march; but sent Demosthenes before with forty galleys to Naupactus, to the end that he should levy an army of Acarnanians and other their confederates in these quarters, and sail to Siphæ to receive it by treason. And a day was set down betwixt them, on which these things should have been done together. Demosthenes, when he arrived and found the Ceniades by compulsion of the rest of Acarnania entered into the Athenian confederation, and had himself raised all the confederates thereabouts, made war first upon Salynthus and the Agræans; and having taken in other places thereabouts, stood ready¹, when the time should require, to go to Siphæ.

Brasidas passeth through Thessaly with seventeen hundred men of arms, to aid the Chalcideans that deliberated a revolt.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

The soft answer of Brasidas, notwithstanding he was resolved to pass.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas goeth apace through Thessaly.

The cause why Perdiccas and the Chalcideans called in the Lacedæmonians into those parts.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The cause why the Lacedæmonians so willingly sent an army to them.

An impious policy of the Lacedæmonians in destroying their Helotes.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

78. About the same time of this summer, Brasidas marching towards the cities upon Thrace with seventeen hundred men of arms, when he came to Heracleia in Trachinia sent a messenger before him to his friends at Pharsalus, requiring them to be guides¹ unto him and to his army. And when there were come unto him Panærus and Dorus and Hippolochidas and Torylaus and Strophacus, who was the public host of the Chalcideans; all which met him at Melitia, a town of Achaia²; he marched on. There were other of the Thessalians also that convoyed him; and from Larissa he was convoyed by Niconidas, a friend of Perdiccas. For it had been hard to pass Thessaly without a guide howsoever, but¹ especially with an army. And to pass through a neighbour territory without leave, is a thing that all Grecians alike are jealous of. Besides, that the people of Thessaly had ever borne good affection to the Athenians. Insomuch, as if by custom the government of that country had not been lordly rather than a commonwealth², he could never have gone on. For also now as he marched forward, there met him at the river Enipeus others of a contrary mind to the former, that forbade him; and told him that he did unjustly to go on without the common consent of all. But those that convoyed him answered, that they would not bring him through against their wills: but that coming to them on a sudden, they conducted him as friends. And Brasidas himself said, he came thither a friend both to the country and to them; and that he bore arms, not against them, but against the Athenians their enemies; and that he never knew of any enmity between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, whereby they might not use one another's ground; and that even now he would not go on without their consent; for neither could he; but [only] entreated them not to stop him. When they heard this, they went their ways. And he, by the advice of his guides, before any greater number should unite to hinder him, marched on with all possible speed, staying nowhere by the way. And the same day he set forth from Melitia, he reached Pharsalus, and encamped by the river Apidanus: from thence he went to Phacium: from thence into Peræbia¹. The Peræbians, though subject to the Thessalians, set him at Dion in the dominion of Perdiccas, a little city of the Macedonians situate at the foot of Olympus on the side towards Thessaly. 79. In this manner Brasidas ran through Thessaly before any there could put in readiness to stop him; and came into the territory of the Chalcideans², and to Perdiccas. For Perdiccas and the Chalcideans, all that had revolted from the Athenians, when they saw the affairs of the Athenians prosper, had drawn this army out of Peloponnesus for fear: the Chalcideans, because they thought the Athenians would make war on them first, as³ having been also incited thereto by those cities amongst them that had not revolted; and Perdiccas, not that he was their open enemy, but because he feared the Athenians for ancient quarrels; but principally because he desired to subdue Arrhibæus, king of the Lyncestians. And the ill success which the Lacedæmonians in these times had, was a cause that they obtained an army from them the more easily. 80. For the Athenians vexing Peloponnesus, and their particular territory Laconia most of all, they thought the best way to divert them was to send an army to the confederates of the Athenians, so to vex them again. And the rather because Perdiccas and the Chalcideans were content to maintain the army; having called it thither to help the Chalcideans in their revolt. And because also they desired a pretence to send away part of their Helotes; for fear they should take the opportunity of the present state of their affairs, the enemies lying now in Pylus, to innovate. For they did also this further, fearing the youth and multitude of their Helotes: for the Lacedæmonians had

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. The praise
of Brasidas.

ever many ordinances concerning how to look to themselves against the Helotes. They caused proclamation to be made, that as many of them as claimed the estimation to have done the Lacedæmonians best service in their wars, should be made free 1; feeling them in this manner, and conceiving that, as they should every one out of pride deem himself worthy to be first made free, so they would soonest also rebel against them. And when they had thus preferred about two thousand, which also with crowns on their heads went in procession about the temples as to receive their liberty, they not long after made them away: and no man knew how they perished. And now at this time, with all their hearts, they sent away seven hundred men of arms more of the same men along with Brasidas. The rest of the army were mercenaries, hired by Brasidas out of Peloponnesus. [But] Brasidas 1 himself the Lacedæmonians sent out, chiefly because it was his own desire: 81. notwithstanding the Chalcideans also longed to have him, as one esteemed also in Sparta every way an active man. And when he was out, he did the Lacedæmonians very great service. For by showing himself at that present just and moderate towards the cities, he caused the most of them to revolt; and some of them he also took by treason. Whereby it came to pass, that if the Lacedæmonians pleased to come to composition, (as also they did), they might have towns to render and receive reciprocally 1. And also long after, after the Sicilian war, the virtue and wisdom which Brasidas showed now, to some known by experience, by others believed upon from report, was the principal cause that made the Athenian confederates affect the Lacedæmonians. For being the first that went out, and esteemed in all points for a worthy man, he left behind him an assured hope that the rest also were like him.

82. Being now come into Thrace, the Athenians upon notice thereof declared Perdiccas an enemy, as imputing to him this expedition; and 2 reinforced the garrisons in the parts thereabouts. 83. Perdiccas with Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, marched presently against Arrhibæus the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestians, a people of Macedonia, confining on Perdiccas his dominion; both for a quarrel they had against him, and also as desiring to subdue him. When he came with his army, and Brasidas with him, to the place 1 where they were to have fallen in, Brasidas told him that he desired, before he made war, to draw Arrhibæus by parley, if he could, to a league with the Lacedæmonians. For Arrhibæus had also made some proffer by a herald, to commit the matter to Brasidas' arbitrement. And the Chalcidean ambassadors being present, gave him likewise advice not to thrust himself into danger in favour of Perdiccas 2, to the end they might have him more prompt in their own affairs. Besides, the ministers of Perdiccas, when they were at Lacedæmon, had spoken there, as if they had meant to bring [as] many of the places about him [as they could] into the Lacedæmonian league. So that Brasidas favoured Arrhibæus for the public good of their own state. But Perdiccas said, that he brought not Brasidas thither to be a judge of his controversies, but to destroy those enemies which he should show him: and that it will be an injury, seeing he pays the half of his army, for Brasidas to parley with Arrhibæus. Nevertheless Brasidas, whether Perdiccas would

Brasidas joined with Perdiccas marcheth towards Lyncus.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas refusing to make war on Arrhibæus: for the offer of Arrhibæus:

and through the advice of the Chalcideans:

giveth therein distaste to Perdiccas.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas cometh before Acanthus:

or not, and though it made a quarrel, had conference with Arrhibæus; by whom also he was induced to withdraw his army. But from that time forward Perdiccas instead of half, paid but a third part of his army; as conceiving himself to have been injured.

84. The same summer, a little before the vintage, Brasidas having joined to his own the forces of the Chalcideans, marched to Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians. And there arose sedition about receiving him, between such as had joined with the Chalcideans in calling him thither, and the common people.

Founded A. C. 656.

and is received without his army

Nevertheless for fear of their fruits, which were not yet gotten in, the multitude was won by Brasidas to let him enter alone, and then after he had said his mind, to advise what to do amongst themselves. And presenting himself before the multitude, (for he was not uneloquent, though [1](#) a Lacedæmonian), he spake to this effect:

85. “Men of Acanthus, the reason why the Lacedæmonians have sent me and this army abroad, is to make good what we gave out in the beginning for the cause of our war against the Athenians:

the oration of brasidas.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Brasidas.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Brasidas.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Brasidas.

which was, that we meant to make a war for the liberties of Greece. But if we be come late, as deceived by the war there in the opinion we had, that we ourselves should soon have pulled the Athenians down without any danger of yours, no man hath reason therefore to blame us. For we are come as soon as occasion served, and with your help will do our best to bring them under. But I wonder why you shut me forth of your gates, and why I was not welcome. For we Lacedæmonians have undergone this great danger, of passing many days’ journey through the territory of strangers, and showed all possible zeal, because we imagined that we went to such confederates, as before we came had us present in their hearts and were desirous of our coming. And therefore it were hard that you should now be otherwise minded, and withstand your own and the rest of the Grecians’ liberty; not only in that yourselves resist us, but also because others whom I go to will be the less willing to come in; making difficulty, because you to whom I came first, having a flourishing city and being esteemed wise, have refused us. For which I shall have no sufficient excuse to plead, but must be thought either to pretend to set up liberty unjustly [1](#), or to come weak and without power to maintain you against the Athenians [2](#). And yet against this same army I now have, when I went to encounter the Athenians at Nisæa, though more in number they durst not hazard battle. Nor is it likely that the Athenians will send forth so great a number against you, as they had in their fleet there at Nisæa [3](#). 86. I come not hither to hurt, but to set free the Grecians: and I have the Lacedæmonian magistrates bound unto me by great oaths, that whatsoever confederates shall be added to their side, at least by me, shall still enjoy their own laws; and that we shall not hold you as confederates to us brought in either by force or fraud, but on the contrary, be confederates to you that are kept in servitude by the Athenians. And therefore I claim not only that you be not jealous of me, (especially having given you so good assurance), or think me unable to defend you; but also that you declare yourselves boldly with me. And if any man be unwilling so to do through fear of some particular man, apprehending that I would put the city into the hands of a few, let him cast away that fear [1](#): for I came not to side,

nor do I think I should bring you an assured liberty, if neglecting the ancient use here I should enthrall either the *multitude* to the *few*, or the *few* to the *multitude*. For to be governed so, were worse than the domination of a foreigner: and there would result from it to us Lacedæmonians, not thanks for our labours; but instead of honour and glory, an imputation of those crimes for which we make war amongst the Athenians, and which would be more odious in us, than in them, that never pretended the virtue². For it is more dishonourable, at least to men in dignity, to amplify their estate by specious fraud, than by open violence. For the latter assaileth with a certain right of power given us by fortune; but the other, with the treachery of a wicked conscience. 87. But³ besides the oath which they have sworn already, the greatest further assurance you can have, is this: that our actions weighed with our words, you must needs believe that it is to our profit to do as I have told you. But if after these promises of mine you shall say, you cannot; and yet, forasmuch as your affection is with us, will claim impunity for rejecting us; or shall say, that this liberty I offer you seems to be accompanied with danger, and that it were well done to offer it to such as can receive it, but not to force it upon any: then will I call to witness the gods and heroes of this place, that my counsel which you refuse was for your good; and will endeavour, by wasting of your territory, to compel you to it. Nor shall I think I do you therein any wrong; but have reason for it for two necessities: one of the Lacedæmonians, lest whilst they have your affections and not your society, they should receive hurt from your contributions of money to the Athenians¹; another of the Grecians, lest they should be hindered of their liberty by your example. For otherwise indeed we could not justly do it; nor ought we Lacedæmonians to set any at liberty against their wills, if it were not for some common good. We covet not dominion [over you]; but seeing we haste to make others lay down the same, we should do injury to the greater part, if bringing liberty to the other states in general we should tolerate you to cross us. Deliberate well of these things: strive to be the beginners of liberty in Greece; to get yourselves eternal glory; to preserve every man his private estate from damage, and to invest the whole city with a² most honourable title.”

88. Thus spake Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much said on either side, partly for that which Brasidas had effectually spoken, and partly for fear of their fruits abroad, the most of them decreed to revolt from the Athenians; having given their votes in secret. And when they had made him take the same oath which the Lacedæmonian magistrates took when they sent him out, namely, that what confederates soever he should join to the Lacedæmonians should enjoy their own laws, they received his army into the city. And not long after revolted Stageirus, another colony of the Andrians. And these were the acts of this summer.

The revolt of Acanthus.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

The revolt of Stageirus. The end of the eighth summer.

Demosthenes approacheth Siphæ by sea to take it by treason, but failed.

The treason detected.

89. In the very beginning of the next winter, when the Bœotian cities should have been delivered to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, generals of the Athenians; and Demosthenes should have gone to Siphæ, and Hippocrates to Delium: having mistaken the days on which they should have both set forward, Demosthenes went to Siphæ first, and having with him the Acarnans and many confederates of those parts in his fleet, [yet] lost his labour. For the treason was detected¹ by one Nicomachus, a Phocæan of the town of Phanotis, who told it unto the Lacedæmonians, and they again unto the Bœotians. Whereby the Bœotians concurring universally to relieve those places, (for Hippocrates was not yet gone to trouble them in their own several territories), preoccupied both Siphæ and Chæroneia. And the conspirators knowing the error, attempted in those cities no further. 90. But Hippocrates having raised the whole power of the city of Athens, both citizens and others that dwelt amongst them, and all strangers that were then there, arrived afterwards at Delium when the Bœotians were now returned from Siphæ; and there stayed and took in Delium, a temple of Apollo, with a wall in this manner. Round about the temple and the whole consecrated ground they drew a ditch; and out of the ditch, instead of a wall they cast up the earth; and having driven down piles on either side, they cast thereinto the matter of the vineyard¹ about the temple, which to that purpose they cut down, together with the stones and bricks of the ruined buildings: and by all means heightened the fortification, and in such places as would give leave, erected turrets of wood upon the same. There was no edifice of the temple standing, for the cloister that had been was fallen down. They began the work the third day after they set forth from Athens; and wrought all the same day and all the fourth, and the fifth day till dinner. And then being most part of it finished, the camp came back from Delium about ten furlongs homewards. And the light-armed soldiers went most of them presently away; but the men of arms laid down their arms there, and rested. Hippocrates stayed yet behind, and took order about the garrison, and about the finishing of the remainder of the fortification.

Hippocrates marcheth to Delium:

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. he fortifieth Delium.

The army of the Athenians, having taken Delium, begin to retire.

91. The Bœotians took the same time to assemble at Tanagra: and when all the forces were come in that from every city were expected, and when they understood that the Athenians drew homewards; though the rest of the Bœotian commanders, which were eleven, approved not giving battle, because they were not now in Bœotia, (for the Athenians, when they laid down their arms, were in the confines of Oropia); yet Pagondas¹ the son of Aioladas, being the Bœotian commander for Thebes, whose turn it was to have the leading of the army, was, together with Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas, of opinion to fight, and held it the best course to try the fortune of a battle; wherefore calling them unto him every company by itself, that they might not be all at once from their arms, he exhorted the Bœotians to march against the Athenians and to hazard battle, speaking in this manner:

The Bœotians follow them.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

92. “Men of Bœotia, it ought never to have so much as entered into the thought of any of us the commanders, that because we find not the Athenians now in Bœotia, it should therefore be unfit to give them battle. For they out of a bordering country have entered Bœotia and fortified in it, with intent to waste it: and are indeed enemies in whatsoever ground we find them, or whencesoever they come doing the acts of hostility. But now if any man think it also unsafe, let him henceforth be of another opinion. For providence in them that are invaded, endureth not such deliberation concerning their own, as may be used by them, who retaining their own, out of desire to enlarge voluntarily invade the estate of another. And it is the custom of this country² of yours, when a foreign enemy comes against you, to fight with him both on your own and on your neighbour’s ground alike; but much more you ought to do it against the Athenians, when they be¹ borderers. For liberty with all men, is nothing else but to be a match for the cities that are their neighbours. With these then, that attempt the subjugation not only of their neighbours, but of estates far from them, why should we not try the utmost of our fortune? We have for example the estate that the Eubœans over against us, and also the greatest part of the rest of Greece, do live in under them. And you must know², that though others fight with their neighbours about the bounds of their territories, we, if we be vanquished, shall have but one bound amongst us all: so that we shall no more quarrel about limits. For if they enter, they will take all our several states into their own possession by force. So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians, than of other people. And such as upon confidence in their strength invade their neighbours, as the Athenians now do, use to be bold in warring on those that sit still, defending themselves only in their own territories: whereas they be less urgent to those that are ready to meet them without their own limits, or [also] to begin the war when opportunity serveth. We have experience hereof in these same men. For after we had overcome them at Coroneia³, at what time through our own sedition they held our country in subjection, we established a great security in Bœotia: which lasted till this present. Remembering which, we ought now, the elder sort to imitate our former acts there; and the younger sort, who are the children of those valiant fathers, to endeavour not to disgrace the virtue of their houses: but rather with confidence that the god, whose temple fortified they unlawfully dwell in, will be with us, the sacrifices we offered him appearing fair¹, to march against them; and let them see, that though they may gain what they covet when they invade such as will not fight, yet men that have the generosity to hold their own in liberty by battle, and not invade the state of another unjustly, will never let them go away unfoughten.”

the oration of pagondas to his soldiers.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Pagondas.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Pagondas.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. The order of the army of the Bœotians.

The order of the army of the Athenians.

93. Pagondas with this exhortation persuaded the Bœotians to march against the Athenians, and making them rise² led them speedily on; for it was drawing towards night. And when he was near to their army, in a place from whence by the interposition of a hill they saw not each other, making a stand he put his army into order and prepared to give battle. When it was told Hippocrates, who was then at Delium, that the Bœotians were marching after them, he sends presently to the army, commanding them to be put in array. And not long after he came himself: having left some three hundred horse about Delium, both for a guard to the place if it should be assaulted, and withal to watch an opportunity to come upon the Bœotians when they were in fight. But for these, the Bœotians appointed some forces purposely to attend them. And when all was as it should be, they showed themselves from the top of the hill, where they sat down with their arms¹ in the same order they were to fight in: being about seven thousand men of arms, of light-armed soldiers above ten thousand, a thousand horsemen, and five hundred targetiers. Their right wing consisting of the Thebans, and their partakers²; in the middle battle were the Haliartians, Coronæans, Copæans, and the rest that dwell about the lake³; in the left were the Thespians, Tanagræans, and Orchomenians. The horsemen and light-armed soldiers were placed on either wing. The Thebans were ordered by twenty-five in file⁴; but the rest, every one as it fell out. This was the preparation and order of the Bœotians. 94. The Athenian men of arms, in number no fewer than the enemy, were ordered by eight in file throughout: their horse they placed on either wing. But for light-armed soldiers armed as was fit¹, there were none; nor was there any in the city. Those that went out, followed² the camp for the most part without arms, as being a general expedition both of citizens and strangers; and after they once began to make homeward, there stayed few behind. When they were now in their order and ready to join battle, Hippocrates the general came into the army of the Athenians, and encouraged them, speaking to this effect:

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

95. “Men of Athens, my exhortation shall be short, but with valiant men it hath as much force as a longer; and is for a remembrance rather than a command. Let no man think, because it is in the territory of another, that we therefore precipitate ourselves into a great danger that did not concern us. For in the territory of these men, you fight for your own. If we get the victory, the Peloponnesians will never invade our territories again, for want of the Bœotian horsemen. So that in one battle, you shall both gain this territory, and free your own. Therefore march on against the enemy, every one as becometh the dignity, both of his natural city, which he glorieth to be chief of all Greece; and of his ancestors, who having overcome these men at Cœnophyta under the conduct of Myronides, were in times past masters of all Bœotia.”

the oration of
hippocrates to his
soldiers.

The Bœotians
interrupt the

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

96. Whiles Hippocrates was making this exhortation, and had gone with it over half the army, but [could proceed] no further, the Bœotians³ (for Pagondas likewise made but a short exhortation and had there sung the Pæan) came down upon them from the hill. And the Athenians likewise went forward to meet them, [so fast that] they¹ met together running. The utmost parts of both the armies never came to join, hindered both, by one and the same cause: for certain currents of water kept them asunder. But the rest made sharp battle; standing close, and striving to put by each others' bucklers². The left wing of the Bœotians, to the very middle of the army, were overthrown by the Athenians: who³ in this part had to deal, amongst others, principally with the Thespians. For whilst they that were placed within the same wing, gave back, and were circled in by the Athenians in a narrow compass, those Thespians that were slain were hewed down in the very fight. Some also of the Athenians themselves, troubled with inclosing them, through ignorance slew one another. So that the Bœotians were overcome in this part; and fled to the other part where they were yet in fight. But the right wing wherein the Thebans stood, had the better of the Athenians; and⁴ by little and little forced them to give ground, and followed upon them from the very first. It happened also that Pagondas, whilst the left wing of his army was in distress, sent two companies of horse secretly about the hill; whereby that wing of the Athenians which was victorious, apprehending upon their sudden appearing that they had been a fresh army, was put into affright: and the whole army of the Athenians, now doubly terrified by this accident and by the Thebans that continually won ground and brake their ranks, betook themselves to flight. Some fled toward Delium and the sea; and some towards Oropus; others toward the mountain Parnethus; and others other ways, as to each appeared hope of safety. The Bœotians, especially their horse and those Locrians that came in after the enemy was already defeated, followed killing them. But night surprising them, the multitude of them that fled was the easier saved. The next day those that were gotten to Oropus and Delium went thence by sea to Athens, having left a garrison in Delium: which place, notwithstanding this defeat, they yet retained. 97. The Bœotians, when they had erected their trophy, taken away their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and left a guard upon the place, returned back to Tanagra; and there entered into consultation for an assault to be made on Delium. In the meantime, a herald sent from the Athenians to require the bodies, met with a herald by the way sent by the Bœotians: which turned him back, by telling him he could get nothing done till himself was returned from the Athenians. This herald, when he came before the Athenians, delivered unto them what the Bœotians had given him in charge: namely, "that they had done unjustly to transgress the universal law of the Grecians; being a constitution received by them all, that the invader of a another's country should abstain from all holy places in the same: that the Athenians had fortified Delium and dwelt in it, and done whatsoever else men use to do in places profane; and had drawn that water to the common use, which was unlawful for themselves to have touched, save only to wash their hands for the sacrifice¹: that therefore the Bœotians, both in the behalf of the god and of themselves, invoking

The Athenians fly.

Dispute about giving leave to the Athenians to take up their dead.

the message of the bœotians to the athenians.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

the message of the athenians to the bœotians by a friend of their own.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

the reply of the bœotians.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

Apollo and all the interested spirits, did warn them to be gone and to remove their stuff out of the temple.” 98. After the herald had said this, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Bœotians: “denying that either they had done any wrong to the holy place already, or would willingly do any hurt to it hereafter: for neither did they at first enter into it to such intent; but to requite the greater injuries which had been done unto them: as for the law which the Grecians have, it is no other but that they which have the dominion of any territory, great or small, have ever the temples also; and besides the accustomed rites, may superinduce what other they can: for also the Bœotians, and most men else, all that having driven out another nation possess their territory, did at first invade the temples of others and make² them their own: that therefore, if they could win from them more of their land, they would keep it; and for the part they were now in, they were in it with a good will and would not out of it, as being their own: that for the water, they meddled with it upon necessity; which was not to be ascribed to insolence, but to this, that fighting against the Bœotians that had invaded their territory first, they were forced to use it; for whatsoever is forced by war or danger, hath in reason a kind of pardon even with the god himself: for the altars, in cases of involuntary offences, are a refuge; and they are said to violate laws that are evil without constraint, not they that are a little bold upon occasion of distress: that the Bœotians themselves, who require restitution of the holy places for a redemption of the dead, are more irreligious by far than they, who, rather than let their temples go, are content to go without that which were fit for them to receive¹: and they bade him say plainly: that they would not depart out of the Bœotian territory, for that they were not now in it; but in a territory which they had made their own by the sword: and nevertheless, required truce according to the ordinances of the country, for the fetching away of the dead.” 99. To this the Bœotians answered: “that if the dead were in Bœotia, they should quit the ground and take with them whatsoever was theirs: but if the dead were in their own territory, the Athenians themselves knew best what to do.” For they thought that though Oropia, wherein the dead lay, (for the battle was fought in the border between Attica and Bœotia), by subjection belonged to the Athenians, yet they could not fetch them off by force; and for truce that the Athenians might come safely on Athenian ground, they would give none: but conceived it was a handsome answer, to say, “*that if they would quit the¹ground they should obtain whatsoever they required.*” Which when the Athenian herald heard, he went his way without effect.

100. The Bœotians presently sent for darters and slingers from [the towns on] the Melian gulf; and with these, and with two thousand men of arms of Corinth, and with the Peloponnesian garrison that was put out of Nisæa, and with the Megareans, all which arrived after the battle, they marched forthwith to Delium and assaulted the wall. And when they had attempted the same many other ways, at length they brought to it an engine, wherewith they also took it, made in this manner. Having slit in two a great mast, they made hollow both the sides, and curiously set them together again in the form of a pipe. At the end of it in chains they hung a cauldron: and into the cauldron from the end of the mast they conveyed a snout of iron; having with iron also armed a great part of the rest of the wood. They carried it to the wall, being far off, in carts; to that part, where it was most

The form of an engine, wherewith they set the wall on fire.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

Delium recovered by the Bœotians.

made up with the matter of the vineyard and with wood. And when it was to, they applied a pair of great bellows to the end next themselves, and blew. The blast passing narrowly through into the cauldron, in which were coals of fire, brimstone, and pitch, raised an exceeding great flame, and set the wall on fire: so that no man being able to stand any longer on it, but abandoning the same and betaking themselves to flight, the wall was by that means taken. Of the defendants, some were slain, and two hundred taken prisoners: the rest of the number recovered their galleys, and got home.

101. Delium thus taken on the seventeenth day after the battle, and the herald, which not long after was sent again about the fetching away of the dead, not knowing it¹: the Bœotians let him have them, and answered no more as they had formerly done. In the battle there died, Bœotians, few less than five hundred: the Athenians, few less than a thousand, with Hippocrates the general; but of light-armed soldiers and such as carried the provisions of the army, a great number.

The Bœotians deliver to the Athenians their dead.

Not long after this battle, Demosthenes², that had been with his army at Siphæ, seeing the treason succeeded not, having aboard his galleys his army of Acarnanians and Agræans and four hundred men of arms of Athens, landed in Sicyonia. But before all his galleys came to shore, the Sicyonians, who went out to defend their territory, put to flight such as were already landed, and chased them back to their galleys; having also slain some, and taken some alive. And when they had erected a trophy, they gave truce to the Athenians for the fetching away of their dead. About the time that these things passed at Delium, died Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, overcome in battle in an expedition against the Triballians. And Seuthes the son of Spardocus, his brother's son, succeeded him in the kingdom, both of the Odrysians, and of the rest of Thrace as much as was before subject to Sitalces.

Demosthenes landing in Sicyonia, is beaten back by the inhabitants.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

Sitalces king of Thrace, dieth: and Seuthes his brother's son succeedeth him.

102. The same winter, Brasidas with the confederates in Thrace made war upon Amphipolis; a colony¹ of the Athenians, situated on the river Strymon. The place whereon the city now standeth, Aristagoras of Miletus had formerly attempted to inhabit², when he fled from king Darius: but was beaten away by the Edonians. Two-and-thirty years after this, the Athenians assayed the same; and sent thither ten thousand of their own city, and of others as many as would go: and these were destroyed all by the Thracians at Drabescus. In the twenty-ninth year after, conducted by Agnon the son of Nicias, the Athenians came again; and having driven out the Edonians, became founders of this place, formerly called the Nine-ways. His army lay then at Eion, a town of traffic by the seaside subject to the Athenians, at the mouth of the river Strymon; five-and-twenty furlongs from the city. Agnon named this city Amphipolis, because it was surrounded by the river Strymon, that runs on either side it. When he had taken it in with a long wall from river to river, he put inhabitants into the place, being conspicuous round about both to the sea and land¹.

Brasidas goeth to Amphipolis.

The original of Amphipolis. A. C. 498. Ol. 70. 3.

Agnon founder of Amphipolis.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

103. Against this city marched Brasidas with his army, dislodging from Arnæ in Chalcidea. Being about twilight come as far as Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe entereth into the sea, he caused his army to sup, and then marched forward by night. The weather was foul, and a little it snowed; which also made him to march the rather, as desiring that none of Amphipolis, but only the traitors, should be aware of his coming. For there were both Argilians that dwelt in the same city, (now Argilus is a colony of the Andrians), and others, that contrived this, induced thereunto some by Perdiccas, and some by the Chalcideans. But above all the Argilians, being of a city near unto it, and ever suspected by the Athenians, and secret enemies to the place, as soon as opportunity was offered and Brasidas arrived, (who² had also long before dealt underhand with as many of them as dwelt in Amphipolis, to betray it), both received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians, brought the army forward the same night as far as to the bridge of the river. The town stood not close to the river, nor was there a fort at the bridge then, as there is now¹; but they kept it only with a small guard of soldiers. Having easily forced this guard, both in respect of the treason and of the weather, and of his own unexpected approach, he passed the bridge, and was presently master of² whatsoever the Amphipolitans had that dwelt without. 104. Having thus suddenly passed the bridge, and many of those without being slain³, and some fled into the city, the Amphipolitans were in very great confusion at it: and the rather, because they were jealous one of another. And it is said, that if Brasidas had not sent out his army to take booty, but had marched presently to the city, he had in all likelihood taken it then. But so it was, that he pitched there, and fell upon those without; and seeing nothing succeeded by those within⁴, lay still upon the place. But the contrary faction to the traitors being superior in number, whereby the gates were not opened presently, both they and Eucles the general, who was then there for the Athenians to keep the town, sent unto the other general, Thucydides the son of Olorus, the writer of this history, who had charge in Thrace, and was now about Thasos, (which is an island, and a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail), requiring him to come and relieve them. When he heard the news, he went thitherwards in all haste with seven galleys, which chanced to be with him at that time. His purpose principally was, to prevent the yielding up of Amphipolis; but if he should fail of that, then to possess himself of Eion [before Brasidas his coming].

The Argilians
conspire to betray
Amphipolis.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1. Argilus
revolteth

Brasidas winneth the
bridge, and is master
of all between it and
the city.

The Amphipolitans
send for aid to
Thucydides, the
author of this history.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

Brasidas, fearing to be
prevented by
Thucydides, hasteth
by easy conditions to
procure the town to
yield.

year viii. A. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.

105. Brasidas in the meantime, fearing the aid of the galleys to come from Thasos, and having also been informed that Thucydides possessed mines of gold in the parts of Thrace thereabouts, and was thereby of ability amongst the principal men of the continent, hasted by all means to get Amphipolis before he should arrive; lest otherwise at his coming the commons of Amphipolis, expecting that he would levy confederates both from the sea-side and in Thrace, and relieve them, should thereupon refuse to yield. And to that end offered them a moderate composition: causing to be proclaimed, “that whosoever, Amphipolitan or Athenian, would, might continue to dwell there and enjoy his own, with equal and like form1 of government; and that he that would not, should have five days’ respite to be gone and carry away his goods.” 106. When the commons heard this, their minds were turned; and the rather, because the Athenians amongst them were but few, and the most were a promiscuous multitude; and the kinsmen of those that were taken without, flocked together within. And in respect of their fear, they all thought the proclamation reasonable: the Athenians thought it so, because they were willing to go out, as apprehending their own danger to be1 greater than that of the rest; and withal, not expecting aid in haste: and the rest of the multitude, as being thereby both delivered of the danger, and withal to retain their city with the equal form of government. Insomuch that they which conspired with Brasidas now openly justified the offer to be reasonable: and seeing the minds of the commons were now turned, and that they gave ear no more to the words of the Athenian general, they compounded, and upon the conditions proclaimed received him. Thus did these men deliver up the city: Thucydides with his galleys arrived in the evening of the same day at Eion. Brasidas had already gotten Amphipolis, and wanted but a night of taking Eion also: for if these galleys had not come speedily to relieve it, by next morning it had been had.

Amphipolis yielded.

Thucydides cometh too late to relieve Amphipolis, and putteth himself into Eion:

107. After this Thucydides assured Eion, so as it should be safe both for the present, though Brasidas should assault it, and for the future; and took into it such as, according to the proclamation made, came down from Amphipolis. Brasidas with many boats came suddenly down the river to Eion, and attempted to seize on the point of the ground lying out from the wall into the sea, and thereby to command the mouth of the river: he assayed also the same at the same time by land, and was in both beaten off; but Amphipolis he furnished with all things necessary1. Then revolted to him Myrcinus, a city of the Edonians; Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, being slain by the sons of Goaxis, and by Braures his own wife. And not long after Gapselus also, and Æsyme, colonies of the Thasians. Perdicas also, after the taking of these places, came to him, and helped him in assuring of the same.

and defendeth it against Brasidas.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1. Greatinclination of the people of those parts to come in to Brasidas.

The Athenians begin to fear.

year viii. A. C. 424. Ol. 89. 1.

108. After Amphipolis was taken, the Athenians were brought into great fear; especially, for that it was a city that yielded them much profit, both in timber which is sent them for the building of galleys, and in revenue of money; and because also, though the Lacedæmonians had a passage open to come against their confederates, the Thessalians convoying them, as far as to Strymon, yet if they had not gotten that bridge, the river being upwards nothing but a vast fen, and towards Eion well guarded with their galleys, they could have gone no further: which now they thought they might easily do; and therefore feared lest their confederates should revolt. For Brasidas both showed himself otherwise very moderate, and also gave out in speech, that he was sent forth to recover the liberty of Greece. And the cities which were subject to the Athenians, hearing of the taking of Amphipolis, and what assurance he brought with him, and of his gentleness besides, were extremely desirous of innovation; and sent messengers privily to bid him draw near, every one striving who should first revolt. For they thought they might do it boldly, falsely estimating the power of the Athenians to be less than afterwards it appeared, and making a judgment of it according to [blind] wilfulness rather than safe forecast: it being the fashion of men, what they wish to be true to admit even upon an ungrounded hope, and what they wish not, with a magistral kind of arguing to reject. Withal, because the Athenians had lately received a blow from the Bœotians, and because Brasidas had said, (not as was the truth, but as served best to allure them), that when he was at Nisæa the Athenians durst not fight with those forces of his alone, they grew confident thereon, and believed not that any man would come against them. But the greatest cause of all was, that for the delight they took at this time to innovate, and for that they were to make trial of the Lacedæmonians, not till now angry¹, they were content by any means to put it to the hazard. Which being perceived, the Athenians sent garrison soldiers into those cities, as many as the shortness of the time and the season of winter would permit. And Brasidas sent unto Lacedæmon, to demand greater forces; and in the meantime prepared to build galleys on the river Strymon. But the Lacedæmonians, partly through envy of the principal men², and partly because they more affected the redemption of their men taken in the island and the ending of the war, refused to furnish him.

The Athenians send garrisons to the places thereabouts.

Brasidas envied at home.

109. The same winter the Megareans, having recovered their long walls holden by the Athenians³, razed them to the very ground.

A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. The Megareans demolish their long walls.

year viii. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas invadeth the territory of Acte, where Athos standeth.

Torone revolteth to Brasidas.

The manner how the town was betrayed.

Brasidas, after the taking of Amphipolis, having with him the confederates, marched with his army into the territory called Acte. This [1](#) Acte is that prominent territory, which is disjoined from the continent by a ditch made by the king: and Athos a high mountain in the same, determineth at the Ægean sea. Of the cities it hath, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians, by the side of the said ditch on the part which looketh to the sea towards Eubœa: the rest are Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dion; and are inhabited by promiscuous barbarians of two languages [2](#). Some few there are also of the Chalcidean nation; but the most are Pelasgic, of those Tyrrhene nations [3](#) that once inhabited Athens and Lemnos; and of the Bisaltic and Chrestonic nations, and Edonians; and dwell in small cities. The most of which yielded to Brasidas: but Sane and Dion held out; for which cause he stayed with his army and wasted their territories. 110. But seeing they would not hearken unto him, he led his army presently against Torone of Chalcidea, held by the Athenians. He was called in by *the few*, who were ready withal to deliver him the city: and arriving there a little before break of day, he sat down with his army at the temple of Castor and Pollux [4](#), distant about three furlongs from the city. So that to the rest of the city and to the Athenian garrison in it, his coming was unperceived. But the traitors knowing he was to come, (some few of them being also privily gone to him [1](#)), attended his approach: and when they perceived he was come, they took in unto them seven men armed only with daggers; (for of twenty appointed at first to that service, seven only had the courage to go in; and were led by Lysistratus of Olynthus); which getting over [2](#) the wall towards the main sea unseen, went up (for the town standeth on a hill's side) to the watch that kept the upper end of the town, and having slain the watchmen brake open the postern gate towards Canastræa. 111. Brasidas this while with the rest of his army lay still, and then coming a little forward [3](#), sent a hundred targetiers before, who when the gates should be opened and sign agreed on be set up, should run in first. These men, expecting long and wondering at the matter, by little and little were at length come up close to the city. Those Toronæans within, which helped the men that entered to perform the enterprise, when the postern gate was broken open, and the gate leading to the market-place opened likewise by cutting asunder the bar, went first and fetched some of them about to the postern, to the end that they might suddenly affright such of the town as knew not the matter, both behind and on either side: and then they put up the sign appointed, which was fire, and received the rest of the targetiers by the gate that leadeth to the market-place. 112. Brasidas, when he saw the sign, made his army rise; and with a huge cry of all at once, to the great terror of those within, entered into the city running. Some went directly in by the gate, and some by certain squared timber-trees [1](#), which lay at the wall (which having been lately down was now again in building) for the drawing up of stone. Brasidas therefore, with the greatest number, betook himself to the highest places of the city, to make sure the winning of it by possessing the places of advantage. But the rest of the rabble [2](#) ran dispersed here and there without difference.

year viii. A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 1.

year viii. A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 1. The town
taken.

The Athenians escape
into a castle of the
same, called
Lecythus.

113. When the town was taken, the most of the Toronæans were much troubled, because they were not acquainted with the matter; but the conspirators, and such as were pleased with it, joined themselves presently with those that entered. The Athenians, (of which there were about fifty men of arms asleep in the market-place), when they knew what had happened, fled all, except some few that were slain upon the place, some by land, some by water in two galleys that kept watch there, and saved themselves in Lecythus; which was a fort which they themselves held, cut off³ from the rest of the city to the seaward in a narrow isthmus. And thither also fled all such Toronæans as were affected to them. 114. Being now day, and the city strongly possessed, Brasidas caused a proclamation to be made, that those Toronæans which were fled with the Athenians might come back, as many as would, to their own, and inhabit⁴ there in security. To the Athenians he sent a herald, bidding them depart out of Lecythus under truce with all that they had, as a place that belonged to the Chalcideans. The Athenians denied to quit the place; but the truce they desired for one day, for the taking up of their dead. And Brasidas granted it for two: in which two days he fortified the buildings near; and so also did the Athenians theirs¹. He also called an assembly of the Toronæans, and spake unto them as he had done before to the Acanthians: adding, “that there was no just cause, why either they that had practised to put the city into his hands should be the worse thought of, or accounted traitors for it; seeing that they did it with no intent to bring the city into servitude, nor were hired thereunto with money, but for the benefit and liberty of the city: or that they which were not made acquainted² with it, should think that themselves were not to reap as much good by it as the others; for he came not to destroy either city or man: but had therefore made that proclamation touching those that fled with the Athenians, because he thought them never the worse for that friendship, and made account when they had made trial of the Lacedæmonians, they would³ show as much good will also unto them, or rather more, inasmuch as they would behave themselves with more equity; and that their present fear was only upon want of trial. Withal he wished them to prepare themselves to be true confederates for the future; and from henceforward, to look to have their faults imputed: for⁴, for what was past he thought they had not done any wrong, but suffered it rather from other men that were too strong for them; and therefore were to be pardoned, if they had in aught been against him.” 115. When he had thus said and put them again into heart, the truce being expired, he made divers assaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians fought against them from the wall, though a bad one, and from the houses such as had battlements: and for the first day kept them off. But the next day, when the enemies were to bring to the wall a great engine, out of which they intended to cast fire upon their wooden fences; and that the army was now coming up to the place where they thought they might best apply the engine, and which was easiest to be assaulted: the Athenians, having upon the top of the building¹ erected a turret of wood, and carried up many buckets of water, and many men being also gone up into it, the building overcharged with weight fell suddenly to the ground; and that with so huge a noise, that though those which were near and saw it were grieved more than afraid, yet such as stood further off, especially the furthest of all, supposing the place to be in that part already taken, fled as fast as they could towards the sea and went aboard their galleys.

year viii. A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 1.

brasidas his speech to
the toronæans.

year viii. A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 1.

