Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times

Characteristicks

VOLUME III

MISCELLANEOUS REFLECTIONS on the preceding Treatises, and other Critical Subjects.

A Notion of the Tablature, or Judgment of Hercules. With a Letter concerning Design.



Printed in the Year M.DCC.XXXII.

This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.

The cuneiform inscription that serves as our logo and as the design motif for our endpapers is the earliest-known written appearance of the word "freedom" (*amagi*), or "liberty." It is taken from a clay document written about 2300 B.C. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash.

© 2001 Liberty Fund, Inc. All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of, 1671–1713.

Characteristicks of men, manners, opinions, times /

Anthony, Third Earl of Shaftesbury;

introduction by Douglas Den Uyl.

p. cm.

Originally published: 6th ed., cor., with the addition of a letter concerning design.

London: Printed by J. Purser, 1737-1738. With new introd.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-86597-294-x (hc: set)

ISBN 0-86597-295-8 (pbk.: set)

1. Ethics. I. Title.

ві386. с48 200і

192 — dc21

99-045747

LIBERTY FUND, INC. 8335 Allison Pointe Trail, Suite 300 Indianapolis, Indiana 46250-1684

CONTENTS

Foreword	vii	
A Note on the Text	xiii	
VOLUME I		
A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm.	I	
Sensus Communis; an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour.	37	
Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author.		
VOLUME II		
An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit.	I	
The Moralists; a Philosophical Rhapsody.	101	
VOLUME III		
Miscellaneous Reflections on the Said Treatises, and Other Critical Subjects.	I	
A Notion of the Historical Draught, or Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules. With a Letter Concerning Design.	211	
INDEXES		
Shaftesbury's Index	253	
Index to This Edition		

TREATISE VI


VIZ.

Miscellaneous Reflections, &c.

Of course he was favorable to Virtue only and to her friends.* Horat. Sat. I. Lib. 2.

Printed first in the Year M.DCC.XIV.

*Scilicet uni aequus Virtuti, atque ejus Amicis.



Miscellaneous Reflections

MISCELLANY I

CHAPTER I

Of the Nature, Rise, and Establishment of Miscellanys. —— The Subject of these which follow. —— Intention of the Writer.

PEACE be with the Soul of that charitable and courteous Author, who for the common Benefit of his Fellow-Authors, introduc'd the ingenious way of MISCELLANEOUS Writing!—It must be own'd that since this happy Method was establish'd, the Harvest of Wit has been more plentiful, and the Labourers more in number than heretofore. 'Tis well known to the able Practitioners in the writing Art; "That as easy as it is to conceive

[2]

Wit, 'tis the hardest thing imaginable to be deliver'd of It, upon Chap. 1. certain Terms." Nothing cou'd be more severe or rigid than the Conditions formerly prescrib'd to Writers; when Criticism took place, and Regularity and Order were thought essential in a Treatise. The Notion of a genuine Work, a legitimate and just Piece, has certainly been the Occasion of great Timidity and Backwardness among the Adventurers in Wit: And the Imposition of such strict Laws and Rules of Composition, has set heavy on the free Spirits and forward Genius's of Mankind. 'Twas a Yoke, it seems, which our Forefathers bore; but which, for our parts, we have generously thrown off. In effect, the invidious Distinctions of Bastardy and Legitimacy being at length remov'd; the natural and lawful Issue of the Brain comes with like advantage into the World: And Wit (mere WIT) is well receiv'd; without examination of the Kind, or censure of the Form.

This the MISCELLANEOUS *Manner* of Writing, it must be own'd, has happily effected. It has render'd almost every Soil productive. It has disclos'd those various *Seeds* of Wit, which lay suppress'd in many a Bosom; and has rear'd numberless *Conceits* and curious *Fancys*, which the natural Rudeness and Asperity of their native Soil wou'd have with-held, or at least not have permitted to rise above the ground. From every *Field*, from every *Hedge* or *Hillock*, we now gather as delicious Fruits and fragrant Flowers, as of old from the richest and best-cultivated *Gardens*. Miserable were those antient Planters, who understanding not how to conform themselves to the rude *Taste* of unpolish'd Mankind, made it so difficult a Task to serve the World with *intellectual* Entertainments, and furnish out the Repasts of *Literature* and *Science*.

There was certainly a time when the Name of AUTHOR stood for something considerable in the World. To succeed happily in such a Labour as that of writing *a Treatise* or *a Poem,* was taken as a sure mark of Understanding and Good Sense. The Task was painful: But, it seems, 'twas honourable. How the Case happen'd, in process of time, to be so much revers'd, is hard to say. The

[3]

primitive Authors perhaps being few in number, and highly respected for their Art, fell under the weight of *Envy*. Being sensible of their Misfortune in this respect, and being excited, as 'tis probable, by the Example of some popular Genius; they quitted their regular Schemes and accurate Forms of Workmanship, in favour of those *Wits* who could not possibly be receiv'd as AUTHORS upon such difficult Terms. 'Twas necessary, it seems, that *the Bottom* of Wit shou'd be enlarg'd. 'Twas advisable that more Hands shou'd be taken into the Work. And nothing cou'd better serve this popular purpose, than the way of MISCELLANY, or *common* Essay; in which the most confus'd Head, if fraught with a little Invention, and provided with *Common-place-Book* Learning, might exert itself to as much advantage, as the most orderly and well-settled Judgment.

To explain the better how this Revolution in Letters has been effected, it may not perhaps be indecent, shou'd we offer to compare our Writing-Artists, to the *Manufacturers* in *Stuff* or *Silk*. For among These 'tis esteem'd a principal piece of Skill, to frame a Pattern, or Plan of Workmanship, in which the several Colours are agreeably dispos'd; with such proportionable Adjustment of the various Figures and Devices, as may, in the whole, create a kind of *Harmony* to the Eye. According to this Method, each *Piece* must be, in reality, *an Original*. For to copy what has gone before, can be of no use. The Fraud wou'd easily be perceiv'd. On the other side, to work *originally*, and in a manner *create* each time anew, must be a matter of pressing weight, and fitted to the Strength and Capacity of none besides the choicest Workmen.

A Manner therefore is invented to confound this Simplicity and Conformity of Design. *Patch-work* is substituted. *Cuttings* and *Shreds* of Learning, with various *Fragments*, and *Points* of Wit, are drawn together, and tack'd in any fantastick form. If they chance to cast a *Luster*, and spread a sort of sprightly *Glare*; the MISCELLANY is approv'd, and the *complex* Form and Texture of the Work admir'd. The Eye, which before was to be won by Regularity, and

Chap. 1.

[4]

[5]

[7]

Chap. I. had kept true to Measure and strict Proportion, is by this means pleasingly drawn aside, to commit a kind of *Debauch*, and amuse it-self in gaudy Colours, and disfigur'd Shapes of things. Custom, in the mean while, has not only tolerated this Licentiousness, but render'd it even commendable, and brought it into the highest repute. The *Wild* and *Whimsical*, under the name of the *Odd* and *Pretty*, succeed in the room of the *Graceful* and the *Beautiful*. Justness and Accuracy of Thought are set aside, as too constraining, and of too painful an aspect, to be endur'd in the agreeable and more easy Commerce of *Gallantry*, and modern *Wit*.

Now since it has been thought convenient, in these latter Ages, to distinguish the Provinces of WIT and WISDOM, and set apart the agreeable from the useful; 'tis evident there cou'd be nothing devis'd more sutable to the distinct and separate Interest of the former of these Provinces, than this complex manner of Performance which we call MISCELLANY. For whatever is capricious and odd, is sure to create Diversion, to those who look no further. And where there is nothing like Nature, there is no room for the troublesom part of Thought or Contemplation. 'Tis the Perfection of certain Grotesque-Painters, to keep as far from Nature as possible. To find a Likeness in their Works, is to find the greatest Fault imaginable. A natural Connexion is a Slur. A Coherence, a Design, a Meaning, is against their purpose, and destroys the very Spirit and Genius of their Workmanship.

I remember formerly when I was a Spectator in the *French* Theater, I found it the Custom, at the end of every grave and solemn *Tragedy*, to introduce a comick *Farce*, or MISCELLANY, which they call'd *the little Piece*. We have indeed a Method still more extraordinary upon our own Stage. For we think it agreeable and just, to mix the *Little Piece* or *Farce* with the main Plot or Fable, thro' every Act. This perhaps may be the rather chosen, because our Tragedy is so much *deeper* and *bloodier* than that of the *French*, and therefore needs more immediate Refreshment from the elegant way of *Drollery*, and *Burlesque-wit*; which being thus closely interwoven

with its opposite, makes that most accomplish'd kind of *theatrical* MISCELLANY, call'd by our Poets *a Tragi-comedy*.

Chap. 1.

I cou'd go further perhaps, and demonstrate from the Writings of many of our grave Divines, the Speeches of our Senators, and other principal Models of our national Erudition, "That the MISCELLANEOUS Manner is at present in the highest esteem." But since my chief Intention in the following Sheets is to descant cursorily upon some late Pieces of a British Author; I will presume, That what I have said already on this Head is sufficient; and That it will not be judg'd improper or absurd in me, as I proceed, to take advantage of this miscellaneous Taste which now evidently prevails. According to this Method, whilst I serve as Critick or Interpreter to this new Writer, I may the better correct his Flegm, and give him more of the fashionable Air and Manner of the World; especially in what relates to the Subject and Manner of his two last Pieces, which are contain'd in his second Volume. For these being of the more regular and formal kind, may easily be oppressive to the airy Reader; and may therefore with the same assurance as Tragedy claim the necessary Relief of the little Piece or Farce above-mention'd.

[8

Nor ought the Title of a MISCELLANEOUS Writer to be deny'd me, on the account that I have grounded my Miscellanys upon a certain Set of Treatises already publish'd. Grounds and Foundations are of no moment in a kind of Work, which, according to modern Establishment, has properly neither Top nor Bottom, Beginning nor End. Besides, that I shall no-way confine myself to the precise Contents of these Treatises; but, like my Fellow-Miscellanarians, shall take occasion to vary often from my propos'd Subject, and make what Deviations or Excursions I shall think fit, as I proceed in my random Essays.'

[9]

Chap. 2.

CHAPTER II

Of Controversial Writings: Answers: Replies.—
Polemick Divinity; or the Writing Church-Militant.—
Philosophers, and Bear-Garden.—Authors pair'd
and match'd.—The Match-makers.—Foot-Ball.—
A Dialogue between our Author and his Bookseller.

↑ MONG the many Improvements daily made in the Art of **1** Writing, there is none perhaps which can be said to have attain'd a greater Height than that of Controversy, or the Method of Answer and Refutation. 'Tis true indeed, that antiently the Wits of Men were for the most part taken up in other Employment. If Authors writ ill, they were despis'd: If well, they were by some Party or other espous'd. For Partys there wou'd necessarily be, and Sects of every kind, in Learning and Philosophy. Every one sided with whom he lik'd; and having the liberty of hearing each side speak for it-self, stood in no need of express Warning-Pieces against pretended Sophistry, or dangerous Reasoning. Particular Answers to single Treatises, were thought to be of little use. And it was esteem'd no Compliment to a Reader, to help him so carefully in the Judgment of every Piece which came abroad. Whatever Sects there were in those days, the Zeal of Party-causes ran not so high as to give the Reader a Taste of those personal Reproaches, which might pass in a Debate between the different Partymen.

Thus Matters stood of old; when as yet the Method of writing *Controversy* was not rais'd into an *Art*, nor the Feuds of contending Authors become the chief Amusement of the learned World. But we have at present so high a Relish of this kind, that the Writings of the Learned are never truly gustful till they are come to what we may properly enough call *their due Ripeness*, and have begot a *Fray*. When the *Answer* and *Reply* is once form'd, our Curiosity is excited: We begin then, for the first time, to whet our Attention, and apply our Ear.

For example: Let a zealous Divine and flaming Champion of

[10]

our Faith, when inclin'd to shew himself in Print, make choice of some tremendous Mystery of Religion, oppos'd heretofore by some damnable Heresiarch; whom having vehemently refuted, he turns himself towards the orthodox Opinion, and supports the true Belief, with the highest Eloquence and profoundest Erudition; he shall, notwithstanding this, remain perhaps in deep Obscurity, to the great affliction of his Bookseller, and the regret of all who bear a just Veneration for Church-history, and the antient Purity of the Christian Faith. But let it so happen that in this Prosecution of his deceas'd Adversary, our *Doctor* raises up some *living Antagonist*; who, on the same foot of Orthodoxy with himself, pretends to arraign his Expositions, and refute the Refuter upon every Article he has advanc'd; from this moment the Writing gathers Life, the Publick listens, the Bookseller takes heart; and when Issue is well join'd, the Repartees grown smart, and the Contention vigorous between the learned Partys, a Ring is made, and Readers gather in abundance. Every one takes party, and encourages his own Side. "This shall be my Champion!—This Man for my Money!—Well hit, on our side!—Again, a good Stroke!—There he was even with him!—Have at him the next Bout!"—Excellent Sport! And when the Combatants are for a-while drawn off, and each retir'd with his own Companions; What Praises, and Congratulations! What Applauses of the suppos'd Victor! And how honourably is he saluted' by his Favourers, and complimented even to the disturbance of his Modesty! "Nay, but Gentlemen!—Good Gentlemen! Do you really think thus?—Are you sincere with me?—Have I treated my Adversary as he deserves?" "Never was Man so maul'd. Why you have kill'd him downright." "O, Sirs! you flatter me." "He can never rise more." "Think ye so indeed?" "Or if he shou'd; 'twou'd be a Pleasure to see how you wou'd handle him."

These are the Triumphs. This what sets *sharp:* This gives the Author his *Edge*, and excites the Reader's Attention; when the Trumpets are thus sounded to the Croud, and a kind of *Amphitheatrical* Entertainment exhibited to the Multitude, by these *Gladiatorian* Pen-men.

Chap. 2.

[11]

[12]

Chap. 2.

In the state of the s

[14]

The Author of the preceding Treatises being by profession a nice *Inspector* into *the Ridicule* of Things, must in all probability have rais'd to himself some such Views as these, which hinder'd him from engaging in the way of *Controversy*. For when, by accident, the *First of these Treatises (*a private Letter*, and in the Writer's Esteem, little worthy of the Publick's notice) came to be read abroad in Copys, and afterwards in Print; the smartest *Answers* which came out against it, cou'd not, it seems, move our Author to form any *Reply*. All he was heard to say in return, was, "That he thought whoever had taken upon him to publish a Book in answer to that casual Piece, had certainly made either a very high Compliment to the Author, or a very ill one to the Publick."

It must be own'd, that when a Writer of any kind is so considerable as to deserve the Labour and Pains of some shreud Heads to refute him in publick, he may, in the quality of *an Author*, be justly congratulated on that occasion. 'Tis suppos'd necessarily that he must have writ with some kind of Ability or Wit. But if his *original* Performance be in truth no better than ordinary; his *Answerer's* Task must certainly be very mean. He must be very indifferently imploy'd, who wou'd take upon him to answer Nonsense in form, ridicule what is of it-self *a Jest*, and put it upon the World to read *a second Book* for the sake of the Impertinencys of *a former*.

Taking it, however, for granted, "That a sorry Treatise may be the foundation of a considerable Answer;" a *Reply* still must certainly be ridiculous, which-ever way we take it. For either the Author, in his original Piece, has been truly refuted, or not. If refuted; why does he defend? If not refuted; why trouble himself? What has the Publick to do with his private Quarrels, or his Adversary's Impertinence? Or supposing the World out of curiosity may delight to see *a Pedant* expos'd by a Man of better Wit, and *a Controversy* thus unequally carry'd on between two such opposite Partys; How long is this Diversion likely to hold good? And what will become of these *polemick* Writings a few Years hence? What is already become

^{*} Viz. The Letter concerning ENTHUSIASM.

Chap. 2.

of those mighty Controversys, with which some of the most eminent Authors amus'd the World within the memory of the youngest Scholar? An original Work or two may perhaps remain: But for the subsequent Defenses, the Answers, Rejoinders, and Replications; they have been long since paying their attendance to the Pastrycooks. Mankind perhaps were heated at that time, when first those Matters were debated: But they are now cool again. They laugh'd: They carry'd on the Humour: They blew the Coals: They teaz'd, and set on, maliciously, and to create themselves diversion. But the *Jest* is now over. No-one so much as inquires Where the Wit was; or Where possibly the Sting shou'd lie of those notable Reflections and satirical Hints, which were once found so pungent, and gave the Readers such high Delight. - Notable Philosophers and Divines, who can be contented to make sport, and write in learned Billingsgate, to divert the Coffee-house, and entertain the Assemblys at Booksellers Shops, or the more airy Stalls of inferior Book-retailers!

It must be allow'd, That in this respect, controversial Writing is not so wholly unprofitable; and that for Book-Merchants, of whatever Kind or Degree, they undoubtedly receive no small Advantage from a right Improvement of a learned Scuffle. Nothing revives 'em more, or makes a quicker Trade, than a Pair of substantial Divines or grave Philosophers, well match'd, and soundly back'd; till by long worrying one another, they are grown out of breath, and have almost lost their Force of Biting. - "So have I known a crafty Glazier, in time of Frost, procure a Football, to draw into the Street the emulous Chiefs of the robust Youth. The tumid Bladder bounds at every Kick, bursts the withstanding Casements, the Chassys, Lanterns, and all the brittle vitrious Ware. The Noise of Blows and Out-cries fills the whole Neighbourhood; and Ruins of Glass cover the stony Pavements; till the bloated battering Engine, subdu'd by force of Foot and Fist, and yielding up its Breath at many a fatal Cranny, becomes lank and harmless, sinks in its Flight, and can no longer uphold the Spirit of the contending Partys."

[15]

[16]

This our Author supposes to have been the occasion of his being Chap. 3. so often and zealously complimented by his Amanuensis (for so he calls *his Bookseller or Printer) on the Fame of his first Piece. The obliging Crafts-man has at times presented him with many a handsom Book, set off with Titles of Remarks, Reflections, and the like, which, as he assur'd him, were Answers to his small Treatise. "Here Sir! (says he) you have a considerable Hand has undertaken you!——This Sir, is a Reverend—This a Right Reverend——This a noted Author—Will you not reply, Sir?—O' my word, Sir, the World is in expectation." "Pity they shou'd be disappointed!" "A dozen Sheets, Sir, wou'd be sufficient. — You might dispatch it presently." "Think you so?" "I have my Paper ready—And a good Letter.—Take my word for it—You shall see, Sir!" "Enough. But hark ye (Mr. A, a, a, a) my worthy Engineer, and Manager of the War of Letters! Ere you prepare your Artillery, or engage me in [17] Acts of Hostility, let me hear, I intreat you, Whether or no my Adversary be taken notice of. - Wait for his Second Edition. And if by next Year, or Year or two after, it be known in good Company that there is such a Book in being, I shall then perhaps think it

CHAPTER III

Of the Letter concerning Enthusiasm. — Foreign Criticks. — Of Letters in general; and of the Epistolary Style. — Addresses to great Men. — Authors and Horsemanship. — The modern Amble. — Further Explanation of the MISCELLANEOUS Manner.

As resolute as our Author may have shewn himself in refusing to take notice of the smart Writings publish'd against him by certain *Zealots* of his *own* Country, he cou'd not, it seems,

time to consider of a Reply."

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 305.

Chap. 3.

[18]

but out of curiosity observe what the *foreign* and more *impartial Criticks* might object to his small Treatise, which he was surpriz'd to hear had been translated into foreign Languages, soon after it had been publish'd here at home. The first Censure of this kind which came to our Author's sight, was that of the Paris **Journal des Savans*. Considering how little favourable the Author of the Letter had shewn himself towards the *Romish* Church, and Policy of France, it must be own'd those Journalists have treated him with sufficient Candor: tho they fail'd not to take what Advantages they well cou'd against the Writing, and particularly arraign'd it for the want †of Order and Method.

[19]

The Protestant Writers, such as live in a free Country, and can deliver their Sentiments without Constraint, have certainly *done our Author more Honour than he ever presum'd to think he cou'd deserve. His *Translator* indeed, who had done him the previous Honour of introducing him to the Acquaintance of the foreign World, represents particularly, by the Turn given to the latter end of the Letter, that the Writer of it was, as to his Condition and Rank, little better than an inferior Dependent on the noble Lord to whom he had address'd himself. And in reality the *Original* has so much of that air; that I wonder not, if what the Author left ambiguous, the Translator has determin'd to the side of *Clientship* and *Dependency*.

But whatever may have been the Circumstance or Character of our Author himself; that of his *great* Friend ought in justice to have been consider'd by those former Criticks above-mention'd. So much, at least, shou'd have been taken notice of, that there was *a real* GREAT MAN characteriz'd, and sutable Measures of Address and Style preserv'd. But they who wou'd neither observe this, nor

^{*} Du 25 Mars, 1709.

[†] Ses pensées ne semblent occuper dans son Ouvrage, que la place que le hazard leur a donnée. Ibid. pag. 181.

^{‡ (1.)} Bibliotheque Choisie, année 1709. Tome XIX. pag. 427.

^(2.) Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans, *Mois d' Octobre, Novembre & Decembre*, 1708. pag. 514.

^(3.) Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres, *Mois de Mars*, 1710.

[20]

Chap. 3. apprehend the Letter it-self to be *real*, were insufficient Criticks, and unqualify'd to judg of the Turn or Humour of a Piece, which they had never consider'd in a proper light.

'Tis become indeed so common a Practice among Authors, to feign a Correspondency, and give the Title of *a private Letter* to a Piece address'd solely to the *Publick*, that it wou'd not be strange to see other *Journalists* and *Criticks*, as well as the Gentlemen of Paris, pass over such Particularitys, as things of Form. This Prejudice however cou'd not misguide a chief Critick of the Protestant side; when *mentioning this *Letter concerning Enthusiasm*, he speaks of it as a real *Letter*, (such as in truth it was) not a precise and formal †Treatise, design'd for *publick* View.

It will be own'd surely, by those who have learnt to judg of Elegancy and Wit by the help merely of modern Languages, That we cou'd have little Relish of the best *Letters* of a Balsac or Voiture, were we wholly ignorant of the *Characters* of the principal Persons to whom those *Letters* were actually written. But much less cou'd we find pleasure in this reading, shou'd we take it into our heads, that both the Personages and Correspondency it-self were merely fictitious. Let the best of Tully's Epistles be read in such a narrow View as this, and they will certainly prove very insipid. If a real Brutus, a real Atticus be not suppos'd, there will be no real Cicero. The elegant Writer will disappear: as will the vast Labour and Art with which this eloquent *Roman* writ those Letters to his illustrious Friends. There was no kind of Composition in which this great Author prided or pleas'd himself more than in this; where he endeavour'd to throw off the Mein of *the Phi*-

^{*} Ceux qui l'ont luë ont pû voir en général, que l'Auteur ne s'y est pas proposé un certain plan, pour traiter sa matiere methodiquement; parceque c'est une Lettre, & non un Traité. [Those who have read it have been able to see in general that the Author has not proposed there any particular plan, for the purpose of treating his material methodically; because it is a Letter and not a Treatise.] Bibliotheque Choisie. Ibid. pag. 428.

[†] If in this joint Edition, with other Works, *the Letter* be made to pass under that general Name of *Treatise*; 'tis the Bookseller must account for it. For the Author's part, he considers it as no other than what it originally was.

Chap. 3.

15

losopher and Orator, whilst in effect he employ'd both his Rhetorick and Philosophy with the greatest Force. They who can read an Epistle or Satir of HORACE in somewhat better than a mere scholastick Relish, will comprehend that the Concealment of Order and Method, in this manner of Writing, makes the chief Beauty of the Work. They will own, that unless a Reader be in some measure appriz'd of the Characters of an Augustus, a Maecenas, a FLORUS, or a TREBATIUS, there will be little Relish in those Satirs or Epistles address'd in particular to the Courtiers, Ministers, and Great Men of the Times. Even the SATIRICK, or MISCELLANEOUS Manner of the polite Antients, requir'd as much Order as the most regular Pieces. But the Art was to destroy every such Token or Appearance, give an extemporary Air to what was writ, and make the Effect of Art be felt, without discovering the Artifice. There needs no further Explanation on this Head. Our Author himself has said enough in his *Advice to an Author, particularly where he treats of the simple Style, in contra-distinction to the learned, the formal, or methodick.

[22]

'Tis a different Case indeed, when the Title of *Epistle* is improperly given to such Works as were never writ in any other view than that of being made publick, or to serve as Exercises or Specimens of the Wit of their Composer. Such were those infinite Numbers of *Greek* and *Latin* Epistles, writ by the antient *Sophists, Grammarians*, or *Rhetoricians;* where we find the real Character of *the Epistle*, the genuine Style and Manners of the corresponding Partys sometimes imitated; but at other times not so much as aim'd at, nor any Measures of *historical Truth* preserv'd. Such perhaps we may esteem even the Letters of a †Seneca to his Friend Lucilius.

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 233, 257, 258.

^{† &#}x27;Tis not the *Person, Character*, or *Genius*, but the *Style* and *Manner* of this great Man, which we presume to censure. We acknowledg his noble Sentiments and worthy Actions. We own *the Patriot*, and *good Minister*: But we reject *the Writer*. He was the first of any Note or Worth who gave credit to that *false* Style and Manner here spoken of. He might, on this account, be call'd in reality *The Corrupter of* Roman *Eloquence*. This indeed cou'd not but naturally, and of it-self, become re-

[24]

Chap. 3. Or supposing that philosophical Courtier had really such a Correspondency; and, at several times, had sent so many fair Epistles,

honestly sign'd and seal'd, to his Country-friend at a distance; it

lax and dissolute, after such a Relaxation and Dissolution of Manners, consequent to the Change of Government, and to the horrid Luxury and Effeminacy of the Roman Court, even before the time of a CLAUDIUS, or a NERO. There was no more possibility of making a Stand for Language, than for Liberty. As the World now stood, the highest Glory which cou'd be attain'd by mortal Man, was to be Mitigator or Moderator of that universal Tyranny already establish'd. To this I must add, That in every City, Principality, or smaller Nation, where single WILL prevails, and Court-power, instead of Laws or Constitutions, guides the State; 'tis of the highest difficulty for the best Minister to procure a just, or even a tolerable Administration. Where such a Minister is found, who can but moderately influence the petty Tyranny, he deserves considerable Applause and Honour. But in the Case we have mention'd, where a universal Monarchy was actually establish'd, and the Interest of a whole World concern'd; He surely must have been esteem'd a Guardian-Angel, who, as a prime Minister, cou'd, for several Years, turn the very worst of Courts, and worst-condition'd of all Princes, to the fatherly Care and just Government of Mankind. Such a Minister was SENECA under an AGRIPPINA and a NERO. And such he was acknowledg'd by the antient and never-sparing Satirists, who cou'd not forbear to celebrate, withal, his Generosity and Friendship in a private Life:

Nemo petit, modicis quae mittebantur amicis A SENECA; quae PISO bonus, quae COTTA solebat Largiri: namque & titulis, & fascibus olim Major habebatur donandi gloria.

[No one asks for what used to be sent to his clients by Seneca, or what good-natured Piso or Cotta used to give; for the glory of liberality was once reckoned greater than inscriptions recording your high office.] Juvenal. Sat. v. ver. 108.

———Quis tam
Perditus, ut dubitet Senecam praeferre Neroni?
[Who is so abandoned as to hesitate to set Seneca above Nero?] Id. Sat. viii. ver. 211.

This Remark is what I have been tempted to make by the way, on the *Character* of this *Roman* Author, more mistaken (if I am not very much so my-self) than any other so generally study'd. As for the *philosophick* Character or Function imputed to him, 'twas foreign, and no-way proper or peculiar to one who never assum'd so much as that of *Sophist*, or *Pensionary Teacher of Philosophy*. He was far wide of any such Order, or Profession. There is great difference between a Courtier who takes a Fancy for Philosophy, and a Philosopher who shou'd take a Fancy for a Court. Now Seneca was born *a Courtier*; being Son of a Court-*Rhetor*: himself bred in the same manner, and taken into favour for his Wit and Genius, his admir'd Style and Eloquence; not for his Learning in the Books of Philosophy and the Antients. For this

appears however by the Epistles themselves, in their proper Order, (if they may be said to have any) that after a few Attempts at the beginning, the Author by degrees loses sight of his Correspondent, and takes the World in general for his Reader or Disciple. He falls into the random way of Miscellaneous Writing; says everywhere great and noble Things, in and out of the way, accidentally as Words led him (for with these he plays perpetually); with infinite Wit, but with little or no Coherence; without a Shape or Body to his Work; without a real *Beginning, a Middle, or an End. Of a hundred and twenty four Epistles, you may, if you please, make five Hundred, or half a Score. A great-one, for instance, you may divide into five or six. A little-one you may tack to another; and that to another; and so on. The Unity of the Writing will be the same: The Life and Spirit full as well preserv'd. 'Tis not only whole Letters or Pages you may change and manage thus at pleasure: Every Period, every Sentence almost, is independent; and may be taken asunder, transpos'd, postpon'd, anticipated, or set in any new Order, as you fansy.

This is the Manner of Writing so much admir'd and imitated in our Age, that we have scarce the Idea of any other Model. We know little, indeed, of the Difference between one *Model* or *Character* of writing and another. All runs to the same Tune, and beats exactly one and the same Measure. Nothing, one wou'd think, cou'd be more tedious than this uniform *Pace*. The common *Amble* or *Canterbury* is not, I am persuaded, more tiresom to a good Rider, than this *see-saw* of Essay-*Writers* is to an able Reader. The just Composer of a legitimate Piece is like an able Traveller, who

[26]

Chap. 3.

[25]

indeed was not very profound in him. In short, he was a Man of wonderful Wit, Fluency of Thought and Language, an *able Minister*, and *honest Courtier*. And what has been deliver'd down to his prejudice, is by the common Enemy of all the free and generous Romans, that apish shallow Historian, and Court-Flatterer, DION Cassius, of a low Age, when *Barbarism* (as may be easily seen in his own Work) came on apace, and the very Traces and Features of Virtue, Science and Knowledg, were wearing out of the World.

^{*} *Infra*, p. 259, 260 in the Notes. And VOL. I. p. 146.

[28]

exactly measures his Journey, considers his Ground, premeditates Chap. 3. his Stages, and Intervals of Relaxation and Intention, to the very Conclusion of his Undertaking, that he happily arrives where he first propos'd when he set out. He is not presently upon the Spur, or in his full Career; but walks his Steed leisurely out of his Stable, settles himself in his Stirrups, and when fair Road and Season offer, puts on perhaps to a round Trot; thence into a Gallop, and after a while takes up. As Down, or Meadow, or shady Lane present themselves, he accordingly sutes his Pace, favours his Palfry; and is sure not to bring him puffing, and in a heat, into his last Inn. But the Post-way is become highly fashionable with modern Authors. The very same stroke sets you out, and brings you in. Nothing stays, or interrupts. Hill or Valley; rough or smooth; thick or thin: No Difference; no Variation. When an Author sits down to write, he knows no other Business he has, than to be witty, and take care that his Periods be well turn'd, or (as they commonly say) run smooth. In this manner, he doubts not to gain the Character of bright. When he has writ as many Pages as he likes, or as his Run of Fancy wou'd permit; he then perhaps considers what Name' he had best give to [27] his new Writing: whether he shou'd call it *Letter*, *Essay*, *Miscellany*, or aught else. The Bookseller perhaps is to determine this at last, when all, besides the Preface, Epistle Dedicatory, and Title-page, is dispatch'd.

— Incertus scamnum, faceretne Priapum.
— Deus inde ego!
[Hesitating whether he should make a bench or a Priapus. . . .
So I am a God!] Horat. Sat. 8. Lib. i. ver. 2.

Chap. 1.

MISCELLANY II

CHAPTER I

Review of Enthusiasm.—Its Defense, Praise:—Use in Business as well as Pleasure:—Operation by Fear, Love.—
Modifications of Enthusiasm: Magnanimity; Heroick Virtue; Honour; Publick Zeal; Religion; Superstition; Persecution; Martyrdom.—Energy of the extatick Devotion in the Tender Sex.—Account of antient Priesthood.—Religious War.—
Reference to a succeeding Chapter.

WHETHER in fact there be any real *Enchantment*, any Influence of *Stars*, any Power of *Daemons* or of foreign Natures over our own Minds, is thought questionable by many. Some there are who assert the Negative, and endeavour to solve the Appearances of this kind by the natural Operation of our Passions, and the common Course of outward Things. For my own part, I cannot but at this present apprehend a kind of *Enchantment* or *Magick* in that which we call Enthusiasm; since I find, that having touch'd slightly on this Subject, I cannot so easily part with it at pleasure.

After having made some cursory Reflections on our Author's *Letter, I thought I might have sufficiently acquitted my-self on this head; till passing to his next Treatise, I found my-self still further ingag'd. I perceiv'd plainly that I had as yet scarce enter'd into our Author's *Humour*, or felt any thing of that *Passion*, which, as he informs us, is so easily communicable and naturally engaging. But what I had pass'd over in my first Reflections, I found naturally rising in me, upon second thoughts. So that by experience I prov'd it true what our Author says,† "That we all of us know something

[29]

^{*} Viz. Letter concerning Enthusiasm, above. VOL. I. Treatise I.

[†] VOL. I. pag. 54.

Chap. 1.

[30]

[31]

of this Principle." And now that I find I have in reality so much of it imparted to me, I may with better reason be pardon'd, if, after our Author's example, I am led to write on such Subjects as these, with Caution, at different *Reprises*; and not singly, *in one Breath*.

I have heard indeed that the very reading of Treatises and Accounts of *Melancholy*, has been apt to generate that Passion in the over-diligent and attentive Reader. And this perhaps may have been the reason, why our Author himself (as he seems to intimate towards the Conclusion of his first *Letter) car'd not in reality to grapple closely with his Subject, or give us, at once, the precise Definition of Enthusiasm. This however we may, with our Author, presume to infer, from the coolest of all Studys, even from *Criticism* it-self, (of which we have been lately treating) †"That there is a Power in Numbers, Harmony, Proportion, and Beauty of every kind, which naturally captivates the Heart, and raises the Imagination to an Opinion or Conceit of something *majestick* and *divine*."

Whatever this Subject may be *in it-self;* we cannot help being transported with the thought of it. It inspires us with something more than ordinary, and raises us above our-selves. Without this Imagination or Conceit, *the World* wou'd be but a dull Circumstance, and *Life* a sorry Pass-time. Scarce cou'd we be said *to live*. The animal Functions might in their course be carry'd on; but nothing further sought for, or regarded. The gallant Sentiments, the elegant Fancys, the *Belle-passions*, which have, all of them, this BEAUTY in view, wou'd be set aside, and leave us probably no other Employment than that of satisfying our coarsest Appetites at the cheapest rate; in order to the attainment of a supine State of Indolence and Inactivity.

Slender wou'd be the Enjoyments of the Lover, the ambitious Man, the Warrior, or the Virtuoso, (as our Author has *elsewhere

^{*} Viz. Treatise I. (Letter of Enthusiasm) VOL. I. pag. 55. lin. 7.

[†] VOL. II. p. 75, 105, 400, &c.

[‡] VOL. II. pag. 400.

intimated) if in the Beautys which they admire, and passionately pursue, there were no reference or regard to any higher *Majesty* or *Grandure*, than what simply results from the particular Objects of their pursuit. I know not, in reality, what we shou'd do to find a seasoning to most of our Pleasures in Life, were it not for the Taste or Relish, which is owing to this particular Passion, and the Conceit or Imagination which supports it. Without this, we cou'd not so much as admire a *Poem*, or a *Picture*; a *Garden*, or a *Palace*; a charming *Shape*, or a *fair Face*. Love it-self wou'd appear the lowest thing in Nature, when thus anticipated, and treated according to the *Anti-enthusiastick* Poet's method:

*And to indulge lust with whoever is at hand.

How *Heroism* or *Magnanimity* must stand in this Hypothesis, is easy to imagine. The Muses themselves must make a very indifferent figure in this philosophical Draught. Even the Prince of [†]Poets wou'd prove a most insipid Writer, if he were thus reduc'd. Nor cou'd there, according to this Scheme, be yet a place of Honour left even for our [‡]*Latin* Poet, the great Disciple of this un-polite Philosophy, who dares with so little Equity employ the Muses Art in favour of such a System. But in spite of his Philosophy, he everywhere gives way to *Admiration*, and *rapturous Views* of NATURE. He is transported with the several Beautys of the World, even whilst he arraigns the Order of it, and destroys the Principle of *Beauty*, from whence in antient Languages the **World it-self was nam'd.

* Et jacere humorem collectum in corpora quaeque. Lucret. *lib.* iv. *ver.* 1059. Chap. 1.

[32

[33]

[†] ουδὲν μέρος Ὁμήρω ἄθεον, οὐδὲ δυνάστου ἄπορον, οὐδὲ ἀρχῆς ἔρημον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μεστὰ θείων ὀνομάτων καὶ θείων λόγων, καὶ θείας τέχνης. [No part in Homer is devoid of Gods, or bare of princes, or destitute of magistrates; but all is full of names and speeches and art of Gods.] Maximus Tyr. Dissert. xvi.

[‡] Viz. Lucretius. As above, VOL. I. p. 52.

^{**} κόσμος, Mundus. From whence that Expostulation, $\dot{\epsilon}\nu$ σοὶ μ $\dot{\epsilon}\nu$ τις κόσμος ὑφίστασθαι δύναται, $\dot{\epsilon}\nu$ δὲ τ $\hat{\omega}$ παντὶ ἀκοσμία; M. Ant. Lib. iv. 27. [We might with correct etymology call the universe an order, but not a disorder.] And that

Chap. 1.

[34]

This is what our Author advances; when in behalf of Enthusiasm he quotes its formal Enemys, and shews That they are as capable of it as its greatest Confessors and Assertors. So far is he from degrading *Enthusiasm*, or disclaiming it in himself; that he looks on this Passion, simply consider'd, as the most *natural*, and its Object as the *justest* in the World. Even VIRTUE it-self he takes to be no other than a noble *Enthusiasm* justly directed, and regulated by that high Standard which he supposes in the Nature of Things.

He seems to assert, *"That there are certain moral *Species* or *Appearances* so striking, and of such force over our Natures, that when they present themselves, they bear down all contrary Opinion or Conceit, all opposite Passion, Sensation, or mere bodily Affection." Of this kind he makes VIRTUE it-self to be the chief: since of all Views or Contemplations, this, in his account, is the most naturally and strongly affecting. The exalted part of *Love* is only borrow'd hence. That of pure *Friendship* is its immediate Self. He who yields his Life a Sacrifice to his Prince or Country; the Lover who for his Paramour performs as much; the heroick, the amorous, the religious *Martyrs*, who draw their Views, whether visionary or real, from this *Pattern* and *Exemplar* of DIVINITY: all these, according to our Author's Sentiment, are alike actuated by this Passion, and prove themselves in effect so many different *Enthusiasts*.

Nor is thorow *Honesty*, in his Hypothesis, any other than this Zeal, or Passion, moving strongly upon the *Species* or *View* of the DECORUM, and SUBLIME of Actions. Others may pursue †different Forms, and fix their Eye on different Species, (as all Men do on one or other): The real *honest Man*, however plain or simple he appears, has that highest Species, †*Honesty* it-self, in view; and

other Allusion to the same word, κόσμον δ' ἐτύμως τὸ σύμπαν, ἀλλ' οὖκ ἀκοσμίαν ὀνομάσαις ἄν. [Or can a certain order subsist within thee, and none in the universe?] Below, pag. 264. in the Notes.

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 138, 139, &c. VOL. II. pag. 100, 104, 5, 6.

[†] VOL. II. pag. 429, 430.

[†] *The* Honestum, Pulchrum, τὸ καλόν, πρέπον [the beautiful, the fitting]. *Infra*, pag. 182, &c.

instead of *outward* Forms or Symmetrys, is struck with that of *inward* Character, the Harmony and Numbers of the Heart, and Beauty of the Affections, which form the Manners and Conduct of a truly *social* Life.'

Chap. 1.

[35]

'Tis indeed peculiar to the Genius of that cool Philosophy *above describ'd; that as it denies the Order or Harmony of Things in general, so by a just Consequence and Truth of Reasoning, it rejects the Habit of admiring or being charm'd with whatever is call'd *Beautiful* in particular. According to the Regimen prescrib'd by this Philosophy, it must be acknowledg'd that the Evils of *Love, Ambition, Vanity, Luxury,* with other Disturbances deriv'd from the florid, high, and elegant Ideas of Things, must in appearance be set in a fair way of being radically cur'd.

It need not be thought surprizing, that *Religion* it-self shou'd in the account of these Philosophers be reckon'd among those Vices and Disturbances, which it concerns us after this manner to extirpate. If the Idea of *Majesty* and Beauty in other inferior Subjects be in reality distracting; it must chiefly prove so, in that *principal Subject*, the Basis and Foundation of this Conceit. Now if *the Subject* it-self be not *in Nature*, neither the Idea nor the Passion grounded on it can be properly esteem'd *natural:* And thus all *Admiration* ceases; and Enthusiasm is at an end. But if there be *naturally* such a Passion; 'tis evident that Religion it-self is of the kind, and must be therefore *natural* to Man.

[36]

We can admire nothing profoundly, without a certain religious Veneration. And because this borders so much on *Fear*, and raises a certain Tremor or Horror of like appearance; 'tis easy to give that Turn to the Affection, and represent all Enthusiasm and *religious Extasy* as the Product or mere Effect of Fear:

The first fear fashioned the gods on earth.1

But the original Passion, as appears plainly, is of another kind, and in effect is so confess'd by those who are the greatest Opposers

^{*} Supra, pag. 32. And VOL. I. pag. 48, 49, 117, &c.

¹ Primus in orbe deos fecit timor.

of Religion, and who, as our Author observes, have shewn themselves sufficiently convinc'd, *"That altho these Ideas of *Divinity* and *Beauty* were vain; they were yet in a manner innate, or such as Men were really born to, and cou'd hardly by any means avoid."

Now as all Affections have their Excess, and require Judgment and Discretion to moderate and govern them; so this high and noble Affection, which raises Man to Action, and is his Guide in Business as well as Pleasure, requires a steddy Rein and strict Hand over it. All Moralists, worthy of any Name, have recogniz'd the Passion; tho among these the wisest have prescrib'd Restraint, press'd Moderation, and to all Tyro's in Philosophy forbid the forward Use of Admiration, Rapture, or Extasy, even in the Subjects they esteem'd the highest, and most divine. They knew very well that the first Motion, Appetite, and Ardour of the Youth in general towards †Philosophy and Knowledg, depended chiefly on this Turn of Temper: Yet were they well appriz'd, withal, That in the Progress of this Study, as well as in the affairs of Life, the florid Ideas and exalted Fancy of this kind became the Fuel of many incendiary Passions; and that, in religious Concerns particularly, the Habit of Admiration and contemplative Delight, wou'd, by over-Indulgence, too easily mount into high Fanaticism, or degenerate into abject Superstition.

Upon the whole therefore, according to our Author, Enthusiasm is, in it-self, a very natural *honest* Passion; and has properly nothing for its Object but what is *Good and Honest. 'Tis apt indeed, he confesses, to run astray. And by modern example we know, perhaps yet better than by any antient, that, in Religion, the Enthusiasm which works by Love, is subject to many strange Irregularitys; and that which works by Fear, to many monstrous

[38]

^{*} Letter of Enthusiasm, VOL. I. pag. 49.

[†] So The Stagirite: διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωτοι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν. [For it was through wonder that men first began, and do still begin, to philosophise.] Metaph. Lib. i. Cap. 2. See below, pag. 202, 203 in the Nates

[‡] τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν [the beautiful and good].

and horrible Superstitions. *Mysticks* and *Fanaticks* are known to abound as well in our *Reform'd*, as in the *Romish* Churches. The pretended Floods of Grace pour'd into the Bosoms of the *Quietists*, *Pietists*, and those who favour the extatick way of Devotion, raise such Transports, as by their own Proselytes are confess'd to have something strangely agreeable, and in common with what ordinary Lovers are us'd to feel. And it has been remark'd by many, That the *Female* Saints have been the greatest Improvers of this *soft* part of Religion. What truth there may be in the related Operations of this pretended Grace and *amorous* Zeal, or in the Accounts of what has usually past between the *Saints* of each Sex, in these devout Extasys, I shall leave the Reader to examine: supposing he will find credible Accounts, sufficient to convince him of the dangerous progress of Enthusiasm in this amorous *Lineage*.

There are many *Branches* indeed more vulgar, as that of FEAR, Melancholy, Consternation, Suspicion, Despair. And when the Passion turns more towards the astonishing and frightful, than the amiable and delightful side, it creates rather what we call SUPERSTITION than ENTHUSIASM. I must confess withal, that what we commonly style Zeal in matters of Religion, is seldom without a mixture of both these Extravagancys. The extatick Motions of Love and Admiration, are seldom un-accompany'd with the Horrors and Consternations of a lower sort of Devotion. These Paroxysms of Zeal are in reality as the hot and cold Fits of an Ague, and depend on the different and occasional Views or Aspects of the DIVINITY; according as the Worshiper is *guided from without, or affected from within, by his particular Constitution. Seldom are those Aspects so determinate and fix'd, as to excite constantly one and the same Spirit of Devotion. In Religions therefore, which hold most of Love, there is generally room left for Terrors of the deepest kind. Nor is there any Religion so diabolical, as, in its representation of DIVINITY, to leave no room for Admiration and Esteem. Whatever Personage or Specter of DIVINITY is worship'd; a

* Infra, pag. 130.

Chap. 1.

[39]

[40]

[41]

Chap. I. certain *Esteem* and *Love* is generally affected by his Worshipers. Or if, in the Devotion paid him, there be in truth no real or absolute *Esteem*; there is however a certain astonishing *Delight* or *Ravishment* excited.

This Passion is experienc'd, in common, by every Worshiper of the Zealot-kind. The Motion, when un-guided, and left wholly to it-self, is in its nature turbulent and incentive. It disjoints the natural Frame, and relaxes the ordinary Tone or Tenor of the Mind. In this Disposition the Reins are let loose to all Passion which arises: And the Mind, as far as it is able to act or think in such a State, approves the Riot, and justifies the wild Effects, by the suppos'd Sacredness of the Cause. Every Dream and Frenzy is made Inspiration; every Affection, Zeal. And in this Persuasion the Zealots, no longer self-govern'd, but set adrift to the wide Sea of Passion, can in one and the same Spirit of Devotion, exert the opposite Passions of Love and Hatred; unite affectionately, and abhor furiously; curse, bless, sing, mourn, exult, tremble, caress, assassinate, inflict and suffer *Martyrdom, with a thousand other the most vehement Efforts of variable and contrary Affection.

THE common *Heathen* Religion, especially in its latter Age, when adorn'd with the most beautiful Temples, and render'd more illustrious by the Munificence of the ROMAN Senate and succeeding

* A Passage of History comes to my mind, as it is cited by an eminent *Divine* of our own Church, with regard to that *Spirit of* MARTYRDOM which furnishes, it seems, such solid Matter for the Opinion and Faith of many Zealots. The *Story,* in the words of our *Divine,* and with his own Reflections on it, is as follows: "Two *Franciscans* offer'd themselves to the Fire to prove *Savanorola* to be a Heretick. But a certain *Jacobine* offer'd himself to the Fire to prove that *Savanorola* had true Revelations, and was no Heretick. In the mean time *Savanorola* preach'd; but made no such confident Offer, nor durst he venture at that new kind of Fire-Ordeal. And put Case, all *four* had pass'd thro' the Fire, and died in the flames; What wou'd that have prov'd? Had he been a Heretick, or no Heretick, the more, or the less, for the Confidence of these zealous Idiots? If we mark it, a great many Arguments whereon many *Sects* rely, are no better Probation than this comes to." Bishop *Taylor* in his dedicatory Discourse, before his *Liberty* of *Prophesying*. See *Letter of Enthusiasm*, VOL. I. *pag.* 26, &c.

Emperors, ran wholly into Pomp, and was supported chiefly by that sort of Enthusiasm, which is rais'd from the *external Objects of *Grandure, Majesty*, and what we call *August*. On the other side, the Egyptian or Syrian Religions, which lay more in *Mystery* and *conceal'd Rites;* having less Dependence on the Magistrate, and less of that *Decorum* of Art, Politeness, and Magnificence, ran into a more *pusillanimous, frivolous*, and *mean* kind of Superstition; "The Observation of Days, the Forbearance of Meats, and the Contention about Traditions, Seniority of Laws, and †Priority of *Godships*."

Hence a raging madness is abroad on both sides, because each place hates its neighbours' deities, since it believes that only its own objects of worship are Gods.²

History, withal, informs us of a certain Establishment in EGYPT, which was very extraordinary, and must needs have had a very uncommon effect; no way advantageous to that Nation in particular, or to the general Society of Mankind. We know very well, that nothing is more injurious to the *Police*, or municipal Constitution of any City or Colony, than the forcing of a particular Trade: Nothing more dangerous than the over-peopling any Manufacture, or multiplying the *Traders*, or *Dealers*, of whatever Vocation, beyond their natural Proportion, and the publick *Demand*. Now it happen'd of old, in this Mother-Land of Superstition, that *the Sons of

 \ddagger ἔστι δὲ Αἶγυπτίων έπτὰ γένεα· καὶ τούτων οἱ μέν, ἱρέες, οἱ δέ, μάχιμοι κεκλέαται. - οὐδὲ τούτοισιν ἔξεστι τέχνην ἐπασκῆσαι οὐδεμίην, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐς πόλεμον ἐπασκέουσι μοῦνα, παῖς παρὰ πατρὸς ἐκδεκόμενος. [The Egyptians are divided into seven classes—one of priests, one of warriors, etc. . . . The warriors may not practise any craft, but only that of war, which they inherit by birth.] Herodot. L. ii. §. 164.

ίραται δὲ οὐκ εἶς ἑκάστου τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ . . ἐπεὰν δέ τις ἀποθάνη,

Chap. 1.

[42]

42]

Chap. I. certain Artists were by Law oblig'd always to follow the same Calling with their Fathers. Thus the Son of *a Priest* was always *a Priest by Birth*, as was the whole Lineage after him, without interruption. Nor was it a Custom with this Nation, as with others, to have only *one single Priest or Priestess to a Temple: but as the Number of Gods and Temples was infinite; so was that of the Priests. The Religious Foundations were without Restriction: and to one single Worship or Temple, as many of the Holy Order might be Retainers, as cou'd raise a Maintenance from the Office.

τούτου δ πα \hat{i} s ἀντικατίσταται. [Not one priest, but a whole college of priests, is consecrated to each god, . . . and when one priest dies his son is consecrated in his place.] Ibid. §. 37.

^{*} $\tau \eta s$ $\delta \epsilon \chi \omega \rho \alpha s$ $\delta \pi \alpha \sigma \eta s$ $\epsilon s \epsilon s$ $\tau \rho s \alpha \mu \epsilon \rho \eta$ $\delta s \eta \rho \eta \mu \epsilon \nu \eta s$, &c. Cum tota regio in tres partes divisa sit, primam sibi portionem vendicat ordo sacerdotum, magnâ apud indigenas auctoritate pollens, tum ob pietatem in deos, tum quod multam ex eruditione scientiam ejusmodi homines asserunt. Ex reditibus autem suis cuncta per AEgyptum sacrificia procurant, ministros alunt; & propriis commoditatibus ancillantur, ταῖς ἶδίαις χρείαις χορηγοῦσιν. Non enim (AEgyptii) existimant fas esse deorum honores mutari, sed semper ab eisdem eodem ritu peragi, neque eos necessariorum copiâ destituti qui in commune omnibus consulunt. În universum namque de maximis rebus consulentes, indesinenter Regi praestò sunt, in nonnullis tanquam participes imperii, in aliis reges, duces & magistri (συνεργοί, εἰσηγηταί, διδάσκαλοι) existentes. Ex astrologia quoque & sacrorum inspectione, futura praedicunt, atque è sacrorum librorum scriptis res gestas cum utilitate conjunctas praelegunt. Non enim, ut apud Graecos, unus tantummodo vir, aut foemina una, sacerdotio fungitur; sed complures sacrificia & honores deûm obeuntes, liberis suis candem vitae rationem quasi per manus tradunt. Hi autem cunctis oneribus sunt immunes, & primos post Regem honoris & potestatis gradus obtinent. [The whole country being divided into three parts, the order of priests claims the first part. It enjoys great authority among the people, both for its piety toward the Gods and for its profound learning. Out of their revenues the priests find all the sacrifices for Egypt, pay their servants, and meet their own expenses. For the Egyptians do not think it lawful to change the rites of the Gods, but hold that they must be carried on unchanged by the same class of persons, and that those who watch for all must not lack bread. For the priests, perpetually watching for the general good, are ever by the king's side; and in some matters they share his power, in some they act as fellowworkers, advisers, teachers. They also foretell the future from astronomy and from the examination of victims, and from their sacred books they give useful teaching in history. For it is not as with the Greeks, among whom one man or one woman holds a priesthood, but several Egyptian priests attend to sacrifices and ritual, and they pass on the same way of life by inheritance to their children. They are exempted from all taxes, and they enjoy the first rank and dignity after the king. (This text was originally written in Greek; Shaftesbury quotes the opening lines from the Greek, then proceeds to supply the entire passage in Latin.)] Diod. Sic. lib. i. pag. 66.

Whatever happen'd to other Races or Professions, that of the *Priest*, in all likelihood, must, by this Regulation, have propagated the most of any. 'Tis a tempting Circumstance; to have so easy a Mastery over the World; to subdue by Wit instead of Force; to practise on the Passions, and triumph over the Judgment of Mankind; to influence private Familys, and publick Councils; conquer Conquerors; controul the Magistrate himself, and govern without the Envy which attends all other Government or Superiority. No wonder if such *a Profession* was apt to multiply: especially when we consider the easy Living and Security of the *Professors*, their Exemption from all Labour, and Hazard; the suppos'd Sacredness of their Character; and their free Possession of *Wealth*, *Grandure*, *Estates*, and *Women*.

There was no need to invest such a Body as this, with rich Lands and ample Territorys, as it happen'd in EGYPT. The Generation or Tribe being once set apart as sacred, wou'd, without further encouragement, be able, no doubt, in process of time, to establish themselves a plentiful and growing Fund, or religious Land-Bank. 'Twas a sufficient Donative, to have had only that single Privilege from the *Law; "That they might retain what they cou'd get; and that it might be lawful for their Order to receive such Estates by voluntary Contribution, as cou'd never afterwards be converted to other Uses."

Now if, besides the Method of Propagation by Descent, other Methods of Increase were allow'd in this Order of Men; if Volunteers were also admitted at pleasure, without any Stint or Confinement to a certain Number; 'tis not difficult to imagine how enormous the Growth wou'd be of such a Science or Profession, thus recogniz'd by the Magistrate, thus invested with Lands and Power, and thus intitled to whatever extent of Riches or Possession cou'd be acquir'd by Practice and Influence over the superstitious part of Mankind.

There were, besides, in EGYPT some natural Causes of Super-

Chap. 1.

[45]

^{*} Infra, p. 79.

stition, beyond those which were common to other Regions. This Chap. 1. Nation might well abound in Prodigys, when even their Country and Soil it-self was a kind of Prodigy in Nature. Their solitary idle Life, whilst shut up in their Houses by the regular Inun-[46] dations of the NILE; the unwholesom Vapours arising from the new Mud, and slimy Relicts of their River, expos'd to the hot Suns; their various Meteors and Phaenomena; with the long Vacancy they had to observe and comment on them; the necessity, withal, which, on the account of their Navigation, and the Measure of their yearly drowned Lands, compell'd them to promote the Studys of Astronomy and other Sciences, of which their Priesthood cou'd make good advantages: All these may be reckon'd, perhaps, as additional Causes of the immense Growth of Superstition, and the enormous Increase of the Priesthood in this fertile Land.

'Twill however, as I conceive, be found unquestionably true, according to political Arithmetick, in every Nation whatsoever; "That the Quantity of Superstition (if I may so speak) will, in proportion, nearly answer the Number of Priests, Diviners, Sooth-sayers, Prophets, or such who gain their Livelihood, or receive Advantages by officiating in religious Affairs." For if these Dealers are numerous, they will force a Trade. And as the liberal Hand of the Magistrate can easily raise Swarms of this kind, where they are already but in a moderate proportion; so where, thro' any other cause, the Number of these increasing still, by degrees, is suffer'd to grow beyond a certain measure, they will soon raise such a Ferment in Mens Minds, as will at least compel the Magistrate, however sensible of the Grievance, to be cautious in proceeding to a Reform.

We may observe in other necessary Professions, rais'd on the Infirmitys and Defects of Mankind, (as for instance, in *Law* and *Physick*) "That with the least help from the Bounty or Beneficence of the Magistrate, the Number of the Professors, and the Subjectmatter of the Profession, is found over and above increasing." New Difficultys are started: New Subjects of Contention: *Deeds* and *Instruments* of Law grow more numerous and prolix: *Hypotheses*,

[47]

Methods, Regimens, more various; and the Materia Medica more extensive and abundant. What, in process of time, must therefore naturally have happen'd in the case of Religion, among the Egyptians, may easily be gather'd.

Chap. 1.

Nor is it strange that we shou'd find the *Property and Power of the Egyptian' Priesthood, in antient days, arriv'd to such a height, as in a manner to have swallow'd up the State and Monarchy. A worse Accident befel the Persian Crown, of which the Hierarchy having got absolute possession, had once a fair Chance for Universal Empire. Now that the Persian or Babylonian Hierarchy was much after the Model of the Egyptian, tho different perhaps in Rites and Ceremonys, we may well judg; not only from the History of the †Magi, but from what is recorded of antient Colonys sent long before by the Egyptians into ‡Chaldea and the adjacent Countrys. And whether the Ethiopian Model was from that of Egypt, or the Egyptian from that of Ethiopian, (for **each Nation had its pretence) we know by remarkable ††Effects, that the Ethiopian Emperence

[48]

^{*} Which was one Third. β ou λ oµ ϵ v η v δ è τ $\dot{\eta}$ v * To ν , &c. Sed cum Isis lucro etiam Sacerdotes invitare vellet ad cultus istos, (nempe Osiridis, mariti fato functi) tertiam eis terrae partem ϵ is π poo $\dot{\delta}$ ovs, ad Deorum ministeria & sacra munia, fruendam donavit. [But as Isis wished to encourage the priests by gain also to the worship of her dead husband Osiris, she granted them one-third of the country, to employ its revenues for divine duties and sacrifices. (Again, Shaftesbury quotes the introductory words in Greek, then quotes the entire passage in Latin.)] Diod. Sic. lib. i. A remarkable Effect of Female Superstition! See also the Passage of the same Historian, cited above, pag. 43. in the Notes.

[†] See Treatise II. viz. *Sensus Communis*, (VOL. I.) pag. 85, &c. *Herodotus* gives us the History at length in his third Book.

[‡] Diod. Sic. lib. i. p. 17, & 73.

^{**} Herodot. Euterpe; & Diod. Sic. lib. iii.

^{††} κατὰ τὴν Μερόην οἱ περὶ τὰς τῶν θεῶν θεραπείας τε καὶ τιμὰς διατρίβοντες ἱερεῖς, &c. Qui in Meroe (urbe, & insula primaria AEthiopum) Deorum cultus & honores administrant sacerdotes, (ordo autem hic maximâ pollet auctoritate) quandocumque ipsis in mentem venerit, misso ad Regem nuncio, vitâ se illum abdicare jubent. Oraculis enim Deorum hoc edici: nec fas esse ab ullo mortalium, quod Dii immortales jusserint, contemni. [The priests who look after the ritual and worship of the Gods at Meröe (and very great is the authority of this order) send word to the king, whenever they think fit, that he must die; for so (they say) the oracles of the Gods enjoin, and what Gods command no mortal must disobey.—Diod. Sic. iii. 6.]—So

Chap. 1.

[49]

[50]

pire was once in the same Condition: the State having been wholly swallow'd in the exorbitant Power of their landed Hierarchy. So true it is, "That *Dominion* must naturally follow *Property*." Nor is it possible, as I conceive, for any State or Monarchy to withstand the Encroachments of a growing Hierarchy, founded on the *Model* of these *Egyptian* and *Asiatick* Priesthoods. No Superstition will ever be wanting among the Ignorant and Vulgar, whilst the Able and Crafty have a power to gain Inheritances and Possessions by working on this *human Weakness*. This is a Fund which, by these Allowances, will prove inexhaustible. New *Modes* of Worship, new *Miracles*, new *Heroes*, *Saints*, *Divinitys* (which, serve as new Occasions for *sacred* Donatives) will be easily supply'd on the part of the religious Orders; whilst the Civil Magistrate authorizes the accumulative Donation, and neither restrains the *Number* or *Possessions* of the Sacred Body.

We find, withal, that in the early days of this antient *Priestly Nation* of whom we have been speaking, 'twas thought expedient also, for the increase of *Devotion*, to enlarge their *System* of Deity; and either by *mystical Genealogy, Consecration*, or *Canon-*

much for their Kings. For as to Subjects, the Manner was related a little before. Unus ex lictoribus ad reum mittitur, signum mortis praeferens: quo ille viso, domum abiens sibi mortem consciscit. [One of their attendants is sent to the accused, bearing a sign of death; whereupon the accused goes home and kills himself.—Diod. Sic. iii. 5.] This, the People of our days wou'd call Passive-Obedience and Priestcraft, with a witness. But our Historian proceeds—Et per superiores quidem aetates, non armis aut vi coacti, sed merae superstitionis, $\delta \pi$ ' $\alpha \delta \tau \hat{\eta}_s$ $\delta \epsilon \iota \sigma \iota \delta \alpha \iota \mu o \nu \iota \alpha s$ fascino, mente capti reges sacerdotibus morem gesserunt: donec Ergamenes, AEthiopum rex, (Ртоlomaeo secundo rerum potiente) Graecorum disciplinae & philosophiae particeps, mandata illa primus adspernari ausus fuit. Nam hic animo, qui regem deceret, sumto, cum militum manu in locum inaccessum, ubi aureum fuit templum AEthiopum, profectus; omnes illos sacrificos jugulavit, & abolito more pristino, sacra pro arbitrio suo instauravit. [In former generations the kings, not forced by arms, but simply bewitched by superstition, obeyed the priests. But Ergamenes, king of the Ethiopians in the time of Ptolemy II., who was initiated into Greek philosophy, was the first to despise their orders. With kingly courage he marched his soldiers upon the inaccessible spot where stood the golden temple of the Ethiopians, cut down all the priests, abolished the old usage, and rearranged the ritual to his own liking. (In each of these Greek and Latin references, Shaftesbury opens the quotation in Greek and completes it in Latin.)] Diod. Sic. lib. iii.

Chap. 1.

ization, to multiply their reveal'd Objects of Worship, and raise new *Personages* of DIVINITY in their Religion. They proceeded, it seems, in process of time, to increase the *Number of their *Gods*, so far that, at last, they became in a manner numberless. What odd Shapes, Species, and Forms of *Deity* were in latter times exhibited, is well known. Scarce an *Animal* or *Plant* but was adopted into some share of *Divinity*.

[†]O pious nation, for whom Gods like these grow in the garden!

No wonder if by a Nation so abounding in religious *Orders*, spiritual Conquests were sought in foreign Countrys, [‡]Colonys led abroad, and Missionarys detach'd, on Expeditions, in this prosperous Service. 'Twas thus a *Zealot*-People, influenc'd of old by their very Region and Climate, and who thro' a long Tract of Time, under a peculiar Policy, had been rais'd both by Art and Nature to an immense Growth in religious Science and Mystery; came by degrees to spread their variety of Rites and Ceremonys, their distinguishing Marks of *separate* Worships and *secrete* Communitys, thro' the distant World; but chiefly thro' their neighbouring and dependent Countrys.

[دی]

^{*} ωs δὲ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, ἔτεά ἐστι ἐπτακισχίλια καὶ μύρια ἐσ Ἄμασιν βασιλεύσαντα, ἐπεί τε ἐκ τῶν ὀκτὼ θεῶν οἱ δυώδεκα θεοὶ ἐγένοντο. [By the Egyptians' own story it is 17,000 years from the time when the eight Gods grew into twelve down to the reign of Amasis.] Herodot. lib. ii. sect. 43.

[†] O sanctas Gentes, quibus haec nascuntur in hortis Numina!— Juvenal. Sat. xv. ver. 10.

[‡] οἱ δὲ οὖν Αἰγύπτιοι, &c. AEgyptii plurimas colonias ex AEgypto in orbem terrarum disseminatas fuisse dicunt. In Babylonem colonos deduxit Belus, qui Neptuni & Libyae filius habetur: & positâ ad Euphratem sede, instituit sacerdotes ad morem AEgyptiorum exemptos impensis & oneribus publicis, quos Babylonii vocant Chaldaeos, qui, exemplo Sacerdotum & Physicorum, Astrologorumque in AEgypto, observant stellas. [The Egyptians say that very many colonies were scattered over the world from Egypt. Belus, who is reputed son of Poseidon and Libya, led colonists to Babylon. After planting his town on the Euphrates, he instituted priests after the Egyptian fashion, exempt from taxes and public burdens; these, whom the Babylonians call Chaldeans, like the priests and the men of science and the astronomers in Egypt, watch the stars. (Again, the passage is introduced with the Greek, then offered in its entirety in Latin.)] Diod. Sic. lib. i. p. 17. Ibid. p. 73.

Chap. I. We understand from History, that even when the EGYPTIAN State was least powerful in Arms, it was still respected for its Religion and Mysterys. It drew Strangers from all Parts to behold its Wonders. And the Fertility of its Soil forc'd the adjacent People, and wandring Nations, who liv'd dispers'd in single Tribes, to visit them, court their Alliance, and sollicit a Trade and Commerce with them, on whatsoever Terms. The Strangers, no doubt, might well receive religious Rites and Doctrines from those, to whom they ow'd their Maintenance and Bread.

Before the time that ISRAEL was constrain'd to go down to EGYPT, and sue for Maintenance to these powerful *Dynastys* or Low-Land States, the Holy *Patriarch* *ABRAHAM himself had been necessitated to this Compliance on the same account. He apply'd in the same manner to the EGYPTIAN *Court*. He was at first well receiv'd, and handsomly presented; but afterwards ill us'd, and out of favour with the Prince, yet suffer'd to depart the Kingdom, and retire with his Effects; without any attempt of recalling him again by force, as it happen'd in the case of his Posterity. 'Tis certain that if this holy *Patriarch*, who first instituted the sacred Rite of *Circumcision* within his own Family or Tribe, had no regard to any Policy or Religion of the EGYPTIANS; yet he had formerly been a Guest and Inhabitant in EGYPT (where †Historians mention this to have

^{*} Gen. cap. xii. ver. 10, &c.

[†] Abramus, quando AEgyptum ingressus est, nondum circumcisus erat, neque per annos amplius viginti post reditum. — Illius posteri circumcisi sunt, & ante introitum, & dum in AEgypto commorati sunt: post exitum verò non sunt circumcisi, quamdiu vixit Moses. — Fecit itaque Josue cultros lapideos, & circumcidit filios Israel in Colle Praeputiorum. Factum Deus ratum habuit, dixitque, Hodie ἀφείλον τὸν ὀνειδισμὸν Αἰλύπτον ἀφ' ὑμῶν, abstuli opprobrium AEgypti à vobis. Josue cap. 5. ver. 3. Tam AEgyptiis quàm Judaeis opprobrio erant incircumcisi. — Apud AEgyptios circumcidendi ritus vetustissimus fuit, & ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ab ipso initio institutus. Illi nullorum aliorum hominum institutis uti volunt. [Abram, when he went into Egypt, had not yet been circumcised nor for more than twenty years after his return. . . . His descendants were not circumcised as long as Moses lived. Thus Joshua made polished stones and Israel circumcised its sons on the Hill of Foreskins. God held the deed valid and he said, Today I have taken away the censure of Egypt from you. Joshua ch. 5, v. 3. So they were uncircumcised as a disgrace to the Egyptians rather than the Judeans. Among the Egyptians the rite of circumcision was very long stand-

Chap. 1.

[53]

been a national Rite); long *ere he had receiv'd any divine Notice or Revelation, concerning this Affair. Nor was it in *Religion* merely that this reverend Guest was said to have deriv'd Knowledg and Learning from the EGYPTIANS. 'Twas from this *Parent-Country* of *occult Sciences*, that he was presum'd, together with other Wisdom, to have learnt that of †*judicial Astrology*; as his Successors did afterwards other prophetical and miraculous Arts, proper to the MAGI, or *Priesthood* of this Land.

One cannot indeed but observe, in after times, the strange Adherence and servile Dependency of the whole Hebrew Race on the Egyptian Nation. It appears that tho they were of old abus'd in the Person of their grand Patriarch; tho afterwards held in bondage, and treated as the most abject Slaves; tho twice expel'd, or necessitated to save themselves by flight, out of this oppressive Region; yet in the very instant of their last Retreat, whilst they were yet on their March, conducted by visible Divinity, supply'd and fed from Heaven, and supported by continual Miracles; they notwithstanding inclin'd so strongly to the Manners, the Religion, Rites, Diet, Customs, Laws, and Constitutions of their tyrannical Masters, that it was with the utmost difficulty they could be withheld from *returning again into the same Subjection. Nor could

ing and they were willing to use the practices no other men use.] Herodot. lib. 2. cap. 91. $\tau \grave{\alpha}$ αἰδοῖα ῷ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐῶσι ὡς ἐλένοντο, πλὴν ὅσοι ἀπὸ τούτων ἔμαθον· Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ περιτάμνονται. [The Egyptians practise circumcision, but no other people do so except those who have learned it from the Egyptians.] Herod. lib. ii. cap. 36. Marshami Chronicus Canon, p. 72.

^{*} Gen. cap. xvii.

[†] Julius Firmicus, apud Marshamum, p. 452, 453.

[‡] It can scarce be said in reality, from what appears in Holy Writ, that their Retreat was voluntary: And for the Historians of other Nations, they have presum'd to assert that this People was actually expel'd EGYPT on account of their Leprosy; to which the Jewish Laws appear to have so great a Reference. Thus TACITUS: Plurimi auctores consentiunt, ortâ per AEgyptum tabe, quae corpora foedaret, regem Occhorim, adito Hammonis oraculo, remedium petentem, purgare regnum, & id genus hominum ut invisum Deis, alias in terras avehere jussum. Sic conquisitum collectumque vulgus,—Mosen unum monuisse, &c. [Several authors agree that when a disfiguring disease spread among the Egyptians, king Bocchoris consulted the oracle of Hammon, and was bidden to purge the kingdom and remove from it that class of

[56]

Chap. I. their great Captains and Legislators prevent their *relapsing per-[55] petually into the same Worship to which they had been so long accustom'd.

> How far the divine Providence might have indulg'd the stubborn Habit and stupid Humour of this People, by *giving them Laws* (as the †Prophet says) *which he himself approv'd not*, I have no Inten-

> men (the sick) as offensive to the Gods. So when the mob was hunted up and got together . . . Moses alone advised.] Hist. lib. v. c. 3. AEgyptii, quum scabiem & vitiliginem paterentur, responso moniti eum (Mosen) cum aegris, ne pestis ad plures serperet, terminis AEgypti pellunt. Dux igitur exulum factus, sacra AEgyptiorum furto abstulit: quae repetentes armis AEgyptii, domum redire tempestatibus compulsi sunt. [When the Egyptians were suffering from leprosy they were warned by an oracle to expel Moses and the sick from Egypt, lest the disease should spread further. Becoming therefore leader of the exiles, Moses stole the sacred objects of the Egyptians; and when the Egyptians tried to recapture these, they were driven home by storms.] Justin. lib. xxxvi. c. 2. And in Marsham we find this remarkable Citation from Manetho: Amenophin regem affectasse $\theta \epsilon \hat{\omega} \nu \gamma \epsilon \nu \epsilon \sigma \theta \alpha \iota \theta \epsilon \alpha \tau \dot{\eta} \nu$, $\check{\omega} \sigma \pi \epsilon \rho \Omega \rho \epsilon \dot{\iota} \varsigma \tau \dot{\omega} \nu \pi \rho \dot{\delta} \alpha \dot{\upsilon} \tau \delta \dot{\upsilon}$ βεβασιλευκότων, Deorum esse contemplatorem, sicut Orum quendam Regum priorum. Cui responsum est, ὅτι δυνήσεται θεούς ἰδεῖν, quòd posset videre Deos, si Regionem à leprosis & immundis hominibus purgaret. [That king Amenophis desired to see the Gods, like Orus, an earlier king, and received the answer from an oracle that he might see the Gods if he cleared the country of filthy lepers.] Chronicus Canon, p. 52.

> * See what is cited above (p. 52. in the Notes from Marsham) of the Jews returning to Circumcision under Joshua, after a Generation's Intermission: This being approv'd by God, for the reason given, "That it was taking from them the Reproach of the Egyptians, or what render'd them odious and impious in the eyes of that People." Compare with this the Passage concerning Moses himself, Exod. iv. 18, 25, 26. (together with Acts vii. 30, 34.) where in regard to the Egyptians, to whom he was now returning when fourscore years of Age, he appears to have circumcis'd his Children, and taken off this National Reproach: ZIPPORAH his Wife, nevertheless, reproaching him with the Bloodiness of the Deed; to which she appears to have been a Party only thro' Necessity, and in fear rather of her Husband, than of GOD.

† Ezek. xx. 25. Acts xv. 10. Of these AEgyptian Institutions receiv'd amongst the Jews, see our Spencer. Cum morum quorundam antiquorum toleratio vi magnâ polleret, ad Hebraeorum animos Dei legi & cultui conciliandus, & à reformatione Mosaicâ invidiam omnem amoliretur; maximè conveniebat, ut Deus ritus aliquos antiquitùs usitatos in sacrorum suorum numerum assumeret, & lex à Mose data speciem aliquam cultus olim recepti ferret. — Ita nempe nati factique erant Israelitae, ex AEgypto recens egressi, quod Deo penè necesse esset (humanitùs loqui fas sit) rituum aliquorum veterum usum iis indulgere, & illius instituta ad eorum morem & modulum accommodare. Nam populus erat à teneris AEgypti moribus assuetus, & in iis multorum annorum usu confirmatus. — Hebraei, non tantum AEgypti moribus assueti, sed etiam refractarii fue-

tion to examine. This only I pretend to infer from what has been advanc'd; "That the Manners, Opinions, Rites and Customs of the EGYPTIANS, had, in the earliest times, and from Generation to

Chap. 1.

runt. — Quemadmodum cujusque regionis & terrae populo sua sunt ingenia, moresque proprii, ita natura gentem Hebraeorum, praeter caeteres orbis incolas, ingenio moroso, difficili, & ad infamiam usque pertinaci, finxit. — Cum itaque veteres Hebraei moribus essent asperis & efferatis adeò, populi conditio postulavit, ut Deus ritus aliquos usu veteri firmatos iis concederet, & νομικήν λατρείαν τῆ ξαυτών ἀσθενεία συμβαίνουσαν (uti loquitur Theodoretus) cultum legalem eorum infirmitati accommodatum instituerit. —Hebraei superstitiosa gens erant, & omni pene literaturá destituti. Quam altè Gentium superstitionibus immergebantur, è legibus intelligere licet, quae populo tanquam remedia superstitionis imponebantur. Contumax autem bellua superstitio, si praesertim ab ignorantiae tenebris novam ferociam & contumaciam hauserit. Facilè verò credi potest, Israelitas, nuper è servorum domo liberatos, artium humaniorum rudes fuisse, & vix quicquam supra lateres atque allium AEgypti sapuisse. Quando itaque Deo jam negotium esset, cum populo tam barbaro, & superstitioni tam impensè dedito; penè necesse fuit, ut aliquid eorum infirmitati daret, eosque dolo quodam (non argumentis) ad scripsum alliceret. Nullum animal superstitioso, rudi praecipuè, morosius est, aut majori arte tractandum. [When the acceptance of the old-fashioned morals was prevailing with great strength to reconcile the minds of the Hebrews to the laws and sacrificial rites of God and was removing all the ill-will from the Mosaic reformation, it was especially appropriate that God received some rites customary in former times into the number of his own sacred rituals and that the law given by Moses carried some aspect of these assimilated practices. Certainly the Israelites had been so born and reared, having departed from Egypt only recently, that it was almost necessary to God (it is right to say humane) to indulge them in the practice of some of their former rituals and to adapt his laws to their habit and standard. For they were a people habituated from childhood to the customs of the Egyptians and confirmed in them by the practice of many years. . . . The Hebrews were accustomed not only to the manners of the Egyptians but also to their obstinacies. . . . Just as a people from whatever locale and country have their own distinct character and habits peculiar to them, so nature fashioned the race of the Hebrews in distinction from the rest of the inhabitants of the world in disposition: capricious, difficult and stubborn even to the point of disgrace. . . . Therefore since the old Hebrews had such harsh and savage manners, the character of the people demanded that God would allow them some rituals of long-standing usage and a lawful servitude happened to them due to their own weakness; (just as Theodorus says) he established the ritual law suited to their weaknesses. . . . The Hebrews were a race full of superstitions and were almost destitute of all writing. How deeply they were immersed in the superstitions of the race you may understand from the laws which were being imposed on the people as if they were antidotes for superstitions. Moreover stiff-necked superstition is a monster, especially if from blind ignorance it will have drunk in a new ferocity and obstinacy. In truth it can easily be believed that the Israelites recently freed from slavery were untutored in civilized arts and scarcely had a taste for anything beyond

[57]

Chap. I. Generation, strongly influenc'd the Hebrew People (their Guests, and Subjects) and had undoubtedly gain'd a powerful Ascendency over their Natures."

How extravagant soever the multitude of the EGYPTIAN Superstitions may appear, 'tis certain that their Doctrine and Wisdom were in high repute; since it is taken notice of in Holy Scripture, as no small Advantage even to Moses himself, *"That he had imbib'd the Wisdom of this Nation"; which, as is well known, lay chiefly among their Priests and Magi.

Before the Time that the great *Hebrew* Legislator receiv'd his Education among these *Sages*, a †*Hebrew* Slave, who came a Youth into the *Egyptian* Court, had already grown so powerful in this kind of Wisdom, as to outdo the chief *Diviners*, *Prognosticators*, and *Interpreters* of EGYPT. He rais'd himself to be chief Minister to a Prince, who, following his Advice, obtain'd in a manner the whole *Property*, and consequently *the absolute Dominion* of that Land. But to what height of Power the establish'd Priesthood was arriv'd even at that time, may be conjectur'd hence; "That *the Crown* (to speak in a modern Style) offer'd not to meddle with

th so

the bricks and garlic of the Egyptians. And so since now God had a duty to people so barbarous and so thoroughly dedicated to superstition it was almost necessary that he give something to the inconstancy of those weak men and would draw them to himself by a certain trick (not by arguments). No animal is more full of dread, so especially ignorant, more wayward or in need of being taken in hand with greater skill.] Spencerus de Leg. Hebr. pag. 627, 628, 629.

^{* (}I.) καὶ ἐπαιδεύθη Μωσῆς πάση σοφία Αἰλυπτίων: ἦν δὲ δυνατὸς ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις. Act. Apost. cap. vii. ver. 22. [(εν is in the Loeb edition, but not in Shaftesbury's.—ES) And Moses was educated in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. And he was powerful in speeches and in deeds. (Loosely paraphrased/translated by Shaftesbury in the main text.)]

^(2.) Exod. cap. vii. ver. 11, & 22.

^(3.) Ibid. cap. viii. ver. 7.

^(4.) Justin. lib. xxxvi. cap. 2.

[†] Gen. cap. xxxix, &c. Minimus aetate inter fratres Joseph fuit, cujus excellens ingenium veriti fratres clam interceptum peregrinis mercatoribus vendiderunt. A quibus deportatus in AEgyptum, cùm magicas ibi artes solerti ingenio percepisset, brevi ipsi Regi percarus fuit [Joseph was the youngest of the brothers, and they, fearing his cleverness, kidnapped him and sold him to foreign merchants. These men carried him to Egypt, where he quickly learned magic and rose to high favour even with the king.] Justin. lib. xxxvi. c. 2.

the *Church-Lands*"; and that in this great *Revolution* nothing was attempted, so much as by way of Purchase or Exchange,* in prejudice of this *Landed* Clergy: The prime Minister himself having join'd his Interest with theirs, and enter'd †by Marriage into their Alliance. And in this he was follow'd by the great Founder of the *Hebrew-*State; for he also †match'd himself with the Priesthood of some of the neighbouring Nations, and Traders **into Egypt, long ere his Establishment of the Hebrew Religion and Commonwealth. Nor had he perfected his *Model*, till he consulted the foreign Priest his ††Father-in-law, to whose Advice he paid such remarkable Deference.

Chap. 1.

[58]

BUT TO resume the Subject of our Speculation, concerning the wide Diffusion of the Priestly Science or Function; it appears from what has been said, that notwithstanding the EGYPTIAN Priesthood was, by antient Establishment, hereditary; the Skill of *Divining, Soothsaying*, and *Magick* was communicated to others besides their national sacred Body: and that the *Wisdom* of the MAGICIANS, the Power of *Miracles*, their Interpretation of *Dreams* and *Visions*, and their Art of administring in Divine Affairs, were entrusted even to *Foreigners* who resided amongst them.

[59]

It appears, withal, from these Considerations, how apt the *religious* Profession was to spread it-self widely in this Region of the World; and what Efforts wou'd naturally be made by the more necessitous of these unlimited Professors, towards a Fortune, or Maintenance, for themselves and their Successors.

Common Arithmetick will, in this Case, demonstrate to us, "That as the Proportion of so many *Lay-men* to each *Priest* grew every day less and less, so the Wants and Necessitys of each *Priest* must grow more and more." The *Magistrate* too, who according to this Egyptian Regulation had resign'd his Title or share of Right

^{*} Gen. xlvii. ver. 22, 26.

[†] Gen. xli. ver. 45.

[‡] Exod. chap. iii. ver. 1. and chap. xviii. ver. 1, &c.

^{**} Such were the Midianites, Gen. xxxvii. ver. 28, 36.

^{††} Exod. xviii. ver. 17-24.

Chap. I. in sacred Things, cou'd no longer govern, as he pleas'd, in these Affairs, or check the growing Number of these *Professors*. The spiritual Generations were left to prey on others, and (like *Fish* of Prey) even on themselves, when destitute of other Capture, and confin'd within too narrow Limits. What Method, therefore, was there left to heighten the Zeal of Worshipers, and augment their *Liberality*, but "to foment their *Emulation*, prefer Worship to Worship, Faith to Faith; and turn the Spirit of Enthusiasm to the side of sacred *Horror*, religious *Antipathy*, and *mutual Discord* between Worshipers?"

Thus Provinces and Nations were divided by the most *contrary* Rites and Customs which cou'd be devis'd, in order to create the strongest *Aversion* possible between Creatures of a like Species. For when all other Animositys are allay'd, and Anger of the fiercest kind appeas'd, the *religious Hatred*, we find, continues still, as it began, without Provocation or voluntary Offence. The presum'd *Misbeliever* and *Blasphemer*, as one rejected and abhor'd of God, is thro' a pious Imitation, abhor'd by the *adverse* Worshiper, whose *Enmity* must naturally increase as his *religious Zeal* increases.

From hence the Opposition rose of Temple against Temple, Proselyte against Proselyte. The most zealous Worship of *one* God, was best express'd (as they conceiv'd) by the open defiance of *another*. SIR-Names and Titles of DIVINITY pass'd as Watch-words. He who had not the SYMBOL, nor cou'd give the Word, receiv'd the Knock.

Down with him! Kill him! Merit Heaven thereby;

As our *Poet has it, in his American Tragedy.

Nor did †Philosophy, when introduc'd into *Religion*, extinguish, but rather inflame this *Zeal:* as we may shew perhaps in our following Chapter more particularly; if we return again, as is likely, to this Subject. For this, we perceive, is of a kind apt enough to grow upon our hands. We shall here, therefore, observe only what is

[61]

^{*} Dryden, Indian Emperor, Act v. Scene 2.

[†] Infra, pag. 81.

obvious to every Student in sacred Antiquitys, That from the contentious Learning and Sophistry of the antient Schools (when true Science, Philosophy, and Arts were already deep in their *Decline) religious Problems of a like contentious Form sprang up; and certain Doctrinal Tests were fram'd, by which religious Partys were ingag'd and lifted against one another, with more Animosity than in any other Cause or Quarrel had been ever known. Thus religious Massacres began, and were carry'd on; Temples were demolish'd; holy Utensils destroy'd; the sacred Pomp trodden under-foot, insulted; and the Insulters in their turn expos'd to the same Treatment, in their Persons as well as in their Worship. Thus Madness and Confusion were brought upon the World, like that Chaos, which the Poet miraculously describes in the mouth of his mad Hero: When even in Celestial Places, Disorder and Blindness reign'd:—"No Dawn of Light";

— "No Glimpse or starry Spark, But Gods met Gods, and jostled in the Dark."

CHAPTER II

Judgment of Divines and grave Authors concerning Enthusiasm.—Reflections upon Scepticism.—A Sceptick-Christian.—Judgment of the Inspir'd concerning their own Inspirations.—Knowledg and Belief.—History of Religion resum'd.—Zeal Offensive and Defensive.—A Church in Danger.—Persecution.—Policy of the Church of Rome.

WHAT I had to remark of my own concerning Enthusiasm, I have thus dispatch'd: What Others have remark'd on the same Subject, I may, as an *Apologist* to another Author, be allow'd to cite; especially if I take notice only of what has been

Chap. 2.

[62]

[63]

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 221, 222, & 350. in the Notes. And Infra, pag. 79, 80, 1, 2, &c.

[†] OEDIPUS of Dryden and Lee.

[64]

Chap. 2. dropt very naturally by some of our most approv'd *Authors*, and ablest *Divines*.

It has been thought an odd kind of Temerity, in our Author, to assert, *"That even Atheism it-self was not wholly exempt from Enthusiasm; That there have been in reality Enthusiastical Atheists; and That even the Spirit of Martyrdom cou'd, upon occasion, exert it-self as well in this Cause, as in any other." Now, besides what has been intimated in the preceding Chapter, and what in fact may be demonstrated from the Examples of Vaninus and other Martyrs of a like Principle, we may hear an †excellent and learned Divine, of highest Authority at home, and Fame abroad; who after having describ'd an Enthusiastical Atheist and one atheistically inspir'd, says of this very sort of Men, "That they are Fanaticks too; however that word seem to have a more peculiar respect to something of a Deity: All Atheists being that blind Goddess-Nature's Fanaticks."

And again: "All Atheists (says he) are possess'd with a certain kind of Madness, that may be call'd **Pneumatophobia*, that makes

- * Viz. In his Letter concerning Enthusiasm, VOL. I.
- † Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System, pag. 134.
- * The good Doctor makes use, here, of a Stroke of Raillery against the overfrighted anti-superstitious Gentlemen, with whom our Author reasons at large in his second Treatise (viz. VOL. I. pag. 85, 86, &c. and 88, 89, &c.). 'Tis indeed the Nature of Fear, as of all other Passions, when excessive, to defeat its own End, and prevent us in the execution of what we naturally propose to our-selves as our Advantage. Superstition it-self is but a certain kind of Fear, which possessing us strongly with the apprehended Wrath or Displeasure of Divine Powers, hinders us from judging what those *Powers* are in themselves, or what Conduct of ours may, with best reason, be thought sutable to such highly rational and superior Natures. Now if from the Experience of many gross Delusions of a superstitious kind, the Course of this Fear begins to turn; 'tis natural for it to run, with equal violence, a contrary way. The extreme Passion for religious Objects passes into an Aversion. And a certain *Horror* and *Dread of Imposture* causes as great a Disturbance as even Imposture it-self had done before. In such a Situation as this, the Mind may easily be blinded; as well in one respect, as in the other. 'Tis plain, both these Disorders carry something with them which discover us to be in some manner beside our Reason, and out of the right use of Judgment and Understanding. For how can we be said to intrust or use our Reason, if in any case we fear to be convinc'd? How are we Masters of our-selves, when we have acquir'd the Habit of bringing Horror, Aversion, Favour, Fondness, or any other Temper than that of mere Indifference and Impartiality, into the Judgment of Opinions, and Search of Truth?

them have an irrational but desperate Abhorrence from Spirits or incorporal Substances; they being acted also, at the same time, with an *Hylomania*, whereby they madly dote upon *Matter*, and devoutly worship it, as the only Numen."

Chap. 2.

[65]

What the Power of Extasy is, whether thro' *Melancholy, Wine, Love,* or other natural Causes, another learned *Divine of our Church, in a Discourse upon Enthusiasm, sets forth: bringing an Example from Aristotle, "of *a Syracusean* Poet, who never versify'd so well, as when he was *in his distracted Fits.*" But as to *Poets* in general, compar'd with the *religious Enthusiasts*, he says: There is this Difference; "That *a Poet* is an Enthusiast in jest: and *an Enthusiast* is a Poet in good earnest."

[66]

"'Tis a strong Temptation †(says the Doctor) with a Melancholist, when he feels a Storm of Devotion and Zeal come upon him like a mighty Wind; his Heart being full of Affection, his Head pregnant with clear and sensible Representations, and his Mouth flowing and streaming with fit and powerful Expressions, such as would astonish an ordinary ‡Auditory; 'tis, I say, a shreud Temptation to him, to think it the very Spirit of God that then moves supernaturally in him; whenas all that Excess of Zeal and Affection, and Fluency of Words, is most palpably to be resolv'd into the power of Melancholy, which is a kind of natural Inebriation."

[67]

The learned Doctor, with much pains afterwards, and by help of the Peripatetick Philosophy, explains this *Enthusiastick Inebriation*, and shews in particular,** "How the Vapours and Fumes of *Melancholy* partake of the nature of Wine."

One might conjecture from hence, that the malicious Opposers

^{*} Dr. More, §. 11, 19, 20, and so on.

^{† §. 16.}

[‡] It appears from hence, that in the Notion which this learned Divine gives us of Enthusiasm, he comprehends the *social* or *popular* Genius of the Passion; agreeably with what our Author in his Letter concerning *Enthusiasm* (p. 15, 16, 44, 45.) has said of the Influence and Power of the *Assembly* and *Auditory* it-self, and of the communicative Force and rapid Progress of this extatick Fervor, once kindled, and set in action.

^{** §. 20, 2}I, 23, 26.

[68]

Chap. 2. of early Christianity were not unvers'd in this Philosophy; when they sophistically objected against the apparent Force of *the Divine Spirit* speaking in divers Languages, and attributed it "To the Power of *new *Wine*."

But our devout and zealous Doctor seems to go yet further. For besides what he says of the †*Enthusiastick* Power of *Fancy* in Atheists, he calls *Melancholy* †*a pertinacious and religious Complexion;* and asserts, "That there is not any true spiritual *Grace* from God, but this mere natural Constitution, according to the several Tempers and Workings of it, will not only *resemble*, but sometimes seem to *outstrip*." And after speaking of ***Prophetical* Enthusiasm, and establishing (as our Author ††does) a *Legitimate* and a *Bastard*-sort, he asserts and justifies the ††*Devotional* Enthusiasm (as he calls it) *of holy and sincere Souls*, and ascribes *this* also to Melancholy.

He allows, "That the Soul may sink so far into *Phantasms*, as not to recover the use of her free Facultys; and that this enormous Strength of *Imagination* does not only beget the Belief of mad internal Apprehensions, but is able to assure us of the Presence of *external Objects* which *are not*." He adds, "That what *Custom* and *Education* do by degrees, distemper'd Fancy may do in a shorter time." And speaking ^(a) of Extasy and the Power of Melancholy in *Extatick Fancys*, he says, "That what *the Imagination* then puts forth, of herself, is as *clear* as broad day; and the Perception of the Soul at least as *strong* and *vigorous*, as at any time in beholding things *awake*."

From whence the Doctor infers, "That the Strength of *Perception* is no sure Ground of Truth."

^{*} Acts ii. 13.

^{† §.} I.

^{‡ §. 15.}

^{** §. 30, &}amp; 57.

^{††} VOL. I. p. 53.

^{‡‡ §. 63.}

⁽a) §. 28.

Had any other than a reverend Father of our Church express'd himself in this manner, he must have been contented perhaps to bear a sufficient Charge of *Scepticism*.'

Chap. 2.

[69]

'Twas good fortune in my Lord Bacon's Case, that he shou'd have escap'd being call'd an Atheist, or a Sceptick, when speaking in a solemn manner of the *religious Passion*, the Ground of Superstition, or Enthusiasm, (which he also terms *a Panick) he derives it from an Imperfection in the Creation, Make, or natural Constitution of Man. How far the Author of the †Letter differs from this Author in his Opinion both of the End and Foundation of this Passion, may appear from what has been said above. And, in general, from what we read in the other succeeding Treatises of our Author, we may venture to say of him with Assurance, "That he is as little a Sceptick (according to the vulgar Sense of that word) as he is *Epicurean*, or *Atheist*." This may be prov'd sufficiently from his *Philosophy:* And for any thing higher, 'tis what he

[70]

* NATURA RERUM omnibus viventibus indidit metum & formidinem, vitae atque essentiae suae conservatricem, ac mala ingruentia vitantem & depellentem. Veruntamen eadem Natura modum tenere nescia est, sed timoribus salutaribus semper vanos & inanes admiscet: adeò ut omnia (si intus conspici darentur) Panicis Terroribus plenissima sint, praesertim humana; & maximè omnium apud vulgum, qui superstitione (quae verè nihil aliud quàm Panicus Terror est) in immensum laborat & agitatur; praecipuè temporibus duris & trepidis, & adversis. Franciscus Bacon de Augment. Scient. lib. ii. c. 13. [The nature of things, she who defends life and her own being, avoiding evil attacks and repelling them, gives to all living creatures dread and awe. Nevertheless the same nature does not know how to keep within a limit but mixes vain and empty alarms with advantageous ones to such an extent that all creatures, especially human beings are very full of panicky fears (if they were allowed to be seen within ourselves) and especially in the mind of the common crowd, the sort who of all men struggle and are troubled exceedingly by superstition (which is actually nothing other than panic) principally in harsh times and in anxious and unfortunate moments.]

The Author of *the Letter*, I dare say, wou'd have expected no quarter from his Criticks, had he express'd himself as this celebrated Author here quoted; who, by his *Natura Rerum*, can mean nothing less than the *Universal Dispensing Nature*, erring blindly in the very first Design, Contrivance, or original Frame of Things; according to the Opinion of Epicurus himself, whom this Author, immediately after, cites with Praise.

[†] Viz. The Letter concerning Enthusiasm, above, VOL. I.

Chap. 2. no-where presumes to treat; having forborn in particular to mention any Holy *Mysterys* of our Religion, or Sacred Article of our Belief.

As for what relates to *Revelation in general, if I mistake not our Author's meaning, he professes to believe, as far as is possible for any one who himself had never experienc'd any Divine Communication, whether by Dream, Vision, Apparition, or other supernatural Operation; nor was ever present as Eye-witness of any Sign, Prodigy, or Miracle whatsoever. Many of these, †he observes, are at this day pretendedly exhibited in the World, with an Endeavour of giving them the perfect Air and exact Resemblance of those recorded in Holy Writ. He speaks indeed with Contempt of the Mockery of modern Miracles and Inspiration. And as to all Pretences to things of this kind in our present Age; he seems inclin'd to look upon 'em as no better than mere Imposture or Delusion. But for what is recorded of Ages heretofore, he seems to resign his Judgment, with intire Condescension, to his Superiors. He pretends not to frame any certain or positive Opinion of his own, notwithstanding his best Searches into Antiquity, and the Nature of religious Record and Tradition: but on all occasions submits most willingly, and with full Confidence and Trust, to the ‡Opinions by Law establish'd. And if this be not sufficient to free him from the Reproach of Scepticism, he must, for ought I see, be content to undergo it.

To say truth, I have often wonder'd to find such a Disturbance rais'd about the simple name of **SCEPTICK. 'Tis certain that, in its original and plain signification, the word imports no more than barely, "That State or Frame of Mind in which every one remains, on every Subject of which he is *not certain*." He who is *certain*, or presumes to say *he knows*, is in that particular, whether he be

^{*} Infra, pag. 315.

[†] VOL. I. pag. 44, 45, &c. And VOL. II. pag. 322, 323, &c.

[‡] VOL. I. pag. 360, 1, 2, &c. And Infra, pag. 103, 231, 315, 316.

^{**} VOL. II. pag. 205, 206, & 323, &c. And Infra, pag. 317, 318, &c.

mistaken or in the right, a DOGMATIST. Between these two States or Situations of Mind, there can be no medium. For he who says, "That he believes for certain, or is assur'd of what he believes"; either speaks ridiculously, or says in effect, "That he believes strongly, but is not sure." So that whoever is not conscious of Revelation, nor has certain Knowledg of any Miracle or Sign, can be no more than SCEPTICK in the Case: And the best Christian in the World, who being destitute of the means of Certainty, depends only on History and Tradition for his Belief in these Particulars, is at best but a Sceptick-Christian. He has no more than a nicely critical *Historical Faith, subject to various Speculations, and a thousand different Criticisms of Languages and Literature.

This he will naturally find to be the Case, if he attempts to search into *Originals*, in order to be *his own Judg*, and proceed on the bottom of *his own* Discernment, and Understanding. If, on the other hand, he is *no Critick*, nor competently learned in these Originals; 'tis plain he can have no *original* Judgment of his own; but must rely still on the *Opinion* of those who have opportunity to examine such matters, and whom he takes to be the unbias'd and disinterested Judges' of these *religious Narratives*. His Faith is not in antient *Facts* or *Persons*, nor in the antient *Writ*, or Primitive *Recorders*; nor in the successive Collators or *Conservators* of these Records (for of these he is unable to take cognizance): But his Confidence and Trust must be in those *modern* Men, or *Societys of Men*, to whom the Publick, or He himself, ascribes the Right to judg of these *Records*, and commits the Determination of *sacred Writ* and *genuine* Story.

Let the Person seem ever so positive or dogmatical in these high Points of Learning; he is yet in reality no *Dogmatist*, nor can any way free himself from a certain kind of Scepticism. He must know himself still capable of *Doubting*: Or if, for fear of it, he strives to banish every opposite Thought, and resolves not so much as to deliberate on the Case; this still will not acquit him. So far

Chap. 2.

72]

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 146, 147. And Infra, pag. 316, 317, 320, &c.

Chap. 2. are we from being able to *be sure* when we have a mind; that indeed we can never be thorowly *sure*, but then only when we can't help it, and find of necessity we must be so, whether we will or not. Even the highest *implicit Faith* is in reality no more than a kind of *passive* SCEPTICISM; "A Resolution to examine, recollect, consider, or hear, as little as possible to the prejudice of that *Belief*," which having once espous'd we are ever afterwards afraid to lose."

If I might be allow'd to imitate our Author, in daring to touch now and then upon the Characters of our Divine Worthys, I shou'd, upon this Subject of Belief, observe how fair and generous the great Christian Convert, and learned Apostle, has shewn himself in his Sacred Writings. Notwithstanding he had himself an original Testimony and Revelation from Heaven, on which he grounded his Conversion; notwithstanding he had in his own Person the Experience of outward Miracles and inward Communications; he condescended still, on many occasions, to speak sceptically, and with some Hesitation and Reserve, as to the Certainty of these Divine Exhibitions. In his account of some Transactions of this kind, himself being the Witness, and speaking (as we may presume) of his own Person, and proper Vision, *he says only that "He knew a Man: whether in the Body or out of it, he cannot tell. But such a one caught up to the third Heaven, he knew formerly (he says) above fourteen years before his then Writing." And when in another Capacity the same inspir'd Writer, giving Precepts to his Disciples, distinguishes what †he writes by Divine Commission from what he delivers as his own Judgment and private Opinion, he condescends nevertheless to speak as one no way positive, or Master of any absolute Criterion in the Case. And in several subsequent *Passages, he expresses himself as under some kind of Doubt how to judg or determine certainly, "Whether he writes by Inspiration or otherwise." He only "thinks he has the Spirit." He "is not sure," nor wou'd have us to depend on him as positive or certain in a matter of so nice Discernment.

[75]

^{* 2} Cor. xii, ver. 2, 3.

^{† 1} Cor. vii. 10, 12.

^{‡ 1} Cor. vii. 40.

The holy Founders and inspir'd Authors of our Religion requir'd not, it seems, so *strict* an Assent, or such *implicit Faith* in behalf of their *original* Writings and Revelations, as later un-inspir'd Doctors, without the help of Divine Testimony, or any Miracle on their side, have requir'd in behalf of their own Comments and Interpretations. The earliest and worst of *Hereticks*, 'tis said, were those call'd *Gnosticks*, who took their name from an audacious Pretence to *certain Knowledg* and *Comprehension* of the greatest *Mysterys* of Faith. If the most dangerous State of Opinion was this *dogmatical* and presumptuous sort; the safest, in all likelihood, must be the *sceptical* and modest.

Chap. 2.

[76]

There is nothing more evident than that our *Holy* Religion, in its original Constitution, was set so far apart from all *Philosophy* or refin'd *Speculation*, that it seem'd in a manner diametrically oppos'd to it. A Man might have been not only *a Sceptick* in all the controverted Points of the Academys, or Schools of Learning, but even a perfect *Stranger* to all of this kind; and yet compleat in his Religion, Faith, and Worship.

Among the polite Heathens of the antient World, these different Provinces of Religion and Philosophy were upheld, we know, without the least interfering with each other. If in some barbarous Nations the *Philosopher* and *Priest* were join'd in one, 'tis observable that the Mysterys, whatever they were, which sprang from this extraordinary Conjunction, were kept secret and undivulg'd. 'Twas Satisfaction enough to the Priest-Philosopher, if the initiated Party preserv'd his Respect and Veneration for the Tradition and Worship of the Temple, by complying in every respect with the requisite Performances and Rites of Worship. No Account was afterwards taken of the Philosophick Faith of the Proselyte, or Worshiper. His Opinions were left to himself, and he might philosophize according to what foreign School or Sect he fansy'd. Even amongst the Jews themselves, the Sadduce (a Materialist, and Denyer of the Soul's Immortality) was as well admitted as the Pharisee; who from the Schools of PYTHAGORAS, PLATO, or other latter Philosophers of Greece, had learnt to reason upon immaterial Substances, and the natural Immortality of Souls.

[77]

Chap. 2.

'Tis no astonishing Reflection to observe how fast the World declin'd in *Wit and Sense, in Manhood, Reason, Science, and in every Art, when once the Roman Empire had prevail'd, and spread an universal Tyranny and Oppression over Mankind. Even the *Romans* themselves, after the early Sweets of one peaceful and long Reign, began to groan under that Yoke, of which they had been themselves the Imposers. How much more must other Nations, and mighty Citys, at a far distance, have abhor'd this Tyranny, and detested their common Servitude under a People, who were themselves no better than mere Slaves?

It may be look'd upon, no doubt, as providential, that at this time, and in these Circumstances of the World, there shou'd arise so high an expectation of *a divine Deliverer*; and that from the Eastern Parts and Confines of Judea the Opinion shou'd spread it-self of such *a Deliverer to come*, with Strength from Heaven sufficient to break that Empire, which no earthly Power remaining cou'd be thought sufficient to encounter. Nothing cou'd have better dispos'd the generality of Mankind, to receive the *Evangelical Advice*; whilst they mistook *the News*, as many of the first Christians

[†]Superstition, in the mean while, cou'd not but naturally prevail, as *Misery* and *Ignorance* increas'd. The Roman Emperors, as they grew more barbarous, grew so much the more superstitious. The *Lands* and *Revenues*, as well as the *Numbers* of the Heathen Priests grew daily. And when the season came, that by means of a Convert-Emperor, the Heathen [‡]*Church-Lands*, with an In-

plainly did, and understood the Promises of a Messias in this temporal Sense, with respect to his *second* Coming, and *sudden* Reign

here upon Earth.

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 220, &c. And in the preceding Chapter, pag. 61.

[†] VOL. I. pag. 133. And below, pag. 90.

^{*} How rich and vast these were, especially in the latter times of that Empire, may be judg'd from what belong'd to the single Order of *the Vestals*, and what we read of the Revenues belonging to the Temples of *the Sun*, (as in the time of the Monster Heliogabalus) and of other Donations by other Emperors. But what may give us yet a greater Idea of these Riches, is, That in the latter Heathen Times, which grew more and more superstitious, the restraining Laws (or Statues of *Mort-main*) by which Men had formerly been with-held from giving away Estates by *Will*, or other-

crease of Power, became transfer'd to the Christian Clergy, 'twas no wonder if by such Riches and Authority they were in no small measure influenc'd and corrupted; as may be gather'd even from the Accounts given us of these matters by themselves.

Chap. 2. [79]

[80]

When, together with this, the Schools of the antient *Philosophers, which had been long in their Decline, came now to be dissolv'd, and their sophistick Teachers became Ecclesiastical Instructors; the unnatural Union of Religion and Philosophy was compleated, and the monstrous Product of this Match appear'd soon in the World. The odd exterior Shapes of Deitys, Temples, and holy Utensils, which by the †EGYPTIAN Sects had been formerly set in battel against each other, were now metamorphos'd into philosophical Forms and Phantoms; and, like Flags and Banners, display'd in hostile manner, and borne offensively, by one Party against another. In former times those barbarous Nations above mention'd were the sole Warriors in these religious Causes; but now the whole World became engag'd: when instead of Storks and Crocodiles, other Ensigns were erected; when sophistical Chimeras, crabbed Notions, bombastick Phrases, Solecisms, Absurditys, and a thousand Monsters of a scholastick Brood, were set on foot, and made the Subject of vulgar Animosity and Dispute.

Here first began that Spirit of Bigotry, which broke out in a

wise, to Religious Uses, were repeal'd; and the Heathen-Church left, in this manner, as a bottomless Gulph and devouring Receptacle of Land and Treasure. Senatûs-consulto, & Constitutionibus Principum, Haeredes instituere concessum est Apollinem Didymaeum, Dianam Ephesiam, Matrem Deorum, &c. [By decree of the Senate and by the imperial orders of the Emperor it is granted to establish as heirs Didymean Apollo, Ephesian Diana, mother of the gods, etc.]

This answers not amiss to the modern Practice and Expression of *Making our Soul our Heir:* Giving to *God* what has been taken sometimes with freedom enough from *Man;* and conveying Estates in such a manner in this World, as to make good Interest of them in another. The Reproach of the antient *Satirist* is at present out of doors. 'Tis no affront to Religion now-a-days to compute its Profits. And a Man might well be accounted dull, who, in our present Age, shou'd ask the Question, *Dicite, Pontifices, in sacro quid facit Aurum?* Pers. Sat. ii. ver. 69. [Reverend pontiffs, tell us what good gold can do in a holy place?] See below, *pag.* 90, and 125. in the Notes, and 88. *ibid.*

^{*} As above, *pag.* 61.

[†] Supra, pag. 42, 46, 47, 60. And VOL. I. pag. 350. in the Notes.

[82]

more raging manner than had been ever known before, and was Chap. 2. less capable of Temper or Moderation than any Species, Form, or Mixture of Religion in the antient World. Mysterys, which were [81] heretofore treated with profound respect, and lay unexpos'd to vulgar Eyes, became publick and prostitute; being enforc'd with Terrors, and urg'd with Compulsion and Violence, on the unfitted Capacitys and Apprehensions of Mankind. The very Jewish Traditions, and Cabalistick Learning underwent this Fate. That which was naturally the Subject of profound Speculation and Inquiry, was made the necessary Subject of a strict and absolute Assent. The *allegorical*, *mythological* Account of Sacred Things, was wholly inverted: Liberty of Judgment and Exposition taken away: No Ground left for Inquiry, Search, or Meditation: No Refuge from the dogmatical Spirit let loose. Every Quarter was taken up; every Portion prepossess'd. All was reduc'd to *Article and Proposition.

Thus a sort of *philosophical* Enthusiasm overspread the World. And Bigotry (a †Species of *Superstition* hardly known before) took place in Mens Affections, and arm'd 'em with a new Jealousy against each other. Barbarous Terms and Idioms were every day introduc'd: Monstrous Definitions invented and impos'd: New Schemes of Faith erected from time to time; and Hostilitys, the fiercest imaginable, exercis'd on these occasions. So that the Enthusiasm or Zeal, which was usually shewn by Mankind in behalf of their particular Worships, and which for the most part had been hitherto *defensive* only, grew now to be universally of the *offensive* kind.

IT MAY be expected of me perhaps, that being fallen thus from remote Antiquity to later Periods, I shou'd speak on this occasion with more than ordinary Exactness and Regularity. It may

^{*} Infra, pag. 323, 3, 4. in the Notes. Et supra, p. 61.

[†] Let any one who considers distinctly the Meaning and Force of the word BIG-OTRY, endeavour to render it in either of the antient Languages, and he will find how peculiar a Passion it implies; and how different from the mere Affection of *Enthusiasm* or *Superstition*.

Chap. 2.

be urg'd against me, that I talk here, as at random, and without-book: neglecting to produce my Authoritys, or continue my Quotations, according to the profess'd Style and Manner in which I began this present Chapter. But as there are many greater Privileges by way of Variation, Interruption, and Digression, allow'd to us Writers of MISCELLANY; and especially to such as are Commentators upon other Authors; I shall be content to remain mysterious in this respect, and explain my-self no further than by a noted Story; which seems to sute our Author's purpose, and the present Argument.'

[83]

'Tis observable from Holy Writ, that the antient Ephesian Worshipers, however zealous or enthusiastick they appear'd, had only a defensive kind of Zeal in behalf of their *Temple; whenever they thought in earnest, it was brought in danger. In the †Tumult which happen'd in that City near the time of the holy Apostle's Retreat, we have a remarkable instance of what our Author calls a religious Panick. As little Bigots as the People were, and as far from any offensive Zeal, yet when their establish'd Church came to be call'd in question, we see in what a manner their Zeal began to operate. ‡"All with one voice, about the space of two hours, cried out, saying, Great is Diana of the Ephesians." At the same time this As-

[84]

^{*} The Magnificence and Beauty of that Temple is well known to all who have form'd any Idea of the antient *Grecian* Arts and Workmanship. It seems to me to be remarkable in our learned and elegant Apostle, that tho an Enemy to this mechanical Spirit of Religion in the Ephesians; yet according to his known Character, he accommodates himself to their Humour, and the natural Turn of their Enthusiasm; by writing to his Converts in a kind of *Architect*-Style, and almost with a perpetual Allusion to *Building*, and to that *Majesty, Order*, and *Beauty*, of which their Temple was a Master-piece. ἐποικοδομηθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ θεμελίῳ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ προφητῶν, ὅντος ἀκογωνιαίου αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐν ῷ πᾶσα ἡ οἰκοδομὴ συναρμολγουμένη αὕξει εἰς ναὸν ἄγιον ἐν Κυρίῳ, ἐν ῷ καὶ ὑμεῖς συνοικοδομεῖσθε εἰς κατοικητήριον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν πνεύματι. [You are built upon the foundations of the apostles and the prophets, with Jesus Christ himself being the cornerstone on which the entire framed-together structure grows into a holy temple in the Lord. In this, even you will be built in together into a dwelling place for God in spirit.] — Eph. ch. ii. ver. 20, 21, 22. And so Ch. iii. ver. 17, 18, ૯τ. And Ch. iv. ver. 16, 29.

[†] Act. Apost. chap. xix. ver. 23.

[‡] Ibid. ver. 28, & 34.

Chap. 2. sembly was so confus'd, that *the greater part knew not wherefore they were come together; and consequently cou'd not understand why their Church was in any Danger. But the Enthusiasm was got up, and a Panick Fear for the Church had struck the Multitude. It ran into a popular Rage or epidemical Phrenzy, and was communicated (as our †Author expresses it) "by Aspect, or, as it were, by Contact, or Sympathy."

It must be confess'd, that there was, besides these Motives, a secret Spring which forwarded this Enthusiasm. For certain Partys concern'd, Men of Craft, and strictly united in Interest, had been secretly call'd together, and told, "Gentlemen! †(or Sirs!) Ye know that by this Mystery, or Craft, we have our Wealth. Ye see withal, and have heard, that not only here at Ephesus, but almost thro'out all Asia, this Paul has persuaded and turn'd away many People, by telling them, They are no real Gods who are figur'd, or wrought with hands: so that not only this our Craft is in danger; but also the Temple it-self."

Nothing cou'd be more *moderate* and wise, nothing more agreeable to that magisterial Science or Policy, which our Author **recommends, than the Behaviour of the *Town-Clerk* or *Recorder* of the City, as he is represented on this occasion, in Holy Writ. I must confess indeed, he went pretty far in the use of this moderating Art. He ventur'd to assure the People, "That every one acquiesc'd in their antient Worship of the great Goddess, and in their Tradition of the Image, which fell down from JUPITER: That these were Facts undeniable: and That the new Sect neither meant the pulling down of their Church, nor so much as offer'd to blaspheme or speak amiss of their Goddess."

This, no doubt, was stretching the point sufficiently; as may be understood by the Event, in after time. One might perhaps have

[85]

^{*} Act. Apost. chap. xix. ver. 32.

[†] Letter of Enthusiasm, VOL. I. pag. 15.

[‡] Act. Apost. chap. xix. ver. 25, &c.

^{**} Letter of Enthusiasm, VOL. I. pag. 16, &c.

suspected this Recorder to have been himself *a Dissenter*, or at least *an Occasional Conformist*, who cou'd answer so roundly for the new Sect, and warrant the *Church in Being* secure of Damage, and out of all *Danger* for the future. Mean while the Tumult was appeas'd: No harm befel the Temple for that time. The new Sect acquiesc'd in what had been spoken on their behalf. They allow'd the Apology of the Recorder. Accordingly the Zeal of the Heathen Church, which was only *defensive*, gave way: And the new Religionists were prosecuted no further.

Hitherto, it seems, the Face of Persecution had not openly shewn it-self in the wide World. 'Twas sufficient Security for every Man, that he gave no disturbance to what was publickly establish'd. But when *offensive Zeal* came to be discover'd in one Party, the rest became in a manner necessitated to be Aggressors in their turn. They who observ'd, or had once experienc'd this intolerating Spirit, cou'd no longer tolerate on their part.* And they who

* Thus the Controversy stood before the Time of the Emperor Julian, when Blood had been so freely drawn, and Crueltys so frequently exchang'd not only between Christian and Heathen, but between Christian and Christian; after the most barbarous manner. What the Zeal was of many early Christians against the Idolatry of the old Heathen Church (at that time the establish'd one) may be comprehended by any Person who is ever so slenderly vers'd in the History of those Times. Nor can it be said indeed of us Moderns, that in the quality of good Christians (as that Character is generally understood) we are found either backward or scrupulous in assigning to Perdition such Wretches as we pronounce guilty of Idolatry. The name Idolater is sufficient Excuse for almost any kind of Insult against the Person, and much more against the Worship of such a Mis-Believer. The very word Christian is in common Language us'd for Man, in opposition to Brute-Beast, without leaving so much as a middle place for the poor Heathen or Pagan: who, as the greater Beast of the two, is naturally doom'd to Massacre, and his Gods and Temples to Fracture and Demolishment. Nor are we masters of this Passion, even in our best humour. The French Poets, we see, can with great Success, and general Applause, exhibit this primitive Zeal even on the publick Stage: POLYEUCTE, Act II. Sc. 6.

Ne perdons plus de temps, le Sacrifice est prêt.
Allons y du vray Dieu soutenir l'intérêt,
Allons fouler aux piés ce Foudre ridicule
Dont arme un bois pourri ce Peuple trop credule;
Allons en éclairer l'aveuglement fatal,
Allons briser ces Dieux de Pierre & de Metau;

Chap. 2.

[86]

Chap. 2. had once exerted it over others, cou'd expect no better Quarter for themselves. So that nothing less than *mutual Extirpation* became the Aim, and almost open Profession of each religious Society.'

Abandonnons nos jours à cette ardeur celeste,
Faisons triompher Dieu; qu'il dispose du reste.
[Let us lose no more time, the Sacrifice is ready.
Let us go to sustain the true God's interest,
Let us trample underfoot this ridiculous Thunder
With which this too credulous people arms a rotten wood [i.e., an idol];
Let us go to enlighten its fatal blindness,
Let us destroy these gods of stone and metal;
Let us give up our lives to this celestial ardor,
Let us make God triumph; let Him dispose of the rest!]

I shou'd scarce have mention'd this, but that it came into my mind how ill a Construction some People have endeavour'd to make of what our Author, stating the Case of Heathen and Christian Persecution, in his *Letter of Enthusiasm*, has said concerning the Emperor Julian. It was no more indeed than had been said of that virtuous and gallant Emperor by his greatest Enemys; even by those who, to the shame of Christianity, boasted of his having been most insolently affronted on all occasions, and even treacherously assassinated by one of his Christian Soldiers. As for such Authors as these, shou'd I cite them in their proper invective Style and Saint-like Phrase, they wou'd make no very agreeable appearance, especially in *Miscellanys* of the kind we have here undertaken. But a Letter of that elegant and witty Emperor, may not be improperly plac'd amongst our Citations, as a Pattern of his Humour and Genius, as well as of his Principle and Sentiments, on this occasion. Julian's *Epistles*, Numb. 52.

JULIAN to the BOSTRENS.

"I should have thought, indeed, that the Galilaean Leaders wou'd have esteem'd themselves more indebted to me, than to him who preceded me in the Administration of the Empire. For in his time, many of them suffer'd Exile, Persecution, and Imprisonment. Multitudes of those whom in their Religion they term Hereticks, were put to the sword. Insomuch that in Samosata, Cyzicum, Paphlagonia, Bithynia, Galatia, and many other Countrys, whole Towns were level'd with the Earth. The just Reverse of this has been observ'd in my time. The Exiles have been recall'd; and the Proscrib'd restor'd to the lawful Possession of their Estates. But to that height of Fury and Distraction are this People arriv'd, that being no longer allow'd the Privilege to tyrannize over one another, or persecute either their own Sectarys, or the Religious of the lawful Church, they swell with rage, and leave no stone unturn'd, no opportunity unimploy'd, of raising Tumult and Sedition. So little regard have they to true Piety; so little Obedience to our Laws and Constitutions; however humane and tolerating. For still do we determine and steddily resolve, never to suffer one of them to be drawn involuntarily to our Altars. * * As for the mere People, indeed, they appear driven to these Riots and Seditions by those amongst them

In this extremity, it might well perhaps have been esteem'd the happiest Wish for Mankind, That *one* of these contending Partys of incompatible Religionists' shou'd at last prevail over the rest; so as by an universal and absolute Power to *determine Orthodoxy, and make that Opinion effectually *Catholick*, which in their particular Judgment had the best right to that Denomination. And thus by force of Massacre and Desolation, *Peace* in Worship, and *Civil* Unity by help of the *Spiritual*, might be presum'd in a fair way of being restor'd to Mankind.

I shall conclude with observing how ably the ROMAN-Christian, and once Catholick Church, by the assistance of their converted

whom they call CLERICKS: who are now enrag'd to find themselves restrain'd in the use of their former Power and intemperate Rule. * * * They can no longer act the Magistrate or Civil Judg, nor assume Authority to make Peoples Wills, supplant Relations, possess themselves of other Mens Patrimonys, and by specious Pretences transfer all into their own possession. * * * For this reason I have thought fit, by this Publick EDICT, to forewarn the People of this sort, that they raise no more Commotions, nor gather in a riotous manner about their seditious CLERICKS, in defiance of the Magistrate, who has been insulted and in danger of being ston'd by these incited Rabbles. In their Congregations they may, notwithstanding, assemble as they please, and croud about their Leaders, performing Worship, receiving Doctrine, and praying, according as they are by them taught and conducted: But if with any Tendency to Sedition; let them beware how they hearken, or give assent; and remember, 'tis at their peril, if by these means they are secretly wrought up to Mutiny and Insurrection. * * * Live, therefore, in Peace and Quietness! neither spitefully opposing, or injuriously treating one another. You misguided People of the new way, Beware, on your side! And you of the antient and establish'd Church, injure not your Neighbours and Fellow-Citizens, who are enthusiastically led away, in Ignorance and Mistake, rather than with Design or Malice! 'Tis by DISCOURSE and REASON, not by Blows, Insults, or Violence, that Men are to be inform'd of Truth, and convinc'd of Error. Again therefore and again I enjoin and charge the zealous Followers of the true Religion, no way to injure, molest, or affront the Galilaean People."

Thus the generous and mild Emperor; whom we may indeed call *Heathen*, but not so justly *Apostate:* since being, at different times of his Youth, transfer'd to different Schools or Universitys, and bred under Tutors of each Religion, as well *Heathen* as *Christian;* he happen'd, when of full age, to make his choice (tho very unfortunately) in the former kind, and adher'd to the antient Religion of his Country and Forefathers. See the same Emperor's Letters to Artabius, Numb. 7. and to Hecebolus, Numb. 43. and to the People of *Alexandria*, Numb. 10. See VOL. I. *pag.* 25.

Chap. 2.

[89]

[90]

^{*} Infra, pag. 343.

*Emperors, proceeded in the Establishment of their growing Hier-Chap. 2. archy. They consider'd wisely the various Superstitions and Enthusiasms of Mankind; and prov'd the different Kinds and Force of each. All these seeming Contrarietys of human Passion they knew how to comprehend in their political Model and subservient System of Divinity. They knew how to make advantage both from the high Speculations of Philosophy, and the grossest Ideas of vulgar Ignorance. They saw there was nothing more different than that Enthusiasm which ran upon Spirituals, according to the †simpler Views of the divine Existence, and that which ran upon *external Proportions, Magnificence of Structures, Ceremonys, Processions, Quires, and those other Harmonys which captivate the Eye and Ear. On this account they even added to this latter kind, and display'd Religion in a yet more gorgeous Habit of Temples, Statues, Paintings, Vestments, Copes, Miters, Purple, and the Cathedral [91] Pomp. With these Arms they cou'd subdue the victorious Goths, and secure themselves an ATTILA,** when their CAESARS fail'd them.

The truth is, 'tis but a vulgar Species of Enthusiasm, which is mov'd chiefly by *Shew* and *Ceremony*, and wrought upon by Chalices and Candles, Robes, and figur'd Dances. Yet this, we may believe, was lookt upon as no slight Ingredient of *Devotion* in those Days; since, at this hour, the Manner is found to be of considerable Efficacy with some of the Devout amongst our-selves, who pass the least for *superstitious*, and are reckon'd in the Number of the polite

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 133. Supra, 78, 79.

[†] VOL. II. pag. 270, 271.

[‡] Supra, pag. 41.

^{**} When this victorious Ravager was in full March to Rome, St. Leo (the then Pope) went out to meet him in solemn Pomp. The *Goth* was struck with the Appearance, obey'd the Priest, and retir'd instantly with his whole Army in a *panick* Fear; alledging that among the rest of the *Pontifical* Train, he had seen one of an extraordinary Form, who threaten'd him with Death, if he did not instantly retire. Of this important Encounter there are in St. Peter's Church, in the *Vatican*, and elsewhere, at Rome, many fine Sculptures, Paintings, and Representations, deservingly made, in honour of the Miracle.

World. This the wise Hierarchy duly preponderating; but being satisfy'd withal that there were other Tempers and Hearts which cou'd not so easily be captivated by this *exterior* Allurement, they assign'd another Part of Religion to Proselytes of another *Character* and *Complexion*, who were allow'd to proceed on a quite different bottom; by *the inward way* of *Contemplation*, and *Divine Love*.

Chap. 2.

[92]

They are indeed so far from being jealous of mere Enthusiasm, or the *extatick* manner of Devotion, that they allow their *Mysticks* to write and preach in the most rapturous and seraphick Strains. They suffer them, in a manner, to supersede all external Worship, and triumph over outward Forms; till the refin'd Religionists proceed so far as either expresly or seemingly to dissuade the Practice of the vulgar and establish'd Ceremonial Dutys. And then, indeed,* they check the suppos'd *exorbitant* Enthusiasm, which wou'd prove dangerous to their *Hierarchal* State.

If modern *Visions, Prophecys*, and *Dreams, Charms, Miracles, Exorcisms*, and the rest of this kind, be comprehended in that which we call Fanaticism or Superstition; to this Spirit they allow a full Career; whilst to ingenuous Writers they afford the Liberty, on the other side, in a civil manner, to call in question these spiritual Feats perform'd in Monasterys, or up and down by their *mendicant* or *itinerant* Priests, and ghostly Missionarys.

[93]

This is that antient *Hierarchy*, which in respect of its first Foundation, its Policy, and the Consistency of its whole Frame and Constitution, cannot but appear in some respect august and venerable, even in such as we do not usually esteem weak Eyes. These are the spiritual Conquerors, who, like the first CAESARS, from small Beginnings, establish'd the Foundations of an almost Universal Monarchy. No wonder if at this day the immediate View of this Hierarchal Residence, the *City* and *Court* of ROME, be found to have an extraordinary Effect on Foreigners of other latter Churches. No wonder if the amaz'd Surveyors are for the future

^{*} Witness the Case of Molinos, and of the pious, worthy and ingenious *Abbé* Fenelon, now Archbishop of Cambray.

[94]

[95]

Chap. 3. so apt either to conceive the horridest Aversion to all Priestly Government; or, on the contrary, to admire it, so far as even to wish a Coalescence or Re-union with this antient *Mother*-Church.

In reality, the Exercise of Power, however arbitrary or despotick, seems less intolerable under such a spiritual Sovereignty, so extensive, antient, and of such a long Succession, than under the petty Tyrannys and mimical Politys of some new Pretenders. The former may even *persecute* with a tolerable Grace: The latter, who wou'd willingly derive their Authority from the former, and graft on their successive Right, must necessarily make a very aukard Figure. And whilst they strive to give themselves the same Air of Independency on the Civil Magistrate; whilst they affect the same Authority in Government, the same Grandure, Magnificence, and Pomp in Worship, they raise the highest Ridicule, in the Eyes of those who have real Discernment, and can distinguish *Originals* from *Copys:*

[†]O imitators, a slavish herd!

CHAPTER III

Of the Force of Humour in Religion.—Support of our Author's Argument in his Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Raillery.—Zeal discuss'd. Spiritual Surgeons: Executioners: Carvers.—Original of human Sacrifice.—Exhilaration of Religion.—Various Aspects, from outward Causes.

THE celebrated Wits of the MISCELLANARIAN Race, the Essay-Writers, casual Discoursers, Reflection-Coiners, Meditation-Founders, and others of the irregular kind of Writers, may plead it as their peculiar Advantage, "That they follow the Variety of

^{*} Infra, pag. 110.

[†] O Imitatores, servum pecus! Horat. Lib. i. Ep. 19. ver. 19.

NATURE." And in such a Climate as ours, their Plea, no doubt, may be very just. We Islanders, fam'd for other Mutabilitys, are particularly noted for the Variableness and Inconstancy of our Weather. And if our Taste in Letters be found answerable to this Temperature of our Climate; 'tis certain a Writer must, in our Account, be the more valuable in his kind, as he can agreeably surprize his Reader, by sudden Changes, and Transports, from one Extreme to another.

Chap. 3.

[96]

Were it not for the known Prevalency of this Relish, and the apparent Deference paid to those Genius's who are said to *elevate* and *surprize*; the Author of these MISCELLANYS might, in all probability, be afraid to entertain his Reader with this multifarious, complex, and desultory kind of Reading. 'Tis certain, that if we consider the Beginning and Process of our present Work, we shall find sufficient Variation in it. From a profess'd Levity, we are laps'd into a sort of Gravity unsutable to our manner of setting out. We have steer'd an adventurous Course, and seem newly come out of a stormy and rough Sea. 'Tis time indeed we shou'd enjoy a Calm, and instead of expanding our Sails before the swelling Gusts, it befits us to retire under the Lee-shore, and ply our Oars in a smooth Water.

'Tis the *Philosopher*, the *Orator*, or the *Poet*, whom we may compare to some First-Rate Vessel, which launches out into the wide Sea, and with a proud Motion insults the encountering Surges. We Essay-*Writers* are of the *Small-Craft*, or *Galley-kind*. We move chiefly by Starts and Bounds; according as our Motion is by frequent Intervals renew'd. We have no great Adventure in view; nor can tell certainly Whither we are bound. We undertake no mighty Voyage, by help of Stars or Compass; but row from Creek to Creek, keep up a coasting Trade, and are fitted only for fair Weather and the Summer Season.

[97]

Happy therefore it is for *us* in particular, that having finish'd our Course of Enthusiasm, and pursu'd our Author into his *second

^{*} Viz. Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, VOL. I.

[99]

Treatise, we are now, at last, oblig'd to turn towards pleasanter Re-Chap. 3. flections, and have such Subjects in view as must naturally reduce us to a more familiar Style. WIT and HUMOUR (the profess'd Subject of the Treatise now before us) will hardly bear to be examin'd in ponderous Sentences and pois'd Discourse. We might now perhaps do best, to lay aside the Gravity of strict Argument, and resume the way of Chat; which, thro' Aversion to a contrary formal manner, is generally relish'd with more than ordinary Satisfaction. For excess of *Physick*, we know, has often made Men hate the name of wholesom. And an abundancy of forc'd' Instruction, and solemn [98] Counsel, may have made Men full as averse to any thing deliver'd with an Air of high Wisdom and Science; especially if it be so high as to be set above all human Art of Reasoning, and even above Reason it-self, in the account of its sublime Dispensers.

However, since it may be objected to us by certain *Formalists* of this sort, "That we can prove nothing duly without proving it *in form*": we may for once condescend to their Demand; state our Case *formally*; and divide our Subject into Parts, after the *precise* manner, and according to just *Rule* and *Method*.

Our purpose, therefore, being to defend an Author, who has been charg'd as too presumptuous for introducing the way of WIT and HUMOUR into *religious Searches*; we shall endeavour to make appear:

1st, That WIT and HUMOUR are corroborative of *Religion*, and promotive of *true Faith*.

2*ly*, That they are us'd as proper *Means* of this kind by the holy Founders of Religion.

3ly, That notwithstanding the dark Complexion and sour Humour of some religious Teachers, we may be justly said to have in the main, A witty and good-humour'd Religion.

Among the earliest Acquaintance of my Youth, I remember, in particular, *a Club* of three or four merry Gentlemen, who had long kept Company with one another, and were seldom separate in any Party of Pleasure or Diversion. They happen'd once to be upon a travelling Adventure, and came to a Country, where they were told

Chap. 3.

for certain, they should find the worst Entertainment, as well as the worst Roads imaginable. One of the Gentlemen, who seem'd the least concern'd for this Disaster, said slightly and without any seeming Design, "That the best Expedient for them in this Extremity wou'd be to keep themselves in high Humour, and endeavour to commend every thing which the Place afforded." The other Gentlemen immediately took the hint; but, as it happen'd, kept silence, pass'd the Subject over, and took no further notice of what had been propos'd.

Being enter'd into the dismal Country, in which they proceeded without the least Complaint; 'twas remarkable, that if by great chance they came to any tolerable Bit of Road, or any ordinary Prospect, they fail'd not to say something or other *in its praise*, and wou'd light often on such pleasant *Fancys* and *Representations*, as made the Objects in reality agreeable.

[100]

When the greatest part of the Day was thus spent, and our Gentlemen arriv'd where they intended to take their Quarters, the first of 'em who made trial of the Fare, or tasted either *Glass* or *Dish*, recommended it with such an air of Assurance, and in such lively Expressions of Approbation, that the others came instantly over to his Opinion, and confirm'd his *Relish* with many additional Encomiums of their own.

Many ingenious Reasons were given for the several *odd* Tastes and Looks of Things, which were presented to 'em at Table. "Some Meats were *wholesom:* Others *of a high Taste:* Others according to the manner of eating in *this* or *that foreign Country.*" Every Dish had the flavour of some celebrated Receit in *Cookery;* and the *Wine*, and other Liquors, had, in their turn, the advantage of being treated in the same elegant strain. In short, our Gentlemen eat and drank heartily, and took up with their indifferent Fare so well, that 'twas apparent they had wrought upon themselves *to believe* they were tolerably well serv'd.'

[101]

Their Servants, in the mean time, having laid no such Plot as this against themselves, kept to their *Senses*, and stood it out, "That their Masters had certainly lost *theirs*. For how else cou'd they

Chap. 3. *swallow* so contentedly, and take all *for good* which was set before 'em?"—

Had I to deal with a malicious Reader; he might perhaps pretend to infer from this *Story* of my travelling Friends, that I intended to represent it as an easy matter for People to persuade themselves into what *Opinion* or *Belief* they pleas'd. But it can never surely be thought, that Men of true *Judgment* and *Understanding* shou'd set about such a Task as that of perverting their own *Judgment*, and giving a wrong Bias to their Reason. They must easily foresee that an Attempt of this kind, shou'd it have the least Success, wou'd prove of far worse Consequence to them than any Perversion of their *Taste, Appetite*, or ordinary *Senses*.

I must confess it, however, to be my Imagination, that where fit Circumstances concur, and many inviting Occasions offer from the side of Mens Interest, their Humour, or their Passion; 'tis no extraordinary Case to see 'em enter into such a Plot as this against their own Understandings, and endeavour by all possible means to persuade both themselves and others of what they think convenient and useful to believe.

If in many particular Cases, where Favour and Affection prevail, it be found so easy a thing with us, to impose upon ourselves; it cannot surely be very hard to do it, where we take for granted, *our highest Interest is concern'd*. Now it is certainly no small *Interest* or *Concern* with Men, to believe what is by Authority establish'd; since in the Case of Disbelief there can be no Choice left but either to live *a Hypocrite*, or be esteem'd *profane*. Even where Men are left to themselves, and allow'd the Freedom of their Choice, they are still forward enough *in believing*; and can officiously endeavour to persuade themselves of the Truth of any flattering Imposture.

Nor is it unusual to find Men successful in this *Endeavour:* As, among other Instances, may appear by the many *religious Faiths* or *Opinions*, however preposterous or contradictory, which, Age after Age, we know to have been rais'd on the Foundation of *Miracles* and pretended *Commissions* from Heaven. These have been as generally espous'd and passionately cherish'd as the greatest Truths

[102]

and most certain Revelations. 'Tis hardly to be suppos'd that such Combinations shou'd be form'd, and Forgerys erected with such Success and Prevalency over the Understandings of Men, did not they themselves co-operate, of their own accord, towards the Imposture, and shew, "That by a good-Will and hearty Desire of believing, they had in reality a considerable Hand in the Deceit."

Chap. 3. [103]

'Tis certain that in a Country, where FAITH has, for a long time, gone by Inheritance, and Opinions are entail'd by Law, there is little room left for the Vulgar to alter their Persuasion, or deliberate on the Choice of their religious Belief. Whensoever a Government thinks fit to concern it-self with Mens Opinions, and by its absolute Authority impose any particular Belief, there is none perhaps ever so ridiculous or monstrous in which it needs doubt of having good Success. This we may see thorowly effected in certain Countrys, by a steddy Policy, and sound Application of Punishment and Reward: with the Assistance of particular Courts erected to this end; peculiar Methods of Justice; peculiar Magistrates and Officers; proper Inquests, and certain wholesom Severitys, not slightly administer'd, and play'd with, (as certain Triflers propose) but duly and properly inforc'd; as is absolutely requisite to this end of strict Conformity, and Unity in one and the same Profession, and manner of Worship.

[104]

But shou'd it happen to be *the* Truth it-self which was thus effectually propagated by the Means we have describ'd; the very Nature of such *Means* can, however, allow but little Honour to the *Propagators*, and little Merit to the *Disciples* and *Believers*. 'Tis certain that Mahometism, Paganism, Judaism, or any *other* Belief may stand, as well as *the truest*, upon this Foundation. He who is now an *Orthodox* Christian, wou'd by virtue of such a Discipline have been infallibly as true a Mussulman, or as errant a Heretick; had his Birth happen'd in another place.

For this reason there can be no rational Belief but where *Comparison* is allow'd, *Examination* permitted, and a sincere *Toleration* establish'd. And in this case, I will presume to say, "That *Whatever* Belief is once espous'd or countenanc'd by the Magistrate,

Chap. 3. it will have a sufficient advantage; without any help from Force or Menaces on one hand, or extraordinary Favour and partial Treatment on the other." If the Belief be in any measure consonant to Truth and Reason, it will find as much favour in the Eyes of Mankind, as Truth and Reason need desire. Whatever Difficultys there may be in any particular Speculations or Mysterys belonging to it; the better sort of Men will endeavour to pass 'em over. They will believe (as our *Author says) to the full stretch of their Reason, and add Spurs to their Faith, in order to be the more sociable; and conform the better with what their Interest, in conjunction with their Good-Humour, inclines them to receive as credible, and observe as their religious Duty and devotional Task.

Here it is that GOOD HUMOUR will naturally take place, and the *Hospitable Disposition* of our travelling Friends above-recited will easily transfer it-self into *Religion*, and operate in the same manner with respect to the *establish'd Faith* (however miraculous or incomprehensible) under a tolerating, mild, and gentle Government.

Every one knows, indeed, That by Heresy is understood a Stubbornness in *the Will*, not a Defect merely in *the Understanding*. On this account 'tis impossible that an honest and *good-humour*'d Man shou'd be a *Schismatick* or *Heretick*, and affect to separate from his national Worship on slight Reason, or without severe *Provocation*.'

To be pursu'd by *petty* INQUISITORS; to be threatned with *Punishment*, or *penal Laws*; to be *mark'd out* as dangerous and suspected; to be rail'd at *in high Places*, with all the study'd Wit and Art of Calumny; are indeed sufficient Provocations to *ill Humour*, and may force People to *divide*, who at first had never any such Intention. But the Virtue of *Good-Humour* in Religion is such, that it can even reconcile Persons to a Belief, in which they were never bred, or to which they had conceiv'd a former Prejudice.

From these Considerations we cannot but of course conclude,

[106]

^{*} Letter of Enthusiasm, VOL. I. pag. 34.

"That there is nothing so ridiculous in respect of Policy, or so wrong and odious in respect of common Humanity, as a *moderate* and *half-way* Persecution." It only frets the Sore; it raises the *Ill-humour* of Mankind; excites the keener Spirits; moves Indignation in Beholders; and sows the very Seeds of Schism in Mens bosoms. A *resolute* and *bold-fac'd* Persecution leaves no time or scope for these engendring Distempers, or gathering Ill-humours. It does the work at once; by *Extirpation*, *Banishment*, or *Massacre*; and like a bold Stroke in Surgery, dispatches by one short *Amputation*, what a bungling Hand wou'd make worse and worse, to the perpetual Sufferance and Misery of the Patient.

Chap. 3.

[107]

If there be on earth a proper way to render the most sacred Truth suspected, 'tis by supporting it with *Threats*, and pretending to *terrify* People into the Belief of it. This is a sort of daring Mankind in a Cause, where they know themselves superior, and out of reach. The weakest Mortal finds within himself, that tho he may be *out-witted* and *deluded*, he can never be *forc'd* in what relates to his *Opinion* or *Assent*. And there are few Men so ignorant of human Nature, and of what they hold in common with their Kind, as not to comprehend, "That where great Vehemence is express'd by any-one in what relates solely to *another*, 'tis seldom without some private Interest of *his own*."

[108]

In common Matters of Dispute, the angry Disputant makes the best Cause to appear the worst. A *Clown* once took a fancy to hear the *Latin* Disputes of Doctors at a University. He was ask'd what pleasure he could take in viewing such Combatants, when he could never know so much as which of the Partys had the better. "For that matter," reply'd the *Clown*, "I a'n't such a Fool neither, but I can see who's the first that puts t'other into a Passion." Nature her-self dictated this Lesson to the Clown; "That he who had the better of the Argument, wou'd be *easy* and *well-humour'd*: But he who was unable to support his Cause by Reason, wou'd naturally lose his Temper, and grow *violent*."

Were two Travellers agreed to tell their Story separate in publick: the one being a Man of Sincerity, but *positive* and *dogmatical*; the

Chap. 3. other less sincere, but *easy* and *good-humour'd:* tho it happen'd that the Accounts of this latter Gentleman were of the more miraculous sort; they wou'd yet sooner gain Belief, and be more favourably receiv'd by Mankind, than the strongly asserted Relations and vehement Narratives of the other *fierce* Defender of the Truth.

That GOOD HUMOUR is a chief Cause of Compliance, or Acquiescence in matters of Faith, may be prov'd from the very Spirit of those, whom we commonly call Criticks. 'Tis a known Prevention against the Gentlemen of this Character; "That they are generally ill-humour'd, and splenetick." The World will needs have it, That their Spleen disturbs 'em. And I must confess I think the World in general to be so far right in this Conceit, That tho all Criticks perhaps are not necessarily splenetick; all splenetick People (whether naturally such, or made so by ill Usage) have a necessary Propensity to Criticism and Satir. When Men are easy in themselves, they let others remain so; and can readily comply with what seems plausible, and is thought conducing to the Quiet or good Correspondence of Mankind. They study to raise no Difficultys or Doubts. And in religious Affairs, 'tis seldom that they are known forward to entertain ill Thoughts or Surmises, whilst they are unmolested. But if disturb'd by groundless Arraignments and Suspicions, by unnecessary Invectives, and bitter Declamations, and by a contentious quarrelsom Aspect of Religion; they naturally turn Criticks, and begin to question every thing. The Spirit of Satir rises with the ill Mood: and the chief Passion of Men thus diseas'd and thrown out of Good Humour, is to find fault, censure, unravel, confound, and leave nothing without exception and controversy.

These are the *Scepticks* or *Scrupulists*, against whom there is such a Clamor rais'd. 'Tis evident, in the mean while, that the very *Clamor* it-self, join'd with the usual Menaces and Shew of Force, is that which chiefly raises this *sceptical* Spirit, and helps to multiply the number of these inquisitive and *ill-humour'd* CRITICKS. Mere *Threats*, without power of Execution, are only exasperating and provocative. They *who are Masters of the *carnal* as well as

[109]

^{*} Supra, pag. 94.

spiritual Weapon, may apply each at their pleasure, and in what proportion they think necessary. But where the Magistrate resolves steddily to reserve his *Fasces* for his own proper Province, and keep the Edg-Tools and deadly Instruments out of other Hands, 'tis in vain for spiritual Pretenders to take such magisterial Airs. It can then only become them to brandish such Arms, when they have strength enough to make the Magistrate resign his Office, and become *Provost* or *Executioner* in their service.—

Shou'd any one who happens to read these Lines, perceive in himself a rising Animosity against the Author, for asserting thus zealously the Notion of a religious Liberty, and mutual Toleration; 'tis wish'd that he wou'd maturely deliberate on the Cause of his Disturbance and Ill-humour. Wou'd he deign to look narrowly into himself, he wou'd undoubtedly find that it is not ZEAL for Religion or the Truth, which moves him on this occasion. For had he happen'd to be in a Nation where he was no Conformist, nor had any Hope or Expectation of obtaining the Precedency for his own Manner of Worship, he wou'd have found nothing preposterous in this our Doctrine of Indulgence. 'Tis a Fact indisputable, that whatever Sect or Religion is undermost, tho it may have persecuted at any time before; yet as soon as it begins to suffer Persecution in its turn, it recurs instantly to the Principles of Moderation, and maintains this our Plea for Complacency, Sociableness, and GOOD Humour in Religion. The Mystery therefore of this Animosity, or rising Indignation of my devout and zealous Reader, is only this; "That being *devoted* to the Interest of *a Party* already in possession or expectation of the temporal Advantages annex'd to a particular Belief; he fails not, as a zealous *Party-Man*, to look with jealousy on every unconformable Opinion, and is sure to justify those Means which he thinks proper to prevent its growth." He knows that if in Matters of Religion any one believes amiss, 'tis at his own peril. If Opinion damns; Vice certainly does as much. Yet will our Gentleman easily find, if he inquires the least into himself, that he has no such furious Concern for the Security of Mens Morals, nor any such violent Resentment of their Vices, when they are such as noway incommode him. And from hence it will be easy for him to

Chap. 3.

[III]

Chap. 3. infer, "That the Passion he feels on this occasion, is not from pure ZEAL, but *private* Interest, and *worldly* EMULATION."

COME we now (as authentick Rhetoricians express themselves) to our *second Head:* which we shou'd again subdivide into *Firsts* and *Seconds*, but that this manner of carving is of late days grown much out of fashion.

'Twas the Custom of our Ancestors, perhaps as long since as the days of our hospitable King ARTHUR, to have nothing serv'd at Table but what was intire and substantial. 'Twas a whole Boar, or solid Ox which made the Feast. The Figure of the Animal was preserv'd intire, and the Dissection made in form by the appointed Carver, a Man of Might as well as profound Craft and notable Dexterity; who was seen erect, with goodly Mein and Action, displaying Heads and Members, dividing according to Art, and distributing his Subject-matter into proper Parts, sutable to the Stomachs of those he serv'd. In latter days 'tis become the Fashion to eat with less Ceremony and Method. Every-one chuses to carve for himself. The learned Manner of Dissection is out of request; and a certain Method of Cookery has been introduc'd; by which the anatomical Science of the Table is intirely set aside. Ragouts and Fricassees are the reigning Dishes, in which every thing is so dismember'd and thrown out of all Order and Form, that no Part of the Mass can properly be divided, or distinguish'd from another.

Fashion is indeed a powerful Mistress, and by her single Authority has so far degraded the carving Method and Use of *Solids*, even in Discourse and Writing, that our religious Pastors themselves have many of 'em chang'd their Manner of distributing to us their spiritual Food. They have quitted their substantial Service, and uniform Division into *Parts* and *Under-Parts*; and in order to become fashionable, they have run into the more savoury way of learned *Ragout* and *Medley*. 'Tis the unbred rustick Orator alone, who presents his clownish Audience with a *divisible Discourse*. The elegant Court-Divine exhorts in Miscellany, and is asham'd to bring his *Two's* and *Three's* before a fashionable Assembly.

[113]

Shou'd I therefore, as a mere *Miscellanarian* or *Essay*-Writer, forgetting what I had premis'd, be found to drop *a Head*, and lose the connecting Thred of my present Discourse; the Case perhaps wou'd not be so preposterous. For fear however lest I shou'd be charg'd for being worse than my word, I shall endeavour to satisfy my Reader, by pursuing my *Method* propos'd: if peradventure he can call to mind, what that Method was. Or if he cannot, the matter is not so very important, but he may safely pursue his reading, without further trouble.