Brasidas taketh
Lecythus.

year viii. A. C. 423.
Ol. 89. 1.

116. Brasidas, when he perceived the battlements to be abandoned and saw what had happened, came on with his army and presently got the fort; and slew all that he found within it. But the rest of the Athenians, which before abandoned the place, with their boats and galleys put themselves into Pallene¹.

There was in Lecythus a temple of Minerva. And when Brasidas was about to give the assault, he had made proclamation, that whosoever first scaled the wall, should have thirty minæ of silver for a reward. Brasidas now conceiving that the place was won by means not human, gave those thirty minæ to the goddess to the use of the temple. And then pulling down Lecythus, he built² it anew, and consecrated unto her the whole place.

The rest of this winter he spent in assuring the places he had already gotten, and in contriving the conquest of more. Which winter ending, ended the eighth year of this war.

117. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians, in the spring of the summer following, made a cessation of arms presently for a year: having reputed with themselves, the Athenians, that Brasidas should by this means cause no more of their cities to revolt, but that by this leisure they might prepare to secure them; and that if this suspension liked them, they might afterwards make some agreement for a longer time³: the Lacedæmonians, that the Athenians fearing what they feared, would upon the taste of this intermission of their miseries and weary life, be the willing to compound, and with the restitution of their men to conclude a peace for a longer time. For they would fain have recovered their men, whilst Brasidas his good fortune continued; and whilst, if they could not recover them, they might yet (Brasidas prospering, and setting them equal with the Athenians) try it out upon even terms, and get the victory¹. Whereupon a suspension of arms was concluded, comprehending both themselves and their confederates, in these words:

year ix. Truce for a year, the motives to truce on either side.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

118. “Concerning the temple and oracle of Apollo Pythius, it seemeth good unto us,² that whosoever will, may without fraud and without fear ask counsel thereat, according to the laws of his country³. The same also seemeth good to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates here present; and they promise moreover to send ambassadors to the Bœotians and Phœceans, and do their best to persuade them to the same. That concerning the treasure belonging to the god, we shall take care to find out those that have offended therein, both we and you, proceeding with right and equity, according to the laws of our several states: and that whosoever else will, may do the same, every one according to the law of his own country⁴.

the articles of the truce.

“If⁵ the Athenians will accord that each side shall keep within their own bounds, retaining what they now possess, the Lacedæmonians and the rest of the confederates touching the same think good thus:

“That the Lacedæmonians in Coryphasium stay within the mountains of Buphras and Tomeus; and the Athenians in Cythera without joining together in any league, either we with them or they with us. That those in Nisæa and Minoa pass not the highway, which from the gate of Megara near the temple of Nisus leadeth to the temple of Neptune, and so straightforward to the bridge that lies over into Minoa: that¹ the Megareans pass not the same highway, nor into the island which the Athenians have taken; neither having commerce with other. That the Megareans² keep what they now possess in Trœzen, and what they had before by agreement with the Athenians, and³ have free navigation, both upon the coasts of their own territories and their confederates.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. The articles of the truce.

“That the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall pass the seas not in a long ship, but in any other boat rowed with oars of burden not exceeding five hundred talents.

“That the heralds and ambassadors, that shall pass between both sides for the ending of the war or for trials of judgment, may go and come without impeachment, with as many followers as they shall think good, both by sea and land.

“That during this time of truce, neither we nor you receive one another’s fugitives, free nor bond.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. The articles of the truce.

“That you to us, and we to you shall afford law according to the use of our several states; to the end our controversies may be decided judicially without war.

“This is thought good by the Lacedæmonians and their confederates. But if you shall conceive any other articles more fair or of more equity than these, then shall you go and declare the same at Lacedæmon. For neither shall the Lacedæmonians nor their confederates refuse anything, that you shall make appear to be just. But let those that go, go with full authority, even as you do now require it of us.—That this truce shall be for a year.”

“The people decreed it. Acamantis was president of the assembly¹. Phænippus the scribe. Niciades overseer, and Laches pronounced these words: ‘With good fortune to the people of Athens, a suspension of arms is concluded, according as the Lacedæmonians and their confederates have agreed’. And they consented before the people, ‘that the suspension should continue for a year, beginning that same day, being the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion: in which time the ambassadors and heralds, going from one side to the other, should treat about a final end of the wars: and that the commanders of the army and the presidents of the city calling an assembly, the Athenians should hold a council, touching the manner of embassy for ending of the war, first: and the ambassadors there present should now immediately swear this truce for a year’ ”.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

119. The same articles the Lacedæmonians propounded, and the confederates agreed unto¹, with the Athenians and their confederates in Lacedæmon, on the twelfth day of the month

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

Gerastion. The men that agreed upon these articles, and sacrificed, were these, viz. Of the Lacedæmonians, Taurus the son of Echetimidas, Athenæus the son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas the son of Eryxidaidas. Of the Corinthians, Æneas the son of Ocytes, and Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus. Of the Sicyonians, Damotimos the son of Naucrates, and Onasimus the son of Megacles. Of the Megareans, Nicasus the son of Cecalus, and Menecrates the son of Amphidorus. Of the Epidaurians, Amphias the son of Eupaidas. Of the Athenians, the generals [themselves], Nicostratus the son of Diotrepthes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Autocles the son of Tolmæus. This was the truce: and during the same they were continually in treaty about a longer peace.

120. About the same time, whilst they were going to and fro, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The Scionæans say, that they be Pallenians descended of those of Peloponnesus; and that their ancestors passing the seas from Troy, were driven in by a tempest¹, which tossed the Achæans up and down, and planted themselves in the place they now dwell in. Brasidas, upon their revolt, went over into Scione by night: and though he had a galley with him that went before, yet he himself followed aloof in a light-horseman. His reason was this: that if his light-horseman should be assaulted by² some greater vessel, the galley would defend it; but if he met with a galley equal to his own, he made account that such a one would not assault his boat, but rather the galley, whereby he might in the meantime go through in safety. When he was over and had called the Scionæans to assemble, he spake unto them as he had done before to them of Acanthus and Torone: adding, “that they of all the rest were most worthy to be commended, inasmuch as Pallene, being cut off in the isthmus by the Athenians that possess Potidæa, and being no other than islanders, did yet of their own accord come forth to meet their liberty, and stayed not through cowardliness till they must of necessity have been compelled to their own manifest good: which was an argument, that they would valiantly undergo any other great matter, to¹ have their state ordered to their minds: and that he would verily hold them for most faithful friends to the Lacedæmonians, and also otherwise do them honour.” 121. The Scionæans were erected with these words of his; and now every one alike encouraged, as well they that liked not what was done as those that liked it, entertained a purpose stoutly to undergo the war: and received Brasidas both otherwise honourably, and crowned him with a crown of gold in the name of the city, as *the deliverer of Greece*. And private persons honoured him with garlands and came to him, as they use to do to a champion that hath won a prize. But he leaving there a small garrison for the present, came back; and not long after carried over a greater army, with design by the help of those of Scione to make an attempt upon Mende and Potidæa. For he thought the Athenians would send succours to the place, as to an island; and desired to prevent them. Withal,

The revolt of Scione.

Brasidas goeth over in a boat, but with a galley before him: and his reason.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. brasidas his speech to the scionæans.

The honour done to Brasidas by the Scionæans.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Brasidas receiveth news of the suspension of arms.

Difference between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians about the restitution of Scione, which revolted after the truce made, but before the Lacedæmonians knew of it.

The Athenians prepare to war on Scione.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Decree of the Athenians against Scione.

he had in hand a practice with some within to have those cities betrayed. So he attended, ready to undertake that enterprise². 122. But in the meantime came unto him in a galley, Aristonymus for the Athenians, and Athenæus for the Lacedæmonians, that carried about the news of the truce. Whereupon he sent away his army again to Torone: and these men related unto Brasidas the articles of the agreement. The confederates of the Lacedæmonians in Thrace approved of what was done: and Aristonymus had in all other things satisfaction. But for the Scionæans, whose revolt by computation of the days he had found to be after the making of the truce, he denied that they were comprehended therein. Brasidas said much in contradiction of this, and that the city revolted before the truce: and refused to render it. But when Aristonymus had sent to Athens to inform them of the matter, the Athenians were ready presently to have sent an army against Scione. The Lacedæmonians in the meantime sent ambassadors to the Athenians, to tell them that they could not send an army against it without breach of the truce; and, upon Brasidas his word, challenged the city to belong unto them, offering themselves to the decision of law. But the Athenians would by no means put the matter to judgment; but meant with all the speed they could make to send an army against it: being angry at the heart that it should come to this pass, that even islanders durst revolt, and trust to the unprofitable help of the strength of the Lacedæmonians by land. Besides, touching [the time of] the revolt, the Athenians had more truth on their side than¹ themselves alleged: for the revolt of the Scionæans was after the truce two days. Whereupon, by the advice of Cleon, they made a decree, to take them by force and to put them all to the sword. And, forbearing war in all places else, they prepared themselves only for that.

123. In the meantime revolted also Mende in Pallene, a colony of the Eretrians. These also Brasidas received into protection: holding it for no wrong, because¹ they came in openly in time of truce: and somewhat there was also which he charged the Athenians with, about breach of the truce. For which cause the Mendæans had also been the bolder, as sure of the intention of Brasidas: which they might guess at by Scione, inasmuch as he could not be gotten to deliver it. Withal, the *few* were they which had practised the revolt, who being once² about it, would by no means give it over; but fearing lest they should be discovered, forced the multitude contrary to their own inclination to the same. The Athenians being hereof presently advertised, and much more angry now than before, made preparation to war upon both: and Brasidas expecting that they would send a fleet against them, received the women and children of the Scionæans and Mendæans into Olynthus in Chalceida, and sent over thither five hundred Peloponnesian men of arms and three hundred Chalcedean targetiers, and for commander of them all Polydamidas. And those that were left in Scione and Mende³ joined in the administration of their affairs, as expecting to have the Athenian fleet immediately with them.

The revolt of Mende.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Perdiccas and Brasidas jointly invade Arrhibæus.

The Lyncestians fly.

124. In the meantime Brasidas and Perdiccas, with joint forces, march into Lyncus against Arrhibæus the second time. Perdiccas led with him the power of the Macedonians his subjects, and such Grecian men of arms as dwelt among them. Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians that were left him, led with him the Chalcideans, Acanthians, and the rest, according to the forces they could severally make. The whole number of the Grecian men of arms were about three thousand. The horsemen, both Macedonians and Chalcideans, somewhat less than a thousand; but the other rabble of barbarians was great. Being entered the territory of Arrhibæus, and finding the Lyncestians encamped in the field, they also sat down opposite to their camp. And the foot of each side being lodged upon a hill, and a plain lying betwixt them both, the horsemen ran down into the same, and a skirmish followed, first between the horse only of them both. But afterwards, the men of arms of the Lyncestians coming down to aid their horse from the hill, and offering battle first, Brasidas and Perdiccas drew down their army likewise, and charging, put the Lyncestians to flight: many of which being slain, the rest retired to the hill-top and lay still. After this they erected a trophy, and stayed two or three days, expecting the Illyrians who were coming to Perdiccas upon hire: and Perdiccas meant afterwards to have gone on against the villages of Arrhibæus one after another, and to have sitten still there no longer. But Brasidas having his thoughts on Mende, lest if the Athenians came thither before his return it should receive some blow; seeing withal that the Illyrians came not; had no liking to do so, but rather to retire. 125. Whilst they thus varied, word was brought that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas, and joined themselves with Arrhibæus. So that now it was thought good to retire by them both, for fear of these who were a warlike people; but yet for the time when to march, there was nothing concluded, by reason of their variance. The next night, the Macedonians and multitude of barbarians¹ (as it is usual with great armies, to be terrified upon causes unknown) being suddenly affrighted, and supposing them to be many more in number than they were, and even now upon them, betook themselves to present flight and went home. And Perdiccas, who at first knew not of it, they constrained when he knew, before he had spoken with Brasidas, (their camps being far asunder), to be gone also. Brasidas betimes in the morning, when he understood that the Macedonians were gone away without him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibæans were coming upon him, putting his men of arms into a square form, and receiving the multitude of his light-armed into the midst, intended to retire likewise. The youngest men of his soldiers he appointed to run out upon the enemy, when they charged the army anywhere [with shot]; and he himself with three hundred chosen men marching in the rear, intended, as he retired, to sustain the foremost of the enemy fighting, if¹ they came close up. But before the enemy approached, he encouraged his soldiers, as the shortness of time gave him leave, with words to this effect:

Perdiccas expecteth mercenary aid out of Illyris.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. The Illyrians come: and turn to Arrhibæus.

The Macedonians upon a sudden fear run away, and desert Brasidas.

Brasidas his retreat.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

the oration of brasidas to his soldiers.

126. “Men of Peloponnesus, if I did not mistrust, in respect you are thus abandoned by the Macedonians, and that the barbarians which come upon you are many², that you were afraid, I should not [at this time] instruct you and encourage you as I do³. But now against this desertion of your companions and the multitude of your enemies, I will endeavour with a short instruction and hortative to give you encouragement to the full. For to be good soldiers is unto you natural, not by the presence of any confederates, but by your own valour; and not to fear others for the number, seeing you are not come from a city where *the many* bear rule over *the few*, but *the few* over *the many*; and have gotten this for power by no other means than by overcoming in fight⁴. And as to these barbarians, whom through ignorance you fear, you may take notice, both by the former battles fought by us against them before, in favour of the Macedonians¹, and also by what I myself conjecture and have heard by others, that they have no great danger in them. For when any enemy whatsoever maketh show of strength, being indeed weak, the truth once known doth rather serve to embolden the other side: whereas against such as have valour indeed, a man will be the boldest when he knoweth the least. These men here, to such as have not tried them, do indeed make terrible offers: for the sight of their number is fearful, the greatness of their cry intolerable, and the vain shaking of their weapons on high is not without signification of menacing. But they are not answerable to this, when with such as stand them they come to blows. For fighting without order they will quit their place without shame, if they be once pressed; and seeing it is with them honourable alike to fight or run away, their valours are never called in question: and a battle wherein every one may do as he list, affords them a more handsome excuse to save themselves¹. But they trust rather in their standing out of danger and terrifying us afar off, than in coming to hands with us: for else they would rather have taken that course than this. And you see manifestly, that all that was before terrible in them, is in effect little; and serves only to urge you to be going with their show and noise. Which if you sustain at their first coming on, and again withdraw yourselves still, as you shall have leisure, in your order and places, you shall not only come the sooner to a place of safety, but shall learn also against hereafter, that such a rabble as this, to men prepared to endure their first charge, do but make a flourish of valour with threats from afar before the battle: but to such as give them ground, they are eager enough to seem courageous where they may do it safely.”

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Brasidas.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. Oration of Brasidas.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

127. When Brasidas had made his exhortation, he led away his army. And the barbarians seeing it, pressed after them with great cries and tumult, as supposing he fled¹. But seeing that those who were appointed to run out upon them [did so, and] met them which way soever they came on; and that Brasidas himself, with his chosen band, sustained them where they charged close, and endured the first brunt beyond their expectation; and seeing also that afterwards continually when they charged, the other received them and fought, and when they ceased the other retired: then at length the greatest part of the barbarians forbore the Grecians, that with Brasidas were in the open field, and leaving a part to follow them with shot,

Brasidas draweth away his army, and the barbarians follow him.

The Illyrians pursue the Macedonians, leaving part of their army to follow Brasidas.

the rest ran with all speed after the Macedonians which were fled, of whom as many as they overtook they slew; and withal prepossessed the passage, which is a narrow one between two hills, giving entrance into the country of Arrhibæus, knowing that there was no other passage by which Brasidas could get away. And when he was come to the very strait, they were going about him to have cut him off.

128. He, when he saw this, commanded the three hundred that were with him, to² run every man as fast as he could to one of the tops, which of them they could easliest get up to, and try if they could drive down those barbarians that were now going up¹ to the same, before any greater number was above to hem them in. These accordingly fought with and overcame those barbarians upon the hill, and thereby the rest of the army marched the more easily to the top². For this beating of them from the vantage of the hill, made the barbarians also afraid; so that they followed them no further, conceiving withal that they were now at the confines, and already escaped through. Brasidas, having now gotten the hills and marching with more safety, came first the same day to Arnissa, of³ the dominion of Perdiccas. And the soldiers of themselves, being angry with the Macedonians for leaving them behind, whatsoever teams of oxen, or fardles fallen from any man, (as was likely to happen in a retreat made in fear and in the night), they lighted on by the way, the oxen they cut in pieces, and took the fardles to themselves. And from this time did Perdiccas first esteem Brasidas as his enemy, and afterwards hated the Peloponnesians, not with ordinary hatred for the Athenians' sake; but being utterly fallen out with him about his own particular interest, sought means as soon as he could to compound with these, and be disleagued from the other⁴.

Brasidas seizeth the top of the hill by which he was to pass.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1.

The spite of Brasidas' soldiers against the Macedonians for abandoning them.

Perdiccas and Brasidas fall out.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. 2.

The Mendæans encamp without the city.

Nicias wounded.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. 2.

Sedition in Mende.

The gates opened to the Athenians upon sedition.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. 2. Mende pillaged by the Athenians.

129. Brasidas, at his return out of Macedonia to Torone, found that the Athenians had already taken Mende: and therefore staying there, (for he thought it impossible to pass over into Pallene and to recover Mende), he kept good watch upon Torone.

The Athenians lead their army against Scione.

For about the time that these things passed amongst the Lyncestians, the Athenians, after¹ all was in readiness, set sail for Mende and Scione with fifty galleys, (whereof ten were of Chios), and a thousand men of arms of their own city, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and other targetiers of their own confederates thereabouts, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus the son of Diotrephe. These launching from Potidæa with their galleys, and putting in at the temple of Neptune, marched presently against the Mendæans. The Mendæans with their own forces, three hundred of Scione that came to aid them, and the aids of the Peloponnesians, in all seven hundred men of arms, and Polydamidas their commander, were encamped upon a strong hill without the city. Nicias with a hundred and twenty light-armed soldiers of Methone, and sixty chosen men of arms of Athens, and all his archers, attempting to get up by a path that was in the hill's side, was wounded in the attempt, and could not make his way by force. And Nicostratus with all the rest of the army, going another way further about, as he climbed the hill, being hard of access, was quite disordered; and the whole army wanted little of being utterly discomfited. So for this day, seeing the Mendæans and their confederates stood to it, the Athenians retired and pitched their camp: and at night the Mendæans retired into the city. 130. The next day the Athenians sailing about unto that part of the city¹ which is towards Scione, seized on the suburbs; and all that day wasted their fields, no man coming forth to oppose them: (for there was also sedition in the city): and the three hundred Scionæans the night following went home again. The next day Nicias, with the one half of the army, marched to the confines and wasted the territory of the Scionæans; and Nicostratus at the same time, with the other half, sat down against the city before the higher gates towards Potidæa. Polydamidas (for it fell out that the Mendæans and their aids had their arms lying within the wall in this part) set his men in order for the battle, and encouraged the Mendæans to make a sally. But when one of the faction of the commons in sedition² said to the contrary, that they would not go out, and that it was not necessary to fight; and was upon this contradiction by Polydamidas pulled and molested: the commons in passion presently took up their arms, and made towards the Peloponnesians and such other with them as were of the contrary faction; and falling upon them put them to flight, partly with the suddenness of the charge, and partly through the fear they were in of the Athenians, to whom the gates were at the same time opened. For they imagined that this insurrection was by some appointment made between them. So they fled into the citadel, as many as were not presently slain; which was also in their own hands before. But the Athenians (for now was Nicias also come back, and at the town-side) rushed into the city with the whole army, and rifled it; not as opened to them by agreement, but as taken by force; and the captains had much ado to keep them that they also killed not the men. After this, they bade the Mendæans use the same form of government they had done before, and to give judgment upon those they thought the principal authors of the revolt, amongst themselves. Those that were in the citadel, they shut up with a wall reaching on both sides to the sea; and left a guard to defend it. And having thus gotten Mende, they led their army against Scione. 131. The Scionæans and the Peloponnesians, coming out against them, possessed

themselves of a strong hill before the city: which if the enemy did not win, he should not be able to enclose the city with a wall. The Athenians having strongly charged them [with shot] and beaten the defendants from it, encamped upon the hill: and after they had set up their trophy, prepared to build their wall about the city. Not long after, whilst the Athenians were at work about this, those aids that were besieged in the citadel of Mende, forcing the watch by the sea-side, came by night: and escaping most of them through the camp before Scione, put themselves into that city.

132. As they were enclosing of Scione, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian commanders and concluded a peace with the Athenians, upon hatred to Brasidas about the retreat made out of Lyncus: having then immediately begun to treat of the same.

Perdiccas maketh peace with the Athenians.

For¹ it happened also at this time that Ischagoras a Lacedæmonian was leading an army of foot unto Brasidas. And Perdiccas, partly because Nicias advised him, seeing¹ the peace was made, to give some clear token that he would be firm, and partly because he himself desired not that the Peloponnesians should come any more into his territories, wrought with his hosts

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 1. 2.

The Lacedæmonians make young men governors of cities.

in Thessaly², having in that kind ever used the prime men, and so stopped the army and munition as they would not so much as try the Thessalians [whether they would let them pass or not]. Nevertheless Ischagoras, and Ameinias, and Aristeus themselves went on to Brasidas, as sent by the Lacedæmonians to view the state of affairs there: and also took with them from Sparta, contrary to the law, such men as were but in the beginning of their youth³, to make them governors of cities, rather than commit the cities to the care of such as were there before. And Clearidas the son of Cleonymus, they made governor of Amphipolis; and Epitelidas⁴ the son of Hegesander, governor of Torone.

133. The same summer, the Thebans demolished the walls of the Thespians, laying Atticism to their charge. And though they had ever meant to do it, yet now it was easier, because the flower of their youth was slain in the battle against the Athenians. The temple of Juno in Argos was also burnt down the same summer, by the negligence of Chrysis the priest, who having set a burning torch by the garlands, fell asleep: insomuch as all was on fire and flamed out before she knew. Chrysis the same night for fear of the Argives fled presently to Phlius: and they, according to the law formerly used, chose another priest in her room, called Phaeinis. Now when Chrysis fled, was the eighth year of this war ended¹, and half of the ninth. Scione, in the very end of this summer, was quite enclosed; and the Athenians having left a guard there, went home with the rest of their army.

A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 2. The walls of Thespiæ demolished by the Thebans.

The temple of Juno in Argos burnt by negligence of an old woman priest.

year ix. A. C. 423. Ol. 89. 2.

Phaeinis priest of Juno in the place of Chrysis.

Siege laid to Scione. The end of the ninth summer.

134. The winter following nothing was done between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, because of the truce. But the Mantineans and the Tegeatæ, with the confederates of both, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the territory of Orestis, wherein the victory was doubtful: for either side put to flight one wing of their enemies, both sides set up trophies, and both sides sent of their spoils unto Delphi. Nevertheless, after many slain on either side, and equal battle which ended by the coming of night, the Tegeatæ lodged all night in the place, and erected their trophy then presently; whereas the Mantineans turned to Bucolion, and set up their trophy afterwards.

Battle between the Mantineans and the Tegeatæ.

135. The same winter ending and the spring now approaching, Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidæa. For coming by night, he applied his ladders: and was thitherto undiscerned. He took the time to apply his ladders² when the bell passed by, and before he that carried it to the next returned. Nevertheless being discovered he scaled not the wall, but presently again withdrew his army with speed, not staying till it was day. So ended this winter: and the ninth year of this war written by Thucydides.

A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. Brasidas attempteth Potidæa.

year ix. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. The end of the ninth year.

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[1][The passage here alluded to (vii. now no more than a commendation 86), has been corrected by Bekker by of Nicias for his regard for virtue.] striking out ?ç τ? θε?ov: and contains

[1][This story is generally regarded as fabulous. The recital by Herodotus of his history at the Olympic games at all, has been called in question. Goeller says: “Libenter credo prælectiones ab Herodoto habitas esse: Thucydidem vero præsentem, ingenuo laudis studio commotum, lachrymas inter auditionem fudisse, una mihi videtur illarum fictionum, quas frequentissimas posterior Græcarum literarum ætas effudit de viris domi militiæque celebribus.” Vit. Thucyd. p. 43.]

[1][See viii. 109, note.]

[2][Thucydides was not living at that time in retirement, but was one of the ten annually-chosen *Strategi*, and with another, Eucles, sent with a squadron of seven ships to Thasos, an island within half-a-day's sail of the mouth of the Strymon. He was appointed to that station, probably for the sake of his influence in those parts derived from his gold mines at Scaptesytle.]

[1]ἢ ἢ πολέμησαν. [“As” they warred, and not, as translated by Valla and others, “how” they warred. The words ῥξάμενος εἴθῃ καθισταμένου, would of themselves imply that the history was so written, even if the words ἢ ἢ πολέμησαν were omitted. They are so understood by Goeller, Poppo, and others, as well as the Scholiast and Dionysius of Halicarnassus.]

[1]The common appellation given by the Grecians to all nations besides themselves. [μέρει τινῶν: to a “large portion” of the barbarians. Arnold.]

[2]Greece.

[3]χρηήματα: whatever is estimated by money. Aristotle.

[1]The territory of the Athenian city, so called from Atthis, the daughter of Cranaus.

[2]The Athenians had an opinion of themselves, that they were not descended from other nations, but that their ancestors were ever the inhabitants of Attica: wherefore they also styled themselves αἰτόχθονες, *i. e.* men of the same land. [“sprung from the land itself”].

[3][This passage is differently understood by different translators. Some, as Valla, Acacius, and Hudson, understand it thus: “that Attica increased not so much in other things as in men.” Others, as Poppo, Goeller, and Arnold, thus: “that Greece in its other parts did not thrive equally with Athens:” which is in substance the same interpretation as that of Hobbes.]

[1][“But the tribes, the Pelasgian in especial as well as the rest, gave their names from themselves;” that is, each tribe gave its own name to the region it inhabited, the Pelasgian being the most general.]

[2][“Because that neither were the Hellenes, as appears to me, as yet distinguished by one name in opposition” (to the barbarians).]

[3][“They, therefore, who first of all individually, and, such as had intercourse with each other, by cities, got the name of Hellenes, and afterwards were universally so called, did never before,” &c.]

[1][Hobbes seems to have read τῶν πλείων. Bekker, Goeller, Arnold, all omit the article. “And to that expedition they came together through their having now more use of the sea.”]

[2] Before that time, it was called the Carian Sea. [Made himself master “of the greatest part” of the now Grecian sea.”]

[3] [Began “more frequently” to cross over.]

[4] [Κατ? κατ? κώμας ο?κουμέναις. This is not exactly “scatteringly” inhabited, as appears from ch. x. κατ? κώμας δε? τ? παλαι? τ?ς Ελλάδος τρ?όπ? ο?κισθείσης. It seems rather to mean that the πόλις was still divided into distinct communities, called κ?μαί. “If several little tribes united to form one people, they would sometimes occupy a spot where several eminences were to be found, near to each other, yet distinct: and each of them would form a separate κώμη, or village, appropriated to a separate tribe, while all together composed the city of the united people. Sparta was an instance of a city thus formed out of a cluster of distinct villages; and, according to some opinions, Rome was another.” Arnold.]

[1] [Od. iii. 71:—

ξξίνοι τίνες ?στε?
? τί κατ? πρ??ξιν, ? μαψιδίως ?λάλησθε
?ιά τε ληϊστ?ρ?ες ?πε?ρ ?λα;]

[2] In distinction to the other Locrians, called Opuntii.

[3] [The words explain why they wore the linen dress, not why they left it off. Arnold, Goeller. The sense therefore is: “they not long after laid aside the effeminate custom of wearing linen under-garments.”]

[1] The Athenians, holding themselves to be sprung from the ground they lived on, wore the grasshopper for a kind of cognizance; because that beast is thought to be generated of the earth.

[2] [“A common dress.” The Lacedæmonian dress consisted principally of two parts, the χιτ?ν and the χλα?να. The first was a narrow kind of frock, without sleeves, coming down to the knees; the other a sort of large square shawl, which wrapped round the left arm, then passed across the back and under the right arm, then over the breast, and the end was finally thrown over the left shoulder. Arnold. Goeller renders it “a plain dress.”]

[3] Exercises of divers kinds instituted in honour of Jupiter at Olympia in Peloponnesus; to which resorted such out of Greece as contended for prizes.

[4] This was perhaps the cause, why it was a capital crime for women to be spectators of the Olympic exercises.

[5] [“And one might perhaps show that the ancient Greeks, in many other respects also, used,” &c.]

[1] [But the old cities, “by reason of the great hindrance of piracy,” were built, &c. Bekker and Arnold read ?ντισχο?σαν. Goeller reads ?ντισχο?σαι; which he renders:

“veteres urbes ob latrocinia, postquam diu et restiterunt et perduraverunt, longius a mare conditæ erant.”]

[2][“For they robbed both each other, and also such of the rest as, not being seamen, dwelt by the sea-side.”]

[3]The Cyclades.

[4]Vide lib. iii. cap. 104.

[5]The Carians having invented the crest of the helmet, and the handle of the target, and also the drawing of images on their targets, had therefore a helmet and a buckler buried with them, and had their heads laid towards the west. [This is a mistake. It is not the Carians, but the Phœnicians who were distinguished by their position in their grave. And their heads were laid not to the west, but to the east, so as to look to the west. See the Scholium.]

[1][“And” these robberies were the exercise, &c. “But” when Minos his navy, &c.]

[2]The son of Atreus, the son of Pelops.

[3]The opinion was, that Tyndareus, the father of Helena, took an oath of all his daughter’s suitors, that if violence were done to him that obtained her, all the rest should help to revenge it. And that Menelaus, having married her, and Paris, the son of Priam king of Troy, taken her away, Agamemnon, in the behalf of his brother Menelaus, drew them by this oath to the siege of Ilium.

[4][“Those who have received the clearest accounts of the affairs of Peloponnesus;” or, “those who have received the clearest accounts of any Peloponnesians.” Arnold considers that the want of the article, and the word Πελοποννησίων, which for the first interpretation should be Πελοποννησιακῶν, are in favour of the second.]

[1][The original name of the country was Apia. See the Schol. and Il. i. 270: τηλόθεν ἔξ ἑπίης γαίης.]

[2]A kindred and race of men whereof was Hercules. This family was persecuted by Euristheus, who was of the house of Perseus; and driven into Attica, thither he following them was slain by the Athenians.

[3]Astidamia, the mother of Euristheus, was Atreus’ sister.

[4][“And who happened to have fled from his father for the death of Chrysippus.”]

[5]Atreus and Thyestes, sons of Pelops, at the impulsion of their mother, slew this Chrysippus, who was their half-brother, viz. by the father; and for this fact Atreus fled to Euristheus.

[6][Thus far is the account of “those that by tradition know most,” &c.]

[7] The son of Atreus, heir to the power of both houses, both of the Pelopides and of the Perseides.

[1][Il. ii. 108.]

[2][The islands which Thucydides here calls “periœcidæ,” are, according to Poppo, Calauria, Hydrea, Tipareus, Cecryphalea; perhaps Ægina, though of that Od. Mueller has some doubts. Goeller.]

[3][Mycenæ had been destroyed by the Argives, A.C. 468, thirty–seven years before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. From that time it remained in ruins; but the remains, which will last apparently as long as the human race exists, are fully described in Sir W. Gell’s Argolis. Arnold.]

[4][Et traditio diu durans obtinet. Goeller.]

[5]1. Laconia. 2. Arcadia. 3. Argolica. 4. Messenia. 5. Elis. [Achaia was the fifth part: Elis was comprehended in Arcadia. Goeller.]

[6]Laconia, Messenia.

[1][“And not forming a connected or continuous city, but made up of different κ?μαι, after the ancient manner of Greece.” Mueller (Dor.) gives the names of these villages: Pitane, Messoia, Simnæ, and Cynosura, lying round about the Acropolis, some on small hills, some on the plains. In the time of the Romans they were all enclosed in one wall. Goeller.]

[2][α?: again. Referring to “if any think his testimony sufficient.” chap. ix.]

[3][“But that they were all mariners and fighting men, he has shown in his account of the ships of Philoctetes.” Bekker, Goeller, and Arnold all agree in this construction of the passage.]

[1]As Achilles, Ulysses, Ajax, Diomedes, Patroclus, and the like. The whole number of men, estimating the ships at a medium to carry eighty–five men a piece, which is the mean between one hundred and twenty and fifty, come to one hundred and two thousand men carried in these one thousand two hundred ships. Yet the author makes it a light matter in respect of the present war.

[2][And no greater than they “expected could maintain itself from the seat of war by their arms: and when upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight, &c., they appear not even then to have used their whole power,” &c. That is, they carried the lesser army, and that lesser army they did not make the most of.]

[1][“Whereas, if they had gone furnished with store of provision, and had with all their forces, eased of boot–haling and tillage, carried through the war without interruption, they might easily have overcome them in open battle and taken the city; since they were a match for the Trojans even without their whole force, and with such

part only as from time to time was present at the siege; or even by a blockade, they might have taken Troy with less time and trouble.”]

[2][“Built *the* cities.” That is, those famous cities built by Teucer, Philoctetes, Diomede, &c. Poppo.]

[1][The great family or rather clan, which claimed descent from the hero Hercules, being expelled from Peloponnesus by the Pelopidæ, found an asylum among the Dorians, an Hellenian people inhabiting a mountain district between the chain of Æta on the one side, and Parnassus on the other. Here they found willing followers in their enterprise for the recovery of their former dominion in Peloponnesus: the Heraclidæ were to possess the thrones of their ancestors; but the Dorians were to have the free property of the lands they hoped to conquer, and were not to hold them under the Heraclidæ. The invaders were also assisted by an Ætolian chief named Oxylus, and by his means they were enabled to cross over by sea from the northern to the southern side of the Corinthian gulf, instead of forcing their way by land through the isthmus. This invasion was completely successful; all Peloponnesus, except Arcadia and Achaia, fell into their power; and three chiefs of the Heraclidæ took possession of the thrones of Sparta, Argos, and Messenia, while Elis was assigned to their associate Oxylus. The land was divided in equal shares, with the exception probably of some portions attached to the different temples, and which, with the offices of priesthood, belonged to the Heraclidæ, as descendants of the national gods and heroes of the country. Meanwhile the old inhabitants were either reduced to emigrate, or were treated as an inferior caste, holding such lands as they were permitted to cultivate, not as freeholders, but as tenants under Dorian lords. These were the Laconians, or *περῖοικοι*, of whom we shall find frequent mention in the course of this history; and some of this caste striving to recover their independence, were degraded to the still lower condition of villains or predial slaves; and thus formed the first class of Helots, which was afterwards greatly swelled from other quarters. On the other hand, the Hellenian name derived its general predominance throughout Greece from the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus; the Dorians claiming descent from the eldest son of Hellen, and while they gloried in their extraction, asserting their peculiar title to the Hellenian name above all the other tribes which had assumed it. Arnold.]

[1][The name “Italy,” in the age of Thucydides, was applied merely to the southernmost point of the Peninsula, the modern provinces of Calabria citra and Calabria ultra. See Aristotelis Politica, vii. 10. Arnold.]

[2][“And wealth was accumulated still more than formerly; in many of the cities there were erected tyrannies, the revenues becoming greater: (but before that, the governments were hereditary kingdoms with prerogatives and revenues defined).” Goeller.]

[3][That is, from fifty-oared vessels to triremes.]

[4][Triremes.]

[5] [“And Aminocles, the shipwright of Corinth, appears to have built four ships for the Samians also.”]

[6] By this it appears, that Thucydides outlived the whole war.

[7] By Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, for the slaughter of his son Lycophron. See Herodotus, iii. 53. [The Scholiast has misled Hobbes: Periander did not begin till about a. c. 630.]

[1] [Il. 2. 570. ἄνευ τε Κόρυθον.]

[2] [“And after the Grecians had more commerce by sea, they (the Corinthians) procured the ships (before mentioned), and scoured the sea of pirates.”]

[3] [See Herod. iii. 39, 120.]

[4] [See post, book iii. 104.]

[5] The Phocæans in the time of Tarquinius came into the mouth of Tiber, entered into amity with the Romans, and thence went and built Marseilles amongst the savage nations of the Ligurians and Gauls. Justin, lib. xliii. 3.

[6] [Arnold cautions against confounding this battle with the Carthaginians, with that mentioned by Herodotus, i. 166. The building of Marseilles took place fifty–five years before the expulsion of the Phocæans by the Persians, related by Herodotus. See also Hermann’s Griech. Antiquitäten. § 78. n. 28.]

[1] [πεντηκοντόροις. Hoc vocabulum etsi apud Homerum non obvium est, naves tamen hujus generis ab eo commemorari videntur, ut Il. ii. 719; xvi. 168. Erant autem πεντηκόντοροι ex eo navium genere, quod dicitur μονῥες, id est, uno remorum ordine in utroque latere instructum. Quini ergo et viceni remiges in dextro, totidem in sinistro latere sedebant. Siebel, cited by Goeller.]

[2] Medes and Persians used here promiscuously, the Medan monarchy being translated to the Persians.

[3] Of the Corinthians, Ionians, and Phocæans. [“For these were the last navies before the invasion of Xerxes (that is, the navies next before the invasion of Xerxes) worth speaking of.”]

[4] [And the Athenians, “and the rest, if any,” had, &c.]

[5] [“And it was at a late period that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, making war on Ægina, &c. to build,” &c. Arnold, Goeller. See Herod. vii. 144.]

[1] [See Herod. v. 99.]

[2] [And Darius afterwards, “overcoming by the aid of the Phœnician fleet,” did the like, &c.]

[1] [“But the tyrants, as many as there were in the Grecian cities, considering only how to promote their own private interest, both as to the safety of their persons and as to their household, governed their states with a view mainly to security; and did no action,” &c.]

[2] [ἢ γὰρ ἢ Σικελίῃ. Ante hæc verba, supple (cum Schol.): “non dico de tyrannis Siciliae: nam Siciliae tyranni,” &c. Goeller, Arnold.]

[3] [For a long time “in every way” hindered.]

[4] Pisistratus and his sons.

[5] [And of the rest of Greece, “governed for the most part by tyrants even before”: that is, before Athens.]

[6] [By the Dorians “who now inhabit it.”]

[7] [See Herod. i. 65.]

[8] [Herod. v. 92.]

[1] A fleet of twelve hundred galleys, and two thousand hulks of the round manner of building. Corn. Nepos in Vita Themistoclis.

[2] [ῥασκευάζεσθαι: “to break up one’s establishment, and make off with it.” It is opposed to κατασκευάζεσθαι. Goeller, Arnold.]

[3] The Athenians being admonished by the Oracle, for their safety against the Medes to put themselves within walls of wood: Themistocles interpreting the oracle, they went into their galleys.

[4] This variance began upon this: that Cimon having been sent for to aid the Lacedæmonians against the Helots, was sent back with his Athenians out of distrust the Lacedæmonians had of their forward spirit: which the Athenians took for a disgrace. [See ch. 102.]

[1] Hence it is, that through all this history “subjects” and “confederates” are taken for the same thing, especially with the Athenians. [“The Lacedæmonians governed their confederates, not making them tributaries, but only drawing, &c.: but the Athenians (governed them) in the course of time taking into their hands the galleys of the cities, all except the Chians and Lesbians, and ordaining every of them,” &c. This is the sense according to the reading of Bekker, Goeller, Arnold, &c. Hobbes is mistaken in supposing that *subjects* and *confederates* are synonymous, even amongst the Athenians. The distinction is constantly made between those ξύμμαχοι that were ἀτόνομοι and those that were ἡήκοοι. See iii. 39, vi. 69, vii. 57.]

[2] [“Than when their prosperity was at the greatest.” Hoc fastigium potentiae Atheniensium referas recte ad tempora paulo ante inducias tricennales; quum Athenienses non solum insularum, sed etiam Asiae minoris dominatum tenebant,

Æginetas perdomuerant, atque Phocin, Argos, Bœotiam, et Achaïam sibi junctas habebant. Goeller. See chap. 102–115.]