To proceed, therefore. Whatever Means or Methods may be employ'd at any time in maintaining or propagating a religious Belief already current and establish'd, 'tis evident that the first Beginnings must have been founded in that natural Complacency, and GOOD HUMOUR, which inclines to Trust and Confidence in Mankind. Terrors alone, tho accompany'd with Miracles and Prodigys of whatever kind, are not capable of raising that sincere Faith and absolute Reliance which is requir'd in favour of the divinely authoriz'd Instructor, and spiritual Chief. The Affection and Love which procures a true Adherence to the new religious Foundation, must depend either on a real or counterfeit *Goodness in the religious Founder. Whatever ambitious Spirit may inspire him; whatever savage Zeal or persecuting Principle may lie in reserve, ready to disclose it-self when Authority and Power is once obtain'd; the First Scene of Doctrine, however, fails not to present us with the agreeable Views of Joy, Love, Meekness, Gentleness, and Moderation.

In this respect, Religion, according to the common Practice in many Sects, may be compar'd to that sort of *Courtship*, of which the Fair Sex are known often to complain. In the Beginning of an Amour, when these innocent Charmers are first accosted, they hear of nothing but *tender Vows*, *Submission*, *Service*, *Love*. But soon afterwards, when won by this Appearance of Gentleness and Humility, they have resign'd themselves, and are no longer *their own*, they hear a different Note, and are taught to understand *Submis*-

Chap. 3.

[114]

[115]

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 94. and VOL. II. pag. 334.

[116]

Chap. 3. sion and Service in a sense they little expected. Charity and Brotherly Love are very engaging Sounds: But who wou'd dream that out of abundant Charity and Brotherly Love shou'd come Steel, Fire, Gibbets, Rods, and such a sound and hearty Application of these Remedys as shou'd at once advance the worldly Greatness of religious Pastors, and the particular Interest of private Souls, for which they are so charitably concern'd?

It has been observ'd by our *Author, "That the Jews were naturally a very cloudy People." That they had certainly in Religion, as in every thing else, the least Good-Humour of any People in the World, is very apparent. Had it been otherwise, their holy Legislator and Deliverer, who was declar'd †the meekest Man on Earth, and who for many years together had by the most popular and kind Acts endeavour'd to gain their Love and Affection, wou'd in all probability have treated them afterwards with more Sweetness, and been able with ‡less Blood and Massacre to retain them in their religious Duty. This however we may observe, That if the first Jewish Princes and celebrated Kings acted in reality according to the Institutions of their great Founder, not only Musick, but even PLAY and DANCE, were of holy Appointment, and divine Right. The first Monarch of this Nation, tho of a melancholy Complexion, join'd Musick with his spiritual Exercises, and even us'd it as a Remedy under that *dark* Enthusiasm or ***evil Spirit;* which how far it might resemble that of *Prophecy*, experienc'd by him ††even after his Apostacy, our **Author pretends not to determine. 'Tis certain that the Successor of this Prince was a hearty Espouser of the merry Devotion, and by his example has shewn it to have been fundamental in the religious Constitution of his People. (a) The

^{*} Letter of Enthusiasm, VOL. I. pag. 29. And above, pag. 55, 56.

[†] Numb. Ch. xii. ver. 3.

[‡] Exod. Ch. xxxii. ver. 27, &c. And Numb. Ch. xvi. ver. 41.

^{**} I Sam. Ch. xviii. ver. 10. And Ch. xix. ver. 9.

^{††} Ibid. ver. 23, 24.

^{‡‡} Letter of Enthusiasm, VOL. I. pag. 45.

⁽a) 2 Sam. Ch. vi. ver. 5, 14, & 16.

famous *Entry* or *high Dance* perform'd by him, after so conspicuous a manner, in the Procession of the sacred *Coffer*, shews that he was not asham'd of expressing any Extasy of *Joy* or *playsom *Humour*, which was practis'd by the †meanest of the Priests or People on such an occasion.'

Chap. 3.

[118]

Besides the many Songs and Hymns dispers'd in Holy Writ, the Book of *Psalms* it-self, *Job, Proverbs, Canticles*, and other intire Volumes of the sacred Collection, which are plainly *Poetry*, and full of humorous Images, and jocular Wit, may sufficiently shew how readily the inspir'd Authors had recourse to Humour and Diversion, as a proper Means to promote *Religion*, and strengthen the establish'd Faith.

When the Affairs of the *Jewish* Nation grew desperate, and every thing seem'd tending to a total Conquest and Captivity, the Style of their holy Writers and Prophets might well vary from that of earlier days, in the Rise and Vigor of their Common-wealth, or during the first Splendor of their Monarchy, when the Princes themselves prophesy'd, and potent Kings were of the number of the Sacred Pen-men. This still we may be assur'd of; That however *melancholy* or *ill-humour'd* any of the Prophets may appear at any time, 'was not that kind of Spirit, which *God* was wont to encourage in them. Witness the Case of the Prophet Jonah; whose Character is so naturally describ'd in Holy Writ.'

[119]

^{*} Ibid. ver. 22.

[†] Tho this *Dance* was not perform'd quite naked, the Dancers, it seems, were so slightly cloth'd, that in respect of Modesty, they might as well have wore nothing: their Nakedness appearing still by means of their high Caperings, Leaps, and violent Attitudes, which were proper to this Dance. The Reader, if he be curious, may examine what relation this religious Extasy and naked Dance had to the *naked* and *processional Prophecy;* (1 Sam. Ch. xix. ver. 23, & 24.) where Prince, Priest, and People prophesy'd in conjunction: the Prince himself being both of the *itinerant* and *naked* Party. It appears that even before he was yet advanc'd to the Throne, he had been seiz'd with this prophesying Spirit *errant, processional,* and *saltant,* attended, as we find, with a sort of Martial Dance perform'd in Troops or Companys, with Pipe and Tabret accompanying the March, together with Psaltry, Harp, Cornets, Timbrels, and other variety of Musick. See 1 Sam. Ch. x. ver. 5. and Ch. xix. ver. 23, 24, &c. and 2 Sam. Ch. vi. ver. 5. And above, *Letter of Enthusiasm,* VOL. I. pag. 45.

Chap. 3. Pettish as this Prophet was, unlike a Man, and resembling rather some refractory boyish *Pupil;* it may be said that God, as a kind *Tutor*, was pleas'd *to humour him*, bear with his Anger, and in a lusory manner, expose his childish Frowardness, and shew him *to himself.*

*"Arise (said his gracious Lord) and go to Ninive." "No such matter," says our Prophet to himself; but away over-Sea for Tarshish. He fairly plays the Truant, like an arch *School-Boy;* hoping to hide out of the way. But his *Tutor* had good Eyes, and a long Reach. He overtook him at Sea; where a Storm was ready prepar'd for his Exercise, and a Fish's Belly for his Lodging. The Renegade found himself in harder Durance than any at Land. He was sufficiently mortify'd: He grew good, pray'd, moraliz'd, and spoke mightily against †*Lying Vanitys*.

Again, *the Prophet is taken into favour, and bid *go to* NINIVE, to foretel Destruction. He foretels it. NINIVE repents: God pardons: and the Prophet is angry.'

**"Lord!—Did I not foresee what this wou'd come to? Was not this my Saying, when I was safe and quiet at home?—What else shou'd I have run away for?—As if I knew not how little dependence there was on the Resolution of those, who are always so ready to forgive, and repent of what they have determin'd.—No!—Strike me dead!—Take my Life, this moment. 'Tis better for me.—If ever I prophesy again." * * * * * *

**Hand Dost thou well then to be thus angry, Jonah? Consider with thy-self.—Come!—Since thou wilt needs retire out of the City, to see at a distance what will come of it; here, Take a better Fence than thy own Booth against the hot Sun which incommodes Thee. Take this tall Plant as a shady Covering for thy Head. Cool thy-self, and be deliver'd from thy Grief."

[120]

^{*} Jonah, Ch. i, &c.

[†] Ibid. Ch. ii. ver. 8.

[‡] Ch. iii. ver. 1, &c.

^{**} Jonah, Ch. iv. ver. 1, 2, 3.

^{††} Ver. 4, 5, 6.

When the Almighty had shown this Indulgence to the Prophet, he grew better-humour'd, and pass'd a tolerable Night. But the *next morning the Worm came, and an East-Wind: the Arbor was nip'd: the Sun shone vehemently, and the Prophet's Head was heated, as before. Presently the ill Mood returns, and the Prophet is at the old pass. "Better die, than live at this rate.—Death, Death alone can satisfy me. Let me hear no longer of Living.—No!—'Tis in vain to talk of it."—

Again †GOD expostulates; but is taken up short, and answer'd churlishly, by the testy Prophet. "Angry he *is;* angry he *ought to be,* and angry he *will* be, *to his Death.*" But the Almighty, with the utmost pity towards him, in this *melancholy* and *froward Temper,* lays open the Folly of it; and exhorts to *Mildness,* and Good Humour, in the most tender manner, and under the most *familiar* and *pleasant Images;* whilst he shews †*expressly* more Regard and Tenderness to the very Cattel and *Brute-Beasts,* than the Prophet to his own Human Kind, and to those very *Disciples* whom by his Preaching he had converted.

In the antienter Parts of Sacred Story, where the Beginning of things, and Origin of human Race are represented to us, there are sufficient Instances of this *Familiarity of Style*, this popular pleasant Intercourse, and Manner of Dialogue between **God and *Man*: I might add even between ††*Man* and *Beast*; and what is still more extraordinary, between God and ‡‡Satan.

Whatsoever of this kind may be *allegorically* understood, or in the way of Parable or Fable; this I am sure of, That the *Accounts*, *Descriptions*, *Narrations*, *Expressions*, and *Phrases* are in themselves many times exceedingly *pleasant*, *entertaining*, and *facetious*. But

Chap. 3.

[121]

[122]

^{*} Ver. 7, 8.

[†] Ver. 9.

[‡] See the last Verse of this Prophet.

^{**} Gen. Ch. iii. ver. 9, &c.

^{††} Numb. Ch. xxii. ver. 28, &c.

^{‡‡ (1.)} Job, Ch. i, & ii.

^{(2.) 2} Chron. Ch. xviii. ver. 18, 19, &c.

Chap. 3. fearing lest I might be mis-interpreted, shou'd I offer to set these Passages in their proper Light, (which however has been perform'd by undoubted good Christians, and most learned and *eminent Divines of our own Church) I forbear to go any further into the Examination or Criticism of this sort.

As for our Saviour's Style, 'tis not more *vehement* and *majestick* in his gravest Animadversions or declamatory Discourses; than it is *sharp, humorous*, and *witty* in his Repartees, Reflections, fabulous Narrations, or Parables, Similes, Comparisons, and other Methods of *milder* Censure and Reproof. His Exhortations to his Disciples; his particular Designation of their Manners; the pleasant Images under which he often couches his Morals and prudential Rules; even his Miracles themselves (especially the †first he ever wrought) carry with them a certain *Festivity, Alacrity*, and Good Humour so remarkable, that I shou'd look upon it as impossible not to be mov'd in a pleasant manner at their Recital.

Now, if what I have here asserted in behalf of Pleasantry and Humour, be found just and real in respect of the *Jewish* and *Christian* Religions; I doubt not, it will be yielded to me, in respect of the antient *Heathen* Establishments; that the highest Care was taken by their original Founders, and following Reformers, *to exhilarate* Religion, and correct that *Melancholy* and *Gloominess* to which it is subject; according to those different Modifications of [‡]Enthusiasm above specify'd.'

Our Author, as I take it, has **elsewhere shewn that these Founders were real Musicians, and Improvers of Poetry, Musick, and the entertaining Arts; which they in a manner incorporated with Religion: Not without good reason; as I am apt to imagine. For to me it plainly appears, That in the early times of all Religions, when Nations were yet barbarous and savage, there was ever an Aptness or Tendency towards the dark part of Superstition, which among

[124]

[123]

^{*} See Burnet, Archaeol. cap. 7. p. 280, &с.

[†] St John, Chap. ii. ver. 11.

[‡] Above, Chap. i, ii.

^{**} VOL. I. pag. 237.

many other Horrors produc'd that of *human Sacrifice*. Something of this nature might possibly be deduc'd even from *Holy Writ. And in other Historys we are inform'd of it more at large.

Chap. 3.

[125]

Every one knows how great a Part of the old *Heathen* Worship consisted in *Play, Poetry*, and *Dance*. And tho some of the more melancholy and superstitious Votarys might approach the Shrines of their DIVINITYS with mean *Grimaces*, *Crouchings*, and other *fawning* Actions, betraying the low Thoughts they had of the Divine Nature; yet 'tis well known, that in those times the *illiberal* *sycophantick* manner of Devotion was by the wiser sort contemn'd, and oft suspected, *as knavish and indirect.

[126]

* Gen. chap. xxii. ver. 1, 2, &c. and Judg. chap. xi. ver. 30, 31, ${\it cc.}$

These Places relating to ABRAHAM and JEPHTHAH, are cited only with respect to the Notion which these Primitive Warriors may be said to have entertain'd concerning this horrid Enormity, so common among the Inhabitants of the Palestine and other neighbouring Nations. It appears that even the elder of these Hebrew Princes was under no extreme Surprize on this trying Revelation. Nor did he think of expostulating, in the least, on this occasion; when at another time he cou'd be so importunate for the Pardon of an inhospitable, murderous, impious and incestuous City; Gen. xviii. 23, &c. See Marsham's Citations, pag. 76, 77. Ex istis satius est colligere hanc Abrahami Tentationem non fuisse κεκαινουργημένην πράξιν, actionem innovatam; non recens excogitatam, sed ad pristinos Cananaeorum mores designatam. [From these facts it is preferable to deduce that the trial of Abraham was not a new action, not a new action, not a recent invention but one chosen in accordance with the former customs of the Canaanites.] See the learned Capel's Dissertation upon ЈЕРНТНАН; "Ex hujus voti Lege (Lev. xxvii. ver. 28, 29.) JEPHTE Filiam omnino videtur immolasse, hoc est, morte affecisse, & executus est in eâ votum quod ipse voyerat, Jud. xi. 39." [From the law of this hold promise Jephthah is understood to have sacrificed his daughter completely, that is, to have bound her by death, and the pledge was carried out against her which he himself had vowed.]

† See VOL. I. pag. 35.

‡ -Non tu prece poscis emaci, &c.

Haud cuivis promptum est, murmurque humilesque su surros,

Tollere de Templis. —

De Jove quid sentis? Estne, ut praeponere cures

Hunc cuinam?—

— Quâ tu mercede Deorum

Emeris auriculas?—

O curvae in terris animae, & coelestium inanes!

Quid juvat hoc, Templis nostros immittere mores,

Et bona Diis ex hâc scelerata ducere pulpâ?

Pers. Sat. ii. ver. 3.

Chap. 3. How different an Air and Aspect the good and virtuous were presum'd to carry with them to the Temple, let Plutarch singly, instead of many others, witness, in his excellent Treatise of *Super-

[You are not the man to make higgling prayers. . . . It is not everyone who is ready to do away with muttering and whispering from our temples. . . . What is your view of Jupiter? May I assume that you would think of putting him above—'above whom?' . . . What is the price you pay for the ears of the Gods? . . . O ye souls that cleave to earth and have nothing heavenly in you! How can it answer to introduce the spirit of the age into the temple-service, and infer what the Gods like from this sinful pampered flesh of ours?]

Non est meum, si mugiat Africis Malus procellis, ad miseras preces Decurrere.—

Hor. lib. iii. Od. 29. ver. 57.

[It is not for me to betake myself to pitiful entreaties if my mast roar with the south-west wind.]

[‡] See VOL. I. pag. 133. And above, pag. 79. in the Notes.

* ὧ βάρβαρ' ἐξευρόντες Έλληνες κατὰ [Note: In the Loeb edition of Plutarch's Moralia, vol. 2, "On Superstition," this reads κακα, not κατα], $\tau \hat{\eta}$ δεισιδαιμονία, πηλώσεις, καταβαρβαρώσεις, σαββατισμούς, δίψεις ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αἰσχράς, προσκαθίσεις, ἀλλοκότους προσκυνήσεις, &c.† [Note: In the Loeb edition, "wicked" (αισχρας) is preceded by a comma, rather than being followed by a comma.] "O wretched Greeks!" (says he, speaking to his then declining Countrymen) "who in a way of Superstition run so easily into the Relish of barbarous Nations, and bring into Religion that frightful Mein of sordid and vilifying Devotion, ill-favour'd Humiliation and Contrition, abject Looks and Countenances, Consternations, Prostrations, Disfigurations, and, in the Act of Worship, Distortions, constrain'd and painful Postures of the Body, wry Faces, beggerly Tones, Mumpings, Grimaces, Cringings, and the rest of this kind—A shame indeed to us Grecians!—For to us, we know, 'tis prescrib'd from of old by our peculiar Laws concerning Musick, and the publick Chorus's, that we shou'd perform in the handsomest manner, and with a just and manly Countenance, avoiding those Grimaces and Contortions of which some Singers contract a Habit. And shall we not in the more immediate Worship of the DEITY preserve this liberal Air and manly Appearance? Or, on the contrary, whilst we are nicely observant of other Forms and Decencys in the Temple, shall we neglect this greater Decency in Voice, Words, and Manners; and with vile Cries, Fawnings, and prostitute Behaviour, betray the natural Dignity and Majesty of that Divine Religion and National Worship deliver'd down to us by our Forefathers, and purg'd from every thing of a barbarous and savage kind?"

What Plutarch mentions here, of the *just Countenance* or *liberal Air*, the στόμα δίκαιον, of the Musical Performer, is agreeably illustrated in his Alcibiades. 'Twas that heroick Youth, who, as appears by this Historian, first gave occasion to the

[†] Plutarchi Oper. T. II. pag. 166. Ed. Fran.

stition; and in another against the *Epicurean* Atheism, where it will plainly enough appear *what a share GOOD HUMOUR had in that which the politer Antients esteem'd as *Piety*, and true *Religion*.'

Chap. 3.

[128] [129]

ATHENIANS of the higher Rank wholly to abandon the use of Flutes; which had before been highly in favour with them. The Reason given, was "the illiberal Air which attended such Performers, and the unmanly Disfiguration of their Looks and Countenance, which this Piping-work produc'd." As for the real Figure or Plight of the superstitious Mind, our Author thus describes it: "Gladly wou'd the poor comfortless Mind, by whiles, keep Festival and rejoice: But such as its Religion is, there can be no free Mirth or Joy belonging to it. Publick Thanksgivings are but private Mournings. Sighs and Sorrows accompany its Praises. Fears and Horrors corrupt its best Affections. When it assumes the outward Ornaments of best Apparel for the Temple, it even then strikes Melancholy, and appears in Paleness and ghastly Looks. While it worships, it trembles. It sends up Vows in faint and feeble Voices, with eager Hopes, Desires, and Passions, discoverable in the whole Disorder of the outward Frame: and, in the main, it evinces plainly by Practice, that the Notion of Pythagoras was but vain, who dar'd assert, That we were then in the best State, and carry'd our most becoming Looks with us, when we approach'd the Gods. For then, above all other Seasons, are the Superstitious found in the most abject miserable State of Mind, and with the meanest Presence and Behaviour; approaching the Sacred Shrines of the Divine Powers in the same manner as they wou'd the Dens of Bears or Lions, the Caves of Basilisks or Dragons, or other hideous Recesses of wild Beasts or raging Monsters. To me therefore it appears wonderful, that we shou'd arraign Atheism as impious; whilst Superstition escapes the Charge. Shall he who holds there are no Divine Powers, be esteem'd impious; and shall not he be esteem'd far more impious, who holds the Divine Beings such in their Nature as the Superstitious believe and represent? For my own part, I had rather Men shou'd say of me, &c." See VOL. I. pag. 41. in the Notes. Nothing can be more remarkable than what our Author says again, a little below.† "The Atheist believes there is no Deity; the Religionist, or superstitious Believer, wishes there were none. If he believes, 'tis against his Will: mistrust he dares not, nor call his Thought in question. But cou'd he with Security, at once, throw off that oppressive Fear, which like the Rock of TANTALUS impends, and presses over him, he wou'd with equal Joy spurn his inslaving Thought, and embrace the Atheist's State and Opinion as his happiest Deliverance. Atheists are free of Superstition, but the Superstitious are ever willing Atheists, tho impotent in their Thought, and unable to believe of the Divine Being as they gladly wou'd. $vvvi \delta \hat{\epsilon} \tau \hat{\omega} \mu \hat{\epsilon} v \delta \hat{\epsilon} \omega \delta \delta \hat{\epsilon} \omega \delta \delta \hat{\epsilon} \omega \delta \delta \hat{\epsilon} \omega \delta \delta \hat{\epsilon} \omega \delta \delta \delta \hat{\epsilon} \omega \delta \delta \hat{\epsilon} \omega \delta \delta \hat{\epsilon} \omega \delta \delta \hat{\epsilon} \omega \delta \delta \delta \delta \delta \delta \delta$ οὐδὲν μέτεστιν, ὁ δὲ δεισιδαίμων τῆ προαιρέσει ἄθεος ὤν, ἀσθενέστερός ἐστιν ἢ τοῦ δοξάζειν περὶ θεῶν ὁ βούλεται" See VOL. I. pag. 35, 36, 40, 41.

* Where speaking of *Religion*, as it stood in the Heathen Church, and in his own time; he confesses, "That as to the vulgar *Disposition*, there was no Remedy. Many even of the better sort wou'd be found, of course, to intermix with their Veneration and Esteem something of *Terror* or *Fear* in their religious Worship, which might give it perhaps the Character of SUPERSTITION: But that this Evil was a thousand times over-balanc'd by the Satisfaction, Hope, Joy, and Delight which attended

[†] Ibid. 170.

Chap. 3. BUT NOW, methinks, I have been sufficiently *grave* and *serious*, in defense of what is directly contrary to Seriousness and Gravity. I have very *solemnly* pleaded for *Gaity* and Good Humour: I have declaim'd against *Pedantry* in learned Language, and oppos'd *Formality* in Form. I now find my-self somewhat impatient to get loose from the Constraint of *Method*: And I pretend lawfully to exercise the Privilege which I have asserted, of rambling from Subject to Subject, from Style to Style, in my MISCELLANEOUS manner, according to my present Profession and Character.

I may, in the mean while, be censur'd probably for passing over my *Third* Head. But the methodical Reader, if he be scrupulous about it, may content himself with looking back: And if possibly he can pick it out of my *Second*, he will forgive this Anticipation, in a Writing which is govern'd less by Form than Humour. I had indeed resolv'd with my-self to make a large Collection of Passages from our most eminent and learned Divines, in order to have set forth this *Latter* Head of my Chapter; and by better Authority than my own to have evinc'd, "That we had in the main a good-humour'd Religion." But after considering a little while, I came to this short Issue with my-self: "That it was better not to cite at all, than to cite partially." Now if I cited fairly what was said as well on the melancholy as the chearful side of our Religion, the Matter, I found, wou'd be pretty doubtfully balanc'd: And the Result at last wou'd be this; "That, generally speaking, as oft as a Divine

religious Worship. This, says he, is plain and evident from the most demonstrable Testimonys. For neither the Societys, or Publick Meetings in the Temples, nor the Festivals themselves, nor any other diverting Partys, Sights, or Entertainments, are more delightful or rejoicing than what we our-selves behold, and act in the Divine Worship, and in the Holy Sacrifices and Mysterys which belong to it. Our Disposition and Temper is not, on this occasion, as if we were in the Presence of worldly Potentates, dread Sovereigns, and despotick Princes. Nor are we here found meanly humbling our-selves, crouching in Fear and Awe, and full of Anxiety and Confusion, as wou'd be natural to us in such a Case. But where *the Divinity* is esteem'd the *nearest*, and most *immediately present*, there Horrors and Amazements are the furthest banish'd; there the Heart, we find, gives freest way to Pleasure, to Entertainment, to Play, Mirth, Humour, and Diversion; and this even to an Excess."

[130]

was in good Humour, we shou'd find Religion *the sweetest* and *best-humour'd* thing in Nature: But at other times (and *that*, pretty often) we shou'd find a very different Face of Matters."

Chap. 3.

Thus are we alternately exalted and humbled, chear'd and dejected, according as our spiritual *Director is himself influenc'd: And this, peradventure, for our Edification and Advantage; "That by these Contrarietys and Changes we may be render'd more supple and compliant." If we are very low, and down; we are taken up. If we are up, and high; we are taken down.—This is Discipline. This is Authority and Command.—Did Religion carry constantly one and the same Face, and were it always represented to us alike in every respect; we might perhaps be overbold, and make Acquaintance with it, in too familiar a manner: We might think our-selves fully knowing in it, and assur'd of its true Character and Genius. From whence perhaps we might become more refractory towards the Ghostly Teachers of it, and be apt to submit our-selves the less to those who, by Appointment and Authority, represent it to us, in such Lights, as they esteem most proper and convenient.

[131]

I shall therefore not only conclude *abruptly*, but even *sceptically* on this my *last* Head: referring my Reader to what has been said already, on my preceding Heads, for the bare probability "of our having, in the main, a *witty* and *good-humour'd* Religion."

This, however, I may presume to assert; That there are undoubtedly some *Countenances* or *Aspects* of our Religion, which are *humorous* and *pleasant* in them-selves; and that the sadder Representations of it are many times so *over*-sad and *dismal*, that they are apt to excite a very contrary Passion to what is intended by the Representers.

[132]

^{*} Supra, pag. 39.

Chap. 1.

MISCELLANY III

CHAPTER I

Further Remarks on the Author of the Treatises.—His Order and Design.—His Remarks on the Succession of Wit, and Progress of Letters, and Philosophy.—Of Words, Relations,

Affections.—Country-Men and Country.—Old

England.—Patriots of the Soil.—Virtuosi, and

Philosophers.—A Taste.

AVING already asserted my Privilege, as a MISCELLA-NEOUS or ESSAY-Writer of the modern Establishment; to write on every Subject, and in every Method, as I fansy; to use Order, or lay it aside, as I think fit; and to treat of Order and Method in other Works, tho free perhaps and unconfin'd as to my own: I shall presume, in this place, to consider the present Method and Order of my Author's Treatises, as in this joint-Edition they are rang'd.

Notwithstanding the high Airs of SCEPTICISM which our Author assumes in his first Piece; I cannot, after all, but imagine that even there he proves himself, at the bottom, a real DOGMATIST, and shews plainly that he has his private *Opinion*, *Belief*, or *Faith*, as strong as any *Devotee* or *Religionist* of 'em all. Tho he affects perhaps to strike at other Hypotheses and Schemes; he has something of his own still in reserve, and holds a certain *Plan* or *System* peculiar to him-self, or such, at least, in which he has at present but few Companions or Followers.

On this account I look upon his Management to have been much after the rate of some *ambitious* Architect; who being call'd perhaps to prop a Roof, redress a leaning Wall, or add to some particular Apartment, is not contented with this small Speci-

[133]

men of his Mastership: but pretending to demonstrate the Unserviceableness and Inconvenience of the *old* Fabrick, forms the Design of a *new* Building, and longs to shew his Skill in the principal Parts of Architecture and Mechanicks.

Chap. 1.

[134]

'Tis certain that in matters of Learning and Philosophy, the Practice of *pulling down* is far pleasanter, and affords more Entertainment, than that of *building* and *setting up*. Many have succeeded, to a miracle, in the first, who have miserably fail'd in the latter of these Attempts. We may find a thousand Engineers, who can *sap, undermine*, and *blow up*, with admirable Dexterity, for one single-one, who can *build* a Fort, or lay the Plat-form of a Citadel. And tho Compassion in *real* War may make the ruinous Practice less delightful, 'tis certain that in the *literate* warring-World, the springing of Mines, the blowing up of Towers, Bastions, and Ramparts of Philosophy, with *Systems, Hypotheses, Opinions*, and *Doctrines* into the Air, is a Spectacle of all other, the most naturally rejoicing.

Our Author, we suppose, might have done well to consider this. We have fairly conducted him thro' his *first* and *second* LETTER, and have brought him, as we see here, into his *third* Piece. He has hitherto, methinks, kept up his *sapping* Method, and *unravelling* Humour, with tolerable good Grace. He has given only some few, and very slender *Hints of going further, or attempting to erect any Scheme or Model, which may discover his Pretence to a real *Architect*-Capacity. Even in this his *Third* Piece he carrys with him the same *sceptical* Mein: and what he offers by way of *Project* or *Hypothesis*, is very faint, hardly spoken aloud; but mutter'd to him-

[135]

^{*} Viz. In the Letter of Enthusiasm, which makes Treatise I. See VOL. I. pag. 41, 43, 44, 49. at the end.—And 54. concerning the previous Knowledg.—So again, Treatise II. VOL. I. pag. 81, and 116.—And again, Treatise III. VOL. I. pag. 294, 295, 297. where the INQUIRY is propos'd, and the System and Genealogy of the Affections previously treated; with an Apology (pag. 312.) for the examining Practice, and seeming Pedantry of the Method.—And afterwards the Apology for Treatise IV. in Treatise V. VOL. II. pag. 263, 264. Concerning this Series and Dependency of these joint Treatises, see more particularly below, pag. 189, 190, 191, 284, &c.

self, in a kind of dubious Whisper, or feign'd Soliloquy. What he discovers of *Form* and *Method*, is indeed so accompany'd with the random *Miscellaneous* Air, that it may pass for Raillery, rather than good Earnest. 'Tis in his following *Treatise that he discovers himself openly, as a plain *Dogmatist*, a *Formalist*, and *Man of Method;* with his Hypotheses tack'd to him, and his Opinions so closesticking, as wou'd force one to call to mind the Figure of some precise and strait-lac'd Professor in a University.

What may be justly pleaded in his behalf, when we come in company with him, to *inquire* into such solemn and profound Subjects, seems very doubtful. Mean while, as his Affairs stand hitherto in this his Treatise of *Advice*, I shall be contented to yoke with him, and proceed, in my *miscellaneous* Manner, to give my ADVICE also to Men of Note; whether they are *Authors* or *Politicians*, *Virtuosi* or *Fine-Gentlemen*; comprehending *Him*, the said Author, as one of the Number of the Advis'd, and *My-self* too (if occasion be) after his own example of *Self-Admonition* and *private Address*.

BUT FIRST as to our Author's Dissertation in this †third Treatise, where his Reflections upon Authors in general, and the Rise and Progress of Arts, make the Inlet or Introduction to his Philosophy; we may observe, That it is not without some appearance of Reason that he has advanc'd this Method. It must be acknowledg'd, that tho, in the earliest times, there may have been divine Men of a transcending Genius, who have given Laws both in Religion and Government, to the great Advantage and Improvement of Mankind; yet Philosophy it-self, as a Science and known Profession worthy of that name, cannot with any probability be suppos'd to have risen (as our Author shews) till other Arts had been rais'd, and, in a certain proportion, advanc'd before it. As this was of the greatest Dignity and Weight, so it came last into Form. It was long

[137]

[136]

^{*} Viz. Treatise V. The INQUIRY concerning Virtue, VOL. II.

[†] VOL. I. pag. 236, 7, 8, 9, &c.

clearing it-self from the affected Dress of *Sophists*, or Enthusiastick Air of *Poets*; and appear'd *late* in its genuine, simple, and just Beauty.

Chap. 1.

The Reader perhaps may justly excuse our Author for having *in this place so over-loaded his Margin with those weighty Authoritys and antient Citations, when he knows that there are many grave Professors in Humanity and Letters among the Moderns, who are puzzled in this Search, and write both repugnantly to one another, and to the plain and natural Evidence of the Case. The real Lineage and Succession of Wit, is indeed plainly founded in Nature: as our Author has endeavour'd to make appear both from History and Fact. The Greek Nation, as it is Original to us, in respect to these polite Arts and Sciences, so it was in reality original to itself. For whether the EGYPTIANS, PHENICIANS, THRACIANS, or BARBARIANS of any kind, may have hit fortunately on this or that particular Invention, either in Agriculture, Building, Navigation, or Letters; which-ever may have introduc'd this Rite of Worship, this Title of a Deity, this or that Instrument of Musick, this or that Festival, Game, or Dance, (for on this matter there are high Debates among the Learned) 'tis evident, beyond a doubt, that the Arts and Sciences were form'd in GREECE it-self. 'Twas there that Musick, Poetry, and the rest came to receive some kind of shape, and be distinguish'd into their several Orders and Degrees. Whatever flourish'd, or was rais'd to any degree of Correctness, or real Perfection in the kind, was by means of Greece alone, and in the hand of that sole polite, most civiliz'd, and accomplish'd Nation.

[138]

Nor can this appear strange, when we consider the fortunate Constitution of that People. For the compos'd of different Nations, distinct in Laws and Governments, divided by Seas and Continents, dispers'd in distant Islands; yet being originally of the same Extract, united by one single Language, and animated by that social, publick and *free* Spirit, which notwithstanding the Animosity of their several warring States, induc'd them to erect such

^{*} Viz. VOL. I. pag. 242, &c.

heroick Congresses and Powers as those which constituted the Chap. 1. AMPHICTONIAN Councils, the OLYMPICK, ISTHMIAN, and other Games; they cou'd not but naturally polish and refine each other. 'Twas thus they brought their beautiful and comprehensive Language to a just Standard, leaving only such Variety in the Dialects [139] as render'd their Poetry, in particular, so much the more agreeable. The Standard was in the same proportion carry'd into other Arts. The Secretion was made. The several Species found, and set apart. The Performers and Masters in every kind, honour'd and admir'd. And, last of all, even Criticks themselves acknowledg'd and receiv'd as Masters over all the rest. From Musick, Poetry, Rhetorick, down to the simple Prose of History, thro' all the plastick Arts of Sculpture, Statuary, Painting, Architecture, and the rest; every thing Muse-like, graceful and exquisite, was rewarded with the highest Honours, and carry'd on with the utmost Ardor and Emulation. Thus Greece, tho she exported Arts to other Nations, had properly for her own share no Import of the kind. The utmost which cou'd be nam'd, wou'd amount to no more than raw Materials, of a rude and barbarous form. And thus the Nation was evidently Original in Art; and with them every noble Study and Science was (as the great Master, so often cited by our Author, says of certain kinds of Poetry) *self-form'd, wrought out of Nature, and [140] drawn from the necessary Operation and Course of things, working, as it were, of their own accord, and proper inclination. Now according to this natural Growth of Arts, peculiar to Greece, it wou'd necessarily happen; That at the beginning, when the Force of Language came to be first prov'd; when the admiring World

^{*} αὐτοσχεδιαστική [the art of improvisation]. VOL. I. pag. 244. 'Tis in this sense of the natural Production, and Self-Formation of the Arts, in this Free State of antient Greece, that the same great Master uses this Word a little before, in the same Chapter of his Poeticks, (viz. the 4th) speaking in general of the Poets: κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες, ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν, ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων. [Advancing step by step they produced poetry out of their improvisations.—Arist. Poet. iv. 6.] And presently after, λέξεως δὲ λενομένης, αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὖρε. [When dialogue was introduced, Nature herself found out the appropriate metre.—Ib. iv. 14.]

made their first Judgment, and essay'd their Taste in the Elegancys of this sort; the Lofty, the Sublime, the Astonishing and Amazing wou'd be the most in fashion, and prefer'd. Metaphorical Speech, Multiplicity of Figures and high-sounding Words wou'd naturally prevail. Tho in the Common-wealth it-self, and in the Affairs of Government, Men were us'd originally to plain and direct Speech; yet when Speaking became an Art, and was taught by Sophists, and other pretended Masters, the high-poetick, and the figurative Way began to prevail, even at the Bar, and in the Publick Assemblys: Insomuch that the Grand-Master, in the *above-cited part of his Rhetoricks, where he extols the Tragick Poet Euripides, upbraids the Rhetoricians of his own Age, who retain'd that very bombastick Style, which even Poets, and those too of the tragick kind, had already thrown off, or at least considerably mitigated. But the Taste of Greece was now polishing. A better Judgment was soon form'd, when a DEMOSTHENES was heard, and had found success. The People themselves (as our Author has shewn) came now to reform their COMEDY, and familiar Manner, after TRAGEDY, and the higher Style, had been brought to its perfection under the last hand of an Euripides. And now in all the principal Works of Ingenuity and Art, SIMPLICITY and NATURE began chiefly to be sought: And this was the TASTE which lasted thro' so many Ages, till the Ruin of all things, under a Universal Monarchy.

If the Reader shou'd peradventure be led by his Curiosity to seek some kind of Comparison between this antient *Growth* of TASTE, and that which we have experienc'd in modern days, and within our own Nation; he may look back to the *Speeches* of our Ancestors in Parliament. He will find 'em generally speaking, to have been very short and plain, but coarse, and what we properly call *homespun*; till *Learning* came in vogue, and *Science* was known amongst us. When our Princes and Senators became Scholars, they spoke *scholastically*. And the *pedantick Style* was prevalent, from the first Dawn of Letters, about the Age of the Reformation, till'long after-

* VOL. I. pag. 245. in the Notes.

Chap. 1.

[141

[142]

Chap. I. wards. Witness the best written Discourses, the admir'd Speeches, Orations, or Sermons, thro' several Reigns, down to these latter, which we compute within the present Age. 'Twill undoubtedly be found, That till very late days, the Fashion of speaking, and the Turn of Wit, was after the *figurative* and *florid* Manner. Nothing was so acceptable as the high-sounding Phrase, the far-fetch'd Comparison, the capricious Point, and Play of Words; and nothing so despicable as what was merely of the plain or natural kind. So that it must either be confess'd, that in respect of the preceding Age, we are fallen very low in Taste; or that, if we are in reality improv'd, the *natural* and *simple* Manner which *conceals* and *covers* Art, is the most truly *artful*, and of the genteelest, truest, and best-study'd Taste: as has *above been treated more at large.

NOW, THEREFORE, as to our Author's Philosophy it-self, as it lies conceal'd in †this Treatise, but more profess'd and formal in his †next; we shall proceed gradually according to his own Method: since it becomes not one who has undertaken the part of his airy Assistant and humorous *Paraphrast*, to enter suddenly, without good preparation, into his *dry* Reasonings and *moral* Researches about the *social Passions* and *natural Affections*, of which he is such a punctilious *Examiner*.

Of all human Affections, the noblest and most becoming human Nature, is that of Love to one's Country. This, perhaps, will easily be allow'd by all Men, who have really a Country, and are of the number of those who may be call'd **A PEOPLE, as enjoying the Happiness of a real Constitution and Polity, by which they

[143]

^{*} Page 21. and VOL. I. pag. 257, 258.

[†] Viz. Soliloguy, or Advice to an Author: Treatise III. VOL. I.

[‡] Viz. INQUIRY, &c. Treatise IV. VOL. II.

^{**} A Multitude held together by Force, tho under one and the same Head, is not properly united: Nor does such a Body make *a People*. 'Tis the social Ligue, Confederacy, and mutual Consent, founded in some common Good or Interest, which joins the Members of a Community, and makes a People One. Absolute Power annuls *the Publick*: And where there is no *Publick*, or *Constitution*, there is in reality no *Mother*-Country, or Nation. See VOL. I. *pag.* 105, 6, 7.

Chap. 1.

[144]

are free and independent. There are few such Country-men or Free-men so degenerate, as directly to discountenance or condemn this Passion of Love to their Community and national Brotherhood. The indirect Manner of opposing this Principle, is the most usual. We hear it commonly, as a Complaint, "That there is little of this Love extant in the World." From whence 'tis hastily concluded, "That there is little or nothing of friendly or social Affection inherent in our Nature, or proper to our Species." 'Tis however apparent, That there is scarce a Creature of human Kind, who is not possess'd at least with some inferior degree or meaner sort of this natural Affection to a Country.

*Our own country charms and draws us with a certain sweetness.

'Tis a wretched Aspect of Humanity which we figure to ourselves, when we wou'd endeavour to resolve the very Essence and Foundation of this generous Passion into a Relation to mere Clay and Dust, exclusively of any thing sensible, intelligent, or moral. 'Tis, I must own, on certain †Relations, or respective Proportions, that all natural Affection does in some measure depend. And in this View it cannot, I confess, be deny'd, that we have each of us a certain Relation to the mere Earth it-self, the very Mould or Surface of that *Planet*, in which, with other Animals of various sorts, We (poor Reptiles!) were also bred and nourish'd. But had it happen'd to one of us British-Men to have been born at Sea, cou'd we not therefore properly be call'd British-Men? Cou'd we be allow'd Country-Men of no sort, as having no distinct relation to any certain Soil or Region; no original Neighbourhood but with the watry Inhabitants and Sea-Monsters? Surely, if we were born of lawful Parents, lawfully employ'd, and under the Protection of Law;

[145]

Ovid. Pont. Lib. i. Eleg. iii. ver. 35.

^{*} Nescio quâ Natale Solum dulcedine captos Ducit.——

[†] τὰ καθήκοντα ταῖς οχέσεσι παραμετρεῖται. [The circumstances are measured according to their nature.]

wherever they might be then detain'd, to whatever Colonys sent, Chap. 1. or whither-soever driven by any Accident, or in Expeditions or Adventures in the Publick Service, or that of Mankind, we shou'd still find we had a Home, and Country, ready to lay claim to us. We shou'd be oblig'd still to consider our-selves as Fellow-Citizens, and might be allow'd to love our Country or Nation as honestly and heartily as the most inland Inhabitant or Native of the Soil. Our political and social Capacity wou'd undoubtedly come in view, and be acknowledg'd full as natural and essential in our Species, as the parental and filial kind, which gives rise to what we peculiarly call natural Affection. Or supposing that both our Birth and Parents had been unknown, and that in this respect we were in a manner younger Brothers in Society to the rest of Mankind; yet from our Nurture and Education we shou'd surely espouse some Country or other; and joyfully embracing the Protection of a Magistracy, shou'd of necessity and by force of Nature join our-selves to the general Society of Mankind, and those in particular, with whom we had enter'd into a nearer Communication of Benefits, [146] and closer Sympathy of Affections. It may therefore be esteem'd no better than a mean Subterfuge of narrow Minds, to assign this natural Passion for Society and a Country, to such a Relation as that of a mere Fungus or common Excrescence, to its Parent-Mould, or nursing Dung-hill.

The Relation of *Country-man*, if it be allow'd any thing at all, must imply something *moral* and *social*. The Notion it-self presupposes a naturally *civil* and *political* State of Mankind, and has reference to that particular part of Society, to which we owe our chief Advantages as *Men*, and rational Creatures, such as are **naturally* and *necessarily* united for each other's Happiness and Support, and for the highest of all Happiness and Enjoyments; "The Intercourse of *Minds*, the free Use of our *Reason*, and the Exercise of mutual Love and *Friendship*."

An ingenious Physician among the Moderns, having in view the

^{*} VOL. I. p. 109, &c. and VOL. II. p. 310, &c.

natural Dependency of the *vegetable* and *animal* Kinds on their *common Mother*-Earth, and observing that both the one and the other draw from her their continual Sustenance, (some rooted and fix'd down to their first abodes, others unconfin'd, and wandring from place to place to suck their Nourishment): He accordingly, as I remember, styles this latter animal-Race, *her releas'd Sons; Filios Terrae emancipatos*. Now if this be our only way of reckoning for Mankind, we may call our-selves indeed, *The Sons of* Earth, *at large;* but not of *any particular* Soil, or *District*. The Division of Climates and Regions is fantastick and artificial: much more the Limits of particular Countrys, Citys or Provinces. Our *Natale Solum*, or Mother-Earth, must by this account be the *real* Globe it-self which bears us, and in respect of which we must allow the common *Animals*, and even the *Plants* of all degrees, to claim an equal *Brotherhood* with us, under this common Parent.

According to this Calculation we must of necessity carry our *Relation* as far as to the whole material World or Universe; where alone it can prove compleat. But for the particular District or Tract of Earth, which in a vulgar sense we call *our* COUNTRY, however bounded or geographically divided, we can never, at this rate, frame any accountable *Relation* to it, nor consequently assign any *natural* or *proper Affection* towards it.

If unhappily a Man had been born either at an *Inn*, or in some dirty *Village*; he wou'd hardly, I think, circumscribe himself so narrowly as to accept a Denomination or *Character* from those nearest Appendices, or local Circumstances of his Nativity. So far shou'd one be from making the *Hamlet* or *Parish* to be characteristical in the Case, that hardly wou'd the *Shire* it-self, or *County*, however rich or flourishing, be taken into the honorary Term or Appellation of *one's* Country. "What, then, shall we presume to call *our* Country? Is it England it-self?" "But what of Scotland? Is it therefore Britain?" "But what of *the other Islands*, the Northern Orcades, and the Southern Jersey and Guernsey? What of the *Plantations*, and poor Ireland?"—Behold, here, a very dubious Circumscription!

Chap. 1.

[147]

[148]

But what, after all, if there be a Conquest or Captivity in the case? Chap. 1. a Migration? a national Secession, or Abandonment of our native Seats for some other Soil or Climate? This has happen'd, we know, to our Forefathers. And as great and powerful a People as we have been of late, and have ever shewn our-selves under the influence of free Councils, and a tolerable Ministry; shou'd we relapse again into slavish Principles, or be administer'd long under such Heads as having no Thought of Liberty for themselves, can have much [149] less for Europe or their Neighbours; we may at last feel a War at home, become the Seat of it, and in the end a Conquest. We might then gladly embrace the hard Condition of our Predecessors, and exchange our beloved native Soil for that of some remote and uninhabited part of the World. Now shou'd this possibly be our Fate; shou'd some considerable Colony or Body be form'd afterwards out of our Remains, or meet, as it were by Miracle, in some distant Climate; wou'd there be, for the future, no English-man remaining? No common Bond of Alliance and Friendship, by which we cou'd still call Country-men, as before? How came we, I pray, by our antient name of English-men? Did it not travel with us over Land and Sea? Did we not, indeed, bring it with us heretofore from as

far as the remoter Parts of GERMANY to this Island?

I MUST confess, I have been apt sometimes to be very angry with our Language, for having deny'd us the use of the word Patria, and afforded us no other name to express our *native Community*, than that of *Country*; which already bore *two different Significations, abstracted from Mankind or Society. Reigning words are many times of such force, as to influence us considerably in our Apprehension of things. Whether it be from any such Cause as this, I know not: but certain it is, that in the Idea of a CIVIL *State* or Nation, we *English-men* are apt to mix somewhat more than ordinary gross and earthy. No People who ow'd so much to a Constitution, and so little to a Soil or Climate, were ever known so indifferent towards *one*, and so passionately fond

[150]

^{*} Rus & Regio. In French Campagne & Païs.

of the other. One wou'd imagine from the common Discourse of our Country-men, that the finest Lands near the Euphrates, the Babylonian or Persian Paradises, the rich Plains of Egypt, the Grecian Tempe, the Roman Campania, Lombardy, Provence, the Spanish Andalusia, or the most delicious Tracts in the Eastern or Western Indies, were contemptible Countrys in respect of Old England.

Now by the good leave of these worthy *Patriots of the Soil*, I must take the liberty to say, I think OLD ENGLAND to have been in every respect a very indifferent Country: and that *Late* ENGLAND, of an Age or two old, even since Queen Bess's days, is indeed very much mended for the better. We were, in the beginning of her Grandfather's Reign, under a sort of *Polish* Nobility; and had no other Libertys, than what were in common to us with the then fashionable Monarchys and *Gothick* Lordships of EUROPE. For *Religion*, indeed, we were highly fam'd, above all Nations; by being the most subject to our *Ecclesiasticks* at home, and the best Tributarys and Servants to *the Holy See* abroad.

I must go further yet, and own, that I think Late ENGLAND, since the Revolution, to be better still than Old England, by many degrees; and that, in the main, we make somewhat a better Figure in Europe, than we did a few Reigns before. But however our People may of late have flourish'd, our Name, or Credit have risen; our Trade, and Navigation, our Manufactures, or our Husbandry been improv'd; 'tis certain that our Region, Climate, and Soil, is, in its own nature, still one and the same. And to whatever Politeness we may suppose our-selves already arriv'd; we must confess, that we are the latest barbarous, the last civiliz'd or polish'd People of EUROPE. We must allow that our first Conquest by the ROMANS brought us out of a State hardly equal to the Indian Tribes; and that our last Conquest by the NORMANS brought us only into the capacity of receiving Arts and civil Accomplishments from abroad. They came to us by degrees, from remote distances, at second or third hand; from other Courts, States, Academys, and foreign Nurserys of Wit and Manners.

Notwithstanding this, we have as over-weaning an Opinion of

Chap. 1.

[151]

[152]

our-selves, as if we had a claim to be Original and Earth-born. Chap. 1. As oft as we have chang'd Masters, and mix'd Races with our several successive Conquerors, we still pretend to be as legitimate and genuine Possessors of our Soil, as the antient ATHENIANS accounted themselves to have been of theirs. 'Tis remarkable however in that truly antient, wise, and witty People, That as fine Territorys and noble Countrys as they possess'd, as indisputable Masters and Superiors as they were in all Science, Wit, Politeness, and Manners; they were yet so far from a conceited, selfish, and ridiculous Contempt of others, that they were even, in a contrary Extreme, "Admirers of whatever was in the least degree ingenious or curious in foreign Nations." Their Great Men were constant Travellers. Their Legislators and Philosophers made their Voyages into Egypt, pass'd into Chaldea, and Persia; and fail'd not to visit most of the dispers'd Grecian Governments and Colonys thro' the Islands of the AEGEAN, in ITALY, and on the Coasts of ASIA [153] and Africa. 'Twas mention'd as a Prodigy, in the case of a great Philosopher, tho known to have been always poor; "That he shou'd never have travel'd, nor had ever gone out of Athens for his Improvement." How modest a Reflection in those who were themselves Athenians!

For our part, we neither care that *Foreigners shou'd travel to

* An ill Token of our being thorowly civiliz'd: since in the Judgment of the Polite and Wise, this inhospitable Disposition was ever reckon'd among the principal Marks of Barbarism. So Strabo, from other preceding Authors, κοινὸν μὲν εἶναι τοῖς βαρβάροις πᾶσιν ἔθος τὴν ξενηλασίαν, L.xvii. p. 802. [The expulsion of foreigners is a common measure with all barbarians.]

The $Z\epsilon \acute{v}s$ $\Xi \acute{e}vos$ [Zeus, god of strangers] of the Antients was one of the solemn *Characters* of Divinity: the peculiar *Attribute* of the supreme DEITY, benign to Mankind, and recommending universal Love, mutual Kindness, and Benignity between the remotest and most unlike of human Race. Thus their Divine Poet in Harmony with their Sacred Oracles, which were known frequently to confirm this Doctrine.

ξεῖν', οὔ μοι θέμις ἔστ', οὖδ' εἶ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι, ξεῖνον ἀτιμῆσαι· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἶσιν ἄπαντες ξεῖνοι. — ΟΔΥΣ. ξ. [My guest, I may not slight a stranger, even if he were a meaner man us, nor any of ours shou'd travel into *foreign* Countrys. Our best Policy and Breeding is, it seems, "To look abroad as little as possible; contract our Views within the narrowest Compass; and despise all Knowledg, Learning, or Manners, which are not of *a Home Growth*." For hardly will the *Antients* themselves be regarded by those, who have so resolute a Contempt of what the politest *Moderns* of any Nation, besides their own, may have advanc'd in the way of *Literature*, *Politeness*, or Philosophy.

Chap. 1. [154]

THIS Disposition of our *Country-men*, from whatever Causes it may possibly be deriv'd, is, I fear, a very prepossessing Circumstance against our Author; whose Design is to advance something *new*, or at least something *different* from what is commonly current in Philosophy and Morals. To support this Design of his, he seems intent chiefly on this single Point; "To discover, how we may, to best advantage, form within our-selves what in the polite World is call'd *a Relish*, or *Good* Taste."

[155]

He begins, it's true, as near *home* as possible, and sends us to the narrowest of all Conversations, that of Soliloquy or *Self-discourse*. But this Correspondence, according to his Computa-

than thou art; for from Zeus are all strangers."—Homer, *Odyssey*, xiv, 56, 58.] Again,—

οὐδέ τις ἄμμι βροτῶν ἐπιμίσγεται ἄλλος. ἀλλ' ὅδε τις δύστηνος ἀλώμενος ἐνθάδ' ἱκάνει, τὸν νῦν χρὴ κομέειν· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἄπαντες

[And no other mortals hold intercourse with us. But this is some luckless man who has come hither in his wanderings, and we must tend him well, for from Zeus are all strangers.— *Odyssey*, vi. 205–208.] And again,—

ἀφνειὸς βιότοιο, φίλος δ' ἦν ἀνθρώποισι· πάντας γὰρ φιλέεσκεν ὁδῷ ἔπι οἴκια ναίων. $IAIA\Delta$. ζ. [Rich he was, and beloved among men, for he lived by the roadside and entertained all." — Homer, Iliad, vi. 14, 15.]

See also Odys. lib. iii. ver. 34, &c. and 67, &c. lib. iv. ver. 30, &c. and 60. Such was antient *Heathen* CHARITY, and pious Duty towards the Whole of Mankind; both those of different *Nations*, and different *Worships*. See VOL. II. pag. 165, 166.

tion, is wholly impracticable, without a previous Commerce with Chap. 1. the World: And the larger this Commerce is, the more practicable and improving the other, he thinks, is likely to prove. The Sources of this improving Art of Self-correspondence he derives from the highest Politeness and Elegance of antient Dialogue, and Debate, in matters of Wit, Knowledg, and Ingenuity. And nothing, according to our Author, can so well revive this self-corresponding Practice, as the same Search and Study of the highest Politeness in modern Conversation. For this, we must necessarily be at the pains of going further abroad than the Province we call HOME. And, by this Account, it appears that our Author has little hopes of being either relish'd or comprehended by any other of his Countrymen, than those who delight in the open and free Commerce of the World, and are rejoic'd to gather Views, and receive Light from every Quarter; in order to judg the best of what is perfect, and

It may be proper for us to remark in favour of our Author, that the sort of *Ridicule* or *Raillery*, which is apt to fall upon Philosophers, is of the same kind with that which falls commonly on the Virtuosi, or refin'd *Wits* of the Age. In this latter general Denomination we include the real *fine Gentlemen*, the Lovers of *Art* and *Ingenuity*; such as have seen *the World*, and inform'd themselves of the *Manners* and *Customs* of the several Nations of Europe, search'd into their *Antiquitys*, and *Records*; consider'd their *Police*, *Laws*, and *Constitutions*; observ'd the Situation, Strength, and Ornaments of their *Citys*, their principal *Arts*, Studys, and Amusements; their *Architecture*, *Sculpture*, *Painting*, *Musick*, and their Taste in *Poetry*, *Learning*, *Language*, and *Con-*

according to a just Standard, and true TASTE in every kind.

Hitherto there can lie no *Ridicule*, nor the least Scope for *Satirick Wit* or *Raillery*. But when we push this *Virtuoso*-CHARACTER a little further, and lead our polish'd Gentleman into more nice Researches; when from the view of *Mankind* and their Affairs, our speculative Genius, and minute Examiner of Nature's Works, proceeds with equal or perhaps superior Zeal in the Contemplation

[156]

versation.

of the *Insect*-Life, the Conveniencys, Habitations and OEconomy of a Race of *Shell-Fish*; when he has erected *a Cabinet* in due form, and made it the real Pattern of his Mind, replete with the same Trash and Trumpery of correspondent empty Notions, and chimerical Conceits; he then indeed becomes the Subject of sufficient *Raillery*, and is made the *Jest* of common Conversations.

Chap. 1. [157]

A worse thing than this happens commonly to these *inferior* VIRTUOSI. In seeking so earnestly for *Raritys*, they fall in love with RARITY for Rareness-sake. Now the greatest Raritys in the World are Monsters. So that the Study and Relish of these Gentlemen, thus assiduously imploy'd, becomes at last in reality monstrous: And their whole Delight is found to consist in selecting and contemplating whatever is most monstrous, disagreeing, out of the way, and to the least purpose of any thing in Nature.

In Philosophy, Matters answer exactly to this Virtuoso-Scheme. Let us suppose a Man, who having this Resolution merely, how to employ his Understanding to the best purpose, considers "Who or What he is; Whence he arose, or had his Being; to what End he was design'd; and to what Course of Action he is by his natural Frame and Constitution destin'd:" shou'd he descend on this account into himself, and examine his inward Powers and Facultys; or shou'd he ascend beyond his own immediate Species, City, or Community, to discover and recognize his higher Polity, or Community, (that common and universal-one, of which he is born a Member); nothing, surely, of this kind, cou'd reasonably draw upon him the least Contempt or Mockery. On the contrary, the finest Gentleman must after all be consider'd but as an IDIOT, who talking much of the knowledg of the World and Mankind, has never so much as thought of the Study or Knowledg of himself, or of the Nature and Government of that real Publick and WORLD, from whence he holds his Being.

[158]

*What are we and for what kind of life are we born?

^{*} Quid sumus, & quidnam victuri gignimur?—— Pers. Sat. iii. ver. 67.

"Where are we? Under what Roof? Or on board what Vessel? Chap. 1. Whither bound? On what Business? Under whose Pilotship, Government, or Protection?" are Questions which every sensible Man wou'd naturally ask, if he were on a sudden transported into a new Scene of Life. 'Tis admirable, indeed, to consider, That a Man shou'd have been long come into a World, carry'd his Reason and [159] Sense about with him, and yet have never seriously ask'd himself this single Question, "WHERE am I? or WHAT?" but, on the contrary, shou'd proceed regularly to every other Study and Inquiry, postponing this alone, as the least considerable; or leaving the Examination of it to others, commission'd, as he supposes, to understand and think for him, upon this Head. To be bubbled, or put upon by any sham-Advices in this Affair, is, it seems, of no consequence! We take care to examine accurately, by our own Judgment, the Affairs of other People, and the Concerns of the World which

Here, methinks, the Ridicule turns more against the Philosophy-Haters than the Virtuosi or Philosophers. Whilst Philosophy is taken (as in its prime Sense it ought) for Mastership in Life and Manners, 'tis like to make no ill Figure in the World, whatever Impertinencys may reign, or however extravagant the Times may prove. But let us view Philosophy, like mere Virtuoso-ship, in its usual Career, and we shall find the Ridicule rising full as strongly against the Professors of the higher as the lower kind. Cockleshell abounds with each. Many things exterior, and without our-selves, of no relation to our real Interests or to those of Society and Mankind, are diligently investigated: Nature's remotest Operations, deepest Mysterys, and most difficult Phaenomena discuss'd, and whimsically explain'd; Hypotheses and fantastick Systems erected; a Universe anatomiz'd; and by some *notable Scheme so solv'd and reduc'd, as to appear an easy Knack or Secret to those who have

least belong to us: But what relates more immediately to *our-selves*, and is our chief Self-*Interest*, we charitably leave to *others* to examine for us, and readily take up with the first Comers; on whose

Honesty and good Faith 'tis presum'd we may safely rely.

[160]

^{*} VOL. II. pag. 184, 185.

the Clew. Creation it-self can, upon occasion, be exhibited; Transmutations, Projections, and other Philosophical Arcana, such as in the corporeal World can accomplish all things; whilst in the intellectual, a set Frame of metaphysical Phrases and Distinctions can serve to solve whatever Difficultys may be propounded either in Logicks, Ethicks, or any real Science, of whatever kind.

It appears from hence, that the Defects of Philosophy, and those of *Virtuoso-ship* are of the same nature. Nothing can be more dangerous than a wrong *Choice*, or *Misapplication* in these Affairs. But as ridiculous as these Studys are render'd by their sensless Managers; it appears, however, that each of 'em are, in their nature, essential to the *Character* of a *Fine Gentleman* and *Man of Sense*.

To *philosophize*, in a just Signification, is but to carry *Goodbreeding* a step higher. For the Accomplishment of Breeding is, To learn whatever is *decent* in Company, or *beautiful* in Arts; and the Sum of Philosophy is, To learn what is *just* in Society, and *beautiful* in Nature, and the Order of the World.

'Tis not Wit merely, but a Temper which must form the Wellbred Man. In the same manner, 'tis not a Head merely, but a Heart and Resolution which must compleat the real Philosopher. Both Characters aim at what is excellent, aspire to a just Taste, and carry in view the Model of what is beautiful and becoming. Accordingly, the respective Conduct and distinct Manners of each Party are regulated; The one according to the perfectest Ease, and good Entertainment of Company; the other according to the strictest Interest of Mankind and Society: The one according to a Man's Rank and Quality in his private Nation; the other according to his Rank and Dignity in Nature.'

Whether each of these Offices, of social Parts, are in themselves as *convenient* as *becoming*, is the great Question which must someway be decided. The Well-bred Man has already decided this, in his own Case, and declar'd on the side of what is Handsom: For whatever he practises in this kind,* he accounts no more than what he owes purely to himself; without regard to any further Advan-

Chap. 1.

[161]

[162]

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 129, 130.

[163]

tage. The *Pretender to Philosophy*, who either knows not how to determine this Affair, or if he has determin'd, knows not how to pursue his Point, with Constancy, and Firmness, remains in respect of *Philosophy*, what a Clown or Coxcomb is in respect of *Breeding* and *Behaviour*. Thus, according to our Author, the Taste of Beauty, and the *Relish* of what is decent, just, and amiable, perfects the *Character* of the Gentleman, and the Philosopher. And the Study of such a Taste or *Relish* will, as we suppose, be ever the great Employment and Concern of him, who covets as well to be *wise* and *good*, as *agreeable* and *polite*.

*I care about and I ask what is true and fitting and I am completely occupied in this.'

CHAPTER II

Explanation of a Taste continu'd.—Ridiculers of it.—Their Wit, and Sincerity.—Application of the Taste to Affairs of Government and Politicks.—Imaginary Characters in the State.—Young Nobility, and Gentry.—Pursuit of Beauty.—Preparation for Philosophy.

BY this time, surely, I must have prov'd my-self sufficiently engag'd in the Project and Design of our *Self-discoursing* AUTHOR, whose Defence I have undertaken. His Pretension, as plainly appears in this third Treatise, is to †recommend MORALS on the same foot, with what in a lower sense is call'd *Manners;* and to advance Philosophy (as harsh a Subject as it may appear) on the very Foundation of what is call'd *agreeable* and *polite*. And 'tis in this Method and Management that, as his Interpreter, or Para-

^{*} Quid VERUM atque DECENS, curo, & rogo, & omnis in hoc sum.

Horat. lib. i. Ep. 1. ver. 11.
† VOL. I. pag. 336, &c.

phrast, I have propos'd to imitate and accompany him, as far as my *Miscellaneous* Character will permit.

Chap. 2. [164]

Our joint Endeavour, therefore, must appear this: To shew, *"That nothing which is found charming or delightful in the polite World, nothing which is adopted as Pleasure, or Entertainment, of whatever kind, can any way be accounted for, supported, or establish'd, without the Pre-establishment or Supposition of a certain TASTE." Now a TASTE or Judgment, 'tis suppos'd, can hardly come ready form'd with us into the World. Whatever Principles or Materials of this kind we may possibly bring with us; whatever good Facultys, Senses, or anticipating Sensations, and Imaginations, may be of Nature's Growth, and arise properly, of themselves, without our Art, Promotion, or Assistance; the general Idea which is form'd of all this Management, and the clear Notion we attain of what is preferable and principal in all these Subjects of Choice and Estimation, will not, as I imagine, by any Person, be taken for in-nate. Use, Practice and Culture must precede the Understanding and Wit of such an advanc'd Size and Growth as this. A legitimate and just TASTE can neither be begotten, made, conceiv'd, or produc'd, without the antecedent Labour and Pains of Criticism.

[165]

For this reason we presume not only to defend the Cause of CRITICKS; but to declare open War against those indolent supine *Authors, Performers, Readers, Auditors, Actors,* or *Spectators;* who making their Humour alone the Rule of what is *beautiful* and *agreeable,* and having no account to give of such their Humour or odd Fancy, reject the *criticizing* or *examining Art,* by which alone they are able to discover the *true* Beauty and Worth of every Object.

According to that affected *Ridicule* which these insipid Remarkers pretend to throw upon just Criticks, the Enjoyment of all real Arts or natural Beautys wou'd be intirely lost: Even in Behaviour and Manners, we shou'd at this rate become in time as

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 336, &c.

[166]

Chap. 2. barbarous, as in our Pleasures and Diversions. I wou'd presume it, however, of these *Critick*-Haters, that they are not yet so unciviliz'd, or void of all social Sense, as to maintain, "That the most barbarous Life, or brutish Pleasure, is as desirable as the most polish'd or refin'd."

For my own part, when I have sometimes heard Men of reputed Ability join in with that effeminate plantive Tone of Invective against CRITICKS, I have really thought they had it in their Fancy, to keep down the growing Genius's of the Youth, their Rivals, by turning them aside from that Examination and Search, on which all good Performance as well as good Judgment depends. I have seen many a time a well-bred Man, who had him-self a real good TASTE, give way, with a malicious Complaisance, to the Humour of a Company, where, in favour chiefly of the tender Sex, this soft languishing Contempt of Criticks, and their Labours, has been the Subject set a-foot. "Wretched Creatures! (says one) impertinent Things, these Criticks, as ye call 'em!—As if one cou'dn't know what was agreeable or pretty, without their help.—'Tis fine indeed, that one shou'dn't be allow'd to fansy for one's-self. — Now shou'd a thousand Criticks tell me that Mr. A----'s new Play wan't the wittiest in the World, I wou'dn't mind 'em one bit."

This our real Man of Wit hears patiently; and adds, perhaps of his own, "That he thinks it, truly, somewhat hard, in what relates to People's Diversion and Entertainment, that they shou'd be oblig'd to chuse what pleas'd *others*, and not *themselves*." Soon after this he goes himself to the *Play*, finds one of his effeminate Companions commending or admiring at a wrong place. He turns to the next Person who sits by him, and asks privately, "What he thinks of his Companion's Relish."

Such is the Malice of the World! They who by Pains and Industry have acquir'd a *real* Taste in Arts, rejoice in their Advantage over others, who have either none at all, or such as renders 'em ridiculous. At *an Auction* of Books, or Pictures, you shall hear these Gentlemen persuading every one "*To bid* for what *he fansys*." But, at the same time, they wou'd be soundly mortify'd themselves, if

[167]

by such as they esteem'd good Judges, they shou'd be found to have purchas'd by a wrong Fancy, or ill TASTE. The same Gentleman who commends his Neighbour for ordering his Garden or Apartment, as his Humour leads him, takes care his own shou'd be so order'd as the best Judgments wou'd advise. Being once a Judg himself, or but tolerably knowing in these Affairs, his Aim is not "To change the Being of Things, and bring TRUTH and NATURE to his Humour: but, leaving NATURE and TRUTH just as he found 'em, to accommodate his *Humour* and *Fancy* to *their* STANDARD." Wou'd he do this in a yet higher Case, he might in reality become as wise and great a Man, as he is already a refin'd and polish'd GENTLEMAN. By one of these Tastes he understands how to lay out his Garden, model his House, fansy his Equipage, appoint his Table: By the other he learns of what Value these Amusements are in Life, and of what Importance to a Man's Freedom, Happiness, and Self-enjoyment. For if he wou'd try effectually to acquire the real Science or TASTE of Life; he wou'd certainly discover, "That a RIGHT MIND, and GENEROUS AFFECTION, had more Beauty and Charm, than all other Symmetrys in the World besides": And, "That a Grain of *Honesty* and *native Worth*, was of more value than all the adventitious Ornaments, Estates, or Preferments; for the sake of which some of the better sort so oft turn Knaves; forsaking their Principles, and quitting their Honour and Freedom, for a mean, timorous, shifting State of gaudy Servitude."

[169]

A LITTLE better Taste (were it a *very little*) in the Affair of *Life it-self*, wou'd, if I mistake not, mend the Manners, and secure the Happiness of some of our *noble Countrymen*, who come with high Advantage and a worthy *Character* into the Publick. But ere they have long engag'd in it, their Worth unhappily becomes venal. *Equipages, Titles, Precedencys, Staffs, Ribbons*, and other such glittering *Ware*, are taken in exchange for *inward* Merit, Honour, and a Character.

This they may account perhaps *a shreud Bargain*. But there will be found very untoward Abatements in it, when the matter comes

Chap. 2.

[168]

to be experienc'd. They may have descended in reality from ever Chap. 2. so glorious Ancestors, Patriots, and Sufferers for their Country's Liberty and Welfare: They may have made their Entrance into the World upon this bottom of anticipated Fame and Honour: They may have been advanc'd on this account to Dignitys, which they were thought to have deserv'd. But when induc'd to change their honest Measures, and sacrifice their Cause and Friends to an imaginary private Interest; they will soon find, by Experience, that they have lost the Relish and TASTE of Life; and for insipid wretched Honours, of a deceitful kind, have unhappily exchang'd an amiable and sweet Honour, of a sincere and lasting Relish, and good Savour. They may, after this, act Farces, as they think fit; and hear Qualitys and Virtues assign'd to 'em, under the Titles of Graces, Excellencys, Honours, and the rest of this mock-Praise and mimical [170] Appellation. They may even with serious Looks be told of Honour and Worth, their PRINCIPLE, and their COUNTRY: But they know better within themselves; and have occasion to find, That, after all, the World too knows better; and that their few Friends and Admirers have either a very shallow Wit, or a very profound Hypocrisy.

'Tis not in *one* Party alone that these *Purchases* and *Sales* of Honour are carry'd on. I can represent to my-self a noted Patriot, and reputed *Pillar* of the religious Part of our Constitution, who having by many and long Services, and a steddy Conduct, gain'd the Reputation of thorow Zeal with his own Party, and of Sincerity and Honour with his very Enemys, on a sudden (the time being come that the Fulness of his Reward was set before him) submits complacently to the propos'd Bargain, and sells himself for what he is worth, in a vile detestable Old-Age, to which he has reserv'd the Infamy of betraying both his *Friends* and *Country*.

I can imagine, on the other side, one of a contrary Party; a noted Friend to LIBERTY in *Church* and *State*; an Abhorrer of the slavish Dependency on *Courts*, and of the narrow Principles of *Bigots*. Such a one, after many publick Services of note, I can see wrought upon, by degrees, to seek *Court-Preferment*; and this too under a *Patriot-*Character. But having perhaps try'd this way with less suc-

[171]

cess, he is oblig'd to change his *Character*, and become *a royal Flatterer*, a Courtier *against his Nature*; submitting himself, and suing, in so much the meaner degree, as his inherent Principles are well known at Court, and to his new-adopted Party, to whom he feigns himself *a Proselyte*.

Chap. 2.

The greater the Genius or Character is of such a Person, the greater is his Slavery, and heavier his Load. Better had it been that he had never discover'd such a Zeal for publick Good, or signaliz'd him-self in that Party; which can with least grace make Sacrifices of national Interests to a Crown, or to the private Will, Appetite, or Pleasure of a Prince. For supposing such a Genius as this had been to act his Part of Courtship in some foreign and absolute Court; how much less infamous wou'd his Part have prov'd? How much less slavish, admist a People who were All Slaves? Had he peradventure been one of that forlorn begging Troop of Gentry extant in Denmark, or Sweden, since the time that those Nations lost their Libertys; had he liv'd out of a free Nation, and happily-balanc'd Constitution; had he been either conscious of no Talent in the Affairs of Government, or of no Opportunity to exert any such, to the advantage of Mankind: Where had been the mighty shame, if perhaps he had employ'd some of his Abilitys in flattering like others, and paying the necessary Homage requir'd for Safety's sake, and Self-preservation, in absolute and despotick Governments? The TASTE, perhaps, in strictness, might still be wrong, even in this hard Circumstance: But how inexcusable in a quite contrary one! For let us suppose our Courtier not only an Englishman, but of the Rank and Stem of those old English Patriots, who were wont to curb the Licentiousness of our Court, arraign its Flatterers, and purge away those Poisons from the Ear of Princes; let us suppose him of a competent Fortune and moderate Appetites, without any apparent Luxury or Lavishment in his Manners: What shall we, after this, bring in Excuse, or as an Apology, for such a Choice as his? How shall we explain this preposterous Relish, this odd Preference of Subtlety and Indirectness, to true Wisdom, open Honesty, and Uprightness?

[172]

'Tis easier, I confess, to give account of this ${\it Corruption of TASTE}$

Chap. 2. [173]

in some *noble Youth* of a more sumptuous gay Fancy; supposing him born truly *Great*, and of *honourable Descent*; with a *generous free* MIND, as well as *ample Fortune*. Even these *Circumstances* themselves may be the very Causes perhaps of his being thus ensnar'd. The *Elegance of his Fancy in outward things, may have made him overlook the Worth of *inward Character* and *Proportion:* And the Love of Grandure and Magnificence, wrong turn'd, may have possess'd his Imagination over-strongly with such things as *Frontispieces, Parterres, Equipages, trim Valets in party-colour'd Clothes;* and others *in Gentlemens Apparel.* — Magnanimous Exhibitions of *Honour* and *Generosity!*—"In Town, a Palace and sutable Furniture! In the Country the same; with the addition of such Edifices and Gardens as were unknown to our Ancestors, and are unnatural to such a Climate as Great Britain!"

Mean while the Year runs on; but the Year's Income answers not its Expence. For "Which of these Articles can be retrench'd? Which way take up, after having thus set out?" A *Princely* Fancy has begot all this; and a *Princely* Slavery, and *Court*-Dependence must maintain it.

[174]

The young Gentleman is now led into a Chace, in which he will have slender Capture, tho Toil sufficient. He is him-self taken. Nor will he so easily get out of that Labyrinth, to which he chose to commit his steps, rather than to the more direct and plainer Paths in which he trod before. "Farewel that generous proud Spirit, which was wont to speak only what it approv'd, commend only whom it thought worthy, and act only what it thought right! Favourites must be now observ'd, little Engines of Power attended on, and loathsomly caress'd: an honest Man dreaded, and every free Tongue or Pen abhor'd as dangerous and reproachful." For till our Gentleman is become wholly prostitute and shameless; till he is brought to laugh at publick Virtue, and the very Notion of common Good; till he has openly renounc'd all Principles of Honour and Honesty, he must in good Policy avoid those to whom he lies

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 139.

so much expos'd, and shun that Commerce and Familiarity which was once his chief Delight.