[3][“Being hard for believing, every argument one after another.” Arnold.]

[1][“For men receive from one another the reports of things done before their own time, even those of their own country, all equally without trying them by the touchstone of enquiry”: (ἡ βασιανίστως.)]

[2][At the instant of the deed.]

[3]Panathenaica, were the solemnities instituted by Theseus, in memory of that he had drawn together all the Athenians, that lived dispersed in Attica, into the city of Athens. Paus. in Arcad. [See another derivation given by Hermann; namely, the feast of the tribe Athenais, as Pandia, the feast of the tribe Dias: the Athenians being supposed to have been anciently divided into four tribes, Athenais, Dias, Posidonias, and Hephæstias. Gr. Antiq. § 93.]

[4][ἡ κάτερον: “had each of them not single,” &c. Sententia, quam scriptor reprehendit, est Herodoti, vi. 57. Goeller.]

[5][“And that the Pitanean was a cohort amongst them.” Etiam his verbis tacite Herodotus perstringi creditur, qui cohortis Pitaneatæ mentionem facit, ix. 53, et qui δῆμον Πιτανάτην memorat, iii. 55. Etenim ratione, quam et Græci et Romani antiquitus sequebantur, partes exercitus eadem erant ac partes populi in pace. Goeller.]

[1][ἡ κ δε? τῶν εῖρημένων τεκμηρίων ἡμῶς κ. τ. λ. This is the sentence corresponding to τῶν μετῶν οἶον παλαιῶν, beginning the last chapter. “But at the same time he would not be far out, who, from the proofs I have mentioned, should judge them to be for the most part such as I have described them; and should not rather believe them to be either as poets have sung, adorning them so as to make them greater than the reality, or as prose writers have composed, more delightfully to the ear than conformably to the truth; admitting of no proof, and the greater part of them having by the aid of time taken their place amongst fables, so as to deserve no credit: and should think them here searched out by the most evident signs that can be; and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity.”]

[2][To have been greater “than any of those before it.”]

[1][ἡ λόγῶν εἰπόντων: quæ orationibus habitis dixerunt. Goeller. “In regular set speeches.” Arnold.]

[2][“It were difficult to remember accurately the very words spoken, both for me what I heard myself, and for those who at other times reported to me.”]

[3]To the analogy and fitness of what was to be said: so that though he used not their words, yet he used the arguments that best might serve to the purpose which at any time was in hand. [Verum prout quisque mihi videbatur de præsentī qualibet causa

quæ maxime in rem erant dicturus fuisse, consecranti quam proxime summam sententiæ orationum vere habitarum, sic mihi commemorata sunt. Goeller.]

[4] [Valla and Hudson agree with Hobbes as to the sense of this passage. Goeller and Arnold give a different meaning to the words ῥῆκούντως ῥξει: “it will satisfy me if so many, &c. shall judge this work to be profitable.”]

[1] κτῆμα ῥς ῥε. Both poets and historiographers of old recited their histories to captate glory. This emulation of glory in their writings, he calleth ῥγώνισμα.

[2] When Xerxes invaded them. Two battles by sea, viz. one at Salamis, and the other at Mycale in Ionia. And two by land, one at Thermopylæ, and the other at Plataea. [The battle by sea was at Artemisium in Eubœa, not at Mycale in Ionia.]

[3] [Mycalessus in Bœotia. Goell.]

[4] [Plataea. Thyrea.]

[5] [Potidæa, Ægina, Scione, Melos. Goeller.]

[6] [Corcyraea, Argos, Samos. Haack, Poppo.]

[7] [μέρῶς τι: a considerable part.]

[8] [ταῦτα ῥῥῥ πάντα: “For all these evils entered together with this war.” In continuation of the sentence above: “But as for this war, the harm it did to Greece, &c.”]

[1] [πρῶτος: “cause or occasion.” Goeller; Arnold, citing Herod. iv. 79: the Scholiast, too, explains the word by αῖτίαν. The passage may perhaps be rendered thus: “And the alleged cause for their breaking the treaty, I have therefore set down first, because, &c. For the truest reason, though least in speech, I conceive to be, &c. But the causes publicly alleged on both sides, for which breaking the treaty they went to war, were these.”]

[2] Dyrrachium, Durazzo. The Ionian gulf, now the Gulf of Venice, called so from Iūs an Illyrian.

[3] Illyrii, now Slavonia and Dalmatia.

[4] Inhabitants of Corcyra, now Corfu.

[5] [κατῶ δῶ τῶν παλαιῶν νόμων: according to *the* ancient custom. Si qui in coloniam mittebantur, armis et commeatu a civibus suis instruebantur de publico. Præterea publica iis diplomata debebantur, quæ ῥποίκια vocabant. Sed quod præcipuum est, sacra patria coloni secum asportabant, ignemque sacrum e penetrali urbis depromptum et accensum; qui quidem si casu extinctus esset, ex Prytanæo conditorum accendi eum oportebat. Moris quoque erat, ut coloniæ quotannis legatos in *majorem patriam* (μητρόπολιν) mitterent Diis patriis sacra facturos. Solenne etiam erat, ut coloniæ ab

originibus suis pontifices acciperent. Quinetiam si aliquando coloni aliam coloniam aliquo deducere vellent, moris erat, ut ducem a *majore patria* postularent; ideoque Phalium ex metropoli (Corintho) arcessebant Corcyraei, ut coloniae Epidamnum deducendae dux esset. Duker.]

[1][In part of Corinthians, “and of the other Doric race.” So Bekker and the rest. Valla, as well as Hobbes, has followed the common reading.]

[2][“But having for many years had factions amongst them, growing, as is said, out of a war with the neighbouring barbarians, their strength was broken.” So Valla, as well as Goeller and Arnold.]

[3]Either the Epidamnians had offended the Corcyraeans, or the manner was in those times to take sanctuary, not only for crimes, but for obtaining aid in extremities; tacitly disclaiming all other help save that of the gods, and those to whom they made supplication.

[1][“The colony.”]

[2][“Showing how the first founder was a Corinthian, and declaring what answer,” &c.]

[3][The construction of Goeller (adopted by Arnold) is to make Κορ?ινητ? ?νδρ?? the dative governed by διδόντες; and the sense as follows: “nor allowed due honours to the mother country in their solemn rites, common to both mother country and colony; nor to a Corinthian in the rite of auspicating their sacrifices.” Γέρα τ? νομιζόμενα, intelligo omnia ea, quae honoris causa metropoli essent praestanda in solemnibus metropoli et coloniae communibus. Haec enim ex sacrorum ac religionum inter metropolim et colonias communione fluxisse videntur, sive jura sive officia, ut ad certa quaedam solemnia, diis fere πατρ?ώοις a metropoli instituta, quotannis coloniae mitterent qui iis interessent (θεωρούς), et sacrificia et donaria ferrent. Illi θεωρ?οί sacris epulis adhibebantur, et in ludis publicis sedem in theatro assignatam habebant. Vicissim, sacris coloniarum solennibus legati a metropoli missi intererant, quibus id honoris ex more habitum, ut victimae molam aspergerent et libationem sacram facerent, et in ludis princeps locus eis daretur, (προεδρία): qui locus etiam viris ex metropoli, si qui forte aderant, principibus est tributus. Προκαταρ?χόμενοι: verbum ?ρ?χομαι et composita, in sacris usitata, vim habent auspicandi sacrificia et ceremonias, ac sacra faciendi. Munia autem, quae Corcyraei viro Corinthio tribuere de more tenebantur in suis sacris, intelligo fuisse ea ipsa, quibus Graeci heroicae aetatis et posterae, ut videtur, sacra auspicabantur. Faciebant igitur, sacra auspicantes, ea quae ipsam immolationem antecedeant; id est, χέρνιβα, ο?λοχύτην, τριχοτομίαν, σπονδίην. Erat enim is honor praecipuus viris principibus, qui aderant, habitus, ut sacra haec ministeria per eos facerent. Haec igitur totius loci sententia est; “neque enim in solennitatibus communibus solita munia (id est, πρ?οεδρ?ίαν, ?ερξια, et sacrorum praefectura) Corinthiis tribuebant, nec viro Corinthio in suis sacris χέρ?νιβα, ο?λοχύτην, τρ?ιχοτομίαν, et σπονδίην.” Goeller.]

[1][“And more strongly,” &c.]

[2] By Homer this isle is called Phæacia.

[1] [To Apollonia, “being a colony of the Corinthians.”]

[2] [κατ’ ἠπείρου: “out of malice;” that is, out of malice to the Epidamnians, not from a desire to gratify the exiles. Goeller.]

[3] ἠγάδες. Divers occasions force men from their country: sentence of law, which is commonly called banishment: proscription, when the sentence is death, for which cause they fly into banishment. But those that are here meant, are such as in seditions being the weaker faction, fly for fear of being murdered; which I call here banished men; or might call them perhaps better outlaws or fugitives, but neither of them properly. The Florentines, and other places of Italy that were or are democratical, wherein such banishment can only happen, call them properly *fuorusciti*.

[1] [Should have equal and like privileges “with the mother country”: that is, the colony was to be a sovereign state, independent of the mother country. Goeller, Arnold.]

[2] [“To escort them with some galleys.”]

[3] ἠλῆται: Men in armour.

[1] [“Or if they make any claim to it themselves.”]

[2] Meaning the Athenians.

[3] [σπονδῆς δὲ ποιήσασθαι. This appears to have been the reading of Hobbes; which is defended also by Arnold. Bekker, Goeller, and Poppo, all omit δὲ: “and that they were also ready, on condition that (??ε) both sides remain as at present, to make a truce until,” &c.]

[1] [“The Corinthians assented to none of these propositions, but as soon as their galleys were manned,” &c.]

[2] Either here or before, it is likely the number hath been miswritten: for a little before he says they had made ready three thousand.

[3] [Hobbes reads ἕν κτί. Bekker, Goeller, and Arnold ἕν κτί: in a light vessel.]

[4] [ζεύξαντες. ζευγνῆναι ναῦν est navem reficere. Goell. One mode is described by Goeller, of passing ropes round the hull of the vessel, so as to hold together the loose planks.]

[5] [ἠσκευάσαντες. Hoc verbum significat *navem ad cursum aptare*, quod de navibus, quæ per vela aguntur, dicas. Alias, ἠσκευάζειν ναῦν, significat fere, εκ παλαιότητος ἐς νέαν κατάστασιν ἐδοποίην, ut verbis Scholiastæ utar. Goeller.]

[6] [The sense literally is this: “The Corcyraeans sent a herald, &c., and at the time were manning their ships, having made the old ones sea-worthy by binding them together, and having as it were new-made the rest.”]

[1] [Literally: “But when the herald returned, &c., and their ships were completely manned to the number of eighty, (for there were forty at the siege of Epidamnus), they put to sea,” &c.]

[2] It is said before, that the Corcyraeans had in all one hundred and twenty galleys: which number agreeth with this eighty that fought, and the forty that maintained the siege.

[3] [παραστήσασθαι: to force to surrender. “To make another stand by one’s side”: as the vanquished is compelled to fight on the side and under the standard of the conqueror. Arnold.]

[4] [ῥητοδοθεῖν: Should be sold. Goeller.]

[5] τρητοπ: Turning, particularly turning the back. Trophies, monuments, in remembrance of having made the enemy turn their backs. These were usual in those times, now out of date.

[6] [After this, when the Corinthians “and their vanquished allies were gone home with their ships,” &c.]

[7] Santa Maura, now an island, then a peninsula. [See iv. 8. note. But Thucydides is speaking of the city, not of the island itself.]

[1] [περιῖοντι τῷ θερέει. This is the reading of Reiske, Goeller, and Arnold, instead of περιόντι, the common reading still retained by Bekker and Poppo. Goeller says, that περιῖέναι ῥητοδοθῆς is said of the year when it is on the turn, or verging towards its close; that the summer here meant, is that in which the battle was fought between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans; and that this is manifest, from putting in juxta-position the word τοῦ τε χρόνου τὴν πλεστον μετ’ τὴν ναυμαχίαν, κ. τ. λ., with the words at the end of the chapter, ἄλλ’ τῷ θερέος τοῦτο αντικαθεζόμενοι, χειμῶνος ῥη (scil. ῥητος) ῥηχωρήσαν ῥη’ οἰκου ῥηκατεροί, and with the words at the beginning of the next chapter, τὸν δ’ ῥητοδοθῆς πάντα τὴν μετ’ τὴν ναυμαχίαν, καὶ τὴν ῥητοδοθῆς [Editor: illegible character] ῥητον, ῥη Κορῥηνθιοί ῥηναυπηγοῦντο. “Primo, pugnae navalis exitum narravit, deinde quid aestate post pugnam factum sit; hinc Corcyraeos et hostes eorum, ingruente hyeme, stationes utrosque suas reliquisse, quas post pugnam habuerant; denique addit, quid anno proximo et altero post pugnam egerint.” He observes moreover, that the words περιῖοντι τῷ θερέει cannot signify *reliqua aestate*; that that would be either τῷ περιῖοντι τοῦ θερέους, or τῷ θερέει τῷ περιῖοντι; and that they are the same as τῷ θερέει ῥητοδοθῆς, that is *in the summer* (that one of two or more summers) *which was remaining*. Arnold considers the meaning of περιῖοντι τῷ θερέει not certain, but Goeller’s the most probable. The sense is literally: “And the greatest part of the time after the sea-fight they were masters of those seas, and infested the Corinthian allies, until at the close of the summer the Corinthians sending a fleet and

land–force, their allies being hard pressed, encamped at Actium and about Chimerium, for the more safe keeping,” &c.]

[2]Thesprotis, part of Albania.

[1][τῷ θεροῦ τοῦτο: “during *this* summer,” that is, the summer now describing. χειμῶνος ἡδη: “at the setting in of the winter.”]

[2][“And during the whole year, both that after the sea–fight and the following year.”]

[3][ῥογὴ ἑρῶντες τὴν πρῶτην Κερκυραίουσ πόλεμον. Cupidi vindictæ, bellum fortiter toleraverunt, id est, sumptus omnes bellicos in se receperunt, ita ut per biennium non desinerent naves ædificare. Goeller.]

[4][Preparing of a fleet, “in the best manner they could.”]

[5][To procure mariners “by the offer of pay,” &c.]

[6][Because they “were” not in league, &c.]

[7][To go to Athens “and become allies”, and to see, &c.]

[1][“It is reasonable that such as, like us, come to implore the aid of their neighbours without previous title to any good offices or any alliance, should make it *quite* clear (ἡαδιδάξει), first of all, that what they seek is advantageous, or at any rate not prejudicial (to those that are to grant it); and in the next place, that they will also not forget the favour: and if they shall not clearly establish any of these things, then,” &c. πρῶτον answers to πειτα δε?, and has not the meaning of “before they go any farther”.]

[1][περὶγενέσθαι: to get the better.]

[2][“The accident of our need will in many ways bring honour to you.”]

[3][καταθεσθε. This is Bekker’s conjecture, adopted by Goeller and Arnold, instead of the common reading κατάθησθε. It is, as Goeller observes, a metaphor taken from money placed out at interest. “You shall so place out your favour, as to place it out with the most everlasting testimony.”]

[1][“Have not, in all the time we know of (that is, within memory), happened,” &c.]

[2][“Are making a beginning with us now, in their way to their attack hereafter upon you; in order that we may not, by our common hatred of them, stand by each other.”]

[3][“And that they may not miss of both things, to be beforehand either in doing us a mischief, or in gaining strength to themselves.” Goeller.]

[4][Valla, as well as Hobbes, has “your part”. Bekker, Goeller, Poppo, and Arnold, “our part”.]

[1][“Not to be led away by their false pretences, nor lend yourselves to their purpose making their demands directly or openly.” Goell.]

[2][“For there it is said”: that is to say, in the thirty years’ treaty; which is also meant by τῆς προκειμένης ξυμμαχίας, a little farther on, which Hobbes has translated “the league now propounded”.]

[3][“And moreover out of the rest of Greece also.”]

[4]As Cephalonia.

[5][Hobbes seems to have read εἰ δεῖ, for which there is no authority, instead of εἴτα. “And it would be hard if they are to man their ships, &c., and exclude us from the common treaty and all other help, &c.: *and then* complain of being wronged by your listening to our demand. But we shall complain of you much more loudly, if we prevail not.”]

[1][“But also suffer to raise forces in your dominions, which it is not just (to suffer): but (you ought) either to forbid their recruiting, or give us help too, according to what you may be prevailed on to give; but especially to help us by taking us openly into your league”.]

[2][“And as we suggested at first, we show you many advantages: and principally, that these same men were enemies to us both, which is a most decisive argument; and those not weak ones, but able to hurt such as secede from them. And when you have the offer of a naval, and not a continental alliance, it is not the same thing to reject it: but it behoves you above all, if you can, to let no one else have any ships; and if you cannot do that, then whosoever is the strongest, him to have your friend”. This is the sense according to the reading of Bekker and the rest, ἴμην ἴσαν instead of the common reading ἴμην εἴσιν. Goeller supposes that the imperfect, “the same men were enemies to us both,” is used with reference to the already existing enmity between the Athenians and the Corinthians on the score of the Megareans, mentioned in ch. 103. Arnold supposes that it is a mere inaccuracy of expression.]

[1][Will be less “dreadful to his powerful enemies.”]

[2][“Will be made friend or enemy.” Goeller, Arnold. The sense is quite altered by the misplacing of the relative: it should be “he forecasteth for them (Athens and Corcyra) none of the best, who considering the present state of affairs, makes a question,” &c.]

[3][ἴθι ἐνδεῖ πρὸς τὰ κξί: “hence to those parts;” from Athens to Italy.]

[1][ἴμετέροις. Bekker is followed by Arnold in retaining this reading. “You will contend with your ships more in number than theirs, instead of less.” Haack, Poppo,

Goeller, read ἡμετέραις: “with so many more on your side, as our fleet amounts to:” making ἡμετέραις the dative after πλείοσι, as in the phrase πολλὰ πλείονες.

[2][ἠσφάλεστερον προειδῆτε: “that you may be more certainly acquainted beforehand with the grounds of our request.” Haack and Bredow: using ἠσφάλεστερον adverbially.]

[3][ἤχρησάν: a demand urged by necessity, as opposed to ἠξίωσις, one supported by equity. Bredow.]

[4][But from mere wickedness; “and as being unwilling to have any ally, either to witness their evil deeds, or to put them to the blush by calling for their aid.”]

[1][And to this end have they put forward this plausible pretext of theirs, of keeping out of alliances.]

[2][ἠληπτότεροι. Valla agrees with Hobbes in the translation of this word, which the Scholiast also explains by ἠκατηγορητότεροι. Duker, Goeller, and Arnold, all translate it: “less in the power of others”. Arnold gives two other instances in chaps. 82 and 143 of this book, in which the sense is manifestly that of security from attack.]

[3][“By giving and receiving law”: by submitting their disputes to the decision of the law.]

[4][“Our other colonies, at least, honour us; and from the colonists especially we receive the love of a child to its parent.”]

[1][“Nor are we wont to make war in a manner unbecoming the mother country, unless compelled by some signal injury.” Goeller. “Nor do we attack them (that is, the Corcyraeans in this particular instance) without having received,” &c. Arnold.]

[2][“And they say forsooth, that before they took it, they offered to put the cause to trial of judgment: which truly not he that challenges when he has the advantage and is in security, ought to meet with any attention, but he that fashions his deeds as well as his words according to equity before he begins the contest.”]

[3][“To overlook, put up with it.”]

[1][τότε οἱ μεταλαβόντες: “that partook not of their power *then*”; that is, when they were most in safety. This refers to the Samian and Æginetan war. Goeller.]

[2][ἠνῶν: Will *now* have to impart aid.]

[3][“And they (the Corcyraeans) should of old have shared their power with you, if they meant you to take your share in the events.” The rest of the sentence, “and they that share not,” &c., is omitted by Bekker, and placed within brackets by Poppo, Goeller, and Arnold.]

[4][?ν τα?ς σπονδα?ς: the thirty years' truce. All the states were either ?νσπονδοι, that is, included in this truce: or ?σπονδοι, ?κσπονδοι, or ?γρ?α?οι, included neither in the thirty years' truce, nor any treaty with the Lacedæmonians or the Athenians.]

[1][That not withdrawing themselves from any other.]

[2][ε? σωρ?ονο?σι. No satisfactory explanation is given of these words; Goeller's is far from being so. As rendered by Hobbes, they are nonsense. Valla has made sense by taking the liberty of interpolating "non recepturis;" thus "iis a quibus recipitur (non recepturis, si saperent)," &c.]

[3][“Which may befall you at this time, if you listen not to us. For you may chance to be not only auxiliaries to these,” &c.]

[4][“We too must defend (our colony) against them, and you along with them. Wherefore you shall do justly at any rate by standing,” &c.]

[5][“Were divided in opinion, as to whether they should assist them.”]

[1][?πικρ?άτησιν: Getting the mastery over.]

[2][παρ?? τ? νικ?v: Are blind to every thing “for the sake of conquering.” Arnold.]

[3][“For they (those about to attack their enemies) consider as a friend, him that then serves their purpose, even though heretofore he may have been his enemy; and as an enemy, him that withstands him, even though he chance to be his friend: for they sacrifice even their own affairs to their eagerness of present contention.”]

[4][?μύνεσθαι: “To requite us with the like.” Duker, Goeller, Arnold. See also lib. iv. 63: τ?v ε? κα? κακ?ς δρ??ντα ?ξ ?σου ?μυνούμεθα.

[1][See chap. 103.]

[2][“Excited by the immediately apparent.”]

[3][Hobbes seems to have read δέχεσθαι, which is found in one MS. (See Arnold). Bekker and the rest read δέχεσθε: “and receive not,” &c.]

[1][“But they gave them orders not to fight,” &c.]

[1][“And they gave these orders, because,” &c.]

[2][πρ?οσέμιξαν: when they had touched land. “And when sailing from Leucas they touched land over against Corcyra, they station themselves at Chimerium in the country of Thesprotis.” It is only necessary to look at the map, to see that ?π? Λευκάδος πλέοντες, belongs to προσέμιξαν, and not to ?ρμίζονται; that is to say, that they sailed from Leucas *before*, and not *after* reaching land opposite Corcyra.]

[3] ["It (Chimerium) is a haven, and *by* it lies," &c. Thucydides distinguishes the port of Chimerium from the promontory.]

[4] Cestrine, the territory of Cestria, part of Chaonia.

[1] ["In this part of the continent then the Corinthians station their fleet and pitch their camp."]

[2] [ἤ? ποτε εἰσίν: Are "never not" their friends. Goeller.]

[3] [They descried the galleys of the Corcyræans "at sea, and sailing down upon them".]

[4] κέρασ. The galleys stood all one by one in a row; and the right wing were those that were on the right hand from the midst; and the left wing, those on the left hand.

[5] ["But the rest" (the centre and the left wing), "they occupied themselves; making three divisions of their ships, each of which was commanded by one of the three generals."]

[1] σημεῖα: A picture or image held up, as the eagle amongst the Romans.

[2] [ἤ? τῶν καταστρωμάτων: upon the decks. "Both sides having upon the decks many heavy-armed soldiers and many archers and slingers, being still somewhat unskilfully appointed after the old fashion. *And* the battle was," &c. The want of skill was displayed in crowding their decks with fighting men, instead of relying upon their ships. The word *but*, inserted by Hobbes, quite alters the sense.]

[3] ["For whenever they happened to run aboard each other, they did not easily disengage themselves, both by reason of the number and crowding of the ships, and from trusting rather to the men at arms on the decks, who made a standing fight," &c.]

[4] [διέκπλοι. περίπλοι. ἠνακρούσεις. ἠναροῖα?. These various manœuvres may be described thus: διέκπλους, breaking through the enemy's line, so as by a quick turn to strike their opponent on either the side or the stern, and so sink it: περίπλους, taking a circuit round the enemy's ships, and bearing down upon them whenever the opportunity seemed favourable: ἠνάκρουσις, rowing back or astern, so as to gain space for making another charge. ἠναστροῖα is understood by Arnold to mean the return to the charge, after gaining space enough by either περίπλους or ἠνάκρουσις.]

[1] [More without pretext or disguise. "They aided them now more undisguisedly; at first indeed forbearing from making assault upon any: but when they fled," &c.]

[1] ἤ? καταδύσειαν: "Which they might happen to have sunk": not meaning, sunk "to the bottom", but damaged and made waterlogged. Goeller, Arnold.]

[2] ["*But* after the Corinthians had chased the Corcyræans on shore, they betook themselves to collecting the wrecks," &c.]

[3][κα? ?σαι ?σαν λοιπα?. Goeller and Poppo agree in the opinion, which is also seemingly adopted by Arnold, that by λοιπα? are here meant the ten vessels, out of the one hundred and twenty in all belonging to the Corcyraeans (see chap. 25), which were not present at the battle; they having but a hundred and ten in the action (see chap. 47). It should therefore be “with such galleys as they had fit for sea, *and* those which were not in the action, together with,” &c.]

[1]Pæan, a hymn to Mars, in the beginning of fight: to Apollo, after the victory.

[2][“For they descried twenty Athenian galleys making towards them: which, after the first ten, the Athenians sent as a reinforcement; for fear,” &c.]

[3][?λιλαι ?μύνειν: “Few” to defend: that is, “too few.”

[4]viz., More behind their backs.

[5][ε?πον ?τι ν?ες ?κε?ναι ?πιπέουσι: “Said, there are ships yonder sailing down upon us.” Goeller, Arnold.]

[1][“Ended at night”: anglice, did not end till night. Goeller, Arnold. See lib. iii. 108. ? μάχη ?τελεύτα ?ως ?ψέ.]

[2][These Corcyraeans were those encamped at Leucimna, the footsoldiers and the thousand Zacynthians mentioned in chap. 47. Valla, as well as Goeller, interprets ?ρμίσαντο: “the Corcyraeans received them (the Athenians) into their station”: and not, the Athenians “stationed themselves there”.]

[3][And that being in a desert place, “there was no repairing of their ships”.]

[1][The common reading was προπέμψαι: but Bekker, Poppo, Goeller, and Arnold, all agree in reading προσπέμψαι. Without herald: that is, as if in time of peace.]

[2][If therefore you be resolved, &c. “*and* you break the treaty, lay hands first upon us that are here,” &c.]

[3][“So far as in us lies, we will not overlook it.”]

[1][They had the better all day, “so as to carry off the greatest number of the wreck,” &c.]

[2][“About thirty galleys.”]

[3][And for that when “the Athenians” went to Sybota. This is according to the reading of Bekker, and also of Arnold, who refers to chap. 52 in confirmation of the opinion, that the Athenians are the subject of the verb ?λθον. Hobbes has followed the common reading, omitting ?ι ?θηνα?οι, which is adopted by Stephen and Valla, and approved of by Poppo and Goeller, both of whom include those words in brackets; considering the Corcyraeans as the nominative to ?λθον.]

[4][“And establishing in it Corinthian colonists, departed,” &c.]

[5][δοῦλοι: Slaves. “But two hundred and fifty they kept in bonds,” &c. These prisoners are met with again in iii. 70.]

[1][περιγγίνεται. Arnold, “survived the war”; Poppo and Goeller, “bello Corinthios superat.” It is at all events hardly correct to say “was delivered from the war”; this in fact being only the commencement of it.]

[2][πρασσόντων: practising. See iii. 70. note.]

[3][Anciently Phlegra.]

[4][That is, the wall towards the sea, which was therefore a defence against the Athenians, masters of the sea. The Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, were accustomed to destroy the walls towards the continent.]

[5][?πιδημουργοι: magistrates of the Dorians, a name expressing their doing the work of the people. The preposition ?π? is considered by Goeller, to indicate that they were magistrates sent by the mother country, in addition or as assessors to the magistrates (δημουργο?) appointed by the colony.]

[1]King of Macedonia.

[2][τοῦς ?π? Θρῆκης: “The people *Thrace-ward*,” or living in the direction of Thrace; a general term applied to the Greek states situate on the northern coast of the Ægean Sea from Thessaly to the Hellespont. The Chalcidian colonies hereabouts, amongst which were Olynthus, Torone, Sermyle, and Arne, were planted from Chalcis in Eubœa. Arnold.]

[3][“Had been rendered hostile to them.”]

[1][τῆς τοῦ τείχους: “The wall.” See the last chapter.]

[2][?πρῶτον. This word is included in brackets by Bekker and the rest. If omitted, the sentence would run thus: “The Potidæans having sent to Athens, &c., and also going to Lacedæmon, in order to secure aid, if wanted, &c.: when they found, after much negotiation, that they got no good at Athens, but that the ships sent against Macedonia attacked them also; and when the government of the Lacedæmonians promised, &c.: then at last they revolted”, &c.]

[3][“*And* Perdiccas persuades,” &c.]

[4][“He gave them part of his own territory, Mygdonia, to live in.”]

[1][This does not accurately express the idea in the Greek, which is literally: “And so they destroying their cities, went higher up the country and prepared themselves for war.” The destroying, and going higher up the country, was part of the preparing for war.]

[2] [“Both of themselves such as volunteered, and of the rest of the Peloponnesians such as they could induce by pay.”]

[3] Archers, darters, and the like, that wore not armour on their bodies, and were called ψίλοι, naked.

[4] [Valla, as well as Hobbes, omits ουχ ἠκιστα: “for whose sake chiefly most of those from Corinth went as volunteers”.]

[1] [“With four others.” See chap. 62.]

[2] Therme, after called Thessalonica, now Salonichi. [“These on first coming into Macedonia, find the former thousand had just taken Therme, &c. And they too stationed themselves there and besieged Pydna.”]

[3] Or scarce honourable. [It means no more than, a league forced by circumstances.]

[4] [Berœa. Bekker and the rest.]

[5] [“And their galleys, seventy in number, sailed by them. And marching forward by slow marches, in three days they reached Gignonus, and encamped.”]

[1] [πρὸς Ἰλύνθον. This is the reading of Haack and Bekker, as well as Hobbes. The common reading, which is that also of Valla, is πρὸ Ἰλύνθου, *before* Olynthus. Poppo, Goeller, and Arnold read πρὸς Ἰλύνθου, on the side of Potidæa *towards* Olynthus.]

[2] [This was, that the men might have no excuse for leaving their posts to go into the town for provisions. Arnold.]

[3] The isthmus of Pallene, where they were. [In the isthmus on the other side of Potidæa: not in *Pallene*.]

[4] [“And when the Athenians should march upon themselves”: upon Aristeus and his army.]

[1] [“And saw the rest of the army worsted”.]

[2] [“In the end he resolved to draw those with him into as small a space as possible, and run and force his way into Potidæa.” Goell.]

[3] [παρὰ τὴν χηλῶν. So called from its likeness either to the claw of a crab, or the cloven hoof of an ox. It seems to have comprised not only the mole or pier of the harbour, but also the breakwater that protected the sea-wall. The walls of Potidæa extending to the sea on both sides of the isthmus, and the gate towards the continent being shut, Aristeus was obliged to get in at the gate towards Pallene; which he could reach only by the breakwater under the sea-wall.]

[4] [“And the standards were raised.”]

[5][The stadium, always translated by Hobbes *furlong*, used to be reckoned six hundred feet; but has been fixed by recent surveys at five hundred and seventy-five. A furlong being six hundred and sixty feet, the stadium is much nearer to the ninth than the eighth part of a mile. The word *for*, in “for it is” &c., is not in the Greek.]

[1][“Being torn down.”]

[2][“*And* neither side, &c. ἠπὸς δεῦ. It no where appears as yet that the Potidæans had no cavalry in the battle.]

[3][“*From* the isthmus”: that is, towards Olynthus.]

[4][Who “marching from Aphytis, led his army by slow marches to Potidæa”, wasting, &c.]

[1][“Desiring to do what was the next best thing to be done”, and make the best, &c.]

[2][Bekker and the rest have ξυνεπολέμει: “amongst other acts of *assistance* in the war.”]

[3][πρὸς ὁμογενήντο. Goeller, Bekker. προεγεγεννητο, Arnold. “These were the quarrels which had before this time arisen between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians.”]

[1][“They summoned the allies to Lacedæmon.”]

[2][κατ’ τῆς σπονδᾶς. Arnold considers that the treaty here meant, that is, that the treaty which the Æginetæ would naturally appeal to, must be the latest treaty, or the thirty years’ treaty. Mueller observes that in strictness the Æginetæ could appeal to neither treaty, neither the five years’ nor the thirty years’ treaty, being under the dominion of the Athenians before the date of either; and that by neither was any alteration made in their condition. He inclines to refer the words τῆς σπονδᾶς to τῆς ξυμμαχικῶν, made by the influence of the Spartans, amongst the Greeks in general, and the stipulation for mutual liberty made in that treaty.]

[3][Of the Ephori and those that had the sovereignty, that is, before the aristocracy. [See chap. 87, note.]

[1][This decree of Pericles is said by the Scholiast, to have been proposed by him at the suggestion of Alcibiades; who, when a boy, saw him much disturbed by thinking how he should account for the public money; and being informed of the cause, told him that he should be thinking not how he should account, but how he should not account. Whereupon Pericles proposed this decree, and succeeded in diverting public attention from the subject of his accounts.]

[2][According to Bekker and Arnold: “makes you less ready to give credit to others, if we complain of aught”. According to Goeller: “makes you less ready to give credit to us, if we have aught to say against the rest”. Valla makes something quite different

of the passage: “fides vestra facit, ut nobis alii, si quid in vos dixerimus, fidem non habeant.”]

[3][And hereby “you do indeed exhibit your moderation”, but you have less, &c.]

[1][The Æginetans. Schol.]

[2][The Potidæans and Megareans. Schol.]

[3][πρὸς τὸ πρὸς Θράκης ποχρῶσθαι: “most commodious, to give you the full benefit of your dominion in the neighbourhood of Thrace.” Arnold. To use away, or out; simili, si non eodem sensu, Latini dicunt *abuti*. Goeller.]

[1][“The question should no longer be”.]

[2][“For they (the Athenians) being the active party, come with their plans already arranged, and not having still to do that, upon their adversary who has yet decided upon nothing.” Goeller.]

[3][“And we know in what manner, and that it is by degrees that the Athenians encroach upon their neighbours.”]

[4][μελλήσει: “With threatening demonstration.” Arnold. “Expectation of attack meditated.” Goell.]

[5][“You were indeed said to be cautious and secure: and your report therefore exceeded the reality”. For we, &c]

[6][“As far as” Peloponnesus.]

[1][“Though you well know”, &c.]

[2][“You neither seem, to us at least, to have any feeling, nor ever to have considered with yourselves.”]

[3][“And in action to attain not even to what is necessary.”]

[1][“You distrust even counsels to be surely calculated upon.” Arnold, Goeller.]

[2][καὶ τὸ ὑποῦμα: “Even what is under your hand.”]

[3][μὴ ἐξέλθωσιν: “Unless they go through with”, that is, “attain.”]

[4][“And if therefore they fail, &c., by entering into other hopes they have already repaired the mishap.”]

[1][“Quietem iis maxime contingere.” Poppo and Goeller. “That they enjoy the longest peace.” Arnold.]

[2] [“Though your neighbouring state were of the same way of thinking”, in regard to justice.]

[3] [“Why in the Athenian customs, through much experience, there has been more innovation than in yours.”]

[4] [νῦν δε?: And at this moment.]

[5] [ξυγγενε?: The Potidæans, a colony of the Corinthians.]

[6] [“And we the rest be driven” through despair, &c.]

[1] [ἄνθρώπων τῶν ἀσθανομένων: “homines aliquo sensu præditos”: Stephen, Goeller. An allusion to the insensibility charged against the Lacedæmonians in chap. 70.]

[2] [“About other matters.”]

[3] [περὶ τοῦ παντός, scilicet λόγου: “concerning the whole matter in debate”. See the next chap. βουλόμενοι περὶ τοῦ παντός λόγου δηλῆσαι.]

[1] [Bekker and the rest, ἡμετέροις: “against your confederates.”]

[2] [“Though it be somewhat irk–some to us to be ever bringing forward this subject.”]

[3] [“These things when we did, we endangered ourselves for the common safety; in achieving which, it cannot be denied that up to a certain point you took your share; but still we ought not to be deprived, if it is of any value, of all right of speaking of them.” Goeller.]

[1] [“But of testimony.”]

[2] [“As if his power were no longer what it had been, went away, &c.” Goeller, Arnold.]

[3] [ἄρα: “to it”: that is, the event just related, τοιοῦτου συμβάντος τούτου. “This coming to pass in this manner, we contributed to it,” &c.]

[4] [Of Salamis.]

[1] [“But whilst we were yet safe,” (that is, whilst the time was for aiding us), “you were not at hand”: whereas, &c.]

[2] [The Athenians at the coming in of the Persian, when they put themselves into their galleys, left their city to the army of the Persians by land, and sent their wives and children into Ægina, Salamis, and Trœzene.]

[3][?πε?ρ τ?ς ?ν βρ?αχει? ?λπίδι ο?σης. τ?ς ο?σης are by Didot referred, not to Athens, but to the fleet, the only city the Athenians then had remaining; which at that time was εν βραχει? ?λπίδι, of slender hopes.]

[4][τ? μέρος: “we bore our share in delivering you and ourselves”. Arnold. “quantum in nobis erat”: Goeller.]

[1][Had quietly succeeded.]

[2][?ρ? ?ξιοί ?σμεν, κ. τ. λ.; “Do we deserve then not to be so greatly envied, &c.?” ?ρ?α est *ecquid*; qui interrogandi modus graviter affirmat. Bayer. Hobbes has followed the common reading, ?ρχ?ς τε. Bekker and the rest read ?ρχ?ς γε.]

[3][“To run the risk of laying down our power.”]

[4][It is no fault, &c. to order to the best. You “therefore at any rate” order, &c.: “and had you at that time staid it out, and made yourselves hated for your command like us, we well know that you would have been not less heavy, &c. So neither have we done any thing wonderful, if overcome by three the greatest things, &c.”]

[1]That is, when Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, pursuing the relics of the Persian war, through his pride and insolent command procured the hatred of the confederates so far as, the Lacedæmonian state calling him home, they put themselves under the leading of the Athenians.

[2][Goeller agrees with Hobbes in rendering ?στε ?ρχειν, *desiring* to rule: “prægnanti sensu accipiendum, vt sit *imperare velle*”. Vulgo, γένωνται. Bekker and the rest, γεγένηται: *have been* juster than, &c.]

[3][?δοξ?α: an ill name.]

[1][“For conceding somewhat of our strict right in making conventions with our allies for trying their causes, and giving them the right of decision by the same laws with ourselves, we have then”, &c. Δίκαι ξυμβολαίαι, “conventional causes” are thus explained by Goeller: “Inter quas civitates frequens commercium esset, eæ pacta quædam inire solebant de ratione actionum inter privatos cives suos instituendarum, de foro, utrum litigantes sequerenter, et rebus similibus. Hæc, ut alia pacta civitatum cum civitatibus, σύμβολα appellabantur. Causas privatorum, quæ ex talibus pactis componebantur, Thucydides dixit ξυμβολαίας δίκας. Latine cum Livio, xli. 24, hoc institutum dicas “commercium jus præbendi et repetendi.”]

[2]διότι: *wherefore*. “None of them considering how it comes about that others, &c., are never upbraided with *this* (a love of contention).” The reason is, they use force. “For they that may compel, have no need farther, to go to law”.]

[3][?ι δε?: “*But* these men, &c., if they are worsted in any thing, be it ever so trifling, contrary to their opinion that it ought not to be, either by sentence, &c., are not in the majority of cases thankful for what they do not lose; but take their disappointment in worse part than if”, &c. Goeller.]

[4] ["But in that case", that is, if we took by force, &c. Goeller.]

[1] ["If your system be such as that of which you showed symptoms before." ?πεδείξατε for ?πεδείξατε has been rightly restored by Bekker, Poppo, Goeller. The Lacedæmonians had not "fully manifested" (?πέδειξαν), their tyrannical spirit during the command of Pausanias; but had "shown symptoms of it", which is exactly ?πέδειξαν. Arnold.]