Chap. 2.

Such is the Sacrifice made to a wrong Pride, and ignorant Self-esteem; by one whose inward Character must necessarily, after this manner, become as mean and abject, as his outward Behaviour insolent and intolerable.

[175]

There are another sort of *Suitors to Power*, and *Traffickers* of *inward* Worth *and* Liberty for outward *Gain*, whom one wou'd be naturally drawn to compassionate. They are themselves of a humane, compassionate, and friendly nature, Well-wishers to their Country and Mankind. They cou'd, perhaps, even embrace Poverty contentedly, rather than submit to any thing diminutive either of their *inward Freedom* or *national Liberty*. But what they can bear in their own Persons, they cannot bring themselves to bear in the Persons of such as are to come after them. Here the *best* and *noblest* of Affections are borne down by the Excess of the *next best*, those of *Tenderness for Relations* and *near Friends*.

Such Captives as these wou'd disdain, however, to devote themselves to any Prince or Ministry, whose Ends were wholly tyrannical, and irreconcilable with the true Interest of their Nation. In other cases of a less Degeneracy, they may bow down perhaps in the Temple of RIMMON, support the Weight of their supine LORDS, and prop the Steps and ruining Credit of their corrupt Patrons.'

[176]

This is Drudgery sufficient for such honest Natures; such as by hard Fate alone cou'd have been made dishonest. But as for *Pride* or *Insolence* on the account of their outward Advancement and seeming Elevation; they are so far from any thing resembling it, that one may often observe what is very contrary in these fairer *Characters* of Men. For tho perhaps they were known somewhat *rigid* and *severe* before; you see 'em now grown in reality *submissive* and *obliging*. Tho in Conversation formerly *dogmatical* and *overbearing*, on the Points of State and Government; they are now *the patientest* to hear, the *least forward* to dictate, and the readiest to embrace any entertaining Subject of Discourse, rather than that of the *Publick*, and their own *personal Advancement*.

Chap. 2. Nothing is so near *Virtue* as this Behaviour; and nothing so remote from it, nothing so sure a Token of the most profligate Manners, as the contrary. In a free Government, 'tis so much the Interest of every one *in Place*, who profits by the Publick, to demean himself with *Modesty* and *Submission*; that to appear immediately the more insolent and haughty on such an Advancement, is the mark only of a contemptible Genius, and of a want of 'true Understanding, even in the narrow Sense of *Interest* and *private Good*.

Thus we see, after all, that 'tis not merely what we call *Principle*, but a Taste, which governs Men. They may think for certain "This is *right*, or that *wrong*": They may believe "This *a Crime*, or that *a Sin*; This punishable by *Man*, or that by *God!*" Yet if the *Savor* of things lies cross to Honesty; if the *Fancy* be florid, and the *Appetite* high towards the subaltern Beautys and lower Order of worldly Symmetrys and Proportions; the Conduct will infallibly turn this latter way.

Even *Conscience*, I fear, such as is owing to religious Discipline, will make but a slight Figure, where this Taste is set amiss. Among the Vulgar perhaps it may do wonders. A *Devil* and a *Hell* may prevail, where a *Jail* and *Gallows* are thought insufficient. But such is the Nature of the liberal, polish'd, and refin'd part of Mankind; so far are they from the mere Simplicity of Babes and Sucklings; that, instead of applying the Notion of a future Reward or Punishment to their immediate Behaviour in Society, they are apt, much rather, thro' the whole Course of their Lives, to shew evidently that they look on the pious Narrations to be indeed no better than Childrens Tales, or the Amusement of the mere Vulgar:

*That our ghosts exist and realms below the earth . . . not even children believe, except those who are too young to pay at the baths.

[178]

^{*} Esse aliquos Manes, & subterranea regna, * * * * * * * * * * * * Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum aere lavantur. Juven. Sat. 2. ver. 149.

Something therefore shou'd, methinks, be further thought of, in behalf of our generous Youths, towards the correcting of their Taste, or *Relish* in the Concerns of *Life*. For this at last is what will influence. And in this respect *the Youth* alone are to be regarded. Some hopes there may be still conceiv'd of *These*. The rest are confirm'd and harden'd in their way. A middle-ag'd Knave (however devout or orthodox) is but a common Wonder: An old-one is no Wonder at all: But a young-one is still (thank Heaven!) somewhat extraordinary. And I can never enough admire what was said once by a worthy Man at the first appearance of one of these young able Prostitutes, "That he even trembled at the sight, to find Nature capable of being turn'd so soon: and That he boded greater Calamity to his Country from this single Example of *young* Villany, than from the Practices and Arts of all the *old* Knaves in being."

Chap. 2.

[179]

Let us therefore proceed in this view, addressing our-selves to the grown *Youth* of our polite World. Let the Appeal be to these, whose *Relish* is retrievable, and whose *Taste* may yet be form'd in *Morals*; as it seems to be, already, in *exterior Manners* and *Behaviour*.

THAT there is really A STANDARD of this latter kind, will immediately, and on the first view, be acknowledg'd. The Contest is only, "Which is *right:*—Which the *un-affected* Carriage, and *just* Demeanour: And Which the *affected* and *false.*" Scarce is there anyone, who pretends not to know and to decide What is *well-bred* and *handsom*. There are few so affectedly clownish, as absolutely to disown *Good-breeding*, and renounce the Notion of A BEAUTY in *outward Manners* and *Deportment*. With such as these, wherever they shou'd be found, I must confess, I cou'd scarce be tempted to bestow the least Pains or Labour, towards convincing 'em of a *Beauty* in *inward Sentiments* and *Principles*.

Whoever has any Impression of what we call *Gentility* or *Politeness*, is already so acquainted with the DECORUM and GRACE of things, that he will readily confess a Pleasure and Enjoyment in the very *Survey* and *Contemplation* of this kind. Now if in the way

[180]

Chap. 2. of polite Pleasure, the Study and Love of Beauty be essential; the Study and Love of Symmetry and Order, on which Beauty depends, must also be essential, in the same respect.

'Tis impossible we can advance the least in any *Relish* or *Taste* of outward Symmetry and Order; without acknowledging that the proportionate and regular State is the truly *prosperous* and natural in every Subject. The same Features which make Deformity, create Incommodiousness and Disease. And the same Shapes and Proportions which make Beauty, afford Advantage, by adapting to Activity and Use. Even in the imitative or *designing* Arts, (to which our Author so often refers) the *Truth* or *Beauty* of every Figure or Statue is measur'd from the Perfection of Nature, in her just adapting of every Limb and Proportion to the Activity, Strength, Dexterity, Life and Vigor of the particular Species or Animal *design'd*.

Thus *Beauty* and **Truth* are plainly join'd with the Notion of *Utility* and '*Convenience*, even in the Apprehension of every ingenious Artist, the †*Architect*, the *Statuary*, or the *Painter*. 'Tis the same in *the Physician's* way. Natural *Health* is the just Proportion,

[181]

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 142, &c.

[†] In GRAEČIS Operibus, nemo sub mutulo denticulos constituit, &c. Quod ergo supra Cantherios & Templa in Veritate debet esse collocatum, id in Imaginibus, si infrà constitutum fuerit, mendosam habebit operis rationem. Etiamque ANTIQUI non probaverunt, neque instituerunt, &c. Ita quod non potest in Veritate fieri, id non putaverunt in Imaginibus factum, posse certam rationem habere. Omnia enim certà proprietate, & à veris NATURAE deductis Moribus, traduxerunt in Operum perfectiones: & ea probaverunt quorum explicationes in Disputationibus rationem possunt habere VERITATIS. Itaque ex eis Originibus Symmetrias & Proportiones uniuscujusque generis constitutas reliquerunt. [În Greek buildings no one placed denticules under mutules. . . . What therefore ought in reality to be put above beams and small timbers will, if in imitations it be put below, be faulty in theory: and so the ancients did not approve of this or practise it. . . . Thus they thought that what cannot be done in reality cannot be correct if done in a copy thereof. For they transferred everything to their perfect works with exact accuracy and attention to the true laws of Nature, and approved only those points the explanation of which can, when discussed, show truthfulness. And so from this beginning they left us proportions and canons ready established in every kind.] VITRUVIUS, lib. iv. cap. 2. whose Commentator Philander may be also read on this place. See above, VOL. I. pag. 208, 336, &c. 340, 350, &c. And below, pag. 259, 260.

Truth, and regular Course of things, in a Constitution. 'Tis *the inward Beauty of the* Body. And when the Harmony and just Measures of the rising Pulses, the circulating Humours, and the moving Airs or Spirits are disturb'd or lost, *Deformity* enters, and with it, *Calamity* and *Ruin*.

Shou'd not this, one wou'd imagine, be still the same Case, and hold equally as to *the* MIND? Is there nothing *there* which tends to Disturbance and Dissolution? Is there no natural Tenour, Tone, or Order of the Passions or Affections? No *Beauty*, or *Deformity* in this *moral* kind?' Or allowing that there really is; must it not, of consequence, in the same manner imply *Health* or *Sickliness, Prosperity* or *Disaster?* Will it not be found in this respect, above all, "That what is *BEAU'TIFUL is *harmonious* and *proportionable;* what

* This is the HONESTUM, the PULCHRUM, τὸ καλόν [the Beautiful], on which our Author lays the stress of VIRTUE, and the Merits of this Cause; as well in his other Treatises, as in this of Soliloguy here commented. This Beauty the ROMAN Orator, in his rhetorical way, and in the Majesty of Style, cou'd express no otherwise than as A Mystery.† "HONESTUM igitur id intelligimus, quod tale est, ut, detractà omni utilitate, sine ullis praemiis fructibusve, per seipsum possit jure laudari. Quod quale sit, non tam definitione quâ sum usus intelligi potest (quanquam aliquantum potest) quam COMMUNI omnium JUDICIO, & optimi cujusque studiis, atque factis a qui permulta ob eam unam causam faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est; etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident." [By right therefore I understand what is such that, apart from expediency, without any reward or profit, it can properly be praised on its own account. What sort of thing, that is, may be understood, not so much from the definition I have given (though to some extent it may be so understood) as from the general agreement of all, and from the enthusiasm and acts of the best men; they do many a thing for this one reason, that it is becoming, is proper, is right, even though they see no gain likely to follow.] Our Author, on the other side, having little of the Orator, and less of the Constraint of Formality belonging to some graver Characters, can be more familiar on this occasion: and accordingly descending, without the least scruple, into whatever Style, or Humour; he refuses to make the least Difficulty or *Mystery* of this matter. He pretends, on this head, to claim the Assent not only of Orators, Poets, and the higher Virtuosi, but even of the Beaux themselves, and such as go no farther than the Dancing-Master to seek for *Grace* and *Beauty*. He pretends, we see, to fetch this natural Idea from as familiar Amusements as Dress, Equipage, the Tiring-Room, or Toy-shop. And thus in his proper manner of SOLILOQUY, or Self-Discourse, we may imagine him running on: beginning perhaps with some particular Scheme or

†Cic. de Fin. Bon. & Mal. lib. ii. sect. 14.

Chap. 2.

[182]

[183]

Chap. 2. is harmonious and proportionable, is TRUE; and what is at once both *beautiful* and *true*, is, of consequence, *agreeable* and GOOD?" Where then is this BEAUTY or *Harmony* to be found? How is

fansy'd *Scale* of BEAUTY, which, according to his Philosophy, he strives to erect; by distinguishing, sorting, and dividing into Things *animate*, *in-animate*, and *mixt*: as thus.

In the IN-ANIMATE; beginning from those *regular Figures* and *Symmetrys* with which Children are delighted; and proceeding gradually to the Proportions of *Architecture* and the other *Arts.*—The same in respect of *Sounds* and MUSICK. From beautiful Stones, Rocks, *Minerals*; to *Vegetables*, Woods, aggregate Parts of the World, Seas, Rivers, Mountains, Vales.—The *Globe.*—Celestial Bodys, and their Order. The higher *Architecture* of Nature.—NATURE her-self, consider'd as *inanimate* and *passive*.

In the ANIMATE; from *Animals*, and their several Kinds, Tempers, Sagacitys, to *Men.*—And from single *Persons* of Men, their private *Characters*, Understandings, *Genius's*, Dispositions, Manners; to Publick Societys, *Communitys*, or *Commonwealths*.—From Flocks, Herds, and other natural *Assemblages* or *Groups* of living Creatures, to human Intelligencys and Correspondencys, or whatever is higher in the kind. The Correspondence, Union and Harmony of NATURE her-self, consider'd as *animate* and intelligent.

In the MIXT; as in a *single Person*, (a Body and a Mind) the Union and Harmony of this kind, which constitutes the real *Person*: and the Friendship, Love, or whatever other Affection is form'd on such an Object. A *Houshold*, a *City*, or *Nation*, with certain Lands, Buildings, and other Appendices, or local Ornaments, which jointly form that agreeable Idea of *Home*, *Family*, *Country*.—

"And what of this?" (says an airy Spark, no Friend to Meditation or deep Thought) "What means this *Catalogue*, or *Scale*, as you are pleas'd to call it?" "Only, Sir, to satisfy my-self, That I am not alone, or single in a certain Fancy I have of a thing call'd BEAUTY; That I have almost the whole World for my Companions; and That each of us *Admirers* and earnest *Pursuers of* BEAUTY (such as in a manner we *All* are) if peradventure we take not a certain Sagacity along with us, we must err widely, range extravagantly, and run ever upon a false Scent. We may, in the Sportsman's Phrase, *have many Hares afoot*, but shall stick to no real *Game*, nor be fortunate in *any Capture* which may content us.

"See with what Ardour and Vehemence, the young Man, neglecting his proper Race and Fellow-Creatures, and forgetting what is *decent, handsom*, or *becoming* in human Affairs, pursues these SPECIES in those common Objects of his Affection, a *Horse*, a *Hound*, a *Hawk!*—What doting on these *Beautys!*—What Admiration of the *Kind* it-self! And of the particular *Animal*, what Care, and in a manner Idolatry and Consecration; when the Beast beloved is (as often happens) even set apart from use, and only kept to gaze on, and feed the enamour'd Fancy with highest Delight!—See! in another Youth, not so forgetful of *Human Kind*, but remembring it still in a wrong way! a $\phi\iota\lambda\delta\kappa\alpha\lambda$ os [a lover of the beautiful] of another sort, a CHAEREA. *Quàm elegans formarum Spectator!*—See as to other *Beautys*, where

this Symmetry to be discover'd and apply'd? Is it any other *Art* than that of Philosophy, or *the Study of inward Numbers and' Proportions*, which can exhibit this in Life? If no other; Who, then,

Chap. 2.

there is no Possession, no Enjoyment or Reward, but barely seeing and admiring: as in the Virtuoso-Passion, the Love of Painting, and the Designing Arts of every kind, so often observ'd.—How fares it with our *princely Genius*, our *Grandee* who assembles all these Beautys, and within the Bounds of his sumptuous Palace incloses all these Graces of a thousand kinds?—What Pains! Study! Science!—Behold the Disposition and Order of these finer sorts of Apartments, Gardens, Villas!—The kind of Harmony to the Eye, from the various Shapes and Colours agreeably mixt, and rang'd in Lines, intercrossing without confusion, and fortunately co-incident.— A Parterre, Cypresses, Groves, Wildernesses. - Statues, here and there, of Virtue, Fortitude, Temperance. — Heroes-Busts, Philosophers-Heads; with sutable Mottos and Inscriptions.—Solemn Representations of things deeply natural.—Caves, Grottos, Rocks. - Urns and Obelisks in retir'd places, and dispos'd at proper distances and points of Sight: with all those Symmetrys which silently express a reigning Order, *Peace, Harmony,* and *Beauty!*—But what is there answerable to this, in the MINDS of the Possessors?—What Possession or Propriety is theirs? What Constancy or Security of Enjoyment? What *Peace*, what *Harmony* WITHIN."—

Thus our MONOLOGIST, or self-discoursing Author, in his usual Strain; when incited to the Search of BEAUTY and the DECORUM, by vulgar Admiration, and the universal Acknowledgment of the SPECIES in outward Things, and in the meaner and subordinate Subjects. By this inferior Species, it seems, our strict Inspector disdains to be allur'd: And refusing to be captivated by any thing less than the superior, original, and genuine Kind; he walks at leisure, without Emotion, in deep philosophical Reserve, thro' all these pompous Scenes; passes unconcernedly by those Court-Pageants, the illustrious and much-envy'd Potentates of the Place; overlooks the Rich, the Great, and even the Fair: feeling no other Astonishment than what is accidentally rais'd in him, by the View of these Impostures, and of this specious Snare. For here he observes those Gentlemen chiefly to be caught and fastest held, who are the highest Ridiculers of such Reflections as his own; and who in the very height of this Ridicule prove themselves the impotent Contemners of a SPECIES, which, whether they will or no, they ardently pursue: Some, in a Face, and certain regular Lines, or Features: Others, in a Palace and Apartments: Others, in an Equipage and Dress.—"O EFFEMINACY! EFFEMINACY! Who wou'd imagine this cou'd be the Vice of such as appear no inconsiderable Men?—But Person is a Subject of Flattery which reaches beyond the Bloom of Youth. The experienc'd Senator and aged General, can, in our days, dispense with a Toilet, and take his outward Form into a very extraordinary Adjustment and Regulation.—All Embellishments are affected, besides the true. And thus, led by Example, whilst we run in search of *Elegancy* and *Neatness;* pursuing BEAUTY; and adding, as we imagine, more Lustre, and Value to our own *Person;* we grow, in our real *Character* and truer SELF, deform'd and monstrous, servile and abject; stooping to the lowest Terms of Courtship; and sacrificing all internal Proportion, all intrinsick and real BEAUTY [187]

Chap. 2. can possibly have a Taste of this kind, without being beholden to Philosophy? Who can admire the *outward* Beautys, and not recur instantly to the *inward*, which are the most real and essential, the most naturally affecting, and of the highest Pleasure, as well as Profit and Advantage?'

In so short a compass does that Learning and Knowledge lie, on which *Manners* and *Life* depend. 'Tis *We our-selves* create and form our Taste. If we resolve to have it *just;* 'tis in our power. We may esteem and value, approve and disapprove, as we wou'd wish. For who wou'd not rejoice to be always equal and consonant to himself, and have constantly that Opinion of things which is natural and proportionable? But who dares search Opinion to the bottom, or call in question his *early* and *prepossessing* Taste? Who is so just to himself, as to recal his Fancy from the power of *Fashion* and *Education*, to that of Reason? Cou'd we, however, be thus courageous; we shou'd soon settle in our-selves such an *Opinion* of Good as wou'd secure to us an *invariable*, *agreeable*, and *just* Taste in Life and Manners.

THUS HAVE I endeavour'd to tread in my *Author's* steps, and prepare the Reader for the serious and downright Philosophy, which even in this *last commented Treatise, our Author keeps still as a Mystery, and dares not formally profess. His Pretence has been to *advise Authors*, and polish *Styles*; but his Aim has been to correct *Manners*, and regulate *Lives*. He has affected Soliloquy, as pretending only to censure Himself; but he has taken occasion to bring others into his Company, and make bold with *Personages* and *Characters* of no inferior Rank. He has given scope enough to Raillery and Humour; and has intrench'd very largely on the Province of us *Miscellanarian* Writers. But the Reader is †now about to see

and WORTH, for the sake of Things which carry scarce a Shadow of the Kind." *Supra*, VOL. II. *pag*. 394, &c. and VOL. I. *pag*. 138, &c. and *pag*. 337.

^{*} Viz. Treatise III. (ADVICE to an Author) VOL. I.

[†] Viz. In Treatise IV. (The INQUIRY, &c.) Vol. II.

him in a new aspect, "a formal and profess'd *Philosopher*, a *System*-Writer, a *Dogmatist*, and *Expounder*." — *Habes consitentem reum*.

Chap. 2.

So to his Philosophy I commit him. Tho, according as my Genius and present Disposition will permit, I intend still to accompany him at a distance, keep him in sight, and convoy him, the best I am able, thro' the dangerous Seas he is about to pass.'

[188]

[189]

Chap. 1.

MISCELLANY IV

CHAPTER I

Connexion and Union of the Subject-Treatises.—
PHILOSOPHY in form.—Metaphysicks.—EGO-ity.
Identity.—Moral Footing.—Proof and Discipline
of the Fancys. Settlement of Opinion.—
Anatomy of the Mind.—A Fable.

7E have already, in the beginning of our preceding *Miscel*lany, taken notice of our Author's Plan, and the Connection and Dependency of his *Joint-Tracts, comprehended in two preceding Volumes. We are now, in our Commentator-Capacity, arriv'd at length to his second Volume, to which the three Pieces of his first appear preparatory. That they were really so design'd, the Advertisement to the first Edition of his Soliloguy is a sufficient Proof. He took occasion there, in a line or two, under the Name of his Printer, or (as he otherwise calls him) his Amanuensis, to prepare us for a more elaborate and methodical Piece which was to follow. We have this System now before us. Nor need we wonder, such as it is, that it came so hardly into the World, and that our Author has been deliver'd of it with so much difficulty, and after so long a time. His Amanuensis and he, were not, it seems, heretofore upon such good Terms of Correspondence. Otherwise such an unshapen Foetus, or false Birth, as that of which our Author in his †Title-page complains, had not formerly appear'd abroad. Nor had it ever risen again in its more decent Form, but for the accidental Publication of our Author's First ‡Letter, which, by a neces-

[190]

^{*} Above, pag. 135. Again below, 284, 285, &c.

[†] Viz. To the INQUIRY (Treatise IV.) VOL. II.

[‡] Viz. Letter of Enthusiasm, VOL. I.

sary Train of Consequences, occasion'd the revival of this abortive Piece, and gave usherance to its Companions.

Chap. 1.

It will appear therefore in this *Joint*-Edition of our Author's *Five Treatises*, that the *Three* former are preparatory to the *Fourth*, on which we are now enter'd; and the *Fifth* (with which he concludes) a kind of *Apology* for this reviv'd Treatise concerning *Virtue* and *Religion*.

[191]

As for his Apology (particularly in what relates to reveal'd Religion, and a World to come) I commit the Reader to the disputant Divines, and Gentlemen, whom our Author has introduc'd in that concluding Piece of Dialogue-Writing, or rhapsodical Philosophy. Mean while, we have here no other part left us, than to enter into the dry Philosophy, and rigid Manner of our Author; without any Excursions into various Literature; without help from the Comick or Tragick Muse, or from the Flowers of Poetry or Rhetorick.

Such is our present Pattern, and strict *moral Task;* which our more humorous Reader fore-knowing, may immediately, if he pleases, turn over; skipping (as is usual in many grave Works) a Chapter or two, as he proceeds. We shall, to make amends, endeavour afterwards, in our following Miscellany, to entertain him again with more chearful Fare, and afford him *a Dessert,* to rectify his Palat, and leave his Mouth at last in good relish.

[192]

To the *patient* and *grave* READER, therefore, who in order *to moralize*, can afford to retire into his Closet, as to some religious or devout Exercise, we presume thus to offer a few Reflections, in the support of our Author's profound Inquiry. And accordingly, we are to imagine our Author speaking, as follows.

HOW LITTLE regard soever may be shewn to that *moral Speculation* or INQUIRY, which we call the *Study of our-selves;* it must, in strictness, be yielded, That all Knowledg whatsoever depends upon this *previous-one:* "And that we can in reality be assur'd of nothing, till we are first assur'd of What *we are* Our-selves." For by this alone we can know what *Certainty* and *Assurance* is.

That there is something undoubtedly which thinks, our very

Chap. I. Doubt it-self and scrupulous Thought evinces. But in what Subject that Thought resides, and how that Subject is continu'd one and the same, so as to answer constantly to the suppos'd Train of Thoughts or Reflections which seem to run so harmoniously thro' a long Course of Life, with the same relation still to one single and self-same Person; this is not a Matter so easily or hastily decided, by those who are nice Self-Examiners, or Searchers after Truth and [193] Certainty.

'Twill not, in this respect, be sufficient for us to use the seeming Logick of a famous *Modern, and say "We think: therefore We are." Which is a notably invented Saying, after the Model of that like philosophical Proposition; That "What is, is." — Miraculously argu'd! "If I am; I am." — Nothing more certain! For the Ego or I, being establish'd in the first part of the Proposition, the Ergo, no doubt, must hold it good in the latter. But the Question is, "What constitutes the WE or I?" And, "Whether the I of this instant, be the same with that of any instant preceding, or to come." For we have nothing but Memory to warrant us: and Memory may be false. We may believe we have thought and reflected thus or thus: but we may be mistaken. We may be conscious of that, as Truth; which perhaps was no more than Dream: and we may be conscious of that as a past Dream, which perhaps was never before so much as dreamt of.

This is what *Metaphysicians* mean, when they say, "That *Identity* can be prov'd only by *Consciousness;* but that Consciousness, withal, may be as well false as real, in respect of what is past." So that the same successional *We* or *I* must remain still, on this account, undecided.

To the force of this Reasoning I confess I must so far submit, as to declare that for my own part, I take my Being *upon Trust*. Let others philosophize as they are able: I shall admire their strength, when, upon this Topick, they have refuted what able *Metaphysicians* object, and Pyrrhonists plead in their own behalf.

[194]

^{*} Monsieur Des Cartes.

Mean while, there is no Impediment, Hinderance, or Suspension of *Action*, on account of these wonderfully refin'd *Speculations*. Argument and Debate go on still. Conduct is settled. Rules and Measures are given out, and receiv'd. Nor do we scruple to act as resolutely upon the mere Supposition that *we are*, as if we had effectually prov'd it a thousand times, to the full satisfaction of our *Metaphysical* or *Pyrrhonean* Antagonist.

This to me appears sufficient Ground for a *Moralist*. Nor do I ask more, when I undertake to prove the reality of VIRTUE and MORALS.

If it be certain that I AM; 'tis certain and demonstrable Who and What' *I ought to be*, even on my own account, and for the sake of my own private Happiness and Success. For thus I take the liberty to proceed.

The *Affections*, of which I am conscious, are either GRIEF, or JOY; DESIRE, or AVERSION. For whatever mere *Sensation* I may experience; if it amounts to neither of these, 'tis indifferent, and no way *affects* me.

That which causes *Joy* and *Satisfaction* when present, causes *Grief* and *Disturbance* when absent: And that which causes *Grief* and *Disturbance* when present, does when absent, by the same necessity occasion *Joy* and *Satisfaction*.

Thus Love (which implies *Desire*, with *Hope* of Good) must afford occasion to *Grief* and *Disturbance*, when it acquires not what it earnestly seeks. And HATRED (which implies *Aversion*, and *Fear* of *Ill*) must, in the same manner, occasion *Grief* and *Calamity*, when that which it earnestly shun'd, or wou'd have escap'd, remains present, or is altogether unavoidable.

That which being *present* can never leave the Mind at rest, but must of necessity cause *Aversion*, is its ILL. But that which can be sustain'd without any *necessary Abhorrence*, or *Aversion*, is not its ILL; but remains *indifferent* in its own nature; the ILL being in the Affection only, which wants redress.

In the same manner, that which being *absent*, can never leave the Mind at rest, or without *Disturbance* and *Regret*, is of necessity its

Chap. 1.

[195]

[196]

Chap. I. Good. But that which can be absent, without any present or future Disturbance to the Mind, is not its Good, but remains indifferent in its own nature. From whence it must follow, That the Affection towards it, as suppos'd Good, is an ill Affection, and creative only of Disturbance and Disease. So that the Affections of Love and Hatred, Liking and Dislike, on which the Happiness or Prosperity of the Person so much depends, being influenc'd and govern'd by Opinion; the highest Good or Happiness must depend on right Opinion, and the highest Misery be deriv'd from wrong.

To explain this, I consider, for instance, the Fancy or Imagination I have of *Death*, according as I find this Subject naturally passing in my Mind. To this *Fancy*, perhaps, I find united an Opinion or Apprehension of *Evil* and *Calamity*. Now the more my *Apprehension* of this Evil increases; the greater, I find, my *Disturbance* proves, not only at the approach of the suppos'd Evil, but at the very distant Thought of it. Besides that, the *Thought* it-self will of necessity so much the oftner recur, as the *Aversion* or *Fear* is violent, and increasing.

From this suppos'd Evil I must, however, fly with so much the more earnestness, as the Opinion of the *Evil* increases. Now if the Increase of the *Aversion* can be no Cause of the Decrease or Diminution of the *Evil it-self*, but rather the contrary; then the Increase of the *Aversion* must necessarily prove the Increase of Disappointment and Disturbance. And so on the other hand, the Diminution or Decrease of the Aversion (if this may any way be effected) must of necessity prove the Diminution of inward Disturbance, and the better Establishment of inward Quiet and Satisfaction.

Again, I consider with my-self, That I have the *Imagination of something Beautiful, Great, and Becoming in Things. This

[197]

^{*} Of the necessary Being and Prevalency of some such IMAGINATION or SENSE (natural and common to all Men, irresistible, of original Growth in the Mind, the Guide of our Affections, and the Ground of our Admiration, Contempt, Shame, Honour, Disdain, and other natural and unavoidable Impressions) see VOL. I. pag. 138, 139, 336, 337. VOL. II. pag. 28, 29, 30, 394, 420, 421, 429, 430. And above, p. 30, 31, 2, 3, &c. 182, 3, 4, 5, 6. in the Notes.

Chap. 1.

[198]

Imagination I apply perhaps to such Subjects as Plate, Jewels, Apartments, Coronets, Patents of Honour, Titles, or Precedencys. I must therefore naturally seek these, not as mere Conveniencys, Means, or Helps in Life, (for as such my Passion cou'd not be so excessive towards 'em) but as EXCELLENT in them-selves, necessarily attractive of my Admiration, and directly and immediately causing my Happiness, and giving me Satisfaction. Now if the PASSION rais'd on this Opinion (call it Avarice, Pride, Vanity, or Ambition) be indeed incapable of any real Satisfaction, even under the most successful Course of Fortune; and then too, attended with perpetual Fears of Disappointment and Loss: how can the Mind be other than miserable, when possess'd by it? But if instead of forming thus the Opinion of GOOD; if instead of placing WORTH or EXCELLENCE in these outward Subjects, we place it, where it is truest, in the Affections or Sentiments, in the governing Part and inward Character; we have then the full Enjoyment of it within our power: The Imagination or Opinion remains steddy and irreversible: And the Love, Desire and Appetite is answer'd; without Apprehension of Loss or Disappointment.

Here therefore arises Work and Employment for us *Within:* "To regulate Fancy, and rectify *Opinion, on which all depends." For if our *Loves, Desires, Hatreds* and *Aversions* are left to themselves:

[199]

^{*} ὅτι πάντα ἡ ὑπόληψις, καὶ αὐτὴ ἐπὶ σοί. ἀρον οὖν ὅτε θέλεις τὴν ὑπόληψιν, καὶ ιὅσπερ κάμψαντι τὴν ἄκραν γαλήνη, σταθερὰ πάντα καὶ κόλπος ἀκύμων. [What view you take is everything, and your view is in your power. Remove it then when you choose, and then, as if you had rounded the cape, come calm serenity, a waveless bay.] M. Ant. Lib. xii. 22.

οδόν ἐοτιν ἡ λεκάνη τοῦ ὕδατος, τοιοῦτον ἡ ψυχή. οδον ἡ αὐγὴ ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῷ ὕδατι, τοιοῦτον αἱ φαντασίαι. ὅταν οὖν τὸ ὕδωρ κινηθῃ, δοκεῖ μὲν καὶ ἡ αὐγὴ κινεῖσθαι. οὐ μέντοι κινεῖται καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν σκοτωθῃ τίς, οὐχ αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ συγχέονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐφ' οὖ εἰσί καταστάντος δὲ, καθίσταται κἀκεῖνα. [As is the water-dish, so is the soul; as is the ray which falls on the water, so are the appearances. When then the water is moved the ray too seems to be moved, yet is not. And when, accordingly, a man is giddy, it is not the arts and the virtues which are thrown into confusion, but the spirit to which they belong; and when he is recovered so are they.] Arrian. Lib. iii. cap. 3. See VOL. I. pag. 185, &c. 294, 5, 6, 324, &c. And VOL. II. pag. 437.

Chap. I. we are necessarily expos'd to endless Vexation and Calamity: but if these are found capable of Amendment, or in any measure flexible or variable by *Opinion*; we ought, methinks, to make trial, at least, how far we might by this means acquire Felicity and Content.

Accordingly, if we find it evident, on one hand, that by indulging any wrong Appetite (as either *Debauch, Malice*, or *Revenge*) the Opinion of the *false Good* increases; and the Appetite, which is a *real Ill*, grows so much the stronger: we may be as fully assur'd, on the other hand, that by restraining this Affection, and nourishing a contrary sort in opposition to it; we cannot fail to diminish what is *Ill*, and increase what is properly our *Happiness* and *Good*.'

On this account, a Man may reasonably conclude, "That it becomes him, by working upon his own Mind, to withdraw the Fancy or Opinion of Good or Ill from that to which justly and by necessity it is not join'd; and apply it, with the strongest Resolution, to that with which it naturally agrees." For if the Fancy or Opinion of Good be join'd to what is not durable, nor in my power either to acquire or to retain; the more such an Opinion prevails, the more I must be subject to Disappointment and Distress. But if there be that to which, whenever I apply the Opinion or Fancy of Good, I find the Fancy more consistent, and the Good more durable, solid, and within my Power and Command; then the more such an Opinion prevails in me, the more Satisfaction and Happiness I must experience.

Now, if I join the *Opinion of Good* to the Possessions of the MIND; if it be in *the Affections* themselves that I place my highest Joy, and in those Objects, whatever they are, of *inward* Worth and Beauty, (such as *Honesty, Faith, Integrity, Friendship, Honour*) 'tis evident I can never possibly, in this respect, rejoice amiss, or indulge my-self too far in the Enjoyment. The greater my Indulgence is, the less I have reason to fear either Reverse or Disappointment.'

This, I know, is far contrary in another *Regimen* of Life. The Tutorage of Fancy and Pleasure, and the easy Philosophy of taking that for Good which *pleases me, or which I fansy merely,

[200]

[201]

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 308. VOL. II. pag. 227.

Chap. 1.

will, in time, give me Uneasiness sufficient. 'Tis plain, from what has been debated, That the less *fanciful* I am, in what relates to my Content and Happiness, the more powerful and absolute I must be, in Self-enjoyment, and the Possession of my Good. And since 'tis *Fancy* merely, which gives the force of Good, or power of passing as such, to Things of Chance and outward Dependency; 'tis evident, that the more I take from *Fancy* in this respect, the more I confer upon *my-self*. As I am less led or betray'd by *Fancy* to an Esteem of what depends on *others;* I am the more fix'd in the Esteem of what depends on *myself* alone. And if I have once gain'd the *Taste* of *LIBERTY, I shall easily understand the force of this Reasoning, and know both my *true* SELF and INTEREST.

The Method therefore requir'd in this my inward OEconomy, is, to make those *Fancys* themselves the Objects of my Aversion which justly deserve it; by being the Cause of a wrong Estimation and Measure of *Good* and *Ill*, and consequently the Cause of my Unhappiness and Disturbance.

[202]

Accordingly (as the learned Masters in this Science advise) we are to begin rather †by the *averse*, than by the *prone* and *forward*

ὄρεξιν ἆραί σε δεῖ παντελώς, ἔκκλισιν ἐπὶ μόνα νεταθεῖναι τὰ προαιρετικά. [You must do away with desire altogether, and transfer aversion to those things only which are within the scope of the will.] Arrian. Lib. iii. cap. 22. This subdu'd or moderated Admiration or Zeal in the highest Subjects of Virtue and Divinity, the Philosopher calls σύμμετρον καὶ καθισταμένην τὴν ὄρεξιν [Desire settled and proportioned to its objects.]; the contrary Disposition, τὸ ἄλογον καὶ ὼστικόν. [Unreasonable and pushing.] Lib. ii. cap. 26. The Reason why this over-forward Ardor and Pursuit of high Subjects runs naturally into Enthusiasm and Disorder, is shewn in what succeeds the first of the Passages here cited; viz. τῶν δὲ ἐφ ἡμῖν, ὅσαν ὀρέγεσθαι καλὸν αν, οὐδὲν οὐδέτω σοι πάρεστι. [And of things in our power, such as it would bewell to desire, no one is yet set before you.] And hence the repeated Injunction, ἀπόσχου ποτὲ παντάποσιν ὀρέξεως, ἵνα ποτὲ καὶ εὐλόγως ὀρεχθηςη εἰ δ' εὐλόγως, ὅταν ἔχης τί ἐν σεαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὖ ὀρεχθήση. [Keep away altogether from desire, in order that you may some day have a desire with good reason; and if with good reason, when you have anything good in you, you will desire well.] Lib. iii. cap. 13. To this HORACE, in one of his latest Epistles of the deeply philosophical kind, alludes.

^{*} VOL. II. *pag.* 432. And below, *pag.* 307, &c.

[†] åρον οὖν τὴω ἔκκλισιν ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν οὖκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ μετάθες ἐπὶ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. [Give up then aversion from all things which are not in our power; transfer it to the things contrary to nature which are in our power.] Epictet. Enchirid. cap. vii.

Chap. I. Disposition. We are to work rather by the weaning than the ingaging Passions: since if we give way chiefly to *Inclination*, by loving, applauding and admiring what is *Great* and *Good*, we may possibly, it seems, in some high Objects of that kind, be so amus'd and extasy'd, as to lose our-selves, and miss our proper Mark, for want of a steddy and settled Aim. But being more sure and infallible in what relates to our *Ill*, we shou'd begin, they tell us, by applying our Aversion, on that side, and raising our Indignation against those Meannesses of Opinion and Sentiment, which are the Causes of our Subjection, and Perplexity.

Thus the COVETOUS FANCY, if consider'd as the Cause of Misery, (and consequently detested as a real Ill) must of necessity abate: And the AMBITIOUS FANCY, if oppos'd in the same manner, with Resolution, by better Thought, must resign it-self, and leave the Mind free, and disincumber'd in the pursuit of its better Objects.

Nor is the Case different in the Passion of COWARDICE, or FEAR of DEATH. For if we leave this Passion *to it-self*, (or to certain

Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui, Ultra quam satis est Virtutem si petat ipsam.

Lib. i. Ep. vi. ver. 15.

[The wise man must be called mad, the fair man unfair, if he seek even virtue too keenly.]

And in the beginning of the Epistle:

Nil admirari propè res est una, Numici, Solaq; quae posset facere & servare beatum.

Ibid. ver. 1

[Not to admire is all the art I know,

To make men happy and to keep them so. — Pope's version.]

For tho these first Lines (as many other of Horace's on the Subject of Philosophy) have the Air of the Epicurean Discipline and Lucretian Style; yet by the whole taken together, it appears evidently on what System of antient Philosophy this Epistle was form'd. Nor was this Prohibition of the wondering or admiring Habit, in early Students, peculiar to one kind of Philosophy alone. It was common to many; however the Reason and Account of it might differ, in one Sect from the other. The Pythagoreans sufficiently check'd their Tyro's, by silencing them so long on their first Courtship to Philosophy. And tho Admiration, in the Peripatetick Sense, as above-mention'd, may be justly call'd the inclining Principle or first Motive to PHILOSOPHY; yet this Mistress, when once espous'd, teaches us to admire, after a different manner from what we did before. See above, pag. 37. And VOL. I. pag. 41.

[204]

Chap. 1.

Tutors to manage for us) it may lead us to the most anxious and tormenting State of Life. But if it be oppos'd by sounder Opinion, and a just Estimation of things, it must diminish of course: And the natural Result of such a Practice must be, the Rescue of the Mind from numberless Fears, and Miserys of other kinds.

Thus at last a MIND, by knowing *it-self*, and its own proper Powers and Virtues, becomes *free*, and independent. It sees its Hindrances and Obstructions, and finds they are wholly from *it-self*, and from *Opinions wrong-conceiv'd*. The more it conquers in this respect, (be it in the least particular) the more it is its own *Master*, feels its own *natural* LIBERTY, and congratulates with it-self on its own *Advancement* and *Prosperity*.

Whether some who are call'd *Philosophers* have so apply'd their Meditations, as to understand any thing of this Language, I know not. But well I am assur'd that many an *honest* and *free-hearted Fellow*, among the *vulgar Rank of People*, has naturally some kind of Feeling or Apprehension of this Self-enjoyment; when refusing to act for Lucre or outward Profit, the Thing which from his Soul he abhors, and thinks below him; he goes on, with harder Labour, but more Content, in his direct plain Path. He is secure *within*; free of what the World calls *Policy*, or Design; and sings, according to the old *Ballad*,

[205

My Mind to me a Kingdom is, &c.

Which in Latin we may translate,

*———Et meâ Virtute me involvo, probamque Pauperiem sine dote quaero.

BUT I FORGET, it seems, that I am now speaking in the Person of our *grave* Inquirer. I shou'd consider I have no Right to vary from the Pattern he has set; and that whilst I accompany him in this particular Treatise, I ought not to make the least Escape out

^{*} I wrap myself in my own merits and seek as my bride honest poverty, undowered. Horat. Lib. iii. Od. xxix. ver. 54.

Chap. I. of the high Road of Demonstration, into the diverting Paths of *Poetry*, or *Humour*.

As grave however as MORALS are presum'd *in their own nature*, I look upon it as an essential matter in their Delivery, to take now and then the natural Air of *Pleasantry*. The first MORALS which were ever deliver'd in the World, were in *Parables*, *Tales*, or *Fables*. And the latter and most consummate Distributers of Morals, in the very politest times, were great *Tale-Tellers*, and Retainers to honest AEsop.

After all the regular *Demonstrations* and *Deductions* of our grave Author, I dare say 'twou'd be a high Relief and Satisfaction to his Reader, to hear an *Apologue*, or *Fable*, well told, and with such humour as to need no sententious *Moral* at the end, to make the application.

As an Experiment in this case, let us at this instant imagine our grave *Inquirer* taking pains to shew us, at full length, the unnatural and unhappy Excursions, Rovings, or Expeditions of our ungovern'd Fancys and Opinions over a World of *Riches, Honours*, and other ebbing and flowing Goods. He performs this, we will suppose, with great Sagacity, to the full measure and scope of our Attention. Mean while, as full or satiated as we might find our-selves of serious and solid Demonstration, 'tis odds but we might find Vacancy still sufficient to receive Instruction by another Method. And I dare answer for success, shou'd a merrier *Moralist* of the AEsopaean-*School* present himself; and, hearing of this *Chace* describ'd by our *Philosopher*, beg leave to represent it to the life, by a homely *Cur* or two, of his Master's ordinary breed.'

"Two of this Race" (he wou'd tell us) "having been daintily bred, and in high thoughts of what they call'd *Pleasure* and *good Living*, travel'd once in quest of Game and Raritys, till they came by accident to the Sea-side. They saw there, at a distance from the shore, some floating pieces of a Wreck, which they took a fancy to believe some wonderful rich *Dainty*, richer than *Ambergreese*, or the richest Product of the Ocean. They cou'd prove it, by their Appetite and Longing, to be no less than *Quintessence of the Main, ambrosial Substance*, the *Repast of marine Deitys*, surpassing

[207]

all which *Earth* afforded.—By these rhetorical Arguments, after long Reasoning with one another in this florid Vein, they proceeded from one Extravagance of Fancy to another; till they came at last to this issue. Being unaccustom'd to Swimming, they wou'd not, it seems, in prudence, venture so far out of their Depth as was necessary to reach their imagin'd *Prize:* But being stout Drinkers, they thought with themselves, they might compass to drink all which lay in their way; even *The* SEA it-self; and that by this method they might shortly bring their Goods safe to dry Land. To work therefore they went; and drank till they were both *burst.*"

Chap. 1.

[208]

For my own part, I am fully satisfy'd that there are more *Seadrinkers* than one or two, to be found among the principal Personages of Mankind; and that if these *Dogs* of ours were *silly Curs*, many who pass for *wise* in our own Race are little wiser; and may properly enough be said to have *the Sea to drink*.

'Tis pretty evident that they who live in the highest Sphere of human Affairs, have a very uncertain View of the thing call'd *Happiness* or *Good*. It lies out at Sea, far distant, in the *Offin;* where those Gentlemen ken it but very imperfectly: And the means they employ in order to come up with it, are very wide of the matter, and far short of their propos'd End.—"First a general Acquaintance.—Visits, Levees.—Attendance upon the *Great* and *Little*.—Popularity.—A Place in Parliament.—Then another at Court.—Then Intrigue, Corruption, Prostitution.—Then a higher Place.—Then a *Title*.—Then a Remove.—A *new* MINISTER!—Fractions at Court.—Ship-wreck of *Ministrys*—The *new:* The *old*.—Engage with *one:* piece up with *t'other*.—Bargains; Losses; After-Games; Retrievals."—Is not this, *the Sea to drink?*

_

*But if riches could make you wise, if they could make you less lustful, less easily frightened, of course you would blush to have any one alive more avaricious than you.

^{*} At si Divitiae prudentem reddere possent, Si cupidum timidumque minùs te; nempe ruberes, Viveret in Terris te si quis avarior uno. Horat. Lib. ii. Epist. ii. ver. 155.

Chap. 2. But lest I shou'd be tempted to fall into a manner I have been oblig'd to disclaim in this part of my *Miscellaneous* Performance; I shall here set a Period to this Discourse, and renew my attempt of serious Reflection and grave Thought, by taking up my Clew in a [210] fresh Chapter.'

CHAPTER II

Passage from Terra Incognita to the visible World.—
Mistress-ship of Nature.—Animal-Confederacy, Degrees,
Subordination.—Master-Animal Man. Privilege of his
Birth.—Serious Countenance of the Author.

As heavily as it went with us, in the deep philosophical part of our preceding Chapter; and as necessarily engag'd as we still are to prosecute the same serious Inquiry, and Search, into those dark Sources; 'tis hop'd, That our remaining Philosophy may flow in a more easy Vein; and the second Running be found somewhat clearer than the first. However it be; we may, at least, congratulate with our-selves for having thus briefly pass'd over that Metaphysical part, to which we have paid sufficient deference. Nor shall we scruple to declare our Opinion, "That it is, in a manner, necessary for one who wou'd usefully philosophize, to have a Knowledg in this part of Philosophy, sufficient to satisfy him that there is no Knowledg or Wisdom to be learnt from it." For of this Truth nothing besides Experience and Study will be able fully to convince him.

When we are even past these empty Regions and Shadows of Philosophy; 'twill still perhaps appear an uncomfortable kind of travelling thro' those other *invisible Ideal* Worlds: such as the Study of *Morals*, we see, engages us to visit. Men must acquire a very peculiar and strong Habit of turning their Eye inwards, in order to explore the *interior Regions* and *Recesses* of the MIND, the *hollow Caverns* of deep *Thought*, the private Seats of *Fancy*, and the

[211]

Wastes and Wildernesses, as well as the more fruitful and cultivated Tracts of this obscure Climate.

Chap. 2.

But what can one do? Or how dispense with these *darker* Disquisitions and *Moon-light* Voyages, when we have to deal with a sort of *Moon-blind* WITS, who tho very acute and able in their kind, may be said to renounce *Day-light*, and *extinguish*, in a manner, the bright visible outward World, by allowing us to *know* nothing beside what we can *prove*, by strict and formal *Demonstration?*

'Tis therefore to satisfy such rigid *Inquirers* as these, that we have been necessitated to proceed by the *inward* way; and that in our preceding Chapter we have built only on such foundations as are taken from our very *Perceptions, Fancys, Appearances, Affections,* and *Opinions* themselves, without regard to any thing of *an exterior* WORLD, and even on the supposition that there is *no such World in being*.

Such has been our late dry Task. No wonder if it carrys, indeed, a meagre and raw Appearance. It may be look'd on, *in Philosophy*, as worse than a mere EGYPTIAN *Imposition*. For to make *Brick* without *Straw* or *Stubble*, is perhaps an easier labour, than to prove MORALS without *a World*, and establish *a Conduct of Life* without the Supposition of *any thing living or extant* besides our immediate *Fancy*, and WORLD *of Imagination*.

But having finished this *mysterious* Work, we come now to open *Day*, and *Sunshine*: And, as a Poet perhaps might express himself, we are now ready to quit

The dubious Labyrinths, and Pyrrhonean Cells Of a Cimmerian Darkness.——

We are, henceforward, to trust our Eyes, and take for real the whole Creation, and the fair Forms which lie before us. We are to believe the Anatomy of our own Body, and in proportionable Order, the Shapes, Forms, Habits, and Constitutions of other Animal-Races. Without demurring on the profound modern Hypothesis of animal Insensibility, we are to believe firmly and resolutely, "That other Creatures have their Sense and Feeling, their mere Passions

[212]

[213]

Chap. 2. and *Affections*, as well as our-selves." And in this manner we proceed accordingly, on our Author's Scheme, "To inquire what is truly *natural* to each Creature: And Whether that which is *natural* to each, and is its *Perfection*, be not withal its *Happiness*, or *Good*."

To deny there is any thing properly *natural*, (after the Concessions already made) wou'd be undoubtedly very preposterous and absurd. Nature and the *outward* World being own'd existent, the rest must of necessity follow. The *Anatomy* of Bodys, the *Order* of the Spheres, the *proper Mechanisms* of a thousand kinds, and the infinite *Ends* and sutable *Means* establish'd in the general Constitution and Order of Things; all this being once admitted, and allow'd to pass as certain and unquestionable, 'tis as vain afterwards to except against the Phrase of *natural* and *unnatural*, and question the Propriety of this Speech apply'd to the particular Forms and Beings in the World, as it wou'd be to except against the common Appellations of *Vigour* and *Decay* in Plants, *Health* or *Sickness* in Bodys, *Sobriety* or *Distraction* in Minds, *Prosperity* or *Degeneracy* in any variable part of the known Creation.

We may, perhaps, for Humour sake, or after the known way of disputant Hostility, in the support of any odd Hypothesis, pretend to deny this *natural* and *unnatural* in Things. 'Tis evident, however, that tho our Humour or Taste be, by such Affectation, ever so much deprav'd; we cannot resist our natural *Anticipation

* See what is said above on the word Sensus Communis, in that second Treatise, VOL. I. pag. 103, &c. and pag. 110, 138, 139, 140. And in the same VOL. p. 336, &c. and 352, 353, &c. And in VOL. II. p. 307, 411, 412, &c. concerning the natural Ideas, and the Pre-conceptions or Pre-sensations of this kind; the προλήψεις [anticipations], of which a learned Critick and Master in all Philosophy, modern and antient, takes notice, in his lately publish'd Volume of Socratick Dialogues; where he adds this Reflection, with respect to some Philosophical Notions much in vogue amongst us, of late, here in England. Obiter dumtaxat addemus, Socraticam, quam exposuimus, Doctrinam magno usui esse posse, si probè expendatur, dirimendae inter viros doctos controversiae, ante paucos annos, in Britannia praesertim, exortae, de Ideis Innatis, quas dicerc possis ἐμφύτους ἐννοίως. Quamvis enim nullae sint, si adcurate loquamur, notiones à natura animis nostris infixae; attamen nemo negárit ita esse facultates Animorum nostrorum naturâ adfectas, ut quàm primùm ratione uti incipimus, Verum à Falso, Malum à Bono aliquo modo distinguere incipiamus. Species Veritatis nobis

[214]

in behalf of NATURE; according to whose suppos'd *Standard* we perpetually approve and disapprove, and to whom in all natural Appearances, all moral Actions (whatever we contemplate, what-

Chap. 2. [215]

semper placet; displicet contra Mendacii: Imo & HONESTUM INHONESTO praeferimus; ob Semina nobis indita, quae tum demum in lucem prodeunt, cum ratiocinari possumus, eoque uberiores fructus proferunt, quo melius ratiocinamur, adcuratioreque institutione adjuvamur. [Incidentally let us add, precisely speaking, that the Socratic teaching which we have presented can be of great use, if it should be rightly estimated, to the divisive controversies among learned men having arisen a few years ago chiefly in Britain about innate conceptions which you can call [innate ideas]. For although, if we should speak accurately, there may be no conceptions imprinted on our minds by nature, nevertheless no one would deny that the faculties of our minds have been shaped by nature so that as soon as we start to use reason we begin to distinguish in some fashion truth from falsity, evil from good. The appearance of truth is always pleasing to us; on the other hand that of mendacity is displeasing and certainly we prefer honor to disgrace on account of the seeds planted in us which eventually spring up into the light at a time when we are able to reason; and then when the richer fruits mature by which we reason better, we are guided for public duty and education.] AEsch. Dial. cum Silvis Philol. Jo. Cler. ann. 1711. pag. 176. They seem indeed to be but weak Philosophers, tho able Sophists, and artful Confounders of Words and Notions, who wou'd refute Nature and Common Sense. But NATURE will be able still to shift for her-self, and get the better of those Schemes, which need no other Force against them, than that of HORACE's single Verse:

Dente Lupus, cornu Taurus petit. Unde, nisi INTUS Monstratum?

Lib. ii. Sat. 1. ver. 52.

[The wolf bites, the bull tosses you: how did they learn it, but by instinct?]

An ASS (as an English Author says) never butts with his Ears; tho a Creature born to an arm'd Forehead, exercises his butting Faculty long ere his Horns are come to him. And perhaps if the Philosopher wou'd accordingly examine himself, and consider his natural Passions, he wou'd find there were such belong'd to him as Nature had premeditated in his behalf, and for which she had furnish'd him with Ideas long before any particular Practice or Experience of his own. Nor wou'd he need be scandaliz'd with the Comparison of a Goat, or Boar, or other of HORACE's premeditating Animals, who have more natural Wit, it seems, than our Philosopher; if we may judg of him by his own Hypothesis, which denies the same implanted SENSE and natural Ideas to his own Kind.

Cras donaberis Haedo, Cui Frons turgida Cornibus Primis, & Venerem & Praelia destinat. Lib. iii. Od. 13. ver. 3.

[To-morrow a kid shall be sacrificed to you, a kid whose brow just sprouting with horns promises him a life of love and fighting.]

Chap. 2. ever we have in debate) we inevitably appeal, and pay our constant Homage, with the most apparent Zeal and Passion.

'Tis here, above all other places, that we say with strict Justice,

*You may turn out nature with a pitchfork, yet back she will keep coming.

The airy Gentlemen, who have never had it in their thoughts to study NATURE in their own Species; but being taken with other Loves, have apply'd their Parts and Genius to the same Study in a Horse, a Dog, a Game-Cock, a Hawk, or any other †Animal of that degree; know very well, that to each Species there belongs a several Humour, Temper, and Turn of inward Disposition, as real and peculiar as the Figure and outward Shape, which is with so much Curiosity beheld and admir'd. If there be any thing ever so little amiss or wrong in the inward Frame, the Humour or Temper of the Creature, 'tis readily call'd vicious; and when more than ordinarily wrong, unnatural. The Humours of the Creatures, in order to their redress, are attentively observ'd; sometimes indulg'd and flatter'd; at other times controul'd and check'd with proper Severitys. In short, their Affections, Passions, Appetites, and Antipathys, are as duly regarded as those in Human Kind, under the strictest Discipline of Education. Such is the SENSE of inward Proportion and Regularity of Affections, even in our Noble Youths them-selves; who in this respect are often known expert and able Masters of Education, tho not so susceptible of Discipline and Culture in their own case, after those early Indulgences to which their Greatness has intitled 'em.

As little favourable however as these sportly Gentlemen are pre-

And,

[217]

Verris obliquum meditantis Ictum.

Ib. Od. 22. ver. 7.

[The boar who practises his side-long slash.]

^{*} Naturam expellas Furcâ, tamen usque recurret. Hor. Lib. i. Ep. 10. ver. 24.

[†] VOL. II. pag. 92, 93, &c. and 131, &c. and pag. 307, &c.

sum'd to show themselves towards the Care or Culture of their own Species; as remote as their Contemplations are thought to lie from Nature and Philosophy; they confirm plainly and establish our philosophical Foundation of the natural Ranks, Orders, interior and exterior Proportions of the several distinct Species and Forms of Animal Beings. Ask one of these Gentlemen, unawares, when sollicitously careful and busy'd in the great Concerns of his Stable, or Kennel, "Whether his Hound or Greyhound-Bitch who eats her Puppys, is as *natural* as the other who nurses 'em?" and he will think you frantick. Ask him again, "Whether he' thinks the unnatural Creature who acts thus, or the natural-one who does otherwise, is best in its kind, and enjoys it-self the most?" And he will be inclin'd to think still as strangely of you. Or if perhaps he esteems you worthy of better Information; he will tell you, "That his bestbred Creatures, and of the truest Race, are ever the noblest and most generous in their Natures: That it is this chiefly which makes the difference between the Horse of good Blood, and the errant Jade of a base Breed; between the Game-Cock, and the Dunghil-Craven; between the true Hawk, and the mere Kite or Buzzard: and between the right Mastiff, Hound, or Spaniel, and the very Mungrel." He might, withal, tell you perhaps with a masterly Air in this Brute-Science, "That the timorous, poor-spirited, lazy and gluttonous of his Dogs, were those whom he either suspected to be of a spurious Race, or who had been by some accident spoil'd in their Nursing and Management: for that this was not natural to 'em. That in every Kind, they were still the miserablest Creatures who were thus spoil'd: And that having each of 'em their proper Chace or Business, if they lay resty and out of their Game, chamber'd, and idle, they were the same as if taken out of their Element. That the saddest Curs in the world, were those who took the Kitchin-Chimney and Dripping-pan for their Delight; and that the only happy Dog (were one to be a Dog One's-Self) was he, who in his proper Sport and Exercise, his natural Pursuit and Game, endur'd all Hardships, and had so much delight in Exercise and in the Field, as to forget Home and his Reward."

Chap. 2.

[218]

[219]

Chap. 2.

Thus the *natural* Habits and Affections of the inferior Creatures are known; and their *unnatural* and degenerate part discover'd. Depravity and Corruption is acknowledg'd as real in their *Affections*, as when any thing is mishapen, wrong, or monstrous in their *outward Make*. And notwithstanding much of this inward Depravity is discoverable in the Creatures tam'd by Man, and, for his Service or Pleasure merely, turn'd from their natural Course into a contrary Life and Habit; notwithstanding that, by this means, the Creatures who naturally herd with one another, lose their associating Humour, and they who naturally pair and are constant to each other, lose their kind of conjugal Alliance and Affection; yet when releas'd from human Servitude, and return'd again to their natural *Wilds*, and rural Liberty, they instantly resume their *natural* and regular Habits, such as are conducing to the Increase and Prosperity of their own Species.

[220]

Well it is perhaps for Mankind, that tho there are so many Animals who naturally herd for Company's sake, and mutual Affection, there are so few who for Conveniency, and by Necessity are oblig'd to a strict Union, and kind of confederate State. The Creatures who, according to the OEconomy of their Kind, are oblig'd to make themselves Habitations of Defense against the Seasons and other Incidents; they who in some parts of the Year are depriv'd of all Subsistence, and are therefore necessitated to accumulate in another, and to provide withal for the Safety of their collected Stores, are by their Nature indeed as strictly join'd, and with as proper Affections towards their Publick and Community, as the looser Kind, of a more easy Subsistence and Support, are united in what relates merely to their Offspring, and the Propagation of their Species. Of these thorowly associating and confederate-Animals, there are none I have ever heard of, who in Bulk or Strength exceed the BEAVER. The major part of these political Animals, and Creatures of a joint Stock, are as inconsiderable as the Race of ANTS or BEES. But had Nature assign'd such an OEconomy as this to so puissant an Animal, for instance, as the ELEPHANT, and made him withal as prolifick as those smaller

[221]

Chap. 2.

Creatures commonly are; it might have gone hard perhaps with *Mankind:* And a single Animal, who by his proper Might and Prowess has often decided the Fate of the greatest Battels which have been fought by Human Race, shou'd he have grown up into a Society, with a Genius for Architecture and Mechanicks proportionable to what we observe in those smaller Creatures; we shou'd, with all our invented Machines, have found it hard to dispute with him the Dominion of the Continent.

Were we in a disinterested View, or with somewhat less Selfishness than ordinary, to consider the OEconomys, Parts, Interests, Conditions, and Terms of Life, which *Nature* has distributed and assign'd to the several *Species* of Creatures round us, we shou'd not be apt to think our-selves so hardly dealt with. But Whether our Lot in this respect be just, or equal, is not the Question with us, at present. 'Tis enough that we know "There is certainly *an Assignment* and *Distribution:* That each *OEconomy* or *Part* so distributed, is in it-self uniform, fix'd, and invariable: and That if any thing in the Creature be accidentally impair'd; if any thing in the inward Form, the Disposition, Temper or Affections, be contrary or unsutable to the distinct OEconomy or Part, the Creature is *wretched* and *unnatural*."

[222]

The social or natural Affections, which our Author considers as essential to the Health, *Wholeness*, or Integrity of the particular Creature, are such as contribute to the Welfare and Prosperity of that *Whole* or *Species*, to which he is by Nature join'd. All the Affections of this kind our Author comprehends in that single name of *natural*. But as the Design or End of Nature in each Animal-System, is exhibited chiefly in the Support and Propagation of the particular Species; it happens, of consequence, that those Affections of earliest Alliance and mutual Kindness between the Parent and the Offspring, are known more particularly by the name of *natural Affection. However, since it is evident that all Defect or

^{*} $\sigma \tau o \rho \gamma \dot{\eta}$ [love of parents and children]; for which we have no particular Name in our Language.

[224]

Chap. 2. Depravity of Affection, which counterworks or opposes the original Constitution and OEconomy of the Creature, is *unnatural*; it follows, "That in Creatures who by their particular OEconomy are fitted to *the strictest Society* and Rule of *common Good*, the most *unnatural* of all Affections are those which separate from this [223] Community; and the most *truly natural*, generous and noble, are those which tend towards *Publick* Service, and the Interest of *the* Society *at large*."

This is the main *Problem* which our Author in more *philosophical* Terms demonstrates, *in this Treatise, "That for a Creature whose natural End is Society, to operate as is by Nature appointed him towards the Good of such his Society, or Whole, is in reality to pursue his own natural and proper Good." And "That to operate contrary-wise, or by such Affections as sever from that common Good, or publick Interest, is, in reality, to work towards his own natural and proper Ill." Now if Man, as has been prov'd, be justly rank'd in the number of those Creatures whose OEconomy is according to a joint-Stock and publick-Weal; if it be understood, withal, that the only State of his Affections which answers rightly to this publick-Weal, is the regular, orderly, or virtuous State; it necessarily follows, "That VIRTUE is his natural Good, and VICE his Misery and Ill."

As for that further Consideration, "Whether NATURE has orderly and justly distributed the several *OEconomys* or *Parts;* and Whether the Defects, Failures, or Calamitys of *particular* Systems are to the advantage of all *in general,* and contribute to the Perfection of the *one* common and universal System"; we must refer to our Author's profounder Speculations in this his INQUIRY, and in his following *Philosophick* DIALOGUE. But if what he advances in this respect be real, or at least the most probable by far of any Scheme or Representation which can be made of *the Universal Nature* and *Cause of things;* it will follow, "That since Man has

^{*} Viz. The INQUIRY concerning Virtue, VOL. II.

been so constituted, by means of his rational Part, as to be conscious of this his more immediate Relation to the Universal System, and Principle of Order and Intelligence; he is not only by Nature sociable, within the Limits of his own Species, or Kind; but in a yet more generous and extensive manner. He is not only born to VIRTUE, Friendship, Honesty, and Faith; but to Religion, Piety, Adoration, and *a generous Surrender of his Mind to whatever happens from that Supreme CAUSE, or ORDER of Things, which he acknowledges intirely just, and perfect."

Chap. 2.

[225]

THESE ARE our *Author's* formal and grave Sentiments; which if they were not truly *his*, and sincerely espous'd by him, as the real Result of his best Judgment and Understanding, he wou'd be guilty of a more than common degree of imposture. For, according to his own †Rule, an affected Gravity, and feign'd Seriousness carry'd on, thro' any Subject, in such a manner as to leave no Insight into the Fiction or intended Raillery; is in truth no *Raillery*, or *Wit*, at all; but a gross, immoral, and illiberal way of *Abuse*, foreign to the Character of a *good Writer*, a *Gentleman*, or *Man of* WORTH.

But since we have thus acquitted our-selves of that serious Part, of which our Reader was before-hand well appriz'd; let him now expect us again in our original Miscellaneous Manner and Capacity. 'Tis here, as has been explain'd to him, that *Raillery* and *Humour* are permitted: and Flights, Sallys, and Excursions of every kind are found agreeable and requisite. Without this, there might be less Safety found, perhaps, in *Thinking*. Every light *Reflection* might run us up to the dangerous State of *Meditation*.' And in reality, *profound Thinking* is many times the Cause of *shallow Thought*. To prevent this *contemplative Habit* and *Character*, of which we see so little good effect in the World, we have reason

[226]

^{*} VOL. II. pag. 72, 73, &c.

[†] VOL. I. pag. 63.

Chap. 2. perhaps to be fond of the *diverting* Manner in Writing, and Discourse, especially if the Subject be of *a solemn* kind. There is more need, in this case, to interrupt the long-spun Thred of Reasoning, and bring into the Mind, by *many* different Glances and broken Views, what cannot so easily be introduc'd by *one* steddy Bent, or continu'd Stretch of Sight.

Chap. 1.

MISCELLANY V

CHAPTER I

Ceremonial adjusted, between AUTHOR and READER.—
Affectation of Precedency in the former.—Various Claim to
Inspiration.—Bards; Prophets: Sibylline Scripture.—Written
Oracles; in Verse and Prose.—Common Interest of antient
Letters, and Christianity.—State of Wit, Elegance, and
Correctness.—Poetick Truth.—Preparation for Criticism
on our Author, in his concluding Treatise.

F all the artificial Relations, form'd between Mankind, the most capricious and variable is that of *Author* and *Reader*. Our Author, for his part, has declar'd his Opinion of this, where *he gives his Advice to modern Authors. And tho he supposes that every *Author in Form*, is, in respect of the particular matter he explains, superior in Understanding to his *Reader*; yet he allows not that any Author shou'd assume the upper hand, or pretend to withdraw himself from that necessary Subjection to foreign Judgment and Criticism, which must determine the Place of Honour on the Reader's side.

'Tis evident that an Author's Art and Labour are for his *Reader's* sake alone. 'Tis to his Reader he makes his application, if not openly and avowedly, yet, at least, with implicit Courtship. *Poets* indeed, and especially those of a modern kind, have a peculiar manner of treating this Affair with a high hand. They pretend to set themselves above Mankind. "Their *Pens* are *sacred:* Their Style and Utterance *divine.*" They write, often, as in a Language foreign

* Viz. Treatise III. VOL. I.

[228]

[229]

Chap. I. to human Kind; and wou'd disdain to be reminded of those poor Elements of Speech, their *Alphabet* and *Grammar*.

But here inferior Mortals presume often to intercept their Flight, and remind them of their fallible and human part. Had those first Poets who began this Pretence to *Inspiration*, been taught a manner of communicating their rapturous Thoughts and high Ideas by some other Medium than that of *Style* and *Language*; the Case might have stood otherwise. But the *inspiring* DIVINITY or Muse having, in the Explanation of her-self, submitted her Wit and Sense to the mechanick Rules of *human arbitrary* Composition; she must, in consequence, and by necessity, submit her-self to *human Arbitration*, and *the Judgment* of the *literate World*. And thus the Reader is still superior, and keeps the upper hand.

'Tis indeed no small Absurdity, to assert a Work or Treatise, written in human Language, to be above human Criticism, or Censure. For if the Art of Writing be from the grammatical Rules of human Invention and Determination; if even these Rules are form'd on casual Practice and various Use: there can be no Scripture but what must of necessity be subject to the Reader's narrow Scrutiny and strict Judgment; unless a Language and Grammar, different from any of human Structure, were deliver'd down from Heaven, and miraculously accommodated to human Service and Capacity.'

'Tis no otherwise in the grammatical Art of Characters, and painted Speech, than in the Art of Painting it-self. I have seen, in certain Christian Churches, an antient Piece or two, affirm'd, on the solemn Faith of Priestly Tradition, "to have been Angelically and Divinely wrought, by a supernatural Hand, and sacred Pencil." Had the Piece happen'd to be of a Hand like RAPHAEL's, I cou'd have found nothing certain to oppose to this Tradition. But having observ'd the whole Style and Manner of the pretended heavenly Workmanship to be so indifferent as to vary in many Particulars from the Truth of Art, I presum'd within my-self to beg pardon of the Tradition, and assert confidently, "That if the Pencil had been Heaven-guided, it cou'd never have been so lame in its per-

[230]

formance": It being a mere contradiction to all Divine and Moral Truth, that *a Celestial Hand*, submitting it-self to the Rudiments of *a human Art*, shou'd sin against *the* ART *it-self*, and express *Falshood* and *Error*, instead of *Justness* and *Proportion*.

Chap. 1.

[231]

It may be alledg'd perhaps, "That there are, however, certain AUTHORS in the World, who tho, of themselves, they neither boldly claim the Privilege of Divine Inspiration, nor carry indeed the least resemblance of Perfection in their Style or Composition; yet they subdue the READER, gain the ascendent over his Thought and Judgment, and force from him a certain implicit Veneration and Esteem." To this I can only answer, "That if there be neither Spell nor Inchantment in the Case; this can plainly be no other than mere Enthusiasm"; except, perhaps, where the supreme Powers have given their Sanction to any religious Record, or pious Writ: And in this Case, indeed, it becomes immoral and profane in any one, to deny absolutely, or dispute the sacred Authority of the least Line or Syllable contain'd in it. But shou'd the Record, instead of being single, short and uniform, appear to be multifarious, voluminous, and of the most difficult Interpretation; it wou'd be somewhat hard, if not wholly impracticable in the Magistrate, to suffer this Record to be universally current, and at the same time prevent its being variously apprehended and descanted on, by the several differing Genius's and contrary Judgments of Mankind.

'Tis remarkable, that in the politest of all Nations, the Writings look'd upon as most *sacred*, were those of their great POETS; whose Works indeed were truly *divine*, in respect of *Art*, and *the Perfection of their Frame and Composition*. But there was yet more *Divinity ascrib'd to them, than what is comprehended in this latter Sense. The Notions of vulgar Religion were built on their miraculous Narrations. The wiser and better sort themselves paid a regard to them in this respect; tho they interpreted them indeed more *allegorically*. Even the *Philosophers* who criticiz'd 'em with most Severity,

[232]

^{*} Supra, pag. 153, 154. in the Notes.

[233]

Chap. I. were not their least Admirers; when they *ascrib'd to 'em that divine *Inspiration*, or *sublime* Enthusiasm, of which our Author has largely treated †elsewhere.

It wou'd, indeed, ill become any Pretender to Divine Writing, to publish his Work under a Character of *Divinity;* if, after all his Endeavours, he came short of *a consummate and just Performance*. In this respect the *Cumean* SIBYL was not so indiscreet or frantick, as she might appear, perhaps, by writing her *Prophetick* Warnings and pretended *Inspirations* upon *Joint-Leaves;* which, immediately after their elaborate Superscription, were torn in pieces, and scatter'd by the Wind.'

[‡]You will see an inspired prophetess, who chants destiny at the foot of her rock and entrusts her marks and words to leaves. Whatever lines the maid has written on the leaves, she sorts into order and shuts them within her cave. There they remain unmoved nor shift from their order. Yet when the hinge turns and a breath of wind has stirred them, and the door has disordered the light leaves, never thereafter does she trouble to capture them as they flutter in her cavern or to restore their order or join the leaves. Away men go without advice and hate the Sibyl's home.

'Twas impossible to disprove the DIVINITY of such *Writings*, whilst they cou'd be perus'd only in *Fragments*. Had the Sister-*Priestess* of Delphos, who deliver'd her-self in audible plain *Metre*, been

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 53, 54.

[†] Viz. Letter of Enthusiasm, VOL. I. And above, MISC. II. chap. 1, 2.

^{*} Insanam vatem aspicies; quae rupe sub imâ
Fata canit, foliisque notas & nomina mandat.
Quaecunque in foliis descripsit Carmina Virgo,
Digerit in numerum, atque antro seclusa relinquit.
Illa manent immota locis, neque ab ordine cedunt.
Verum eadem, verso tenuis cum cardine ventus
Impulit, & teneras turbavit janua frondes:
Nunquam deinde cavo volitantia prendere saxo,
Nec revocare situs, aut jungere carmina curat.
Inconsulti abeunt, sedemque odere SIBYLLAE.
Virg. AEn. lib. iii. 444.

found at any time to have transgress'd *the Rule of Verse*, it wou'd have been difficult in those days to father the lame Poetry upon APOLLO himself. But where the Invention of *the Leaves* prevented the reading of a single Line intire; whatever Interpretations might have been made of this *fragil* and *volatil* Scripture, no Imperfection cou'd be charg'd on the *Original* Text it-self.

Chap. 1.

[234]

What those *Volumes may have been, which the disdainful SIBYL or Prophetess committed to the Flames; or what the remainder was, which the *Roman* Prince receiv'd and consecrated; I will not pretend to judg: Tho it has been admitted for Truth by the antient Christian Fathers, That these Writings were so far sacred and divine, as to have prophesy'd of the Birth of our *religious Founder*, and bore testimony to that *holy Writ* which has preserv'd his Memory, and is justly held, in the highest degree, *sacred* among Christians.