[2] [?μικτα: unmixed, not modified to suit those of other states. Spartanos, antiquis rebus constanter adhærentes, consentaneum est postremo in tanta cæterorum Græcorum mobilitate ab his ita recessisse, ut peculiaris neque aut cum Græcis aut cum barbaris consociabilis populus viderentur. Muell. By saying that those who go abroad, use neither the customs of Sparta nor of the rest of Greece, must be meant that they use their own arbitrary will only.]

[1] ["Out of the assembly". The speech of the Athenians was addressed ?ς τ? πλ?θος, see chap. 72.]

[2] [That is, of the same age.]

[1] [παρόμοιος: "of the same description": military rather than naval. Arnold.]

[2] [If we will exercise ourselves.]

[3] [Still much more deficient.]

[1] ["For as for the hope," &c.]

[2] [And in the meantime to make our provision, "both by getting allies, &c., and by contributing our own fortunes at the same time". Göll.]

[3] [We then attack them, if we will, "better prepared".]

[4] ["Already making".]

[1] ["See that we do not make the affair more dishonourable", &c.]

[2] [As well *of* cities as, &c.]

[3] [πολλο?ς: "that we being many." Valla has "multas urbes".]

[5] ["Above all things."]

[4] [?ν πάυσαισθε: you may be the longer, &c.]

[1] ["Is the main ingredient in."]

[2] ["Good counsellors in this: that we are brought up more simply than, &c.; and not like men exceedingly wise in things needless, to find fault eloquently, &c.; but to

think that the thoughts of our neighbours are like the accidents of fortune, not to be discovered by speeches”, &c. Goeller.]

[3][“That has been taught what is most needful”.]

[1][μελέτας. Lacedæmoniorum instituta in educandis liberis. Goeller. “*These* institutions, which our ancestors have handed down to us.”]

[2][We are alike, “both then and now”. The deliverers of Greece.]

[1][Nor to be “judged with judgments and words”.]

[2]ψήφος: properly lapillus, calculus; a little stone or ball, which he that gave his voice put into a box, either on the affirmative or negative part, as he pleased. The Athenians used beans, white and black. The Venetians now use balls; and the distinction is made by the box, inscribed with yea and no. [κρίνουσι γὰρ βοῶ: “for they vote by shouting.” This was the mode of voting in the Spartan ἑκκλησία: a body consisting of such of the Spartans of the class called ἕμοιοι or peers, that is, those whose means enabled them to devote their time to the Spartan education and to support the expenses of the ἰδίτια or public table, as were of the age of thirty years. No Spartan that had not gone through the discipline considered essential for forming a useful citizen, was admitted by Lycurgus to the exercise of any political right: and hence the Spartans of inferior means formed a class which, in distinction to the ἕμοιοι, came to be designated the ἑπομείονες or inferiors. The γερουσία or senate, said to be an institution of Lycurgus, consisted, including the two kings who presided in it, of thirty members: their qualification was, the being of the ἕμοιοι and sixty years of age: they were chosen for life, and nominally by the pares: see Plut. Lycurg. The assembly, here called τὸ πλῆθος, had the right of simply affirming or rejecting the measures proposed to them by the kings and senate: they could neither modify nor even discuss those measures, nor originate any of their own. The five Ephori, said to be instituted about a hundred and thirty years after the time of Lycurgus by Theopompus, were chosen out of the whole Spartan race without distinction; and were therefore naturally the organ of the democracy: whilst the ἕμοιοι were in possession of the senate and the assembly.]

[1][“But wishing to excite them more to the war, openly declaring their opinion”: that is to say, the war being popular, by obliging them to vote openly.]

[2][This joint vote is taken afterwards. Chap. 119, 125.]

[1]A promontory in Asia the less, where the remnant of Xerxes’ fleet was defeated, the same day that this land forces were also defeated by Pausanias at Platea with the slaughter of Mardonius their general, and almost their whole army of three hundred thousand men. [When the Medes were departed *from Europe*, &c.]

[2][See Herodot. ix. 114, et seq.]

[3]τὸ κορυφόν: the state. That is, they made Athens again the seat of their government, whereas before it was in the fleet and camp, still removing.

[1][?νουκοδομξιν: “went about to rebuild the city and the walls: for of the circuit of the walls little remained standing, and of the houses the most had fallen down; though a few were standing, in which lodged the principal of the Persians.”]

[2][?σπερ ν?ν: as he had just now made of Thebes.]

[1][Till the walls were raised to the lowest possible height they could defend themselves from.]

[2][πρ?ς τ?ς ?ρχ?ς: to the Ephori. Goeller.]

[1][“The Lacedæmonians or their allies.”]

[2][*They* said. Themistocles is speaking in the name of the Athenians. “They said, they were bold to decide upon it without them: and that in whatever on the other hand they thought fit to advise of with them, they showed themselves in counsel behind no one.”]

[1][παρασκευ?ς: apparatus, or *means of strength*: “for that they could not, if they were not to be on equal terms in point of apparatus, advise”, &c. No single word will express the exact sense in English.]

[2][“For they had not, forsooth, sent their ambassadors to forbid, but to offer advice for the common good. Moreover they were just at that time specially well affected to them”, &c.]

[3][“Even at this day.”]

[4]The walls of Athens made of chapels and tombs. Corn. Nepos, in Vita Themistoclis.

[5]This was before a village, and now made the Athenian arsenal.

[1][“Considering that the spot was both convenient, having three natural havens, and would also aid them, when they were become seamen, to obtain power”. Popp. Göll. These havens were called Cantharon, Aphrodision, and Zea.]

[2][“For *the* stones (for building the wall) were carried by two carts, that used to pass each other on the wall”. Arnold.]

[3][The meaning here of ?γγώνιοι, in itself simply “angular”, is decided by the fact that the wall is found at the present day to be built of square stones.]

[4][“That if, therefore, they were ever forced by land”.]

[1]Constantinople.

[2][“And all” who had newly, &c.]

[3] The Ionians were all colonies of the people of Athens.

[1] [“Convicted” of some, &c.]

[2] [“But not the least matter laid to his charge was Medising”, the which, &c.]

[3] [?όπος. Quia ?όπος Græcis nomen grave et odiosum erat, pro eo deinde cœpit dici σύνταξις. Duk.]

[4] 86,250*l.* sterling. [If Boeckh has correctly estimated the Attic drachma at 5 gros 6 pfenninge, formulæ imperialis, the drachme would be equal to 8¼*d.* and the talent to 206*l.* 5*s.* sterling; and four hundred and sixty talents would therefore be equal to 94,875*l.* That is, calculating the thaler at thirty–six pence English.]

[1] Not at Athens, because they would not seem to challenge a propriety in that money.

[2] [“Now using their authority at first, &c.; by war and administration &c. they came to such great power. And I have written those things and made this digression in the history, because all writers before me have pretermitted &c., (for they have either &c.); and Hellenicus who has touched them, has mentioned them but briefly &c. Moreover they carry, &c.” The history of Hellenicus is called ? ?τθίς.]

[3] [There was one Eion in Chalcis in Thrace, a colony of the Mendæans, and another on the Strymon, a colony of the Athenians.]

[1] [“Sold them as slaves”.]

[2] [“In violation of the established law”: the law, that is, that all Greeks were free. Schol. Goell.]

[3] [“And making default (when it so happened) in sending their contingent of military.” This is Goeller’s interpretation of λειποστράτιον: ?στρατεία, desertion of military duty. The latter is said of individuals; the former, of states.]

[4] [“For through this dread of military service, the most &c. taxed themselves in money instead of sending their quota of ships: whereby the Athenian navy was increased with the funds contributed by the allies, and they, whenever they revolted, were without either means *or experience* to make war.” Bekker &c., ?πειροι: Valla, Portus, Hobbes, ?ποροι.]

[1] [“Under the conduct of Cimon the son of Miltiades: and took and destroyed triremes of the Phœnicians, in all to the number of two hundred”.]

[2] [“About the places of trade in the opposite part of Thrace, and the mines which they possessed”. The Thasians had some gold mines at Scape Hyle in Thrace; but there were also mines in Thasos itself, particularly those found by the Phœnicians, between Ænyra and Cœnyra. See Herod. vi. 46, 47.]

[3][They were “all destroyed at Drabescus by the Thracians”. This is according to Poppo’s conjecture of ξύμπαντες for ξυμπάντων. There is the authority of Diodorus, and of Thucydides himself (iv. 102.), for the fact that these ten thousand settlers were *all* destroyed. Valla has: “omnes sunt perempti.”]

[1]The Lacedæmonians employed the captives taken in war, and their posterity, in husbandry and other servile works; which was all done by this kind of men. And they were called by them Helots, because the first of them so employed were captives of the town of Helos in Laconia. [See iv. 80.]

[2][τῶν περιοίκων. The περίοικοι were the old Achaian inhabitants of Laconia, who after the Dorian conquest submitted to the invaders on certain conditions, by which they retained their private rights of citizenship, and also the right of voting in the public assembly. These rights however were forfeited after an unsuccessful attempt to shake off the Dorian yoke; and from henceforward they were treated as subjects rather than citizens; being eligible indeed to military commands, but with no voice in the public assembly, and of course being disqualified for the offices of Ephor or senator. They remained in this dependent condition down to the time of Augustus Cæsar, who on their making an appeal to his interference gave them the full enjoyment of civil rights, and deprived the Spartans of their exclusive ascendancy. Arnold.]

[3][“At *that* so well known time”.]

[4][“Against these *then* had the Lacedæmonians, &c.: *and* the Thasians”, &c. This, commonly called the third Messenian war, by occupying the Lacedæmonians, caused the surrender of the Thasians.]

[1][They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural assaults. “But on the siege being protracted, there appeared in them a deficiency of this skill: for else they had taken the place by assault.” Arnold, Goeller.]

[2]The Lacedæmonians were Dorians, the Athenians Ionians.

[3][Upon the “fairer reason”.]

[1][“Immediately upon their return”.]

[2][They “already” bore, &c.]

[1][“A Libyan, king of the Libyans.” Hobbes throughout renders Λίβυς by “Africa”, as often as the word occurs.]

[1][“After this the Peloponnesians sent over into Ægina three hundred men of arms, &c.: and the Corinthians seized on the heights of Geraneia, and descended into the Megarid.” So Bekker and the rest. The seizing of these heights would naturally be the act of the party that was descending into the Megarid: lying immediately in their passage, and essential for the security of their retreat. Portus and Valla are both with Hobbes. “With other forces”, is not in the Greek.]

[2] [The common reading was ἠκβοήσαντες, βο? being often used in the sense of pugna, auxilium. Bekker and the rest have ἠκβοηθήσαντες; that is, “sallying out of Megara to oppose them”. See iii. 18, where ἠκβοηθεία is used in the sense of “sallying out”.]

[1] [“Shut them in with their heavy-armed men in front.”]

[2] [But “the bulk” of the army.]

[3] The Dorians, the mother nation of the Lacedæmonians, inhabited a little country on the north side of Phocis, called Doris, and Tetrapolis, from the four cities it contained; of which those here mentioned were three, and the fourth was Pindus. [Goeller observes: “vulgo de tetrapoli Dorica loquuntur, sed quartam urbem Pindum ignorant cum Thucydide Diodorus, Conon aliique.” Hermann names Acyphas as the fourth town; and says that others make out six instead of four. Gr. Antiq. § 16. 7.]

[1] [“The Athenian fleet had already sailed round, and were ready to hinder them”.]

[2] [“And at that very time they saw they were intending to stop them this way too”.]

[3] [“And another thing, certain Athenians were privily inviting them”; hoping, &c.]

[4] [“And they marched upon them (the Lacedæmonians) thinking them to be at a loss by which way they should pass; and also in some measure from suspicion of an intended dissolution of the democracy”.]

[5] [“According to the terms of their alliance”.]

[1] [“Under the conduct of Tolmides the son of Tolmæus”.]

[2] A city of Corinthians, near the river Evenus in Ætolia.

[3] [“In the meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt with their allies were still persevering: and saw, &c. For at first”, &c.]

[1] [Megabazus returned with the money, &c.: “but sends Megabyzus the son of Zopyrus”, &c. So Bekker and the rest.]

[2] [Prosopitis, an island in the Delta. See Herod. ii. 41.]

[3] [ἠτ ἠλαιοι; “qui in palustribus (βουκολίαις) habitabant, inter Taniticum et Pelusiacum ostia Nili. Vocatur quoque inferior Ægypti pars ἠλος, inclusa Bolbitino et Sebennytico ostiis. Quæ regio insularis hoc loco intelligenda videtur.” Gottleber.]

[1] [Taking them *as* their confederates. Goeller.]

[2] Famous for the battle between Jul. Cæsar and Cn. Pompeius.

[3][“So far as was consistent with not straying far from where the arms were piled”: that is, from the camp.]

[4][“To Sicyon”.]

[5][“Marched to Ēniadæ”.]

[6][The words “after *this*”, which would fix the date of this treaty, about which there are many different opinions, are wanting in the Greek.]

[1][“In the army”, not in the Greek.]

[2][And when “off Salamis”, &c. Bekker and the rest omit the “Cyprians”.]

[3][Because the noble families of the Delphians were of Dorian origin. Arnold. Hermann observes, that, as belonging to their race, this oracle had at all times exercised a peculiar influence over the internal concerns of the Dorians; hence the sanction given by it to the constitution of Lycurgus. Gr. Antiq. §23.]

[4][“And having taken Chæroneia, they departed, leaving a garrison in it”. So Bekker and the rest, leaving out the remainder.]

[1][Κορωνεία. The field of battle at Chæroneia is so connected with the plain of Coroneia, that the scene of more than one battle is assigned, sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other. Mueller. Amongst others that fell at this battle, was Clinias, the father of Alcibiades.]

[2][By ἡ ἄλλα πᾶντες: “and all the rest,” are meant the Locrian exiles, and some also from Phocis; Phocis and Locris, as well as Bœotia, being lost to the Athenians by the battle of Coronea; which revolution, the commons of Phocis being well-affected to Athens (iii. 95), could be effected only by the return of the exiles and consequent ascendancy of the aristocratical party. Arnold.]

[3][“They invaded and wasted Attica as far as Eleusis and the Thriasian plain”. Θριάσιον πεδίων campus erat, ut nonnullis videtur, inter Eleusinem, Eleutheras, Castiam, Rhetos, et Daphnen monasterium. Goeller.]

[1][“Under the conduct of Pericles.”]

[2][Opinions differ as to the meaning of ἡ χαιᾶ. Arnold understands by it the country of that name. The connexion, he says, between Athens and the Achaians was natural: the latter being alienated from Lacedæmon by difference of race as well as of government. Their ancestors had been expelled from Laconia and Argolis by the Dorians: and the twelve states of Achaia were all democratical in their government. And he supports his opinion by that of Thirlwall. Goeller is persuaded that it is the name of some unknown town: referring to iv. 21, where Cleon requires Lacedæmon to restore “Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzene, and Achaia”; an insane demand, if he meant the province of Achaia. Od. Mueller understands by it some small town in Megaris.]

[1][The garrison was left in Samos, not over the hostages.]

[2][παρ? σ?ίσιν: in Samos.]

[3][“At the island of Tragia”.]

[4][That is, by a wall on three sides, and the ships on the fourth.]

[1][?ρ?ατοπέδ?. The naval camp pitched on the sea–shore, the constant accompaniment of all naval expeditions of the Greeks. Their ships being totally unprovided with accommodation for eating or sleeping on board, they had always a camp with a regular market established on shore, where the men took their meals and slept. The ships were drawn up on the beach in front of this camp, and protected against surprise by a certain number of ships which lay afloat off the camp, ready manned, as a guard. Sometimes a stockade was made in the sea in front of the ships so drawn up, or a palisade or a similar fortification was raised on the shore. These precautions the Athenians appear on this occasion to have neglected. Arnold.]

[2][And overcame “those that were launched to meet them”.]

[3]Not the writer of the history.

[1][μεταξ?, “intervenient”, omitted by Bekker and the rest.]

[2][δέγνωστο: “it *had* already been decreed, &c.: but still they sent to Delphi to inquire”, &c.]

[1][This is not correct: for the Lacedæmonians had not yet decreed the war, but had summoned the allies to consider ?ι χρ? πολεμε?ν: a question in which they had equal voices with themselves. “Do not let us blame the Lacedæmonians for not having themselves voted the war, when they have now brought us together for this purpose. For it is the duty of our leaders, having due regard to their private interests, to consider first of all the common weal, as they also are in other things honoured above all the rest”.]

[1][Not to be careless judges of what we now say. Goeller, Arnold.]

[2][“Have disgracefully fallen out contrariwise”. *Against well–advised enemies*, is not in the Greek.]

[1][“And in warlike skill”.]

[2]All land–soldiers, all of one manner of arming and discipline.

[1][Their revenues: “wherein their strength lies”.]

[2]Though this be here said in the person of a Corinthian, yet it was never thought on by any of that side till Alcibiades put it into their heads when he revolted from his country.

[3][?ντικρυς δουλείαν: “direct, downright”, and so, “clear, undisputed”. A metaphor taken from a dart or arrow going straight forward, and penetrating to its object. Arnold.]

[1][“How we can be cleared of &c.: for certainly you avoid them not when you betake yourselves to that, which, &c. For contempt, because &c, hath gotten the *opposite* name of foolishness”. The opposition between *κατα?ρόνησις* and *??ροσύνη*, contempt or arrogance and folly, is not very satisfactorily explained.]

[2][“They that would defend what they have at present, must labour for what is next to be. For we have it from our forefathers, to gain”, &c.]

[1][?ελει?: “some from fear of the Athenians, some *to aid us*”. See ii. 8. 11. Goeller.]

[2][“Which for certain even the God, by enjoining war, deemeth broken”. Neither *us*, nor *by them*, is in the Greek.]

[1][“Let us attack and subdue it”.]

[2]Excommunication: extending also to posterity. [“To drive out those under the curse of the goddess. Now the sacrilege was as follows”. ?γος, which Hobbes seems throughout to consider equivalent to “pollution of sanctuary”, is in its original meaning, any thing venerated: thence by antiphrasis, any thing wicked and accursed. Arnold observes, that it corresponds to the Latin word “sacer”, and implies devoted to some god for good or for evil.]

[1][“Of Jupiter”.]

[2][“Esteeming this to be the greatest feast of Jupiter”. Besides those in Peloponnesus, revived by Iphitus of Elis, there were Olympic games also in Macedonia, instituted by Archelaus.]

[3]The oracles were always obscure, that evasion might be found to salve their credit; and whether they were the imposture of the devil, or of men, which is the more likely, they had no presentation nor secure wise conjecture of the future.

[4]Images of living creatures, made of paste. [“In which they sacrifice in the assembly of the whole people, many however not living creatures, but such as”, &c. It appears from Herodotus (ii. 47), that in Egypt, in the feast of the Moon, when swine were sacrificed, the poorer classes used to bake figures of swine made of paste, and offer them as their sacrifice.]

[1][Upon the death of Codrus and consequent strife between his sons, the Eupatridæ, as the first step towards establishing the aristocracy, changed the name of King into that of Archon: leaving however the functions of the dignity, which was still for life, untouched. A farther inroad was made (A. C. 752) by limiting the office to ten years: and again (A. C. 714) by declaring the class of Eupatridæ eligible to it. Finally (A.C.683), when the Medontidæ became extinct, the power and name of the office

were shared amongst nine archons elected yearly from the Eupatridæ: the three first assumed to represent the king in his several characters of archon, high priest and judge, and commander in war, by styling themselves respectively ῥαρχων, βασιλεὺς, and πολέμαρχος. The nine archons exercised unlimited power, both executive and judicial. Draco first set bounds to the latter by establishing a court of appeal, called the ἑταί. Solon on introducing his four classes (see iii. 16), gave the office of archon to the first class. But it was the name only: for the surrender to the citizens at large of the judicial functions, and to the council of four hundred, chosen out of the four Ionic tribes, of the administrative functions, stripped it of all real power. Cleisthenes (A. C. 510) introduced the farther change in all offices, of election by lot. And finally Aristides, in making the democracy supreme, declared eligible to the office of archon all citizens without distinction of birth or fortune, with the exception, perhaps of the Thetes, and that the candidate must trace his citizenship up to his grandfather. The ῥαρχων gave his name to the year, and had jurisdiction in disputes relating to inheritance, and other family matters: the βασιλεύς regulated all matters concerning public worship and religion: and the πολέμαρχος had the control of the metæci, aliens, &c. So late however as the battle of Marathon, the polemarch had a vote with the ten strategi: see Herod. vi. 109.]

[1] The Lacedæmonians that in the reign of Codrus invaded Athens and were defeated, some of them being entered the city, could not get away, but sat at those altars, and were dismissed safe; but some of them slain as they went home. [The Athenians, “when they saw them dying in the temple”, raised them, &c.: “and some sitting suppliants even to the venerable Goddesses amongst the altars in the approach to their temple, they slew. And from *this* they (the murderers) were called”, &c. The sentence refers, not to the Lacedæmonians, but to the companions of Cylon. See Plutarch, Solon.]

[2] [The factions of Isagoras and Cleisthenes. See Herod. v. 66–72]

[3] [The mother of Pericles was Agariste, the grand-daughter of Megacles (Herod. vi. 127–131): one principally concerned in the murder of Cylon: Plutarch, Solon. The insurrection of Cylon is attributed by some to the severity of the laws of Draco; whereby the Eupatridæ attempted to stifle the rising desires of the people for a more popular government. See Hermann. Gr. Antiq. § 103.]

[1] [Was “the first time” recalled. See his second recall, chap. 131.]

[1] [Dascylium: the name of the satrapy of Bithynia and Phrygia.]

[2] [ῥνάγραπτος. Qui de rege et regno Persarum (οἰκ?) bene meriti erant, ῥροσάγγαι ab iis dicebantur, (εἰργέται Græci converterunt), eorumque nomina codicibus regiis inferebantur. Hudson.]

[3] [“For thee to go”.]

[4] [“Amongst the Grecians”.]

[1] [“But habited in the Medan stole issued from Byzantium, and went through Thrace with a guard, &c.” *Per σκευῆς Μηδικῆς significat fortasse στολῆν την Μηδικῆν, quæ passim a Xenophonte memoratur, and proprie κἀνδύς dicebatur. Fortasse vero etiam ἡναξυρίδας, et alia quæ recensentur a Xenophonte Cyrop. viii. 3. 14, induit. Poppo.*]

[2] [“And carried himself so haughtily towards all alike”, &c.]

[3] Scytale, properly a staff; here, a form of letter, used by the Lacedæmonians in this manner. They had two round staves of one bigness, whereof the state kept one, and the man whom they employed abroad, kept the other; and when they would write, they wrapt about it a small thong of parchment; and having thereon written, took it off again, and sent only that thong; which wrapped likewise about the other staff, the letters joined again, and might be read. This served instead of cypher. It seems Pausanias retained his staff, from the time he had charge at Byzantium. [“An officer with a letter.” *σκυτάλα*, in Doric, is a staff: thence the writing wrapped round it. Thus Pindar calls the messenger Æneas, *σκυτάλα μουσῶν*. *Ol. vi. 91.*]

[1] [See viii. 12, note.]

[2] [“To be something greater than the present state of things permitted”. Arnold.]

[1] [“They also diligently considered every act, wherein in his manner of life he had transgressed the established customs, and amongst the rest, that upon the tripod, &c., he caused to be inscribed by his own authority this verse”.]

[2] [All the cities that having joined, &c., “made the offering”.]

[3] [“And after he became involved in the present matter, had much more the appearance of an act near akin to his present design”.]

[4] *παιδικά*, taken both in good and bad sense, for a man with whom another man is in love. [It appears from Xenoph. *de Rep. Lac. ii. 13*, that this word was used in the latter sense. The words in use to express the recognized connexion between two Spartans of the male sex, were *εἰσπνήλας*, *inspirer*, and *ἡίτας*, *hearer*. See Müll. *Dor. iv.4.6.*]

[1] [“Upon a concerted plan”.]

[2] [“Saying, that though he had never brought him into any danger in the transactions with the king, yet he is to be selected for death like any other of all the multitude of his servants”. Goeller.]

[1] *ἑρῶν*: both the temple, and ground consecrated wherein standeth the temple, altars, and edifices for the use of their religion: *τέμενος*, the temple or church of the goddess. [“He ran towards the temple of Pallas Chalcioeca, and getting before them, (the precincts were near at hand), entered into a house”, &c. *τέμενος*, from *τέμνω*, *to divide*, and thence *to set apart*, is not, as Hobbes renders it, the temple, but the whole consecrated ground. “These words are sometimes used as synonymous, both denoting no more than “ground consecrated for the worship of some god”. Thus in Herod. *vi.*

79, the grove dedicated to the hero Argos is called by both these names. They are however more frequently distinguished: and then τέμενος signifies the whole consecrated ground, including sometimes even arable land belonging to the temple: Herod. iv. 161. ἱερῶν expresses the sacred buildings, including the στοῶν or cloister, and the habitations of the ministers of the god: Herod. ii. 112. Ναός is that part of the buildings, in which his statue was placed and himself supposed to dwell. Other smaller ναοί, like chapels in the aisles of Roman Catholic cathedrals, were often ranged round the great ναός or choir, and dedicated to other gods. Thus Minerva, under the title of προναία, had a small ναός close to the entrance of the great ναός at Delphi.” Arnold.]

[1][“And when he was near dying as he was, in the house, they seeing it carried him out of the temple”, &c.]

[2]Cæada, a pit near Lacedæmon.

[3][“To remove it *to* the place where he died”. He was buried first of all πλησίον πού, *somewhere near* the Cæadas: that is, as Corn. Nepos says, “procul ab eo loco, quo erat mortuus.”]

[4][ἄν τῷ προτεμενίσματι. The later meaning of this word seems to be that of a portico or vestibule, in which was kept the holy water for every one to sprinkle himself with as he entered. Here however it apparently means a sort of gate or lodge, like the Propylæa at Athens, to the whole sacred ground: similar to our closes at Salisbury, Peterborough, &c. For a dead body would not have been buried within the sacred ground, much less in the actual vestibule of the temple. Arn. The temple of Pallas Chalciœca was one of the most ancient at Sparta: so called from the brazen statue of the goddess, and interior of the temple.]

[1][By certain proofs found *upon* Pausanias. See Plut. Themist.]

[2]A kind of banishment, wherein the Athenians wrote upon the shell of an oyster the name of him they would banish; used principally against great men, whose power or faction they feared might breed alteration in the state: and was but for certain years. [See viii. 73, note.]

[1][That is, amongst the Molossi. See Plut. Themist. Duker.]

[2][“The camp”.]

[3][ἑπὶ τῷ περὶ: “over against the camp”.]

[1][τῶν ἐκ Σαλαμῶνος προάγγελσιν τῆς ἑναχωρήσεως: “the warning to retreat, sent to Xerxes from Salamis *after* the battle”: Arnold. “The message sent *before* the battle, intimating the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis”: Goeller.]

[2][“And having it now in my power to do thee”, &c.]

[1][“Of things immediately present” the best judge, &c., and “of things future” the best conjecturer, &c.]

[2]There is another city of that name in Greece.

[3][“To far exceed others in the fruitfulness of the vine”.]

[1][?ψον. Bread and wine being considered the main supports of human life, all additional articles of food, such as meat, fish, or vegetables, were called by the common name of ?ψον. Arnold.]

[2][τ?ς γ?ς ?ερ?ς κα? τ?ς ?ορίστου. Talis ager ?όριστος, situs erat inter Megarida et Eleusinem, qui perpetuo incultus jacere debebat, ut sacrum solum a profano discerneretur. Thucydides enim hic duplex terræ genus discernit; sacrum, et limites non habens. Nam dicit τ?ς ?ερ?ς κα? τ?ς ?ορίστου, non τ?ς ?ερ?ς κα? ?ορίστου: neque ulla scripturæ discrepantia est. Intelligenda igitur est terra, partim deabus Eleusiniis, Cereri et Proserpinæ, sacra, ager templi Eleusinii, qui non minus diligenter arabatur quam terra non sacra; partim terra in confiniis jacens, nullis limitibus descripta nec tamen Diis sacra. Goeller.]

[1][The slaves of Aspasia. Goeller.]

[1][“And these men here, that are now just come”.]

[2][Nor give place in your minds to any reproach, as if, &c. Goeller.]

[1][“From these considerations”. Goeller.]

[2][α?τουργοί: “men that cultivate their lands by their own hands”. See chap. 142, where they are called γεωργο?. The number of slaves in Laconia was a striking exception to the state of the rest of Peloponnesus; where, as in almost all the merely agricultural republics of Greece and Italy, there were in early times extremely few of them. And we find afterwards that the other states of Peloponnesus were extremely unwilling to undertake any military operation during harvest-time, because their citizens were themselves ordinarily employed at that season in getting in their crops; while to the Lacedæmonians, whose agricultural labours were performed by Helots, one season of the year was the same as another. See iii. 15. Arnold.]

[3][Peloponnesus had as yet no paid troops: nor Athens till the time of Pericles, though half its mariners were now foreigners. See iii. 17, n.]

[1][“They are not sure that it may not be spent: especially, &c. *For* the Peloponnesians”, &c.]

[2]Of the Peloponnesians and their confederates, some were Dorians, some Æolians, some Bœotians.

[3][“And that it concerns any one but himself to take forethought about any thing”.]

[1][Goeller understands ὑπεπιτειχισμένων in a figurative sense: that the Athenian fleet, by infesting the Peloponnesian coasts, would counterbalance the Lacedæmonian fortification in Attica. By ὑπείχισις, he understands the actual building of some city as a check on the state, in or near which it is built; as Megara by the Dorians, as a check on Athens, and Heracleia in Trachinia (iii. 92.), as a check on the Thessalians: by ῥούριον, some already existing town converted into a stronghold in a hostile territory; as Deceleia, Pylos, Methone, Budorum, &c. His sense of the passage is this: “And indeed neither is their fortifying nor their navy much to be dreaded. For the first, it were hard for a city equal to such an undertaking to effect, even in time of peace; to say nothing of a time of war, and of ourselves being already no less formidably fortified with our navy against them. And if they garrison here, they may indeed annoy &c.: but that will not suffice, at any rate, to hinder us from fortifying after our fashion, by sailing to their territory, and taking revenge with our fleet, wherein we are the stronger”. This sense is supported by chap. 143.]

[1][μέτοικοι. For an account of the metœci, usually rendered by Hobbes, *strangers that dwelt amongst them*, see ii. 31.]

[2][“Would choose, by reason of the peril, to fly”, &c.]

[1][We must “abandon our land and houses, and have a care of the sea and the city”.]

[2]Thucydides hath his mind here upon the defeat in Sicily, which fell out many years after the death of Pericles. Whereby it seems, he frameth his speech more to what Pericles might have said, than to what he did say. Which also he professeth in general of his course in setting down speeches. Besides, he maketh Pericles here to answer point by point to the oration of the Corinthians at Lacedæmon, as if he had been by when it was delivered; and useth the same manner in all opposite orations.

[1][“For neither the one, (the use of our markets by the Megareans), nor the other, (the ceasing to banish foreigners from Sparta), does hurt in time of peace”. Goeller. The government of Sparta was accustomed at its pleasure, summarily to order all foreigners to quit the territory: both from a dread of the introduction of foreign manners, and to prevent the formation of any wealthy mercantile class, likely to give strength and consistence to the excluded commons. Arn. See ii. 39, n.]

[1][“According to the treaty”.]

[2][This interpolated *but* reverses the sense. Γῆρ refers, not to ἡκηρύκτως μὲν, but to ἡνυπόπτως δὲ οἷ: “without herald indeed, but without suspicion *not; for* what had passed was the dissolution of the treaty, and the pretext of the war to follow”. Intercourse without herald, was the test of peace.]

[1][“From this time begins the war of the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and the allies of both sides; during which they had no longer commerce, &c.; and having once begun it they warred, &c.”]

[1]Priestess of Juno: by whose priesthood they reckoned their years. The Athenians began their years about the summer solstice. [This is the first year of the introduction

of Meton's cycle. The religious ceremonies of the Greeks, as of other nations, being regulated by the course of the moon, whose revolutions are not commensurable with that of the earth round the sun, it was essential to ascertain a number of solar years exactly equal to a number of lunar revolutions. Throughout the number of years so ascertained, called a *cycle*, might be noted the future phases of the moon, which done for one cycle is done for all; all future cycles (whence the name) being only the same series repeated. Assuming 8 solar years to be equal to 99 lunar revolutions, the Greeks from about the year 560, regulated the Olympic year by that cycle. The 12 months were made to consist of 30 and 29 days alternately, called respectively *πληρῆς* and *κοιλῆς*: and for equalizing the lunar year, so consisting of 354 days, with the solar year, a *full* month, called *ἑμβολιμῆτιος*, was intercalated in the 3rd, 5th, and 8th years. To remedy the defects of this system, Meton adopted a cycle of 19 years: retaining the old number and form of the months, he intercalated a month in 7 out of the 19 years. His cycle, imperfect as it is, has, owing perhaps to some superstitious reverence for the number 19, retained its place in the regulation of the lunar calendar to the present day. From this time the Olympic year, commencing hitherto in the moon sometimes next before, sometimes next after the summer solstice, commenced regularly on the 11th day of the latter moon. The prizes were distributed at the full moon.]

[2][Herodotus, briefly alluding to this attempt upon Plataea by the Thebans, (vii. 233), says four hundred. He mentions the death of Eurymachus (chap. 5 infra): whom he calls the son of Leontiades a Theban, and the leader on this occasion of four hundred Thebans.]

[3][*βοιωτάρχοντες*: see v. 38. note.]

[1][*θήμενοι τῶν ὀπλῶν*: "piling their arms": as our own soldiers pile their muskets together, when not in the ranks and yet not off duty. Hobbes' phrase for it, generally is, *sitting down* or *standing in their arms*. The summons of the herald was meant to disarm the Plataeans.]

[1][“For that they threatened to make no change with any man”.]

[2][“And strove to beat them back wheresoever the assault was made”.]

[1][The common reading was *ὁ πολλοί*, “the greater part”. But as out of about 300 that entered the city, no less than 180 were taken prisoners (see chap. 5), it could not be correct to say that the greatest part perished in the first instance. The article *ὁ* therefore been discarded by Bekker and the rest.]

[2][*στυράκιον* is not the head, but the spike at the other end of the javelin, by which it was fixed in the ground. And *μοχλός* is not the staple, but the bar which went across the gates, and into a hole in which and in the gate, went the *βάλανος* or bolt. The bolt was thrust in, so that no part of it remained out of the hole; and could then of course be drawn out only by something that could lay hold of its head, and therefore exactly fit it.]

[3][Cut through *the bar*.]

[1][Built against, or forming *part of* the wall.]

[2][“Thus *had* feared the Thebans in Plataea”: that is, before the arrival of the other Thebans next described.]

[3][“But the other Thebans, who &c., receiving by the way news about what had passed, went to try to aid”. What they heard, could only be of the attack, and not of the capture of their men: because on their arrival they first learn that they were all taken or slain. It should be, “the rain which *fell* in the night”. “So that what by marching in the rain, and what by the difficulty of passing the river”, &c.]

[1][“Having done no injury”.]

[2][See chap. 2. note.]

[1][“Just after they were overcome, &c.: *and* of what followed after, they knew nothing”.]

[2]The Lacedæmonian league, or Lacedæmonian party, not particularly that state. [“The confederate cities were ordered by the Lacedæmonians to make ready, each according to its size, other ships besides those already on the spot in Italy and Sicily, which had been got ready by those who in those parts sided with the Lacedæmonians, to the number of five hundred”. Göll. Arn. The Dorian states in Italy and Sicily would naturally be the allies of the Lacedæmonians.]

[1][“Especially.”]

[2]“Knowing that *if* these were *securely* their friends, they would be able to infest Peloponnesus round about”. Arnold. Goeller. The latter observes that the Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and Zacynthians were already the friends of the Athenians; and all that remained, was to confirm that friendship.]

[3][“As might be expected”.]

[1][“And besides there were many young men, &c.; and the rest of Greece stood at gaze, &c. Many prophecies also were told, &c.: and moreover a little before this Delos was shaken, &c.” Herodotus, speaking of the impending invasion of Darius, says: “And Delos, as say the Delians, was shaken; for the first and *last* time even until my time: a portent from the god to men of the coming evils. For what with the Persians, and with the chief states striving for the mastery, there befell Greece in the time of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes, three generations, more evils than during twenty generations before Darius”. vi. 98. These passages of Herodotus and Thucydides are remarkable. If with Pliny, Mueller, and others, we adopt the opinion of two earthquakes, it follows that neither historian had heard of the earthquake related by the other. But for such authority, the remarkable fact, that the earthquake related by each was considered portentous of this war, would incline us either to accept the explanation of Arnold: that Thucydides here uses *λίγον πρ? τούτων* to express an interval of sixty years, as in chap. 16, *infra*, he applies *ῥτι* to one of fifty: or else to hold both earthquakes for fabulous.]

[2] [“And every private man and every city”. Bekker and the rest, πόλις: some MSS. πολίτης.]

[1] [Amongst *so many* nations.]

[2] [“Thraceward”. See i. 57.]

[3] [Melos and Thera were Spartan colonies.]

[1] [“And all of them being ready at the time appointed, they assembled at the isthmus, the two–thirds from every state”. That is, two–thirds, not of those within the military age, but only of the *contingent* of each state. Mueller, Goeller. The following is Mueller’s account of the *contingent*. “When an expedition was contemplated, the Spartans sent round (περιήγγελλον) to the confederate states, to desire them to have ready men and stores. The highest contribution of each state having been already fixed once for all, on each particular occasion it was only to be determined what part thereof should be required. In like manner the supplies of money were determined: so that the army with all its equipments, could be collected by a simple summons.” Dor. i. 9. 2. Arnold observes that the time for which the allies were required to serve on a foreign expedition, and to maintain themselves at their own expense, appears to have been at this time forty days.]

[2] [*Most* puissant]

[1] [Begins *suddenly*. Goeller.]

[2] [“Against being attacked”.]

[1] [“And receive commands with readiness”.]

[1] [“Then at length (οὔτω δ?) he dislodged”, &c.]

[2] [“Suspecting, as Archidamus happened to be his guest, that he might, as often happens, either of private courtesy”, &c. Goeller.]

[1] [Consisted *much*.]

[2] [That is, besides the rent of the public lands, mines, customs, judicial fines, and taxes paid by the metœci. Goeller. For the value of the talent, see i. 96, note.]

[3] [τῆς προπύλαια. In the Acropolis were the Parthenon, the *Propylæa*, the temple of Minerva Polias adjoining the fane of Erectheus, and Phidias’ statue of Minerva. The ascent of the hill, which was formerly fortified, was adorned by Pericles with a splendid flight of steps and with the Propylæa: a work begun A. C. 437: and finished in five years, at a cost of 2012 talents. On one side of the Propylæa was the temple of Victory, called ἡπτερος, *wingless*; on the other, the picture gallery. The Parthenon fronted the east. From the eastern portico there was a way into the Opisthodomus, where was the public treasury and wherein were preserved the most precious and sacred things. The Parthenon was built by Callicrates, Ictinus, and Carpion, in the ten

years from A.C. 448 to 438. In this last year Phidias erected in it his gigantic statue of Minerva; from which was to be seen the statue of Pallas Promachos, also of vast size, which he is said to have cast from the Persian spoils, and which stood between the Propylæa and the temple of Minerva Polias. Od. Mueller.]

[1][?κ τ?ν ?λλων ?ερ?ν. From *the* other temples: besides that particular temple of Minerva in the Acropolis, the Parthenon, which was the treasury. Arnold. The Persian spoils: that is, amongst others, the silver-footed chair, in which Xerxes beheld the battle of Salamis, and the golden sabre of Mardonius. Boeckh. *Without the city*, is Hobbes' addition.]

[2][Of all "tribute and revenue". Goeller.]

[3][“For at the first so many kept watch against the invasion of the enemy, young and old, and of the metæci as many as were heavy-armed soldiers.” For the *metæci*, see ch. 31.]

[4][The reasons stated by Arnold in his note on this passage, establish pretty clearly the existence of three walls from the city to Piræus; the outer or northern wall, the Phalerian, and τ? δι? μέσου τ?τχος, the wall between the other two. The same conclusion is adopted by Goeller.]