The Policy however of *Old* Rome was such, as not absolutely to rest the Authority of their Religion on any *Composition of Literature*. The Sibylline *Volumes* were kept safely lock'd, and inspected only by such as were ordain'd, or deputed for that purpose. And in this Policy the *New* Rome has follow'd their Example; in scrupling to annex the supreme Authority and sacred Character of Infallibility *to* Scripture *it-self*; and in refusing to submit *that Scripture* to *publick* Judgment, or to any Eye or Ear but what they qualify for the Inspection of such sacred Mysterys.

[235]

The *Mahometan* Clergy seem to have a different Policy. They boldly rest the Foundation of their Religion on *a Book:* Such a one as (according to their Pretension) is not only perfect, but *inimitable*. Were a real Man of Letters, and a just Critick permitted to examine this *Scripture* by the known Rules of Art; he wou'd soon

^{*} Libri tres in Sacrarium conditi, Sibyllini appellati. Ad eos quasi ad Oraculum Quindecimviri adeunt, cum Dii immortales publicè consulendi sunt. Aul. Gell. lib. i. c. 19. & Plin. lib. xiii. c. 13. [The three books were placed in a shrine and called the Sibyl's books. The College of Fifteen consults them, like an oracle, whenever the Gods have to be consulted by the state.] But of this first Sibylline Scripture, and of other canoniz'd Books and additional Sacred Writ among the ROMANS; see what DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSEUS cites (from VARRO's Roman Theologicks) in his History, lib. iv. c. 62.

Chap. I. perhaps refute this Plea. But so barbarous is the accompanying Policy and Temper of these *Eastern* Religionists, that they discourage, and in effect extinguish all true Learning, Science, and the politer Arts, in company with the antient Authors and Languages, which they set aside; and by this infallible Method, leave their SACRED WRIT *the sole Standard of literate Performance*. For being *compar'd* to nothing besides it-self, or what is of an inferior kind, it must undoubtedly be thought *incomparable*.

'Twill be yielded, surely, to the Honour of the Christian World, that their Faith (especially that of the Protestant Churches) stands on a more generous Foundation. They not only allow Comparison of Authors, but are content to derive their Proofs of the Validity of their sacred Record and Revelation, even from those Authors call'd Profane; as being well appriz'd, according to the Maxim of *our Divine Master, "That in what we bear witness only to our-selves, our Witness cannot be establish'd as a Truth." So that there being at present no immediate Testimony of Miracle or Sign in behalf of holy Writ; and there being in its own particular Composition or Style nothing miraculous, or self-convincing; if the collateral Testimony of other antient Records, Historians, and foreign Authors, were destroy'd, or wholly lost; there wou'd be less Argument or Plea remaining against that natural Suspicion of those who are call'd Sceptical, "That the holy Records them-selves were no other than the pure Invention or artificial Compilement of an interested Party, in behalf of the richest Corporation and most profitable Monopoly which cou'd be erected in the World."

Thus, in reality, the Interest of our pious Clergy is necessarily join'd with that of *antient Letters*, and *polite Learning*. By *this* they perpetually refute the crafty Arguments of those Objectors. When they abandon *this*; they resign their Cause. When they strike at it; they strike even at the Root and Foundation of our holy *Faith*, and weaken that Pillar on which the whole Fabrick of our *Religion* depends.

It belongs to mere Enthusiasts and Fanaticks to plead the Suffi-

[236]

[237]

^{*} John, chap. v. ver. 31.

ciency of a reiterate translated *Text*, deriv'd to 'em thro' so many Channels, and subjected to so many Variations, of which they are wholly ignorant. Yet wou'd they persuade us, it seems, that from hence alone they can recognize the Divine Spirit, and receive it in themselves, un-subject (as they imagine) to any Rule, and superior to what they themselves often call *the dead Letter*, and *unprofitable Science*. — This, any one may see, is building Castles in the Air, and demolishing them again at pleasure; as the exercise of an aerial *Fancy*, or heated *Imagination*.

But the judicious Divines of the establish'd Christian Churches, have sufficiently condemn'd this Manner. They are far from resting their Religion on the common Aspect, or obvious Form of their vulgar Bible, as it presents it-self in the printed Copy, or modern Version. Neither do they in the Original it-self represent it to us as a very Master-piece of Writing, or as absolutely perfect in the Purity and Justness either of Style, or Composition. They allow the Holy Authors to have written according to their best Facultys, and the Strength of their natural Genius: "A Shepherd like a Shepherd; and a Prince like a Prince: A Man of reading, and advanc'd in Letters, like a Proficient in the kind; and a Man of meaner Capacity and Reading, like one of the ordinary sort, in his own common Idiom, and imperfect manner of Narration."

'Tis the *Substance* only of the Narrative, and the *principal Facts* confirming the Authority of the Revelation, which our Divines think themselves concern'd to prove, according to the best Evidence of which the Matter it-self is capable. And whilst the Sacred Authors themselves allude not only to the *Annals* and *Historys* of the HEATHEN *World*, but even to the *philosophical* Works, the regular **Poems*, the very *Plays* and †*Comedys* of the learned and polite Antients; it must be own'd, that as those antient Writings

[239]

Chap. 1.

[238

^{*} ARATUS, Acts ch. xvii. ver. 28. And EPIMENIDES, Titus ch. i. ver. 12. Even one of their own PROPHETS. For so the holy Apostle deign'd to speak of a Heathen Poet, a Physiologist, and Divine: who prophesy'd of Events, wrought Miracles, and was receiv'd as an inspir'd Writer, and Author of Revelations, in the chief Citys and States of Greece.

[†] Menander, i Cor. ch. xv. ver. 33.

Chap. I. are impair'd, or lost, not only the *Light* and *Clearness* of holy Writ, but even the *Evidence* it-self of its *main Facts*, must in proportion be diminish'd and brought in question. So ill advis'd were *those

* Even in the sixth Century, the fam'd Gregorius Bishop of Rome, who is so highly celebrated for having planted the Christian Religion, by his Missionary Monks, in our English Nation of Heathen Saxons, was so far from being a Cultivater or Supporter of Arts or Letters, that he carry'd on a kind of general Massacre upon every Product of human Wit. His own Words in a Letter to one of the French Bishops, a Man of the highest Consideration and Merit, (as a noted modern Critick, and satirical Genius of that Nation acknowledges) are as follow. Pervenit ad nos quod sine verecundiâ memorare non possumus, fraternitatem tuam GRAMMATICAM quibusdam exponere. Quam rem ita molestè suscepimus, ac sumus vehementiùs aspernati, ut ea quae prius dicta fuerunt, in gemitum & tristitiam verteremus, quia in uno se ore cum Jovis laudibus Christi laudes non capiunt. * * * * * post hoc evidenter ea quae ad nos perlata sunt, falsa esse claruerint, nec vos NUGIS & SECULARIBUS LITERIS studere contigerit, Deo nostro gratias agimus, qui cor vestrum maculari blasphemis nefandorum laudibus non permisit. [A story has reached me which I am ashamed to mention, that your brotherhood teaches certain pupils grammar! This news I received with such grief and rejected with such scorn that I turned what was said before into groans and lamentations; for one mouth cannot hold the praise of Jupiter and of Christ too. . . . So if hereafter the news proves false, and you have not spent your time upon trifles and worldly literature, I return thanks to God, who would not have your hearts stained with the blasphemous praise of the wicked.] Gregorii Opera, Epist. 48. lib. ix. Paris. Ann. 1533. And in his Dedication, or first Preface to his Morals, after some very insipid Rhetorick, and figurative Dialect imploy'd against the Study and Art of Speech, he has another Fling at the Classick Authors and Discipline; betraying his inveterate Hatred to antient Learning, as well as the natural Effect of this Zealot-Passion, in his own Barbarity both of Style and Manners. His words are, Unde & ipsam artem loquendi, quam Magisteria Disciplinae exterioris insinuant, servare despexi. Nam sicut hujus quoque Epistolae tenor enunciat, non Metacismi collisionem fugio: non Barbarismi confusionem devito, situs motusque praepositionum casusque servare contemno: quia indignum vehementer existimo, ut verba coelestis oraculi restringam sub regulis Donati. [So I think scorn of observing even the art of speech, which the wider education is bringing in upon us. For, as the course of this letter shows, I do not avoid the frequent use of M; I do not shun barbarisms; I despise rules about the position or the changing or the cases of prepositions: for I strongly hold it to be unfitting to bind the words of heaven by the rules of Donatus.] That he carry'd this savage Zeal of his so far as to destroy (what in him lay) the whole Body of Learning, with all the Classick Authors then in being, was generally believ'd. And (what was yet more notorious and unnatural in a ROMAN Pontiff) the Destruction of the Statues, Sculptures, and finest Pieces of Antiquity in ROME, was charg'd on him by his Successor in the SEE; as, besides Platina, another Writer of his Life, without the least Apology, confesses. See in the above-cited Edition of St. Gregory's Works, at the beginning,

devout Churchmen heretofore, who in the height of 'Zeal did their utmost to destroy all Footsteps of *Heathen Literature*, and consequently all further use of *Learning* or *Antiquity*.

Chap. 1. [240]

viz. Vita D. Gregorii ex Joan. Laxiardo Coelestino. 'Tis no wonder, therefore, if other Writers have given account of that Sally of the Prelate's Zeal against the Books and Learning of the Antients, for which the Reason alledg'd was very extraordinary; "That the holy Scriptures wou'd be the better relish'd, and receive a considerable Advantage by the Destruction of these Rivals." It seems they had no very high Idea of the holy Scriptures, when they suppos'd them such Losers by a Comparison. However, 'twas thought advisable by other Fathers (who had a like view) to frame new Pieces of Literature, after the Model of these condemn'd Antients. Hence those ridiculous Attempts of new heroick Poems, new Epicks and Dramaticks, new HOMERS, EURIPIDES'S, MENANDERS, which were with so much Pains and so little Effect industriously set afoot by the zealous Priesthood; when Ignorance prevail'd, and the Hierarchal Dominion was so universal. But tho their Power had well nigh compass'd the Destruction of those *great Originals*, they were far from being able to procure any Reception for their puny Imitations. The Mock-Works have lain in their deserv'd Obscurity; as will all other Attempts of that kind, concerning which our Author has already given his Opinion, VOL. I. pag. 356, 357, &c. But as to the ill Policy as well as Barbarity of this Zealot-Enmity against the Works of the Antients, a foreign Protestant Divine, and most learned Defender of Religion, making the best Excuse he can for the Greek-Fathers, and endeavouring to clear them from this general Charge of Havock and Massacre committed upon Science and Erudition, has these words: "Si cela est, voilà encore un nouveau Sujet de mépriser les Patriarches de Constantinople qui n'étoient d'ailleurs rien moins que gens de bien; mais j'ai de la poine à le croire, parce qu'il nous est resté de Poetes infiniment plus sales que ceux qui se sont perdus. Personne ne doute qu'Aristophane ne soit beaucoup plus sale, que n'etoit Menander. Plutarque en est un bon témoin, dans la Comparaison qu'il a faite de ces deux Poetes. Il peuvoit être neanmoins arrivé, que quelques Ecclesiastiques ennemis des Belles Lettres, en eussent usé comme dit Chalcondyle, sans penser qu'en conservant toute l'Antiquité Grecque, ils conserveroient la Langue de leurs Prédecesseurs, & une infinité de Faits qui servoient beaucoup à l'intelligence & à la confirmation de l'Histoire Sacrée, & même de la Religion Chretienne. Ces gens-là devoient au moins nous conserver les Histoires Anciennes des Orientaux, comme des Chaldéens, des Tyriens, & des Egyptiens; mais ils agissoient plus par ignorance & par negligence, que par raison." [If that is (true), behold yet again a new reason to disdain the Patriarchs of Constantinople, who moreover were nothing less than good men; but I have difficulty believing it, because there has survived to us Poets infinitely more bawdy than those who were lost. No one doubts that Aristophanes was not much more dirty than Menander. Plutarch testifies well to this in the comparison he made of the two Poets. It could have happened nonetheless that certain Clerics, foes to Belles-Lettres, could have used them as Chalcondyle says, without thinking that by conserving all of Greek Antiquity they would conserve the language of their Predecessors, and an infinity of facts that would aid greatly in the understanding and confirmation of Sacred HisChap. 1. [241]

[242]

But happily the *Zeal* of this kind is now left as proper only to those despis'd' and ignorant *modern Enthusiasts* we have describ'd. The ROMAN *Church* it-self is so recover'd from this *primitive Fanaticism*, that their Great Men, and even their **Pontiffs*, are found ready to give their helping Hand, and confer their Bounty liberally towards the advancement of all antient and polite Learning. They justly observe, that their very *Traditions* stand in need of some collateral Proof. The Conservation of these other antient and disinterested Authors, they wisely judg essential to the Credibility of those principal Facts, on which the whole *religious History* and *Tradition* depend.

'Twou'd indeed be in vain for us, to bring a Pontius Pilate into our Creed, and recite what happen'd *under him*, in Judea, if we knew not, "Under *whom* he himself govern'd, *whose* Authority he had, or *what* Character he bore, in that remote Country, and amidst a foreign People." In the same manner, 'twou'd be in vain for a Roman *Pontiff* to derive his Title to spiritual Sovereignty from the Seat, Influence, Power, and Donation of the *Roman* Caesars, and their *Successors*; if it appear'd not by any *History*, or *collateral Testimony*, "Who the first Caesars were; and how they came possess'd of that universal Power, and long Residence of Dominion."

MY READER doubtless, by this time, must begin to wonder thro' what Labyrinth of Speculation, and odd Texture of capricious Reflections, I am offering to conduct him. But he will not, I presume, be altogether displeas'd with me, when I give him to understand, that being now come into my last MISCELLANY, and being sensible of the little Courtship I have paid him, compara-

[243]

tory and even of the Christian Religion. Those men at least ought to conserve for us the Ancient Histories of the Orientals, such as the Chaldeans, the Tyrians, and the Egyptians, but they acted more from ignorance and negligence than by reason.] BIBL. CHOIS. Tom. XIV. pag. 131, 132, 133.

^{*} Such a one is the present Prince, CLEMENT XI. an Incourager of all Arts and Sciences.

tively with what is practis'd in that kind by other modern Authors; I am willing, by way of Compensation, to express my *Loyalty* or *Homage* towards him, and shew, by my natural Sentiments, and Principles, "What particular Deference and high Respect I think to be his *Due*."

Chap. 1.

The Issue therefore of this long *Deduction* is, in the first place, with due Compliments, in my Capacity of Author, and in the name of all modest Work-men willingly joining with me in this Representation, to congratulate our English READER on the Establishment of what is so advantageous to himself; I mean, that mutual Relation between him and our-selves, which naturally turns so much to his Advantage, and makes us to be in reality the subservient Party. And in this respect 'tis to be hop'd he will long enjoy his just Superiority and Privilege over his humble Servants, who compose and labour for his sake. The Relation in all likelihood must still continue, and be improv'd. Our common Religion and Christianity, founded on Letters and Scripture, promises thus much. Nor is this Hope likely to fail us, whilst READERS are really allow'd the Liberty to read; that is to say, to examine, construe, and remark with Understanding. Learning and Science must of necessity flourish, whilst the Language of the wisest and most learned of Nations is acknowledg'd to contain the principal and essential part of our holy Revelation. And Criticism, Examinations, Judgments, literate Labours and Inquirys must still be in Repute and Practice; whilst Antient Authors, so necessary to the Support of the Sacred Volumes, are in request, and afford Imployment of such infinite Extent to us Moderns of whatever degree, who are desirous to signalize our-selves by any Atchievement in Letters, and be consider'd as the Investigators of Knowledg and Politeness.

[244]

I may undoubtedly, by virtue of my preceding Argument in behalf of Criticism, be allow'd, without suspicion of Flattery or mere Courtship, to assert the READER's Privilege above the *Author;* and assign to him, as I have done, the upper Hand, and Place of Honour. As to Fact, we know for certain, that the greatest of *Philosophers*, the very Founder of Philosophy it-self, was no *Author*. Nor

Chap. I. did the Divine Author, and Founder of our Religion, condescend to be an Author in this other respect. He who cou'd best have given us the History of his own Life, with the intire Sermons and divine Discourses which he made in publick, was pleas'd to leave it to others, *"To take in hand": As there were many, it seems, long afterwards, who did; and undertook accordingly "to write in order, and as seem'd good to them, for the better Information of particular Persons, what was then believ'd among the Initiated or Catechiz'd, from Tradition, and early Instruction in their Youth; or what had been transmitted, by Report, from such as were the presum'd Auditors, and Eye-witnesses of those things in former time."

Whether those sacred Books ascrib'd to the Divine Legislator of

* So Luke, chap. i. ver. 1, 2, 3, 4. "(1) For as much as MANY have taken in hand to set forth, in order, a Declaration (Exposition or Narrative, διήγησιν) of those things which are most surely believ'd among (or were fulfill'd in, or among) us; (2) Even as they deliver'd them unto us, which from the beginning were Eyewitnesses and Ministers of the Word: (3) It seem'd good to ME also, having had perfect understanding of all things from the very first, (or having look'd back, and search'd accurately into all Matters from the beginning, or highest time, παρηκοκονθηκότι ἄνωθεν πᾶσιν ακριβωs) to write unto *Thee* in order, most excellent Theophilus, (4) That *Thou* mightest know the Certainty (or Validity, sound Discussion, ἀσφάλειαν) of those things wherein THOU hast been instructed (or catechiz'd) $\pi \epsilon \rho \hat{\iota} \hat{\omega} \nu \kappa \alpha \tau \eta \chi \dot{\eta} \theta \eta s$." Whether the words $\pi \epsilon \pi \lambda \eta \rho \phi o \rho \eta \mu \epsilon \nu \omega \nu \epsilon \nu \eta \mu \hat{\nu} \nu$, in the first Verse, shou'd be render'd believ'd among, or fulfill'd in, or among us, may depend on the different reading of the *Original.* For in some Copys, the $\dot{\epsilon}\nu$ next following is left out. However, the exact Interpreters or verbal Translators render it fulfill'd, Vid. Ar. Montan. Edit. Plantin. 1584. In Ver. 4. the word CERTAINTY, ἀσφάλειαν, is interpreted ἀκρίβειαν, Validity, Soundness, good Foundation, from the Sense of the preceding Verse. See the late Edition of our learned Dr. MILL, ex recensione KUSTERI, Rot. 1710. For the word *Catechiz'd*, κατηχήθης, (the last of the fourth Verse) Rob. Constantine has this Explanation of it: "Priscis Theologis apud AEGYPTIOS mos crat, ut Mysteria voce tantùm, veluti per manus, posteris relinquerent. Apud Christianos, qui Baptismatis erant candidati, iis, vivâ voce, tradebantur fidei Christianae Mysieria, sine scriptis: quod Paulus & Lucas κατηχείν vocant. Unde qui docebantur, Catechumeni vocabantur; qui docebant, Catechistae." [Among the Egyptians it was the custom of ancient worship that mysteries were left to future generations with the voice alone, just as if written by hands. Among the Christians who were candidates for baptism, to these with the living voice, the mysteries were being handed down to the Christian believers without written instructions, a practice which Paul and Luke called to instruct. Thus those who were being taught were called the catechumen; those who were teaching, the catechists.]

the Jews, and which treat of his *Death, Burial, and Succession, as well as of his Life and Actions, are strictly to be understood as coming from the immediate Pen of that holy Founder, or rather from some other inspir'd Hand, guided by the same influencing Spirit; I will not presume so much as to examine or enquire. But in general we find, That both as to publick Concerns, in Religion, and in Philosophy, the great and eminent Actors were of a Rank superior to the Writing-Worthys. The great Athenian Legislator, tho noted as a poetical Genius, cannot be esteem'd an Author, for the sake of some few Verses he may occasionally have made. Nor was the great Spartan Founder, a Poet himself, tho Author or Redeemer (if I may so express it) to the greatest and best of Poets; who ow'd in a manner his Form and Being to the accurate Searches and Collections of that great Patron. The Politicians and civil SAGES, who were fitted in all respects for the great Scene of Business, cou'd not, it seems, be well taken out of it, to attend the slender and minute Affairs of Letters, and Scholastick Science.

Chap. 1.

[247]

'Tis true, indeed, that without *a Capacity* for Action, and *a Knowledg* of the World and Mankind, there can be no Author naturally qualify'd to write with Dignity, or execute any noble or great Design. But there are many, who with the highest Capacity for Business, are by their Fortune deny'd the Privilege of that higher Sphere. As there are others, who having once mov'd in it, have been afterwards, by many Impediments and Obstructions, necessitated to retire, and exert their Genius in this lower degree.

'Tis to some Catastrophe of this kind that we owe the noblest *Historians* (even the two *Princes* and *Fathers* of History) as well as the greatest *Philosophical* Writers, the *Founder* of the ACADEMY, and others, who were also noble in respect of their Birth, and fitted for the highest Stations in the Publick; but discourag'd from engaging in it, on account of some Misfortunes, experienc'd either in their own Persons, or that of their near Friends.'

[248]

'Tis to the early Banishment and long Retirement of a heroick

^{*} Deut. ch. xxxiv. ver. 5, 6, 7, &c.

[249]

[250]

Chap. I. Youth out of his native Country, that we owe an original System of Works, the politest, wisest, usefullest, and (to those who can understand the *Divineness* of a just *Simplicity*) the most *amiable, and even the most elevating and exalting of all un-inspir'd and merely human Authors.

To this Fortune we owe some of the greatest of the antient Poets. 'Twas this Chance which produc'd the Muse of an exalted *Grecian* †Lyrick, and of his Follower †Horace; whose Character, tho easy to be gather'd from History, and his own Works, is little observ'd by any of his Commentators: The general Idea, conceiv'd of him, being drawn chiefly from his precarious and low Circumstances at Court, after the forfeiture of his Estate, under the Usurpation and Conquest of an Octavius, and the Ministry of a Maecenas; not from his better Condition, and nobler Employments in earlier days, under the Favour and Friendship of *greater* and better Men, whilst the *Roman* State and Liberty subsisted. For of this Change he himself, as great a Courtier as he seem'd afterwards, gives sufficient **Intimation.'

* τὸν ἥδιστον καὶ χαριέστατον Ξενοφῶντα, [loosely translated by Shaftesbury in the text] as Athenaeus calls him, lib. xi. See VOL. I. pag. 255.

† Et te sonantem plenius aureo,

ALCAEE, plectro dura navis,

Dura fugae mala, dura belli.

Horat. Lib. ii. Od. xiii. ver. 26.

[And thou, Alcaeus, who tellest in a fuller tone on a lyre of gold the hardships of the sea, of exile, and of war.]

‡ ——Age, dic Latinum,

Barbite, carmen.

Lesbio primùm modulate Civi;

Qui ferox bello, &c.

Horat. Lib. i. Od. xxxii. ver. 3.

[Come, my lyre, utter for me a Latin song, though thou wert first tuned by a citizen of Lesbos, etc.]

** Dura sed amovere loco me tempora grato, Civilisque rudem belli tulit aestus in arma, Caesaris Augusti non responsura lacertis. Unde simul primum me dimisere Philippi, Decisis humilem pennis, inopemque paterni Let AUTHORS therefore know them-selves; and tho conscious of Worth, Virtue, and a Genius, such as may justly place them above Flattery or mean Courtship to their READER; yet let them

Chap. 1.

Et laris & fundi, paupertas impulit audax Ut versus sacerem.

Horat. Lib. ii. Epist. ii. ver. 46.

[But the cruel times tore me away from that pleasant spot, and civil strife hurried me, with all my ignorance of war, to take up those arms which were to be no match for the might of Augustus Caesar. As soon as Philippi set me free from arms, humbled, my wings clipped, my father's house and estate lost, the fearlessness of a poor man drove me to write verses.]

———At olim

Quòd mihi pareret Legio Romana Tribuno.

Lib. i. Sat. vi. ver. 47.

[A legion of Roman soldiers obeyed me as its officer.]

Viz. under Brutus. Whence again that natural Boast:

Me primis urbis BELLI placuisse Domique.

Lib. i. Epist. xx. ver. 23.

[I pleased the first men of the city in war and peace.]

And again,

— Cum MAGNIS vixisse invita fatebitur usque Invidia.

Lib. ii. Sat. i. ver. 77.

[Envy shall confess against her will that I have ever lived with the great.]

Where the *vixisse* shews plainly whom he principally meant by his *MAGNI*, his *early* Patrons and Great Men in the State: His Apology and Defense here (as well as in his fourth and sixth Satirs of his first Book, and his 2d Epistle of his second, and elsewhere) being supported still by the open and bold Assertion of his good Education, (equal to the highest Senators, and under the best Masters) his Employments at home and abroad, and his *early* Commerce and Familiarity with *former* Great Men, before these his *new* Friendships, and this *latter* Court-Acquaintance, which was now envy'd him by his Adversarys.

NUNC quia Maecenas, tibi sum convictor: at OLIM

Quòd mihi pareret Legio Romana Tribuno.

[Now they envy me because I live familiarly with thee, Maecenas, but formerly because a legion of Roman soldiers obeyed me as officer.]

The Reproach *now* was with respect to a MAECENAS or AUGUSTUS. 'Twas the same *formerly* with respect to a BRUTUS, and those who were *then* the principal and leading Men. The Complaint or Murmur against him on account of his being an *Upstart* or *Favourite* under a MAECENAS and AUGUSTUS, cou'd not be answer'd, by a *Vixisse*

Chap. I. reflect, that as Authors merely, they are but of the second Rank of Men. And let the Reader withal consider, "That when he unworthily resigns the place of Honour, and surrenders his Taste, or Judgment, to an Author of ever so great a Name, or venerable Antiquity, and not to Reason, and Truth, at whatever hazard; he not only betrays himself, but withal the common Cause of Author and Reader, the Interest of Letters and Knowledg, and the chief Liberty, Privilege, and Prerogative of the rational part of Mankind."

'Tis related in History of the Cappadocians, That being offer'd their *Liberty* by the Romans, and permitted to govern themselves by their own Laws and Constitutions, they were much terrify'd at the Proposal; and as if some sore harm had been intended 'em, humbly made it their Request, "That they might be govern'd by arbitrary Power, and that an absolute Governour might without delay be appointed over 'em at the discretion of the Romans." For such was their Disposition towards mere *Slavery* and *Subjection*; that they dar'd not pretend so much as to *chuse* their own Master. So essential they thought Slavery, and so *divine* a thing *the Right of* Mastership, that they dar'd not be so *free* even as to presume to give themselves that Blessing, which they chose to

relating to the same Persons; any more than his *Placuisse*, join'd with his *BELLI Domique*, cou'd relate to those under whom he never went to War, nor wou'd ever consent to bear any Honours. For so he himself distinguishes (Sat. vi. to MAECENAS)

He was formerly an Actor, and in the Ministry of Affairs: Now only a FRIEND to a Minister: Himself still a private and retir'd Man. That he refus'd Augustus's Offer of the Secretary-ship, is well known. But in these Circumstances, the Politeness as well as Artifice of Horace is admirable; in making Futurity or Posterity to be the speaking Party in both those places, where he suggests his Intimacy and Favour with the Great, that there might, in some measure, be room left (tho in strictness there was scarce any) for an Octavius and a Maecenas to be included. See VOL. I. pag. 269, 270. in the Notes.

_

[—] Quia non ut forsit honorem Jure mihi invideat quivis, ita te quoque amicum.

ver. 49.

[[]The two reasons are unlike because, though perhaps a man might fairly grudge me my commission, yet he cannot fairly grudge me your friendship too.]

leave rather to *Providence*, *Fortune*, or a Conqueror, to bestow upon them. They dar'd not *make* a King; but wou'd rather *take* one from their powerful Neighbours. Had they been necessitated to come to an *Election*, the Horror of such a Use of Liberty in Government, wou'd perhaps have determin'd 'em to chuse *blindfold*, or leave it to the Decision of the commonest *Lot*, Cast of Dye, *Cross* or *Pile*, or whatever it were which might best enable them to clear themselves of the heinous Charge of using the least Foresight, Choice, or Prudence in such an Affair.

Chap. 1.

[252]

I shou'd think it a great Misfortune, were my Reader of the number of those, who in a kind of *Cappadocian* Spirit, cou'd easily be terrify'd with the Proposal of giving him his *Liberty*, and making him his own Judg. My Endeavour, I must confess, has been to shew him his just Prerogative in this respect, and to give him the sharpest Eye over his *Author*, invite him to criticize honestly, without favour or affection, and with the utmost Bent of his Parts and Judgment. On this account it may be objected to me, perhaps, "That I am not a little vain and presumptuous, in my own as well as in my *Author's* behalf, who can thus, as it were, challenge my *Reader* to a Trial of his keenest Wit."

[محم]

But to this I answer, That shou'd I have the good fortune to raise the masterly Spirit of *just* Criticism in my *Readers*, and exalt them ever so little above the lazy, timorous, over-modest, or resign'd State, in which the generality of them remain; tho by this very Spirit, I *my-self* might possibly meet my Doom: I shou'd however abundantly congratulate with my-self on these my low Flights, be proud of having plum'd the Arrows of better *Wits*, and furnish'd Artillery, or Ammunition of any kind, to those Powers, to which I *my-self* had fall'n a Victim.

*I will play the part of a whetstone.

I cou'd reconcile my Ambition in this respect to what I call my Loyalty to the READER; and say of his Elevation in Criticism and

^{* ——}Fungar vice Cotis.—— Horat. de Arte Poet. ver. 304.

[254]

[255]

Chap. I. Judgment, what a *Roman* Princess said of her Son's Advancement to Empire, *"Let him kill me, so long as he comes to the throne."

Had I been a *Spanish* Cervantes, and with success equal to that comick Author, had destroy'd the reigning Taste of *Gothick* or *Moorish* Chivalry, I cou'd afterwards contentedly have seen my *Burlesque*-Work it-self despis'd, and set aside; when it had wrought its intended effect, and destroy'd those *Giants* and *Monsters* of the Brain, against which it was originally design'd. Without regard, therefore, to the prevailing *Relish* or *Taste* which, in my own Person, I may unhappily experience, when these my Miscellaneous Works are leisurely examin'd; I shall proceed still in my Endeavour to refine my *Reader's* Palate; *whetting* and *sharpening* it, the best I can, for Use, and Practice, in the lower Subjects: that by this Exercise it may acquire the greater Keenness, and be of so much the better effect in Subjects of a higher kind, which relate to his chief Happiness, his *Liberty* and *Manhood*.

SUPPOSING me therefore a mere *comick* Humourist, in respect of those inferior Subjects, which after the manner of my familiar *Prose-Satir* I presume to criticize; May not I be allow'd to ask, "Whether there remains not still among us noble Britons, something of that original *Barbarous* and *Gothick* Relish, not wholly purg'd away; when, even at this hour, *Romances* and *Gallantrys* of like sort, together with *Works* as monstrous of other kinds, are current, and in vogue, even with the People who constitute our reputed *polite World?*" Need I on this account refer again to our 'Author, where he treats in general of *the Style* and *Manner* of our *modern Authors*, from the *Divine* to the *Comedian?* What Person is there of the least Judgment or Understanding, who cannot easily, and without the help of *a Divine*, or rigid *Moralist*, observe the lame Condition of our *English* Stage; which nevertheless is found the Rendevouz and chief Entertainment of our best Company,

* "Occidat, dum imperet." Tacit. Annal. lib. xiv. cap. 9.

[†] Viz. In his Advice to Authors, Treatise III. VOL. I.

and from whence in all probability our Youth will continue to draw their Notion of *Manners*, and their Taste of *Life*, more directly and naturally, than from the *Rehearsals* and *Declamations* of a *graver* THEATER?

Chap. 1.

Let those whose business it is, advance, as they best can, the Benefit of that *sacred Oratory*, which we have lately seen and are still like to see employ'd to various purposes, and further designs than that of instructing us in Religion or Manners. Let 'em in that high *Scene* endeavour to refine our Taste and Judgment in sacred Matters. 'Tis the good *Critick's* Task to amend our *common* Stage; nor ought this *Dramatick* Performance to be decry'd or sentenc'd by those Criticks of a higher Sphere. The Practice and *Art* is honest, in it-self. Our *Foundations* are well laid. And in the main, our *English* Stage (as *has been remark'd) is capable of the highest Improvement; as well from the present Genius of our Nation, as from the rich Oar of our early Poets in this kind. But *Faults* are easier imitated than Beautys.

[256]

We find, indeed, our Theater become of late the Subject of a growing Criticism. We hear it openly complain'd, "That in our *newer* Plays as well as in our *older*, in *Comedy* as well as *Tragedy*, the Stage presents a proper Scene of Uproar; — Duels fought; Swords drawn, many of a side; Wounds given, and sometimes dress'd too; the Surgeon call'd, and the Patient prob'd and tented upon the Spot. That in our *Tragedy*, nothing is so common as Wheels, Racks, and Gibbets properly adorn'd; Executions decently perform'd; Headless Bodys and Bodiless Heads, expos'd to view: Battels fought: Murders committed: and the Dead carry'd off in great Numbers." — Such is our Politeness!

Nor are these *Plays*, on this account, the less frequented by *either* of the Sexes: Which inclines me to favour the Conceit our [†]Author has suggested concerning the mutual Correspondence and Relation between our *Royal* THEATER, and *Popular* CIRCUS or *Bear*-

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 217, &c. 223, 259, 275, 276.

[†] VOL. I. pag. 270, &c.

Chap. 1.

Garden. For in the former of these Assemblys, 'tis undeniable that at least the two upper Regions or Gallerys' contain such Spectators, as indifferently frequent each Place of Sport. So that 'tis no wonder we hear such Applause resounded on the Victorys of an Almanzor; when the same Partys had possibly, no later than the Day before, bestow'd their Applause as freely on the victorious Butcher, the Hero of another Stage: where amidst various Frays, bestial and human Blood, promiscuous Wounds and Slaughter; one Sex are observ'd as frequent and as pleas'd Spectators as the other, and sometimes not Spectators only, but Actors in the Gladiatorian Parts. - These Congregations, which we may be apt to call Heathenish,* (tho in reality never known among the politer Heathens) are, in our Christian Nation, unconcernedly allow'd and tolerated, as no way injurious to religious Interests; whatever effect they may be found to have on national Manners, Humanity, and Civil Life. Of such Indulgencys as these, we hear no Complaints. Nor are any Assemblys, tho of the most barbarous and enormous kind, so offensive, it seems, to Men of Zeal, as religious Assemblys of a different Fashion or Habit from their own.

[258]

I am sorry to say, that, tho in the many parts of *Poetry* our Attempts have been high and noble, yet in general the Taste of *Wit* and *Letters* lies much upon a level with what relates to our Stage.

I can readily allow to our British *Genius* what was allow'd to the Roman heretofore:

[†]By nature full of elevation and passion; for he has tragic inspiration enough and happy boldness.

But then I must add too, that the excessive Indulgence and Favour shown to our *Authors* on account of what their *mere Genius* and *flowing* Vein afford, has render'd them intolerably supine, con-

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 269, &c.

^{† ——}Naturâ sublimis & acer: Nam spirat Tragicum satis, & feliciter audet. Horat. Lib. ii. Epist. i. ver. 165.

ceited, and Admirers of themselves. The Publick having once suffer'd 'em to take the ascendent, they become, like flatter'd Princes, impatient of Contradiction or Advice. They think it a disgrace to be criticiz'd, even by *a Friend*; or to reform, at his desire, what they them-selves are fully convinc'd is negligent, and uncorrect.

· . . . wanted or forgot

The last and greatest art, the art to blot.

The †Limae Labor is the great Grievance, with our Country-men. An English Author wou'd be all Genius. He wou'd reap the Fruits of Art; but without Study, Pains, or Application. He thinks it necessary, indeed, (lest his Learning shou'd be call'd in question) to show the World that he errs knowingly against the Rules of Art. And for this reason, whatever Piece he publishes at any time, he seldom fails, in some prefix'd Apology, to speak in such a manner of Criticism and Art, as may confound the ordinary Reader, and prevent him from taking up a Part, which, shou'd he once assume, wou'd prove fatal to the impotent and mean Performance.

'Twere to be wish'd, that when once our Authors had consider'd of a *Model* or *Plan*, and attain'd the Knowledg of a *Whole and

* Sed turpem putat in scriptis, metuitque Lituram.

Ibid.

† Ars Poet.

 ‡ ὅλον δ' ἐστι τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὁ αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ' ἄλλο ἐστί, μετ' ἐκεῖνο δ' ἔτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι. τίλευτὴ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὁ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ ἑξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν. μέσον δὲ ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἔτερον. Arist. de Poet. cap. 7. [A whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that which does not itself follow on anything by necessity, but after which something else naturally is or arises. On the contrary, an end is that which naturally follows on something else, either of necessity or as a rule, while it is followed by nothing. A middle is that which itself follows on something else, and has something following on it.] And in the following Chapter, μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἶς οὐχ ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται ἐὰν περὶ ἕνα ἢ, &c. [Unity of plot is not, as some people think, secured by having unity of hero.]

Denique si quod vis simplex duntaxat & UNUM. Horat. de Arte Poet. ver. 23. Chap. 1.

[259]

Chap. I. Parts; when from this beginning they had proceeded to *Morals*, [260] and the Knowledg of what is call'd *Poetick Manners, and

[Let it be what you will, provided only it be consistent and uniform.] *See* VOL. I. p. 145, 146.

'Tis an infallible proof of the want of just *Integrity* in every Writing, from the *Epopee* or *Heroick*-Poem, down to the familiar Epistle, or slightest Essay either in *Verse* or *Prose*, if each several Part or Portion fits not its proper place so exactly, that the least Transposition wou'd be impracticable. Whatever is *Episodick*, tho perhaps it be *a Whole*, and in itself *intire*, yet being inserted, as a *Part*, in a Work of greater length, it must appear only in its *due Place*. And that Place alone can be call'd its *due*-one, which alone befits it. If there be any Passage in the Middle or End, which might have stood in the Beginning; or any in the Beginning, which might have stood as well in the Middle or End; there is properly in such a Piece neither Beginning, Middle, nor End. 'Tis a mere *Rhapsody;* not a Work. And the more it assumes the Air or Appearance of *a real Work*, the more ridiculous it becomes. See above, *pag.* 25. And VOL. I. *pag.* 145, 146.

* Respicere exemplar vitae morumque jubebo
Doctum Imitatorem, & VERAS hinc ducere voces.

Horat. de Arte Poet. ver. 317.

[I shall bid the well-trained imitator to look to the pattern which life presents, and there learn the language of reality.]

The Chief of antient Criticks, we know, extols Homer, above all things, for understanding how "To LYE in perfection": as the Passage shews which we have cited above, VOL. I. pag. 346. His LYES, according to that Master's Opinion, and the Judgment of many of the gravest and most venerable Writers, were, in themselves, the justest Moral Truths, and exhibitive of the best Doctrine and Instruction in Life and Manners. It may be ask'd perhaps, "How comes the Poet, then, to draw no single Pattern of the kind, no perfect Character, in either of his Heroick Pieces?" I answer, that shou'd he attempt to do it, he wou'd, as a Poet, be preposterous and false. 'Tis not the Possible, but the Probable and Likely, which must be the Poet's Guide in Manners. By this he wins Attention, and moves the conscious Reader or Spectator; who judges best from within, by what he naturally feels and experiences in his own Heart. The Perfection of Virtue is from long Art and Management, Self-controul, and, as it were, Force on Nature. But the common Auditor or Spectator, who seeks Pleasure only, and loves to engage his Passion, by view of other Passion and Emotion, comprehends little of the Restraints, Allays and Corrections, which form this new and artificial Creature. For such indeed is the truly virtuous Man; whose ART, tho ever so natural in it-self, or justly founded in Reason and Nature, is an Improvement far beyond the common Stamp, or known Character of Human Kind. And thus the compleatly virtuous and perfect Character is unpoetical and false. Effects must not appear, where Causes must necessarily remain unknown and incomprehensible. A HERO without Passion, is, in Poetry, as absurd as a HERO without Life or Action. Now if Passion be allow'd, passionate Action must ensue. The same Heroick Genius and seeming Magnanimity which transport us when beheld, are

TRUTH; when they had learnt to reject *false Thought*, embarassing and *mix'd Metaphors*, the ridiculous *Paint* in Comedy, and the *false Sublime*, and *Bombast* in Heroick; they wou'd at last have some re-

Chap. 1. [261][262]

naturally transporting in the Lives and Manners of the Great, who are describ'd to us. And thus the able Designer, who feigns in behalf of Truth, and draws his Characters after the Moral Rule, fails not to discover Nature's Propensity; and assigns to these high Spirits their proper Exorbitancy, and Inclination to exceed in that Tone or Species of Passion, which constitutes the eminent or shining part of each poetical Character. The Passion of an ACHILLES is towards that Glory which is acquir'd by Arms and personal Valour. In favour of this Character, we forgive the generous Youth his Excess of Ardor in the Field, and his Resentment when injur'd and provok'd in Council, and by his Allies. The Passion of an ULYSSES is towards that Glory which is acquir'd by Prudence, Wisdom, and Ability in Affairs. 'Tis in favour of this Character that we forgive him his subtle, crafty, and deceitful Air: since the intriguing Spirit, the over-reaching Manner, and Over-refinement of Art and Policy, are as naturally incident to the experienc'd and thorow Politician, as sudden Resentment, indiscreet and rash Behaviour, to the open undesigning Character of a warlike Youth. The gigantick Force and military Toil of an AJAX wou'd not be so easily credible, or engaging, but for the honest Simplicity of his Nature, and the Heaviness of his Parts and Genius. For Strength of Body being so often noted by us, as un-attended with equal Parts and Strength of Mind; when we see this natural Effect express'd, and find our secret and malicious kind of Reasoning confirm'd, on this hand; we yield to any *Hyperbole* of our Poet, on the other. He has afterwards his full Scope, and Liberty of enlarging, and exceeding, in the peculiar Virtue and Excellence of his Hero. He may *lye* splendidly, raise *wonder*, and be as *astonishing* as he pleases. Every thing will be allow'd him in return for this frank Allowance. Thus the Tongue of a NESTOR may work Prodigys, whilst the accompanying Allays of a rhetorical Fluency, and aged Experience, are kept in view. An AGAMEMNON may be admir'd as a noble and wise Chief, whilst a certain princely Haughtiness, a Stiffness, and stately Carriage natural to the Character, are represented in his Person, and noted in their ill Effects. For thus the Excesses of every Character are by the Poet redress'd. And the Misfortunes naturally attending such Excesses, being justly apply'd; our Passions, whilst in the strongest manner engag'd and mov'd, are in the wholesomest and most effectual manner corrected and purg'd. Were a Man to form himself by one single Pattern or Original, however perfect; he wou'd himself be a mere Copy. But whilst he draws from various Models, he is original, natural, and unaffected. We see in outward Carriage and Behaviour, how ridiculous any one becomes who imitates another, be he ever so graceful. They are mean Spirits who love to copy merely. Nothing is agreeable or natural, but what is original. Our Manners, like our Faces, tho ever so beautiful, must differ in their Beauty. An Over-regularity is next to a Deformity. And in a Poem, whether Epick or Dramatick, a compleat and perfect Character is the greatest Monster; and of all poetick Fictions not only the least engaging, but the least moral and improving. — Thus much by way of Remark upon poetical TRUTH, and the just Fiction, or artful Lying of the able Poet; according

Chap. I. gard to Numbers, Harmony, and *an'*Ear;* and correct, as far as [263] possible, the harsh Sounds of our Language, in *Poetry* at least, if not in *Prose*.

But so much are our *British* Poets taken up, in seeking out that monstrous Ornament which we call †*Rhyme*, that 'tis' no wonder

to the Judgment of the *Master*-Critick. What HORACE expresses of the same *Lying* Virtue, is of an easier sense, and needs no explanation.

Atque ita mentitur, sic veris falsa remiscet; Primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet imum.

De Arte Poet. ver. 152.

[Such is his use of fiction, such his combination of true and false, that the middle does not clash with the beginning or the end with the middle.]

The same may be observ'd not only in *Heroick* Draughts, but in the inferior Characters of *Comedy*.

Quàm similis uterque est sui! Ter. Phorm. Act. iii. Sc. 2. [How like himself each man acts!]

See VOL. I. pag. 4, 142, 143, 337, & 351. in the Notes, at the end.

* VOL. I. pag. 217.

† The Reader, if curious in these matters, may see Is. Vossius de viribus Rhythmi; and what he says, withal, of antient Musick, and the degrees by which they surpass us Moderns, (as has been demonstrated by late Mathematicians of our Nation) contrary to a ridiculous Notion some have had, that because in this, as in all other Arts, the Antients study'd Simplicity, and affected it as the highest Perfection in their Performances, they were therefore ignorant of Parts and Symphony. Against this, Is. Vossius, amongst other Authors, cites the antient Peripatetick περὶ κόσμον [On the Cosmos] at the beginning of his fifth Chapter. To which he might have added another Passage in Chap. 6. The Sutableness of this antient Author's Thought to what has been often advanc'd in the philosophical Parts of these Volumes, concerning the universal Symmetry, or Union of the Whole, may make it excusable if we add here the two Passages together, in their inimitable Original. ἴσως δὲ καὶ των έναντίων ή φύσις γλίχεται, καὶ έκ τούτων ἀποτελεῖν τὸ σύμφωνον, οὐκ έκ τῶν ὁμοίων, ὤσπερ ἀμέλει τὸ ἄρρεν συνήγαγε πρὸς τὸ θῆλν, καὶ οὐχ ἑκάτεπον πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον, καὶ τὴν πρώτην ὁμόνοιαν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων συνῆψεν, οὐ διὰ των δμοίων. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ τέχνη τὴν φύσιν μιμουμένη τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ζωγραφία μεν γάρ, λευκών τε καὶ μελάνων, ώχρων τε καὶ ἐρυθρων χρωμάτων ἐγκερασαμένη φύσεις, τὰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προηγουμένοις ἀπετέλεσε συμφώνους. μουσικὴ δέ, ὀξεῖς αμα καὶ βαρεῖς, μακρούς τε καὶ βραχεῖς φθόγγους μίξασα, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς, μίαν ἀπετέλεσεν άρμονίαν. γραμματική δέ, ἐκ φωνηέντων καὶ ἀφώνων γραμμάτων κράσιν ποιησαμένη, τὴν ὅλην τέχνην ἀτ' αὐτῶν συνεστήσατο. ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῷ σκοτεινῷ λεγόμενον Ἡρακλείτῳ. συνάψειας οὖλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὖλα, συμφερόμενον καὶ διαφερόμενον, συνάδον καὶ διάδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἕν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς

Chap. 1.

if other Ornaments, and *real Graces* are unthought of, and left un-attempted. However, since in some Parts of Poetry, especially in *the Dramatick*, we have been so happy as to triumph over this barbarous Taste; 'tis unaccountable that our *Poets*, who from this Privilege ought to undertake some further Refinements, shou'd remain still upon the same level as before. 'Tis a shame to our *Authors*, that in their elegant Style and *metred Prose* there shou'd not be found a peculiar Grace and Harmony, resulting from a more natural and easy Disengagement of their Periods, and from a careful avoiding the Encounter of the shocking Consonants and jarring Sounds to which our Language is so unfortunately subject.

They have of late, 'tis true, reform'd in some measure the gouty Joints and Darning-work of *Whereunto's, Whereby's, Thereof's, Therewith's,* and the rest of this kind; by which, complicated Periods are so curiously strung, or hook'd on, one to another, after the long-spun manner of the *Bar*, or *Pulpit*. But to take into consider-

[265]

πάντα. And in the following Passage, μία δὲ ἐκ πάντων ἁρμονία συναδόντων καὶ χορευόντων κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν, ἐξ ἐνός τε γίνεται, καὶ εἰς ἕν ἀπολήγει. κόσμον δ' έτύμως τὸ σύμπαν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀκοσμίαν ὀνομάσαις ἄν. καθάπερ δὲ ἐν χορῷ κορυφαίου κατάρξαντος, συνεπηχεί πας δ χορὸς ανδρών, ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ γυναικών, ἐν διαφόροις φωναίς ὀξυτέραις καὶ βαρυτέραις, μίαν ἀρμονίαν ἐμμελῆ κεραννύντων, ούτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ σύμπαν διέποντος Θεοῦ. [And perhaps Nature wants opposites too, and wants to make harmony out of them, not out of similars; as, for instance, she brings the male to the female and not each of these to one of his or her own sex; and she made the first concord by means of opposites, not similars. Art too seems to do this in imitation of nature. For painting, by combining the natures of black and white, yellow and red, makes its representations correspond with their types. Music, uniting sharp and grave notes, and long and short syllables, makes one harmony among different sounds. Grammar too, bringing together vowels and consonants, builds her whole art upon them. This is the very point which was given forth by Heraclitus the Obscure, who said, "combine wholes and parts, that which is dispersed and that which is united, that which makes discord and that which is in unison, and out of all comes one and out of one comes all." . . . There is one harmony arising from all the bodies which sound together and circle in the sky, and it springs from one thing and ends in one. We might with correct etymology call the universe an order, but not a disorder. And, just as in a chorus, when the leader has led off, all the band of men (and sometimes women) joins in, making by combination of different voices, higher and lower, one harmony in unison, so it is also in the case of the Deity who controls the universe.] See VOL. II. pag. 214. And above, pag. 182, 3, 4, 5. in the Notes.

ation no real Accent, or Cadency of Words, no Sound or Measure Chap. 1. of Syllables; to put together, at one time, a Set of Compounds, of the longest Greek or Latin Termination; and at another, to let whole Verses, and those too of our heroick and longest sort, pass currently in Monosyllables; is, methinks, no slender Negligence. If single Verses at the head, or in the most emphatical places, of the most considerable Works, can admit of such a Structure, and pass for truly harmonious and poetical in this negligent form; I see no reason why more Verses than one or two, of the same formation, shou'd not be as well admitted; or why an un-interrupted Succession of these well-strung Monosyllables might not be allow'd to clatter after one another, like the Hammers of a Paper-Mill, without any breach of Musick, or prejudice to the Harmony of our Language. But if Persons who have gone no farther than a Smith's Anvil to gain an Ear, are yet likely, on fair trial, to find a plain defect in these Ten-Monosyllable Heroicks; it wou'd follow, methinks, that even a Prose-Author, who attempts to write politely, [266] shou'd endeavour to confine himself within those Bounds, which can never, without breach of Harmony, be exceeded in any just Metre, or agreeable Pronunciation.

THUS HAVE I ventur'd to arraign the Authority of those self-privileg'd Writers, who wou'd exempt themselves from *Criticism*, and save their ill-acquir'd Reputation, by the Decrial of an *Art*, on which the Cause and Interest of *Wit* and *Letters* absolutely depend. Be it they themselves, or their great Patrons in their behalf, who wou'd thus arbitrarily support the Credit of ill Writings; the Attempt, I hope, will prove unsuccessful. Be they Moderns or Antients, Foreigners or Natives, ponderous and austere Writers, or airy and of the humorous kind: Whoever takes refuge here, or seeks Protection hence; whoever joins his Party or Interest to this Cause; it appears from the very Fact and Endeavour alone, that there is just ground to suspect some Insufficiency or Imposture at the bottom. And on this account the READER, if he be wise, will

the rather redouble his Application and Industry, to examine the Merit of his assuming Author. If, as *Reader*, and *Judg*, he dares once assert that *Liberty* to which we have shewn him justly intitled; he will not easily be threaten'd or ridicul'd out of the use of his *examining Capacity*, and *native Privilege* of CRITICISM.

Chap. 1.

[267]

'Twas to this *Art*, so well understood and practis'd heretofore, that the wise Antients ow'd whatever was consummate and perfect in their Productions. 'Tis to the same *Art* we owe the Recovery of Letters in these latter Ages. To this alone we must ascribe the Recognition of antient Manuscripts, the Discovery of what is spurious, and the Discernment of whatever is genuine of those venerable Remains which have pass'd thro' such dark Periods of Ignorance, and rais'd us to the Improvements we now make in every Science. 'Tis to this *Art*, that even the *Sacred Authors* themselves owe their highest Purity and Correctness. So *sacred* ought the *Art* it-self to be esteem'd; when from its Supplies alone is form'd that judicious and learned Strength, by which the Defenders of our Holy Religion are able so successfully to refute the *Heathens*, *Jews*, *Sectarians*, *Hereticks*, and other Enemys or Opposers of our primitive and antient Faith.

But having thus, after our Author's example, asserted the Use of Criticism, in all literate Works, from the main *Frame*, or *Plan* of every Writing, down to the minutest *Particle*; we may now proceed to exercise this *Art* upon our Author himself, and by his own Rules examine him in this his last Treatise; reserving still to our-selves the same Privilege of Variation, and Excursion into other Subjects, the same *Episodick* Liberty, and Right of wandering, which we have maintain'd in the preceding Chapters.

[268]

[269]

Chap. 2.

CHAPTER II

Generation and Succession of our national and modern Wit.—
Manners of the Proprietors.—Corporation and Joint-Stock—
Statute against Criticism. A Coffee-House Committee.—
Mr. Bays.—Other Bays's in Divinity.—Censure of our Author's Dialogue-Piece; and of the Manner of Dialogue-Writing, us'd by Reverend Wits.

ACCORDING to the common Course of Practice in our Age, we seldom see the Character of Writer and that of Critick united in the same Person. There is, I know, a certain Species of Authors, who subsist wholly by the criticizing or commenting Practice upon others, and can appear in no other Form besides what this Employment authorizes them to assume. They have no original Character, or first Part; but wait for something which may be call'd a Work, in order to graft upon it, and come in, for Sharers, at second hand.'

[270]

The Pen-men of this Capacity and Degree are, from their Function and Employment, distinguish'd by the Title of Answerers. For it happens in the World, that there are Readers of a Genius and Size just fitted to these answering Authors. These, if they teach 'em nothing else, will teach 'em, they think, to criticize. And tho the new practising Criticks are of a sort unlikely ever to understand any original Book or Writing; they can understand, or at least remember, and quote the subsequent Reflections, Flouts, and Jeers, which may accidentally be made on such a Piece. Where-ever a Gentleman of this sort happens, at any time, to be in company, you shall no sooner hear a new Book spoken of, than 'twill be ask'd, "Who has answer'd it?" or "When is there an Answer to come out?"— Now the Answer, as our Gentleman knows, must needs be newer than the *Book*. And the *newer* a thing is, the more fashionable still, and the genteeler the Subject of Discourse. For this the Bookseller knows how to fit our Gentleman to a nicety: For he has commonly an *Answer* ready bespoke, and perhaps finish'd, by the time his *new Book* comes abroad. And 'tis odds but our fashionable Gentleman, who takes both together, may read the *latter* first, and drop the other for good and all.'

Chap. 2.

[271]

But of these *answering* Wits, and the manner of *Rejoinders*, and reiterate *Replies*, we have said what is sufficient *in a former Miscellany. We need only remark in general, "That 'tis necessary a *writing* Critick shou'd understand how *to write*. And tho every *Writer* is not bound to shew himself in the capacity of Critick, every writing Critick is bound to shew himself capable of being a Writer. For if he be apparently impotent in this *latter* kind, he is to be deny'd all Title or Character in *the other*."

To censure merely what another Person writes; to twitch, snap, snub up, or banter; to torture Sentences and Phrases, turn a few Expressions into Ridicule, or write what is now-a-days call'd an Answer to any Piece, is not sufficient to constitute what is properly esteem'd a WRITER, or AUTHOR, in due form. For this reason, tho there are many Answerers seen abroad, there are few or no CRITICKS or SATIRISTS. But whatever may be the State of Controversy in our Religion, or politick Concerns; 'tis certain that in the mere literate World, Affairs are manag'd with a better Understanding between the principal Partys concern'd. The WRITERS or AUTHORS in possession have an easier time than any Ministry, or religious Party, which is uppermost. They have found a way, by decrying all Criticism in general, to get rid of their Dissenters, and prevent all Pretences to further Reformation in their State. The CRITICK is made to appear distinct, and of another Species; wholly different from the Writer. None who have a GENIUS for Writing, and can perform with any Success, are presum'd so ill-natur'd or illiberal as to endeavour to signalize themselves in CRITICISM.

[200

'Tis not difficult, however, to imagine why this practical Difference between *Writer* and *Critick* has been so generally establish'd

^{*} Viz. Supra, MISC. I. chap. 2.

[274]

Chap. 2. amongst us, as to make the Provinces seem wholly distinct, and irreconcilable. The *forward* Wits, who without waiting their due time, or performing their requisite Studys, start up in the World as Authors, having with little Pains or Judgment, and by the strength of Fancy merely, acquir'd *a Name* with Mankind, can on no account afterwards submit to a Decrial or Disparagement of those raw Works, to which they ow'd their early Character and Distinction. Ill wou'd it fare with 'em, indeed, if on these tenacious Terms they shou'd venture upon Criticism, or offer to move that *Spirit* which wou'd infallibly give such Disturbance to their establish'd Title.

Now we may consider, That in our Nation, and especially in our present Age, whilst Wars, Debates, and publick Convulsions turn our Minds so wholly upon Business and Affairs; the better *Genius's* being in a manner necessarily involv'd in the active Sphere, on which the general Eye of Mankind is so strongly fixt; there must remain in the Theatre of Wit a sufficient Vacancy of Place: and the quality of *Actor* upon that Stage must of consequence be very easily attainable, and at a low Price of Ingenuity or Understanding.

The Persons therefore who are in possession of the *prime Parts* in this deserted Theatre, being suffer'd to maintain their Ranks and Stations in full Ease, have naturally a good Agreement and Understanding with their Fellow-Wits. Being indebted to the Times for this Happiness, that with so little Industry or Capacity they have been able to serve the Nation with *Wit*, and supply the Place of real Dispensers and Ministers of the Muses *Treasures;* they must, necessarily, as they have any Love for themselves, or fatherly Affection for their Works, conspire with one another to preserve their common Interest of Indolence, and justify their Remisness, Uncorrectness, Insipidness, and downright Ignorance of all literate *Art*, or just *poetick Beauty*.

*Great is the unity of the effeminate.

^{*} Magna inter molles Concordia. Juven. Sat. ii. ver. 47.

For this reason you see 'em mutually courteous, and benevolent; gracious and obliging, beyond measure; complimenting one another interchangeably, at the head of their Works, in *recommendatory* Verses, or in separate Panegyricks, Essays, and Fragments of Poetry; such as in the *Miscellaneous Collections* (our yearly Retail of Wit) we see curiously compacted, and accommodated to the Relish of the World. Here the *Tyrocinium* of Genius's is annually display'd. Here, if you think fit, you may make acquaintance with *the young* Offspring of Wits, as they come up gradually under *the old;* with due Courtship, and Homage, paid to those high Predecessors of Fame, in hope of being one day admitted, by turn, into the noble Order, and made Wits by *Patent* and *Authority*.

This is the young Fry which you may see busily surrounding the grown Poet, or chief Play-house-Author, at a Coffee-House. They are his Guards; ready to take up Arms for him; if by some presumptuous Critick he is at any time attack'd. They are indeed the very Shadows of their immediate Predecessor, and represent the same Features, with some small Alteration perhaps for the worse. They are sure to aim at nothing above or beyond their Master; and wou'd on no account give him the least Jealousy of their aspiring to any Degree or Order of writing above him. From hence that Harmony and reciprocal Esteem, which, on such a bottom as this, cannot fail of being perfectly well establish'd among our Poets: The Age, mean while, being after this manner hopefully provided, and secure of a constant and like Succession of meritorious Wits, in every kind!

If by chance a Man of Sense, un-appriz'd of the Authority of these high Powers, shou'd venture to accost the Gentlemen of this Fraternity, at some *Coffee-house* Committee, whilst they were taken up, in mutual Admiration, and the usual Praise of their national and co-temporary Wits; 'tis possible he might be treated with some Civility, whilst he inquir'd, for Satisfaction sake, into the Beautys of those particular Works so unanimously extoll'd. But shou'd he presume to ask, in general, "Why is our *Epick* or *Dramatick*, our *Essay*, or *common Prose* no better executed?" Or, "Why in particu-

Chap. 2.

[275]

[276]

Chap. 2. lar does such or such a reputed Wit write so incorrectly, and with so little regard to Justness of Thought or Language?" The Answer wou'd presently be given, "That we *Englishmen* are not ty'd up to such rigid Rules as those of the antient *Grecian*, or modern *French* Criticks."

"Be it so (Gentlemen!) 'Tis your good Pleasure. Nor ought any one to dispute it with you. You are Masters, no doubt, in your own Country. But (Gentlemen!) the Question here, is not What your Authority may be over your own Writers. You may have them of what Fashion or Size of Wit you please; and allow them to entertain you at the rate you think sufficient, and satisfactory. But can you, by your good Pleasure, or the Approbation of your highest Patrons, make that to be either *Wit*, or *Sense*, which wou'd otherwise have been Bombast and Contradiction? If your Poets are still *Mr. Bays's, and your Prose-Authors Sir Rogers, without offering at a better Manner; must it follow that *the Manner it-self* is

* To see the Incorrigibleness of our Poets in their pedantick Manner, their Vanity, Defiance of Criticism, their Rhodomontade, and poetical Bravado; we need only turn to our famous Poet-Laureat (the very Mr. Bays himself) in one of his latest and most valu'd Pieces, writ many years after the ingenious Author of the Rehearsal had drawn his Picture. "I have been listening" (says our Poet, in his Preface to Don Sebastian) "what Objections had been made against the Conduct of the Play, but found them all so trivial, that if I shou'd name them, a true Critick wou'd imagine that I plaid booty—Some are pleas'd to say the Writing is dull. But aetatem habet, de se loquatur. [But he is mature, let him speak for himself.] Others, that the double Poison is unnatural. Let the common receiv'd Opinion, and Ausonius's famous Epigram answer that. Lastly, a more ignorant sort of Creatures than either of the former, maintain that the Character of DORAX is not only unnatural, but inconsistent with it-self. Let them read the Play, and think again.—A longer Reply is what those Cavillers deserve not. But I will give them and their Fellows to understand, that the Earl of * * * was pleas'd to read the Tragedy twice over before it was acted, and did me the favour to send me word, that I had written beyond any of my former Plays, and that he was displeas'd any thing shou'd be cut away. If I have not reason to prefer his single Judgment to a whole Faction, let the World be judge: For the Opposition is the same with that of LUCAN's Hero against an Army, concurrere Bellum atque Virum [they run together the war and the man.] I think I may modestly conclude, &c."

Thus he goes on, to the very end, in the self-same Strain. Who, after this, can ever say of the *Rehearsal*-Author, that his Picture of our Poet was over-charg'd, or the national Humour wrong describ'd?"

[277]

good, or *the Wit* genuine?—What say you (Gentlemen!) to this new Piece?—Let us examine these Lines which you call *shining!* This String of Sentences which you call *clever!* This Pile of Metaphors which you call *sublime!*—Are you unwilling (Gentlemen!) to stand the Test? Do you despise the Examination?

Chap. 2.

[278]

"Sir!—Since you are pleas'd to take this Liberty with us; May we presume to ask you a Question?" "O Gentlemen! as many as you please: I shall be highly honour'd." "Why then (pray Sir!) inform us, Whether you have ever writ?" "Very often (Gentlemen!) especially on a Post-night." "But have you writ (for instance, Sir!) a Play, a Song, an Essay, or a PAPER, as, by way of Eminence, the current Pieces of our Weekly Wits are generally styl'd?" "Something of this kind I may perhaps (Gentlemen!) have attempted, tho without publishing my Work. But pray (Gentlemen!) what is my writing, or not writing to the question in hand?" "Only this, (Sir!) and you may fairly take our words for it: That, whenever you publish, you will find the Town against you. Your Piece will infallibly be condemn'd." "So let it. But for what reason, Gentlemen? I am sure, you never saw the Piece." "No, Sir. But you are a Critick. And we know by certain Experience, that, when a Critick writes according to Rule and Method, he is sure never to hit the English Taste. Did not Mr. R-, who criticiz'd our English Tragedy, write a sorry one of his own?" "If he did (Gentlemen!) 'twas his own fault, not to know his Genius better. But is his Criticism the less just on this account? If a Musician performs his Part well in the hardest Symphonys, he must necessarily know the Notes, and understand the Rules of Harmony and Musick. But must a Man, therefore, who has an Ear, and has study'd the Rules of Musick, of necessity have a Voice or Hand? Can no one possibly judg a Fiddle, but who is himself a Fiddler? Can no one judg a Picture, but who is himself a Layer of Colours?"—

[279]

Thus far our rational Gentleman perhaps might venture, before his Coffee-house Audience. Had I been at his Elbow to prompt him as a Friend, I shou'd hardly have thought fit to remind him of any thing further. On the contrary, I shou'd have rather taken

[281]

him aside, to inform him of this Cabal, and establish'd Corpora-Chap. 2. tion of Wit; of their declar'd Aversion to Criticism, and of their known Laws and Statutes in that Case made and provided. I shou'd have told him, in short, that learned Arguments wou'd be mispent on such as these: And that he wou'd find little Success, tho he shou'd ever so plainly demonstrate to the Gentlemen of this Size of Wit and Understanding, "That the greatest Masters of Art, in every kind of Writing, were eminent in the critical Practice." [280] But that they really were so, witness, among the Antients, their greatest *Philosophers, whose critical Pieces lie intermixt with their profound philosophical Works, and other politer Tracts ornamentally writ, †for publick use. Witness in *History* and *Rhetorick*, ISOCRATES, DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSEUS, PLUTARCH, and the corrupt Lucian himself; the only one perhaps of these Authors, whom our Gentlemen may, in some modern Translation, have look'd into, with any Curiosity or Delight. To these among the Romans we may add Cicero, Varro, Horace, Quintilian, PLINY, and many more.

Among the Moderns, a Boileau and a Corneille are sufficient Precedents in the Case before us. They apply'd their Criticism with just Severity, even to their own Works. This indeed is a Manner hardly practicable with the Poets of our own Nation. It wou'd be unreasonable to expect of 'em that they shou'd bring such Measures in use, as being apply'd to their Works, wou'd discover 'em to be wholly deform'd and disproportionable. 'Tis no wonder therefore if we have so little of this critical Genius extant, to guide us in our Taste. 'Tis no wonder if what is generally current in this kind, lies in a manner bury'd, and in disguise under Burlesque, as particularly in the *witty Comedy of a noble Author of this last Age. To the Shame, however, of our profess'd Wits and Enterpriz-

^{*} *Viz.* Plato, Aristotle. See, in particular, the Phaedrus of the former; where an entire Piece of the Orator Lysias is criticiz'd in form.

[†] The distinction of Treatises was into the ἀκροαματικοί and ἐξωτερικοί [esoteric . . . [versus] . . . exoteric].

[‡] The Rehearsal. See VOL. I. pag. 259. and just above, pag. 277. in the Notes.

ers in the higher Spheres of Poetry, it may be observ'd, that they have not wanted good Advice and Instruction of the graver kind, from as high a Hand in respect of Quality and Character: Since one of the justest of our modern Poems, and so confess'd even by our Poets themselves, is a short Criticism, An ART of POETRY; by which, if they themselves were to be judg'd, they must in general appear no better than mere Bunglers, and void of all true Sense and Knowledg in their Art. But if in reality both Critick and Poet, confessing the Justice of these Rules of Art, can afterwards, in Practice, condemn and approve, perform and judg, in a quite different manner from what they acknowledg just and true: it plainly shews, That, tho perhaps we are not indigent in Wit; we want what is of more consequence, and can alone raise Wit to any Dignity or Worth; even plain HONESTY, MANNERS, and a Sense of that MORAL TRUTH, on which (as has been often express'd in these *Volumes) poetick TRUTH and Beauty must naturally depend.

Chap. 2.

[282]

[†]The man who has learned what are his duties to his fatherland or to his friends; what affection is due to a father, a brother, or a guest; what is the duty of a senator, what of a juryman, . . . he to be sure knows how to find suitable language for each character.

As for this Species of *Morality* which distinguishes the Civil Offices of Life, and describes each becoming Personage or Character in this Scene; so necessary it is for the *Poet* and *polite Author* to be appriz'd of it, that even *the Divine* himself may with juster pretence be exempted from the knowledg of this sort. The Com-

^{*} $\it Viz.$ VOL. I. $\it pag.$ 207, 208. and 277, 278. and 336, $\it &c.$ So above, $\it pag.$ 260. and in the Notes.

[†] Qui didicit Patriae quid debeat, & quid Amicis, Quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus & hospes, Quod sit Conscripti, quod Judicis officium,—— ——ille profectò Reddere personae scit convenientia cuique. Horat. de Arte Poet. ver. 312, &c.

poser of religious Discourses has the advantage of that higher Scene Chap. 2. of Mystery, which is above the level of human Commerce. 'Tis not so much his Concern, or Business, to be agreeable. And often [283] when he wou'd endeavour it, he becomes more than ordinarily displeasing. His Theater, and that of the polite World, are very different: Insomuch that in a Reverend AUTHOR, or DECLAIMER of this sort, we naturally excuse the Ignorance of ordinary *Decorum*, in what relates to the Affairs of our inferior temporal World. But for the POET or genteel WRITER, who is of this World merely, 'tis a different Case. He must be perfect in this moral Science. We can easily bear the loss of indifferent POETRY or ESSAY. A good Bargain it were, cou'd we get rid of every moderate Performance in this kind. But were we oblig'd to hear only excellent SERMONS, and to read nothing, in the way of Devotion, which was not well writ; it might possibly go hard with many Christian People, who

*Because a dinner could be carried on without them.

different, as either Fiddlers or Painters:

Other BAYS's and *Poetasters* may be lawfully baited; tho we patiently submit to our BAYS's in *Divinity*.

are at present such attentive Auditors and Readers. Establish'd Pastors have a right to be *indifferent*. But voluntary Discourses and Attempters in Wit or Poetry, are as intolerable, when they are in-

Had the Author of our †Subject-Treatises consider'd thorowly of these literate Affairs, and found how the Interest of Wit stood at present in our Nation, he wou'd have had so much regard surely to his own Interest, as never to have writ unless either in the single Capacity of mere Critick, or that of Author in form. If he had resolv'd never to produce a regular or legitimate Piece, he might pretty safely have writ on still after the rate of his first Volume, and mixt manner. He might have been as critical, as satirical, or as full of Raillery as he had pleas'd. But to come afterwards as a grave

^{* ——}Poterat duci quia Coena sine istis. Hor. Ars Poet. ver. 376.

[†] Supra, p. 135, 189.

Actor upon the Stage, and expose himself to Criticism in his turn, by giving us a Work or two in form, after the regular manner of Composition, as we see in his second Volume; this, I think, was no extraordinary Proof of his Judgment or Ability, in what related to his own Credit and Advantage.

One of these formal Pieces (the INQUIRY already examin'd) we have found to be wholly after the Manner, which in one of his critical Pieces he calls the Methodick. But his next Piece (the MORAL-ISTS, which we have now before us) must, according to his own *Rules, be reckon'd as an Undertaking of greater weight. 'Tis not only at the bottom, as systematical, didactick and preceptive, as that other Piece of formal Structure; but it assumes withal another Garb, and more fashionable Turn of Wit. It conceals what is scholastical, under the appearance of a polite Work. It aspires to Dialogue, and carrys with it not only those poetick Features of the Pieces antiently call'd MIMES; but it attempts to unite the several Personages and Characters in ONE Action, or Story, within a determinate Compass of Time, regularly divided, and drawn into different and proportion'd Scenes: And this, too, with variety of STYLE; the simple, comick, rhetorical, and even the poetick or sublime; such as is the aptest to run into Enthusiasm and Extravagance. So much is our Author, by virtue of this Piece, † a POET in due form, and by

* VOL. I. pag. 193, &c. and pag. 257.

Chap. 2.

[285]

[†] That he is conscious of this, we may gather from that Line or two of Advertisement, which stands at the beginning of his first Edition. "As for the Characters, and Incidents, they are neither wholly feign'd (says he) nor wholly true: but according to the Liberty allow'd in the way of DIALOGUE, the principal Matters are founded upon Truth; and the rest as near resembling as may be. 'Tis a Sceptick recites: and the Hero of the Piece passes for an Enthusiast. If a perfect Character be wanting; 'tis the same Case here, as with the Poets in some of their best Pieces. And this surely is a sufficient Warrant for the Author of a PHILOSOPHICAL ROMANCE."—
Thus our Author himself; who to conceal, however, his strict Imitation of the antient poetick DIALOGUE, has prefix'd an auxiliary Title to his Work, and given it the Sirname of RHAPSODY: As if it were merely of that Essay or mix'd kind of Works, which come abroad with an affected Air of Negligence and Irregularity. But whatever our Author may have affected in his Title-Page, 'twas so little his Intention to write after that Model of incoherent Workmanship, that it appears to be sorely against his Will, if this Dialogue-Piece of his has not the just Character, and cor-

Chap. 2. [286]

[287]

a' more apparent claim, than if he had writ a PLAY, or *dramatick Piece*, in as regular a manner, at least, as any known at present on our Stage.