[1][“Was attended with great difficulty”: Goeller: that is, owing to the great number that had to remove.]

[2]πρυτανε?α. Guild halls, places where those that administered the state did meet: where also some, for honour's cause and service, were allowed diet, and wherein Vesta was worshipped, and a light continually burned; so that some thence derive the name, making πρυτανε?ον quasi πυρος ταμε?ον. [The Prytaneium (the mark of an independent society) has been termed by Pollux (ix. 40) ?στία τ?ς πόλεως, *the hearth* of the community; by Livy (xli. 20) “penetræ urbis”. “Herein,” says Pollux, “were entertained those who came on any public embassy, those who were honoured for service done to the state, and those who by virtue of their office were ?είσιτοι.” Of these last the principal were the hierophantes or teachers of the sacred rites, the κήρυξ or cryer of the sacrifices, the cryer of the council, certain of the secretaries, &c. This at Athens took place at what was called the θόλος: which is not to be confounded with the ancient Prytaneium at the foot of the Acropolis. According to Strabo, the inhabitants of Attica were assembled by Cecrops into twelve cities, the names of which he gives.]

[1][“They did not meet to consult under the king.”]

[2][“He made them all to *belong* to the city that now is: and obliged them, administering the affairs each of their own city as before, to use this as their metropolis: which, now that they all *reckoned as members of it*, grew great”. Goll. Arn. This may perhaps be called the birth of the Athenian democracy.]

[1][Between these two temples, the Pythaistæ took their station to watch nine nights, during three months in the spring, for the favourable flashing of the lightning over

mount Parnes, announcing that the sacred embassy might venture to proceed in its destined route to Pytho. Müll.]

[2][Quod ἔν Λίμναις dicitur, suburbium erat ubi solium paulatim inclinatur Ilissum versus. Ibi duo templa Bacchi erant. Göll. There were *four* Dionysia or feasts of Bacchus: the Anthesterian, the Lenæan, the rural, and the great or city Dionysia. Hermann, Gr. Antiq. § 161.]

[3][*Are* celebrated.]

[4][The Pisistridæ. Except this, there was no good spring–water in the city: that of all the other springs being too salt to drink.]

[5][Till the *present* war.]

[1][ἤρτυ: they had *only just* arranged, &c.]

[2]Pelasgicum, a place by the citadel, where the Pelasgians once fortified themselves against the Athenians, and for that cause there was laid a curse upon the habitation of it. Paus. in Atticis. [Sixty years after the fall of Troy, and about the time of the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus, the Bœotians, a race from Arne in Thessaly, drove the Pelasgians out of Bœotia into Attica. See Hermann, Gr. Antiq. § 15. 21, § 102. 5, 6. There they built the wall about the Acropolis of Athens mentioned by Herodotus, vi. 137. This wall, and the ground under the Acropolis to the north–west, went by the name of the Pelasgicum. The *empty places* of the city lay to the north.]

[3][ἄργυρον: *waste*. ἔξῃ κῆθη: was “filled *out*” with inhabitants. Göll.]

[1][“They divided the long walls amongst themselves”.]

[2][And “after that the army was assembled”, his stay &c.]

[1][Indicatur mensis Julii: Göll. But Arnold seems to show clearly, that this period cannot be much later than the beginning of June.]

[2][Two springs of salt water, forming two lakes near the southeastern coast, at the extremity of the Thriasian plain. Muell. They were anciently supposed to derive their water from the Euripus, by an underground communication: but salt springs occur elsewhere in Attica; and there was one in the Acropolis, said to have been produced by Neptune when contending with Minerva for the honour of naming the city. Arnold.]

[3][Vulgo, κεκροπίας. Bekker and the rest, κρωπειάς. As little seems to be known of one as of the other. If Cecropia, the former name of Athens, became, as Mueller supposes, the name of the plain between Hymettus and Corydalus; still Archidamus did not march through that district.]

[1]Burroughs. [δῆμος has different meanings. Homer uses it in the sense of *pagus*, *land* or *district*. Thus Il. iii. 201, ἔν δῆμῳ ἠθάκης: Od. iii. 215, σέ γε λαοῦ ἠχθαίρουσ’

ἄν? δῆμον. Cicero renders it by oppidum: “quod si δήμους oppida esse volumus, tam est oppidum Sunium quam Piræeus”: ad Att. vii. 3. Thucydides uses it sometimes in the sense of *plebs*, as opposed to the δυνατο? or ἄλιγοι: as in chap. 65 and 74. Here it seems to be used in the sense of *pagus*: “Acharnæ, the most extensive *district* (ager) of Attica, of those called pagi”.]

[2][“At Eleusis and the Thriasian plain”.]

[3][He thought good to try, if &c. “*For* whilst the place seemed &c., he thought also &c”.]

[1][So long as the enemy lay &c. the Athenians “also had some hope” &c. Arnold, Goeller. *They stirred not*, is an addition.]

[2][And when their fields were wasted in their sight: which &c.: it was, *as it was likely*, taken for a horrible matter.]

[1][Conceiving “the greater part of the Athenians to be with them”, were they &c.]

[2][τέλος: a body of cavalry, the number of which is unknown.]

[3][The next, *not* the same day.]

[1][“Upon *the* old league”: see i. 102, 107. Of the Parasians nothing is known; and the name is supposed by Goeller and Arnold to be merely a various reading of the following name, Πυράσιοι.]

[2][δήμων: *districts*. Between the hills Parnes and Brelissus lay Deceleia, which, according to Herodotus (ix. 73), in return for certain good offices to the Tyndaridæ at the time of the rape of Helen, ever after enjoyed at Sparta the privileges of precedence and immunity from taxes; and during this entire war, whilst wasting the rest of Attica, the Lacedæmonians always spared Deceleia. The worship of Hercules at Marathon in the Tetrapolis, and other places to the north of Athens, indicates in the opinion of Mueller, a settlement of the Dorians in the northern parts of Attica. Dor. i. 3.]

[3][Πειραιῖκ?ν: Bekker, Arnold. Γραϊκῆν: Poppo, Goeller. Arnold conceives that Πειραιῖκ? is probably of the same origin as the Πειραιεύς of Athens, which is connected with ἡ πέραν γ?, *the over-land*, an epithet actually given to the district of Oropus in iii. 91: that in this case the expression has relation to the coast of Eubœa, as to that of Salamis or Peloponnesus in the other: and that the later form of the expression was πέρ?ια, the name of Asia Minor with respect to Rhodes, and of the opposite side of Jordan with respect to Judæa. Poppo objects that πέρα does not admit of the diphthong, and that moreover the adjective derived from πέρα would be, not περαιῖκος, but περα?ος. Od. Mueller thinks there was a city called Γρα?α, lying between Oropus and Tanagra. Oropus itself originally belonged to Bœotia.]

[1][“To move or *put the question*.” This decree was repealed upon the revolt of Chios, after the disaster in Sicily. See viii. 15.]

[1][In distinction to Methone in Macedonia.]

[2][“There being *no* men in it”; that is, *no military*: nullo præsidio ibi collocato ex illis militibus, qui domo remanebant ad tuendam patriam, bis tertiis militantibus foras in Attica. Goeller.]

[3][Dispersed in the fields *and intent upon the wall*.]

[4][?κ τ?ς κοίλης ?λιδος: “from the *hollow* Elis and *periœcis* of the Eleians, that came &c.” The lowest slope of Peloponnesus is on the western side: and here we find the most extensive plain in the peninsula, which, from being surrounded by the chains from mounts Scollis and Pholoë, was called the *hollow* Elis. The *periœcis* was the name of all the territory which the Eleians had conquered in addition to their original land, the κοίλη ?λις. Muell. Dor. The Ætolians, who in the end became masters of Elis, appear to have been relations of the Eleians, and received by them at the time of the Dorian invasion as such. They contrived to divide the land without a war. Ibid.]

[1][“But meanwhile.”]

[2][?τρο?σι: “march by land and *take* Pheia. And after that, the galleys &c.” This march and taking of Pheia, shew that the Athenians did not put in first at the *town* of Pheia. For it takes place whilst the Athenians are sailing round the headland to the harbour: after doubling which, they take the others aboard at the town. Goeller takes Pheia to be the name both of the headland, of which Ichthys was the ?κρα or highest point, and also of the town.]

[3][See their fate, iv. 57.]

[1][These exiles were collected and restored by Lysander after the battle of Ægospotamos. Arnold.]

[2]That is, the man at whose house and by whom any public person was to be entertained, that came from Athens to Abdera. [See iii. 70, note.]

[3][“First made the Odrysæ a great state, extending it over a larger part of the rest of Thrace. *For* much of Thrace is *still* independent.” Goeller.]

[1][“Nor of the same Thrace”. The Thracians from Pieria, the worshippers of Bacchus and the Muses, who settled in Phocis: a different race from those of the north.]

[2][“Was the first king of the Odrysæ of any power”.]

[3][Poppo, Goeller, Arnold, ξυνεξελε?ν: “that they might make themselves masters of the country Thrace-ward and of Perdiccas at the same time.” Vulgo et Bekker, ξυνελε?ν.]

[4][*For* him. See i. 61.]

[1][These plural names illustrate the proposition, that the earlier πόλεις, were in their origin societies of men living in the same district, from the several parts of which they afterwards came together, and lived within the same walls. Arnold.]

[2][μέτοικοι. The *metæcus* appears to have been a citizen of one state dwelling, and having acquired a domicile, in another state. They lay under many of the disabilities of foreigners: they could acquire no property in land: they were represented in all public and private affairs by their *patron*, that is, by a citizen of their own choice who stood as a surety between them and the state. By the yearly payment of 12 drachmæ for his whole family, the metæcus might exercise all trades and professions, like a citizen. For non-payment of this tax, or the undue assumption of rights of citizenship, they forfeited the protection of the law, and were liable to be sold as slaves; but instead of that, were usually made to serve certain degrading offices, such as water-carriers and the like, by way of reminding them of their subordinate rank to real citizens. They were liable to all extraordinary taxes and duties, and to the regular military service of citizens. Their number in Athens appears to have exceeded that in any other state: in 309 A.C., the number of their full-grown men reached 10,000. In consideration of services to the state, they were sometimes released from all the restraints affecting the person of the ordinary metæcus, and in all private relations placed on a footing with the citizen; but without acquiring any political rights. These were called ἑσπετέλες. Hermann. Grec. Antiq. § 115, 116. These latter, and the richest amongst the ordinary metæci, served as heavy-armed soldiers: the rest for the most part as mariners. Boeckh.]

[1][The word *before*, which is not in the Greek, makes the statement true. Later in the war, as at Delium (iv. 93–4), and before Syracuse the Athenians had larger armies.]

[2][“And afterwards during the war there were every year other invasions also.” The invasions seem to have been regularly two in each year. See iv. 66. By a public decree, the generals took an oath, twice every year to invade Megaris.]

[1][“And lost some of their men by an unexpected assault of the Cranii: and they were forcibly driven out to sea, and went home.”]

[2][προτίθενται: “they *expose to view* the ashes of the dead three days (πρότριτα) before the burial.” Göll. According to the Greek mode of computation, if the burial took place on the third day of the month, πρότριτα would be on the first. Ordinarily, the burial took place, by law, before sunrise of the day after the death. Arnold. The ashes were put into an earthen vessel, κέραμιον: whence κέραμεικος, the name of the place where they were deposited.]

[1][A tree sacred to death.]

[2][In private funerals this was not allowed; nor that any even of the relations should be present, beyond first cousins. Goeller.]

[3][Into *the* public burial-ground. Ceramicus extra urbem. The προαἶνον, here translated *suburbs*, was as Arnold says, rather an open space like the parks in London.

It was used for reviews and public games. The Campus Martius at Rome was exactly what the Greeks called προαγεον.]

[4][This ceremony appears to have been performed over those slain at the taking of Sphacteria, at Delium, at Amphipolis with Cleon, in Sicily, at Arginusæ, and in the civil war in the year 403. It is believed that about the year 400 it became annual. Did Thucydides forget Plataea, in calling Marathon the only exception? See Herod. ix. 85.]

[1][Their honour *manifested*.]

[2][“It is difficult to preserve the just medium in speaking, in a case in which the auditors can scarcely be impressed with any opinion, which shall not in some degree depart from the truth.” Goeller.]

[3][And what “he knows it to be”.]

[1][Just and “becoming too.”]

[2][This no orator, addressing the Athenian people, ever forgot.]

[3][“But by what pursuits we arrived at that dominion, and by what policy and what means &c.”]

[1][“Yet every man, according as he is esteemed and as he excels in aught, is preferred to public charge, not so much from his belonging to a class, as from his virtue.”]

[2][Aristotle speaks of this toleration as being general at Athens: ἡναρχία δούλων καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων· καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡπὼς τις βούλεται παρορῆν. Pol. vi. 4.]

[1][We “differ from.”]

[2][See i. 144, note. Mueller observes, that the xenelasia was practised only against tribes of different usages and manner of life from themselves: chiefly, for instance, against the Athenians. At their Gymnopædeia, and other festivals, Sparta was full of foreigners. Poets and philosophers were freely admitted: other classes excluded. The prohibition to their own citizens to live abroad, originated in the same feeling common to the Doric race: the desire to maintain pure and unchanged the Doric customs. Dor. iii. 1.]

[3][The peculiar severity of the Spartan education began at the age of twelve years. Thenceforward the boy supported the intense degrees of heat and cold peculiar to the valley of Sparta in the same clothing, one thick woollen garment, throughout the year. At times he was sent abroad to support himself by what he could steal, and severely beaten when detected. At eighteen, he went through the κρυπτεία, the hardships of which are said by Plato to be scarcely credible: traversing the country barefoot, day and night in summer and winter: the purpose, until it was perverted to other objects (iv. 80, n.), being to inspect the fortresses, roads, &c. At twenty, he served in the ranks, and performed duties similar to those of the Athenian περίπολος (iv. 67, n.)

The scourging of boys at the altar of Diana Orthia, presided over by the priestess, seems to have been a substitution for the human sacrifices, expiatory of blood once accidentally shed at her altar. This education (?γωγ?), as it was an essential, so was it also the exclusive privilege of the Spartans, and the Mothaces (slaves brought up in the family) selected to share in it. The Spartan that did not go through it, ceased to be ?μοιος. Writing was never generally taught: and it is not certain that they even learnt to read. Contracts were evidenced by cutting in pieces a staff, and preserving the pieces. It may be questioned whether this system can justly claim the merit of their martial courage. We have Aristotle's testimony (Pol. viii. 4), that it made them θηριώδεις, *brutal*: and that their military superiority over other states, was merely that of disciplined over raw soldiers: and that their superiority in the field, did not survive the loss of that in the gymnasium.]

[1][When we by *ourselves alone* invade &c.; yet we *easily* get the victory.]

[2][“Because at the same time that our hands are full of naval matters, we are sending our own citizens abroad upon divers land-services”.]

[3][We have this odds by it: “not to faint &c., and to appear &c., and to procure” &c.]

[1][?ιλοκαλο?μεν: “we study elegance”: of which *bravery* is rather the opposite.]

[2]In Athens no man so poor but was a statesman. So St. Luke, Acts xvii. 21: “all the Athenians spend their time in nothing but hearing and telling of news”: the true character of politicians without employment.

[3][“And if we do not contrive, we at any rate judge for ourselves correctly of measures”. α?το?, *ourselves*, as distinguished from the magistrates. Goeller, Arnold.]

[4][“We differ from” others.]

[1][“*So as*, by kindness to the person on whom he conferred it, to preserve the favour owed”. Goeller.]

[2][“And we alone do good to others without fear (of its turning out to our damage), not upon computation of profit, so much as through the confidence inspired by liberty”. Poppo, Arnold.]

[3][“And with the utmost grace and dexterity”. Goeller.]

[4][τρόπων: these “manners”.]

[1][καταστρο?ή: “And the *end* of these men here, manifests in my opinion a man's virtue, both when it is the first to indicate, and when the last to confirm (his worth)”: that is, both when he is as yet unknown whether good or bad, and when it confirms the good opinion previously held of him. Goeller.]

[2] [“For it is just towards those in other respects not good, to think more of their valour, &c., (than of their want of goodness on other occasions)” . Goeller.]

[1] [“But considering revenge upon their enemies more to be coveted than those objects (hope or longer enjoyment of wealth); and esteeming this (the battle) the most honourable of dangers; they sought through it to take vengeance on the one and attain the other: committing to hope the uncertainty of the event, but for action concerning what was already before their eyes, deeming fit to rely on themselves.”]

[1] [“But rather daily contemplating *in its reality* the power of the city.”]

[2] [“For having *in common* given their bodies to their country, they receive *individually* in return praise that dieth not, and a most distinguished tomb: not that in which they now lie, but that rather in which” &c. The word ἰδίῳ, *individually*, refers to the inscribing upon the monument the name and tribe of each individual buried on these occasions. Arn. “Their (*i. e.* famous men’s) virtues *are* testified” &c.]

[3] [But “also in foreign lands”.]

[1] [“As the misery that accompanies cowardice” . Göll. Arn.]

[2] [“But happy are they that obtain, as these men have, the most honourable death; and as you, the most becoming subject of grief.” Goeller, Arnold.]

[3] [That are *advanced in years*.]

[1] [To put “the greater part of your life, which has been prosperous”, to the account &c.]

[2] [“But that which is no longer in their way (the dead), men honour with a good will void of jealousy”.]

[3] [“Not to be inferior to the ordinary nature of woman”. That is, they do enough if they act up to the standard of their sex, without striving to surpass it. Arnold.]

[4] The children of such as were the first slain in any war, were kept at the charge of the city till they came to man’s estate. [That is, till the age of sixteen, μέχρι βῆτος. At this age, that of puberty, the Athenian youth entered the Gymnasium, where they passed two years in learning the use of their arms: continuing at the same time their other studies of grammar, music, &c. This was called πρὸς διατεταμένους. On completing their eighteenth year, on proof of their title, called δοκιμασθῆναι, they were received amongst the Ephebi; and in the grove Agraulus took the citizen’s oath, “not to pollute the sacred instruments, not to desert their ranks, to fight for their country in all things, both sacred and profane, and to deliver it unimpaired to their posterity”. Thereupon they received their arms, and were inscribed in the book, πίναξ ληξιαρχικῆς, of their δῆμος. They thereby became *sui juris*, might marry, sue and be sued, &c. The two following years they served as περίπολοι, (see iv. 67): at the end of which time they were admitted to the public assemblies, and to the full exercise of all

political rights: and became liable to foreign military service. Hermann, Gr. Antiq. § 123.]

[5][“Thus *in word* have I &c.: and *in deed* have these men been honoured, *partly* in this ceremony, and *partly* in that their children” &c.]

[1][To these and *their posterity*, a garland in matches *such as these*.]

[2][?γκατασκ?ψαι, proprie de fulmine usurpatur; transfertur autem ad mala quævis graviora cum impetu irrumpentia. Gottleber.]

[1][“For the physicians brought no aid, when at first through ignorance they attempted to cure it.” Goeller. At *no* time were they found to be of any use: see ch. 51. Krauss, in his disquisition on this disease, has pronounced it to bear an affinity to the contagious putrid typhus: shown mainly by the dejection and loss of the mental powers, the catarrhus–plegmonous symptoms, the bilious vomit, the termination of the disease on the days of crisis, the external and internal gangrene. He mentions three other diseases like this, also originating in Æthiopia or Egypt; the first of which (A.D. 165–168) described by Galen, and the second (252–267) by Eusebius and Cyprian, were much the same in species as this disease.]

[2][?ρέατα. Reservoirs or tanks for catching the rain–water. Arnold.]

[1][?ς το?το πάντα ?πεκρίθη: “his disease, whatever it might be, at its *crisis* turned to this.” Goeller.]

[2][*Heat* in the head.]

[3][?ποκαθάρσεις: properly, evacuations *downwards*. Here meaning evacuations generally, but principally by vomit. Poppo, Krauss.]

[4][κεν?: “*empty* hiccough”: that is, not the *full*. It was an opinion of the ancient physicians, (Hippocrates amongst the rest), that spasms and hiccough, (λύγξ), were the effect of either repletion or emptiness. The words, therefore, here signify the attempt of the stomach to throw more off it, when all has been already thrown off. Krauss.]

[1][?λκεσιν: ulcers.]

[2][But rather most willingly to have cast themselves into the cold water: “and many of them that were not looked to, did so into the tanks, possessed with an insatiate thirst. And to drink much or little was the same thing. And restlessness and sleeplessness pervaded the entire disease.” The outward coldness and inward heat and thirst here described, are symptoms set down by Hippocrates as θανάσιμον, *mortal*. Goeller.]

[3][That is, of mortification consequent thereon. Krauss.]

[4][?κράτου is supposed by Goeller and Arnold, to be used in its technical sense; in which, as explained by Hippocrates and Galen, it seems to signify the final purgings, consisting of either yellow or black bile, *unmixed* with any watery mixture. “Or if they escaped that, then the inflammation taking hold of the mucous membrane of the intestines, and violent ulceration arising there, and at the same time a *pure bilious* diarrhœa accompanying it, they afterwards died many of them *of it* (the diarrhœa) through weakness.” Krauss.]

[1][“Yet the disease (that is, the consequent gangrene) seizing the extremities, *left there its mark*. For it struck” &c. ?πισήμαινε, a word applied to the mark or signature of the auditors of the public accounts at Athens, signifying that the account was duly passed. Arnold.]

[2][In the plague at Rome, A. C. 174, Livy says: “Cadavera, intacta a canibus ac vulturibus, tabes absumebat: satisque constabat, nec illo nec priore anno in tanta strage boum hominumque vulturium usquam visum. xli. 21.]

[3][“This disease then, to pass over many varieties of morbid affection, (each case having in it something different from another), was in its *outward form* such as I have shown.” Thucydides proposed to say nothing of the internal nature of the disease. Krauss.]

[1][“But whatever it might be, it ended in this.”]

[2][“Nor was there any one remedy, which it was of use to apply.”]

[3][“Those assuming something of virtue.”]

[4][*Still more* compassion: more, that is, than those venturing their lives as just mentioned.]

[1][?ρ? ?τους: at *the* time, that is, the *best* time of the year: the *summer*. ?ν καλύβαις, in *cellars*. The ordinary population of Athens and the Piræus did not exceed 180,000: and the number of houses was somewhat above 10,000. And here was at this time crowded the entire population of Attica, computed by Boeckh at 500,000.]

[2][“And they died one upon another, and so lay: and they lay halfdead rolling in the streets and about every conduit, &c. And the sacred grounds, where &c.”]

[3][“And every one buried as he best might. And many, for want &c. after so many deaths amongst their own friends, betook themselves to shameless burials.” That is, they buried or burned them in the sepulchres or funeral piles of other *gentes* than their own. Poppo, Goeller.]

[1][“Has become prevalent”.]

[2][*Suddenly* dying.]

[3][“And doing all for their pleasure.”]

[4] [“And whatsoever was pleasant *for the present moment*, and every way conducive to that, that was” &c. Vulgo ?δει. Bekker, ?δη.]

[1] λοιμός, plague. λιμός, famine.

[2] [The answer.]

[3] Apollo, to whom the heathen attributed the immission of all epidemic or ordinary diseases. [Apollo was the god of the Doric race, and of the Athenians he was ?πόλλων πατρ?ος (see chap. 71). By them he was looked upon as the *avertter of evil*, ?λεξίκακος, and the *avenger of guilt*: sickness, pestilence, and sudden death, unexpected and the cause unknown, were his ordinary instruments of punishment, as in Il. i. and Soph. Œd. Tyr , or for averting evil as in Od. iii. 280. His aim was unerring, and the blow unforeseen: hence his name, “the fardarting”. But he was not otherwise considered to be the author of disease: and to many heathen nations he was wholly unknown.]

[1] By the sea-coast. [This was the hilly country extending from the city to the west, about the promontory of Sunium: barren, and suited only to the purposes of commerce. Muell.]

[2] [?τι δε. “But whilst” &c. He would not let the Athenians go out to fight by land; but nevertheless made incursions by sea.]

[3] [The Persians had before this transported horses by sea, though the Greeks had not. See Herod. vi. 48.]

[1] [There was also Epidaurus in Dalmatia.]

[2] [“Took and *sacked*” &c. The town appears to have existed yet in viii. 18.]

[3] [θάπτοντας: “burning” their dead. Hoc verbum et sepulturam omnino, et combustionem significat. Vide Herodotum, v. 8. Hæc igitur verba recte intelligere videntur, qui dicunt Atheniensium sepulturas ex igne et fumo rogorum a Peloponnesiis cognitatas esse. Goeller.]

[4] [“And this invasion was the longest stay they *ever* made”. “About forty days.”]

[1] [“As having instigated them to the war”, and by his means &c.]

[1] [Besides the ordinary assemblies, which were four during each prytaneia, extraordinary assemblies might be called by the Prytaneis, or by the Strategi. The mode of summons was by the cryer, κ?ρυξ: the place of assembly, which at first was the Pnyx, on the side of a hill opposite to the Areiopagus, was in latter times the Theatre. Every citizen that attended the assembly, whether ordinary or extraordinary, received an obolus: which was afterwards, as some say by Cleon, increased to three.]

[2] [But *each singly* cannot &c.]

[1][Will not *in like manner* (as if he were well affected) give &c.]

[2][*ταπειν*?: are *too* object to maintain. See i. 50, note.]

[1][“Often enough assuredly.”]

[2][Now, “as having somewhat too much the appearance of boasting”, but that &c.]

[1][“And there is none, neither *the* king nor any nation besides &c. can impeach your navigation with your present navy.”]

[2][Show not yourselves inferior &c., “but that you hold it” more dishonour &c.]

[3][“And courage, though fortune be only equal, if seconded by contempt of the enemy, is fortified by prudence: which trusts not to hope, of use only where other help is wanting, but to counsel founded upon the means actually at hand, the foresight of which is more to be relied on.” Goeller.]

[1][*From* her dominion.]

[2][If any in present fear “would virtuously forsooth persuade us to this too, without trouble to give up our dominion”. Goeller.]

[1][“And know that this city has gotten a very great name amongst all men *by* not yielding to adversity; and that by having expended very many lives and vast labours in war, it has possessed the greatest power hitherto”: the memory whereof &c.]

[2][“Having regard then in your decision” both to what is honourable &c.]

[1][But “applied themselves more” to the war.]

[2][That is, they made him supreme over the other nine *στρατηγο*?. Arnold. Cleon is said to have been the author of the fine.]

[3][“During *the* peace”: viz., the thirty years’ treaty. Göll. Arn.]

[1]He died of the plague. Plut. [The justice of the character here given of him cannot be disputed. Whether in feeding the rapacity of the people with taxes extorted from the allies, he was not preparing the certain downfall of the state, by corrupting the one and alienating the other, is another question.]

[2][Thucydides alludes to such measures, as sending the squadron to Crete to make an attempt on Cydonia (ii. 85.), which should have sailed without loss of time to reinforce Phormion: wasting their force in petty expeditions in Sicily before the great invasion, whereby no object was gained, and the Dorian states were wholly alienated from Athens: the outrage upon Melos (v. 84), which excited the indignation of all Greece. Arnold. To these might be added the affair of the Mercuries (vi. 27, 53); to their folly wherein, by making Alcibiades their enemy, may perhaps in a measure be attributed the failure of the Sicilian expedition.]

[1] [“Betook themselves to giving up to the people according to their humours even the public affairs.”]

[2] [Which was not so much &c., “as that they who sent out the expedition, by not afterwards in due time voting reinforcements for those who went, but caballing amongst themselves for power with the people,” abated the vigour of the army; and then &c.]

[3] [These “three years” occasion some disputing. Those that assume, that by τρία ἔτη is meant the time next after the defeat in Sicily, observe that from that time to the surrender of Athens to Lysander, was *ten* years. As however from Cyrus assuming the government of Asia minor (A.C. 407), to the surrender of Athens (404), was just three years; Arnold’s conclusion seems the more natural, that the period here meant is that during which Athens had to contend with the whole power of Greece, supported more effectually than before by the money of Persia.]

[1] [“Such superabundant means had Pericles at that time, whereby he could, as he foresaw, with the utmost ease have gotten the better of the Peloponnesians alone in this war.” Goeller, Arnold. τῶν πόλιν, is omitted by the recent editors.]

[2] [“In his private capacity”.]

[1] [“Where was the Athenian army, besieging it”. The remaining words have been omitted by Bekker and the rest.]

[2] [The city, “in a measure his own”. Goeller.]

[3] A vile act of Sadocus, to gratify the Athenians because they had made him free of their city.

[4] [“Even before this present matter.” This event of the death of Nicolaus and Aneristus, is related by Herodotus, vii. 137. The fact mentioned by him, of Aneristus running down at sea the fishermen of Tiryns, may perhaps be one of the acts of the Lacedæmonians alluded to below.]

[1] ἡλικαδες, ships of the round form of building: for the use of merchants, not for the use of war, as were galleys and other vessels of the long form of building. [ἡλικας, from ἡλκω *to draw*, and thence *to weigh*, means a ship of burthen. It has nothing to do with the form. See ch. 97, note.]

[2] [Ambracia is one of the many colonies founded by Corinth along the coast of the Ionian sea: comprising, besides this town, Molycreium, Chalcis in Ætolia, Solium in Acarnania, Anactorium, Leucas, Apollonia, and Corcyra. Her earliest colony of all, was Syracuse in Sicily. Mueller observes, that of the two harbours of Corinth, Lechæum in the Crisæan, and Cenchreæ in the Saronic gulf, all its colonies went out from its western port: and it was not till after the loss of her maritime dominion in these seas, which had taken place before the Persian war, and originated perhaps in the early separation of Corcyra, that she founded Potidæa on the opposite side of Greece. The constitution of Ambracia was at this time democratical: the people

having seized on the sovereign power in an insurrection against Periander, occasioned by an insulting question addressed by him to his minion. See Aristot. Pol. v. 10. They were the most warlike people of that country: see iii. 68.]

[1][“*But the rest are still*” &c.]

[2][“And both together calling in the Athenians, who sent them Phormio as their general, and thirty galleys, on his arrival they take Argos by assault and make slaves of the Ambraciotes: and the Amphilocheians and Acarnanians settled Argos in common.” All this was their doing, not Phormio’s.]

[1][Who “departing from Naupactus” guarded, &c. At this town, the name of which implies *shipbuilding*, the Heracleidæ are said to have built the rafts, on which they sailed to Antirrhium, and thence passed over the straits to Rhium. Muell. Dor. i. 3.]

[2][To binder the Peloponnesian pirates, “departing thence” (from Caria and Lycia), from molesting &c.]

[1][“With one *himation*”: a garment sometimes called *χλαῖνα*, and proper to the men: but also worn by the Doric women. See i. 6, note.]

[1][“Independent”: that is, of Thebes in particular, which always claimed supremacy over Plataea. See iii. 61.]

[2][The Plataeans here attest, the gods called to witness the oath when made: their own local gods, the inhabitants and protectors of Plataeis: and the θεοὶ πατῆροι of the Lacedæmonians. In general, θεοὶ πατῆροι are gods progenitors of some race or family. Thus the Athenians called themselves γενῆται Ἀπολλωνος πατῆρου, “the *gens* of their ancestor Apollo”: because Ion, the fabulous ancestor of the Ionians, was the son of Apollo. Venus, addressed by Lucretius and Ovid as “Æneadum genitrix”, was a Dea patria of the Romans, and “Romanæ dominationis auctor”. And Lucian (Scytha, 4.) makes Anacharsis the Scythian, swear “by Acinaces and Zamolxis, our ancestral gods”: which is as much as to say, that the Scythians were the progeny of their scimitar, and a slave made by them into a god. But Apollo, though the national and peculiar god of the Dorians, was no θεὸς πατῆρος to them: because Ægimius, the founder of their race, was not descended from Apollo. But Hercules, and therefore Jupiter, would be ancestral gods of the Heracleidæ.]

[1][“Neither side in the way of war. And this will satisfy us”.]

[2][Lest the Athenians coming “should not permit them (to remain neutral): or that the Thebans, *as* comprehended” &c. Göll.]

[1][No “alteration”. The Plataeans, pressed by the Thebans, offered themselves (A.C.520) to Cleomenes, king of Sparta: who told them, the Lacedæmonians were too far off to aid them in case of invasion, and bade them go to the Athenians; intending to embroil the latter with the Thebans. The Plataeans thereupon sat down as suppliants at the altar of the twelve gods, whereat the Athenians were sacrificing, and gave themselves to the Athenians. Herod. vi. 108. This is the league here appealed to.]

[1][“Whosoever *possess* the land Plataeis.” Plura loca scriptorum veterum, in quibus urbes vel regiones ᾗχειν dicuntur Dii, in quorum tutela eæ sunt, lege apud Spanheim. hymn. ad Pallad. Duk.]

[2][“Against the *city*.”]

[3][“They built up the mound on both sides, by placing against them a wooden frame–work to serve for walls, and keep the earth from falling much away”. ᾗορμηδᾗν, a frame like mat–work, the timbers crossing each other at right angles. See iv. 48. The palisade was made with δένδρᾗεσιν, *fruit–trees*; which grow in in the plain. The frame was made with *timber trees*, ξύλα; which there grow only on the tops of the hills. Arnold.]

[1][This is the Scholiast’s sense of ξενάγο?. But all seem agreed that it means here, “Lacedæmonian commanders of the contingents of the several allied states.” See Muell. Dor. iii. 12, Hermann, Antiq. § 34. In fact, what mercenaries had the Lacedæmonians, or any of their allies, at this time? ξυνεᾗεστᾗτες means “joined in that command with the officers of each state”: Goeller.]

[2][“The mound *was raised*”.]

[3][Hides, *both raw and dressed*.]

[4][That the mound was not built close to the wall, appears from ch. 77; where the interval between the two is said to be filled with faggots. But its sides must have been somewhat inclined, in order to resist the pressure outwards. So that the foot of the mound extended to the wall.]

[1][When they found it out, “ramming clay into cases of wattled reeds, they cast them into the hole, that it might not moulder and be carried away like the earth.”]

[2][“From the *low* (or, city) wall.]

[3][“And shook down a considerable part of it.” Goeller]

[1][“Seeing their engines availed not, and that a wall was raised against their mound, and thinking it impossible to take the city under present difficulties, began preparing to enclose it with a wall.” Valla.]

[2][“They cast them from the mound first into the space between it and the wall; which by so many hands being quickly filled, they heaped them up in the rest of the city also, as far as ever they could reach from the height of the mound.”]

[1][“For within, they could not get near a grat part of the city”: or, “there was a large part of the city, within which they could not approach. And had the wind &c. *But*, as it is reported, there fell at this time much rain” &c.]

[2][These words, τ? δε? λοιπ?ν ??έντεξ, “and dismissing the rest,” are considered doubtful, and included in brackets, by Bekker and the rest. They would hardly expose a part of their forces with the unfinished wall to an attack of the Athenians. Poppo.]

[3][σιτοποιο?: “to make their bread.” This office appears to have been assigned to the women amongst the ancient Romans as well as the Greeks. Duker. See Od. xx. 110.]

[1][One reading is προπεμψάντων. Bekker and the rest, προσπεμψάντων.]

[2][“Come to an engagement”.]

[3][Crusis, part of Mygdonia, according to Stephanus Byzantinus: and described by Herodotus, vii. 123, under the name of Crossæa, as part of the coast between the peninsular of Pallene and the head of the gulf of Therma. Arnold.]

[4][The men of arms of the Chalcideans were overcome by the Athenians: *but* the horsemen of the Chalcideans overcame the horsemen of the Athenians. “Now the Chalcideans had some few targettiers from Crusis; and *just as the battle was over* came to their help others from Olynthus”.]

[1][“And that the Chalcideans had *not the worst* before”.]

[2][σκευο?όροις: the *baggage*: usually rendered by Hobbes, “the carriages”.]

[1][The regular term of this command at Sparta, at least a few years later, was one year. See viii. 20, 25. It was an office of great power and dignity, and is spoken of by Aristotle as a sort of second royalty. Pol. ii. 7. Arnold.]

[2][“But were led by Photyus and Nicanor, of the race which exclusively had the government, with the command for a year”. The ?ρχικ?ν γένος is exemplified in the Heracleidæ at Sparta, the Alcmaeonidæ at Athens in the time of the aristocracy, the Bacchidæ at Corinth, &c. Arnold.]

[1][“Arrived *too late*”.]

[2][“They *rifled* Limnæa &c”.]

[1][α?τοβοε?: *at the first onset* always rendered by Hobbes, “by their clamour”.]

[2][Aware “of their approach”.]

[1][“From a distance”.]

[2][“Without their *armour*”.]

[3][“In haste”.]

[1][“And their secretly bringing to (at Patræ) in the night, did not escape the notice of the Athenians”. This was a stratagem of the Corinthians, that they might slip across the gulf when the Athenians had shot too far a-head.]

[2][δι? βραχέος: “might *quickly* be out and at hand &c.” Swift vessels would be of no use for getting through a narrow passage.]

[3][“Expected”.]

[1][“Listened neither to orders nor to the *keleustes*”. It was the duty of the κελευστ?ς to sing to the rowers that they might keep time, and to cheer and encourage them in their work (see vii. 70). The Scholiast on Aristoph. Acharn. says, they had also to see that the men baked their bread, and contributed fairly to the mess, and that none of the rations were improperly disposed of. Arnold. ?να?έρειν, “to bear up their oars”, probably means “to avoid *catching crabs*”, as the nautical phrase is.]

[2][“And afterwards disabled all, wheresoever they went”]

[3][“And Dyme in Achaia”. In *Achaia* is added, to distinguish Dyme from the town in Thrace.]

[1][“And taken up most &c.”]

[2][“From Dyme and Patræ to Cyllene”.]

[3][See ch. 80.]

[4][“Sent to Cnemus, to be of his council in the direction of the fleet, Timocrates &c”. See v. 63.]

[5][“For this affair appeared to the Lacedæmonians (the more so, that this was their first essay in fighting at sea) to be much against reason”. Their first trial, that is, with the Athenians: for they had a fleet before this.]

[6][Who being arrived, “joined with Cnemus in intimating” &c.]

[1][*Now* is an addition: the enmity was of long standing between Athens and the Cydonians, not only as Dorians, but as Æginetans. Long before the great Doric migration, Dorians had found their way from their early settlements at the foot of Olympus to Crete. Ulysses (Od. xix. 174.) describes the ninety cities of Crete as inhabited by natives, Achæans, Cydones, three-tribed Dorians, and Pelasgians. Cydonia itself was built, according to Herodotus, by Samians, that is, by Ionians: who in six years (A.C. 519) were expelled by Æginetans. He relates the origin of the enmity between Ægina and Athens: better explained, perhaps, by the jealousy of two adjacent naval and commercial powers. The difficulty of doubling the promontory of Malea, made Ægina the channel of the trade with Peloponnesus: which on her subjugation betook itself to Cythera (iv. 53). The extent of her trade may be judged of by the fact, that money was first stamped in Ægina (A.C. 749, Müll. Dor. ii. App. ix.): and that until A.C. 369, when superseded by the Athenian, her coin was the standard

in Greece, Crete, and Italy. Not long before the invasion of Darius, the Athenians were no match at sea for the Æginetans, and for the purpose of an attack Corinth gave them twenty ships: and they still were beaten. It was not till they could command the navies of their allies (i. 96), that they were able to remove the λήμην τοῦ Πειραιῶς, *the eye-sore of the Peiræus*. The Æginetans were accused by them before the Spartans, of following the example of all the islanders, in offering earth and water, there being no allied fleet to defend them, to Darius: but were adjudged afterwards, nevertheless, to have surpassed all the Grecians in valour at the battle of Salamis. On the morning of that battle, the allies sent to Ægina, the birth-place of the Æacidæ, to invoke the aid of the heros of that family. Herod. iii. 59; v. 82; vi. 49, 89; viii. 64. The dread therefore of a formidable rival in renown as well as in power, was the real cause of the implacable hatred displayed by the Athenians here and in chap. 27.]

[1][“Having prepared themselves for action, sailed to Panormus”.]

[2][“The Peloponnesians therefore, when they saw the Athenians *also* (go to Rhium), they too stationed themselves with seventy-seven ships at Rhium in Achaia, which is at no great distance from Panormus, where were their land forces. And for six or seven days they lay opposite each other, exercising and preparing for action, &c”.]

[3][To fight “in a narrow space”.]

[1][By unskilfulness, “it being our first trial at a sea-fight”.]

[2][“Nor is it just, that that part of our mind (our fortitude) which was not overcome by force, but has within itself some ground of justification, should be dejected &c.: but we ought to think that it is common for men to fail through fortune, but that in mind men of courage are by rights ever the same, and that whilst offering inexperience as an excuse, if their courage remain, they are not likely to have been cowards in aught”. Goeller. Commentators differ much about this passage.]

[1][“And whatever were our *errors* on the former occasion, these very same in addition, will now &c.].

[2][“Each do your duty in your several stations”. Arnold.]

[3][“Not worse”: meaning, *better*.]

[1][This conceit (or confidence) of themselves, “as Athenians to decline no number” &c.].

[2][“To make them call to mind their audacity”.]

[3][“And next, as to that they especially trust to in attacking us, that courage is natural to them, they are bold only through their skill in land-fighting: for being there mostly successful, they think too that it (their courage) will do the like for them in naval fighting too.” Goell.]

[4][This sense would be good, if ἴσμεν, “we are &c.” would admit of it. “And from being each of us in one particular more skilled than the other, we are (on this occasion) the more confident of the two.”]

[1][“For the sake of their own (the Lacedæmonians’) glory”.]

[2][τι ἴξιον τοῦ παρῶ πολῶ: “something worthy of the former signal victory”. Goeller.]

[3][“For most men when fairly matched, go into battle, as these do, relying more upon their strength than upon their courage. But they that out of (with) much inferior numbers go to battle, and at the same time not upon compulsion, do not adventure without having in their designs some great security to rely on”. Goell. Arn.]

[4][“Which they considering.”]

[5][“We are free”: insinuating the contrary of the Lacedæmonians.”]

[1][διέκπλοι οἷδε? ἴνα ῥοῶα?. See i. 49. Arnold considers the ἴνα ῥοῶή to embrace both the ἴνάκρουσις, the rowing astern to get clear of the enemy, for want of space; and also the περίπλους, gaining the requisite distance for a second onset by a circuit, where space admitted it.]

[2][“Especially as we are watching one another’s movements within so short a distance”: Göll. Arn.]

[3][“For the sea”: that is, “for their dominion over the sea”. Portus.]

[1][“Towards” their own land.]

[2][Should sail “towards it”.]

[3][“And with closed front sailed down” &c. μετωπηδῶν means, they sailed down in *line*, and not as they were before sailing, in *column*.]

[4][“Into the wide part of the gulf”. They were sailing *from* the sea.]

[5][διέθειραν, which Hobbes mostly renders *sunk*, and a little below *overcame*, means *rendered useless* or *disabled*.]

[1][ῶδη, the common reading, is omitted by Bekker and Arnold: “and one they took with the men” &c.]

[2][The Messenians settled in Naupactus by the Athenians in i. 103: frequently mentioned hereafter. See iv. 41.]

[3][See ch. 90, note 4.]

[4][τῶν: “the one”. See above.]

[5][“Strikes in midships” &c.]

[1][“*The charge* of the enemy”.]

[2][“At one signal with a shout”]

[3][“*The Lacedæmonian*”. One of the commanders: see chap. 85.]

[4][*Ibi erat Neptuni templum, ut docet Strabo. lib. 8. Hudson.*]

[1][“To *hazard* an attempt”. The words “the haven” are added, to distinguish it from the city of the same name. Goeller.]

[2]It may be hence gathered, that in the galleys of old there was but one man to one oar. [τροπωτήρ: a thong, not *for the oar to turn in*: but a thong of some sort, wound round the upper end of the oar, for the purpose, first, of increasing its weight, that it might balance that of the other longer end; and next, of acting as a nut, to prevent the oar from slipping through the hole in the vessel’s side, in which it acted. See appendix to Arnold’s Thucydides, vol. i.]

[1][Nor was there any imagination that the enemy &c.; “since (they thought not) that they could dare to do it openly and deliberately, nor, if they did conceive such a thing, that they would not have had notice of it beforehand”.]

[2][“*The promontory*”: viz. Budorum. There was a fort of the same name: see ch. 94. There had been of old a long and severe struggle between Megara and Athens for the possession of Salamis: which, after being awarded by five Spartan arbitrators, in obedience to ancient traditions, to Athens, was, with Nisæaaga, lost in the troubles following the banishment of Megalces: but was soon regained, and ever after remained with Athens. Müll. Dor. i. 8.]

[3]Fires lifted up, if they were still, signified friends coming; if waved, enemies. [“By this time”, is an addition. Fires were most likely raised on the fort being taken.]

[1][Which, “had they been minded not to waste their time”, nor &c.]

[2][δι? χρόνου: were “now first after a long time put into the sea”: that is, it was a long time since they had been in the water. Göll.]

[3][*The Odrysian*. See chap. 29.]

[1][“He had not performed”.]

[2][?ντ?ς: “within the mountains Hæmus and Rhodope”. These hills form a circle.]

[3][“Within the Danube, and rather towards the Euxine.” The numerous colonies founded by the Ionians along the shore of this sea, occasioned the change of its ancient name, ?ξενος, *the inhospitable*, to its present name, *the hospitable*. Herm. § 78. Perhaps, like ?υμεν?δες, the *Furies*, a mere euphemism.]

[4][Many of the *Thracians* &c.]

[1][Towards “the Pæonians, who from this point are independent”. Arnold has amended this passage, by inserting γ?ρ? after μέχρι, and striking out ο? before ?ρίζετο; and renders the passage thus: “and these (the Agræans and Lææans) were the last to whom his dominion extended; *for* at the Graæans and Lææans &c., the empire of Sitalkes terminated towards Pæonia, the Pæonians from this point *being* independent”. The following are his observations upon the origin of the name *Graii* and *Græci* amongst the Romans”: “The Pæonians, according to Herodotus, were of the same race as the Teucrians of Troy; both belonging to that stock which overspread western Asia, Greece, and Italy in the earliest times, commonly called the Pelasgians. Now it is curious to find amongst the Pæonians the name of the *Graæans*, evidently the same word as the Latin *Graii*, the name by which the Romans designated the Hellenians. They applied it to the Hellenians, because they had been used to apply it to the Pelasgian inhabitants of Greece before the Hellenians rose to eminence, and because, according to Aristotle, the Hellenians, when living in Epirus, were called *Græci*. Niebühr supposes that the same name may also have been borne by the Pelasgi of Italy.”]

[1]στρογγύλη, a ship that useth only sails, of the round form of building, and serving for burthen, in distinction to galleys, and all other vessels of the long form of building, serving for the wars. [Non credo scriptores Latinos eas naves, quas Græci στρογγύλας vocant, *rotundas* dicere. Est autem in ea re sequendus usus veterum, qui has *onerarias* appellare maluerunt. Duker.]

[2][With a continual wind *aft*.]

[3][“The tribute in gold and silver from all the barbarous nations and the Grecian cities, which they paid under Seuthes, (who reigned after Sitalkes, and made the most of it), was of the value of about four hundred talents of silver.”]

[4][παραδυνα?εβουσι: small lords, or quasi reguli, next to the king: as Seuthes to Sitalkes, ch. 101. Göll.]

[1][“Nevertheless according to their power, so they used it the more”.]

[2][That is, they are *inferior* in all that concerns the *enjoyment* of life. Goeller.]

[3][He had made “by cutting down the woods” when &c.]

[1][“*The free nation*”. See ch. 96.]

[2][“For *to the Macedonians belong* the Lyncestæ &c.: who though confederates of and subject to *these* Macedonians, have still” &c. The original Macedonians, a nation referred by Mueller to the Illyrian race, are supposed to have been confined, in their earliest settlements, to Maketa, a district of Orestis. That which is generally called Macedonia proper, is divided into upper and lower Macedonia. The former comprises the mountainous districts of Elimcia, Lyncestis, and Orestis: which last took its name from the mountains (?ρη) wherein they dwelt, and not, as supposed, from the son of

Agamemnon. Lower Macedonia, which appears to have been a later acquisition of the Maketai, and to have been originally called Emathia, comprised the districts of Edessa and Berœa. This part, inhabited originally by Pelasgians, fell into the power of the Temenidæ, an Argive family; whose conquests are here related by Thucydides: and it is of this part he speaks, when he says the upper Macedonians were “subject to *these* Macedonians”, though still independent in their government. See Müll., Maked. Herm. Antiq. § 15.]

[1][“The *hollow* of Pieria”.]

[2][“These Macedonians”.]

[3][“But those now in the country” were built &c.]

[1][*Besieged* Europus.]

[2][Pella, supposed to have superseded Edessa as the seat of the Macedonian government, was at this time the residence and treasury of the Macedonian kings. It lay about 120 stadia from the sea, close to the lake of the river Lydias, on a small eminence in the midst of the swamps, at all times quite impassable, formed by the waters of that river and of the Axios. On an artificial mole, connected with the city only by a bridge, stood the treasury: serving the purpose also either of a prison, or of a retreat: see Livy, xliv. 46.]

[1][In Thessaly, as in Macedonia, is seen at work the cause which in time effected an entire change in the condition of Greece: namely, the constant pressure of the nations of the north towards the south: the Dorian invasion of Peloponnesus being only the last of these migrations. Emathia, Thessaly, and a great part of Epirus, inhabited once by the Pelasgi, a Grecian race spread over those countries, and Greece itself wherever early civilization existed, were again reduced to barbarism by the irruption of the Illyrian population. Shortly after the Trojan war the Thessalians, a race from Thesprotia, of Illyrian origin, seized on the plains between the Perrhæbians and the Phthiotan Achæans, comprehending the valley of the Peneus (the ancient ῥογος Πελασγικῆν) and the district called Αῖολίς (Herod. vii. 176). The ancient Pelasgo-Æolian inhabitants became, under the name Penestæ (from πένης, *poor*), a race of bondsmen similar to the Laconian Helots, and to their masters equally troublesome. The invaders also made tributaries of the Perrhæbians, Magnesians, and Achæans: but these nations retained a certain degree of independence, and even remained members of the Amphictyonic council. The Thessalians can scarcely be said to have had any general government: the cities, constantly at war amongst themselves, were each under the control of some great family, as Larissa of the Aleuadæ, Cranon of the Scopadæ, &c. Thucydides (iv. 78) tells us, the *people* were ever friendly to the Athenians: but had so little influence on the government, that they could not prevent Brasidas from marching through Thessaly. They were brave, and had greater advantages than perhaps any other state in Greece: and yet their history is a blank in that of Greece. See Müll. Dor. iii. 14. Herm. Gr. Antiq. § 15. 178.]

[1][“Are ever at all times” &c.]

[2][Æniadæ.]

[3][Many of them are in fact united to the mainland. Arnold.]

[4][The islands stand thick, “and are one with another the means of holding together the alluvial soil, so that it spreads not”; lying, &c.]

[1][“To support life”.]

[2][*This* winter.]

[1][Fell upon the enemy “wherever an opportunity offered”. Arnold.]

[1][τ?ν ?πλων; properly the space where the arms were piled; here, the camp of the heavy-armed soldiers. Arnold.]

[2][αλλ?. *But* &c.]

[3][“That they were forcing the Lesbians to submit to the government of Mytilene”: that is, as the people of Attica submitted to that of Athens: ii. 15. Arn. It is hardly possible to suppose with Goeller, that they were attempting to bring all the Lesbians actually to Mytilene. This revolt is one of the instances cited by Aristotle, of seditions attended with fatal consequences, arising out of insignificant causes. Timophanes, a rich man, left two daughters: and Doxandros, the proxenos or host of the Athenians, being rejected by the sons as the suitor of their sisters, brought about the sedition. Pol. v. 4.]

[4][The Bœotians, an Æolian branch from Arne in Thessaly, migrated from Arne in Thessaly sixty years after the Trojan war (i. 12) to Cadmeis, since called Bœotia. After the expulsion of the family of Orestes from Peloponnesus, Penthilus and other of his descendants fled to Bœotia, and thence colonized Mysia in Asia Minor, Tenedos, Lesbos, and other islands: which colonies therefore, as well as Bœotia, were all Æolian. Homer (Il. ii. 494.) makes Bœotians sail to Troy from all the cities in Bœotia, except Thebes and a few others: notwithstanding which, and Thucydides’ expression (i. 12), no Bœotians, according to Mueller and Hermann, were settled there till after the war.]

[1][“Forty galleys which chanced to have been made ready” &c.]

[2][“They *were* to command &c.: and to make war upon them, if” &c.]

[1][Maloeis, the temple of Apollo in the suburbs of Mytilene.]

[2][Allowed “the parley”. Nothing was granted but an armistice.]

[1][Malea, the site of the temple of Apollo Maloeis, in the northern part of the city, and at the northern port, hence also called “portus Maloeis”. *Malea* nomen erat appellativum linguæ Græcæ antiquissimæ, significans prominentiam aliquam montis vel litoris, neque reperitur nomen esse nisi locorum Doricorum Æoliorumque, velut

Lesbi, Cretæ, Laconia. Goeller. The Athenians besieging Mytilene, have their market at Malea: see ch. 6.]

[1][Who came in “much the sooner, for seeing no security in the Lesbians”.]

[2][“And bringing their ships round to the station *to the south* of the city, they fortified two camps &c., and established their blockades at both the harbours, and so quite excluded &c.” Arn. “They fortified two camps *to the south* &c.” Göll.]

[1][“Sailed *along* the Achelous”.]

[2][“At Nericus”.]

[3][“And having put off a little from the land (?ποπλεύσαντες), they afterwards received their dead” &c. Goeller.]

[4][The successful ending of the second Messenian war, and the reduction of Tegea, the stronghold of Arcadia commanding the entrance of Laconia, placed Sparta at the head of Peloponnesus: and from about A.C.580 her ?γεμον?α was recognized, not only by Peloponnesus, but by Greece in general; a rank confirmed to her by the expulsion of the tyrants (which, along with the setting up of oligarchical government, was ever the steady aim of the Spartan policy) and the overthrow of Argos. Thus it was at Sparta, that Athens accused Ægina of giving earth and water to Darius: and Sparta summoned Themistocles to answer to the charge of medizing. We see here however, as before in i. 87, that this supremacy extended to no control over the confederacy. It was formed of Peloponnesian states: and governed by fixed laws, with a certain order of precedence. By this constitution, no common action, such as declaring war or concluding peace or treaties, could be undertaken without a congress, wherein all the states had equal voices (i. 125): and instances are not wanting of Sparta being outvoted (i. 40, 41; Herod. v. 93). Sparta was the place of assembly for the deliberations of the allies: she took upon herself the control and execution of all measures there resolved on. But on the internal affairs of the allied states, neither had Sparta nor the confederacy any influence. By a fundamental law, each state was independent and enjoyed its ancient customs: and even disputes between individual states, were beyond the jurisdiction of the confederacy (v. 31). In Herod. v. 94, we see the allies protest against Sparta’s “meddling with a Grecian state”.]

[1][“Of our intent”. Goeller.]

[1][“Yet we became allies, not with the Athenians for enslaving the Grecians; but with the Grecians for deliverance from the Medes”. Arnold, Goeller.]

[2][?παγομένου: “and proposing to themselves the subjugation” &c.; Poppo: “and bringing about” &c.; Goeller. ?πειγομένου, “eagerly pursuing”, is suggested by Bekker. “But when we saw &c. we were no longer without alarm: (but unable, disunited as we were through difference of councils, to defend ourselves, the allies, all but ourselves and the Chians, were subdued; and we, nominally indeed of our own free will, helped to subdue them): and no longer held we them, by the foregone example, for faithful leaders. For &c.: and if we were all still independent, we should

be more secure of their leaving us alone. But having got most of them under, and we being still on an equality, it was not likely (with our single equality too by the side of the already general giving in of the rest) that they would bear it very patiently: especially” &c.]

[1][No other “than that domination appeared attainable by fair words and craft rather than by force. For they both made use &c., that having equal voice we should not against our will have warred with them (upon our confederates), had these not done the injury: and by the same act, they not only brought first &c., but also reserving” &c.]

[1][“Were not likely” to do &c.]

[2][“*And it was more*” &c. The sentence should run on to “break the league?”: and the next sentence should begin with “So that”, (ἵνα), and not with “Now”; being the manifest consequence of the preceding sentence.]

[1][By Hermæondas: see ch. 5.]

[2][Arnold and Goeller take ἵστασθαι here in its original sense of “standing aloof from”; so that it suits both the cases, one of simply *standing aloof* from the Grecians and doing them no mischief, the other of *revolt* from the Athenians.]

[3][“That you may be seen ready”, at once &c.]

[4][“In case you *the second time* this summer” &c.]

[1][“More easily”.]

[2][“Which you bear”, of not &c.]

[1][This relates to the constitution of Solon. The people of Attica are said to have been divided, in early times, into the four tribes Kekropis, Autocthon, Cranais, Atthis; corresponding to the territorial division, Actæa, Paralia, Mesogæa, Diacris: the same tribes being afterwards called, after their gods, Dias, Atthenais, Posidonias, Hephæstias. The Ionians (a separate class of the aboriginal inhabitants, if not a distinct race) introduced the caste-division called the Ionic tribes, viz. *warriors, artificers, herdsmen, and husbandmen* (or as some read, *priests*): these, for some purposes, remained in being till the time of Cleisthenes (iv. 118, note), though early modified by Theseus (as it is said), the father of the democracy, by the less strongly marked distinction of Eupatridæ, Geomori, and Demiurgi, or in other words, of *nobles* and *plebeians*. The usurpations of the Eupatridæ have been already noticed (i. 126, note). The insurrection of Cylon (one of those popular risings upon the aristocracy, which in other states raised to the throne so many of the so-called *tyrants*; who were therefore so eagerly hunted down by Sparta) was the forerunner of Solon’s changes. He replaced (A.C. 594) the aristocracy of birth by a timocracy, or one of property: of the citizens with incomes exceeding, respectively, 500, 300, and 150 medimni of corn, and as many measures of wine and oil, he formed the three classes, *pentacosi-medimni, hippeis, and zeugitæ*, to whom he committed all the executive

power of the state. All with incomes below that of the *zeugitæ*, formed the class of *thetes*, contributing nothing to the state, and therefore excluded from all offices: but admitted to the public assembly; and having, with the other classes, cognizance of all judicial appeals, a power attended in after times with important consequences. In the eyes however of the people, of this as of other states, these changes were matter of minor importance, and valued only as the means for attaining other objects. What lay next their hearts, was the famous *σεισάχθεια*: the liberation of the land from its mortgage, of the debtor from his debt. This effected, they relapsed into their usual apathy: whence they were roused by the efforts of the aristocracy to regain their lost power, which ended (A.C. 560) in the tyranny of Peisistratus.]

[1][“Wasting the Perioecis”. The Spartans living only in the capital, the whole of Laconia was properly the *περιοικῆς*, “the land inhabited by the perioeci”: though here is meant only the part by the sea. Laconia was divided into six districts; Sparta, Amyclæ, Las, Pharæ, Ægys, and Epidaurus Limera or Gytheium: and Messenia into four; Pylos, Rhium, Mesola, and Hyamia. The whole was called *Λακεδαίμων ἡκατόπολις*: but it must have been after the reduction by Sparta of the whole of Messenia, as well as of Cynuria (to which Anthana, one of the towns belonged), that is, after A. C. 548, that the number of towns inhabited by the perioeci were fixed at a hundred. Müll. Dor. iii. 2. See iv. 126.]

[1][“At the time when the ships sailed, the Athenians had one of the largest fleets they ever had at one time, of ships in a state of effectiveness from their good condition. And they had as many and still more at the beginning of the war”. Arnold.]

[2][Consumed “at first”. At this time the pay of the *hoplites* varied from two oboli to a drachme: officers received twice, the cavalry thrice, and field officers four times as much, with the like for their provisions. The regular pay of the seamen (formed, besides foreigners, of Thetes and slaves, as at Sparta of the Helots) was three oboli, that of the *Paralitæ* four. The value of the *medimnus* of corn (about an English bushel and a half), estimated by Boeckh at two drachmes, will give some idea of the value of this pay: apparently, not high.]

[1][Settled “more securely”.]

[2][But beaten “in a sally”.]

[3][With a single wall, “building *in it* turrets here and there on the strong points: so that” &c. A *single* wall was enough, no attack being feared from without. About Plataea, the Lacedæmonians (ch. 21) build a double wall; one for the blockade, the other for their own protection.]

[1][“The Athenians &c. themselves, then for the first time, contributed a tribute of two hundred talents; and dispatched also Lysicles” &c. This being an extraordinary imposition, the *ῥηγορόλογοι* are sent to collect it. The ordinary tributes were brought in by the allies themselves at the great Dionysia; or collected, if necessary, by ships called *ῥκλογεῖς*.]

[2][See iv. 75.]

[1][“Guessing the length *from* the thickness of a brick, took” &c.]

[2]“To be more storm than usual”: of wind, that is, as well as rain.]

[1][“Whereby the Plataeans were blockaded”.]

[2][“A stormy and rainy night”.]

[3][“Unperceived by the guards”, who &c.]

[4][The noise “of their approach” could not &c.]

[5][“In the *mud*”.]

[6][“That carried *darts*”.]

[7][“More of them”.]

[1][“To the end that they might be least intent upon them”.]

[1][“*Along* (on the top of) the wall”. Goeller.]

[2][“Then came down (the last of them with much ado) they in the towers, and were going to the ditch”.]

[3][“*But* standing themselves in the dark” &c.]

[1][“The fane of the hero Androcrates”. See Herod. ix. 25.]

[2][$\Delta\rho\nu\zeta$ κέφαλαι: the Athenian name of a town in the valley of Cithæron: called by the Bœotians $\tau\rho\epsilon\zeta$ κέφαλαι, the *Three Heads* (Herod. ix. 39); probably from three oaks growing there.]

[1][In chapters 16, 25, 29, 69, they are said to be *forty*.]

[2][“Was still too young to command”. Goeller.]

[1][$\psi\lambda\nu$: “before light-armed”: having no $\pi\lambda\alpha$, *armour*.]

[2][The men *in power*—*the* corn.]

[3][Being in “exceeding fear”.]

[1][*Embatum*.]

[1][*Surprises* of war. Goeller, Arnold.]

[2][This is a corrupt passage.]

[3][See iv. 75.]

[1][He set at liberty “all the Chians he had left, and certain he had of *other* nations. For” &c.]

[2][His temporibus Atheniensibus duæ, quas sacras dicebant, triremes erant; Paralus, quam qui agebant Paralitæ sive Parali dicebantur; et Salaminia sive Delia, etiam Theoria appellata, qua Salaminii vehebantur. Atque hac quidem, ad theoros Delum mittendos; utraque, quippe volociter navigantibus, ad alias theorias emittendas, ferendos nuntios, tributa colligenda, homines pecuniasque trajiciendas, item in præliis vehendis belli ducibus utebantur. Goeller.]

[3][“From all sides”. The cities of Ionia remained unwalled, after they were burnt by Darius on their defection (A.C.497). Herod. vi. 32. Goeller.]

[1][“Brought news of having themselves seen him” &c. Poppo and Bekker, on conjecture, here and above read *Icarus* for *Clarus*.]

[2][Vulgo, Λάτμου: Bekker and the rest, Πάτμου.]

[3][Bekk.: ῥδιαν. Göll. et Arn.: ῥδί?. Itamanes and the barbarians, “introduced through some party quarrel”. Colophon was one of the twelve Ionian states: see ch. 104. Aristotle (v. iii.) attributes the discord between the Colophonians and the Notians to a dissimilarity of habits, pursuits, &c.: which made them, like the inhabitants of Peiræus and Athens (the former more democratic than the latter), unsuitable members of the same state.]

[4][See vii. 57: where the Mantineans, Arcadians, Cretans, and Ætolians are described as mercenaries, ready to march anywhere for pay.]

[1][“And the Colophonians of the high town of the Medan faction, came and joined their state”.]

[2][οῦκιστῆς: *leaders* of the colony:—seated them there “under the Athenian *colonial* laws”. Goeller.]

[1][“And the Peloponnesian ships having dared to venture across to Ionia to help them, contributed not a little to the vehemence of the Athenians”. Goeller.]

[2][“Those in office”, are the Prytanæ, in whose power it was to call extraordinary assemblies: which was done, by exposing publicly in a tablet the time and subject of debate, γνώμας προθεῖναι: see Lucian, Necyomantia, 19. The Proedri presided in the assembly: and the cryer summoned the speakers by the form, τίς ῥγορεύειν βούλεται; See Dem. pro Cor.]

[1][“But it *will be* worst, *if*” &c.]

[2][The more *simple* sort &c.]

[1][“And to find fault with whatever is spoken &c., as unable to show their wit in graver matters”. Goeller.]

[2][“Whereas the vengeance that follows close upon the injury, equals the malice of the wrong doer, and so takes the best satisfaction”. Göll.]

[1][And actions already past, “in such sort, that you take not the evidence of your own eyes as more trustworthy, than what you hear from those who find fault in a fine speech”.]

[2][“And each desirous, above all to be able himself to speak, but if not, then to contradict those that can, rather than seem to follow their advice, and to approve beforehand any thing smartly said; eager to be the first to see the truth of what is spoken, but slow to preconceive &c.: seeking, as one may say, somewhat else” &c. Goeller.]

[1][“Than if they had power to war upon us by themselves”.]

[1][“And *men*, as one may say”.]

[2][“For against *us* they have all alike taken arms; since, if overawed by their oligarchy, they might have called us in, and so have been now in their city again”. Goeller.]

[1][“We must hold out no hope that they will, either by persuasion or corruption, gain any thing from our being conscious that they err through human infirmity”. Göll.]

[2][“Must *be*” &c.: that is, from having made themselves suspected.]

[3]Meaning that the orators are bribed.

[4][Rather than towards such “as remain, after all, just what they were, and not a jot less” &c. Arn. Göll.]

[1][“And then, if even though not your right you still resolve to hold it,” &c.]

[2][“Representing to yourselves in as lively a manner as may be what” &c. Goeller.]

[1][The one “with folly”: the other “with a rude and narrow mind”. Arnold.]

[2][“That will accuse them of making a sort of display for the sake of a bribe”. Arnold, Goeller.]

[1][“Of a want of wisdom, rather than of honesty”.]

[2][“But without appealing to party feeling, to make it appear that his is the best counsel”.]

[3][“And so far from punishing, not even to disgrace the man” &c.]

[4][“He that succeedeth”.]

[5][“Nor would he that doth not, strive in the same way, by himself too gratifying the people, to draw them to him”.]

[1][“Spoken straightforward”.]

[2][“By this needless degree of thought”. Goeller.]

[3][“And liable to such a mode of construing it, give” &c. Goeller.]

[4][At Athens, it was open to any citizen to impeach any law or decree, on the ground of its being either contrary to some existing law, or unjust, or inexpedient. Upon the oath to that effect of the complainant, the validity of the law, or, if not already passed into a law, all further proceedings upon it were suspended till the question of its legality or illegality was decided. This was done by a proceeding called a γρά?? παρανόμων; which took place before the ordinary courts, the judges whereof were the six thousand chosen by lot from the citizens at large. The success of the proceeding subjected the proposer of the law to an arbitrary fine: and a third conviction rendered him incapable of proposing any law thereafter. On the other hand, the complainant, if he failed in obtaining a fifth part of the voices of the judges, was himself subjected to a fine. The time for originating this proceeding, was limited to a year from the passing of the law impeached.]

[1][These words, though evidently required by the sense, are wanting in the Greek.]

[2][“Especially” contendeth.]

[3][“The well-being of” the future.]

[4][“For his council, grounded more upon what is just, may perhaps, according to your present anger against the Mytilenæans, soon win your consent: but we are not pleading judicially against them, so as to need arguments” &c. Goeller.]

[1][“Men, in *imposing* punishment, have gone through all” &c. Goeller. Capital punishments were not, it seems, in use amongst the Greeks in early times.]

[2][“Hope and desire in every way; this as the leader, &c.; are the cause of most mischief: and being undiscerned, have greater power than dangers seen”.]

[1][“Contributes no less to urge men on”.]

[2][“Every man, without reason, conceives greater ideas of those things (liberty and dominion) than the reality”. Goeller, Arnold.]

[3][“*Too* severely: nor make desperate those that revolt” &c.]

[1][“To prejudice ourselves by becoming exact judges” &c.]

[2][“Hath, as was likely, revolted to recover its independence”.]

[3][*And* when.]

[4][“For in *all* cities”, &c.]

[1][“In *it*”: that is, in revenge.]

[2][“Were nevertheless”: that is, notwithstanding the change of opinion in ch. 36.]

[1][“Lest the *former* vessel arriving first”. Bekker, Arnold.]

[2][It was unusual to continue the voyage by night in any but sailing vessels.]

[3][“Drove on”.]

[4][“And was about executing the decree, when the second vessel reached land and arrested the destruction of the city. So near” &c.]

[1][The lands thus assigned to the gods in Greece and Rome, became the property of the state, and were usually let to individuals subject to certain duties to the temple, priests, &c. Land was also sometimes consecrated by individuals to some god, for the sake of the security of the religious sanction: the *τέμενος*, or land set apart, remaining in the possession of themselves and their posterity, subject to the charges of keeping up the temple, maintaining the priests, &c. See the case of Xenophon, *Anab.* v. 3: and of Mæandrius, *Herod.* iii. 142. As to the Athenian *κληρονομοί*, here said to be sent out to Lesbos, they might be sent out to view the lots and arrange with the tenants, but it is manifest they did not remain there: as in the subsequent revolts in Lesbos (viii. 22, 23), there was evidently no Athenian population in the island then. *Arn.* Since A.C. 506 the Athenians had been in the habit of sending *cleruchi* instead of colonies to the countries conquered by them. *Herm. Gr. Antiq.* § 117.]

[2][In iv. 52, called *τῶν κταίᾶς*.]

[1][“And having first *on the side of Nisæa* taken two projecting towers with engines &c., he also took in with a wall the part *over against the continent*, where there was access to the island, which lay not far from the continent, by a bridge over a ford”. Goeller and Arnold understand the towers to have stood, one on a mole from Minoa, and the other on a mole from Nisæa. “Minoa has long ceased to be an island; but the mole on which, according to custom, stood one of the towers defending the entrance of the port, is still traceable.” Arnold.]

[1][“With a demand”.]

[2][And they “fed the Plataeans, till the judges arrived” &c.]

[3][Mueller (Dor. i. 9, n.) observes that Plataea had after the time of Pausanias been on friendly terms with Sparta: to which circumstance, and to this προξένια, Lacon owed his name. Aeimnestus is a name famous, as being that of the slayer of Mardonius at the battle of Plataea: himself with a body of three hundred men being afterwards all slain to a man, in the plain of Stenyclerus in the third Messenian war. Mueller, referring to Herod. ix. 64, calls him a Spartan: but Herodotus calls him, not a *Spartan*, but “a man *famous in Sparta*”: and as the Plataeans assisted the Spartans in that war, there appears in the account of Herodotus nothing inconsistent with its being the person here mentioned.]

[1][“In confidence, to *you* we yielded up &c.: and upon condition not to be at the discretion (as therefore we are *not*) of any but yourselves; conceiving” &c. Göll.]

[2][“For the liberty of this speech has been granted at our request”: and also &c.]

[3][“To say somewhat before running the hazard of judgment” Steph. Arn.]

[4][And we fear not, “lest condemning us beforehand on the ground of our merits towards you being less than yours towards us”, you make that a crime. Göll. Arn.]

[1][“But if you consider us as friends, then that you yourselves rather do the wrong in making war upon us”. Goeller.]

[2][“We have been *now* not the first to break”.]

[3][“With you *and Pausanias*”. This is an answer to the doubts started, (Herodotus *expressly* mentioning the Lacedaemonians, Tegeatans, and Athenians only), whether the Plataeans were present at the *first* of this battle. He makes, however, the number of the Lacedaemonians *engaged*, 50,000 (ix. 61): whereas previously (ch. 28) he reckons them, Lacedaemonians 10,000 (of whom, Spartans 5,000), and Helots (seven to each Spartan) 35,000; in all, 45,000: leaving 5,000 to be accounted for, which might include the Plataeans.]

[1][Ithome, a stronghold on a hill commanding the plains of Stenyclerus and the Pamisus, must have been a place of considerable strength. The first Messenian war seems to have been confined chiefly to its vicinity, and its reduction entailed the subjugation of the whole country. In the third war, the siege of Ithome lasted ten years, though the Spartans were assisted not only by the Plataeans and 4,000 Athenian hoplitæ, but by the Æginetans and Mantineans also. The earthquake is said to have left not more than five houses standing in Sparta, and to have destroyed 20,000 persons; and amongst them, the flower of the Spartan youth, by the fall of the building wherein they were exercising. But for the presence of mind of Archidamus, in gathering round him the Spartans in arms by giving a false alarm of an enemy’s approach, the Helots, already assembled, would have fallen upon them and completed the work of destruction.]

[2][See ii. 73, note.]

[3][The Plataeans were already in the enjoyment of certain rights of citizens of Athens, called “the rights of Plataeans”: extending, it is supposed, to no political rights, but limited to those of marriage, commerce, capacity to hold lands, &c. Under that title they were sometimes conferred on others than Plataeans. Thus, Arnold says, the slaves that fought at Salamis, were made *Plataeans*: and a similar class of rights existed at Rome, called the “*jus Cæritum*”; whence also “in Cærites referri”. The Plataeans, however, that survived the destruction of their city and settled at Athens, were distributed amongst the ten tribes, and admitted to all the rights, sacred and profane, of natural-born citizens, excepting (for the following reason) eligibility to the office of archon and priest. The Athenians had three divisions of society: the *πάτρα* or *γένος*, the descendants of a common ancestor; the *ῥατρία*, *patræ*, connected by intermarriage; and the *ῥυλ?*, a union of *phratriæ*. Thus, they were divided into *tribes* (the four Ionic): and again, into the twelve *phratriæ*: each phratría into thirty *patræ*, of which each again contained thirty heads of families. Every phratría had absolute and exclusive control over the admission of members: and to that purpose was yearly devoted the last of the three days of the feast of the *Apaturia* (a name derived by Mueller from *πατρ?*), when the people were assembled according to phratriæ. On that day, the newly married female citizen was admitted into the phratría of her husband: the child into that of its father: and the child of the *naturalized* citizen into that of its maternal grandfather. But the phratriæ recognized no title to admission but birth: and the naturalized citizen, thus excluded from the phratriæ, was also excluded from the worship of Apollo *πατρ?*: and so (by the oath required of the candidate, that he worshipped *πόλλων πατρ?* and *Ζε? ρκε?*) from the office of priest and archon.]

[1][“By your present benefit, and their feelings of hostility”.]

[1][*Far* more profitable.]

[2][“Not that practised for their own safety against the invasion”.]

[3][“Take heed (for this judgment of yours is not given in obscurity, but by you, highly esteemed, against us, not ill thought of) that they do not” &c.]

[1][Blot it out, “with the entire race of Plataeans” &c.]

[2][“That when the Medes had possession of our land, we were ruined then”. Goeller.]

[3][“And of our then allies none aid us; and you, Lacedæmonians, our only hope, we fear that you too are not firm to us. But we beseech &c”. The “mutual league” here appealed to, is mentioned ii. 71 and i. 67. No more is known of it, than that the allies, by the persuasion of Pausanias, mutually guaranteed the independence of all states, and of the Plataeans in particular.]

[1][“The *fame* of wickedness”.]

[2][We have “through all” been beneficial &c.]

[3][This yearly ceremony is described at large by Plutarch. Aristid. ch. 21. See Tacit. Annal. iii. 2: vestem, odores, aliaque funerum solennia cremabant.]

[1][“And we entreat you, calling aloud upon the gods &c., to yield this, and not to forget the oaths we produce, sworn by your fathers; and we become suppliants at their tombs and invoke the dead, that we be not in the power of the Thebans, nor your dearest friends betrayed to their bitterest enemies”. ἡμοβωμίους καὶ κοινοῖς: Gods common to Greece, and worshipped at *altars also common* to Greece, as at Olympia, Delphi: Göll. Gods worshipped at *the same altar*, as Jupiter, Minerva, Apollo, and the other greater gods, all of the same race. Arnold.]

[1][“We adjure you.”]

[1][The subjugation of Cadmeis by the Bœotians seems to have been effected slowly and not without a hard struggle. It was the fall of Thebes and of Orchomenus (in early times one of the richest and most powerful cities in Greece, reigning over a great part of Bœotia, and making a tributary of Thebes itself) that decided the fate of the whole country: and thereupon followed the *Æolian migration* (ch. 2, note). Amongst the nations driven out, were the Minyans (apparently, another name for *Æolians*) from Orchomenus; the Cadmeians from Thebes; the Gephyræans from Tanagra, who fled to Athens; the Thracians (see ii. 29, note), who retired to the neighbourhood of Parnassus, and there disappear from history; the Pelasgians, who retired to Athens (ii. 16, note) and afterwards occupied Lemnos. The opinion that Plataea was founded by the Thebans after expelling from it “the promiscuous nations,” was perhaps current at Thebes as favoring their claim of supremacy: but it is probable that Plataea did not change its inhabitants. The Plataeans considered themselves an aboriginal people, as appears from the names of their kings, Asopus and Cithæron: Plataea too, their heroine, was the daughter of the Asopus: and their indomitable hostility to Thebes may have arisen from a difference of origin.]

[2][“The laws of our *ancestors*”.]

[1][τοῖς νόμοις: “*the* (its former) laws”. That this excuse of the Thebans is a mere subterfuge, is manifest from the fact of their standing a twenty days’ siege by the allies after the battle of Plataea, before they would give up their leaders, as well as from the address of Timegenides to them on that occasion, σὺν γὰρ τῷ κοινῷ ἡμῶν (Herod. ix. 87: and see viii. 34, Βοιωτῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸν πλοῦτος ἡμῶν).]

[1][“Against us then only should you have called in the Athenians, and not &c.: it being at least in your power (not to invade others), since if the Athenians” &c.]

[2][*With* whom.]

[1][“It is the not repaying a benefit, when it may be done with justice, which is base: and not the omitting the repayment of such, as are justly due, but cannot be repaid without injustice”. Goeller, Arnold.]

[2][Because the Athenians did not; “and because you desired to do as they did, and the contrary to what the Grecians did: and now you claim the benefit of that, wherein for others’ sake you behaved well”.]

[3][τῶν τότε: “the mutual oath made at *that* time”: see ch. 57, n.]

[4][“And others included in the oath”. The Samians, Byzantians, Thasians and others. Ducas. See i. 101, 117: and Herod. ix. 106.]

[1][“That exhibited your good deeds” to their ruin. Göll. Arn.]

[2][ἑρομηνίαις means, as in ch. 56, *any* monthly festival, the plural indicating only the sacred character of the day. The surprise of Plataea seems to have taken place at the change of the moon (ii. 4.): and the first of every month was sacred to Apollo. Goeller.]

[3][“To the customs of our ancestors, common to all Bœotia”.]

[1][“The paternal customs”.]

[2][And you readily coming and making agreement, at first indeed were quiet.]

[3][“But contrary to law to kill &c., what excuse is there for that?”]

[1][“All *those* crimes”: the three just mentioned.]

[2][To let you see &c.: “*and that* you may not be moved” &c.]

[1][“That the trials you will present, will be not of words, but” &c.]

[2][But if those in authority “would, as you will now do, give judgment by making one case an example for all cases to all the *allies* together”, men would be less &c. Goeller.]

[3][For they had, “as they said”.]

[4][“Taking the Plataeans by their own choice to have justly lost the benefit of the treaty”. Goeller. Arnold and Goeller consider this to be an unsound passage.]

[1][A house for the reception of such as might come to worship at the temple of Juno: the city no longer affording lodging. Arnold.]