It appears, indeed, that as high as our Author, in his critical Capacity, wou'd pretend to carry the refin'd Manner and accurate SIMPLICITY of the Antients; he dares not, in his own Model and principal Performance, attempt to unite his Philosophy in one solid and uniform Body, nor carry on his Argument in one continu'd Chain or Thred. Here our Author's Timorousness is visible. In the very Plan or Model of his Work, he is apparently put to a hard shift, to contrive how or with what probability he might introduce Men of any Note or Fashion, *reasoning expresly and purposely, without play or trifling, for two or three hours together, on mere Philosophy and Morals. He finds these Subjects (as he confesses) so wide of common Conversation, and, by long Custom, so appropriated to the School, the University-Chair, or Pulpit, that he thinks it hardly safe or practicable to treat of them elsewhere, or in a different Tone. He is forc'd therefore to raise particular Machines, and constrain his principal Characters, in order to carry a better Face, and bear himself out, against the appearance of Pedantry. Thus his Gentleman-Philosopher THEOCLES, before he enters into his real Character, becomes a feign'd Preacher. And

rect Form of those antient *Poems* describ'd. He wou'd gladly have constituted ONE single *Action* and *Time*, sutable to the just Simplicity of those Dramatick Works. And this, one wou'd think, was easy enough for him to have done. He needed only to have brought his first Speakers immediately into Action, and sav'd the *narrative* or *recitative* Part of Philocles to Palemon, by producing them as speaking Personages upon his Stage. The Scene all along might have been *the Park*. From the early Evening to the late Hour of Night, that the two Galants withdrew to their Town-Apartments, there was sufficient time for the Narrator Philocles, to have *recited* the whole Transaction of the second and third Part; which wou'd have stood thro'out as it now does: only at the Conclusion, when the *narrative* or *recitative Part* had ceas'd, the *simple* and *direct* DIALOGUE wou'd have again return'd, to grace the *Exit*. By this means the *temporal* as well as *local* Unity of the Piece had been preserv'd. Nor had our Author been necessitated to commit that *Anachronism*, of making his first Part, *in order*, to be last *in time*.

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 202, &c.

even when his real Character comes on, he hardly dares stand it out; but to deal the better with his *Sceptick*-Friend, he falls again to personating, and takes up the Humour of the *Poet* and *Enthusiast*. Palemon the Man of Quality, and who is first introduc'd as Speaker in the Piece, must, for fashion-sake, appear *in Love*, and under a kind of Melancholy, produc'd by some Mis-adventures in the World. How else shou'd he be suppos'd so serious? Philocles his Friend (an airy Gentleman of the World, and a thorow Raillier) must have a home Charge upon him, and feel the Anger of his grave Friend, before he can be suppos'd grave enough to enter into a philosophical Discourse. A quarter of an hour's reading must serve to represent an hour or two's Debate. And a new Scene presenting it self, ever and anon, must give Refreshment, it seems, to the faint Reader, and remind him of the Characters and Business going on.

'Tis in the same view that we MISCELLANARIAN Authors, being fearful of the natural Lassitude and Satiety of our indolent Reader, have prudently betaken ourselves to the way of *Chapters* and *Contents;* that as the Reader proceeds, by frequent Intervals of Repose, contriv'd on purpose for him, he may from time to time be advertis'd of what is yet to come, and be tempted thus to renew his Application.

Thus in our modern *Plays* we see, almost in every other Leaf, Descriptions or Illustrations of the Action, not in the *Poem* it-self, or in the mouth of the Actors; but by the Poet, in his own Person; in order, as appears, to help out a Defect of the Text, by a kind of marginal Note, or Comment: which renders these Pieces of a *mix'd* kind between the *narrative* and *dramatick*. 'Tis in this fashionable Style, or manner of dumb Shew, that the Reader finds the Action of the Piece more amazingly express'd, than he possibly cou'd by the Lines of the *Drama* it-self; where the Partys alone are suffer'd to be Speakers.

'Tis out of the same regard to Ease, both in respect of Writer and Reader, that we see long Characters and Descriptions at the head of most dramatick Pieces, to inform us of the Relations, Kindred, Chap. 2.

[288]

[289]

Interests, and Designs of the Dramatis Personae: This being of the Chap. 2. highest importance to the Reader, that he may the better understand the Plot, and find out the principal Characters and Incidents of the Piece; which otherways cou'd not possibly discover themselves, as they are read in their due order. And to do justice to our Play-Readers, they seldom fail to humour our Poets in this respect, and read over the Characters with strict application, as a sort of Grammar, or Key, before they enter on the Piece it-self. I know not whether they wou'd do so much for any philosophical Piece in the [290] world. Our Author seems very much to question it; and has therefore made that part easy enough, which relates to the distinction of his Characters, by making use of the narrative Manner. Tho he had done, as well, perhaps, not to have gone out of the natural plain way, on this account. For with those to whom such philosophical Subjects are agreeable, it cou'd be thought no laborious Task to give the same attention to Characters in Dialogue, as is given at the first entrance by every Reader to the easiest Play, compos'd of fewest and plainest Personages. But for those who read these Subjects with mere Supineness, and Indifference; they will as much begrudg the pains of attending to the Characters thus particularly pointed out, as if they had only been discernible by Inference and Deduction from the mouth of the speaking Partys themselves.

MORE REASONS are given by our *Author himself, for his avoiding the *direct way* of DIALOGUE; which at present lies so low, and is us'd only now and then, in our *Party-Pamphlets*, or new-fashion'd *theological Essays*. For of late, it seems, the Manner has been introduc'd into Church-Controversy, with an Attempt of *Raillery* and *Humour*, as a more successful Method of dealing with Heresy and Infidelity. The Burlesque-Divinity grows mightily in vogue. And the cry'd-up Answers to heterodox Discourses are generally such as are written in Drollery, or with resemblance of the facetious and humorous Language of Conversation.

[291]

^{*} VOL. II. pag. 187, 188.

Joy to the *reverend* Authors, who can afford to be thus gay, and condescend to correct us, in this *Lay*-Wit. The Advances they make in behalf of Piety and Manners, by such a *popular* Style, are doubtless found, upon experience, to be very considerable. As these Reformers are nicely qualify'd to hit the Air of Breeding and Gentility, they will in time, no doubt, refine their Manner, and improve this jocular Method, to the Edification of the polite World; who have been so long seduc'd by the way of *Raillery* and *Wit*. They may do wonders by their *comick* Muse, and may thus, perhaps, find means to *laugh* Gentlemen into their Religion, who have unfortunately been laugh'd out of it. For what reason is there to suppose that Orthodoxy shou'd not be able to laugh as agreeably, and with as much Refinedness, as Heresy or Infidelity?'

Chap. 2.

[292]

At present, it must be own'd, the Characters, or Personages, employ'd by our new orthodox Dialogists, carry with 'em little Proportion or Coherence; and in this respect may be said to sute perfectly with that figurative metaphorical Style and rhetorical Manner, in which their Logick and Arguments are generally couch'd. Nothing can be more complex or multiform than their moral Draughts or Sketches of Humanity. These, indeed, are so far from representing any particular MAN, or Order of MEN, that they scarce resemble any thing of the Kind. 'Tis by their Names only that these Characters are figur'd. Tho they bear different Titles, and are set up to maintain contrary Points; they are found, at the bottom, to be all of the same side; and, notwithstanding their seeming Variance, to co-operate in the most officious manner with the Author, towards the display of his own proper Wit, and the establishment of his private Opinion and Maxims. They are indeed his very legitimate and obsequious Puppets; as like real Men in Voice, Action, and Manners, as those wooden or wire Engines of the lower Stage. Philotheus and Philatheus, Philautus and PHILALETHES are of one and the same Order: Just Tallys to one another: Questioning and Answering in concert, and with such a sort of Alternative as is known in a vulgar Play, where one Person lies down blindfold, and presents himself, as fair as may be, to

[293]

Chap. 2. *another*, who by favour of the Company, or the assistance of his Good-fortune, deals his Companion many a sound Blow, without being once challeng'd, or brought into his Turn of *lying down*.

There is the same curious Mixture of *Chance*, and *elegant Vicissitude*, in the Style of these Mock-Personages of our new *Theological Drama*: with this difference only, "That after the poor Phantom or Shadow of an Adversary has said as little for his Cause as can be imagin'd, and given as many Opens and Advantages as cou'd be desir'd, he *lies down* for good and all, and passively submits to the killing Strokes of his unmerciful Conqueror."

Hardly, as I conceive, will it be objected to our Moralist, (the Author of the *philosophick Dialogue* above) "That the Personages who sustain the *sceptical* or *objecting Parts*, are over-tame and tractable in their Disposition." Did I perceive any such foul dealing in his Piece; I shou'd scarce think it worthy of the Criticism here bestow'd. For in this sort of Writing, where Personages are exhibited, and natural Conversation set in view; if *Characters* are neither tolerably preserv'd, nor *Manners* with any just Similitude describ'd; there remains nothing but what is too gross and monstrous for *Criticism* or *Examination*.

'Twill be alledg'd, perhaps, in answer to what is here advanc'd, "That shou'd a Dialogue be wrought up to the Exactness of these Rules; it ought to be condemn'd, as the worse Piece, for affording the *Infidel* or *Sceptick* such good quarter, and giving him the full advantage of his Argument and Wit."

But to this I reply, That either DIALOGUE shou'd never be attempted; or, if it be, the Partys shou'd appear *natural*, and *such as they really are*. If we *paint* at all; we shou'd endeavour to paint *like Life*, and draw Creatures as they are knowable, in their *proper* Shapes and better Features; not in Metamorphosis, not mangled, lame, distorted, aukard Forms, and impotent Chimeras. *Atheists* have their Sense and Wits, as other Men; or why is ATHEISM so often challeng'd in those of *the better Rank?* Why charg'd so often to the account of *Wit* and *subtle Reasoning?*'

Were I to advise these Authors, towards whom I am extremely well-affected on account of their good-humour'd Zeal, and the

[294]

[295]

seeming Sociableness of their Religion; I shou'd say to 'em, "Gentlemen! Be not so cautious of furnishing your representative SCEPTICK with too good Arguments, or too shreud a Turn of Wit or Humour. Be no so fearful of giving quarter. Allow your Adversary his full Reason, his Ingenuity, Sense, and Art. Trust to the chief Character or Hero of your Piece. Make him as dazling bright, as you are able. He will undoubtedly overcome the utmost Force of his Opponent, and dispel the Darkness or Cloud, which the Adversary may unluckily have rais'd. But if when you have fairly wrought up your Antagonist to his due Strength and cognizable Proportion, your chief Character cannot afterwards prove a match for him, or shine with a superior Brightness; Whose Fault is it?—The Subject's?—This, I hope, you will never allow.—Whose, therefore, beside your own?—Beware then; and consider well your Strength and Mastership in this manner of Writing, and in the qualifying Practice of the polite World, ere you attempt these accurate and refin'd Limnings or Portraitures of Mankind, or offer to bring Gentlemen on the Stage. For if real Gentlemen, seduc'd, as you pretend, and made erroneous in their Religion or Philosophy, discover not the least Feature of their real Faces in your Looking-glass, nor know themselves, in the least, by your Description; they will hardly be apt to think they are refuted. How wittily soever your Comedy may be wrought up, they will scarce apprehend any of that Wit to fall upon themselves. They may laugh indeed at the Diversion you are pleas'd to give 'em: But the Laugh perhaps may be different from what you intend. They may smile secretly to see themselves thus encounter'd; when they find, at last, your Authority laid by, and your scholastick Weapons quitted, in favour of this weak Attempt, To master them by their own Arms, and proper Ability."

THUS WE have perform'd our *critical* Task, and try'd our Strength, both on our Author, and those of his Order, who attempt to write in *Dialogue*, after the active dramatick, **mimical*, or personating Way; according to which a Writer is properly *poetical*.

Chap. 2.

[296]

^{*} See VOL. I. pag. 193, &c.

Chap. 3. What remains, we shall examine in our succeeding and last [297] Chapter.

CHAPTER III

Of Extent or Latitude of Thought. — Free-Thinkers. —
Their Cause, and Character. — Dishonesty, a HalfThought. — Short-Thinking, Cause of Vice and Bigotry. —
Agreement of Slavery and Superstition. — LIBERTY, civil,
moral, spiritual. — Free-thinking Divines. — Representatives
incognito. — Embassadors from the Moon. — Effectual
Determination of Christian Controversy and Religious Belief.

BEING now come to the Conclusion of my Work; after having defended the Cause of *Criticks* in general, and employ'd what Strength I had in that Science upon our adventurous Author in particular; I may, according to Equity, and with the better grace, attempt a line or two, in defense of that *Freedom of Thought* which our Author has us'd, particularly in one of the Personages of his last *Dialogue*-Treatise.'

There is good reason to suppose, that however *equally* fram'd, or near *alike*, the Race of Mankind may appear in other respects, they are not always *equal Thinkers*, or of a like Ability in the management of this natural Talent which we call Thought. The *Race*, on this account, may therefore justly be distinguish'd, as they often are, by the Appellation of the *Thinking*, and the *Unthinking* sort. The mere *Unthinking* are such as have not yet arriv'd to that happy Thought, by which they shou'd observe, "How necessary Thinking is, and how fatal the want of it must prove to 'em." The *Thinking* part of Mankind, on the other side, having discover'd the Assiduity and Industry requisite to *right*-Thinking, and being already *commenc'd* Thinkers upon this Foundation; are, in the progress of the Affair, convinc'd of the necessity of *thinking to good purpose*,

[298]

and carrying the Work to a *thorow* Issue. They know that if they *refrain* or *stop* once, upon this Road, they had done as well *never to have set out*. They are not so supine as to be with-held by mere Laziness; when nothing lies in the way to interrupt the *free* Course and Progress of their Thought.

Chap. 3.

Some Obstacles, 'tis true, may, on this occasion, be pretended. Specters may come a-cross; and Shadows of Reason rise up against Reason it-self. But if Men have once heartily espous'd the reasoning or thinking Habit; they will not easily be induc'd to lay the Practice down; they will not at an instant be arrested, or made to stand, and yield themselves, when they come to such a certain Boundary, Land-Mark, Post, or Pillar, erected here or there (for what reason may probably be guess'd) with the Inscription of a Ne plus ultrà.

[299]

'Tis not, indeed, any Authority on Earth, as we are well assur'd, can stop us on this Road, unless we please to make the Arrest, or Restriction, of our own accord. 'Tis our own *Thought* which must restrain our Thinking. And whether *the restraining Thought* be just, how shall we ever judge, without examining it *freely,* and out of all constraint? How shall we be sure that we have justly quitted REASON, as too high and dangerous, too aspiring or presumptive; if thro' *Fear* of any kind, or submitting to mere *Command,* we quit our very examining Thought, and in the moment stop short, so as to put an end to further Thinking on the matter? Is there much difference between this Case, and that of the obedient Beasts of Burden, who stop precisely at their appointed Inn, or at whatever Point the *Charioteer*, or *Governour of the Reins,* thinks fit to give the signal for *a Halt?*

[300]

I cannot but from hence conclude, That of all Species of Creatures said commonly *to have Brains;* the most insipid, wretched and preposterous are those, whom in just Propriety of Speech, we call *Half-thinkers*.

I have often known *Pretenders to* WIT break out into admiration, on the sight of some raw, heedless, unthinking Gentleman; declaring on this occasion, That they esteem'd it the happiest Case in the World, "Never *to think*, or trouble one's Head with *Study*

or *Consideration*." This I have always look'd upon as one of the highest Airs of Distinction, which the self-admiring Wits are us'd to give them-selves, in publick Company. Now the *Echo* or *Antiphony* which these elegant Exclaimers hope, by this Reflection, to draw necessarily from their Audience, is, "That they themselves are over-fraighted with this Merchandize of Thought; and have not only enough for *Ballast*, but such a *Cargo* over and above, as is enough to sink 'em by its Weight." I am apt however to imagine of these Gentlemen, That it was never their *over-thinking* which oppress'd them; and that if their Thought had ever really become oppressive to 'em, they might thank themselves, for having *under-thought*, or *reason'd short*, so as to rest satisfy'd with a very superfi-

cial Search into Matters of the first and highest Importance.

If, for example, they over-look'd the *chief Enjoyments of Life*, which are founded in *Honesty* and a *good Mind;* if they presum'd *mere Life* to be fully worth what its tenacious Lovers are pleas'd to rate it at; if they thought *publick Distinction, Fame, Power, an Estate*, or *Title*, to be of the same value as is vulgarly conceiv'd, or as they concluded, on a first Thought, without further *Scepticism* or After-deliberation; 'tis no wonder, if being in time become such mature *Dogmatists*, and well-practis'd Dealers in the Affairs of what they call a *Settlement* or *Fortune*, they are so hardly put to it, to find ease or rest within themselves.

These are the deeply-loaded and over-pensive Gentlemen, who esteeming it the truest Wit to pursue what they call their *Interest*, wonder to find they are still as little at ease when they have succeeded, as when they first attempted to advance.

There can never be less *Self-enjoyment* than in these suppos'd wise Characters, these selfish Computers of Happiness and private Good; whose Pursuits of Interest, whether for this World or another, are attended with the same steddy Vein of cunning and low Thought, sordid Deliberations, perverse and crooked Fancys, ill Dispositions, and false Relishes of Life and Manners. The most negligent undesigning thoughtless Rake has not only more of Sociableness, Ease, Tranquillity, and Freedom from worldly Cares,

[302]

but in reality more of Worth, Virtue, and Merit, than such grave Plodders, and *thoughtful* Gentlemen as these.

Chap. 3.

If it happens, therefore, that these graver, more circumspect, and deeply interested Gentlemen, have, for their Soul's sake, and thro' a careful Provision for Hereafter, engag'd in certain Speculations of Religion; their Taste of Virtue, and Relish of Life is not the more improv'd, on this account. The Thoughts they have on these new Subjects of Divinity are so biass'd, and perplex'd, by those Half-Thoughts and raw Imaginations of Interest, and worldly Affairs; that they are still disabled in the rational Pursuit of Happiness and Good: And being necessitated thus to remain Short-Thinkers, they have the Power to go no further than they are led by those to whom, under such Disturbances and Perplexitys, they apply themselves for Cure and Comfort.

[303]

IT HAS been the main Scope and principal End of these Volumes, "To assert the Reality of a Beauty and Charm in *moral* as well as *natural* Subjects; and to demonstrate the Reasonableness of *a proportionate* Taste, and *determinate* Choice, in *Life* and *Manners*." The Standard of this kind, and the noted Character of *Moral* Truth appear so firmly establish'd in Nature it-self, and so widely display'd thro' the intelligent World, that there is no Genius, Mind, or *thinking Principle*, which (if I may say so) is not really *conscious* in the case. Even the most refractory and obstinate Understandings are by certain *Reprises* or *Returns* of Thought, on every occasion, convinc'd of this Existence, and necessitated, in common with others, to acknowledg the actual Right and Wrong.

'Tis evident that whensoever the Mind, influenc'd by Passion or Humour, consents to any Action, Measure, or Rule of Life, contrary to this *governing* STANDARD and *primary* MEASURE of *Intelligence*, it can only be thro' a weak *Thought*, a Scantiness of Judgment, and a Defect in the application of that unavoidable *Impression* and first natural Rule of *Honesty* and *Worth*; against which, whatever is advanc'd, will be of no other moment than to render a

[304]

Chap. 3. Life distracted, incoherent, full of Irresolution, Repentance, and Self-disapprobation.

Thus every Immorality and Enormity of Life can only happen from a partial and narrow View of Happiness and Good. Whatever takes from the *Largeness* or *Freedom of Thought*, must of necessity detract from that first *Relish*, or Taste, on which Virtue and Worth depend.

For instance, when the Eye or Appetite is eagerly fix'd on *Treasure*, and the *money'd* Bliss of *Bags* and *Coffers;* 'tis plain there is a kind of *Fascination* in the case. The Sight is instantly diverted from all other Views of Excellence or Worth. And here, even the Vulgar, as well as the more liberal part of Mankind, discover the contracted Genius, and acknowledg the Narrowness of such a Mind.

In Luxury and Intemperance we easily apprehend how far *Thought* is oppress'd, and the Mind debar'd from just Reflection, and from the *free* Examination and Censure of its own Opinions or Maxims, on which the Conduct of a Life is form'd.

Even in that complicated *Good* of vulgar kind, which we commonly call Interest, in which we comprehend both *Pleasure*, *Riches*, *Power*, and other *exterior Advantages*; we may discern how a *fascinated Sight* contracts a Genius, and by shortning the View even of that very *Interest* which it seeks, betrays the Knave, and necessitates the ablest and wittiest Proselyte of the kind, to expose himself on every Emergency and sudden Turn.

But above all other enslaving Vices, and Restrainers of *Reason* and *just Thought*, the most evidently ruinous and fatal to the Understanding is that of Superstition, Bigotry, and *vulgar* Enthusiasm. This Passion, not contented like other Vices to deceive, and tacitly supplant our Reason, professes open War, holds up the intended Chains and Fetters, and declares its Resolution *to enslave*.

The artificial Managers of this human Frailty declaim against *Free-Thought*, and *Latitude* of Understanding. To go beyond those Bounds of thinking which they have prescrib'd, is by them declar'd a *Sacrilege*. To them, FREEDOM of Mind, a MASTERY of Sense, and

[305]

a Liberty in *Thought* and *Action*, imply Debauch, Corruption, and Depravity.

Chap. 3.

[306]

In consequence of their moral Maxims, and political Establishments, they can indeed advance no better Notion of human Happiness and Enjoyment, than that which is in every respect the most opposite to Liberty. 'Tis to them doubtless that we owe the Opprobriousness and Abuse of those naturally honest Appellations of Free-Livers, Free-Thinkers, Latitudinarians, or whatever other Character implies a Largeness of Mind, and generous Use of Understanding. Fain wou'd they confound Licentiousness in Morals, with Liberty in Thought and Action; and make the Libertine, who has the least Mastery of himself, resemble his direct Opposite. For such indeed is the Man of resolute Purpose and immovable Adherence to REASON, against every thing which Passion, Prepossession, Craft, or Fashion can advance in favour of ought else. But here, it seems, the Grievance lies. 'Tis thought dangerous for us to be over-rational, or too much Masters of our-selves, in what we draw, by just Conclusions, from Reason only. Seldom therefore do these Expositors fail of bringing the Thought of LIBERTY into disgrace. Even at the expence of Virtue, and of that very Idea of GOODNESS on which they build the Mysterys of their profitable Science, they derogate from Morals, and reverse all true Philosophy; they refine on Selfishness, and explode Generosity; promote a slavish Obedience in the room of voluntary Duty, and free Service; exalt blind Ignorance for Devotion, recommend low Thought, decry Reason, extol *Voluptuousness, Wilfulness, Vindicativeness, Arbitrariness, Vain-Glory; and even †deify those weak Passions which are the Disgrace rather than Ornament of human Nature.

[307]

But so far is it from the Nature of *LIBERTY to indulge such *Passions* as these, that whoever acts at any time under the power of any *single-one*, may be said to have already provided for himself *an*

^{*} VOL. II. pag. 256. And below, pag. 310.

[†] VOL. I. pag. 38.

[‡] VOL. II. pag. 252, 432.

Chap. 3. absolute Master. And he who lives under the power of a whole Race, (since 'tis scarce possible to obey one without the other) must of necessity undergo the worst of Servitudes, under the most capricious and domineering Lords.

> That this is no Paradox, even the Writers for Entertainment can inform us; however others may moralize, who discourse or write, as they pretend, for Profit and Instruction. The POETS even of the wanton sort, give ample Testimony of this Slavery and Wretchedness of Vice. They may extol Voluptuousness to the Skies, and point their Wit as sharply as they are able against a virtuous State. But when they come afterwards to pay the necessary Tribute to their commanding Pleasures; we hear their pathetick Moans, and find the inward Discord and Calamity of their Lives. Their Example is the best of Precepts; since they conceal nothing, are sincere, and speak their Passion out aloud. And 'tis in this that the very worst of *Poets* may justly be prefer'd to the generality of modern Philosophers, or other formal Writers of a yet more specious name. The Muses Pupils never fail to express their Passions, and write just as they feel. 'Tis not, indeed, in their nature to do otherwise; whilst they indulge their Vein, and are under the power of that natural Enthusiasm which leads 'em to what is highest in their Performance. They follow Nature. They move chiefly as she moves in 'em; without thought of disguising her free Motions, and genuine Operations, for the sake of any Scheme or Hypothesis, which they have form'd at leisure, and in particular narrow Views. On this account, tho at one time they quarrel perhaps with VIRTUE, for restraining 'em in their forbidden Loves, they can at another time make her sufficient amends; when with indignation they complain, "That MERIT is neglected, and their *worthless Rival prefer'd before them."

[†]To think that the honest heart of a poor man should have no weight against gold!

[308]

[309]

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 141.

[†] Contrane lucrum nil valere candidum Pauperis ingenium? HORAT. Epod. xi. ver. 16.

And thus even in common *Elegiack*, in *Song*, *Ode*, or *Epigram*, consecrated to Pleasure it-self, we may often read the dolorous Confession in behalf of Virtue, and see, at the bottom, how the Case stands:

Chap. 3.

For then and then only are the words of truth drawn from the bottom of a man's heart.³

The airy Poets, in these Fits, can, as freely as the *Tragedian*, condole with Virtue, and bemoan the case of *suffering* Merit;

Th' Oppressor's Wrong, the proud Man's Contumely, The Insolence of Office, and the Spurns That patient MERIT of th' Unworthy takes.

The Poetick Chiefs may give what reason they think fit for their Humour of representing our mad Appetites (especially that of LOVE) under the shape of Urchins and wanton Boys, scarce out of their State of Infancy. The original Design, and Moral of this Fiction, I am persuaded, was to shew us, how little there was of great and heroick in the Government of these Pretenders, how truly weak and childish they were in themselves, and how much lower than mere Children we then became, when we submitted our-selves to their blind Tutorage. There was no fear left in this Fiction the boyish Nature shou'd be misconstru'd as innocent and gentle. The Storms of Passion, so well known in every kind, kept the tyrannick Quality of this wanton Race sufficiently in view. Nor cou'd the poetical Description fail to bring to mind their mischievous and malignant Play. But when the Image of imperious Threatning, and absolute Command, was join'd to that of Ignorance, Puerility, and Folly; the Notion was compleated, of that wretched slavish State, which modern Libertines, in conjunction with some of a graver Character, admire, and represent, as the most eligible of any. - "Happy Condition! (says one) "Happy Life, that of the indulg'd Passions; might we pursue it!—Miserable Condition!

[310

³ Nam verae Voces tum demum pectore ab imo Eliciuntur.

[311]

Chap. 3. Miserable Life, that of REASON and VIRTUE, which we are *bid pursue!"

'Tis the same, it seems, with Men, in *Morals*, as in *Politicks*. When they have been unhappily born and bred to Slavery, they are so far from being sensible of their *slavish* Course of Life, or of that ill' Usage, Indignity and Misery they sustain; that they even admire their own Condition: and being us'd to *think short*, and carry their *Views* no further than those Bounds which were early prescrib'd to 'em; they look upon Tyranny as *a natural Case*, and think Mankind in a sort of dangerous and degenerate State, when under the power of *Laws*, and in the possession of *a free Government*.

We may by these Reflections come easily to apprehend What Men they were who first brought *Reason* and *Free-Thought* under disgrace, and made the noblest of Characters, that of a *Free-Thinker*, to become invidious. 'Tis no wonder if the same Interpreters wou'd have those also to be esteem'd *free* in their Lives, and Masters of *good Living*, who are the least Masters of themselves, and the most impotent in Passion and Humour, of all their Fellow-Creatures. But far be it, and far surely will it ever be, from any worthy Genius, to be consenting to such a treacherous Language, and Abuse of Words. For my own part, I thorowly confide in the *good Powers* of REASON, "That LIBERTY and FREEDOM shall never, by any Artifice or Delusion, be made to pass with me as frightful Sounds, or as reproachful, or invidious, in any sense."

I can no more allow *that* to be *Free-living*, where unlimited Passion, and unexamin'd Fancy govern, than I can allow that to be *a Free Government*, where the mere People govern, and not the Laws. For no People in a Civil State can possibly be *free*, when they are otherwise govern'd than by such *Laws* as they themselves have constituted, or to which they have *freely* given consent. Now to be releas'd from these, so as to govern themselves by each Day's Will or Fancy, and to vary on every Turn the Rule and Measure

[312]

^{*} VOL. II. pag. 256.

of Government, without respect to any antient Constitutions or able State of Tyranny, and absolute Dominion.

Establishments, or to the stated and fix'd Rules of Equity and Justice; is as certain Slavery, as it is Violence, Distraction, and Misery; such as in the Issue must prove the Establishment of an irretriev-

In the Determinations of Life, and in the Choice and Government of Actions, he alone is free who has within himself no Hindrance, or Controul, in acting what he himself, by his best Judgment, and most deliberate Choice, approves. Cou'd VICE agree possibly with it-self; or cou'd the vicious any way reconcile the various Judgments of their inward Counsellors; they might with Justice perhaps assert their Liberty and Independency. But whilst they are necessitated to follow least, what, in their sedate hours, they most approve; whilst they are passively assign'd, and made over from one Possessor to *another, in contrary Extremes, and to different Ends and Purposes, of which they are them-selves wholly ignorant; 'tis evident, That the more they turn †their Eyes (as many times they are oblig'd) towards Virtue and a free Life, the more they must confess their Misery and Subjection. They discern their own Captivity, but not with Force and Resolution sufficient to redeem themselves, and become their own. Such is the real Tragick State, as the old ‡Tragedian represents it:

* Hunccine an hunc sequeris? Subeas alternus oportet Ancipiti obsequio Dominos.-

Pers. Sat. v. ver. 155.

[Are you for following this hook or that? You must submit to each master in turn, with wavering allegiance.]

See VOL. I. pag. 285, 309, 323, &c.

† Magne Pater divûm, saevos punire Tyrannos Haud aliâ ratione velis, cûm dira libido Moverit ingenium ferventi tincta veneno, Virtutem videant, intabescantque relictâ.

Pers. Sat. iii. ver. 35.

[Great father of the Gods, condescend to punish the cruelty of tyrants in no other way, when fierce passion dipped in fiery poison has stirred their souls. Let them look upon virtue and pine to think that they have abandoned her.]

‡ καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα τολμήσω κακά: θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευ-

Chap. 3.

[314]

Chap. 3. ⁴I see and I esteem the better course, I follow the worse.

And thus the highest Spirits, and most refractory Wills, contribute to the lowest Servitude and most submissive State. *Reason* and *Virtue* alone can bestow LIBERTY. *Vice* is unworthy, and unhappy, on this account only, "That it is *slavish* and *debasing*."

THUS HAVE we pleaded the Cause of LIBERTY in general; and vindicated, withal, our Author's particular Freedom, in taking the Person of a *Sceptick*, as he has done in this *last Treatise, on which we have so largely paraphras'd. We may now perhaps, in compliance with general Cusstom, justly presume to add something in defense of the same kind of Freedom we our-selves have assum'd in these latter *Miscellaneous Comments*; since it wou'd doubtless be very unreasonable and unjust, for those who had so freely play'd *the Critick*, to expect any thing less than the same free Treatment, and thorow Criticism in return.

As for the STYLE or *Language* us'd in these *Comments;* 'tis very different, we find; and varys in proportion with the *Author commented*, and with the different *Characters* and *Persons* frequently introduc'd in the original Treatises. So that there will undoubtedly be Scope sufficient for Censure and Correction.'

As for the Observations on Antiquity; we have in most Passages, except the very common and obvious, produc'd our Vouchers and Authoritys in our own behalf. What may be thought of our *Judgment* or *Sense* in the Application of these Authoritys, and in the Deductions and Reasonings we have form'd from such learned Topicks, must be submitted to the Opinion of the Wise and Learned.

In Morals, of which the very Force lies in a love of Discipline,

[315]

μάτων. Eurip. Med. Act. iv. 1078. [And well I know the crime I shall commit, yet rage is stronger than all counsel.]

⁴ — Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.

^{*} Viz. The MORALISTS, or *Philosophick Dialogue*, recited in the Person of a *Sceptick*, under the name of PHILOCLES. See Treatise V. VOL. II. pag. 206, 207, &c.

and in a willingness to *redress* and *rectify* false Thought, and erring Views; we cannot but patiently wait Redress and amicable Censure from the sole competent Judges, *the Wise* and *Good;* whose Interest it has been our whole Endeavour to advance.

Chap. 3.

The only Subject on which we are perfectly secure, and without fear of any just Censure or Reproach, is that of FAITH, and Orthodox Belief. For in the first place, it will appear, that thro' a profound Respect, and religious Veneration, we have forborn so much as to name any of the sacred and solemn Mysterys of *Revelation. And, in the next place, as we can with confidence declare, that we have never in any Writing, publick or private, attempted such high Researches, nor have ever in Practice acquitted our-selves otherwise than as just Conformists to the lawful Church; so we may, in a proper Sense, be said faithfully and dutifully to embrace those holy Mysterys, even in their minutest Particulars, and without the least Exception on account of their amazing Depth. And tho we are sensible that it wou'd be no small hardship to deprive others of a liberty of examining and searching, with due Modesty and Submission, into the nature of those Subjects; yet as for our-selves, who have not the least scruple whatsoever, we pray not any such Grace or Favour in our behalf: being fully assur'd of our own steddy Orthodoxy, Resignation, and intire Submission to the truly Christian and Catholick Doctrines of our Holy Church, as by Law establish'd.

[316]

'Tis true, indeed, that as to †CRITICAL Learning, and the Examination of Originals, Texts, Glosses, various Readings, Styles, Compositions, Manuscripts, Compilements, Editions, Publications, and other Circumstances, such as are common to the Sacred Books with all other Writings and Literature; this we have confidently asserted to be a just and lawful Study. We have even represented this Species of Criticism as necessary to the Preservation and Purity of Scripture; that Sacred Scripture, which has been so miraculously preserv'd in its successive Copys and Transcriptions, under the Eye

[317.

^{*} Supra, pag. 70, 71.

[†] VOL. I. pag. 146, 147.

Chap. 3. (as we must needs suppose) of holy and learned *Criticks*, thro' so many dark Ages of Christianity, to these latter Times; in which Learning has been happily reviv'd.

But if this *critical* Liberty raises any jealousy against us, we shall beg leave of our offended Reader to lay before him our Case, *at the very worst:* That if on such a naked Exposition, it be found criminal, we may be absolutely *condemn'd;* if otherwise, *acquitted,* and with the same favour *indulg'd,* as others *in the same Circumstances* have been before us.

On this occasion therefore, we may be allow'd to borrow something from the Form or Manner of our Dialogue Author, and represent a Conversation of the same free nature as that recited by him in his *Night-Scene; where the suppos'd Sceptick, or Free-Thinker, delivers his Thoughts, and reigns in the Discourse.

'TWAS IN a more considerable Company, and before a more numerous Audience, that not long since, a Gentleman of some Rank, (one who was generally esteem'd to carry a sufficient Caution and Reserve in religious Subjects of Discourse, as well as an apparent Deference to Religion, and in particular to the national and establish'd Church) having been provok'd by an impertinent Attack of a certain violent bigotted Party, was drawn into an open and free Vindication not only of Free-Thinking, but Free-Professing, and Discoursing, in Matters relating to Religion and Faith.

Some of the Company, it seems, after having made bold with him, as to what they fansy'd to be his Principle, began to urge "The Necessity of reducing Men to *one* Profession and Belief." And several Gentlemen, even of those who pass'd for *moderate* in their way, seem'd so far to give into this *Zealot*-Opinion as to agree, "That notwithstanding the *right* Method was not yet found, 'twas highly requisite that some way shou'd be thought on, to reconcile Differences in Opinion; since so long as this Variety shou'd last, Religion, they thought, cou'd never be successfully advanc'd."

[318]

^{*} VOL. II. pag. 321, 2, 3, 4, &c.

To this our Gentleman, at first, answer'd coldly, That "What was *impossible* to be done, cou'd not, he thought, be properly pursu'd, as *necessary* to be done." But the *Raillery* being ill taken, he was forc'd at last to defend himself the best he cou'd, upon this Point; "That Variety of Opinions was not to be cur'd." And "That 'twas impossible All shou'd be of one Mind."

Chap. 3.

[319]

I well know, said he, "That many pious Men, seeing the Inconveniences which the Dis-union of Persuasions and Opinions accidentally produces, have thought themselves oblig'd to stop this Inundation of Mischiefs, and have made Attempts accordingly. Some have endeavour'd to unite these Fractions, by propounding such a Guide, as they were all bound to follow; hoping that the Unity of a Guide wou'd have produc'd Unity of Minds. But who this Guide shou'd be, after all, became such a Question, that 'twas made part of that Fire it-self which was to be extinguish'd. Others thought of a Rule.—This was to be the effectual Means of Union! This was to do the Work, or nothing cou'd!—But supposing all the World had been agreed on this Rule, yet the Interpretation of it was so full of Variety, that this also became part of the Disease."

The Company, upon this Preamble of our Gentleman, press'd harder upon him than before; objecting the Authority of *Holy Scripture* against him, and affirming *this* to be of it-self a sufficient *Guide* and *Rule*. They urg'd again and again that known Saying of a fam'd Controversial Divine of our Church against the Divines of another, "That *the Scripture*, *the Scripture* was the Religion of Protestants."

[320]

To this our Gentleman, at first, reply'd only, by desiring them to explain their word Scripture, and by inquiring into the Original of this Collection of antienter and later Tracts, which in general they comprehended under that Title: Whether it were the apocryphal Scripture, or the more canonical? The full or the half-authoriz'd? The doubtful, or the certain? The controverted, or uncontroverted? The singly-read, or that of various Reading? The Text of these Manuscripts, or of those? The Transcripts, Copys, Titles, Catalogues of this Church and Nation, or of that other? of this Sect

chap. 3. and Party, or of *another?* of those in *one* Age call'd Orthodox, and in possession of Power, or of those who in another overthrew their *Predecessors* Authority, and in their turn also assum'd the Guardianship and Power of holy Things? For how these sacred Records were guarded in those Ages, might easily, he said, be imagin'd by any one who had the least Insight into the History of those Times which we call'd *primitive*, and the Characters of those *Men*, whom we styl'd Fathers of the *Church*.

"It must be confess'd, continu'd he, 'twas a strange Industry and unlucky Diligence which was us'd, in this respect, by these Ecclesiastical Fore-FATHERS. Of all those Heresys which gave them Imployment, we have absolutely no Record, or Monument, but what them-selves who were Adversarys have transmitted to us; and we know that Adversarys, especially such who observe all Opportunitys to discredit both the Persons and Doctrines of their Enemys, are not always the best Recorders or Witnesses of such Transactions." We see it (continu'd he, in a very emphatical, but somewhat embarass'd Style) "We see it now in this very Age, in the present Dis-temperatures, that Partys are no good Registers of the Actions of the adverse Side: And if we cannot be confident of the Truth of a Story now, (now, I say, that it is possible for any Man, especially for the interested Adversary, to discover the Imposture) it is far more unlikely, that After-Ages shou'd know any other Truth than such as serves the ends of the Representers."

Our Gentleman by these Expressions had already given considerable Offense to his Zealot-Auditors. They ply'd him faster with passionate Reproaches, than with Arguments or rational Answers. This, however, serv'd only to animate him the more, and made him proceed the more boldly, with the same assum'd Formality, and air of Declamation, in his general Criticism of *Holy Literature*.

"There are, said he, innumerable Places that contain (no doubt) great Mysterys, but so wrap'd in Clouds, or hid in Umbrages, so heighten'd with Expressions, or so cover'd with Allegorys and Garments of Rhetorick; so profound in the matter, or so alter'd and

[322]

made intricate in the manner; that they may seem to have been left as Trials of our Industry, and as Occasions and Opportunitys for the exercise of mutual Charity and Toleration, rather than as the Repositorys of FAITH, and Furniture of Creeds. For when there are found in the Explications of these Writings, so many Commentarys; so many Senses and Interpretations; so many Volumes in all Ages, and all like Mens Faces, no one exactly like another: either this *Difference* is absolutely no fault at all; or if it be, it is excusable. There are, besides, so many thousands of Copys that were writ by Persons of several Interests and Persuasions, such different Understandings and Tempers, such distinct Abilitys and Weaknesses, that 'tis no wonder there is so great variety of Readings:-whole Verses in one, that are not in another: - whole Books admitted by one Church or Communion, which are rejected by another: and whole Storys and Relations admitted by some Fathers, and rejected by others. - I consider withal, that there have been many Designs and Views in expounding these Writings; many Senses in which they are expounded: and when the Grammatical Sense is found out, we are many times never the nearer. Now there being such variety of Senses in Scripture, and but few Places so mark'd out, as not to be capable of more than one; if Men will write Commentarys by Fancy, what infallible Criterion will be left to judg of the certain Sense of such Places as have been the matter of Question? I consider again, that there are indeed divers Places in these sacred Volumes containing in them Mysterys and Questions of great Concernment; yet such is the Fabrick and Constitution of the Whole, that there is no certain Mark to determine whether the Sense of these Passages shou'd be taken as literal or figurative. There is nothing in the nature of the thing to determine the Sense or Meaning: but it must be gotten out as it can. And therefore 'tis unreasonably requir'd, That what is of it-self ambiguous, shou'd be understood in its own prime Sense and Intention, under the pain of either a Sin, or an Anathema. Very wise Men, even the antient Fathers, have expounded things allegorically, when they shou'd have expounded them literally. Others expound things literally, when they shou'd

Chap. 3.

[323]

[324]

understand them *in Allegory*. If such great Spirits cou'd be deceiv'd in finding out what kind of Senses were to be given to Scriptures, it may well be endur'd that we, who sit at their Feet, shou'd be subject at least to equal Failure. If we follow any One *Translation*, or any One Man's *Commentary*, what *Rule* or Direction shall we have, by which to chuse that One aright? Or is there any *one* Man, that hath translated *perfectly*, or expounded *infallibly*? If we resolve to follow *any one* as far only as we like, or fansy; we shall then only do wrong or right *by Chance*. If we resolve absolutely to follow *any-one*, whither-soever he leads, we shall probably come at last, where, if we have any Eyes left, we shall see our-selves become sufficiently ridiculous."

The Reader may here perhaps, by his natural Sagacity, remark a certain air of study'd Discourse and Declamation, not so very proper or natural in the mouth of a mere *Gentleman*, nor sutable to a Company where alternate Discourse is carry'd on, in un-concerted Measure, and un-premeditated Language. Something there was so very emphatical, withal, in the delivery of these words, by the *sceptical* Gentleman; that some of the Company who were still more incens'd against him for these Expressions, began to charge him as a *Preacher* of pernicious Doctrines, one who attack'd Religion *in form*, and carry'd his Lessons or Lectures about with him, to repeat by rote, at any time, to the *Ignorant* and *Vulgar*, in order to seduce them.

'Tis true indeed, said he, Gentlemen! that what I have here ventur'd to repeat, is address'd chiefly to those you call *Ignorant;* such, I mean, as being otherwise engag'd in the World, have had little time perhaps to bestow upon Inquirys into Divinity-Matters. As for you, Gentlemen! in particular, who are so much displeas'd with my *Freedom;* I am well assur'd, you are in effect so able and knowing, that the Truth of every Assertion I have advanc'd is sufficiently understood and acknowledg'd by you; however it may happen, that, in your great Wisdom, you think it proper to conceal these Matters from such Persons as you are pleas'd to style *the Vulgar*.

[326]

'Tis true, withal, Gentlemen! continu'd he, I will confess to you, That the words you have heard repeated, are not my own. They are no other than what have been publickly and solemnly deliver'd, even by *one of the Episcopal Order, a celebrated *Churchman*, and

Chap. 3.

* The pious and learned Bishop TAYLOR, in his Treatise on the Liberty of Prophesying, printed in his Collection of Polemical and Moral Discourses, Anno 1657. The Pages answering to the Places above-cited are 401, 402, (and in the Epistle-Dedicatory, three or four Leaves before) 438, 439-444, 451, 452. After which, in the succeeding Page, he sums up his Sense on this Subject of sacred Literature, and the Liberty of Criticism, and of private Judgment and Opinion in these Matters, in the following words: "Since there are so many Copys, with infinite Varietys of Reading; since a various Interpunction, a Parenthesis, a Letter, an Accent may much alter the Sense; since some Places have divers literal Senses, many have spiritual, mystical, and allegorical Meanings; since there are so many Tropes, Metonymys, Ironys, Hyperboles, Proprietys and Improprietys of Language, whose understanding depends upon such Circumstances, that it is almost impossible to know the proper Interpretation, now that the knowledg of such Circumstances and particular Storys is irrecoverably lost: since there are some Mysterys, which at the best Advantage of Expression, are not easy to be apprehended, and whose Explication, by reason of our Imperfections, must needs be dark, sometimes weak, sometimes unintelligible: And lastly, since those ordinary means of expounding Scripture, as searching the Originals, Conference of Places, Parity of Reason, and Analogy of Faith, are all dubious, uncertain, and very fallible; he that is the wisest, and by consequence the likeliest to expound truest, in all probability of Reason, will be very far from Confidence; because every one of these, and many more, are like so many degrees of Improbability and Incertainty, all depressing our Certainty of finding out Truth, in such Mysterys, and amidst so many Difficultys. And therefore a wise Man that considers this, wou'd not willingly be prescrib'd to by others; for it is best every Man shou'd be left in that liberty, from which no Man can justly take him, unless he cou'd secure him from Error." The Reverend Prelate had but a few Pages before (viz. pag. 427.) acknowledg'd, indeed, "That we had an Apostolical Warrant to contend earnestly for the Faith." But then, (says the good Bishop, very candidly and ingenuously) "As these Things recede farther from the Foundation, our Certainty is the less.—And therefore it were very fit that our Confidence shou'd be according to our Evidence, and our Zeal according to our Confidence." He adds, pag. 507. "All these Disputes concerning Tradition, Councils, Fathers, &c. are not Arguments against or besides Reason, but Contestations and Pretenses of the best Arguments, and the most certain Satisfaction of our Reason. But then all these coming into question, submit themselves to Reason, that is, to be judg'd by human Understanding, upon the best Grounds and Information it can receive. So that Scripture, Tradition, Councils, and Fathers, are the Evidence in a Question, but Reason is the Judg: That is, we being the Persons that are to be persuaded, we must see that we be persuaded reasonably; and it is unreasonable to assent to a lesser Evidence, when a greater and clearer is

Chap. 3. [327]

[328]

one of the highest sort; as appears by his many devotional Works, which carry the Rites, Ceremonys and Pomp of Worship, with the Honour and Dignity of the Priestly and Episcopal Order, to the highest Degree. In effect, we see the Reverend Doctor's Treatises standing, as it were, in the Front of this Order of Authors, and as the foremost of those Good-Books us'd by the politest and most refin'd Devotees of either Sex. They maintain the principal Place in the Study of almost every elegant and high Divine. They stand in Folio's and other Volumes, adorn'd with variety of Pictures, Gildings, and other Decorations, on the advanc'd Shelves or Glass-Cupboards of the Ladys Closets. They are in use at all Seasons, and for all Places, as well for Church-Service as Closet-Preparation; and, in short, may vie with any devotional Books in British Christendom. And for the Life and Character of the Man himself; I leave it to you, Gentlemen, (you, I mean, of the Zealotkind) to except against it, if you think proper. 'Tis your Manner, I know, and what you never fail to have recourse to, when any Authority is produc'd against you. Personal Reflection is always seasonable, and at hand, on such an occasion. No matter what Virtue, Honesty, or Sanctity may lie in the Character of the Person cited. No matter tho he be ever so much, in other respects, of your own Party, and devoted to your Interest. If he has indiscreetly spoken some Home-Truth, or discover'd some Secret which strikes at the temporal Interests of certain spiritual Societys; he is quickly doom'd to Calumny and Defamation.'

[329]

I shall try this Experiment, however, once more, (continu'd our Gentleman) and as a Conclusion to this Discourse, will venture to produce to you a further Authority of the same kind. You shall have it before you, in the exact Phrase and Words of the great Author, in his *theological* Capacity; since I have now no further occasion to

propounded: but of that every Man for himself is to take cognizance, if he be able to judg; if he be not, he is not bound under the tie of necessity to know any thing of it."

conceal my Citations, and accommodate them to the more familiar Style and Language of Conversation.

Chap. 3.

Our excellent *Archbishop, and late Father of our Church, when expresly treating that very Subject of a Rule *in matters of Belief*, in opposition to Mr. S... and Mr. R... his Romish Antagonists, shews plainly how great a shame it is, for us *Protestants* at least, (whatever the Case may be with *Romanists*) to disallow *Difference* of Opinions, and forbid private *Examination*, and *Search* into matters of *antient* RECORD, and *scriptural* TRADITION; when, at the same time, we have no pretence to *oral* or *verbal*; no Claim to any absolute superior Judg, or decisive Judgment in the Case; no Polity, Church, or Community; no particular Man, or number of Men, who are not, even by our own Confession, plainly *fallible*, and subject to *Error* and *Mistake*.

[330]

"The Protestants" (says his Grace, speaking in the Person of Mr. S... and the *Romanists*) "cannot know *how many* the Books of Scripture ought to be; and Which of the many controverted ones may be securely put in that Catalogue; Which not. - But I shall tell him, replies his Grace, That we know that just so many ought to be receiv'd as un-controverted Books, concerning which it cannot be shewn there was ever any Controversy." It was not incumbent perhaps on my Lord Archbishop to help Mr. S.... so far in his Objection, as to add, That in reality the burning, suppressing, and interpolating Method, so early in fashion, and so tightly practis'd on the Epistles, Comments, Historys, and Writings of the Orthodox and Hereticks of old, made it impossible to say with any kind of Assurance, "What Books, Copys, or Transcripts those were, concerning which there was never any Controversy at all." This indeed wou'd be a Point not so easily to be demonstrated. But his Grace proceeds, in shewing the Weakness of the Romish Pillar, Tradition. "For it must either," says he, "acknowledg some Books to have been controverted, or not. If not, why doth he make a Supposition of

[331]

^{*} Viz. Archbishop TILLOTSON in his Rule of Faith, pag. 677.

controverted Books? If Oral Tradition acknowledges some Books Chap. 3. to have been controverted; then it cannot assure us that they have not been controverted; nor consequently that they ought to be receiv'd as never having been controverted; but only as such, concerning which those Churches who did once raise a Controversy about them, have been since satisfy'd that they are *Canonical. — Where is then the Infallibility of Oral Tradition? How does the living Voice of the present Church assure us, that what Books are now receiv'd by Her, were ever receiv'd by Her? And if it cannot do this, but the matter must come to be try'd by the best Records of former Ages, (which the Protestants are willing to have the Catalogue try'd by) then it seems the Protestants have a better way to know what Books are Canonical, than is the infallible way of Oral Tradition. And so [332] long as 'tis better, no matter tho it be not call'd Infallible." —

Thus the free and generous Archbishop. For, indeed, what greater *Generosity* is there, than in owning Truth frankly and openly, even where the greatest Advantages may be taken by an Adversary? Accordingly, our worthy Archbishop, speaking again immediately in the Person of his Adversary, "The Protestants," says †he, "cannot know that the very *Original*, or a *perfectly true Copy* of these Books, hath been preserv'd." "Nor is it necessary," replies the Archbishop, "that they shou'd know either of these. It is sufficient that they know that those Copys which they have, are not materially corrupted.—But how do the Church of *Rome* know that they have *perfectly true Copys* of the Scriptures in the *original* Languages? They do not pretend to know this. The learned Men of

^{*} His Grace subjoins immediately: "The Traditionary Church *now*, receives the Epistle to the *Hebrews* as Canonical. I ask, Do they receive it as ever deliver'd for such? That they must, if they receive it from Oral Tradition, which conveys things to them under this Notion as ever deliver'd; and yet St. *Hierom* (speaking not as a *Speculator*, but a *Testifier*) says expressly of it, *That the Custom of the Latin Church doth not receive it among the Canonical Scriptures*. What saith Mr. S.... to this? It is clear from this Testimony, that the *Roman* Church in St. *Hierom*'s time did not acknowledg this *Epistle* for Canonical; and 'tis as plain, that the present *Roman* Church doth receive it for Canonical."

[†] Pag. 678.

that Church acknowledg the *various Readings* as well as we, and do not pretend to know, otherwise than by *probable Conjecture*, (as we also may do) Which of those *Readings* is the *true-one*."*—'

Chap. 3.

[333]

And thus, continu'd our *Lay*-Gentleman, I have finish'd my *Quotations*, which I have been necessitated to bring in my own Defense; to prove to you That I have asserted nothing on this Head of *Religion*, *Faith*, or the Sacred *Mysterys*, which has not been justify'd and confirm'd by the most celebrated *Church-Men* and

* The Reader perhaps may find it worth while to read after this, what the Archbishop represents (pag. 716, &c.) of the plausible Introduction of the grossest Article of Belief, in the times when the Habit of making Creeds came in fashion. And accordingly it may be understood, of what effect the dogmatizing Practice in Divinity has ever been. "We will suppose then, that about the time, when universal Ignorance, and the genuine Daughter of it, (call her Devotion or Superstition) had over-spread the World, and the generality of People were strongly inclin'd to believe strange things; and even the greatest Contradictions were recommended to them under the notion of MYSTERYS, being told by their Priests and Guides, That the more contradictious any thing is to Reason, the greater merit there is in believing it: I say, let us suppose, that in this state of things, one or more of the most Eminent then in the Church, either out of Design, or out of superstitious Ignorance and Mistake of the Sense of our Saviour's Words used in the Consecration of the Sacrament, shou'd advance this new Doctrine, that the words of Consecration, &c. * * * Such a Doctrine as this was very likely to be advanc'd by the ambitious Clergy of that time, as a probable means to draw in the People to a greater Veneration of them. * * * Nor was such a Doctrine less likely to take and prevail among the People, in an Age prodigiously ignorant and strongly inclin'd to Superstition, and thereby well-prepar'd to receive the grossest Absurdities under the notion of Mysterys. * * * Now supposing such a Doctrine as this, so fitted to the Humour and Temper of the Age, to be once asserted either by chance or out of design, it wou'd take like Wild-fire; especially if by some one or more who bore sway in the Church, it were but recommended with convenient Gravity and Solemnity. * * * And for the Contradictions contain'd in this Doctrine, it was but telling the People then, (as they do in effect now) That Contradictions ought to be no Scruple in the way of Faith; That the more impossible any thing is, 'tis the fitter to be believ'd; That it is not praise-worthy to believe plain Possibilitys, but this is the Gallantry and heroical Power of Faith, this is the way to oblige God Almighty for ever to us, to believe flat and downright Contradictions. * * * The more absurd and unreasonable any thing is, it is for that very reason the more proper matter for an Article of Faith. And if any of these Innovations be objected against, as contrary to former Belief and Practice, it is but putting forth a lusty Act of Faith, and believing another Contradiction, That tho they be contrary, yet they are the same." Above, pag. 80, 1, 2.

respected Divines. You may now proceed in your Invectives; be-Chap. 3. stowing as free Language of that kind, as your Charity and Breeding will permit. And You, Reverend SIRS! who have assum'd a Character which sets you above that of the mere Gentleman, and [334] releases you from those Decorums, and constraining Measures of Behaviour to which we of an inferior sort are bound; You may liberally deal your religious Compliments and Salutations in what Dialect you think fit; since for my own part, neither the Names of Heterodox, Schismatick, Heretick, Sceptick, nor even INFIDEL, or ATHEIST it-self, will in the least scandalize me, whilst the Sentence comes only from your mouths. On the contrary, I rather strive with my-self to suppress whatever Vanity might naturally arise in me, from such Favour bestow'd. For whatever may, in the bottom, be intended me, by such a Treatment; 'tis impossible [335] for me to term it other than Favour; since there are certain En-

> If, contrary to the Rule and Measure of Conversation, I have drawn the Company's Attention towards me thus long, without affording them an Intermission, during my Recital; they will, I hope, excuse me, the rather, because they heard the other *Recitals*, and were Witnesses to the heavy Charge and personal Reflection, which without any real Provocation was made upon me in publick, by these Zealot-Gentlemen, to whom I have thus reply'd. And notwithstanding they may, after such Breaches of Charity as are usual with them, presume me equally out of Charity, on my own side; I will take upon me however to give them this good Advice, at parting: "That since they have of late been so elated by some seeming Advantages, and a Prosperity, which they are ill fitted to bear; they wou'd at least beware of accumulating too hastily those high Characters, Appellations, Titles, and Ensigns of Power, which may be Tokens, perhaps, of what they expect hereafter, but which, as yet, do not answer the real Power and Authority bestow'd on them." The Garb and Countenance will be more graceful, when the Thing it-self is secur'd to 'em, and in their actual possession.

> mitys, which it will be ever esteem'd a real Honour to have merited.

[336]

Mean while, the Anticipation of high Titles, Honours, and nominal Dignitys, beyond the common Style and antient Usage; tho it may be highly fashionable at present, may not prove beneficial or advantageous in the end.

Chap. 3.

I wou'd, in particular, advise my elegant Antagonists of this *Zealot*-kind; That among the many Titles they assume to themselves, they wou'd be rather more sparing in that high-one of Embassador, till such time as they have just Means and Foundation to join that of Plenipotentiary together with it. For as matters stand hitherto in our *British* World, neither their Commission *from the Sovereign*, nor that which they pretend from *Heaven*, amounts to any absolute or determining *Power*.

The first holy Messengers (for That I take to be the highest apostolick Name) brought with them their proper Testimonials, in their Lives, their Manners and Behaviour; as well as in powerful Works, Miracles, and Signs from Heaven. And tho indeed it might well be esteem'd a Miracle in the kind, shou'd our present Messengers go about to represent their Predecessors in any part of their Demeanour or Conversation; yet there are further Miracles remaining for 'em to perform, ere they can in modesty plead the Apostolick or Messenger-Authority. For tho, in the torrent of a sublime and figurative Style, a holy Apostle may have made use, perhaps, of such a Phrase as that of Embassy or Embassador, to express the Dignity of his Errand; 'twere to be wish'd that some who were never sent of any Errand or Message at all from God himself, wou'd use a modester Title to express their voluntary Negotiation between Us and Heaven.

[337]

I must confess, for my own part, that I think the Notion of an Embassy from *thence* to be at best somewhat high-strain'd, in the metaphorical way of Speech. But certain I am, that if there be any such *Residentship* or *Agentship* now establish'd; 'tis not immediately from God *himself*, but thro' *the Magistrate*, and by *the Prince* or *Sovereign Power* here on Earth, that these Gentlemen-*Agents* are appointed, distinguish'd, and set over us. They have undoubt-

Chap. 3. [338]

[339]

edly a *legal Charter, and Character, legal Titles, and Precedencys, legal Habits, Coats of Arms, Colours, Badges.' But they may do well to consider, That a thousand Badges or Liverys bestow'd by Men merely, can never be sufficient to entitle 'em to the same Authority as Theirs, who bore the immediate Testimony and Miraculous Signs of Power, from Above. For in this case, there was need only of Eyes, and ordinary Senses, to distinguish the Commission, and acknowledg the Embassy or Message as divine.

But allowing it ever so *certain* a Truth, "That there has been a thousand or near two thousand Years *Succession* in this Commission of Embassy": Where shall we find this *Commission* to have lain?—How has it been supply'd still, or *renew'd?*—How often *dormant?*—How often *divided*, even in one and the same Species of Claimants?—What Party are they, among Moderns, who by virtue of any *immediate Testimonial* from *Heaven* are thus intitled?—Where are the Letters-Patent? *The* Credentials? For *these* shou'd, in the nature of the thing, be *open*, *visible*, and *apparent*.

A certain Indian of the Train of the Embassador-Princes sent to us lately from some of those Pagan Nations, being engag'd, one Sunday, in visiting our Churches, and happening to ask his Interpreter," "Who the eminent Persons were whom he observ'd haranguing so long, with such Authority from a high Place?" was answer'd, "They were Embassadors from the Almighty, or (according to the Indian Language) from the Sun." Whether the Indian took this seriously or in raillery, did not appear. But having afterwards call'd in, as he went along, at the Chapels of some of his Brother-Embassadors, of the Romish Religion, and at some other Christian Dissenting Congregations, where Matters, as he perceiv'd, were transacted with greater Privacy, and inferior State; he ask'd, "Whether *These* also were *Embassadors* from the same Place." He was answer'd, "That they had indeed been heretofore of the Embassy, and had Possession of the same chief Places he had seen: But they were now succeeded there, by Others." "If those there-

^{*} VOL. I. pag. 362.

fore," reply'd the Indian, "were *Embassadors* from *the* Sun; *these*, I take for granted, are from *the* Moon."

Chap. 3.

Supposing, indeed, one had been no Pagan, but a good Christian; conversant in the original Holy Scriptures, but unacquainted with the Rites, Titles, Habits and Ceremonials, of which there is no mention in those Writings: Might one not have inquir'd, with humble Submission, into this Affair? Might one not have softly, and at a distance, apply'd for information concerning this high Embassy; and addressing perhaps to some inferior Officer or Livery-Man of the Train, ask'd modestly, "How and Whence they came? Whose Equipage they appear'd in? At Whose Charges they were entertain'd? and by Whose Suffrage or Command appointed and authoriz'd?—Is it true, pray SIRS! that their Excellencys of the present Establishment, are the sole-commission'd? Or are there as many real Commissioners as there are Pretenders? If so; there can be no great danger for us, which-ever way we apply our-selves. We have ample Choice, and may adhere to which COMMISSION we like best. If there be only ONE single TRUE-one; we have then, it seems, good reason to look about us, search narrowly into the Affair, be scrupulous in our Choice, and (as the current *Physick*-Bills admonish us) beware of Counterfeits; since there are so many of these abroad, with earthly Powers, and temporal Commissions, to back their spiritual Pretenses."-

[340]

'Tis to be fear'd, in good earnest, that the Discernment of this kind will prove pretty difficult; especially amidst this universal *Contention, Embroil,* and *Fury* of religious' Challengers, these high *Defiances* of contrary Believers, this zealous Opposition of *Commission* to *Commission*; and this Din of *Hell, Anathema's*, and *Damnations*, rais'd every where by one religious Party against another.

[341]

So far are the pretendedly *commission'd Partys* from producing their *Commission* openly, or proving it from the original Record, or Court-Rolls of Heaven, that they deny us inspection into these very Records they plead, and refuse to submit their *Title* to human Judgment or Examination.

A Poet of our Nation insinuates indeed in their behalf, That they

Chap. 3. are fair enough in this respect. For when the murmuring People, speaking by their chosen Orator, or *Spokes-man*, to the Priests, says to 'em,

With Ease you take what we provide with Care,
And we who your LEGATION must
maintain,
Find all your Tribe in the Commission are,
And none but HEAV'N cou'd send so
large a TRAIN;

The Apologist afterwards excusing this Boldness of the People, and soothing the incens'd Priests with fairer Words, says to 'em, on a foot of *Moderation*, which he presumes to be their Character:

*You with such Temper their Intemperance bear, To shew your solid Science does rely So on it-self, as you no Trial fear: For Arts are weak that are of Scepticks shy.

The Poet, it seems, never dreamt of a time when the very *Countenance* of *Moderation* shou'd be out of fashion with the Gentlemen of this Order, and the *Word* it-self exploded as unworthy of their *Profession*. And, indeed, so far are they at present from bearing with any Sceptick, or *Inquirer*, ever so *modest* or discreet, that to hear an Argument on a contrary side to theirs, or read whatever may be writ in answer to their particular Assertions, is made the highest Crime. Whilst they have among themselves such Differences, and sharp Debates, about their *heavenly* Commission, and are even *in one and the same* Community or Establishment, divided into different *Sects* and *Headships*; they will allow no particular Survey or Inspection into the Foundations of their controverted Title. They wou'd have us inferior passive Mortals, amaz'd as we are, and beholding with astonishment from afar these tremendous Subjects of Dispute, wait blindfold the Event and final

[343]

^{*} GONDIBERT, Book ii. Canto 1.

Decision of the Controversy. Nor is it enough that we are merely passive. 'Tis requir'd of us, That in the midst of this irreconcilable Debate concerning heavenly Authoritys and Powers, we shou'd be as confident of the Veracity of some one, as of the Imposture and Cheat of all the other Pretenders: and that believing firmly there is still A real Commission at the bottom, we shou'd endure the Misery of these Conflicts, and engage on one side or the other, as we happen to have our Birth or Education; till by Fire and Sword, Execution, Massacre, and a kind of Depopulation of this Earth, it be *determin'd at last amongst us, "Which is the true Commission, exclusive of all others, and superior to the rest."

HERE our *secular* Gentleman, who in the latter end of his Discourse had already made several Motions and Gestures which betoken'd a Retreat, made his final Bow in form, and quitted the Place and Company for that time; till (as he told his Auditors) he had another Opportunity, and fresh Leisure to hear, in his turn, whatever his *Antagonists* might anew object to him, in a Manner more favourable and moderate; or, if they so approv'd, in the same *Temper*, and with the same *Zeal* as they had done before.'

Chap. 3.

[344]

[345]

^{*} Supra, pag. 89.

TREATISE VII

VIZ.

A Notion of the Historical Draught or Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules,

According to PRODICUS, Lib. II. Xen. de Mem. Soc.

With a Letter concerning DESIGN.

Find more important Herculean tasks, hard labors, than all the loves, the banquets, and the featherly comforts of Sardanapolus.* Juv. Sat. 10.

Printed first in the Year M.DCC.XIII.

*Potiores HERCULIS aerumnas credat, saevosque Labores, Et Venere, & coenis, & plumâ SARDANAPALI.



THE Judgment of Hercules

INTRODUCTION

BEFORE we enter on the Examination of our Historical Sketch, it may be proper to remark, that by the word *Tablature* (for which we have yet no name in *English*, besides the general one of *Picture*) we denote, according to the original word Tabula, a Work not only distinct from a mere *Portraiture*, but from all those wilder sorts of Painting which are in a manner absolute, and independent; such as the Paintings *in Fresco* upon the Walls, the Cielings, the Stair-Cases, the Cupolo's, and other remarkable Places either of Churches or Palaces.

[348]

(2.) Accordingly we are to understand, that it is not merely the

Intro.

Shape or Dimension of a Cloth, or Board, which denominates the Piece or Tablature; since a Work of this kind may be compos'd of any colour'd Substance, as it may of any Form; whether square, oval or round. But 'tis then that in Painting we may give to any particular Work the Name of Tablature, when the Work is in reality "a Single Piece, comprehended in one View, and form'd according to one single Intelligence, Meaning, or Design; which constitutes a real Whole, by a mutual and necessary Relation of its Parts, the same as of the Members in a natural Body." So that one may say of a Picture compos'd of any number of Figures differently rang'd, and without any regard to this Correspondency or Union describ'd, That it is no more a real Piece or Tablature, than a Picture wou'd be a Man's Picture, or proper Portraiture, which represented on the same Cloth, in different places, the Legs, Arms, Nose, and Eyes of such a Person, without adjusting them according to the true Proportion, Air, and Character which belong'd to him.

[349]

- (3.) This Regulation has place even in the inferior degrees of Painting; since the mere Flower-Painter is, we see, oblig'd to study the Form of *Festons*, and to make use of a peculiar Order, or Architecture of *Vases, Jars, Cannisters, Pedestals*, and other Inventions, which serve as *Machines*, to frame a certain proportionate Assemblage, or united Mass; according to the Rules of Perspective; and with regard as well to the different shapes and sizes of his several Flowers, as to the harmony of Colours resulting from the whole: this being the only thing capable of rendering his Work worthy the name of a *Composition* or *real Piece*.
- (4.) So much the more, therefore, is this Regulation applicable to *History-Painting*, where not only *Men*, but *Manners*, and human Passions are represented. Here *the Unity of Design* must with more particular exactness be preserv'd, according to the just Rules of poetick Art; that in the Representation of any Event, or remarkable Fact, the *Probability*, or *seeming Truth*, which is the *real Truth* of Art, may with the highest advantage be supported and advanc'd: as we shall better understand in the Argument which follows on the historical *Tablature* of *The Judgment of Hercules*; who being young, and retir'd to a solitary place in order to deliberate on

[350]

the Choice he was to make of the different ways of Life, was accosted (as our Historian relates) by the two Goddesses, VIRTUE and PLEASURE. 'Tis on the issue of the Controversy between these *Two*, that the Character of HERCULES depends. So that we may naturally give to this Piece and History, as well the Title of *The Education*, as *the Choice* or *Judgment of* HERCULES.

Chap. 1.

CHAPTER I

Of the general Constitution or Ordonnance of the Tablature

THIS Fable or History may be variously represented, according to the Order of Time:

Either in the instant when the two Goddesses, VIRTUE and PLEASURE, accost HERCULES;

Or when they are enter'd on their Dispute;

Or when their Dispute is already far advanc'd, and VIRTUE seems to gain her Cause.

(2.) According to the *first* Notion, HERCULES must of necessity seem' surpriz'd on the first appearance of such miraculous Forms. He admires, he contemplates; but is not yet ingag'd or interested. According to the *second* Notion, he is interested, divided, and in doubt. According to the *third*, he is wrought, agitated, and torn by contrary Passions. 'Tis the last Effort of the vitious one, striving for possession over him. He agonizes, and with all his Strength of Reason endeavours to overcome himself:

And the spirit is overwhelmed by reason, and it struggles to be conquered.¹

(3.) Of these different Periods of Time, the latter has been chosen; as being the only one of the three, which can well serve to express *the grand Event*, or consequent *Resolution* of HERCULES, and the *Choice* he actually made of a Life full of Toil and Hard-

[26]

¹ Et premitur ratione animus, vincique laborat.

Chap. I. ship, under the conduct of VIRTUE, for the deliverance of Mankind from Tyranny and Oppression. And 'tis to such a Piece, or *Tablature*, as represents this Issue of the Balance, in our pondering Hero, that we may justly give the Title of the Decision or Judgment of HERCULES.

- (4.) The same History may be represented yet according to a fourth Date or Period: as at the time when Hercules is intirely won by Virtue. But then the signs of this resolute Determination reigning absolutely in the Attitude, and Air of our young Hero; there wou'd be no room left to represent his Agony, or inward Conflict, which indeed makes the principal Action here; as it wou'd do in a Poem, were this Subject to be treated by a good Poet. Nor wou'd there be any more room left in this case, either for the persuasive Rhetorick of VIRTUE, who must have already ended her Discourse, or for the insinuating Address of Pleasure, who having lost her Cause, must necessarily appear displeas'd, or out of humour: a Circumstance which wou'd no way sute her Character.
- (5.) In the original Story or Fable of this Adventure of our young Hercules, 'tis particularly noted, that Pleasure, advancing hastily before Virtue, began her Plea, and was heard with prevention; as being first in turn. And as this Fable is wholly *philosophical* and *moral*, this Circumstance in particular is to be consider'd as essential.
- (6.) In this *third* Period therefore of our History (dividing it, as we have done, into *four* successive Dates or Points of Time) HERCULES being Auditor, and attentive, speaks not. PLEASURE has spoken. VIRTUE is still speaking. She is about the middle, or towards the end of her Discourse; in the place where, according to just Rhetorick, the highest Tone of Voice and strongest Action are employ'd.
- (7.) 'Tis evident, that every Master in Painting, when he has made choice of the determinate Date or Point of Time, according to which he wou'd represent his History, is afterwards debar'd the taking advantage from any other Action than what is immediately present, and belonging to that single Instant he describes. For if he passes the present only for a moment, he may as well

[352]

[353]

Chap. 1.

pass it for many years. And by this reckoning he may with as good right repeat the same Figure several times over, and in one and the same Picture represent Hercules in his Cradle, struggling with the Serpents; and the same Hercules of full Age, fighting with the *Hydra*, with *Anteus*, and with *Cerberus:* which wou'd prove a mere confus'd Heap, or Knot of Pieces, and not a single intire *Piece*, or *Tablature*, of the historical kind.

[354]

- (8.) It may however be allowable, on some occasions, to make use of certain *enigmatical* or *emblematical* Devises, to represent a future Time: as when HERCULES, yet a mere Boy, is seen holding a small Club, or wearing the Skin of a young Lion. For so we often find him in the best *Antiques*. And tho History had never related of HERCULES, that being yet very young, he kill'd a Lion with his own hand; this Representation of him wou'd nevertheless be intirely conformable to *poetick Truth;* which not only admits, but necessarily presupposes *Prophecy* or *Prognostication,* with regard to the Actions, and Lives of Heroes and Great Men. Besides that as to our Subject, in particular, the natural Genius of HERCULES, even in his tenderest Youth, might alone answer for his handling such Arms as these, and bearing, as it were in play, these early tokens of the future Hero.
- (9.) To preserve therefore a just Conformity with *historical Truth*, and with the *Unity of Time* and *Action*, there remains no other way by which we can possibly give a hint of any thing future, or call to mind any thing past, than by setting in view such Passages or Events as have actually subsisted, or according to Nature might well subsist, or happen together in *one and the same* instant. And this is what we may properly call *The Rule of Consistency*.
- (10.) How is it therefore possible, says one, to express a Change of Passion in any Subject, since this Change is made by Succession; and that in this case the Passion which is understood as present, will require a Disposition of Body and Features wholly different from the Passion which is over, and past? To this we answer, That notwithstanding the Ascendency or Reign of the principal and immediate Passion, the Artist has power to leave still in his Subject the Tracts or Footsteps of its Predecessor: so as to let us behold not

L355.

only a rising Passion together with a declining one; but, what is more, a strong and determinate Passion, with its contrary already discharg'd and banish'd. As for instance, when the plain Tracts of Tears new fallen, with other fresh tokens of Mourning and Dejection, remain still in a Person newly transported with Joy at the sight of a Relation or Friend, who the moment before had been lamented as one deceas'd or lost.

- (11.) Again, by the same means which are employ'd to call to mind the Past, we may anticipate the Future: as wou'd be seen in the case of an able Painter, who shou'd undertake to paint this History of HERCULES according to the third Date or Period of Time propos'd for our historical Tablature. For in this momentary Turn of Action, HERCULES remaining still in a situation expressive of Suspense and Doubt, wou'd discover nevertheless that the Strength of this inward Conflict was over, and that Victory began now to declare her-self in favour of Virtue. This Transition, which seems at first so mysterious a Performance, will be easily comprehended, if one considers, That the Body, which moves much slower than the Mind, is easily out-strip'd by this latter; and that the Mind on a sudden turning it-self some new way, the nearer situated and more sprightly parts of the Body (such as the Eyes, and Muscles about the Mouth and Forehead) taking the alarm, and moving in an instant, may leave the heavier and more distant Parts to adjust them-selves, and change their Attitude some moments after.
- (12.) This different Operation may be distinguish'd by the names of *Anticipation* and *Repeal*.
- (13.) If by any other method an Artist shou'd pretend to introduce into this Piece any portion of Time, future or past, he must either sin directly against the Law of *Truth* and *Credibility*, in representing things contrary and incompatible; or against that Law of *Unity* and *Simplicity of Design*, which constitutes the very Being of his Work. This particularly shews it-self in a Picture, when one is necessarily left in doubt, and unable to determine readily, *Which* of the distinct successive parts of the History or Action is that *veryone* represented in the Design. For even here the case is the same as

[356]

[357]

in the other Circumstances of Poetry and Painting: "That what is principal or chief, shou'd immediately shew it-self, without leaving the Mind in any uncertainty."

Chap. 2.

(14.) According to this Rule of the *Unity of Time*, if one shou'd ask an Artist, who had painted this History of *The Judgment of* Hercules, *"Which of these four Periods or Dates of Time above propos'd he intended in his Picture to represent"; and it shou'd happen that he cou'd not readily answer, 'Twas this, or that: It wou'd appear plainly he had never form'd a *real Notion* of his Workmanship, or of the History he intended to represent. So that when he had executed even to a Miracle all those other Beautys requisite in *a Piece*, and had fail'd in this single one, he wou'd from hence alone be prov'd to be in truth no *History-Painter*, or Artist in the kind, who understood not so much as how to form the real Design of a *historical Piece*.

[358

CHAPTER II

Of the First or Principal Figure

TO apply therefore what has been said above to our immediate Design or *Tablature* in hand; we may observe, in the first place, with regard to HERCULES, (the *first* or *principal Figure* of our Piece) that being plac'd in the middle, between the two Goddesses, he shou'd by a skilful Master be so drawn, as even setting

* If the same Question concerning the *instantaneous* Action, or present Moment of Time, were apply'd to many famous historical Paintings much admir'd in the World, they wou'd be found very defective: as we may learn by the Instance of that single Subject of ACTEON, one of the commonest in Painting. Hardly is there any where seen a Design of this poetical History, without a ridiculous Anticipation of the *Metamorphosis*. The Horns of ACTEON, which are the Effect of a Charm, shou'd naturally wait the execution of that Act in which the Charm consists. Till the Goddess therefore has thrown her Cast, the Hero's Person suffers not any Change. Even while the Water flies, his Forehead is still sound. But in the usual Design we see it otherwise. The Horns are already *sprouted*, if not full grown: and the Goddess is seen watering *the Sprouts*.

Chap. 2. aside the Air and Features of the Face, it shou'd appear by the very Turn, or Position of the Body alone, that this young Hero had not wholly quitted the balancing or pondering part. For in the manner of his turn towards the worthier of these Goddesses, he shou'd by no means appear so averse or separate from the other, as not to suffer it to be conceiv'd of him, that he had ever any inclination for her, or had ever hearken'd to her Voice. On the contrary, there ought to be some hopes yet remaining for this latter Goddess [359] Pleasure, and some regret apparent in Hercules. Otherwise we shou'd pass immediately from the *third* to the *fourth* Period; or at least confound one with the other.

- (2.) HERCULES, in this Agony describ'd, may appear either sitting, or standing: tho it be more according to probability for him to appear standing; in regard to the presence of the two Goddesses, and by reason the case is far from being the same *here* as in *The Judgment of Paris*; where the interested Goddesses plead their Cause before their Judg. Here the Interest of HERCULES himself is at stake. 'Tis *his own* Cause which is trying. He is in this respect not so much *the Judg*, as he is in reality *the Party judg'd*.
- (3.) The superior and commanding Passion of Hercules may be express'd either by *a strong Admiration*, or by an Admiration which holds chiefly of *Love*.

Excited by an amorous love.²

(4.) If the latter be us'd, then the reluctant Passion, which is not yet wholly overcome, may shew it-self in Pity and Tenderness, mov'd in our Hero by the thought of those Pleasures and Companions of his Youth, which he is going for ever to abandon. And in this sense Hercules may look either on the one or the other of the Goddesses, with this difference; That if he looks on *Pleasure*, it shou'd be faintly, and as turning his Eyes back with Pity; having still his Action and Gesture turn'd the other way towards *Virtue*. If, on the contrary, he looks on *Virtue*; it ought to be earnestly,

[360]

² ——Ingenti perculsus amore.

and with extreme attention, having some part of the Action of his Body, inclining still towards Pleasure, and discovering by certain Features of Concern and Pity, intermix'd with the commanding or conquering Passion, that the Decision he is about to make in

favour of Virtue, cost him not a little.

- (5.) If it be thought fit rather to make use of Admiration, merely to express the commanding Passion of HERCULES: then the reluctant-one may discover it-self in a kind of Horror, at the thought of the Toil and Labour, to be sustain'd in the rough rocky way apparent on the side of VIRTUE.
- (6.) Again, HERCULES may be represented as looking neither towards VIRTUE nor PLEASURE, but as turning his Eyes either towards the mountainous rocky Way pointed out to him by VIR-TUE, or towards the flowry Way of the Vale and Meadows, recommended to him by Pleasure. And to these different Attitudes may be apply'd the same Rules for the Expression of the Turn or Balance of Judgment in our pensive Hero.

(7.) Whatever may be the manner chosen for the designing of this Figure of HERCULES, according to that part of the History in which we have taken him; 'tis certain he shou'd be so drawn, as neither by the opening of his mouth, or by any other sign, to leave it in the least dubious whether he is speaking or silent. For 'tis absolutely requisite that Silence shou'd be distinctly characteriz'd in HERCULES, not only as the natural effect of his strict Attention, and the little leisure he has from what passes at this time within his breast; but in order withal to give that appearance of Majesty and Superiority becoming the Person and Character of pleading VIRTUE; who by her Eloquence and other Charms has ere this made her-self mistress of the Heart of our enamour'd Hero:

*And again she hangs on the lips of the storyteller.

This Image of the Sublime in the Discourse and Manner of VIR-TUE, wou'd be utterly lost, if in the instant that she employ'd the Chap. 2.

[361]

^{* ——}Pendetque iterum narrantis ob ore. Virg. AEn. Lib. iv. ver. 79.

Chap. 3. greatest Force of Action, she shou'd appear to be interrupted by the ill-tim'd Speech, Reply, or Utterance of her Auditor. Such a Design or Representation as this, wou'd prove contrary to Order, contrary to the History, and to the *Decorum*, or Decency of Manners. Nor can one well avoid taking notice here, of that general Absurdity committed by many of the esteem'd great Masters in Painting; who in one and the same Company, or Assembly of Persons jointly employ'd, and united according to the History, in one single or common Action, represent to us not only *two* or *three*, but *several*, and sometimes *all* speaking at once. Which must naturally have the same effect on the Eye, as such a Conversation wou'd have upon the Ear, were we in reality to hear it.

CHAPTER III

Of the Second Figure

AFTER what has been said on the Subject of HERCULES, it appears plainly what the *Attitude* must be of our second Figure, VIRTUE; who, as we have taken her in this particular Period of our History, must of necessity be *speaking* with all the Force of Action, such as wou'd appear in an excellent Orator, when at the height, and in the most affecting part of his Discourse.

- (2.) She ought therefore to be drawn *standing*; since 'tis contrary to all probable Appearance, and even to Nature it-self, that in the very Heat and highest Transport of Speech, the Speaker shou'd be seen sitting, or in any Posture which might express Repose.
- (3.) She may be *habited* either as an AMAZON, with the Helmet, Lance, and in the Robe or Vest of Pallas; or as any other of the *Virtues*, *Goddesses*, or *Heroines*, with the plain original Crown, without Rays, according to genuine Antiquity. Our History makes no mention of a Helmet, or any other Armour of VIRTUE. It gives us only to understand, that she was dress'd neither negligently, nor with much study or ornament. If we follow this latter method, we

[363]

need give her only in her hand the Imperial or *Magisterial Sword; which is her true characteristick Mark, and wou'd sufficiently distinguish her, without the Helmet, Lance, or other military Habit. And in this manner, the opposition between her-self and her Rival wou'd be still more beautiful and regular.—"But this Beauty, says one, wou'd be discoverable only by the Learned."—Perhaps so. But then again, there wou'd be no loss for others: since no-one wou'd find this Piece the less intelligible on the account of this Regulation. On the contrary, one who chanc'd to know little of Antiquity in general, or of this History in particular, wou'd be still further to seek, if upon seeing an armed Woman in the Piece, he shou'd represent to himself either a Pallas, a Bellona, or any other warlike Form, or Deity of the female kind.

Chap. 3.

[364]

- (4.) As for the *Shape*, *Countenance*, or Person of VIRTUE; that which is usually given to Pallas may fitly serve as a Model for this Dame; as on the other side, that which is given to Venus may serve in the same manner for her Rival. The Historian whom we follow, represents VIRTUE to us as a Lady of a goodly Form, tall and majestick. And by what he relates of her, he gives us sufficiently to understand, that tho she was neither lean, nor of a tann'd Complexion, she must have discover'd however, by the Substance and Colour of her Flesh, that she was sufficiently accustom'd to exercise. Pleasure, on the other hand, by an exact Opposition, is represented in better case, and of a Softness of Complexion; which speaks her Manners, and gives her a middle Character between the Person of a Venus, and that of a Bacchinal *Nymph*.
- (5.) As for the *Position*, or *Attitude* of VIRTUE; tho in a historical Piece, such as ours is design'd, 'twou'd on no account be proper to have immediate recourse to the way of *Emblem*; one might, on this occasion, endeavour nevertheless by some artifice to give our Figure, as much as possible, the resemblance of the same *Goddess*, as she is seen on Medals, and other antient *emblematick* Pieces of like nature. In this view, she shou'd be so design'd, as to stand firm

[365]

^{*} Parazonium.

Chap. 3. with her full poise upon one foot, having the other a little advanc'd, and rais'd on a broken piece of ground or rock, instead of the Helmet or little Globe on which we see her usually setting her foot, as triumphant, in those Pieces of the *emblematick* kind. A particular advantage of this Attitude, so judiciously assign'd to VIRTUE by antient Masters, is, that it expresses as well her aspiring Effort, or Ascent towards the Stars and Heaven, as her Victory and Superiority over Fortune and the World. For so the Poets have, of old, describ'd her.

- *Attempts a course by a path denied.
- [†]And deserts the path of difficult virtue.

And in our Piece particularly, where the *arduous* and *rocky way* of VIRTUE requires to be emphatically represented; the ascending Posture of this Figure, with one Foot advanc'd, in a sort of climbing Action, over the rough and thorny Ground, must of necessity, if well executed, create a due effect, and add to the Sublime of this [‡]antient *Poetick* Work.

(6.) As for the *Hands* or *Arms*, which in real Oratory, and during the strength of Elocution, must of necessity be active; 'tis plain in respect of our Goddess, that the Arm in particular which she has free to her-self, and is neither incumber'd with Lance or

Τὴν μεν γαρ κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδόν ἐστιν ἑλέσθαι Ρηιδιως. λείη μέν όδος, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει. Τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ιδρώτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν 'Αθανατοι. μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος ὀιμος επ ἀυτὴν, Καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρώτον. ἐπὴν δ' είς ἀκρον ικηται Ρηιδίη δ' ἤπείτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐουσα.

Oper. & Dier. Lib. i. ver. 285.

[For abundant wickedness is easy to prefer; the road of plunder lies close by. But the immortal gods placed sweat in front of virtue. And it is a long uphill path to virtue, and rough at first. Later, as you approach the peak, you will then move easily, no matter how difficult it is.]

[366]

^{* ——}Negatâ tentat iter viâ. Horat. Lib. iii. Od. ii. ver. 22.

[†] Virtutisque viam deserit arduae. Idem ibid. Od. xxiv. ver. 44.

[‡] As antient as the Poet Hesiod: which appears by the following Verses, cited by our Historian, as the Foundation, or first Draught of this Herculean Tablature.

Sword, shou'd be employ'd another way, and come in, to second the Discourse, and accompany it, with a just Emphasis and Action. Accordingly, VIRTUE wou'd then be seen with this Hand, turn'd either upwards to the rocky Way mark'd out by her with approbation; or to the Sky, or Stars, in the same sublime sense; or downwards to the flowery Way and Vale, as in a detesting manner, and with abhorrence of what passes there; or last of all (in a disdainful sense, and with the same appearance of Detestation) against Pleasure herself. Each Manner wou'd have its peculiar advantage. And the best Profit shou'd be made of this Arm and Hand at liberty, to express either the Disapprobation or the Applause propos'd. It might prove, however, a considerable advantage to our Figure of VIRTUE, if holding the Lance, or Imperial Sword, slightly, with one of her Hands stretch'd downwards, she cou'd, by that very Hand and Action, be made to express the latter meaning; opening for that purpose some of the lower Fingers of this Hand, in a refusing or repelling manner; whilst with the other Arm and Hand at liberty, she shou'd express as well the former meaning, and point out to HERCULES the way which leads to Honour, and the just Glory of heroick Actions.

(7.) From all these Circumstances of History, and Action, accompanying this important Figure, the difficulty of the Design will sufficiently appear, to those who carry their Judgment beyond the *mere Form*, and are able to consider the Character of the Passion to which it is subjected. For where a real Character is mark'd, and *the inward Form* peculiarly describ'd, 'tis necessary *the outward* shou'd give place. Whoever shou'd expect to see our Figure of VIRTUE, in the exact Mein of a *fine Talker*, curious in her Choice of Action, and forming it according to the usual Decorum, and regular Movement of one of the fair Ladys of our Age, wou'd certainly be far wide of the Thought and Genius of this Piece. Such study'd Action, and artificial Gesture, may be allow'd to the Actors and Actrices of the Stage. But the good Painter must come a little nearer to Truth, and take care that his Action be not *theatrical*, or at second hand; but *original*, and drawn from Nature her-

Chap. 3.

[367]

[368]

Chap. 4. S

[369]

self. Now altho in the ordinary Tenour of Discourse, the Action of the Party might be allow'd to appear so far govern'd and compos'd by Art, as to retain that regular Contraste, and nice Balance of Movement, which Painters are apt to admire as the chief Grace of Figures; yet in this particular case, where the natural Eagerness of Debate, supported by a thorow Antipathy and Animosity, is join'd to a sort of enthusiastick Agitation incident to our prophetick Dame, there can be little of that fashionable Mein, or genteel Air admitted. The Painter who, in such a Piece as we describe, is bound to preserve the heroick Style, will doubtless beware of representing his Heroine as a mere Scold. Yet this is certain, That it were better for him to expose himself to the Meanness of such a Fancy, and paint his Lady in a high Rant, according to the common Weakness of the Sex, than to engage in the Embelishment of the mere Form; and, forgetting the Character of Severity and Reprimand belonging to the illustrious Rival, present her to us a fair specious Personage, free of Emotion, and without the least Bent or Movement, which shou'd express the real Pathetick of the kind.

CHAPTER IV

Of the Third Figure

ONCERNING PLEASURE there needs little to be said, after what has been already remark'd in relation to the two preceding Figures. The Truth of *Appearance*, that of *History*, and even the *Decorum* it-self, (according to what has been explain'd above) require evidently that in this Period or Instant describ'd, PLEASURE shou'd be found silent. She can have no other Language allow'd her than that merely of *the Eyes*. And 'twou'd be a happy Management for her in the Design, if in turning her Eyes to meet those of HERCULES, she shou'd find his Head and Face already turn'd so much on the contrary side, as to shew it impossible for her as yet to discover the growing Passion of this Hero in favour of

her Rival. By this means she might still with good right retain her fond Airs of Dalliance and Courtship; as having yet discover'd no reason she has to be dissatisfy'd.'

Chap. 4.

[370]

- (2.) She may be drawn either *standing*, *leaning*, *sitting*, or *lying*; without a Crown, or crown'd either with Roses, or with Myrtle; according to the Painter's Fancy. And since in this *third* Figure the Painter has so great a liberty left him, he may make good advantage of it for the other *two*, to which *this latter* may be subjected, as the last in order, and of least consequence.
- (3.) That which makes the greatest difficulty in the Disposition or Ordonnance of this Figure Pleasure, is, that notwithstanding the supine Air and Character of Ease and Indolence, which shou'd be given her, she must retain still so much Life and Action, as is sufficient to express her *persuasive Effort*, and Manner of *Indication* towards her proper Paths; those of the flowery kind, and Vale below, whither she wou'd willingly guide our Hero's steps. Now shou'd this *Effort* be over-strongly express'd; not only the supine Character and Air of Indolence wou'd be lost in this Figure of Pleasure; but, what is worse, the Figure wou'd seem to speak, or at least appear so, as to create a double Meaning, or *equivocal Sense* in Painting: which wou'd destroy what we have establish'd as fundamental, concerning the absolute Reign of *Silence* thro'out the rest of the Piece, in favour of Virtue, the sole speaking Party at this Instant, or third Period of our History.

[371]

(4.) According to a Computation, which in this way of Reasoning might be made, of the whole *Motion* or *Action* to be given to our Figure of Pleasure; she shou'd scarce have *one fifth* reserv'd for that which we may properly call *active* in her, and have already term'd her *persuasive* or *indicative Effort*. All besides shou'd be employ'd to express, if one may say so, her *Inaction*, her *Supineness*, *Effeminacy*, and *indulgent Ease*. The Head and Body might intirely favour this latter Passion. One Hand might be absolutely resign'd to it; serving only to support, with much ado, the lolling lazy Body. And if the other Hand be requir'd to express some kind of Gesture or Action toward the Road of Pleasures recommended by this

[372]

Chap. 5. Dame; the Gesture ought however to be slight and negligent, in the manner of one who has given over speaking, and appears weary and spent.

(5.) For the *Shape*, the *Person*, the *Complexion*, and what else may be further remark'd as to the *Air* and *Manner* of Pleasure; all this is naturally comprehended in the Opposition, as above stated, between *Her-self* and Virtue.'

CHAPTER V

Of the Ornaments of the Piece; and chiefly of the Drapery, and Perspective

TIS sufficiently known, how great a liberty Painters are us'd to take, in the colouring of their Habits, and of other Draperys belonging to their historical Pieces. If they are to paint a Roman People, they represent 'em in different Dresses; tho it be certain the common People among 'em were habited very near alike, and much after the same colour. In like manner, the Egyptians, Jews, and other antient Nations, as we may well suppose, bore in this particular their respective Likeness or Resemblance one to another; as at present the Spaniards, Italians, and several other People of Europe. But such a Resemblance as this wou'd, in the way of Painting, produce a very untoward effect; as may easily be conceiv'd. For this reason the Painter makes no scruple to introduce Philosophers, and even Apostles, in various Colours, after a very extraordinary manner. 'Tis here that the historical Truth must of necessity indeed give way to that which we call poetical, as being govern'd not so much by Reality, as by Probability, or plausible Appearance, So that a Painter, who uses his Privilege or Prerogative in this respect, ought however to do it cautiously, and with discretion. And when occasion requires that he shou'd present us his Philosophers or Apostles thus variously colour'd, he must take care at least so to mortify his Colours, that these plain poor Men may not appear, in his Piece, adorn'd like so many Lords or Princes of the modern Garb.

[373]

- (2.) If, on the other hand, the Painter shou'd happen to take for his Subject some solemn Entry or Triumph, where, according to the Truth of *Fact*, all manner of Magnificence had without doubt been actually display'd, and all sorts of bright and dazling Colours heap'd together and advanc'd, in emulation, one against another; he ought on this occasion, in breach of the *historical Truth*, or Truth *of Fact*, to do his utmost to diminish and reduce the excessive Gaiety and Splendor of those Objects, which wou'd otherwise raise such a Confusion, Oppugnancy, and Riot of Colours, as wou'd to any judicious Eye appear absolutely intolerable.
- (3.) It becomes therefore an able Painter in this, as well as in the other parts of his Workmanship, to have regard principally, and above all, to the Agreement or Correspondency of things. And to that end 'tis necessary he shou'd form in his Mind a certain Note or Character of *Unity*, which being happily taken, wou'd, out of the many Colours of his Piece, produce (if one may say so) *a particular distinct Species* of an original kind: like those Compositions in Musick, where among the different Airs, (such as *Sonatas*, *Entrys*, or *Sarabands*) there are different and distinct Species; of which we may say in particular, as to each, "That it has its own proper Character or Genius, peculiar to it-self."
- (4.) Thus the *Harmony* of Painting requires, "That in whatever *Key* the Painter begins his Piece, he shou'd be sure to finish it in the same."
- (5.) This Regulation turns on the *principal Figure*, or on the two or three which are *eminent*, in a Tablature compos'd of many. For if the Painter happens to give a certain Height or Richness of colouring to his principal Figure; the rest must in proportion necessarily partake this Genius. But if, on the contrary, the Painter shou'd have chanc'd to give a softer Air, with more Gentleness and Simplicity of colouring, to his principal Figure; the rest must bear a Character proportionable, and appear in an extraordinary Simplicity; that one and the same Spirit may, without contest, reign thro' the whole of his Design.
- (6.) Our Historical Draught of HERCULES will afford us a very clear example in the case. For considering that the Hero is to ap-

Chap. 5.

[374]

[375]

pear on this occasion retir'd and gloomy; being withal in a manner Chap. 5. naked, and without any other Covering than a Lion's Skin, which is it-self of a yellow and dusky colour; it wou'd be really impracticable for a Painter to represent this principal Figure in any extraordinary brightness or lustre. From whence it follows, that in the other inferior Figures or subordinate parts of the Work, the Painter must necessarily make use of such still quiet Colours, as may give to the whole Piece a Character of Solemnity and Simplicity, agreeable with it-self. Now shou'd our Painter honestly go about to follow his Historian, according to the literal Sense of the History, which represents VIRTUE to us in a resplendent Robe of the purest and most glossy White; 'tis evident he must after this manner destroy his Piece. The good Painter in this, as in all other occasions of like nature, must do as the good Poet; who undertaking to treat some common and known Subject, refuses however to follow strictly, like a mere Copyist or Translator, any preceding Poet or Historian; [376] but so orders it, that his Work in it-self becomes really new and original.

*A public subject will be a private right to you if you will not linger around worthless and common matters nor will endeavor to return word for word as a conscientious interpreter.

(7.) As for what relates to the *Perspective* or *Scene* of our historical Piece, it ought so to present it-self, as to make us instantly conceive that 'tis in the Country, and in a place of Retirement, near some Wood or Forest, that this whole Action passes. For 'twou'd be impertinent to bring *Architecture* or Buildings of whatever kind in view, as tokens of Company, Diversion, or Affairs, in a Place purposely chosen to denote Solitude, Thoughtfulness, and premeditated Retreat. Besides, that according to the Poets (our

Horat. de Art. Poet. ver. 131.

^{*} Publica materies privati juris erit, si Nec circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem; Nec verbum verbo curabis reddere fidus Interpres.

Guides and Masters in this Art) neither the Goddesses, nor other divine Forms of whatever kind, car'd ever to present themselves to human Sight, elsewhere than in these deep Recesses. And 'tis worth observing here, how particularly our philosophical Historian affects to speak, by way of prevention, of the solitary place where Hercules was retir'd, and of his Thoughtfulness preceding this Apparition: which from these Circumstances may be constru'd hence-forward as a mere *Dream*; but as such, a truly rational, and *divine* one.

Chap. 5.

[377]

- (8.) As to the *Fortress, Temple*, or *Palace* of Virtue, situated on a Mountain, after the emblematical way; as we see represented in some Pieces form'd upon this Subject; there is nothing of this kind express'd by our Historian. And shou'd this, or any thing of a like nature, present it-self in our Design, it wou'd fill the Mind with foreign Fancys, and mysterious Views, no way agreeable to the Taste and Genius of this Piece. Nor is there any thing, at the same time, on Pleasure's side, to answer, by way of opposition, to this *Palace* of Virtue; which, if express'd, wou'd on this account destroy the just Simplicity and Correspondency of our Work.
- (9.) Another Reason against the Perspective-part, the Architecture, or other study'd Ornaments of the Landskip-kind, in this particular Piece of ours, is, That in reality there being no occasion for these Appearances, they wou'd prove a mere Incumbrance to the Eye, and wou'd of necessity disturb the Sight, by diverting it from that which is principal, the *History* and *Fact*. Whatsoever appears in a historical Design, which is not essential to the Action, serves only to confound the Representation, and perplex the Mind: more particularly, if these Episodick parts are so lively wrought, as to vie with the principal Subject, and contend for Precedency with the Figures and human Life. A just Design, or Tablature, shou'd, at first view, discover, What Nature it is design'd to imitate; what Life, whether of the higher or lower kind, it aims chiefly to represent. The Piece must by no means be equivocal or dubious; but must with ease distinguish it-self, either as historical and moral, or as perspective and merely natural. If it be the latter of these Beautys,

[378]

which we desire to see delineated according to its perfection, then Chap. 5. the former must give place. The higher Life must be allay'd, and in a manner discountenanc'd and obscur'd; whilst the lower displays it-self, and is exhibited as principal. Even that, which according to a Term of Art we commonly call Still-Life, and is in reality of the last and lowest degree of Painting, must have its Superiority and just Preference in a Tablature of its own Species. 'Tis the same in Animal-Pieces; where Beasts, or Fowl are represented. In Landskip, Inanimates are principal: 'Tis the Earth, the Water, the Stones and Rocks which live. All other Life becomes subordinate. Humanity, Sense, Manners, must in this place yield, and become inferior. 'Twou'd be a fault even to aim at the Expression of any real Beauty in this kind, or go about to animate or heighten [379] in any considerable degree the accompanying Figures of Men, or Deitys, which are accidentally introduc'd, as Appendices, or Ornaments, in such a Piece. But if, on the contrary, the human Species be that which first presents it-self in a Picture; if it be the *intelligent* Life, which is set to view; 'tis the other Species, the other Life, which must then surrender and become subservient. The merely natural must pay homage to the historical or moral. Every Beauty, every Grace must be sacrific'd to the real BEAUTY of this first and highest Order. For nothing can be more deform'd than a Confusion of many Beautys: And the Confusion becomes inevitable, where the Subjection is not compleat.

(10.) By the word MORAL are understood, in this place, all Sorts of judicious Representations of the human Passions; as we see even in *Battel-Pieces*; excepting those of distant Figures, and the diminutive kind; which may rather be consider'd as a sort of *Landskip*. In all other martial Pieces, we see express'd in lively Action, the several degrees of Valor, Magnanimity, Cowardice, Terror, Anger, according to the several Characters of Nations, and particular Men. 'Tis here that we may see *Heroes* and *Chiefs* (such as the Alexanders or Constantines) appear, even in the hottest of the Action, with a Tranquillity and Sedateness of Mind peculiar to themselves: which is, indeed, in a direct and proper sense, profoundly *moral*.

(11.) But as the Moral part is differently treated in a Poem, from

[380]

what it is in *History*, or in a *philosophical* Work; so must it, of right, in *Painting* be far differently treated, from what it naturally is, either in the *History*, or *Poem*. For want of a right understanding of this Maxim, it often happens that, by endeavouring to render a Piece highly *moral* and *learned*, it becomes thorowly ridiculous and impertinent.

(12.) For the ordinary Works of Sculpture, such as the Low-Relieves, and Ornaments of Columns and Edifices, great allowance is made. The very Rules of Perspective are here wholly revers'd, as necessity requires; and are accommodated to the Circumstance and Genius of the Place or Building, according to a certain OEconomy or Order of a particular and distinct kind; as will easily be observ'd by those who have thorowly study'd the Trajan and Antoninus-Pillars, and other Relieve-Works of the Antients. In the same manner, as to Pieces of ingrav'd Work, Medals, or whatever shews it-self in one Substance, (as Brass or Stone) or only by Shade and Light, (as in ordinary Drawings, or Stamps) much also is allow'd, and many things admitted, of the fantastick, miraculous, or hyberbolical kind. 'Tis here, that we have free scope, withal, for whatever is learned, emblematical, or enigmatick. But for the compleatly imitative and illusive Art of Painting, whose Character it is to employ in her Works the united Force of different Colours; and who, surpassing by so many Degrees, and in so many Privileges, all other human Fiction, or imitative Art, aspires in a directer manner towards Deceit, and a Command over our very Sense; she must of necessity abandon whatever is over-learned, humorous, or witty; to maintain her-self in what is natural, credible, and winning of our Assent: that she may thus acquit her-self of what is her chief Province, the specious Appearance of the Object she represents. Otherwise we shall naturally bring against her the just Criticism of HORACE, on the scenical Representation so nearly ally'd to her:

Whatsoever you show me, disbelieving it, I despise it.3

Chap. 5.

[381]

³ Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi.

Chap. 5.

[382]

(13.) We are therefore to consider this as a sure Maxim or Observation in Painting, "That a historical and moral Piece must of necessity lose much of its natural Simplicity and Grace, if any thing of the *emblematical* or *enigmatick* kind be visibly and directly intermix'd." As if for instance, the Circle of the *Zodiack, with its twelve Signs, were introduc'd. Now this being an Appearance which carrys not any manner of similitude or colourable resemblance to any thing extant in real Nature; it cannot possibly pretend to win the Sense, or gain Belief, by the help of any poetical Enthusiasm, religious History, or Faith. For by means of these, indeed, we are easily induc'd to contemplate as Realitys those divine Personages and miraculous Forms, which the leading Painters, antient and modern, have speciously design'd, according to the particular Doctrine or Theology of their several religious and national Beliefs. But for our Tablature in particular, it carrys nothing with it of the mere emblematical or enigmatick kind: since for what relates to the double Way of the Vale and Mountain, this may naturally and with colourable appearance be represented at the Mountain's foot. But if on the Summit or highest Point of it, we shou'd place the Fortress, or Palace of Virtue, rising above the Clouds, this wou'd immediately give the enigmatical mysterious Air to our Picture, and of necessity destroy its persuasive Simplicity, and natural Appearance.

[383]

(14.) In short, we are to carry this Remembrance still along with us, "That the fewer the Objects are, besides those which are absolutely necessary in a Piece, the easier it is for the Eye, by one simple Act and in one View, to comprehend the *Sum* or *Whole*." The multiplication of Subjects, tho subaltern, renders the Subordination more difficult to execute in the Ordonnance or Composition of a Work. And if the *Subordination* be not perfect, the *Order*

^{*} This is what RAPHAEL himself has done, in his famous Design of *The Judgment of Paris*. But this Piece having never been painted, but design'd only for Maro Antonio's engraving, it comes not within our Censure; as appears by what is said in the Paragraph just preceding.

(which makes the Beauty) remains imperfect. Now the *Subordination* can never be perfect, except *"When the Ordonnance is such, that the Eye not only runs over with ease the several Parts of the Design, (reducing still its View each moment to the principal Subject on which all turns) but when the same Eye, without the least detainment in any of the particular Parts, and resting, as it were, immovable in the middle, or center of the Tablature, may see at once, in an agreeable and perfect Correspondency, all which is there exhibited to the Sight."

Chap. 6.

[384]

CHAPTER VI

Of the Casual or Independent Ornaments

THERE remains for us now to consider only of the separate Ornaments, independent both of Figures and Perspective; such as the †Machine-Work, or Divinitys in the Sky, the Winds, Cupids, Birds, Animals, Dogs, or other loose Pieces, which are introduc'd without any absolute necessity, and in a way of Humour. But as these belong chiefly to the ordinary Life, and to the comick, or mix'd kind; our Tablature, which on the contrary is wholly epick, heroick, and in the tragick Style, wou'd not so easily admit of any thing in this light way.

(2.) We may besides consider, that whereas the Mind is naturally led to fansy Mystery in a Work of such a Genius or Style of Painting as ours, and to confound with each other the two distinct kinds of the *emblematick*, and merely *historical*, or *poetick*; we shou'd take care not to afford it this occasion of Error and Deviation, by introducing into a Piece of so uniform a Design, such Ap-

[385]

^{*} This is what the *Grecian* Masters so happily express'd, by the single word ἐυσύνοπλον. See VOL. I. *pag.* 143, &c.

[†] This is understood of the Machine-Work, when it is merely ornamental, and not essential in the Piece; by making part of the History, or Fable it-self.

- Chap. 6. pendices, or supplementary Parts, as, under pretext of giving light to the History, or characterizing the Figures, shou'd serve only to distract or dissipate the Sight, and confound the Judgment of the more intelligent Spectators.
 - (3.) "Will it then," says one, "be possible to make out the Story of these two *Dames* in company with Hercules, without otherwise distinguishing them than as above describ'd?"—We answer, it is possible; and not that only, but certain and infallible, in the case of one who has the least Genius, or has ever heard in general concerning Hercules, without so much as having ever heard this History in particular. But if, notwithstanding this, we wou'd needs add some exterior marks, more declaratory and determinative of these two Personages, Virtue and Pleasure; it may be perform'd, however, without any necessary recourse to what is absolutely of the *Emblem*-kind. The Manner of this may be explain'd as follows.
 - (4.) The Energy or natural Force of *Virtue*, according to the moral Philosophy of highest note among the Antients, was express'd in the double effect of *Forbearance and Indurance, or what we may otherwise call Refrainment and Support. For the former, the Bit or Bridle, plac'd somewhere on the side of Virtue, may serve as Emblem sufficient; and for the second, the Helmet may serve in the same manner; especially since they are each of them Appurtenances essential to Heroes, (who, in the quality of Warriors, were also Subduers or †Managers of Horses) and that at the same time these are really portable Instruments, such as the martial Dame, who represents Virtue, may be well suppos'd to have brought along with her.
 - (5.) On the side of PLEASURE, certain *Vases*, and other Pieces of imboss'd Plate, wrought in the figures of *Satyrs, Fauns*, and *Baccha-*

[386]

^{*} Καρτερία, Εγκρατεία: They were describ'd as Sisters in the emblematick Moral Philosophy of the Antients. Whence that known Precept, Ανέχου καὶ $A\pi$ έχου, Sustine & Abstain [bear up and abstain (The Latin and Greek are given, but not the English.)]

[†] CASTOR, POLLUX; all the Heroes of HOMER; ALEXANDER the Great, &c.

nals, may serve to express the Debauches of the Table-kind. And certain Draperys thrown carelesly on the ground, and hung upon a neighbouring Tree, forming a kind of Bower and Couch for this luxurious Dame, may serve sufficiently to suggest the Thought of other Indulgences, and to support the Image of the effeminate, indolent, and amorous Passions. Besides that, for this latter kind, we may rest satisfy'd, 'tis what the Painter will hardly fail of representing to the full. The fear is, lest he shou'd overdo this part, and express the Affection too much to the life. The Appearance will, no doubt, be strongly wrought in all the Features and Proportions of this third Figure; which is of a relish far more popular, and vulgarly ingaging, than that other oppos'd to it, in our historical Design.

Conc.

[387]

CONCLUSION

Which seems to arise naturally from what has been said on this Subject in particular: "That in a real *History-Painter*, the same Knowledg, the same Study, and Views, are requir'd, as in a real *Poet*." Never can the *Poet*, whilst he justly holds that name, become a *Relator*, or *Historian* at large. He is allow'd only to describe a single Action; not the Actions of a single Man, or People. The *Painter* is a Historian at the same rate, but still more narrowly confin'd, as in fact appears; since it wou'd certainly prove a more ridiculous Attempt to comprehend two or three distinct Actions or Parts of History in *one* Picture, than to comprehend ten times the number in *one* and *the same* Poem.

[388]

(2.) Tis well known, that to each Species of Poetry, there are natural Proportions and Limits assign'd. And it wou'd be a gross Absurdity indeed to imagine, that in a Poem there was nothing which we cou'd call *Measure* or *Number*, except merely in the Verse. An Elegy, and an Epigram, have each of 'em their Measure, and Proportion, as well as a Tragedy, or Epick Poem. In the same manner, as to Painting, Sculpture, or Statuary, there are particular Mea-

Conc.

[389]

sures which form what we call a Piece: as for instance, in mere Portraiture, a Head, or Bust: the former of which must retain always the whole, or at least a certain part of the Neck; as the latter the Shoulders, and a certain part of the Breast. If any thing be added or retrench'd, the Piece is destroy'd. 'Tis then a mangled Trunk, or dismember'd Body, which presents it-self to our Imagination; and this too not thro' use merely, or on the account of custom, but of necessity, and by the nature of the Appearance: since there are such and such parts of the human Body, which are naturally match'd, and must appear in company: the Section, if unskilfully made, being in reality horrid, and representing rather an Amputation in Surgery, than a seemly Division or Separation according to Art. And thus it is, that in general, thro' all the plastick Arts, or Works of Imitation, "Whatsoever is drawn from Nature, with the intention of raising in us the Imagination of the natural Species or Object, according to real Beauty and Truth, shou'd be compriz'd in certain compleat Portions or Districts, which represent the Correspondency or Union of each part of Nature, with intire NATURE her-self." And 'tis this natural Apprehension, or anticipating Sense of Unity, which makes us give even to the Works of our inferior Artizans, the name of Pieces by way of Excellence, and as denoting the Justness and Truth of Work.

(3.) In order therefore to succeed rightly in the Formation of any thing truly beautiful in this higher Order of Design; 'twere to be wish'd that the Artist, who had Understanding enough to comprehend what a real Piece or Tablature imported, and who, in order to this, had acquir'd the Knowledg of a Whole and Parts, wou'd afterwards apply himself to the Study of moral and poetick Truth: that by this means the Thoughts, Sentiments, or Manners, which hold the first rank in his historical Work, might appear sutable to the higher and nobler Species of Humanity in which he practis'd, to the Genius of the Age which he describ'd, and to the principal or main Action which he chose to represent. He wou'd then naturally learn to reject those false Ornaments of affected Graces, exaggerated Passions, hyperbolical and prodigious Forms; which, equally

[390

Conc.

with the mere *capricious* and *grotesque*, destroy the just *Simplicity*, and *Unity*, essential in a PIECE. And for his *Colouring*; he wou'd then soon find how much it became him to be reserv'd, severe, and chaste, in this particular of his Art; where Luxury and Libertinism are, by the power of Fashion and the modern Taste, become so universally establish'd.

(4.) 'Tis evident however from Reason it-self, as well as from *History and Experience, that nothing is more fatal, either to Painting, Architecture, or the other Arts, than this false Relish, which is govern'd rather by what immediately strikes the Sense, than by what consequentially and by reflection pleases the Mind, and satisfies the Thought and Reason. So that whilst we look on Painting with the same Eye, as we view commonly the rich Stuffs, and colour'd Silks worn by our Ladys, and admir'd in Dress, Equipage, or Furniture; we must of necessity be effeminate in our Taste, and utterly set wrong as to all' Judgment and Knowledg in the kind. For of this imitative Art we may justly say; "That tho It borrows help indeed from Colours, and uses them, as means, to execute its Designs; It has nothing, however, more wide of its real Aim, or more remote from its Intention, than to make a shew of Colours, or from their mixture, to raise a †separate and flattering Pleasure to the Sense."

1331

[392]

^{*} See VITRUVIUS, and PLINY.

[†] The Pleasure is plainly foreign and separate, as having no concern or share in the proper Delight or Entertainment which naturally arises from the Subject, and Workmanship it-self. For the Subject, in respect of Pleasure, as well as Science, is absolutely compleated, when the Design is executed, and the proposed Imitation once accomplished. And thus it always is the best, when the Colours are most subdu'd, and made subservient.

A LETTER CONCERNING THE ART, or SCIENCE of DESIGN,

Written from ITALY,
On the occasion of the *Judgment* of HERCULES,

TO My Lord * * * *

The Muses before all things.* Vir. Georg. Lib. ii.

^{*}Ante omnia Musae.

A LETTER Concerning Design

My Lord,

HIS Letter comes to your Lordship, accompany'd with a small Writing intitled A NOTION: for such alone can that Piece deservedly be call'd, which aspires no higher than to the forming of a *Project*, and that too in so vulgar a Science as *Painting*. But whatever the Subject be, if it can prove any way entertaining to you, it will sufficiently answer my Design. And if possibly it may have that good success, I shou'd have no ordinary opinion of my Project; since I know how hard it wou'd be to give your Lordship a real Entertainment by any thing which was not in some respect worthy and useful.'

[396]

On this account I must, by way of prevention, inform your Lordship, that after I had conceiv'd my Notion such as you see it upon paper, I was not contented with this, but fell directly to work; and by the Hand of a Master-Painter brought it into *Practice*, and form'd a real *Design*. This was not enough. I resolv'd afterwards to see what effect it wou'd have, when taken out of mere Black-and-White, into Colours: And thus *a Sketch* was afterwards drawn. This pleas'd so well, that being incourag'd by the *Virtuosi*, who are so eminent in this part of the World, I resolv'd at last to engage my Painter in the great Work. Immediately a Cloth was bespoke of a sutable Dimension, and the Figures taken as big or bigger than the common Life; the Subject being of the Heroick kind, and requiring rather such Figures as shou'd appear above ordinary human Stature.

244 A LETTER

Thus my Notion, as light as it may prove in the *Treatise*, is become very substantial in the *Workmanship*. The Piece is still in hand; and like to continue so for some time. Otherwise the first Draught or Design shou'd have accompany'd the Treatise; as the Treatise does this Letter. But the *Design* having grown thus into *a Sketch*, and the Sketch afterwards into *a Picture*; I thought it fit your Lordship shou'd either see the several Pieces together, or be troubled only with that which was the best; as undoubtedly the great one must prove, if the Master I employ sinks not very much below himself, in this Performance.

Far surely shou'd I be, my Lord, from conceiving any Vanity or Pride in Amusements of such an inferior kind as these; especially were they such as they may naturally at first sight appear. I pretend not here to apologize either for them, or for my-self. Your Lordship however knows, I have naturally Ambition enough to make me desirous of employing my-self in Business of a higher Order: since it has been my fortune in publick Affairs to act often in concert with you, and in the same Views, on the Interest of Europe and Mankind. There was a Time, and that a very early one of my Life, when I was not wanting to my Country, in this respect. But after some years of hearty Labour and Pains in this kind of Workmanship, an unhappy Breach in my Health drove me not only from the Seat of Business, but forc'd me to seek these foreign Climates; where, as mild as the Winters generally are, I have with much ado liv'd out this latter-one; and am now, as your Lordship finds, employing my-self in such easy Studys as are most sutable to my state of Health, and to the Genius of the Country where I am confin'd.

This in the mean time I can, with some assurance, say to your Lordship in a kind of spirit of Prophecy, from what I have observ'd of the rising Genius of our Nation, That if we live to see a Peace any way answerable to that generous Spirit with which this War was begun, and carry'd on, for our *own* Liberty and that of Europe; the Figure we are like to make abroad, and the Increase of Knowledg, Industry and Sense at home, will render *united* Britain the principal Seat of Arts; and by her Politeness and Advantages in this

[398]

[397]

kind, will shew evidently, how much she owes to those Counsels, which taught her to exert herself so resolutely in behalf of the *common Cause*, and that of her own *Liberty*, and happy *Constitution*, necessarily included.

I can my-self remember the Time, when, in respect of Musick, our reigning Taste was in many degrees inferior to the *French*. The long Reign of Luxury and Pleasure under King Charles the Second, and the foreign Helps and study'd Advantages given to *Musick* in a following Reign, cou'd not raise our Genius the least in this respect. But when the Spirit of the Nation was grown more *free*, tho engag'd at that time in the fiercest War, and with the most doubtful Success, we no sooner began to turn our-selves towards *Musick*, and enquire what ITALY in particular produc'd, than in an instant we outstrip'd our Neighbours the French, enter'd into a Genius far beyond theirs, and rais'd our-selves an *Ear*, and *Judgment*, not inferior to the best now in the World.

In the same manner, as to Painting. Tho we have as yet nothing of our own native Growth in this kind worthy of being mention'd; yet since the Publick has of late begun to express a Relish for Ingravings, Drawings, Copyings, and for the original Paintings of the chief *Italian* Schools, (so contrary to the modern *French*) I doubt not that, in very few years, we shall make an equal progress in this other Science. And when our Humour turns us to cultivate these designing Arts, our Genius, I am persuaded, will naturally carry us over the slighter Amusements, and lead us to that higher, more serious, and noble Part of *Imitation*, which relates to *History*, *Human Nature*, and *the chief Degree or Order of* Beauty; I mean that of the *rational* Life, distinct from the merely *vegetable* and *sensible*, as in Animals, or Plants; according to those several Degrees or Orders of Painting, which your Lordship will find suggested in this extemporary *Notion* I have sent you.

As for Architecture, 'tis no wonder if so many noble Designs of this kind have miscarry'd amongst us; since the Genius of our Nation has hitherto been so little turn'd this way, that thro' several Reigns we have patiently seen the noblest publick Buildings perish

[399]

[400]

246 A LETTER

(if I may say so) under the Hand of one single Court-Architect; who, if he had been able to profit by Experience, wou'd long since, at our expence, have prov'd the greatest Master in the World. But I question whether our Patience is like to hold much longer. The Devastation so long committed in this kind, has made us begin to grow rude and clamorous at the hearing of a new Palace spoilt, or a new Design committed to some rash or impotent Pretender.

'Tis the good Fate of our Nation in this particular, that there remain yet two of the noblest Subjects for Architecture; our Prince's Palace, and our House of Parliament. For I can't but fansy that when Whitehall is thought of, the neighbouring Lords and Commons will at the same time be plac'd in better Chambers and Apartments, than at present; were it only for Majesty's sake, and as a Magnificence becoming the Person of the Prince, who here appears in full Solemnity. Nor do I fear that when these new Subjects are attempted, we shou'd miscarry as grosly as we have done in others before. Our State, in this respect, may prove perhaps more fortunate than our Church, in having waited till a national Taste was form'd, before these Edifices were undertaken. But the Zeal of the Nation cou'd not, it seems, admit so long a Delay in their Ecclesiastical Structures, particularly their Metropolitan. And since a Zeal of this sort has been newly kindled amongst us, 'tis like we shall see from afar the many Spires arising in our great City, with such hasty and sudden growth, as may be the occasion perhaps that our immediate Relish shall be hereafter censur'd, as retaining much of what Artists call the Gothick Kind.

Hardly, indeed, as the Publick now stands, shou'd we bear to see a *Whitehall* treated like a *Hampton-Court*, or even a new Cathedral like St. Paul's. Almost every-one now becomes concern'd, and interests himself in such publick Structures. Even those Pieces too are brought under the common Censure, which, tho rais'd by private Men, are of such a Grandure and Magnificence, as to become National Ornaments. The ordinary Man may build his Cottage, or the plain Gentleman his Country-house according as he fansys: but when a great Man builds, he will find little Quarter from the

[401]

[402]

Publick, if instead of a beautiful Pile, he raises, at a vast expence, such a false and counterfeit Piece of Magnificence, as can be justly arraign'd for its Deformity by so many knowing Men in Art, and by the whole *People*, who, in such a Conjuncture, readily follow their Opinion.

In reality the People are no small Partys in this Cause. Nothing moves successfully without 'em. There can be no Publick, but where they are included. And without a Publick Voice, knowingly guided and directed, there is nothing which can raise a true Ambition in the Artist; nothing which can exalt the Genius of the Workman, or make him emulous of after-Fame, and of the approbation of his Country, and of Posterity. For with these he naturally, as a Freeman, must take part: in these he has a passionate Concern, and Interest, rais'd in him by the same Genius of Liberty, the same Laws and Government, by which his Property, and the Rewards of his Pains and Industry are secur'd to him, and to his Generation after him.'

[403]

Every thing co-operates, in such a State, towards the Improvement of Art and Science. And for the designing Arts in particular, such as Architecture, Painting, and Statuary, they are in a manner link'd together. The Taste of one kind brings necessarily that of the others along with it. When the free Spirit of a Nation turns itself this way, Judgments are form'd; Criticks arise; the publick Eye and Ear improve; a right Taste prevails, and in a manner forces its way. Nothing is so improving, nothing so natural, so con-genial to the liberal Arts, as that reigning Liberty and high Spirit of a People, which from the Habit of judging in the highest Matters for themselves, makes 'em freely judg of other Subjects, and enter thorowly into the Characters as well of Men and Manners, as of the Products or Works of Men, in Art and Science. So much, my Lord, do we owe to the Excellence of our National Constitution, and Legal Monarchy; happily fitted for Us, and which alone cou'd hold together so mighty a People; all sharers (tho at so far a distance from each other) in the Government of themselves; and meeting under one Head in one vast Metropolis; whose enormous Growth,

248 A LETTER

however censurable in other respects, is actually a Cause that Workmanship and Arts of so many kinds arise to such perfection.

What Encouragement our higher Powers may think fit to give these growing Arts, I will not pretend to guess. This I know, that 'tis so much for their advantage and Interest to make themselves the chief Partys in the Cause, that I wish no Court or Ministry, besides a truly virtuous and wise one, may ever concern themselves in the Affair. For shou'd they do so, they wou'd in reality do more harm than good; since 'tis not the Nature of a Court (such as Courts generally are) to improve, but rather corrupt *a Taste*. And what is in the beginning set wrong by their Example, is hardly ever afterwards recoverable in the Genius of a Nation.

Content therefore I am, my Lord, that BRITAIN stands in this respect as she now does. Nor can one, methinks, with just reason regret her having hitherto made no greater advancement in these affairs of Art. As her Constitution has grown, and been establish'd, she has in proportion fitted her-self for other Improvements. There has been no Anticipation in the Case. And in this surely she must be esteem'd wise, as well as happy; that ere she attempted to raise her-self any other Taste or Relish, she secur'd her-self a right one in Government. She has now the advantage of beginning in other Matters, on a new foot. She has her *Models* yet to seek, her *Scale* and Standard to form, with deliberation and good choice. Able enough she is at present to shift for her-self; however abandon'd or helpless she has been left by those whom it became to assist her. Hardly, indeed, cou'd she procure a single Academy for the training of her Youth in Exercises. As good Soldiers as we are, and as good Horses as our Climate affords, our Princes, rather than expend their Treasure this way, have suffer'd our Youth to pass into a foreign Nation, to learn to ride. As for other Academys, such as those for Painting, Sculpture, or Architecture, we have not so much as heard of the Proposal; whilst the Prince of our rival Nation raises Academys, breeds Youth, and sends Rewards and Pensions into foreign Countrys, to advance the Interest and Credit of his own. Now if, notwithstanding the Industry and Pains of this foreign Court, and the

[405]

[404]

supine Un-concernedness of our own, the National Taste however rises, and already shews it-self in many respects beyond that of our so highly-assisted Neighbours; what greater Proof can there be of the Superiority of Genius in one of these Nations above the other?'

[406]

'Tis but this moment that I chance to read in an Article of one of the Gazettes from Paris, that 'tis resolv'd at Court to establish a new *Academy* for political Affairs. "In it the present Chief-Minister is to preside; having under him six Academists, *douëz des Talens nécessaires*¹—No Person to be receiv'd under the age of twenty five. A thousand Livres Pension for each Scholar—Able Masters to be appointed for teaching them the necessary Sciences, and instructing them in the Treatys of Peace and Alliances, which have been formerly made—The Members to assemble three times a Week—*C'est de ce Seminaire* (says the Writer) *qu'on tirera les Secretaires d'Ambassade; qui par degrez pourront monter à de plus hauts Emplois.*" ²

I must confess, my Lord, as great an Admirer as I am of these regular Institutions, I can't but look upon an Academy for Ministers as a very extraordinary Establishment; especially in such a Monarchy as France, and at such a Conjuncture as the present. It looks as if the Ministers of that Court had discover'd lately some new Methods of Negotiation, such as their Predecessors Richelieu and Mazarine never thought of; or that, on the contrary, they have found themselves so declin'd, and at such a loss in the Management of this present Treaty, as to be forc'd to take their Lesson from some of those Ministers with whom they treat: a Reproach, of which, no doubt, they must be highly sensible.

[,,,=

But 'tis not my design here, to entertain your Lordship with any Reflections upon Politicks, or the Methods which the French may take to raise themselves *new* Ministers, or *new* Generals; who may prove a better Match for us than hitherto, whilst we held our

¹ endowed with the necessary Talents

² It is from this group (says the Writer) that will be drawn Secretaries of Ambassadors and gradually they will rise to the highest Offices.

250 A LETTER

old. I will only say to your Lordship on this Subject of Academys; that indeed I have less concern for the Deficiency of such a one as this, than of any other which cou'd be thought of, for England; and that as for a Seminary of Statesmen, I doubt not but, without this extraordinary help, we shall be able, out of our old Stock, and the common course of Business, constantly to furnish a sufficient Number of well-qualify'd Persons to serve upon occasion, either at home, or in our foreign Treatys; as often as such Persons accordingly qualify'd shall duly, honestly, and bonâ fide be requir'd to serve.'

[408]

I return therefore to my Virtuoso-Science; which being my chief Amusement in this Place and Circumstance, your Lordship has by it a fresh Instance that I can never employ my Thoughts with satisfaction on any Subject, without making you a Party. For even this very NOTION had its rise chiefly from the Conversation of a certain Day, which I had the happiness to pass a few years since in the Country with your Lordship. 'Twas there you shew'd me some Ingravings, which had been sent you from ITALY. One in particular I well remember; of which the Subject was the very same with that of my written Notion inclos'd. But by what Hand it was done, or after what Master, or how executed, I have quite forgot. 'Twas the Summer-season, when you had Recess from Business. And I have accordingly calculated this Epistle and Project for the same Recess and Leisure. For by the time this can reach England, the Spring will be far advanc'd, and the national Affairs in a manner over, with those who are not in the immediate Administration.

[409]

Were *that* indeed your Lordship's Lot, at present; I know not whether in regard to my Country I shou'd dare throw such Amusements as these in your way. Yet even in this Case, I wou'd venture to say however, in defense of my Project, and of the *Cause of Painting*; that cou'd my young Hero come to your Lordship as well represented as he might have been, either by the Hand of a *Marat or a Jordano, (the Masters who were in being, and in

^{*} Carlo Marat was yet alive, at the time this Letter was written; but had been long super-annuated, and incapable of any considerable Performance.

repute, when I first travel'd here in ITALY) the *Picture* it-self, whatever the *Treatise* prov'd, wou'd have been worth notice, and might have become a Present worthy of our Court, and Prince's *Palace;* especially were it so bless'd as to lodge within it a royal Issue of her Majesty's. Such a Piece of Furniture might well fit the Gallery, or Hall of Exercises, where our young Princes shou'd learn their usual Lessons. And to see VIRTUE in this Garb and Action, might perhaps be no slight Memorandum hereafter to *a Royal Youth*, who shou'd one day come to undergo this Trial himself; on which his own Happiness, as well as the Fate of Europe and of the World, wou'd in so great a measure depend.

This, my Lord, is making (as you see) the most I can of my *Project*, and setting off my Amusements with the best Colour I am able; that I may be the more excusable in communicating them to your Lordship, and expressing thus, with what Zeal I am,

My Lord,
Your Lordship's
most faithful
humble Servant,
SHAFTESBURY.

Naples, March 6 N.S. 1712. [410]

[*N.B.* The Letters shew the Volume: The Figures, the Pages of each.]

Α

ABRAHAM, Patriarch, his Character and Life. Vol. iii. pag. 52, 53, 124

Absolute Power. See Arbitrary.

Absolute Princes. i. 203. Seem to act by Counsel and Advice. i. 210, 11. Their Education and Manners. ibid. No real Society in Absolute Government. i. 105, 6. No Publick, or Sense of publick Good. 107. No social or common Affection. ibid. No Community or Mother-Country. iii. 143. Absolute Monarchy, debauching in religious and moral Principles. i. 107. iii. 310, 11. Necessary Subjection and Homage in Absolute Government. i. 219. iii. 172

Academick *Philosophy.* i. 18, 253. *Its Excellence.* i. 81, 256. ii. 189, 191, 230, 31, &c. 305, 6. *See* Sceptick.

Academick Founder and Successor. ii. 253, 4

Academick Discipline amongst the Antients. i. 122. ii. 191

Academists: their way of arguing unsutable to the impatient Humour of our Age. ii. 189, 191
Academys for Exercise, wanted for our Youth. Unhappily neglected. i. 333, 4. iii. 405. One propos'd at Paris, for Political Affairs. iii. 406. Reflections thereupon. ibid. See Exercises, School, University.

ACTEON: a common Absurdity in the Pictures of his Metamorphosis. iii. 357

Actions: Spring of Actions. ii. 86

Activity, or Action, how necessary to Mankind. ii. 131, 32

Actor (Stage) i. 7

———In the Publick. i. 8

Admiration, Weakness of the Passion. i. 144, &c. ii. 324, &c. See Miracle, Wonder. Just Admiration. ii. 29

Admiration founded in the natural and necessary Imagination of a sublime and beautiful in things. i. 138, 9, 336, 7. ii. 28, &c. 394, 420, 21, 29, 30. iii. 30, &c. 182, &c.

Admiration, Motive, or Incentive to Philosophy. iii. 37. Restraint of it in Philosophy. iii. 35, &c. 202, 3

Admiration, a strong one, distinguish'd from that of Love. iii. 359

Advice. See Treatise of: viz. Vol. I. 153, &c.

AEGYPT, its Description. ii. 386. Origin and enormous Growth of Superstition from AEGYPT. ii. 387, 8. iii. 42, &c. Natural as well as Political Causes. iii. 45, 6. Unsociableness of Religion, mutual Abhorrence of Worshipers, and Persecution of Sects begun from hence. ii. 387, 8. iii. 42, 59, &c. 80, &c. Unhappy Settlement, Cantonment, and Agrarian of the primitive AEgyptians. iii. 42, &c. AEgyptian Mysterys. iii. 245. See Hierarchy, Priesthood.

AEgyptian Loan. i. 358. Catechism and Catechumens originally AEgyptian. iii. 245. See Circumcision.

AETHIOPIA, its Empire and Priesthood. iii. 48, 9 AEthiopian Spectator. i. 82, 3, 5

Affectation in Behaviour opposite to Grace. i. 190

Affectation in Belief, Faith, Religion, Praise. i. 6, 7, 34, &c. 41, &c.

Affection: Natural Affection towards Moral Beauty. i. 280, 81

Social Affection: Enjoyment. i. 310, 11. Social Affection confess'd in Love of Country, &c. iii. 143, &c. In Parental, Filial Affection. iii. 145. Strength of Social Affection. i. 16. Conjugal Affection. ii. 132. iii. 219

'Tis by Affection merely that a Creature is esteem'd good or ill. ii. 21, 22

Private or Self-Affection. ii. 22. When vitious. ii. 22, &c. When good. ii. 23, 24

Reflex Affection. ii. 28. Unequal Affection, or Iniquity. ii. 31. Opposition of the Affections. ii. 52

Religious Affection. ii. 75. See Devotion, Enthusiasm.

System of the Affections. ii. 85. That System explain'd. ii. 86

Three kinds of Affections. ii. 86, 87

Degrees of Affections. ii. 87, 88, &c.

Affection: Private Affection too weak, when? ii. 89. Affections towards private Good, necessary. ii. 90

Energy of Natural Affections. ii. 101, 2, &c.

What Pleasure attends the very Disturbances belonging to Natural Affection. ii. 106, 7. Effects of Natural Affection. ii. 107, 8, &c. Partial Affection has no foundation in Reason.

iii. 111. How slender Satisfaction it affords. ii. 112, 13 Intire Affection, its Advantages. ii. 113, 14

Analysis or Plan of the Affections, as they relate to human Happiness or Unhappiness. iii. 195, 96, &c.

Natural Affection, σόργη. iii. 222. The same parental or filial kind. iii. 145

Balance of the Affections. ii. 92, 95, 130, 31, &c.

Exercise of the Social or Natural Affections, how necessary to Man. ii. 134, 5, 6

Of the Affections which relate to the immediate Self, or private Interest of the Creature. ii. 139

Unnatural Affections. ii. 163, 4, &c. Their Consequences. ii. 168, 9, &c.

Age, the present: improving, in our Nation: Why? i. 9, 10

Agrarian: untoward-one in the AEgyptian State. iii. 43. How occasion'd. iii. 47, 48, 57, 58 Air of Person: See Grace.

Alchymy. ii. 184, 190, 377. iii. 160

Alchymists: why their Philosophy still prevails so much in our Age. ii. 189, 90

Alcibiades. iii. 126

ALEXANDER the Great. i. 249, 325

Modern Alexanders. i. 227

Amanuensis, the Author's. i. 305. iii. 16, 190

Ambition. i. 320, 21, 25, &c. ii. 157, 433, 40, 41

Amble: common Amble, Pace, or Canterbery of Writers. iii. 25, 26

Amorous Passion: What Occasion of Disorder. ii. 151, 52, &c.

Amour. Manner of it with the Fair Sex. iii. 115. History of an Amour. i. 176, &c. See Gallantry, Novel, Love.

Amphictonian Counsel. iii. 138

Amphitheater. See Gladiator.

Amphitheatrical Spectacles. i. 270

Anacharsis. i. 89

Anatomy of the Mind. i. 206, 7. Of the Body. ii. 302, &c.

Andrew: Merry-Andrew and Executioner: a Picture. i. 66

Angels: Angelical Company. i. 7

Anger: Use of the Passion in the inferior Orders of Creatures, and in the ordinary Characters of Men. ii. 144, 45. Its ill Effects, when indulg'd. ii. 145, 6, 7. Void in the highest and most virtuous Characters. ii. 144. Anger an Acknowledgment of Just and Unjust. ii. 419, 20

Animal: How becomes a Part of another System. ii. 18

Animal System. ibid.

Wild and Tame Animals of the same Species, how different. ii. 132

Answers to Books. iii. 9, 10, &c. Answer-Writers. ibid. and 270, 71

Ant. ii. 96. iii. 220

Anticipation. ii. 420. See Pre-conception.

Anticipation and Repeal. iii. 356

Antidote to Enthusiasm: See Enthusiasm.

Antients, their Discipline of Youth. i. 122. ii. 191. See Academy.

Antient Policy, in the Affairs of Religion and Philosophy. i. 17, 18. ii. 262

ANTIPATER. i. 249

Antipathy, religious. See Religion.

Apelles. i. 227. See Painter.

APOLLO. iii. 233. Apollo and Muses. i. 5, 6, 7. See Muses, Pythian, Delphick.

Apologue. iii. 206, 7. See Fable, Mythology, Esop.

Apology, practice of. i. 329, 30. See Preface.

Appearances: See Species.

Appetites high, eager. iii. 177

Appetite, elder Brother to Reason. i. 187

Applause: See Praise.

ARATUS, Poet. iii. 238

Arbitrary Power, i. 220. The sweet and bitter. ibid.

Arbitrary *Power, or absolute Monarchy, destructive of Arts.* i. 219, 20, 21, 237, 38, &c. iii. 23. *See* Absolute Power, Tyranny, Will.

Arcadia. i. 21

Architecture, Barbarous, Gothick. i. 353. True and natural, independent of Fancy. ibid. Founded in Truth and Nature. iii. 181. Why it has succeeded no better in England. iii. 400

Architect ambitious. iii. 133

ARISTIDES. i. 267

Aristophanes. i. 245

Aristotle cited. i. 142, 3, 242, &c. iii. 66, 139, 259, 80. See Peripatetick.

Arm: Secular-Arm, deliver over. i. 66. iii. 110

Arms and Hands, expressive in Oratory. iii. 366

ARTHUR King. iii. 112

Articles of Belief. See Belief, Divinity.

Artisans. i. 192. Artisan honest, resolute. i. 262

Artists rejoice in Criticism. i. 235, 61. Virtue and Generosity of Artists. i. 261, &c. See Poet, Painter, Architect.

Arts and Sciences how rais'd and improv'd. i. 239, &c. 248, &c. iii. 136, &c. Encourag'd by Liberty. iii. 403. 'Tis the Interest of great Men to encourage them. iii. 404

Arts and Virtues mutual Friends. i. 338

Assemblys, Publick, demand Respect. i. 75

Atellan, Plays. i. 251

Atheism: its Consequences with respect to Virtue. ii. 69, 70

Compar'd in that respect with Theism. ii. 72, 3, 4

Atheism from Superstition. ii. 335, 6, &c. Martyrs for Atheism. iii. 64. Atheism preferable to Superstition. i. 41. iii. 126, 7, 8. Faith of Atheism. ii. 357

Atheism charg'd on the People of the better Rank and Fashion. ii. 264. iii. 294. Charg'd upon Wit and subtle Reasoning. ibid.

Atheism. See Ill-Humour, Chance.

Atheist, a compleat one: His Belief or Faith. ii. 11, 298, 357, 8. Hard to pronounce certainly of any Man, that he is an Atheist. ii. 12. Atheist personated. iii. 294, 95

Atheists. Best Writers against 'em. ii. 259. Two sorts of People call'd Atheists. ii. 260. Different in themselves; and to be us'd differently. ii. 260, 61

Atheists miscall'd. i. 345

Atheists Enthusiasts. i. 52. iii. 64, 5

Atheist, a strong Believer. ii. 357

Atheistical Hypothesis. ii. 298

Certain Principles common to Atheists with the Devout, or Zealots. i. 97, 117, 18, 23, 24, &c. 132, 345, 52. ii. 68, 80, 81, 256. iii. 310

Atheistical Writers or Talkers, no genuine Atheists. i. 89, 90, 92, &c.

ATHENIANS. i. 30. Their Antiquity, Genius. iii. 152, 3.

Manners, Modesty. ibid. (See Greece.) Progress of Arts and Letters amongst them. i. 248, 49, 50

Attick Elegance. i. 233

ATTICUS. iii. 21

ATTILA, Gothick Prince. iii. 91

Avarice. i. 319, 20. iii. 197, 98, 304. Avaritious Temper, how miserable. ii. 155, 6, &c.

Audience. i. 264, 65, 77. See Stage.

Augustus. i. 220, 28, 269, 70. iii. 21, 250

Authors: Saint-Authors. i. 164, 5. iii. 239, 40. Author in Solitude. i. 175. Prince-Authors. i. 213, 14. Author's Courtship to the Reader. i. 200, 330. Selfishness of Authors. i. 200. Coquetry of an Author. ibid.

Author once an honourable Name. iii. 3, 4. A Character or Note of Understanding. ibid. Jealousy of free Authors. ii. 7, 8, 262, &c.

Author Orthodox. i. 358, 59, 60. Orthodoxy of our Author in particular. iii. 70, 71, 315

Authors not excusable for their ill Performance, because neglected by the Great. i. 222, 3, 4, 30. Or because of Criticism and Censure. i. 231, &c. Or because of the publick Genius or Ear. i. 261, 2, 78

Author and Reader, their mutual Relation, Interest. iii. 227, &c. Their Pretensions, Privileges, Place, Ceremonial. ibid.

Divinest Characters and Personages, no Authors, either in Sacred or Profane Letters. iii. 244, &c. Great Authors capable of Business, tho out of it. iii. 247, &c. 273

Authors of narrow Genius's, incapable of Action or Speculation. iii. 272, 3, &c. Bookseller makes the Author. i. 264. iii. 27. Modern Author professes Laziness, Precipitancy, Carelessness. i. 233, 4. In doubt about his own Work. iii. 27. See Piece, Penman, Miscellany.

Author of these Treatises: accidentally engag'd in them. iii. 190. His first Treatise (viz. Letter of Enthusiasm) a real Letter. ibid. And before. 12, 13, 19, 20

Authority: Divine Authority judg'd by Morals. i. 298 Awe: Its Effect on Mens Understandings. i. 96. See Fear.

В

BABYLONIAN Empire and Hierarchy. iii. 48. See Hierarchy.

BACON, Lord, cited. iii. 69

Banter: Fashionable with modern Politicians and Negotiators. i. 62

Banter from Persecution. i. 72

Barbarian. See Goth, Indian.

Barbarism, chief Mark of. iii. 153

Barbarism from Universal Monarchy. i. 221, 22

Bart'lemy-Fair. i. 28

Mr. BAYS. iii. 274, 5, 6, &c. Other Bays's in Divinity. iii. 282, &c.

Bear-Garden. i. 270, 71. iii. 256, 7

Beasts. Beast or Brute-Science. iii. 184, 218. Passionate Love and Fondness towards the Bestial or Animal-Forms, Virtues, Beautys. iii. 184, 216, &c.

Oeconomy or Order of Nature in the Beasts. See Oeconomy.

Beasts: their natural Instincts. ii. 307, 8

Beaver. iii. 220

Beauty: where to be found. ii. 404, &c. Mysterious Charms of Beauty. ii. 211, &c. Knowledg in the Degrees and Orders of Beauty. ibid. Three Degrees or Orders of Beauty. ii. 406, &c. Scale or Scheme of Beauty. iii. 182, &c. Moral Beauty. ii. 409. Confess'd. i. 280, 81. ii. 419, &c. iii. 179, 80. Moral Beauty and Deformity. ii. 29, 30. Beauty of Sentiments, Character, Mind. i. 136, 207. iii. 303. See Character, Mind, Virtue, Heart.

Beauty, is Truth. i. 142, 3. iii. 180, 1, &c.

Beauty of Virtue. i. 315, &c. Beauty of the Soul. ii. 414, 15

Beauty of the Body. ii. 414

Beauty dangerous. i. 183. Outward Beauty expressive of inward. i. 138. Natural Health, the inward Beauty of the Body. iii. 181. Mechanick Beautys, in opposition to Moral and Intellectual. i. 139

Beauty in Animals. iii. 218. How attractive, enchanting. iii. 216, 17, &c.

Scale of Beauty. iii. 182, 3

The Odd and Pretty in the room of the Graceful and Beautiful. iii. 5, 6, &c.

Beauty: its Idea natural. ii. 415

Beauty and Good the same. ii. 399, 422. Not the Object of the Sense. ii. 423, 4. Its Extent. ii. 211, 12, 13

The Beautiful, Honestum, Pulchrum, τὸ καλὸν. See Fair, Decorum, Enthusiasm.

Bee. ii. 94, 96. iii. 220

Beggars. i. 35, 36. Beggarly Religion. ibid. and iii. 126, &c.

Belief. (See Faith.) Belief at a venture. i. 35. No Merit in believing on weak Grounds. i. 34. Affectation of Belief. ibid. Articles of Belief. i. 361. iii. 60, 1, 2, 79, 80, 1, 2. Grossest Article of Belief, how introduc'd of old into the Church. iii. 333, 4. Sacred and indisputable Articles of Belief. iii. 70. Whether a Man can be accountable for his wrong Belief. ii. 326, 7, 8. Men persuade themselves into any Opinion or Belief whatever. iii. 101, 2, &c. Belief at the Stretch of Reason. i. 34. iii. 105

Believer against his Will. i. 35. iii. 127. Superstitious Believer wishes there were no God. iii. 127, 8

Belly. Gluttonous Imagination, or Belly-Sense. i. 283

Bibliotheque Choisie. iii. 18, 20, 241. See Monsieur LE CLERC.

Bigotry: its Spirit. i. 74. First Rise. iii. 80. Force of the Word. iii. 81, 2

Bird. ii. 302, &c.

Bit or Bridle, proper Emblem for the Figure of Virtue. iii. 386

Body-Politick, Head and Members. i. 113, 14. See Constitution.

Boileau: French Satirist. i. 218. iii. 280

Bombast. i. 232, 41. iii. 262

Books. See Reading, Scholar, Burning.

Good-Books so call'd. i. 165. iii. 327. Books of Chivalry, Gallantry, Prodigys, Travels, barbarous Nations, and Customs. i. 341, &c. Interpolating, suppressing Practice on Books. iii. 330. See Scripture, Fathers.

Bookseller. i. 304. (See Author, Amanuensis.) Begets a Fray or learned Scuffle. iii. 10, 11, 15, &c. Bookseller and Glazier. iii. 15. Bookseller's Shop and Trade. ibid. Bookseller determines Titles. iii. 27. Fits his Customers. iii. 270

Bossu: Pere Bossu, du Poeme Epique. i. 142

Breeding. See Academy, University.

Good-Breeding. i. 64, 5. ii. 242. Leading Character to Virtue. i. 129, 35, 333. iii. 161, 62, 68 Good-Breeding, and Liberty, necessarily join'd. i. 76. Man of Good-Breeding incapable of a brutal Action. i. 129. Acts from his Nature, without Reflection, and by a kind of Necessity. i. 129, 30. Compar'd with the thorow honest Man. ibid. See Gentleman.

BRITAIN: its Advantages. i. 219. Has secur'd a right Taste in Government, Arts, &c. iii. 404, 5. Old Britain. i. 272

British Liberty. i. 216, 22. British Sense in Politicks. i. 80

British Countrymen, Fellow-Citizens. iii. 144, &c.

Britons: their Sense of Government, and a Constitution. i. 108. See England, Englishmen.

Brute. ii. 305. See Beast.

Brutus. iii. 249

Buffoons. i. 72. See Laugh, Italian, Banter, Burlesque.

Build: easier to demolish than build. iii. 134

Burlesque: its principal Source. i. 71. (See Banter.) Mere Burlesque rejected by the Antients. i. 73. See Parodys, Comedy.

Burlesque-Wit and Buffoonery on the Stage. iii. 281

Burlesque Divinity. See Divinity.