[2][“It was, throughout even the whole of this affair of the Plataeans, almost wholly for the Thebans’ sake that the Lacedæmonians were thus alienated from them”. Arn.—Xerxes rewarded the Thebans’ tardy desertion to him at Thermopylæ, by branding them and their leader Leontiades (see ii. 2, note) with the royal mark (Herod. vii. 233): but they were still the most ardent in his service of all the medizing Greeks. They were the chief advisers of Mardonius at Plataea: where they fought with great courage, losing no fewer than 300 of their chief men. Against them probably was

aimed the oath of the Greek congress: “whatsoever Greeks, uncoerced and in estate whole, shall join the barbarian, them to decimate and send as slaves to the god at Delphi”: to fulfil which, the Greeks after the battle marched to Thebes; but were satisfied with the death of the chief criminals, Timegenides and Attaginus. By these events the supremacy of Thebes in Bœotia was for the time annihilated: but Sparta’s interest soon called for its revival. In consigning the Plataeans to Athens (ii. 73, note), Sparta had not miscalculated: Thebes and Athens were thenceforth enemies. Her hands full of the third Messenian war and the settlement of Arcadia, she had quietly regarded the aggressions of Athens upon the maritime towns of Argolis, and the subjugation of Ægina. But returning from the liberation of Doris (i. 107), an expedition not unconnected with intrigues with Cimon and the aristocratical or Laconian party at Athens, the Spartans, barred in their passage by the Athenians, bartered Plataea, the independence of Bœotia, and their solemn oaths (ii. 71), for the aid of Thebes at Tanagra and the promise of future active hostility against Athens. The Athenian democracy, brought to the brink of destruction by the defeat at Tanagra, quickly recovered itself by the victory of Cænophyta; subdued all Bœotia, except Thebes, and established the democracy in Thebes itself. Eight years, however, of democratic rule sufficed to revive the Theban oligarchy (Aristot. v. 3); the battle of Coroneia rid Bœotia of the Athenians, and was followed by the revolt of Eubœa and Megara: and Athens, now open to invasion from Peloponnesus, was glad, by the thirty years’ treaty, to secure Eubœa at the expense of all her possessions in Peloponnesus. The true bond of union, however, between Sparta and Thebes, lay in the constitution of the latter, at this time a timocracy, confined to such as had not for ten years appeared on the market-place (ibid. iii. 3): a union which remained unshaken till the surrender of Athens, when Sparta’s resistance to the demands of Corinth and Thebes for its destruction, unmasked her design of retaining it as an instrument for her ambitious projects.—Plataea, first of all burnt to the ground by Xerxes, was after this second destruction a second time rebuilt at the peace of Antalcidas, A.C.388: and a third time destroyed, 373, by the Thebans before the battle of Leuctra; and again restored by Philip, 337.]

[1][“At the ransom, as was voiced, of 800 talents guaranteed by their proxeni: but in truth, having engaged to bring over Corcyra to the Corinthians”. Some doubt the correctness of the word ἡκτακοσίων; considering it an incredible ransom for two hundred and fifty men, when that of a heavy-armed soldier was only two minæ (Herod. vi. 79). But at a time when the ransom of a hoplite did not exceed from three to five minæ, Æschines (de fals. leg.) speaks of a talent as that of a not wealthy individual; and an ambassador of Philip is said to have paid nine talents for his ransom: and these wealthy merchants of Corcyra, the richest in Greece, might well pay one of three talents each. Arn. The ransom, which was merely nominal, would naturally be high, the better to mislead as to the real object of their return.]

[1][ἡπρασσον: “they practised to make the city revolt”. Hac voce πράσσειν infinitis locis utitur Thucydides de his, qui quocunque dolo, arte, ac fraude aliquid moliantur ac machinantur. Duker.]

[2][On the articles. See i. 44.]

[3][?θελοπρόξενος. *Proxeni* homines dicebantur privati, quibus in patria urbe degentibus honorificum jus cum alia civitate publicitus intercedebat: his id muneris erat præcipue injunctum, ut sedulo prospicerent ne quid publica istius civitatis res a civibus suis caperet detrimenti, legatos illius venientes hospitio exciperent, ad populum deducerent, utque iis bene esset procurarent. Valck. The ?θελοπρόξενος, *voluntary* proxenus, was one that discharged the functions of proxenus to some state without the public authority of that state, or of the state in which he resided: it is disputed which. It appears that cities sometimes appropriated certain lands to the office of proxenus: and that the office sometimes descended as an inheritance from father to son.]

[4][χάρακας: “vine-poles”: that is, that they had cut in the sacred woods poles for making vine-poles. Göll. Arn. These five men were probably, like the Roman aristocracy with respect to the public lands, the tenants of the sacred grounds whence the poles were cut; and from long possession derived from their ancestors, had come to consider the lands as their own property. The Agrarian law at Rome, concerned the right of property in the *public* lands only. Arnold.]

[1]Of our money about 15*s.* 7½*d.* [Hobbes has probably taken the golden stater, which was twenty drachmæ: but Goeller and Arnold conceive the silver stater or tetradrachm to be here meant, which is not quite 2*s.* 2*d.*]

[2][“Being shut out by the law (from their hope of paying by instalments)”. Goeller.]

[3][“Conspired *together*”.]

[4][“That it was for the advantage of Athens, what they had done”. Goeller.]

[1][“And the haven adjacent to it and opposite to the continent”.]

[2][“Into the country”. A district lying to the west of the city, between it and mount Istone: called also τ? πεδίων, *the plain*; and by Xenophon, ? χώρα.] Goeller.]

[3][“Late in the afternoon”.]

[1][α?τοβοε?: see ii. 81, n. “And fearing lest the people should attack and *instantly* make themselves masters of the arsenal, and put them to the sword, to stop their passage set fire to their own houses (ο?κία) and the houses of the lower orders (ξυνοικ?ας), round about the agora, sparing neither the one nor the other. So that not only was much merchandise entirely consumed, but the whole city was in danger of being destroyed, if a wind arose and carried the flames that way. And they gave over fighting; and each side kept quiet, but upon the watch, during the night. And when” &c.—ο?κία is a house belonging to or hired by a single, and therefore a rich person: ξυνοικία one hired or inhabited by several persons or families, and therefore belonging to the lower orders. Arnold.]

[2][“*The leaders* of the people”.]

[1][“And they *picked out* their enemies for these ships”.]

[2] [“And endeavoured to encourage them (to go)”].

[1] [The Corcyraeans &c. “were through their own means in much distress: *and* the Athenians, fearing &c., did not charge those opposed to them either in a body or in the centre, but charged” &c.]

[1] [“In expectation &c.”, is considered by Bekker and the rest to be an interpolation.]

[2] [“At nightfall they (the Peloponnesians) had notice by fires *from Leucas* &c.” If the Athenian ships had as yet reached Leucas, the Peloponnesian fleet could not (as they afterwards did) have crossed the isthmus. Goeller.]

[1] [See iv. 8, note.]

[2] [See ch. 75.]

[3] [“And *bringing out of* the thirty ships (ἡκβιβάζοντες) all they had persuaded to go aboard, (ἡπεχρήντο or ἡνεχρήσαντο) they slew them”. Goeller, Arnold. Bekker and all the MSS. have ἡπεχώρησαν, “they went their way”. But then, what became of the men disembarked? Those slain as the ships “went about”, were part of those who had embarked to escape to the continent: of whom five hundred escaped thither (see ch. 85). Goeller.]

[1] [“And of the sanctuary men, that were not persuaded to stand their theirtrial, the greater part, when they saw what was done, slew each other thereright in the temple: and some hanged themselves on the trees, and others made away with themselves each man as he could”].

[2] [“Affecting to accuse the enemies of the people: but under that pretext died some also from private enmity; and others that had money owing to them, by the procurement of their debtors”. Goeller.]

[3] [“And there is nothing that usually falls out in such a case, which did not come to pass, and even more”].

[1] [“But when they were at war, to those of both sides desirous of innovating, the occasion of bringing in allies soon presented itself, both for weakening the alliance of their adversaries, and at the same time acquiring alliances for themselves”. Goeller.]

[2] [“Yet are they aggravated or more mild, and varying in form, according” &c. Goeller.]

[3] [“*Fell* into sedition”].

[4] [“Arbitrarily”].

[5] [Manliness *devoted to one’s party—disguised fear—wisdom*, the cloak &c.—*furious passion*.]

[1][“For violent measures”]

[2][“A still cleverer man”.]

[3][τῆς ἑταίρειας: of his *party*.]

[4][“For such associations are for no lawful purpose, but for the purposes of private ambition, contrary to the laws” &c. Goeller, Arnold.]

[5][“The fair proposals of their adversary, they received, if they were the stronger, with measures of precaution, and not ingenuously”. Goeller.]

[6][Of force, “so long as they had no power from other sources”: and he that first took courage, “if he saw his enemy unarmed”, thought &c.]

[1][“Men in general, when dishonest, more easily gain credit for cleverness, than when simple, for honesty”. Arnold.]

[2][The cause, *was* &c.]

[3][“And revenged them, inflicting punishment still greater than the injury”, without &c.]

[4][“So that neither side made any use of piety; but they were in highest esteem, that could perpetrate and hateful thing by fair words”.]

[1][“Simplicity, whereof, &c. was laughed down and disappeared; and it became better to stand &c.: for there was neither vehement promise nor terrible oath that could cure the distrust of enmity”. The next sentence is corrupt or untranslatable. Arnold.]

[2][“For through fear both of their own inferiority and their adversaries’ subtlety, lest they should be worsted by words and circumvented and outstripped by their crafty designs, they went &c.: whereas the others, in their arrogance trusting to being aware in time and thinking they needed not &c., were” &c.]

[3][Corcyra departed early from the moderate constitution of Corinth: and the separation from the motherstate, relaxing the connexion with the Peloponnesian league and bringing her in closer contact with Athens, accelerated her democratic tendency, and the popular assembly soon absorbed the supreme power. The licentiousness that sprang from this sedition, is coarsely expressed by the proverb: ἡλευθερα κέρκυρα· χέζ’ ἔπου θέλεις. The scenes here described, hitherto rare, yet being the result of causes that continued to operate throughout Greece with increasing malignity, soon became common and familiar. The old aristocracies had sunk, and made way either for tyrannies or more or less exclusive oligarchies, often ending in democracies. In every state existed, either a commonalty containing a germ of democracy, needing only favourable circumstances to unfold it: or a democracy tyrannising over the old aristocracy and the wealthy class, who on their side, united in *clubs* (ἑταίρειαι, ξυνωμόσται), ostensibly for the object of mutual support in elections

and law-suits, but in reality for the overthrow of the democracy, and secretly connected with similar societies in other states, awaited the time to strike the blow. So long as either party was decidedly predominant, the seeds of discord lay dormant but the rupture between Sparta and Athens, insuring foreign aid to both parties, rendered their inequality a matter of little moment, and conflicts became more frequent and men's passions more inflamed. The butcheries described here, and in iv. 46, were surpassed in Argos, when the battle of Leuctra having broken the power of Sparta and prostrated the party of the aristocracy in Peloponnesus, the popular leaders, after dispatching above twelve hundred of the chief citizens, themselves fell a sacrifice to their dread of farther bloodshed. A state of things arose, called *σκυταλισμὸς*, *bludgeon-law*: and Athens, as if all Greece were polluted, purified her market-place. The height to which party animosity was carried, appears in the oath of the *clubs* (Aristot. v. 9): "I will be ever the enemy of the people, and contrive for them all the mischief I can."]

[1][This chapter, by Bekker included in brackets, is pronounced by the scholiasts, Goeller, and Arnold, to be spurious.]

[1][That is, *bringing back*, or *restoration*.]

[1][“Those in the city”.]

[2][“The Doric cities were all except &c., confederates” &c.]

[3][That is, the Rhegians, between whom and the Athenians existed an ancient alliance which was renewed (A. C. 433) by a decree preserved in the Elgin marbles. Goeller.—“For that *they* were deprived” &c. Rhegium is said to have been founded, under the immediate direction of the Delphic oracle, by a band of Chalcidians, (that is, of *Ionians*), who had been consecrated, like an Italian *ver sacrum*, to Apollo to avert a famine, and were joined by Messenian exiles flying their country on the fall of Ithome (A.C.724) in the first Messenian war. Thirl. The *ver sacrum*, was the immolation of all animals born in that spring. Instances are not wanting of other colonies (Magnesia in Crete) founded in like manner. For an account of the Doric and Chalcidic states in Sicily, see vi. 3–5.]

[1][?κ τῶν τάξεων: see vi. 43, note. The equestrian order contained a thousand horsemen.]

[2][“At Orchomenus *in Bœotia*”. There was another in Arcadia.]

[3][“For *want* of water”. These islands have but few springs; and the nature of the soil appears to be such, as rapidly to absorb the moisture: so that the inhabitants have none but rain water, preserved in large tanks. Cnidus was a Lacedæmonian colony, founded by Hippotes, whose descendants (A.C.580) led a colony of Cnidians to Lipara, with whom and five hundred of the original Liparæans they founded a state: whence it is probable that Æolus, the god of the winds, who was supposed to live in these islands, came to be called the son of Hippotes. This, if true, shows the name ?πποτάδης in Od. κ, 2,37, to be later than the Homeric age. Muell. i.2.]

[1][“Of fire in the night, and smoke in the day”.]

[2][“About the same time, earthquakes being then prevalent, the sea first retiring from what was then land (that is, from the coast) at Orobæ in Eubœa, and then rising to a head, invaded a part of the city; and partly permanently inundated the land, but partly subsided: and what was formerly land is now sea.” Goeller, Arnold.]

[1][“A certain *retiring*”.]

[2][“By *an* earthquake”.]

[3][δύο ἑυλα?: “two Messanian tribes”. See vi. 98, note.]

[1][Goeller considers ? πέραν γ? to have become the proper name of Oropus: as *Terra Firma*, that of the isthmus of Darien.]

[1][The Malians dwelt in the valley of the Spercheus, enclosed on all sides by mountains, except on the side by the sea, where lived, as their name implies, the *Paralians*: the *Hieres*, or sacerdotal class, dwelt probably near the Amphictyonic temple at Thermopylæ: the *Trachinians*, on the declivities of Mount Œta. These people were in such close alliance with the Dorians, that Diodorus speaks of Trachis as the mother-town of Lacedæmon. They were a warlike race, no person being admitted to a share in the government that had not served as a hoplites. Mueller i. 2. See viii. 3, note.]

[1][See vi. 3, note.]

[2][Both of their own people and “of the periœci”.]

[3][“They built *anew*”. The old city, called Trachis, is mentioned by Herodotus vii. 199. Haack.]

[4][“Naval arsenals”.]

[5][*Whilst* it was founding.]

[6][That the Thessalians, “who were masters of the country thereabouts, and upon whose territory it encroached, fearing lest they should come and settle amongst themselves in considerable numbers”, afflicted &c.]

[1][“Not least *however*”.]

[1][The Hellenic or Æolian settlements in Ætolia, originally the land of the Curetes, seem never to have extended beyond the maritime parts; the interior apparently continuing to be occupied by tribes of a different origin, which by continual accessions from the north gained rather than lost ground. The character of the country, mountainous and woody and severed from the rest of Greece, whilst it kept it a stranger to Hellenic manners and civilization, was at the same time the cause of its retaining its independence, and finding itself in later times at the head of the Ætolian

league. The Locrians, who are connected by their traditions both with Ætolia and Elis (there being in the latter an Opuntian colony), claimed a higher antiquity than any other branch of the Greek nation; those of Opus boasting that Cynus, their port-town, was the dwelling of Deucalion on descending with his new people from Parnassus, and showing there the tomb of Pyrrha. The Locrian mythology seems to lead to the conclusion that the earliest population of eastern Locris were Leleges: and to them perhaps the name of Locrians originally belonged, though chiefs of a Hellenic, and most probably Æolian race, settled among them. Thirl. Muell.]

[1][That is, the Acarnanians, the Amphilochians, the Locri Ozolæ, &c. “With the Ætolians”: that is, “with the allies only, *if* the Ætolians would join them”. Goeller.]

[2][“Messenians”, omitted.]

[3][?πιβάταις: Anglice, *marines*. The trireme seems to have ordinarily carried ten *epibatæ* or marines. “The number of forty *epibatæ* to a ship, mentioned by Herodotus vi. 15, belongs to the earliest stage of Greek naval tactics, when victory depended more on the soldiers than on the manœuvres of the seamen. It was in this very point that the Athenians improved the system, by decreasing the number of *epibatæ*, and relying on the skilful management of their vessels”. Arn. See i. 49. But Arnold seems to err in supposing that they were chosen from the *Thetes*: the character given in ch. 98 of these *epibatæ*, “the very best of the Athenians that fell in this war”, hardly belonging to men from the *Thetes*. Neither however were they chosen from the *army*, though sometimes *reinforced* thence. Goeller, Boeckh.]

[1]“They were *all* united”. It is not to be understood that any Ætolian tribe extended to the Malian gulf; but probably, that the Bomienses and Callienses occupied the heads of the valleys on the Ætolian side of Cæta, and extended over the ridge and some way down the valleys of the streams running into the Ægean. Arnold.]

[1][“Which attacking”.]

[2][ψιλο?: without armour.]

[3][“But when &c., *and* the *hoplitæ* were also wearied &c., *and* the Ætolians still afflicted them &c., they were at last forced” &c.]

[1][?λακία: “and the very flower of the Athenians”. The word is used in the same sense in ch. 67.]

[2][“And took in a station or fort of the *περίπολοι*”: in ch. 115, called ?ρούριον.]

[3][“Having *heretofore* sent”: that is, before the Ætolian expedition.]

[1][“To hold out”.]

[2]“To Æolis, now called Calydon and Pleuron, and *to* the places there”. Goeller, Arnold. The country about Calydon, and perhaps all the south of Ætolia, once bore the name of Æolis. The earlier inhabitants were Æolians. Thirlwall.]

[1] [“And being their (the Athenians’) allies (having revolted to them from the Syracusians), had joined their standard, went and attacked Inessa, *the* town of the Sikeli &c.: and when they could not” &c. ?π’ ?νησσαν. Bekker.]

[2] [“Made several descents from their ships upon Locris at the river Cæcinus”.]

[1] [The distance was four stadia, about 760 yards. Goeller.]

[2] [That is, the inhabitants of the Cyclades.]

[3] Homer, Hym. ad Apoll. vers. 146.

[1] Hym. ad Apoll. vers. 165.

[2] [“Witnessed, that there was of old *too* a great meeting and solemnity in Delos. And the islanders and the Athenians used afterwards to send the chorus with sacrifices: but the games and most of the solemnities fell into disuse” &c.—The irruptions of the Æolians into Bœotia, and the Dorians into Peloponnesus, caused great stir amongst the population of those countries: resulting in three great movements, called the *Æolian*, *Dorian*, and *Ionian* migrations. Of the Achæans, expelled from Argolis and Laconia, some migrated: others in turn expelled the Ionians from *Ionia*, the district since called *Achaia*. The migrating Achæans, passing through Bœotia to embark in search of new seats in the east, were joined, as is believed, by part of the antient Cadmean population and of their Æolian conquerors: and this, the *Æolian* migration, may perhaps be regarded, in its origin, as a continuation of the former Achæan enterprise against the territory of Priam. Headed by descendants of Agamemnon, and embarking from the same port, Aulis, whence he had led the Greeks to Troy, they took the same direction: and some settling in Lesbos, and there founding six cities, others occupied the coast of Asia from the foot of Ida to the mouth of the Hermus. Here they found their old enemies, the allies of Troy, the Pelasgians, still in possession of the coast, but reduced to great weakness by the Trojan war. Taking their chief town, Larissa, the invaders founded Cume Phriconis; the chief of the eleven cities of *Æolis*. About the same time, another body of Achæans and Dorians were led by Dorian chiefs to the south–west corner of the Asiatic peninsula. In Rhodes were founded Lindus, Ialysas, and Camirus: forming with Halicarnassus, Cnidus, and Cos, an exclusive association, which, after Halicarnassus was excluded for the reason given by Herodotus (i. 144), was called the *Doric Pentapolis*, and jointly worshipped the Dorian god, Apollo, at Triopium. The Ionian fugitives from Achaia sought refuge with their kindred in Attica: whence, with swarms of Phœcean and other adventurers, they followed the sons of Codrus to the part of Asia lying between the Hermus and the Mæander: blessed with a climate extolled by Herodotus as the most delicious in the known world. In their passage across the Ægean, many formed settlements in the Cyclades, and in time *Delos* became a common sanctuary of the Ionians. Samos, Chios, and the Asiatic coast were at this time inhabited by various tribes, as Carians and Leleges, and by others recently driven from Greece by the same causes as these Ionian settlers. With all these they readily united, except the Carians and Leleges, whom they expelled or exterminated. Gradually arose twelve independent states: Samos, Chios, Miletus, Myus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedos, Teos, Erythræ,

Clazomenæ, and Phocæa. Though formed of such widely differing elements, they all assumed the Ionian name, and were regarded as parts of one nation: and all, except Ephesus and Colophon, kept the feast of the Apaturia (see chap. 55, note). Their meetings were held at a spot at the foot of mount Mycale, called Panionium, and consecrated to the Ionian god, Poseidon. The periodical meetings, however, for the sole object of honouring the tutelary god, but affording also an opportunity for political deliberation when called for, formed the nearest approach of these colonies to a political union of the cities even of the same race. As to the Æolians, it is not certain they possessed even such a centre of union: though they may, by analogy, be supposed to have held similar assemblies near the temple of Apollo at Gryneia. The difference of race, which kept asunder the Greeks in Europe, was not forgotten by passing across the Ægean: and there existed, at the time of migrating, no power in Asia formidable enough to terrify the three races into a union, which might have changed the history of the European Greeks as well as their own. The increase of wealth and refinement was far more rapid in the colonies than in the mother-country: and in the seventh and sixth centuries A.C. the progress of mercantile industry and maritime discovery was coupled by the Asiatic Greeks, especially the Ionians, with intellectual pursuits and the cultivation of the nobler arts, in a degree unequalled in history before the opening of the latest period of European civilization. Miletus, regarded as the common protectress of the Greek settlers, by her eighty colonies in the Propontis and the Euxine caused the latter sea to change its name (ii. 96, note): whilst Phocæa was exploring, in the west, the shores of Spain, Italy, and the Adriatic. But luxurious and disunited, they successively became the prey of the Lydians and Persians. With the aid of Athens (the proximate cause of the war that ensued between Asia and Greece) they revolted from Darius, and were subdued: and in retaliation for the burning of Sardis and the temple of Cybebe, every revolted city (Samos only excepted) was with its temples committed to the flames. The fate of Miletus was so taken to heart by the Athenians, that Phrynichus by his tragedy, the Fall of Miletus, moved the whole audience to tears, and was fined a thousand drachmæ for reminding them of national calamities. These events may perhaps be “the adversity” which caused the disuse of the games. It is remarkable that in this general conflagration of cities and temples, Delos, as “the birth-place of the twin-gods”, or the temple at any rate, was held inviolate by the generals of Darius (Herod. vi. 97): perhaps from some conceived analogy between Apollo and Artemis, and the Persian deities, the sun and moon.]

[1][“*And* the Acarnanians and *a* few Amphilochians (for the greater part the Ambraciotes forcibly kept back) were already assembled at Argos, and prepared” &c.]

[2][“*And* the Peloponnesian army being superior in numbers and outflanking him, Demosthenes therefore fearing” &c.]

[3][“Overgrown with brushwood”.]

[1][“*And* the rest of the ground was occupied by the Acarnanians, posted each in their own place, and by the Amphilochian darters that were there.”]

[2][Stood “*towards* the left”.]

[3][“But panic–struck themselves, caused the flight of the greater part of the army besides”.]

[4][“The Ambraciotes *and* those in the right wing, chased &c.: for they are the most warlike of any in those parts. But on their *return*, seeing the greatest part” &c.]

[1][And “after the great defeat sustained” not finding &c.]

[1][“And buried them in haste, as they best might”.]

[2][“With their whole power”.]

[3][“To support them”.]

[4][“But the Ambraciotes and *the* others, (the mercenaries, ch. 109), that happened *thus* (on pretext of gathering herbs) to be come out together in great numbers, seeing the others go off, were eager” &c.]

[1][“Demosthenes as soon as he had supped, and the rest of the army as soon as it was evening, set out on the march; he with one–half of the army towards the pass, and the other half through the hills of Amphilochia”. $\text{?}\sigma\beta\omicron\lambda\text{?}$ seems to mean *a pass through hills*; but what pass is here meant, is not clear. Goeller understands that of Idomene.]

[1][“Which was not far off”.]

[2][“If needs must”.]

[1][“The arms here then *agree not* (with those of 200), but” &c. Göll.]

[1][“The Acarnanians &c., granted to those Ambraciotes &c., a truce to retire from Eniadaë, whither they had indeed removed from Salynthius”. This is Hermann’s reading, adopted by Goeller, Arnold, &c.]

[2][Vulgo, $\text{?}\mu\omicron\pi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. Bekker and the rest, $\text{?}\mu\eta\pi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$: *hostages*.]

[1][“By the Sikeli”. Goeller, Arnold.]

[2][“From the high country”.]

[3][They, the Syracusans.]

[1][“*The* fort”. See ch. 99, note.]

[2][“And (it is said) *that*” &c.]

[1][The place “afforded an approach to Sicily”. Goeller, Arnold.]

[1][That is, from their own territory, Locris, and with naval forces from Messana. Goeller.]

[2][“To oppose the Locrians”.]

[1][“Were hastening”.]

[1][ταξίαρχοις. The ten tribes were the groundwork both in levying and arranging the Athenian army: and accordingly, ten *strategi* and ten *taxiarchs*, as well as ten *phylarchs*, were yearly chosen. But the taxiarchs here meant, are the commanders, not of the *tribes*, but of the *τάξις*: a body consisting of about 100 men, and the principal, if not the only elementary division of the army. The only known officers, are the *strategi* and the *taxiarchs*.]

[2][“He remained quietly at Pylus owing to the bad weather: till at last there came upon the soldiers lying idle, a desire of their own accord, *setting to work on all sides*, to wall in the place”. Arn. *changing their opinion*: Goell. Bekker, &c. περιστ?σιν. Vulgo περ?? στάσιν.]

[1][“The Spartans themselves, and the nearest of the *periaeci* &c.: but the Lacedæmonians came” &c. The distinction is here made between *Spartans* and *Lacedæmonians*. The former name belonged only to the *Dorians* of Sparta: the latter was the proper name of the *periaeci*, or old Achæan inhabitants of Laconia, as distinguished from the Spartans. With relation however to foreign states, the name *Lacedæmonians* was used to signify the Spartan state: and then embraced both Spartans and *periaeci*.]

[2][Leucadia, originally a peninsula, seems to have been twice reduced by manual labour to the form of an island. “Leucadiæ, quum antiquitus peninsula esset, a Corinthiis per Cypselum et Gargasum illic missis isthmus perfossus est”. Poppo. We see that in the time of Thucydides it was again become a peninsula; whilst Livy says of it: “Leucadia *nunc insula*, et vadoso freto, quod perfossum manu est, ab Acarnania divisa, tum (A. C. 197) peninsula erat, occidentis regione arctis faucibus cohærens Acarnaniæ. Quingentos ferme passus longæ fauces erant: latae haud amplius centum et viginti”. xxxiii. 17. It took its name from the *white* cliff, the celebrated lover’s leap.]

[3][Demosthenes sent secretly &c., “before the Lacedæmonians could get there”.]

[1][“To bar up &c., so that the Athenians might not put into it”.]

[1][“Were *taken* there”. Bekk. &c.]

[2][“And when he had drawn up under the fort the galleys he had of those left behind, he placed a stockade close to them”. Goeller. Two out of the five ships left behind with him had been sent to Zacynthus: see ch. 8.]

[3][“And even those osier bucklers they took” &c. *κέλης* (a light horseman) is a small sharp sailing boat. Scholiast.]

[4][“He placed upon the strongest parts of the fortifications, and upon the strong positions towards the continent”.]

[1][“And they (the Peloponnesians) expected, that if they could force a landing, the place might be taken”. Goeller, Arnold.]

[2][“To hinder their landing, if he could”.]

[3][“Since even from this straight he may escape”. Goeller.]

[4][“*Both* the difficulty”—“*and* their numbers”. See next note.]

[5][They will land well enough: “and we shall have a more dangerous enemy to deal with, by reason of his retreat being cut off if we even chance to force him: for in their ships, they are most easy to keep off; but when disembarked, they are then on equal terms with us. *And their numbers* are not much to be feared: for though they be many, they will few of them fight, for want of room to land at: and their army is not on land, superior to us in numbers and on equal terms in other respects: but they have to fight from their ships, where many favourable circumstances belonging to the sea will be required (for their success). So that I think” &c. Goeller.]

[1][He got upon the landingsteps, but was *beaten* back &c.]

[2][*παρεξαιρεσίαν*: the extremity of the galley, both at the head and stern, where the benches for the rowers cease.]

[1][“For it was at that time the great glory of the former, (the Lacedæmonians), that they were chiefly landsmen and strongest in the army; of the latter (the Athenians) that they excelled most in ships and naval matters”.]

[2][“Fifty”: Goeller, Arnold. See ch. 23, where a reinforcement of 20 ships is said to raise the whole to 70.]

[1][“And chasing them, disabled a great many for the short distance of the pursuit; and took five &c.: and the rest that had taken refuge ashore, they struck amidships”.]

[2][“They tied &c. and towed away, the men having taken to flight”.]

[1][“The *empty* galleys”.]

[2][“Had passed at Pylus”.]

[3][“To send the Ephori to the camp, to see and determine *forthwith* what should be done”. Bekk. Arn. Goeller agrees with Hobbes.]

[1][“For every man, two Attic chœnixes of barley bread”. A chœnix was the forty–eighth part of a medimnus, and a cotyle the fourth part of a chœnix: a medimnus of corn was about a bushel and a half, English measure; and is valued by Boeckh at two drachme. The monthly contribution of every Spartan to the public table, was a

medimnus of barley—meal (the common food in Greece), and eight chœnixes of wine: so that the daily allowance for each man, was about a chœnix and a half of meal; the chœnix being equal to about two English pints.]

[2][That they might guard it “in any way short of landing in it”.]

[3][κα? ?τιο?ν: “in any part, be it what it may”. See the handle made of this by the Athenians, ch. 23.]

[1][“We are about to lengthen our speech, not indeed against our wont, but that it is our natural practice, where few words suffice, there indeed not to use many: but to use more, when occasion may be for explaining by words something important in order to effect our object”. Goell. See the story related by Herodotus, iii. 46. Arnold.]

[1][“Always aspire”.]

[2][“Come to you, hitherto thinking ourselves too high to grant what we now come to request”.]

[3][“But deceived in our opinion, (taken) from our ordinary resources”. Goeller, Arnold.]

[4][“From the present strength of your state, and its late accessions, that fortune” &c.]

[1][“To leave a reputation beyond the reach of danger”.]

[2][“*And* thinking it better”.]

[3][That is, should be not only blockaded, but actually taken.]

[4][“But when, having it in his power, and by his virtue prevailed on, to compound on equal terms, he should contrary to what an enemy expects be reconciled”. Goeller.]

[1][“And men more readily do this towards their great enemies, than towards those with whom they have only some ordinary difference. And naturally” &c.]

[2][“Besides the hatred of the state, that also of individuals”: that is, for the loss each family would suffer. The Spartan aristocracy would feel it a personal wound to lose so many of the members of their principal families. Arn. Göll.]

[3][“And *let* us not only ourselves prefer” &c.]

[1]τ? μέγι?α τιμήσει: “will give us highest honour”. Conveying to the understanding of the wiser sort of the hearers, the consideration of tyrannizing the rest of Greece. For by the highest honour, he means tyranny; but avoiding the envy of the word. Because if he had said it plainly, the confederates would see, that they which termed themselves *the Deliverers of Greece*, would now, out of private interest, be content to

join with the Athenians to tyrannize it. [Goeller and Arnold have adopted the idea contained in this note. See v. 50, note.]

[2][“When the Athenians *came to terms* being” &c. See i. 115. Athens is said by Thirlwall (iii. 43), to have had some hold on Achaia enabling her to levy troops there. In any other sense it would be difficult to say how Achaia ever belonged to Athens to restore to Sparta (see i. 115). Trœzen is supposed before its restoration by Athens to have been captured by Tolmides in his expedition against Peloponnesus (i. 108). In it, as in Epidaurus, appear distinct traces of the ancient Ionian population: its fabulous genealogies and religious rites attesting a close connexion between its earlier inhabitants and the Athenians: so much so, that it shared with the Ionic cities in the worship of the Apaturian Minerva (see iii. 55, note).]

[1][“Lay encamped on the continent, and made assaults” &c.]

[1][“The Athenians would be unable, both to cruize against them, and to be masters of the strait”.—*Rhegium* is supposed to be derived from ρήγνυμι, *to break*: as if it were the point at which Sicily had been severed from Italy.—“Charybdis appears to be an agitated water of from seventy to ninety fathoms in depth, circling in quick eddies. It is owing probably to the meeting of the harbour and lateral currents with the main one, the latter being forced over in this direction by the opposite point of Pezzo. This agrees in some measure with the relation of Thucydides, who is the only writer of remote antiquity I remember to have read, who has assigned to this danger its true situation, and not exaggerated its effects”. Smyth’s Mem. on Sicily.]

[2][“Each”: that is, the Syracusans and Locrians.]

[1][“At Peloris in Messene”.]

[2][α?το?: Goell. Arn.: “they *on their part* lost a galley”. Vulgo et Bekk., α?το?ς: “the Athenians *destroyed* for them (the Syracusans) a galley”. But there being no men to swim out of any Syracusan galley, it could not belong to them.]

[3][“Getting themselves out to sea by a lateral movement”. Goell. Arn.]

[4][?σέβαλλον is supposed to be corrupt: and never means, in Thucydides, *adoriri urbem*, but *irruptionem facere in terram*; and is never joined with πρὸς. Poppo.]

[1][“Putting into Messina”.]

[2][“Against the city”.]

[1][That is, on the beach.]

[2][“Some to take their victual on shore, and others to lie at anchor. *And* it was very great discouragement, the time” &c.]

[3][“*More* easily: for it was then impossible to lie round &c., *whilst* the Helots were not tender” &c.]

[1][“Skins”. The seed of the white poppy, roasted and mixed with honey, was a dish in the second course amongst the ancients.]

[2][“Seeing that the transport of the necessary supplies round Peloponnesus would be impossible; (and this in a desert place, where even in summer they were unable to send them sufficient supplies); and that there could be no watch kept by their galleys, the place being harbourless: so that either, themselves giving over the blockade, the men would escape so, or taking advantage of some foul weather, they would get out aboard the ships that brought them food”.]

[1][“That the Lacedæmonians felt they had some strong ground to rely on”.]

[2][“He advised the Athenians, seeing them somewhat more inclined in their minds to the expedition, that it was not fit” &c.]

[3][“The *generals*”: that is, the ten annually chosen.—“That himself *at any rate*, if he had” &c.]

[1][“For what concerned them (the generals)”. Arnold.]

[2][Gave *up* his command.]

[3][“But nevertheless the affair gave great content to the wiser sort, considering that of two” &c.]

[1][“And was proceeding to sail shortly”. Arnold.]

[2][“And he was confirmed” &c.]

[3][“*He* was afraid”.]

[4][“For to themselves the deficiencies and the preparation of their enemy, being hidden by the wood, would not be equally visible”.]

[1][“In a great degree”. See i. 23.]

[2][“Having unwittingly set fire to a small part of the wood, and the wind” &c.]

[3][Discerning that the Lacedæmonians were more &c., “*and that* the Athenians would take the affair rather to heart as a matter of importance, *and that* the island was easier to land in than he thought for, did now prepare for the enterprise, and both sent” &c.]

[1][“The middle of the island, being the most level and where lay the water, was kept” &c.]

[2][“For there was *there*” &c.]

[3][“They (the guards) being yet in their cabins and in the act of taking arms, and they (the Athenians) having landed unobserved; the Lacedæmonians thinking that those galleys had come” &c.]

[1][The trireme had three ranks of rowers, the *Thranitæ*, *Zygitæ*, and *Thalamii*. Of these the *Thalamii* were the lowest order or least efficient men, and were therefore unprovided with arms and unfit for action. The relative position in the galley of these three ranks, is matter of doubt: some placing them one above the other, others the *Thranitæ* in the stern, the *Zygitæ* in midships, and the *Thalamii* in the head. Goeller.]

[2][“*Were* to follow them”. *ἡπορώτατοι* (*meanliest provided* &c.) is rendered by Goeller “most difficult to get at”.—“Who are *formidable* at a distance”.]

[1][“Whilst the heavy-armed advanced not, but lay still”.]

[1][*πῆλος* seems to have signified a *helmet*, as well as a *jerkin* or lining of the breast-plate: here probably the latter. From its original signification of *hair*, it may be supposed to be something made of hair. Goeller.]

[2][“To the stronghold at the extremity of the island, which was not far off, and their own guards”.]

[1][“Wherever they gave a passage, and where trusting” &c. Goeller.]

[1][“For there they were slain by the Persians, who turned them by the path (over the mountains)”.]

[2][“Knowing that if they gave ground any more, be it ever so little, they would be utterly destroyed by their army, stayed the fight” &c.]

[3][“Whether would they” &c.]

[4][“That had command (*πρότερον*) before Styphon”.]

[1][The Spartans had three officers chosen by the ephors, called *Hippagretæ*: each of whom chose 100 young men, the very flower of the Spartan youth, justifying his choice by his reasons. These 300 accompanied the king on expeditions not far from home: and were called, “the 300 horsemen”. (Muell. iii. 12.) But it is probable that *Hippagretes* is here a proper name and not that of the office.]

[1][“*Spartans*”: see ch. 8, note.]

[2][“By *what* was brought in”.]

[3][*καλο?* *κ’αγαθο?*, *γεννα?οι*, &c. were the titles assumed by the aristocratical class in Greece: whilst the plebeians were designated as *δειλο?*, *κακο?*, *πονηρο?*, and the like. See Aristot. iv. 8.]

[1][Pylos was destined to belong once more to the Messenians. The ancient inhabitants of Messenia (Caucones and Leleges) appear to have been mixed, before the Dorian invasion, with a people from the north of Thessaly. There stood an Ithome, a Tricca, and an Œchalia, all within the district afterwards called *Doris*: and it is probable that the irruption of the Dorians into Doris caused the migration that carried these names to Messenia. The Messenians are said to have submitted quietly to their Dorian sovereigns. Their Heracleid kings appear in fact to have adopted a wise and liberal system of government, very different from the oppressive rule of the Dorians in Laconia and Argolis. But the Dorians shrank from all intercourse with the native population: and jealous of the favour showed to them by Cresphontes, (the son of Aristomachus to whose lot fell Messenia), they assassinated him. His successors nevertheless are found dedicating temples and instituting rites in honour of the old Messenian gods and heroes, apparently for the purpose of effacing national distinctions by a common worship. Pylos, before the Dorian invasion the most important town of Messenia, seems to have remained long unsubdued, and to have been held by the Nestoridæ for several centuries after they had wrested it from the house of Atreus. Even in their second struggle with Sparta, in the seventh century A. C., the Messenians still found allies in the Nestoridæ: and after their defeat were long sheltered at Pylos and Methone. The revival of Messenia in 369, gave Sparta her death-blow. After the battle of Leuctra, the Messenians were recalled by Epaminondas to their native land: and the city of Messene was founded on the site of their ancient stronghold, Ithome. The chief of the new settlers appear to have been the Messenian exiles (see i. 103), who at the close of the Peloponnesian war were expelled from Naupactus, and betook themselves, part to their kinsmen at Rhegium, part to Hesperis, the Cyrenaic city in Africa. From their singular tenacity of the Doric dialect and customs, they seem to have included many Dorian families: and appear accordingly to have been very impatient under the democratic equality prevailing afterwards at Messene.]

[1][“And setting sail, betimes next morning they put in” &c.]

[1][“*Twelve stadia*”. The isthmus, generally understood as the neck of land between Schœnus on the one sea, and Diholcus on the other: that is, as the names imply, the ancient place of transport over the isthmus: must here be taken as extending as far as Cenchreïæ.—Ephyra, the Dorian “Corinth of Jupiter”, became a seat of the Æolic race: but the more ancient population are believed to have been nearly allied to that of Attica: the legends of Sicyon and Corinth speak of an ancient connexion between this region and Attica: and the distinct traces of the Ionians found in Trœzen and Epidaurus, and the well attested antiquity of the Cynurians, “Ionians doricised under the Argives” (Herod. viii. 73), show that the Ionian name had in very early times prevailed on the eastern, as well as the western, side of Peloponnesus. The *Iasian*, supposed to mean *Ionian*, appears to be a more ancient epithet of Argos, than the *Achæan*.—This account of the reduction of Corinth, illustrates the Dorian mode of warfare in subduing the country: and also shows that the great revolution which imposed a foreign yoke on the Achæans, was not (according to the common legend) effected by a momentary struggle. The plan was to occupy a strong post, as the top of some hill, near the enemy’s city, and wear him out by incessant excursions. And when the number is considered (not exceeding 20,000) of the Dorian warriors migrating to

Peloponnesus, it is difficult to conceive how a people, notoriously inexpert at storming fortifications, could subdue a country abounding in inaccessible strongholds in any other manner. The reduction of Argos, against which, after marching through Arcadia and seating themselves in the plains of Sparta, they first turned their arms, is another example. Upon a hill about three miles south of Argos, stands *Temenium*: a fortified place, so called from containing a monument of Temenus, one of the three sons of the Heracleid chief Aristomachus. From this spot, after a hard struggle and manifestly after the death of Temenus, the Dorians made themselves masters of Argos: and it is a fable therefore, which represents the descendants of Aristomachus as having nothing to do on entering Peloponnesus, but to cast lots and take possession of their several districts, Argolis, Messenia, and Laconia. Cresphontes, another son, founded a new capital in the plain of Stenyclerus: doubtless, as the first step towards the conquest of the whole land, neither Pylos nor Andania, the seat of the ancient Messenian kings, being yet in his possession. As to Laconia, it is clear that it cost the Dorians much time and toil to subdue it. Amyclæ, lying not three miles from Sparta, and apparently the ancient capital of the Achæan kings, was not reduced till the close of the ninth century, 300 years after the invasion: and Helos itself, not till later. Nor was it till about the first Olympiad, 776, that Laconia was so far subdued and tranquillized, as to enable the Spartans to turn their arms against their neighbours.]

[1][“As soon as it landed”.]

[1][“And retiring to a wall, they threw from above (for the place was all rising ground) the stones of the wall; and singing the Pæan, again charged: whom when” &c.]

[2][“For that *the* horsemen supported the Athenians, and did them great” &c. See chap. 42.]

[3][“The greatest slaughter was in the right wing”.]

[1]To fetch off the dead by a herald, was a confession of being the weaker: but yet Nicias chooseth rather to renounce the reputation of victory, than omit an act of piety. Besides, the people took marvellously ill the neglect of the dead bodies: as may appear by their sentence on the captains after the battle of Arginusæ.

[1][“Wherein lies Methone.”]

[1][“Did not conceal their reluctance”.]

[1][“Whilst the greater part slew themselves, some with the arrows &c., and others with cords &c., in every conceivable way making away with themselves most part of the night (for &c.): they perished also by the shot from above”. Goeller.]

[2][?ορμηδ?v: see ii. 75, note.]

[3][“For of one of the parties”.]

[4][“And the Athenians sailed for Sicily, whither &c.: and prosecuted” &c.]

[1][“And the Acarnanians”.]

[2][“Out of the Assyrian *character*”. Fortassis hoc significat Thucydides: Persas non habuisse suas ac proprias literarum formas, sed ad scribendam adhibuisse literas Assyrias, quas pro antiquissimis habet Plinius; et ab Assyriis ad Phœnices aliosque Orientis populos venisse, viri docti existimant. Duker. It was in Assyrian and Greek characters that Darius inscribed, on the two pillars erected on the Bosphorus, the names of all the tribes that accompanied him in the Scythian expedition. Herod. iv. 87.]

[1][“Taking however from the Athenians such security as they could, that no innovation should be made in their state”. Goell. Arn.]

[2][“Coming from”.]

[3][“The cities called *Actææ*, formerly occupied by the Mytilenæans but then in the possession of the Athenians, and especially Antandros; which having fortified (seeing there was there abundant means for building galleys, &c.) they might easily issue thence with” &c. These cities, namely, Antandros, and perhaps Coryphantis and Heracleia, were taken by the Athenians, iii. 50.—Has ἠκταίας vocatas Thucydides dicit haud dubie quod in propinqua Lesbo ora Asiæ sitæ erant. Duker.]

[1][“Of the *Periæci*”: that is, not *Spartans*: see ch. 8. Cythera was colonized by Lacedæmonians (see vii. 57).—“And every year there *went over*” &c.]

[2][“Being that way only vulnerable. For it (Laconia) lieth wholly out” &c. Laconia is most properly described by the poet, as a country difficult of access to an enemy: a character of great historical importance. To the north and east, the plain of Sparta can be invaded by two natural passes only: one opening from the upper vale of the Eurotas; the other from that of the Cenus, in which a road leading from Arcadia by the western side of Parnon, and another crossing the same hill from Argos through Cynuria, meet at Sellasia. On the west, Taygetus forms an almost insurmountable barrier. It is indeed traversed by a track, which beginning near the head of the Messenian gulf, enters the plain near Sparta through a narrow defile at the foot of lofty and precipitous rocks. But this pass the simplest precautions would secure. At the mouth of the Laconian gulf, Cythera, with its excellent harbours, was a valuable appendage or a formidable neighbour. Thirl. Demaretus advised Xerxes to invade Laconia from this point: describing it, as an island which it were better for Sparta to be sunk in the sea. Herod. vii. 235.]

[1][There must be some error here. The heavy-armed soldiers already said to have embarked, are two thousand men in all. There could scarcely be so many of the Milesians. Goeller.]

[2][“Marched upon the city of Cythera on the sea”. Cythera seems to have consisted of an upper and lower town: one on the heights, the other close to the sea.]

[1][For otherwise the Athenians *would have* removed” &c. This is an amendment of Heilman, adopted by all the recent editors. That they were not in fact removed, appears in ch. 57.]

[2][“Having received (from the Milesians) Scandea, *the* fort upon the haven &c., they sailed to Asine *and Helos* and most” &c. The Asinæans (those at least of the Asine mentioned in ch. 13) were Dryopes: a race expelled by the Dorians, in the first stage of their wanderings from the north of Thessaly, from the land between Parnassus and Cæta afterwards called Doris. Such of them as submitted to the invaders, were either transplanted to the south side of Parnassus, and under the title of Craugallidæ made bondmen of the temple of Delphi: or else migrated to Eubœa and Peloponnesus, and established themselves in Asine, Hermione, and Eion on the coast of Argolis. Shortly before the first Messenian war, they were expelled from Asine by the Argives, for aiding the Spartans in an inroad on the Argive territory: and took refuge in Laconia. In that war they assisted the Spartans against the Messenians: for which service they were rewarded, on the fall of Ithome, with a part of the Messenian coast, where they founded another Asine, and there long preserved their national name and recollections. The Dorian migration appears to have scattered the Dryopes in various directions over the sea: as besides Eubœa, they were found also in Cyprus, Ionia, and the shores of the Hellespont. They were of Arcadian, that is, Pelasgian origin.]

[1][A war “they were unprovided for”: never having expected to see the enemy in Laconia. The cavalry were in after times raised from 400 to 600: but never were a match for the better mounted and practised cavalry (the ῥιπποὶ, v. 57, note) of Bœotia. Mueller iii. 12.]

[2][“And one body, stationed for the defence of Cortyta and Aphrodisia, charged and frighted in &c.: *and* when the men of arms” &c.]

[1][That is, Argolis.—For *Cynuria*, see v. 41, note.]

[2][“Into the *citadel*”—“cooped up within *it*”. Goeller.]

[1][“Together with Tantalus &c., captain of the Lacedæmonians, who was amongst them and was wounded” &c.]

[2][In this year died Artaxerxes: shortly before whose death Zopyrus, son of the Megabyzus mentioned in i. 109, revolted and fled to Athens. His flight is mentioned by Herodotus, iii. 160: and is, as Goeller says, the latest incident alluded to in his history.]

[1][“If it succeed not, so that we part each having what he conceives to be his right, we will go to war again hereafter. (First however let us agree amongst ourselves till we are rid of the Athenians.) And indeed you must see that this assembly &c.” Schol. Goell. Arn.]

[1][“Of the commodities in Sicily which” &c.]

[1][This they proved “upon the invitation of the Chalcidian race”.]

[2][The *league*: that is, the ancient alliance in iii. 86.]

[3][“And the Athenians that covet &c., may well be pardoned: and I blame not &c. — *But* we are to blame, as many as know this and do not provide aright, and whoever comes here not judging it a most admirable maxim, that all join in averting the common danger”.]

[1][“*And* if some man be &c., let him not be disappointed if he fail, contrary to his expectation: knowing” &c.]

[2][“And so far as we have each of us fallen short in the designs which we thought to execute, considering that we have been abundantly thwarted by these stumbling-blocks (the Athenians), let us banish hence the impending enemy”. Göll.]

[1][“Love of contention”.]

[1][“Told them, that they were intending to come to terms (with the rest of the Sicilians); and that the treaty should be open to them (the Athenians) also”. κ?κείνοις, cannot relate to the allies.]

[1][“Prosperity beyond expectation”.—“A strength *of* hope”: *i. e.* supplied by hope.]

[2][The fall of Corinth (ch. 42, n.) brought the Dorians for the first time in contact with Attica: but the expedition failed through the devotion of Codrus. Hearing that the Delphic oracle had promised them success, if they spared the Athenian king, he is said to have procured his own death by stratagem at the hands of a Dorian: and on the Athenians demanding his body, they withdrew in despair from Attica. The expedition however had the important result of finally separating Megaris from Attica. It was now occupied by a Dorian colony, and remained long subject to Corinth, as Ægina was to Epidaurus, Chæroneia to Orchomenus &c.: so much so that the same observances were exacted from the Megarean peasantry on the death of a Bacchiad, as from the Laconian periœci on the death of the Spartan king (see Herod. vi. 55). Aided by Argos, the Megareans recovered their independence, and remained subject to their own Dorian oligarchy till about 620: when a popular insurrection raised to the throne the demagogue Theagenes, who had gained his popularity by destroying the cattle of the rich in their pastures (Arist. v. 5). To confirm his own power, he aided his son-in-law Cylon in his attempt on Athens (i. 126). Like the other *tyrants*, he prompted industry and the arts, and employed the people in adorning the city with splendid and useful buildings. Upon his overthrow, whether by Sparta or not is uncertain, the democracy soon lost sight of all moderation: and Solon’s *disburthening ordinance* was improved upon, by not simply cancelling the debt, but also compelling the creditor to refund the interest received. So freely were the rich banished for the sake of their confiscated property, that in the end (as happened also at Cume) the banished became the stronger party, and ejected the democracy (Arist. v. 5). It was perhaps at this period that ostracism was adopted at Megara. On the rupture between Sparta and Athens in the third Messenian war (i. 102), the people were again

uppermost, and fought on the side of the Athenians at Tanagra: but the defeat at Coroneia was followed by a revolution at Megara. How the oligarchy came to be at this time in banishment, does not appear.]

[1][“Knowing that the people, in their present distress, could no longer hold with themselves, in their fear made an offer” &c. Arn. Goell.]

[2][“Which would more readily *surrender*, if that” &c.]

[3][“*The island*”.]

[1][The Athenian youth at the age of eighteen took the military oath, ο? κατασχυν? ?πλα τ? ?ερά. κ. τ. λ.: “I will not disgrace my arms, nor desert my post &c”: and served two years as περίπολος; that is to say, kept watch and ward in the towns and fortresses on the coast and frontier, and performed all duties necessary for the defence of Attica; not *generally* going over the borders. But Boeckh observes, that the περίπολοι here mentioned are not *ephebi*: being classed with the light-armed, and distinguished from the hoplitæ; whereas the ephebi were completely armed: that these are the ordinary *patroles* to be found in every army.]

[2][“And during this night none of the city perceived any thing of this, save such as had peculiar care to know what was passing”.]

[3][“And then sail out, and before it was day in a cart to bring it back” &c.—“Within the gates”: that is, of the long walls.]

[1][“And at the same time the Megareans that were in the plot, slay the guards at the gates. And first” &c.]

[2][“Took to their heels in a fright, the enemy falling upon them in the night, and thinking, on finding themselves assaulted by the Megarean traitors, that all the Megareans had betrayed them”.]

[3][“That any Megarean that would, should go and pile his arms with the Athenians”.]

[4][That is, the long walls: now follows the attempt on the city.]

[1][“Anoint themselves with *oil*. And they had the greater security in opening the gates, for that 4,000 &c., which were to come *from Eleusis* &c., were &c.” The anointing with oil was too common to excite suspicion.]

[2][“And they remained on guard about the gates”.]

[1][“And beginning from the long walls, which they were masters of, they built a wall across them on the side of Megara, and thence on either side of Nisæa down to the sea, distributing &c.: and felling *the* fruit trees and timber trees, they formed a palisade where required”.]

[1] Not pulled them down quite, but only so far as not to be a defence to any part of the city. [That part of the long walls, between the city and their own cross wall.]

[2] ["Desiring above all".]

[1] ["And then they might more safely turn to the side they were disposed to, when that side had the victory. *But* Brasidas, not prevailing, returned" &c. That is, he did not, as the Megareans expected, fight.]

[2] ["Having intended, *even* before Brasidas sent, to come" &c.]

[1] ["For the Athenians charged the hipparchus and some few others of the Bœotians close to Nisæa, and slew and rifled them". Poppo, to account for the Athenian cavalry being so close to Nisæa, supposes that they retreated there purposely to draw the enemy after them.]

[2] ["Any decided advantage".]

[3] The period is somewhat long: and seems to be one of them, that gave occasion to Dionysius Halicarnasius to censure the author's elocution.

[1] ["Being now dismayed".]

[1] ["But these, as soon as they were in possession of the government, held a review: and having separated the lochi from each other in divers quarters of the city, picked out" &c.]

[2] ["Thinking there was danger it might happen there, as" &c. Anæa, on the opposite continent, had of old been a place of refuge for exiles from Samos. The original inhabitants of Samos, the Leleges, appear to have received a colony of Ionians from Epidaurus: who being expelled by Androclus, son of Codrus, one of the leaders of the Ionian migration and the founder of Ephesus, fled some to Samothrace, then inhabited by Pelasgians, some to Anæa, there waiting the opportunity to return. This in a few years presented itself, and they again ejected the Ephesians: and became a part of the *Ionian* body. The present exiles must have been driven out on the surrender of Samos to Pericles in 440: see i. 117].

[1] ["And *sailed* to it".]

[1] ["Orchomenus the Minyeian, but now the Bœotian". See iii. 61, note. There was an Orchomenus in Arcadia, and also in Thessaly. The race of Minyans took their name from their king Minyas, said to be the first man that ever built a treasury. The vast wealth of the city is attested by the expression of Achilles, "that he would not forgive Agamemnon, though he should give him all that is brought to Orchomenus, or Egyptian Thebes": Il. ix. 381. It retained its name, the *Minyeian*, for some time after the occupation of Bœotia by the Bœotians: Il. ii. 511. In 368 A. C., being the chief seat of the aristocratical party in Bœotia, the members of the equestrian order were charged with a plot to overthrow the Theban democracy: the male population was put to the sword, and the city razed to the ground. Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Plataea

disappeared at this time from the list of Bœotian cities. — ξυντελε? means, that Chæroneia retained its own laws and the dominion over its territory: but besides paying tribute was bound to furnish troops for Orchomenus, and sent no ambassadors to the Bœotian league. Goeller.]

[2][“Might not come to aid Delium with &c., but might be busied each about their own troubled affairs”. Vulgo κινούμενοι: Bekker &c. κινούμενα.—Templum est Apollinis Delium imminens mari: quinque millia passuum a Tanagra abest: minus quatuor millium inde in proxima Eubœæ est mari trajectus. Liv. xxxv. 51.]

[1][“And having reduced *them* (Salynthius and the Agræi), had all *other* things ready, when the time should require” &c.]

[1][“To give a safe passage”.]

[2][“Melitia in Achaia”, the seat of Hellen, the father of Dorus, Æolus, and Xuthus; the latter the father of Achæus and Ion: the fabulous genealogy used by the ancients to express an affinity they could no better define, between the four tribes of which the Hellenic nation is generally considered to consist, the Dorians, Æolians, Achæans, and Ionians. Achaia was itself another name for Hellas and Phthia, the seat of the real Hellenes, those mentioned by Homer (Il. ii. 684) in conjunction with the Achæans: thither they are supposed to have migrated from the more ancient Hellas near Dodona in Epirus, probably from the same cause that brought thence the people who gave their name to Thessaly, the pressure of new tribes from the north. In this latter Hellas they are found along with the Græci, both probably akin to each other and to the Pelasgi, the race which under the names of Caucones, Leleges, Curetes, Chaones, &c., were in the earliest times spread widely over the whole of Greece, Epirus, and Thessaly: their settlements being generally indicated by the Pelasgian names, *Argos* (a plain), *Larissa* (a walled town). Of the above four tribes, the *Æolians* were the most widely diffused, spreading themselves over the Pagasæan bay in Thessaly, Bœotia, Ephyra (Corinth), Ætolia, Locris, as well as the western side of Peloponnesus. The *Achæans*, from whom the whole of Peloponnesus is sometimes called the *Achæan Argos*, in distinction to the Pelasgian Argos in Thessaly, were the predominant race in the south of Thessaly and the eastern side of Peloponnesus: the former seeming to be their earlier seat, and being themselves perhaps originally no other than the Pelasgian inhabitants of Phthia. The *Dorians* are supposed to have entered Thessaly from the north: after successive migrations, the epochs of which are unknown, they issued at last from the foot of Mount Cæta to effect the conquest of Peloponnesus. Of the *Ionian* name, there is no trace in the north: and it appears in Peloponnesus (perhaps a more ancient seat of the Ionians than even Attica) before the Hellenes are heard of in Thessaly. It is used by Herodotus as equivalent to Pelasgian or ante-Hellenic: and the genuine Ionians appear to be the aboriginal Pelasgi. Of the four tribes, three seem to have no particular connexion with the Hellenes, except their northern extraction: the fourth has not even that. How the name of this obscure tribe came to fix itself on what we call *Greece*, wants explanation; unless Thucydides (i. 3.) may be considered to have given one. It is remarkable that the two names, Hellenes and Græci, should be first found close beside each other: the one, without any assignable cause, spreading eastward, over the whole continent; the other westward, being applied by the Italians

to the inhabitants of the western coast, and afterwards by the Romans much more extensively, from whom, as Mr. Thirlwall observes, it has unfortunately descended to us. See Thirl. chap. iv.]

[1][“Howsoever: and at any rate, with an army to pass &c., is a thing that all Grecians” &c.]

[2][“Arbitrary rather than constitutional”. Goeller.]

[1][“And here the Thessalian guides left him”.]

[2][“Into Chalcidicé”. Chalcis in Eubœa was, in the middle of the eighth century and long afterwards, under the government of great landowners (ἡ ἡποβόται, Herod. v. 77), who had perhaps political motives for encouraging the poorer citizens to emigrate. About that time it planted, amongst numerous other colonies, several in the peninsula in the Ægean sea, which hence acquired the name of *Chalcidicé*. It was also called (including the coast as far as Amphipolis) τῆ ἡ Θρῆκης: which is by Hobbes generally rendered *Thrace*, though forming no part of it.]

[3][“And at the same time the cities adjacent to them (the Chalcideans), which had not revolted, secretly drew them on”. This should be in a parenthesis.]

[1][“Should separate themselves from the rest, in order to be made free”.—The helots are commonly supposed to have been the Achæan inhabitants of the town of Helos, reduced to bondage after an unsuccessful insurrection against the Dorians: though according to one derivation of the name, from ἡλω (like δμῆες from δαμάω) they were *captives* taken in war, and are supposed by Mueller (iii. 3.) to have been found in that state by the Dorians on first entering Peloponnesus. The name was applied to the Messenians as well as the Laconians. They were bound to the soil, and in a certain sense the slaves of the state. Upon the fixed rent (82 medimni of barley, and oil and wine in proportion) paid for every κλῆρος or lot of land cultivated by them, the Spartan, occupied only with war and the gymnasium, was entirely dependent for that leisure which was the essential condition of his status. Their usual treatment appears to have been intended to make the distinction between freeman and slave as broad and deeply felt as possible. Every thing Spartan was polluted by the touch of a helot: he dared not be heard singing a Spartan song, nor be seen in any but the rustic garb, the livery of his servitude. For thinning their numbers, which must have been ten times greater than those of the Spartans, one expedient was the κρυπτεία: an institution different perhaps in its origin, but one which became a secret commission for removing the more dangerous of the slaves. The Spartan youth were sent abroad armed with daggers, not merely for defence or to inure them to the hardships of a military life. A usage somewhat similar, but without affectation of secrecy, is said to have been established in Attica. Emancipation was not unfrequent: and there were many degrees of freedom between the helot and the Spartan (see v. 34). A little below is seen the first experiment of fully arming helots in the service of the state: the success of which encouraged the repetition of it in cases, like the present, of distant foreign expeditions. Thus 300 neodamodes will be found serving under Gylippus in Sicily: and in 399, Thimbron had 1000 with him in Asia. The 700 here spoken of, go

hereafter by the name of Brasideians. The helots must somehow have been made to forget the fate of their 2,000 fellows: since Sparta when hard pressed after the battle of Leuctra, with the Thebans all but in the city, armed and promised liberty to 6000 helots, and was faithfully served by them.]

[1][“Brasidas was sent off by the Lacedæmonians, both himself most desirous of going, and much desired by the Chalcideans: a man that had then a reputation at Sparta of being active in every thing, and after he went on this expedition one that was most serviceable to the Lacedæmonians”.]

[1][“And also a diversion of the war from Peloponnesus. And in the war after the Sicilian affair, the virtue” &c.]

[2][“And had a watchful eye upon their allies there”.]

[1][“To the pass of Lyncus”: the name of the district, not of any one city, there being here in early times only unfortified villages. It was surrounded on all sides by mountains, this narrow pass between two heights being the chief road to the coast (see ch. 127). It was traversed by the Egnatian Roman road: which starting from Dyrhacium and crossing the Illyrian mountains at Pylon, *the gateway*, led through the country of the Lyncestæ and Eordians to Edessa and Pella. Mueller.]

[2][“Not to remove all dangers out of the way of Perdiccas”. Vulgo ?πεξελεθε?v. Bekker &c. ?πεξελε?v.]

[1][“Not uneloquent *for* a Lacedæmonian”.]

[1][“A false liberty”.]

[2][“If they invade you”.]

[3][A corrupt sentence.]

[1][“Into the hands of *certain men*, let him above all have confidence”.]

[2][“Not thanks for our labour, but accusation rather than honour and glory: and the charges on pretence of which we are now warring against the Athenians, we should appear to be ourselves liable to in a more odious degree, than one that never pretended virtue”.]

[3][“So great is our circumspection in matters which concern us in the highest degree. And besides the oaths we have sworn already, the greatest” &c.]

[1][“Lest, if you be not forced to join them, they be injured by this your good will towards them, whilst contributing your money to the Athenians”.]

[2][“*The* most honourable title”.]

[1][“Was *denounced*”.]

[1][?μπελον: “the vines”: making fascines, to hold the earth together. Goeller.—“And the stones and bricks of the buildings near, pulling them down for that purpose”.—“And in such places &c., and where the building of the temple no longer stood, (for the stoa had fallen down), erected wooden towers”.]

[1][“Pagondas, being with Arianthidas *bæotarch* of Thebes, and the command being his, was of opinion” &c. Whether the relative ο?, “*who* are eleven”, refers to the “*bæotarchs*”, or to “the rest” of them, that is, whether their whole number was *eleven* or thirteen, is a disputed point. See v. 38, note.]

[2][“Your *hereditary* custom”.]

[1][“When *besides* they be” &c.]

[2][“And (how should we not) know, that though others fight &c., we, if worsted, shall have one indisputable boundary fixed for our whole territory? For they will enter and hold all we have by force”.]

[3][See i. 108, 113: iii. 68, note.]

[1][See vi. 69, note.]

[2][“Breaking up his camp”.]

[1][“Where they piled their arms”: see ii. 2, note.]

[2][The ξύμμοροι stood in the same relation to Thebes, that Chæroneia did to Orchomenus: see ch. 76, n.]

[3][Copais: the lake whereon stood the *Athens* said to have been founded by Cecrops, and to have been swallowed up by a flood.]

[4][In the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans formed their column fifty deep: the Syracusans, in their first battle with the Athenians, sixteen deep; the ordinary depth of the Macedonian phalanx. When the Romans used the same tactics, their phalanx, consisting of four different descriptions of soldiers drawn from the four highest classes, seems to have been drawn up twenty deep, and perhaps more. On the contrary, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians generally formed their line only eight deep, in the Peloponnesian war; though at Leuctra the Lacedæmonians adopted a deeper order of battle. The causes of this difference are probably to be found in the circumstance, that the phalanx at Athens and Sparta was formed entirely of citizens of the same class and similarly armed: whereas in Bœotia and Macedonia, as at Rome, it contained a large admixture of poorer citizens, who being unable to furnish themselves as heavy-armed soldiers, were less fitted for the front line; and were therefore stationed in the rear of their better armed comrades, to add weight to their charge by the mere force of numbers. Arnold.]

[1][“*Regular* light-armed”. Göll.]

[2][“Being far more numerous than those of the enemy”, followed &c.]

[3][“The Bœotians, when Pagondas had there given them too a short exhortation, sang the pæan and charged down the hill”. Bekker &c., *παιωνίσαντες*: vulgo *παιωνίσαντος*.]

[1][“*And* they met” &c.]

[2][“Bearing each other down with their shields”.]

[3][“And in this part they fell especially upon the Thespians. For deserted by those on their flanks, and surrounded and crowded together, those Thespians that” &c.]

[4][“And forcing them back, pursued them at first for a short space. And Pagondas seeing the distress of his left wing, and sending two &c., it came to pass that that wing of the Athenians which was victorious, thinking &c., was put into affright: and on *both* wings now, one under this mistake and the other overpowered and broken by the Thebans, the flight became general of the Athenian army”.]

[1][“Save only for holy water at the sacrifices”. The modern custom of sprinkling with holy water seems to be borrowed from the ancients. The priest used to dip a brand in it, and therewith sprinkle and sanctify the congregation.]

[2][“Now use them as their own.”]

[1][“Than they that will not barter dead bodies for things sacred to the gods: and they bade the Bœotians to tell them plainly to gather up their dead, not on terms of leaving the Bœotian territory; (for in it they were not, but in that they had made their own by the sword); but under truce according to the custom of their ancestors”.]

[1][“*Their* (the Bœotians’) ground”. Oropus is placed by some amongst the fourteen confederate states of Bœotia, in respect of which every sixty years, at the festival of Dædala, fourteen wooden images were carried up to the top of Cithæron. It was the subject of many contests between Thebes and Athens, but in the end became part of the territory of Attica. To Athens it was of vast importance, not only for the fertility of its territory, but as commanding the passage to Eubœa, which was in some measure indispensable to her subsistence.]

[1][“And the herald, knowing nothing of it, coming again” &c. The moral effects of this battle are described by Xenophon (Mem. iii. 5.) as most disastrous for the Athenians. So much were they depressed and their enemy elated, that whereas heretofore the Thebans did not consider themselves, even on their own ground, a match for the Athenians without the aid of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians now did not feel even Attica secure from invasion by the Thebans. Other fruits of it will be seen in the expedition of Brasidas to Chalcidice.]

[2][“Demosthenes *too*”.—“Sitalkes *too* died”: the ally of the Athenians. An enumeration of their various mishaps at this time.]

[1][“*The colony*”.]

[2][“To colonize”.—“Sent thither, both of themselves and such as volunteered, ten thousand settlers”. Amphipolis was important to Athens on account of its wealth and magnitude, but more so as commanding the only passage by which a hostile army from the south could reach the towns and gold mines on the Thracian coast, a main source of her revenue. Thirlwall.]

[1][“And they carried on the war from Eion, which they used as a place of traffic at the mouth of the river by the sea-side, five-and-twenty stadia from the city, which Hagnon named Amphipolis: because, being washed by the Strymon on two sides, to surround it entirely he enclosed it with a long wall from one bend of the river to the other, and made it conspicuous on all sides, both to the sea and the continent”.]

[2][“But above all the Argilians, being &c., as soon as opportunity offered and Brasidas arrived, *they* having been practising long before with those of their own party there to betray the city, now receiving him into it and revolting” &c. Bekker &c. ?πραξάν: vulgo ?πραξέν.]

[1][“The town is at some distance from the bridge: and there were not then walls, as there are now”. That is, from the town to the bridge.]

[2][“Of the outlying property of the Amphipolitans, whose dwellings were all about the place”.]

[3][“Being taken”.]

[4][“Nothing passed from those within, as he expected” &c.]

[1][That is, Amphipolitan and Athenian, all alike.]

[1][“To be not what it was (before the offer of Brasidas) &c.: and the rest &c., as being *unexpectedly* delivered &c., and not deprived (as they were before Brasidas’ offer) of the rights of citizenship”. Goeller.]

[1][“But began settling the affairs of Amphipolis”.]

[1][“To make their *first* trial of the Lacedæmonians, who were very earnest in the matter”.]

[2][That is, the envy *felt* by the πρῶτοι ἄνδρες. See v. 15, note.]

[3][See chapter 69, note.]

[1][“A prominence projecting from the king’s ditch into the Ægæan sea, where it is bounded by Athos, a high mountain upon it”. This canal of Xerxes is stated in Walpole’s *Memoirs* (1818), to be yet clearly traceable, though filled with mud and weeds: and to be in length about a mile and a quarter, and in breadth about twenty-five yards.]

[2] The Greek and their own.

[3] [See vi. 88, note.]

[4] [See viii. 93, note.]

[1] ["Having privily visited him".]

[2] ["*Through* the wall".]

[3] ["Advanced a little and then lay still; but sent" &c.]

[1] [*Planks*, forming inclined planes to the wall. Arnold.]

[2] ["The rest of his men".]

[3] ["Having seized on the extremity of Torone, reaching to the sea and separated from the city by a narrow isthmus". Arn. Goell.]

[4] [ἡδὲ? πολιτεύειν: "and exercise the rights of citizens there in security".]

[1] ["The fort".]

[2] ["That had no hand in it".]

[3] ["They would not think worse of them, but be so much the better disposed to them as they will deal justly by them".]

[4] ["But for the past, not themselves (the Lacedæmonians) were injured, but they (the Toronæans) rather by other men" &c.]

[1] ["Upon the top of *a* building":—"and carried up many jars and casks of water and great stones: and many men being" &c.]

[1] ["Thus did the Athenians abandon the place, and in their boats and galleys got safe to Pallene".]

[2] ["And stripping the houses of their furniture, he consecrated the whole ground."]

[3] ["Make a general peace".]

[1] [No good sense has yet been made of this passage.]

[2] [From the beginning to "This truce shall be for a year", the words of the treaty are those of the Lacedæmonians, who are throughout to be understood by ἡμῶν. Then follows the ratification by the Athenian people, ἡδοξε τὸ δῆμον?.]

[3] ["Of our *ancestors*". The Athenians and their allies had probably been excluded from the oracle during the war.]

[4] [“Both we and you, and of the rest such as please, abiding and doing right and justice all of us by the laws of our *ancestors*”. Hobbes generally renders πατρίοις νόμοις, “laws of the *country*”.—The sacred treasures had been openly treated by the Peloponnesians (see i. 121.) as property to be converted to their own purposes: and the Athenians probably had discovered or suspected some unfair dealings with it. Thirlwall.]

[5] [“And the following seem good to the Lacedæmonians and the rest of the allies, if the Athenians agree to a truce: namely, that each side remain within their own territory, retaining what they now hold; the Lacedæmonians in Coryphasium staying within” &c.]

[1] [“And that neither the Megareans nor their allies pass beyond this road”. These words should be in a parenthesis: the article then continuing: “and retaining possession of the island, which the Athenians have taken, neither having commerce with the other side”.]

[2] [“That the *Lacedæmonians* keep &c.” The “agreement” here spoken of, is the thirty years’ peace; whereby the possession of Træzen was conceded to the Lacedæmonians. Goeller, Arnold.]

[3] [“And that the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall have free navigation &c: but shall not pass the seas in a long ship” &c. Goell. Arn.]

[1] [“The people decreed: the tribe Acamantis gave the Prytanes: Phænippus was scribe: Niciades epistates: Laches put the question, ‘*that* with good fortune there be concluded’ &c. And the assembly agreed, ‘that there be a suspension, &c., to begin from *this* day, being’ &c.”—On the expulsion of the Pisistradæ and the success of the party of Cleisthenes over that of Isagoras, that is, of the democracy over the aristocracy, Cleisthenes, amongst other changes reorganizing the whole frame of the state, abolished the four Ionic tribes, and formed *ten* new ones: and from each drawing fifty senators, increased the senate from 400 to 500. The fifty senators of each tribe succeeded by lot to the office of President for 35 or 36 days, being called during that time the *prytanes*: the time of office, *prytaneia*: and this decree, made in the pryteneia of the tribe Acamantis, is therefore inscribed ἡ κάμαντις πρυτανεία. The prytanes were distributed by lot into five decuriæ, each decuria presiding over the rest for seven days; thence called πρόεδροι, *presidents*: and during each of the seven days, the powers of all the proedri centered in one, called *epistates*, who kept the keys of the citadel and the treasury. Originally, these proedri proposed matters for deliberation, and presided in the senate and assembly. But in time the presidency in both was committed to nine men, also called *proedri*, chosen by the epistates, one out of each of the other nine tribes: these also had their *epistates* (here, Niciades). There were *scribes* both of the senate and assembly: of whom one was γραμματεὺς κατὰ πρυτανείαν (in the present case, Phænippus), his office being to take charge of all votes and public writings made during his prytaneia.]

[1] [“These articles the Lacedæmonians agreed to, and the allies also swore to”.]

[1][“By *the* storm which befell the Achæans”.]

[2][“Should light upon some greater vessel”.]

[1][“Undergo the greatest hardships, *if* their state shall be” &c.]

[2][“And he was about to lay hands on those cities. But” &c.]

[1][Vulgo, ?. Bekker &c., [Editor: illegible character]: “the truth was rather *as*” &c.]

[1][“*That* they came in *manifestly* &c.: *for* somewhat” &c.]

[2][τότε: “at the time before mentioned”: see the end of ch. 121.]

[3][“And they (the Scionæans and Mendæans, and Brasidas’ men) made their arrangements in common, as expecting” &c.]

[1][The Macedonians are here classed with the barbarians, as in ch. 124 they are distinguished from the Greeks. Arnold. Herodotus (v. 22.) tells us, that the father of Perdiccas, Alexander the Philhellene, was desirous of contending at the Olympic games, but as a *Macedonian* was driven from the course as a barbarian, until he proved his Hellenic descent by tracing it from Temenus of Argos.]

[1][“That should fall on him”.]

[2][“And that they which are coming upon you, are barbarians and many”.]

[3][“I should not instruct, as well as encourage you”.]

[4][If the whole system of Spartan government and customs is to be attributed to Lycurgus, no better general view can be given of his legislation, than to say that he transformed Sparta into a camp. But it seems nearer the truth, to say that it was a camp from the time of the conquest: for no description can better suit an unwallled city, occupied by a handful of foreigners, in the midst of a hostile and half-subdued people: and the Spartan was not improperly said to be throughout the military age, *ἄμρουρος*, *on guard*. Laconia and Messenia appear to have contained three classes: the Dorians of Sparta, the helots, and the free provincials of Laconia. The last class consisted for the most part of the conquered Achæans, including possibly some few Dorians also: the towns of Bœæ and Geronthræ appearing to have been founded, the one by a Heracleid, the other by Spartans; but as the whole body of invaders was barely strong enough to effect the conquest, few could have been spared for the provinces. The provincials were absolute subjects: their land acknowledged by tribute the sovereignty of the state: political privileges they had none, their municipal government being under the controul of Spartan officers. The helots (whose condition has been described ch. 80, note) seem to have been at least thrice as numerous as the free Laconians: and the Spartans not being a third part of the latter, could have been barely a fifteenth part of the entire population. To secure the dominion of this small body, threatened with immediate dissolution from internal dissensions, was the main scope of the legislation of Lycurgus. The principal cause of discord was for the time

removed by a new distribution of landed property. According to Plutarch, he divided the whole of Laconia (though in his time it could hardly have been all subdued: and whether Messenia, certainly not acquired till afterwards, was included in the 9,000 parcels, the ancients are not agreed) into 39,000 parcels: of which 9,000 were assigned to so many Spartan families, and 30,000 to the free Laconians. It seems to have been intended that each of the 9,000 parcels should always be represented by the head of a family: and it is said, that every child at its birth was brought to the elders of its tribe, and if pronounced worthy to live, had one of the parcels assigned to it. It is not easy to conceive how such a regulation, aided even as it might be by the controul of the kings over adoptions and marriages of orphan heiresses, could be made effective. At all events it wholly failed, especially when the inalienability of landed estates was relaxed by the admission of donations and devises, to prevent the extremes of wealth and indigence (Arist. ii. 7). And this is one of the causes of the decline, at this time in progress, of the Spartan power. For in spite of the penalties imposed by Lycurgus on celibacy, and the rewards assigned in later times to the father of many children, the growing temptation to concentrate the franchise as it increased in value was too strong for Spartan patriotism: and the Dorian population, said to have contained at one time 10,000 families (Arist. *ibid.*), and in the Persian war 8,000 men able to bear arms (Herod. vii. 234), shewed a sensible decline from the time of the great earthquake, a blow it never recovered from. Sparta could not bring into the field at Leuctra more than 700 men: and perished at last by what may perhaps be considered as the fate of any state similarly circumstanced, δι? τ?ν ?λιγανθρωπίαν (Arist. *ibid.*). See Thirl. ch. 8.]

[1][“Against such of them as are Macedonians”. Brasidas had just defeated the Lyncestæ, who were Macedonians.]

[1][“For they have no order, whereby to be made ashamed to quit their ranks when pressed”:—“and a manner of fighting wherein every one &c., is especially fitted to afford them a more” &c.]

[1][“And that they should seize and destroy them. But seeing” &c.]

[2][“To leave their ranks and run &c., and seize that height which he (Brasidas) thought was easiest to take, and try if they could” &c.]

[1][Bekker and all the MSS., ?πόντας, “going up”: Goell. Arn. Popp. ?πόντας, “that were already upon the same”.]

[2][“To *it*”.]

[3][“The first point of Perdiccas his dominions”.]

[4][“And thenceforth entertained for the Peloponnesians a hatred not consistent with his former feelings towards them, hitherto influenced by his hatred of the Athenians; and betraying his own natural interest, sought any means” &c. Goeller.]

[1][“The Athenians, as they were preparing to do, set sail” &c.]

[1][“Of the *peninsula*”.]

[2][“In a seditious spirit”.]

[1][“And Perdiccas (for it happened &c.) partly” &c.]

[1][“*When* the peace” &c.]

[2][His friends in Thessaly: that is, the same powerful men, who, against the general wishes of the nation, had conducted Brasidas through the country. Thirlwall.]

[3][?β?ντες, those within thirty years of age. They were neither admitted to the public assembly, nor to fill any public office out of the country. Muell. iii. 4.]

[4][Pasitelidas (see v. 3.).

[1][The 56th of her priesthood (see ii. 2.).

[2][“To the vacant place”: that is, when the sentinel was absent. For securing the watchfulness of the sentinel, there were two contrivances: one used in times of alarm, which the Potidæans appear to have neglected, was this. An officer went his rounds with a bell, which every sentinel was to answer as soon as he heard it. The other was the delivery by one sentinel to another of a bell or staff: which thus came round at last to the point whence it set out. If any sentinel found the next man off his post, he was to carry the bell back and deliver it to the sentinel from whom he received it: so that the bell returning the wrong way, the delinquent was discovered. Goeller.]