Burnet Archaeol. cited. iii. 122

Burning Zeal See Zeal.

Burning and Destruction of Books, Learning, &c. iii. 239, &c. See Fathers of the Church.

Business. Man of Business. i. 309

C

Cabalistick Learning. iii. 81

CAESAR, Julius. i. 272. Caesar's Commentarys. i. 224. His Ability. i. 228

Caesars, Roman. i. 24, 25, 133, 221. iii. 41, 86, 90, 91

Cake: not eat and have. i. 130

Camp. i. 335

Cantonizing. i. 113

Canterbery. See Amble.

Cappadocians. iii. 251

Carnival. i. 82, &c.

Carver, carnal, spiritual. iii. 112, &c.

Catechism, Theological, Metaphysical. i. 306, 7. Moral, Philosophical. i. 307, &c.

Catechism, and Catechumens, originally AEgyptian. iii. 245. See Circumcision.

Catholick Church. See Church, Rome, Pope.

Catholick Opinion, how form'd. iii. 86, &c. See Uniformity.

CATULLUS. i. 228

Cause: common Cause. i. 222

CEBES. ii. 254

Censors of Manners. i. 240. Censure free. i. 9

Ceremony. i. 203, 4. See Compliments.

Ceremonial, between Author and Reader. iii. 227, &c.

Ceremonys. See Rites.

CERVANTES, Michael. iii. 253

Chaldea. iii. 48

Challenge. (See Duel.) Spiritual Challengers, Lists, Combatants. i. 363. iii. 341. See Religion, Priests.

Chance, prefer'd to Providence, by the superstitious. i. 40. iii. 126, &c. See Atheism.

Chaos, and Darkness, from Universal Monarchy. i. 222

Chaos of the English Poets. iii. 62

Characters. Dealer in Characters must know his own. i. 189

Sacred Characters. i. 281

Character, Divine. i. 23, 37. In God, in Man. i. 38, 41. Beauty of Character. i. 136. See Beauty.

Character with one's self, and others. i. 130, 294, 5

Character, generous, and vile, set in opposition. i. 141

Real Characters and Manners. i. 194, 99, 200, &c. See Manners.

Perfect Character, veil'd. i. 194. Perfect Character unartificial in Poetry. i. 337. Monstrous in Epick, or on the Stage. iii. 260, &c.

Homer's Characters. See Homer.

Principal Characters and Under-Parts. i. 195

Characters in Holy Writ, not Subjects for a Poem. i. 356

Characters or Personages in Dialogue. iii. 292, 3, &c. See Dialogue.

Sublime of Characters. i. 336

Inward Character. i. 339. iii. 34

Character from Circumstances of Nativity. iii. 147, 8

Characters in the State. iii. 163, 70, &c.

Inward Character and Worth. iii. 174, 5

Character of a Critick. See Critick.

Characteristick of Understandings. i. 201

Charity and good Will: Pretexts to what Ends. i. 87, 133. iii. 115, 33, 4. See Morals.

Christian Charity. i. 99. Charitable Foundations, to whose Benefit. i. 133. Supernatural Charity. i. 18. iii. 115. Heathen Charity. iii. 153, 4

Charm of Nature, in Moral Objects. See Nature, Beauty, Harmony, Taste.

Childrens Play. i. 66

Chivalry. i. 272, 3. *Originally* Moorish, Gothick. i. 344, &c. iii. 253. *Books of Chivalry*. i. 344. *Dregs of it.* ii. 195. *See* Gallantry.

Christian Author. i. 67. Good Christian. i. 99. Christian, Mahometan, Pagan. i. 352. iii. 104. Sceptick-Christian. iii. 72

Christianity no way concern'd in modern Miracles. ii. 326, 30, &c. Not founded in Miracle merely. ibid. and i. 297, 8

A Church. i. 10. See Hierarchy, Catholick.

Roman Christian and Catholick Church. iii. 90. See Monarchy.

National Church. i. 17, 28. Its Interest asserted. i. 17. Panick Fear for the Church. iii. 83, &c.

Church-Lands. i. 25, 133. iii. 45, 79

Writing Church-Militant. iii. 9, &c. and 290, &c.

Antient Heathen-Church. i. 50. iii. 126, &c.

Church of England. iii. 15, &c. See Divines.

Church-Patriot. iii. 170, 71

Chymistry. See Alchymy.

Cicero. i. 208, 334. iii. 20, 21, 182, 280

Circumcision, its Origin among the AEgyptians. iii. 52, 3. Receiv'd by the Hebrew Patriarch, their Guest. ibid. By Moses on his Return. 55. Laid down again, on his Retreat. 52. Again renew'd by Joshua, with regard to the same AEgyptians. 52, 4, 5

City: Heavenly City Jerusalem. i. 282

Clan. See Tribe.

Cleanliness. i. 125

CLERC (Mr. Le Clerc, Sylv. Phil.) iii. 214, 15. See Bibliotheque Choisie.

Clergy, Benefit of. i. 305. Interest of Christian Clergy in antient and polite Learning. iii. 236, 7. Management and Practices of the antient Clergy. iii. 333, 4. See Clericks, Priesthood, Fathers of the Church.

Clericks seditious. iii. 88, 9. See Magistrate, Civil Government.

Climates, Regions, Soils, compar'd. iii. 150

Closet-Thoughts. i. 139

Clown, judges Philosophers. iii. 107. Better Philosopher than some so call'd. iii. 204

Club, Liberty of the Club. i. 75. (See Committee.) Club-Method. i. 267

Coffee-House. iii. 15, 274, &c. Coffee-House Committee. iii. 274, &c. Coffee-House Hero. ibid.

College. i. 334. ii. 184, 91

Collision amicable. i. 64

Comedy. i. 198. *Posterior to Tragedy.* i. 244, &c. *See* Farce, Play, Theater, Drama, Burlesque.

Comedy, antient. First, Second, Third. i. 245, &c. 252, &c.

Comick Style. i. 257, &c. See Style, Satir.

Commission: sole Commission for Authorship. i. 335. Heavenly Commission, Pretences to it examin'd. iii. 102, 59, 336, &c.

Committee. iii. 275, &c. See Club.

Common Sense. (See Sense, Nature.) Men not to be reason'd out of it. i. 96

Company, provocative to Fancy. i. 159. See Assemblys, Conversations.

Complexions, religious. i. 84. See Salvation, Persecution.

Compliments. i. 203, 4. See Ceremony.

Comprehension in Religion. See Uniformity.

Conference, free. i. 70, 3, 5

Conformity in Religion. iii. 315. See Uniformity.

Conformist Occasional. iii. 85

Conjurer, a wise and able one. i. 318. Conjurers. i. 87, 175, 348. See Magi, Priest, Enchanter.

Conquest, National. iii. 148

Conscience, Moral: ii. 119. Its Effects. ii. 120, 1, 2. Religious Conscience supposes Moral Conscience. ii. 120. False Conscience, its Effects. ii. 122, 3, 4

Conscience from Interest. ii. 125

Consecration of Opinions, Notions. i. 60

Consistency, Rule of. iii. 354

Constitution, *State or Government*. i. 108, 239. English *Constitution*. i. 212, 16. iii. 150 Contemplation. ii. 75. *See* Meditation.

Controversy. Controversial Writings. iii. 9, &c. 270, 71. Church-Controversy. iii. 290, &c. Religious Controversy, and Decision of the Cause, according to modern Priesthood. iii. 341, &c.

Conversation. i. 68, &c. 75, 6. iii. 335, 6. Life of Conversation. i. 75, 6. Sterility of the best Conversations: the Cause. i. 77. Remedy. ibid. Modern Conversation, effeminate, enervate. ii. 186

Convocation (Synod, Council) what Candour, Temper? i. 360, &c.

Coquetry, see Author.

CORNEILLE, French Tragedian, cited. iii. 87, 280

Corporation of Wit. iii. 279. See Wit.

Correctness (See Genius, Critick) in writing. i. 232, &c. 241. iii. 227. Incorrectness. iii. 2, 3, &c. 258. Cause of Incorrectness in our English Writers. ibid. & 272, 3, &c.

Covetousness. See Avarice.

Counsellor. Privy Counsellors, of wise aspect. i. 211

Countenances. See Complexions.

Cowardice. i. 314. ii. 140, &c. See Fear.

Country. Love of native Country. iii. 143. See Love.

Native Country, Name wanting. iii. 149. Higher City or Country recogniz'd. iii. 158, 9

A Court. i. 10, 335. Court-Power. iii. 23. Grandeur of a Court, what influence on Art and Manners. i. 219, &c. 239, &c. 341, 2. iii. 23. Spirit of a Court. i. 104, &c. Specters met with there. i. 139. Place at Court. iii. 169, &c. 203. Court-Slavery. iii. 168, &c. See Slavery.

Court-Engines. iii. 174. See Favourites.

Courtier. i. 192. Honest Courtier. iii. 24, 175, 6

Creature. Every one a private Interest. ii. 15, &c. Private Ill of every Creature. ibid.

No Creature good, if by his Nature injurious to his Species, or to the whole in which he is included. ii. 17. When a Creature is suppos'd good. ii. 21, 22, 26. What makes an ill Creature. ii. 26, 27. What makes a Creature worthy or virtuous. ii. 30, 31

Creature void of natural Affection. ii. 81, 82

Creature when too good. ii. 90, 91

Creed. iii. 242. Furniture of Creeds. iii. 322. Creed-making. iii. 60, 61, 80, &c. 332, 3, 4. See Belief, Article, Watch-word.

Credulity and Incredulity. i. 345. Credulity, how dangerous. ii. 326, &c.

Criterion of Truth. i. 61

Critical Truth. See Truth.

Critical Liberty. iii. 316

Critical Art, Support of Sacred Writ. iii. 236, &c. 241, &c. 267

Criticism, rejoices the real Artist. i. 234, &c. Toleration of Criticism, essential to Wit. i. 260.

Sacred Criticism. iii. 72, 3, 229, 30, &c. Prevention against. iii. 166, 276

Criticks: the ingenious and fair sort. i. 81. Formidable to the Author or Poet, why? i. 231, 2. iii. 272, 73, &c.

French Criticks. iii. 280. See Bossu, Journalists.

Critick-haters. i. 235, 6. iii. 165, 6, 7, 258, 272, 74, &c.

Self-Critick. i. 168

Interest, Party, Cause, or Writing, to be suspected, which declares against Criticism, or declines the Proof. iii. 266, 342

Criticks, Pillars of State in Wit and Letters. i. 236, &c. 240, 41. iii. 267. Criticks, Notarys, Expositors, Prompters. i. 241. Treated as whimsical. i. 272. Their Cause defended. iii. 165, 66

Criticks by fashion. i. 272

Writing-Criticks, or Satirists. iii. 271, 2

Criticks, Satirists, Scepticks, Scrupulists. iii. 109

Crocodile, worship'd. ii. 32. iii. 80. Emblem of Superstition. ii. 387

Crocodiles, Chimeras, Scholastick. iii. 80

Crowns, how purchas'd on some occasions. i. 133

Crudities. i. 164, &c.

CUDWORTH (Dr.) his Character. ii. 262. Why accus'd of being a Friend to Atheists. ibid. Cited. iii. 64

Custom and Fashion powerful Seducers. i. 355. Custom vitious. ii. 35

Cybele, Goddess. ii. 253

D

Daemon, or Guardian Spirit. i. 168, 9. iii. 28

Daemon, to what that Name belongs. ii. 11. See Witch.

Daemonist, who, what. ii. 11, 12

Dancer. i. 193

Figur'd Dances. iii. 91. High Dance in Religion and Prophecy. iii. 117

Death, King of Terrors. i. 314. ii. 253. See Fear.

Debate, free. i. 71. iii. 155. See Conference, Freedom.

Debauch, has a reference to Society. i. 310, 11. ii. 127

Declamation. i. 70. See Preaching.

Decorum. i. 138, 9, 337. ii. 415. iii. 180, 85, 97, 8. Decorum and Sublime of Actions. iii. 34. (See Beauty, Grace.)

Dulce & Decorum. i. 102, 23

Dedication. See Preface.

Defender of the Faith. i. 213

Deist, the Name set in opposition to Christianity. ii. 209

Deity, when view'd amiss. i. 32, 3. Deity sought in Chaos and Confusion, not in Order and Beauty. ii. 336, &c. Various Combinations of Opinions concerning Deity. ii. 13. How Men are influenc'd by the Belief of a Deity. ii. 54, &c. Terror of the Deity implies not moral Conscience. ii. 119. Different Characters, Aspects, or Views of Deity. iii. 39, 40. Species multiply'd. iii. 47, 49, 50, 80. Heathen Attributes of Deity. iii. 153. See Genius, Mind.

Deity, the sovereign Beauty, and Source of all Beautys. ii. 294, 5. See God.

Delphick Inscription. i. 170

Demosthenes. i. 161, 208. iii. 141

Denmark and Sweden. iii. 171

Despotick. See Arbitrary, Absolute.

Devil. See Hell.

Devotion of the dismal sort; its Effects. ii. 116, 17. The abject, beggarly, illiberal, sycophantick, knavish kind. i. 34, 35. iii. 125, &c.

Dialogue: Manner of Writing us'd by the Antients. i. 73. Preliminary Science to Poetry and just Writing. i. 191, &c. Moderns, why so sparing and unsuccessful in the way of Dialogue-Writing. ii. 187, 8. How practis'd by some modern Divines. iii. 291, &c. Dialogue between an Author and his Bookseller. iii. 16. Between GOD and Man. iii. 122. Between Man and Beast. ibid. Between GOD and Satan. ibid. Between GOD and JONAH. iii. 119, &c.

Diana. iii. 79, 83, &c.

DIODORUS SICULUS cited. iii. 43, 47, &c.

DION CASSIUS, wretched Historian. i. 270. iii. 24

Dionysius Halicarn. iii. 234, 80

Discourse continu'd and alternate. i. 70. Vicissitude in Discourse, a Law. i. 70, 76

Dishonesty, a Half-Thought. iii. 297, 302, 4. See Knavery, Thinking.

Disinterestedness in Friendship. i. 100, 1. See Friendship. Disinterestedness in Religion, and its holy Founders. i. 281, &c. See Reward, Love.

Distraction, real. i. 322, &c.

Divine, or God-like. i. 33, 38. See Character, Theogony, Theology.

Divine Example. ii. 56

Divine Presence. ii. 57

Divines (Theologists) iii. 122, 235, 237, &c. 282, 90, 91, 93, &c. 305, 6, 316, 325, &c. Why incautious, and ill Managers, in the Cause of Religion. ii. 258, 9

Divine, in humour, out of humour. iii. 130

Divinity-Doctor, combatant in Print. iii. 10, &c.

Polemick Divinity. iii. 9, &c.

Burlesque Divinity. iii. 291, &c. Sirnames and Titles of Divinity. iii. 60. See Deity, Theology.

Doctrine. See Hypothesis.

Dog. See Fable, Beast.

Dogmatists, why so fashionable in this Age. ii. 190, 91. Dogmatizing in Religion and on a future State. ibid. and 236, 7, 297. See Sceptick.

Dominion, founded in Property. iii. 49

Drama: English *Drama, lame Support of it.* iii. 289, 90. Dramatis Personae. ibid. *See* Play, Stage, Tragedy, Comedy, *Mr.* Bays.

Theological Drama. iii. 293

Drapery, Rules concerning it. iii. 372, 3

DRYDEN. iii. 61, 2. See BAYS.

Duels. i. 273, 363. See Challenges.

E

EAR in Musick. i. 42, 135, 217, 18, 35, 336, 38

Ear lost. i. 344. Publick Ear. i. 264, 275, 6. See Audience.

Distemper in the Ear. i. 324, 5

Ears to hear, &c. i. 63

Ear in Poetry. i. 217, 275. iii. 262, &c.

Earth: System of the Earth, how a part of some other System. ii. 19. Another Earth, or World. ii. 282. Our Relation to mere Earth and Soil. iii. 144, &c. Sons of Earth. iii. 146, 7

Education. See University, Academy, School, Tutor.

Effeminacy. i. 314. ii. 186. iii. 186

Effeminate Wit. iii. 166, 7

EGYPT. See AEGYPT.

Elephant. iii. 221

Eloquence. i. 8. Leprosy of. i. 160. Corruption of. iii. 22

Eloquence and other Arts depend on Liberty. i. 219, 20. See Liberty.

Embassadors from Heaven, in what sense, iii. 336, &c. From the Moon. iii. 339, &c. Apostolick Commission, Embassy, Succession. iii. 337, &c.

Emblematical, nothing of that kind to be directly mingled in an Historical Piece. iii. 381. An Instance from RAPHAEL. iii. 382

Emperors, Roman. i. 24, 133, 222, 28. Convert Emperors. i. 133. iii. 78

Empirick. i. 163, 235

Enchanter. i. 348, 49. See Conjurer, Priest, Magi.

Engineer of Letters. iii. 16, 17. In Philosophy and Sciences. iii. 134

Engine: Court-Engines. iii. 174

England, a Conquest: whence to be fear'd. iii. 148, 9

Old-England. iii. 150, 51. Late England. ibid. See Britain.

Church of England. See Church, Divines.

Englishmen, Fellow-Citizens, Countrymen. iii. 144, &c. Name whence brought. iii. 149

English, inhospitable Humour. iii. 152, 3

English Authors in general. i. 265. Speeches and admir'd Wit of our English Ancestors. iii. 141, 2

English Liberty. i. 216, 22

English Poetry. (See Muses.) Uncorrectness of English Poets. i. 263. iii. 258, 59, 64, &c.

English *Divines*. iii. 122. *See* Divines.

Enjoyment: deceitful kind. i. 309. Sincere. i. 311. Social. i. 310, 11

Enthusiasm: Definition of the natural sort, &c. iii. 30, 31. Enthusiasm of holy Souls. iii. 68. Legitimate and bastard sort. i. 53. iii. 67. Rais'd from Internals. ii. 270, 71. iii. 90. From Externals. iii. 41, 90, 91. Philosophical Enthusiasm. iii. 81. Prophetical. iii. 67, 8. Poetical. i. 21. Mathematical. ii. 104, 5. Enthusiasm of the Lover, Hero, Virtuoso, &c. ii. 400, &c. 430. iii. 31. Universal, or in all. i. 54. iii. 29

Enthusiasms of different sorts. iii. 41. Comprehended in the Romish Church. iii. 90, &c. Vulgar sort, and more refin'd. ibid. Enthusiasm divine. i. 53

Modification of Enthusiasm. i. 17. Various Operation. i. 48, &c. Enthusiasm at second hand. i. 43

Enthusiasm justify'd. i. 53, &c. ii. 57, 394, 5, 400, 1, 8. iii. 28, &c. Ravage of Enthusiasm. i. 89. Antidote to Enthusiasm. i. 55

Virtue it-self a noble Enthusiasm. iii. 33, 4

Enthusiasm a natural and honest Passion. iii. 37, 8. Soft and lovely. ii. 218, 19. Enthusiasm works differently, by Fear, by Love. iii. 38, 9. Its amorous Lineage. iii. 38. Contrary and miraculous Effects of Enthusiasm. iii. 40

Enthusiasm *catching*, *communicable*, *imparted*. i. 44, 5. iii. 29, 30, 84. *See* Melancholy, Prophecy.

Sociable Enthusiast. ii. 218

Enthusiast itinerant. i. 287. Epicureans, Enthusiastical Atheists. i. 52. iii. 64, 5

Enthusiastick Inebriation. iii. 66, 7

Envy, unnatural Passion. ii. 165

Ephesian Worshipers. iii. 83, &c. Zeal for their Church. ibid.

EPICURUS, his Connivance in matters of Vision and Fanaticism. i. 48, &c. Recognition of the Force of Nature, and Natural Affection. i. 117, 18. Toleration of Natural Enthusiasm.

i. 48, &c. iii. 32, &c.

Epicurus, primitive Father to some conceal'd Moderns. i. 117. Love and Religion cruelly treated by Epicurus. iii. 31, &c.

Nature, a Deity to the Epicurean Atheist. i. 52. iii. 64. See Enthusiasm, Atheism.

Epicurean Atomist. i. 301

Epicurean Hypothesis. iii. 32, 35, 69

Epicurean Sect tolerated. i. 18

Vulgar Epicurism. ii. 126

Epimenides. iii. 238

Epistles: Tully's Epistles. iii. 20. Seneca's Epistles. iii. 22, &c.

Epistolar Style. iii. 17, &c.

Epistle Dedicatory. See Preface.

Ergamenes (King) destroys a Hierarchy. iii. 49

Esop. iii. 206

Essays. i. 163. Essay-Writing. ibid. See Miscellany.

Етніоріа. *See* АЕтніоріа.

Euphranos, Painter. i. 144, 340

Euripedes. i. 244, &c. iii. 141, 240, 313

Executioner. See Magistrate.

Excellency. See Titles.

Exemplars, in the Writing-Art. i. 192, 206

Exercises. i. 191. See Academy.

Eyes: fitted to certain Lights. i. 62

Eye in Painting. i. 135, 235, 336. Eye in Painting lost, how? i. 344

Distemper in the Eye. i. 324, 5

Harmony to the Eye. iii. 4

Eye debauch'd. iii. 5

F

FABLES us'd by Wisemen and Moralists. i. 63. iii. 205, 6. See Parable, Mythology.

Fable of the Man and Lion. ii. 188. Of the Travelling Dogs. iii. 207, 8

Truth of Fable. See Truth.

Fact. Matter of Fact, how judg'd by Zealots. i. 43, 4, 55, 147, 8. Matter of Fact, in the Language of the Superstitious. i. 44

Matters of Fact, unably tho sincerely related, prove the worst sort of Deceit. i. 346. See Truth.

Faction, Spirit of. i. 114

Fair, Bartl'my. i. 28

Fair, Beautiful. i. 139. See Beauty, Decorum, Numbers.

Fair, Species of. i. 139

Fairys. i. 6

Faith (religious) antient, modern. i. 6, 7. Implicit Faith. i. 94. iii. 231. Definition. iii. 73, 4. Extension of Faith. i. 5, &c. Act of Faith. ibid. Faith on any Terms. i. 36. Heroick Faith. iii. 334. Religious Faith, dependent on what? i. 39. Historical Faith. iii. 72. Personal. iii. 73. Faith National, Hereditary, entail'd by Law. i. 344, 62. iii. 103. Faith in Travellers, Romancers, Legends. i. 344, &c. Rule of Faith. iii. 318, 19, 22, &c. See Belief.

Rule of Faith (Treatise of Archbishop Tillotson) cited. iii. 329, &c.

Chinese, or Indian Faith. i. 344, 5. Historical, Critical Faith. iii. 22

Confession of Faith, the Author's. iii. 315. Gradual Decay of the Evidence relating to the Matters of our Faith. iii. 238, &c.

Fanaticks, antient. i. 47, &c. Compar'd with modern. ibid. Fanatick errant. ii. 330. See Lymphaticks.

Fanaticks in all Churches and Religions. i. 50. iii. 38. Fanaticism, its true Character. ii. 329, 30. Fanatick Sense and Judgment of Scripture. iii. 237. Popish Fanaticism. iii. 92, 3, 239, &c.

Fancys apostrophiz'd. i. 188. Sophisters, Impostors. ibid. Government of Fancy. i. 308, &c. ii. 231. Fancy: her Assault, Combat, Fortress. i. 311, &c. 320, &c.

Fancys, Sollicitresses, Enchantresses. i. 312, 13. Reprimanded, question'd, examin'd, dismiss'd. i. 325, &c. Disagreement with Fancy, makes the Man himself; Agreement, not himself. i. 325, &c. Lady-Fancy cross'd by a What next? i. 326. Fancys in a Tribe. i. 321, 27. Florid Fancy. iii. 177. Power of Fancy in Religion. iii. 68. See Humour.

Farce. i. 150. iii. 6, &c. See Fescennin, Atellan, Parody.

Fasces. i. 16. See Magistrate.

Fashion. See Modes, Custom.

Father of a Country. i. 37, 321

Fathers of the Church disputing and disputed. iii. 327. Industrious in suppressing all Scripture or Arguments of their Adversarys which made against them. iii. 320, &c. 330, &c. Burning Method of Roman and Greek Fathers, Bishops, &c. iii. 239, &c.

Favourites. i. 192. ii. 138. See Court.

Fear, Passion of. i. 294. ii. 55, &c. Description by Des Cartes. i. 294. Its Root and Cure. i. 295, &c.

Fear of Death. ii. 140, &c. How improv'd or abated. i. 314, &c. iii. 196, 7, 203, 4

Fear and Hope in Religion. ii. 55. See Future State, Rewards and Punishments.

Ferments. See Humours.

Fescennin (Plays.) i. 251

Fiction. See Fable.

Figure, principal in a Picture, to govern the rest. iii. 374

Flattery in Devotion. i. 34. See Devotion, Sycophant.

Fly. ii. 18. See Spider.

Fools: the greatest, who? ii. 231

Foot-ball. i. 187. iii. 15

Force and Arbitrary Power destructive of all Arts. i. 219, &c. 237, &c.

Form, outward, in a Figure, to give place where the inward is describ'd. iii. 367

Formality. i. 11, 12, 74

Formalists. i. 12, 13, 174, 335. iii. 97, 8. The Author himself a Formalist. iii. 135

Foreigners: Treatment of them by different Nations. iii. 152, &c. See Hospitality.

Free *Thought*. See Thought.

Free Writer. ii. 7.

Free States. i. 238, &c.

Freedom of Wit. i. 69. (See Wit, Discourse, Debate.) Consequence of a Restraint. i. 71, 2

French Authors. i. 335. Theater. iii. 6, 7, 8

French Criticks. See Bossu, Criticks.

Friend: knowable, unknowable. i. 284. Friend of Mankind. ii. 247

Friendship: real Good. ii. 238, &c. Comprehends Society and Mankind. ii. 239, &c. Friendship how prevalent and diffusive. ii. 109

Friendship, Christian, Heathen. i. 98, &c. (See Charity, Hospitality, Disinterestedness.) Friendship its own Reward. i. 100

Fucus, Mask or Vizard of Superstition. i. 84

Fungus. iii. 146

Future State. i. 18, 97, &c. ii. 236, 7. iii. 302. See Rewards and Punishments.

G

A Galante. i. 192

Gallantry, Original and Progress. i. 272, 3, 331, 2. ii. 194, &c. iii. 253. Devout Gallantry. i. 20, 362, 3. Gallantry and Heroick Power of Faith. iii. 334. Merit in the Gallant World. i. 331. See Ladys, Chivalry, Novel.

Gallows. i. 127. iii. 177. See Jail.

Gardens. iii. 167. See Palace.

Aulus Gellius cited. iii. 234

Generation: Natural Instinct in the Case. ii. 412

Genius, or Guardian-Angel. i. 168, 9

Genius of the World. ii. 245, 284, 95, 343, 47, 352, &c. See Deity.

Genius, not sufficient to form a Writer or Poet. i. 193. iii. 258. English Author wou'd be all Genius. i. 233. iii. 258. Fashionable Affectation of a Genius, without Correctness, in our English Writers. i. 263. iii. 258, 9, 64, &c. See English Poets.

Gentleman: Character of a Gentleman. i. 135. iii. 156, &c. (See Breeding.) Amusements of Gentlemen more improving than the profound Researches of Pedants. i. 335. iii. 168
Fine Gentleman, owing to Masters. i. 191

Gibbet. i. 125. See Jail, Gallows, Hell.

Gibbets and Rods succeed to Charity and Love, when. iii. 115

Giddiness in Life. i. 322

Gladiators: Barbarity of Gladiatorian Spectacles. i. 269, 70. iii. 256, 7

Gladiatorian Penmen. iii. 12

Glass. See Looking-Glass.

Glazier. iii. 15

Glory: Acting for Glory's sake, how far divine? i. 38

GNOSTICKS, antient Hereticks. iii. 75, 6

God: God and Goodness the same. i. 33, &c. 40, &c. Nothing in God but what is Godlike. i. 33, &c. Question concerning his Being, what Issue? ibid. and 39, 40. See Deity, Attributes, Praise.

God, what? ii. 10. What Idea given of God in certain Religions. ii. 13, 14. Ill Character of a God: Its Consequences in respect to Morality. ii. 47, &c. How God can be said to witness for himself to Men. ii. 333, 4

Belief of a God, consider'd as Powerful. ii. 55. As Worthy and Good. ii. 56

Gondibert. iii. 341, 2

Good: how predominant in Nature. ii. 216, 17. What is truly Good. ii. 225, 237, &c.

Good of the Whole. i. 40. Private Good, what? i. 203. See Interest, Pleasure.

Good, what? Where found? i. 308, &c. Good and Happiness. ii. 227. iii. 196, &c. Opinion of Good. ibid.

Goods of Fortune, and Goods of the Mind compar'd. ii. 432, &c.

Goodness, Divine. i. 23. Opinion of Goodness creates Trust. i. 94. ii. 334. iii. 114

Goodness: what, in a sensible Creature? ii. 21

Gorgias Leontinus. i. 74

GOTH. i. 86, 89. Gothick Influence in Philosophy and Religion as well as Arts. i. 350, 51. Gothick Government. iii. 150, 51. Gothick Notion. i. 86, 9. Gothick Poetry. i. 217, 18. Gothick Architecture. i. 236

Gothick Conqueror, conquer'd by spiritual Arms. iii. 90, 91

Gothicism. See Barbarism, Barbarians.

Government absolute. (See Absolute.) Free Government or Constitution. i. 216. Definition. iii. 311, 12. Origin or Rise of Civil Government: Ridiculous Account. i. 109. (See State of Nature.) Natural Account. i. 110, &c. 236, &c. Civil Government conforming and subordinate. i. 110, 336. Defy'd, insulted, embroil'd. i. 363. iii. 89

Grace. (See Decorum.) The naturally graceful. i. 135. (See Beauty, Numbers.) Grace and Action in Human Bodys. i. 190

Grace. See Titles.

Grammar: Grammatical Rules necessarily applicable to Scripture of whatever kind. iii. 229, &c.

Grandees. See Ministers.

Grapes not from Thorns. i. 286

Gratitude. ii. 240, 41

Gratuity. i. 126. See Reward.

Gravity, try'd, prov'd. i. 11, 12. True and false. ibid. Of the Essence of Imposture. i. 11. Convenient Gravity of this sort. iii. 334. See Grimace, Formality, Solemnity.

GREAT BRITAIN, like to be the principal Seat of Arts. iii. 398

Great Men. See Ministers.

The Great (Great People) their Influence on Wit, and in the literate World. i. 8, 210, &c. Their Character. ii. 137, 8

GREECE, Fountain of Arts, Science, and Politeness. i. 219. iii. 138, &c. Early Writers of Greece form'd the publick Taste. i. 263, 4. Grecian Religion. iii. 126, &c. 153, 4. Manners. ibid. 152, &c. See Athenians.

Greek Language, original Beauty and Refinement. iii. 138, &c.

GREGORIUS the Great. iii. 239, 40

Grimace, religious and zealot-kind. i. 65, 6, 74, 149. See Gravity.

Grimace, from Constraint and Persecution. i. 84

Grotesque-Figures. i. 149

Guardian honest, when? i. 125

Η

Half-Jesters. i. 81

Half-Knave, thorow Fool. i. 131, 2

Half-Thinkers. iii. 300. See Thought.

Harmony, such by Nature, not by Fashion or Will. i. 353. Natural Harmony, how advanc'd. i. 238. Harmony, Rules of. i. 140. See Musick.

Haunt. See Specter.

Heart, unfound, hollow. i. 43. A Heart in Lover's Language. i. 137. Descent on the Territorys of the Heart. i. 355. Heart merely human. i. 358. Heart after the Pattern of God Almighty. ibid. Numbers of the Heart. iii. 34. Wisdom of. i. 277. See Beauty, Character.

Heart makes the Philosopher. iii. 161

Heathen-Charity. See Charity.

Heathen-Church. See Church.

Hell. iii. 177, 8. See Devil, Gallows, Jail.

Heraldry. i. 362, 3

Herald of Fame. i. 225

HERCULES. ii. 188

Judgment of Hercules, the Subject of it. iii. 349, 50. The principal Figure in the Piece. iii. 358. His different Appearance in the several Parts of the Dispute. iii. 350, 51, 59, 60

Herculean *Law.* i. 267

Hereafter: A Question with a Sceptick. ii. 236, 7. See Future State.

Heretick by Birth. iii. 104. Good-humour'd Man properly no Heretick. iii. 105

Hermit, never by himself. i. 175

Hero: Philosophick Hero. i. 194, 98. Hero of the black Tribe. i. 349

Heroick Prince: a Character and Story. i. 176, &c.

Heroick Virtue. See Virtue.

Heroick Sign-Post. i. 225

Heroism and Philanthropy. i. 113. Heroism in Faith. See Volunteer, Faith.

HERODOTUS. iii. 247. Cited. iii. 43

Hierarchy. i. 86. iii. 48. (See Magi, Priest.) Its Power in Persia, Ethiopia, Egypt. ibid. Its Growth over the Civil Magistrate. ibid. Acquisition of Lands and consequent Dominion. ibid. Certain Law, Permission, or Indulgence, necessarily producing this Effect, and fatal to the Civil Magistrate. iii. 44, 5, 78, 9. Establishment of the Hierarchy over the Monarchy, or State in the Egyptian, Ethiopian, Babylonian Empires. iii. 48, 9. Parallel Effect in the Roman. iii. 78, 9, 88, &c. Roman-Christian and Catholick Hierarchy: its Growth under the Universal Roman Monarchy. iii. 90. And afterwards over the barbarous Nations. iii. 91. Its Prevalency, Policy, Comprehensiveness, Majesty and Grandeur. iii. 92, &c. Affected Pretenders, Imitators, and Copists after these Originals. ibid. and 106

History compar'd with Poetry. i. 145

Historian. i. 122, 189. Disinterested. i. 224, 5. See Poet.

Historical Truth. See Truth.

History of Criticks. i. 240, &c.

Mr. Hobbes. i. 88, &c. 94

HOMER. ii. 205, 221. His Character. i. 208. iii. 32, 334. Cited. iii. 153. Character of his Works. i. 196, &c. iii. 32, 153. Father and Prince of Poets. iii. 32. and i. 244. Age when he rose. i. 243, &c. Revolution made by him. ibid.

Homerical Characters or Personages. 196, 7, 207. iii. 260, &c. Homer understood how to lye in Perfection. i. 346. iii. 260, &c.

Honest in the dark. i. 125

Honesty, its Value. i. 121. Honesty and Harmony reside together. i. 208. See Virtue, Integrity.

Honesty the best Policy. i. 132. iii. 204, 5

Honours. See Titles.

Point of Honour. ii. 194, 5

Auctions or Sales of Honour. iii. 168, 9, 208, 9

Hope and Fear in Religion. ii. 55, 57, &c. See Future State, Reward and Punishment.

HORACE cited, passim—Passages of Horace explain'd. i. 51. (viz. Sat. v. ver. 97.) iii. 202. (Epist. vi. lib. i. bis) iii. 249. (Epist. xx. Sat. I. lib. ii, &c.) Also his Epistle to Augustus (lib. 2.) i. 269, 70

Horace, best Genius, and most Gentleman-like of Roman Poets. i. 328. His History, Character. ii. 224. iii. 202, 248, &c.

Horse. Hound, Hauk, &c. See Beast.

Hobby-Horse. i. 217

Horseman and Horsemanship. i. 193

Hospitality: what kind of Virtue. ii. 166. Antient, Heathen. iii. 143, 4. (See Charity, Friendship.) Inhospitable Disposition or Hatred of Foreigners, what Sign? iii. 153. Inhospitality, English. iii. 152, 3

Hot-cockles. iii. 293

Hound, Horse. See Beast.

Humility, what Virtue, in Religion, and Love. i. 331, 2

Humour: Good-Humour, best Security against Enthusiasm. i. 22, 55. Force of Humour in Religion. iii. 95, 98, 108, &c. Ill-Humour, Cause of Atheism. i. 23

Good-Humour and Imposture, Enemys. i. 32. Good Humour, Proof of Religion. ibid. Of Wit. 74. A natural Lenitive against Vice. i. 128. Specifick against Superstition and Enthusiasm. ibid. and 55

Humour and Fancy, ill Rule of Taste. i. 338, &c. iii. 165, &c.

Ill Rule of Good and Ill. ibid. and iii. 200-201

Humours, as in the Body, so in the Mind. i. 14

Hydrophobia. i. 50

Hylomania. iii. 65

Hypocrites. i. 94

Hypothesis. See System.

Fantastick Hypothesis. ii. 190. iii. 160

Hypotheses, Systems, destroy'd, blown up. i. 88

Religious Hypotheses multiply'd. iii. 47, &c.

Ι

Jail. i. 125. iii. 177. See Gallows.

JANUS: Janus-Face of Zealot-Writers. i. 66

Ideal World. iii. 211

Ideas, simple, complex, adequate, &c. i. 287, 8, 299, &c. (See Metaphysicks.) Comparison of mere Ideas and articulate Sounds, equally important. i. 288, 303. Examination of our Ideas not pedantick, when? i. 312. True and useful Comparison, Proof, and Ascertainment of Ideas. i. 299, &c.

Ideas innate. i. 49, 354. ii. 43, &c. 412. iii. 36, 214, &c.

Not innate, of what kind. iii. 164

Ideas of the World, Pleasure, Riches, &c. what? i. 301. See Opinion, Fancy.

Identity. ii. 350, &c. iii. 192, &c.

Idol; Idol-Notions, Idolaters. i. 60, 357

JEPHTHAH. iii. 124

Jest: true, false. i. 74, 81, 128, 9. See Ridicule.

JEWS, a cloudy People. i. 29, 30, 282. iii. 55, &c. 115, 16. Sullen, bitter, persecuting. ibid. Their Character by God himself. iii. 55. Jewish Understanding. i. 282, 3. Disposition towards the darker Superstitions. iii. 124. Jews, a chosen People. i. 357. iii. 282. Left to Philosophy for Instruction in Virtue. i. 101

Jewish People, originally dependent on the Egyptians. iii. 51, &c. Their Rites, Ceremonys, Learning, Science, Manners, how far deriv'd thence. ibid. How tenacious and bigotted in this respect. ibid. Spirit of Persecution and Religious Massacre, propagated from hence. ibid. iii. 60, &c. 80, &c. 86, &c. (See Persecution.) Jewish Princes. iii. 116, 24

Ill, whether really existent in the Universe. ii. 9, 10. Absolute Ill, what? ii. 20. Relative Ill. ibid. & 21. The Appearances of Ill no Argument against the Existence of a perfect sovereign Mind. ii. 363, 4. No real Ill in Things. ii. 364.

Appearance of Ill necessary. ii. 288, 9

Imitation *Poetical.* i. 193. See Poet. Works of Imitation, how to be regulated. iii. 389, 90 Imperium in Imperio. i. 114

Impostors, speak the best of Human Nature. i. 94. See Goodness.

Imposture arraign'd. i. 10. Hid under Formality. i. 74. Essence of Imposture. i. 11. Imposture fears not a grave Enemy. i. 31. Strangely mix'd with Sincerity, Hypocrisy, Zeal, and Bigotry. ii. 324, 5

Indian Musick and Painting. i. 242, 340. Indian Princes late Embassadors. iii. 339

Indolence. i. 310, 18, 19. Its dangerous Consequences. ii. 158, &c.

Informers. i. 126

Ingratitude, a negative Vice. ii. 167

Inhumanity not compatible with Good-Breeding. ii. 163. Unnatural. ii. 164

Inquiry concerning Virtue, Deity, &c. See Vol. ii. Treatise I. & i. 297. Occasion of this Treatise. ii. 5, &c. Its Defense. ii. 263, &c.

Inquiry, Freedom of. i. 34

Inquisition. i. 20, 186. iii. 103

Inquisitors. i. 65. Self-Inquisitor. i. 186

Inspiration. i. 7, 45. (See Prophets, Poets.) Inspiration a Divine Enthusiasm. i. 53. Atheistical Inspiration. iii. 64. True and False, alike in their outward Symptoms. i. 53. Inspiration credited, how? iii. 40

Judgment of the Inspir'd concerning their own Inspiration. iii. 63, 74, 5, 245. See Poets, Sibyls.

Instinct, from Nature. ii. 411, 12. See Ideas.

Intelligent Being: What contributes most to his Happiness. ii. 100, 1

Interest governs the World, a false Maxim. i. 115, 17, 18.

Self-Interest. ii. 80. Rightly and wrong taken. i. 281, &c. iii. 302, 4, 5. Unwisely committed to the care of others. iii. 159. How form'd. i. 296. Vary'd, steer'd. ibid.

True Interest either wholly with Honesty or Villany. i. 131, 172, &c. Judgment of true Interest. i. 307, 8. iii. 201

Disinterestedness real, if Virtue and Goodness be such. i. 98

Јов. іі. 34, 123

Jonah, Prophet. iii. 118, &c.

JOSEPH, Patriarch, his Education, Character. iii. 57, 8

Joshua. i. 356, &c.

JOVE. ii. 47, 8, 203

Journalists: Journal des Savans de Paris. iii. 18, 20. Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans. 18. Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres. ibid. Bibliotheque Choisie. ibid. & 20. *See* Bibliotheque Choisie.

Irony. i. 71. See Banter, Raillery.

Isis. iii. 47

ISOCRATES. iii. 280

ITALIANS, Buffoons. i. 72, 129. Italian Wit and Authors. i. 335, 46

Italian Taste, the best in Painting, Musick, &c. i. 338, 40

Judgment, preliminary Right. i. 12. Previous Judgment. i. 54

Julian (Emperor) i. 25. iii. 86, &c. His Letter to the Bostrens. ibid.

Jupiter. See Jove.

Just and Unjust acknowledg'd. ii. 420

JUSTIN, (Historian.) iii. 54, 7

Juvenal, explain'd. i. 103, &c. Cited. i. 70, 106, 126, 253. iii. 23, 4, 42, 50, 178, 274

K

KIND (Species) Union with a Kind. ii. 78. Oppos'd by Self-Interest. ii. 79

Kings. See Princes, Monarchy, the Great, a Court.

Knave, natural and civil. i. 109. By what Principle different from the Saint: or how distinguish'd from the honest Man. i. 102, 126, 7, 130, 31, 172, 3

Knave incapable of Enjoyment. i. 130. Betrays himself, however able. iii. 305

Knaves in Principle, in Practice. i. 93, 4. Knave, has no Quarrel with Religion. ibid. Half-Knave, thorow-Fool. i. 131, 2. ii. 173. Zealot-Knave. i. 132, 3. (See Zeal.) Court-Knaves. iii. 168, 69, &c. Knaves, Friends to Moderation, in what sense. i. 115. Knave young, middleag'd, old. iii. 178

Knavery, mere Dissonance and Disproportion. i. 207, 8. See Dishonesty.

Knavish Indulgence, the Consequences. i. 121, 130, &c. 172, 310, 11. iii. 302, 5. Knavish Religion. iii. 125. See Religion.

Knight-Errantry. i. 20. See Chivalry, Gallantry.

Knights-Templar, growing to be an Overmatch for the Magistrate. i. 86. Extirpated. ibid. See Magophony, Hierarchy.

Knowledg: first Principle, previous. i. 41, &c. 54, 269, 334

Knowledg of Men and Things, true Philosophy, how learnt. i. 122, 3

L

Ladys, fainted, worship'd, deify'd. i. 273, 331, 2. ii. 195. (See Gallantry, Chivalry.) English Ladys seduc'd by Tales and Impostures. i. 347, &c. Type or Prophecy of this in our antient Stage-Poet. ibid. See Superstition, Sex, Women.

Lampoons. i. 265

Lands. (See Property, Agrarian.) Religious Land-Bank. iii. 44, &c.

Latitude of Thought. iii. 297, &c.

Latitudinarians. ibid.

Laugh half-way. i. 81. Both ways. i. 129. Laugh wrong-turn'd. iii. 296. (See Ridicule.) Men

not to be laugh'd out of their Wits. i. 96. Men laugh'd out of, and into Religion. iii. 291. Difference in seeking what to laugh at, and what deserves Laughter. i. 128

Laugh, mutual, and in turn. i. 149

Laws, Royal Counsellors in our English Constitution. i. 212. Guardian-Laws. i. 219. Religion by Law establish'd. i. 362. iii. 71, 103, 231, 315, 16, 337, 38. (See Rites, Mysteries, Revelation.) Heraldry by Law establish'd. i. 362

Herculean Law. i. 267

Laziness. i. 310. See Indolence.

Learning: Passion for Learning or Science, rank'd with natural Affection. ii. 104, 5

Legitimate Work or Piece, in Writing. i. 336. iii. 2, 26

Leo (St.) iii. 91

Letters. See Epistles.

Leviathan-Hypothesis. i. 88. See Mr. Hobbes. Wolf.

Liberal Arts. See Arts. Liberal Education. ii. 65. Liberal and illiberal Service. ii. 55, 65

Liberty of Criticism. iii. 266, 316. See Criticks.

Liberty civil, philosophical or moral, personated. ii. 252, 3. Abuse of the Notion of Liberty in Morals and Government. iii. 305, &c. Liberty of the Will. i. 178, &c. 184, &c. Liberty or free Disposition to follow the first Motion of the Will, is the greatest Slavery. i. 211. ii. 231

Liberty *Philosophical, Moral.* ii. 252, &c. 432, &c. iii. 201, 4, 307, &c.

Protestant Liberty. See Protestant.

Liberty: (See Government, Constitution, English, British.) Its Patrons, Well-wishers. i. 8. Consequence of its Rise and Fall. i. 219, &c.

Liberty in Conversation. i. 75. Falsly censur'd. i. 10. See Wit, Freedom.

Prejudice against Liberty. i. 89. Arts, Sciences, and Virtues, its Dependents. i. 64, 72, 96, 220, 21. See Arts, Science, Virtue.

Life—its Value. i. 121, 24, 302.—Living well or good Living, false sense of the Phrase. i. 124. Living fast, false application of the Phrase. i. 315, 16. ii. 126, 7. Life sometimes a Misery. ii. 141. Over-Love of Life, contrary to the Interest of a Creature. ii. 141, &c.

Future Life: The Belief, of what advantage? ii. 60, &c.

Lineage of Philosophy and Poetry. i. 239, 40, 253, &c. iii. 132, 37, &c.

Livy, the Historian. i. 47, 8

Logick, of modern Schools. i. 286, 7, 334, 50, 51

Looking-glass, vocal. i. 171. Magical Pocket-Looking-glasses. i. 195. Looking-glass to the Age. i. 99, 202, 5. False Looking-glass. iii. 296

Love. (See Charity.) Love of Friends. ii. 238, 9

Love of Mankind. ii. 241, 2

Love of one's Country. iii. 143, &c. Love of Order and Perfection. ii. 212

Love imperfect and narrow, generous and equal. iii. 143, &c. (See Affection.) Publick Love. i. 37. (See Publick.) Love, highest, noblest. ii. 211, &c. Divine Love. ii. 244, 5. See Enthusiasm.

Love, dangerous Sophister. i. 183, 4. Passion of Love in the Sexes. i. 176, &c. Subject the most affecting, in the Passion of Love between the Sexes. ii. 105, 6. Flattery of Love. i. 138. Religious Love between the Sexes. iii. 38. Love cruelly treated by Epicurus. iii. 31, 2

Self-Love. ii. 58. Its Effects in Religion. ii. 58, 9. Silly reasoning about Self-Love, by pretended Wits. i. 90, 118. &c. See Self.

Religion and Love. i. 331, 2. Galante Love, and religious Charity of a certain kind, compar'd. iii. 115

Lover, Martyr. See Martyr.

Lover solitary. i. 174. Story of a Heroick Lover. i. 176, &c. Lover's Pursuit and Enjoyment, of what kind. i. 309. See Enjoyment.

Luke (St.) cited, commented iii. 245

Lucretius. i. 52, 118. iii. 32

Luxury. i. 310, 15, 319, &c. ii. 147, &c. iii. 199, 200, 304, 5

Lycurgus. iii. 246

Lyes, judiciously compos'd, teach Truth in the best manner. i. 346. Homer perfect in this Science. ibid. and iii. 260, 61, 2

Lymphaticks. i. 50, 51. See Fanaticks, Enthusiasm.

Lysias, Orator. iii. 280

М

Machine (in Epick and Dramatick.) i. 359. World a Machine. ii. 337

Madness: real Madman, who? i. 321, &c.

Maecenas. i. 220, 270. iii. 21, 249, 50

Magi of Persia, &c. i. 85. Their Power. iii. 48. See Hierarchy.

Magicians. See Magi.

Magick, moral. i. 136. Magick of Enthusiasm. iii. 29

Magistrate, his Duty and becoming Part in Religion. i. 10, 16, 19. ii. 261. iii. 104, &c. Executioner to the Priest, when? i. 66. iii. 110. A Dresser. i. 83. Dress'd in his turn. ibid. See Government, Hierarchy.

Civil Magistrate, insulted. i. 363. iii. 89. Controul'd. iii. 44. Over-aw'd. iii. 47. Depos'd, sentenc'd. iii. 48, 9

Magnificence, true and false. i. 139

Magophony, Persian. i. 85, &c. Ethiopian. iii. 49. European and Christian. i. 85, 6

Mahometism. iii. 104. Mahometan Clergy. iii. 235

Malice, only where Interests are oppos'd. i. 39, 40. None in the general Mind—nor in mere Nature. ibid.

Malignity, Passion unnatural. ii. 165

Man: a good, an ill. ii. 21. Formidable, in what sense. ii. 94. Subject to Nature. ii. 302. Why no Wings. iii. 302, 3. Man's Excellency different from that of a Brute. ii. 304, 5. Why Man has not the same Instincts which are in Brutes. ii. 308, 9. Whether sociable by Nature. ii. 311, &c. Whether a Man can be accounted a Wolf to a Man. ii. 320. Absurdity of that Saying. ibid. Man's Dignity and Interest. ii. 425. Different Manners of Men. ii. 429, &c.

Mankind, how corrupt. ii. 198, 201

Manners: Poetic Manners and Truth. iii. 260, &c. See Poet, Truth.

Marsham. Chron. Can. iii. 52, &c. 124

Martyrdom. i. 26, &c. iii. 40, 1

Martyrs for Atheism. i. 90. iii. 64—Pro and Con, for any Opinion. iii. 40, 41. Amorous, Heroick, Religious Martyrs. ii. 106. iii. 34

Mask. See Carnival.

Mass. i. 26

Massacre. See Magophony.

Masters in Exercises and Philosophy. i. 191. Masters in Mechanicks. See Mechanicks. Young Masters of the World. i. 106, 211

Mathematical Demonstration in Morals. See Morals.

Mathematicks. i. 19. Delightful, whence. ii. 104, 5. Necessary. i. 289, 90. Modest. ibid.

Matter, Whole and Parts. ii. 368. Not capable of real Simplicity. ii. 351, 2. Not constitutive of Identity. ibid. Substance material, immaterial. ii. 353, 4

Matter and Thought, how mutually affecting or productive. ii. 296, 7, 369

MAXIMUS TYRIUS, cited. ii. 295. iii. 32

Mechanicks, Masters in. i. 235

Mechanick Forms, Beautys. i. 137. See Palaces.

Mechanism-human. i. 115, 294. Divine. ii. 336, 7

Medea. iii. 313

Meditation Rural-Philosophical. ii. 344, &c.

Meditations publish'd. i. 164. Meditation imposing, conceited, pedantick. i. 164, 5, 343

Meditation in the praise of a Deity. ii. 344, &c. Upon the Works of Nature. ii. 366, &c. Upon the Elements. ii. 376, &c. Upon the Variety of Seasons and Climates. ii. 383, &c.

Melancholy, a pertinacious and religious Complexion. iii. 67

Melancholy in Religion, Love. i. 13. Power of Melancholy in Religion. iii. 66. Devout Melancholy. i. 22, 32, 44. iii. 67, 8. Treatises of Melancholy. iii. 30. See Religion, Enthusiasm.

Memoirs. i. 163. Memoir-Writing. i. 200, 224, 346. See Miscellany.

Memory, τὸ Ἐυμνημόνετον. i. 143

Menander. i. 246. iii. 238

Mental Enjoyment, whence. ii. 101, 117, &c.

Mercenariness. i. 126. See Reward.

Merit in believing. See Belief.

MESSIAS. iii. 78. See Monarchy.

Metaphor, or Metaphorick Style or Manner. i. 243, &c. iii. 140

Metaphysicks. i. 289, 299, 301. ii. 354. iii. 193, 4

Metaphysicks, necessary Knowledge of nothing knowable or known. iii. 210, 11

Metaphysicians, their Character. i. 291

Metaphysical Articles of Belief. i. 306, 7

M1LO. ii. 304

Milton. i. 276, 358, 9

Mimes. i. 193. iii. 285. See Imitation, Mimickery.

Mimickery. i. 196. Mimographer. ibid.

Mind, free. i. 130.——a Kingdom. iii. 205. Beauty of the Mind. i. 137. Value of a Mind. ii. 440. iii. 168, 205. Its inward Proportion. ii. 83

Mind: particular Minds prove an Universal one. ii. 355, &c. Universal Mind, how prov'd. ii. 290, 91

Minister of State. i. 37, 192. Ministers of State concern'd for their Character and Memory. i. 225. Conduct necessary to preserve them. i. 225, &c. Claim of the People over them. i. 227. Dangerous Conceit of Ministers and Great Men. i. 229, 30

Ministers Maecenas's. i. 215, 16

Good Minister, how to be valu'd and judg'd. i. 23, 4

Ministry: good Ministry in England. iii. 148. The new, the old. iii. 208. Ill and slavish Ministry, of what consequence. iii. 148, 9

Miracles, scriptural, traditional. i. 6. Modern. i. 44. iii. 70. Christian, Moorish, Pagan. i. 345, 47, &c. Past, present. ii. 331. The Danger of believing new Miracles. ii. 328, &c. Whether Miracles can witness for God or Men. ii. 331, &c. Mere Miracles insufficient Proof of Divinity, or Revelation. ii. 333, 4. iii. 114. Merry Miracle. iii. 123

Mirrour. See Looking-glass.

Misanthropy: what kind of Passion. ii. 165. Sometimes, in a manner, national. ii. 166. iii. 153

Miscellanarian Authors, their Policy and Art. iii. 288, 9

Miscellanys. Vol. iii. p. 1, 2, &c.

Miscellaneous Memoir, Essay-Writing, Style and Manner. ibid. and iii. 95, &c. 225, 6. See Essay, Memoir.

Miscellaneous Collections, annual. iii. 274

Mode: Modes of Religion. i. 84

Model: current Models of Religion. i. 84. Models for Poetry and Writing. i. 206. See Exemplar.

Moderation Philosophical. iii. 37. When in fashion with the Zealots of every Party. iii. 110, 11. Moderation disclaim'd. iii. 342

Moderation in a Writer. i. 166

Monarch: Grand Monarch now; and of old in Greece. i. 223

Monarchy. See Hierarchy.

Monarchy universal. i. 216, 17, 220, &c. iii. 23. (See Barbarians, Tyranny.) Absolute Monarchy, destructive of Arts, Manhood, Reason, Sense. i. 219, &c. 237, &c. iii. 23, 77, &c. World groaning under the Roman Monarchy. iii. 77, 8. Hopes of a Divine Deliverer or Messias from hence. ibid. See Emperor, Roman.

Monarchs. ii. 137

Monosyllables in files or strings. iii. 265. Clash or clattering Rencounter of them in our Language. ibid.

Monster: Monstrous Imaginations. i. 60. Monstrous Objects and Taste. i. 344, 47, &c. iii. 157 Moon: Embassadors from the Moon. iii. 339. Moon and Planets. ii. 373, &c. Traveller from the Moon. ii. 198

Moor: Moorish Hero. i. 347, 8

Moor of Venice (Play.) i. 347, &c.

Morals: Rule and Distinction of Revelation. i. 298. Difference about Morals. i. 70. Morals interwove with political religious Institutions. i. 87. Brought into disgrace. i. 90. (See Charity.) New Forgers of Morals. i. 133. Moral Magick. i. 136

Morals and Government how related. i. 106, 8. Morals essential to Poetical Performance. i. 278. See Manners, Poetick Truth.

Morals mathematically demonstrated. ii. 173, &c. and iii. 194, &c. 212, &c. See Philosophy. Moral Sense, Rise of it. ii. 28, &c. 53, &c. Foundation in Nature. ii. 413, &c. Whether it can be perfectly lost in any rational Creature. ii. 41, &c. Impair'd by opposite Affection. ii. 44. Not by Opinion merely. ii. 45. Corruption of moral Sense. ii. 45, 6. Causes of this Corruption. ii. 46, &c. Rise of moral Sense, antecedent to the Belief of a God. ii. 53, 4

Moral Inquirys, why out of fashion. ii. 185

Moral Excellence. i. 39. Moral Venus and Graces. i. 337, 8. Moral Species. See Species.

Moral, the Word, in Painting, signifys the Representation of the Passions. iii. 379

The Moralists (viz. Treatise V. p. 181, &c.) criticiz'd. iii. 284, &c.

Moralists, the fashionable sort. i. 80, 124. See Virtue, Philosophy.

More (Dr.) iii. 65, &c.

Moroseness. i. 23

Moses. i. 356, &c. Character and Life. iii. 52, 5, 7, 8, 116, 246

Mountebanks, modern Prometheus's. ii. 205

Mountebanks. See Empiricks.

Mummius. i. 272

Muse. i. 4, 8. Divine, Orthodox. i. 359. iii. 229. Muses what; in the Heathen Creed. i. 6, 7. British Muses. i. 215, &c. In their Cradle. i. 217, 262, 3. Lisping Speech. ibid. Hobby-Horse and Rattle. ibid.

Muses, Tutoresses. i. 220. Favourites. i. 224. Chief Recorders. ibid.

Muses degraded by Epicurus. iii. 32

Muses personating the Passions, Virtues, and Vices. i. 313, &c. Profane Mistresses in respect of sacred Letters. i. 358

Musick, Barbarian. i. 242. Just, real, independent on Caprice or Will. i. 353. When best relish'd by the English. iii. 398. See Harmony.

Musician, asham'd of Praise from the Unskilful. i. 42. Delighted with Examination and Criticism. i. 234, 5

Musician-Legislators. i. 237, 8

Mystery makes any Opinion become considerable. i. 91. Gives rise to Partys, Sects. ibid.

Mysterys by Law establish'd. i. 359, 60. Religious Mysterys. i. 361

Mystery debated. iii. 10, 11

Sacred Mysterys inviolable with our Author, and, as such, un-nam'd by him. iii. 70, 71, 315 Mysterys the most absurd, how introduc'd into the Church. iii. 333, 4

Mystical Love. ii. 211, 243

Mysticks. ibid. Consequences of their indiscreet Zeal. ii. 271

Mysticks. i. 175. See Quietists.

Mythology. i. 359. Mythological or Fabulous Style of our Blessed Saviour. iii. 122, 3

Ν

Nastiness. See Cleanliness.

National Church. i. 17. See Church.

National Opinion. i. 9

Natural Affection, confess'd. i. 92. See Affection.

The Natural and Unnatural in Things. iii. 213, &c.

Natural Ideas. See Ideas, Instinct.

Nature, its Energy. ii. 359, 60. Nature in Man. ii. 300. In Brutes. ibid.

Nature's admirable Distribution. ii. 306, 7

State of Nature, imaginary, fantastical. i. 109. ii. 310, &c. See Society.

Nature, Divinity with Epicurus. iii. 64. See Epicurus.

Power of Nature in moral Actions and Behaviour. i. 92. ii. 128. Naturam expellas Furca. iii. 216. Nature will not be mock'd. i. 354. Has a strong Party within ourselves. ibid. Makes reprisals on her Antagonists. ibid. Prerogative of Nature. ibid.

Nero. i. 25, 105. iii. 23

Nobility, Polish-English. iii. 150. Young Noblemen. i. 103, &c. Young Noblemen, English. iii. 168, 9, 172, &c. 216, &c.

Nose: a Nose (Discernment or Sense) in Morals, Life, &c. i. 125 (See Sense, Taste.) Noses counted. i. 148

Novels, sweet natural Pieces, highly in vogue. ii. 194. iii. 254. See Gallantry, Chivalry.

Numbers and Proportion. i. 139, 336. Numbers of Life. i. 141. See Proportion, Beauty.

Nympholepti. i. 50. See Fanaticks.

O

OEconomy of the Animal Races. ii. 92, &c. 131, &c. 300, &c. 318, &c. iii. 220, &c. See Society.

Olympicks, antient, modern. i. 269. Olympick Games, and Congress of Greece. iii. 138 Omnipotence, what? i. 39, 40. ii. 10, 11, 57, 71, &c. 203, 359, 60, 64. What not. i. 107. ii. 14

Opinion (see Doctrine, Hypothesis) National, or by Inheritance. i. 9. ii. 103. Governour, and Govern'd. i. 185. Ground of Passion. i. 294, &c. Principle of Conduct. i. 307, 8. Opinion all in all. ii. 435, 37, &c. iii. 186, 7, 196, &c. Freedom in examining our own Opinions, as well as the Opinions of others. i. 60, 61. Corrupt Opinion, Cause of Wrong. ii. 32, 3. Opinion and Fashion, suppos'd measure of Virtue and Vice. i. 80, 352, 3. ii. 417, 18. Life regulated by Opinion. ii. 435, &c.

Oracle. i. 126. Divine Oracles Guardianship. i. 360. Heathen and Christian Oracles. ii. 330, 31. iii. 232, &c.

Oration. See Rhetorick, Declamation, Preaching.

Orator. i. 161. Orators. i. 268

Order: Principle of Order Universal. ii. 362. Love of Order. ii. 212. Study and Contemplation of it, a natural Joy, Inclination, and Affection in Man. ii. 105

Order and Providence. ii. 276

Order in Writing. See Style.

Ornament independent, to be cautiously employ'd in the Action of Hercules. iii. 384. The Emblematick and Historical not to be confounded. iii. 384, 5. An Objection concerning it answer'd. iii. 385. False Ornaments to be avoided. iii. 390

Orthodoxy: casual, fortunate. iii. 104, &c. Orthodox Muse. i. 359

Orthodox, Divine, or Churchman. iii. 10, 11

Orthodoxy of the Author. iii. 70, 71, 315

Osiris. iii. 47 Ovid, *cited.* iii. 144

Р

PACE. See Amble.

Pageant of State. i. 204. Court-Pageant. iii. 185

Pain and Pleasure mix'd. ii. 234, 5

Paint. See Fucus.

Painter of History, to fix his Date. iii. 353. Not at liberty to mingle Actions of different Dates. ibid. Test of his Judgment. iii. 357. Not to make his Action Theatrical, but according to Nature. iii. 368. The same Qualifications necessary in him as in a Poet. iii. 387

Painters: Ill Painters compar'd with like Poets: i. 225, 6. Painter put to his shift. i. 204, 5

Painters: Raphael. i. 338. iii. 230. Carache i. 338

Painters after the Life. iii. 294. Face-Painters. i. 144, 5. Painting and Painters. i. 142, &c. Master-Painter. i. 197, 206, 227. Battel-Painter. i. 202. See Artists, Statuary.

Painting. False Taste in Painting. i. 338. True Taste how gain'd. i. 338, 9. Dignity, Severity, Austerity of the Art. i. 340, &c. Style in Painting. ii. 186. Simplicity and Unity of Style and Colouring. i. 143, 4, 341, 2. Unity and Truth of Design. The Έυσύνοπτον ibid. and 354. Greatness. i. 144. Antient Masters. i. 144, 340, &c. False Taste and Corruption of the Art, whence. ibid. Grotesque Painting. iii. 6. Imposture in Painting. iii. 230. Pretended Heavenly Style, and Divine Hand disprov'd. ibid. The Progress Painting is like to make in England. iii. 399

Painting of History, the Regulation of it. iii. 349

Palaces and their Ornaments. i. 139. iii. 173, 184, &c. See Beauty.

PALESTINE, the Country: its Superstitions. iii. 124. See Syria, Jew.

PAN. i. 15, 16. Panick Fear. ibid. Panick Rage or popular Fury. ibid. Religious Panick. ibid. and iii. 66, 69. Panick Fear for the Church. iii. 83, &c. Panick Zeal. ibid. & 69. i. 43, 4

Panegyricks the worst of Satires. i. 226. Panegyricks, English. i. 266, &c. Panegyrick Games.

i. 269. Herculean Law, or Club-Method in Panegyrick. i. 267. Panegyricks modern. iii. 274

Parables, double-meaning to amuse. i. 63

Paracelsus. i. 287

Parasites. i. 35. See Sycophants.

PARIS, Judgment of, how distinguish'd from that of Hercules. iii. 359

Parody. i. 198, 246. See Comedy.

Parterre. See Palace.

Passion: Genealogy of the Passions. i. 116, 295. Study of the Passions. i. 295, 97. iii. 31. Belle Passion. i. 5. Heroick Passion of the Devout. i. 19. OEconomy of the Passions. ii. 92, &c. See OEconomy.

Passion too strong or too weak. ii. 91

Human and weak Passions deify'd. i. 38, ii, 256. iii. 306, 7

Passion, how the Change of it may be express'd in a Subject. iii. 355, 6

Patch-work. iii. 5

Patent: Letters-Patent. iii. 338

Patentees for Authorship. i. 335. For Religion. iii. 338

Patria: Non ille, &c. i. 123. Dulce & Decorum. i. 102.

The word wanting in our Language. iii. 149

Patriot. i. 101, 2. Bought and sold. iii. 170, &c. Patriots of the Soil. iii. 150

Patrons, modern. i. 229, 68, 304

PAUL (St.) his Character. i. 30. iii. 74, 75, 83, &c. Style. iii. 83, &c. 337. Cited. i. 26, 102, 281. iii. 238, 45

St. Paul allows to the Heathen their own Prophets. iii. 238. Cites their Poets with Honour. ibid.

Pedagogue. i. 72, 3. See Tutor, Pedant.

Pedant baited. iii. 14

Pedant and Pupil. i. 64, 122, 3

Pedant. See Pedagogue, Zealot, Scholastick, University.

Pedantry a Milstone. i. 67. Pedantry in Conversation. i. 70

Pedantry oppos'd to true Knowledg. i. 122, 3

Pencil, Sacred, or Heaven-guided. iii. 230. See Painting.

Penmen, Gladiatorian. iii. 12

People, naturally good Judges of the Poet. i. 278. Also of Architecture, Painting, &c. iii. 402, 3 Perfection, of Workmanship. i. 332, 37

Peripatetick Philosophy. Genius. i. 256. Author de Mundo. ii. 214. iii. 263, 4

Persecution. ii. 35. iii. 115. In Arcadia. i. 21. Unknown to the polite Heathen-World. ii. 166.

iii. 154, 5. *How begun.* i. 25. iii. 60, 86, &c. *See* AEgypt, Jews.

Romish Persecution, of any other the most tolerable, and of best Grace and Countenance. iii. 93, 4, 103, 6

Persecution of Features, Airs, Complexions, Miens. i. 84

Persian Empire and Hierarchy. iii. 48. See Hierarchy.

Persius. i. 162, 170, 71, 89, 315, 30. iii. 158, 312, 13

Perspective, the Rules of it revers'd in Sculpture. iii. 380

Persuasion, Goddess. i. 237, &c. Mother of Musick, Poetry and other Arts. ibid. Sister to Liberty. ibid. Men persuade themselves into whatever Opinions. iii. 310

Petronius, cited. i. 192

Petulancy: wanton Mischievousness unnatural. ii. 164

Phaenomena in Scripture. i. 282. Moral Phaenomena. ibid.

Phallico. i. 250. See Farce.

Phenix-Sect. i. 27

PHILIP. i. 249

Philologists. i. 241, 46. ii. 295

Philosophers, savage. i. 90, 94, 350, &c. See Clown. Moral Philosophers of a modern sort, more ignorant and corrupt than the mere Vulgar. i. 132, 352. iii. 204, 5. Run a Talegathering. i. 350

Philosophers, their Original and Rise. i. 240. Posterior in Birth to Poets, Musicians, Criticks, Sophists. ibid. iii. 136, 7. Philosophers themselves, Criticks of a double kind. i. 240. &c. Philosophers, their antient Schools dissolv'd. iii. 79

Philosophers and Bear-Garden. iii. 9, 11, &c.

Philosophy-modern. i. 122, &c. iii. 308.—Antient. i. 18, 122, 3.—Home-spun. i. 43, 364. Mastership in Life and Manners. iii. 159. Its State and Liberty in the antient World. i. 18. Philosophical Speculations innocent. i. 96. See Hypothesis, Doctrine.

Philosophy, where confin'd now-a-days. i. 333. ii. 184. Its Study incumbent on every Man. i. 322, &c. ii. 438, &c. Philosophy speculative and practical. i. 292, &c. Vain, or solid. i. 297, &c. Guide to Virtue in all Religions. i. 101, 2.—Balance against Superstition. i. 18. Philosophy Judg of Religion. i. 297, 8.—Of her-self, and of every thing besides. ibid. Majesty of Philosophy. i. 298, 99. Philosophy appeal'd to by all. i. 285. Standard or Measure of Trust, Friendship and Merit in Men. ibid. &c. Genuine and false Fruits. i. 286, 7. Unhappy Mixture or Conjunction of Philosophy with Religion. iii. 61, 76, 7. Monstrous Issue and Product of this Union. iii. 79, &c. 86, &c.

Dry Philosophy. iii. 191. Vocal Philosophy. i. 287. Ideal Philosophy. See Idea.

Lineage of Philosophy and Poetry. (See Lineage.) Philosophy of the Woods. ii. 428

Physician. iii. 181

Physicians in the Body-Politick. i. 14, 16

Physiologists. See Metaphysicians.

Piece (Work, Treatise) legitimate, illegitimate. i. 336. iii. 2

PILATE (Pontius.) iii. 242

Planets: see Moon. Planetary System. ii. 19, 370, &c.

Plate, emboss'd with Satyrs, Fauns, &c. proper to accompany the Figure of Pleasure. iii. 386

Plato. i. 54, iii. 77, 247, 80. Cited. i. 53, 4

Platonists, latter sort. i. 18

Plays (*Theatrical*) how frequented. i. 265. See Comedy, Tragedy, Theatre. Plays (vulgar) see Foot-ball, Hot-cockles.

Pleasing Sensations. i. 123, 4, 315

Pleasure: whether our Good. i. 308. ii. 226, &c. iii. 200, &c. All Pleasure not to be reckon'd as Good. ii. 229, 30. Enjoyments of Reason, not really comprehended in the Notion of Pleasure. ii. 232, 3. Pleasure no Rule of Good. i. 309, 339, 40. Pleasures of the Mind greater than those of the Body. ii. 99, 100. Sensual Pleasure, who the properest Judg of it. ii. 102, 3. Sensual Pleasures dependent on social and natural Affection. ii. 126, &c. Distasteful,

inconstant, and insupportable without it. ii. 129, 30. Unnatural Pleasure in general, its Effects. ii. 168, 9. Pleasure (Luxury) ii. 147, 8. See Luxury.

Understanding in Pleasure. i. 140. Rule and Order in Pleasure. ibid.

Men of Pleasure, forc'd to acknowledg Virtue. i. 140. See Poets.

Pleasure, sollicites Hercules in opposition to Virtue. iii. 350. Is first heard. iii. 352. Her Figure to be drawn silent. iii. 369. Her Posture and Ornament. iii. 370, 71

PLINY cited. i. 144, iii. 280

Plum: Cant-word among rich Knaves. i. 130

Plutarch. i. 334. Cited. i. 41, 54. iii. 126, 27, &c. 280

Pneumatophobia. iii. 64

Poem Heroick, Epick. (See Homer.) i. 356, &c. iii. 259, &c. Not to be model'd on Holy Writ. i. 356, &c.

Poet: Character of a Poet and Poetry from Strabo. i. 208, 252. Poet, second Maker. i. 207. Poet, Herald of Fame. i. 225. Ill Poets worse than ill Painters. i. 225, 6

Poets preferable to most Philosophers. i. 122. iii. 307, 8.—More instructive than Historians. i. 346. Morality of Poets. i. 137. iii. 308, 9. Poets acknowledg Virtue. i. 136, 7. Strongest Party on Virtue's side. i. 316, 17

Poets, Enthusiasts. i. 4, &c. iii. 66, 232. Friends to Revelation. i. 4, &c. French Poets. i. 218. Modern Poets or poetical Writers affected, and false in their Draughts or Imitations. i. 204. iii. 289, &c. Conceited, combin'd. iii. 273, &c. Injudicious. i. 207. Impotent. ibid. English Poets, of a preceding Age. i. 275, 6. Of the present. iii. 276, &c.

Audience forms the Poet. i. 264. Poet, how far of necessity a Philosopher, and true to Virtue and Morals. i. 278. iii. 282

Divine or Orthodox Poets. i. 7, 359. iii. 118, 231, &c. Orthodox Mock-Poets. iii. 240, 41. Poets Fanaticks. i. 51

Poets inspir'd. i. 7, 51. iii. 66, 228, &c. 238

Poet. See Author.

Poetess, English. ii. 235

Poetical Enthusiasm. i. 21. Poetical Genius. i. 161. Poetical Imitation. i. 193, &c. Poetical Truth. See Truth.

Poetick Science. i. 141, &c.

Poetry: (See Muses.) Lineage of Poetry and Philosophy. (See Lineage.) Sacred Wit and Poetry. iii. 118. Indifferent Poetry, detestable. iii. 283. Art of Poetry (an English Poem.) iii. 281 Poetry Epick or Dramatick, incompatible with orthodox Divinity. i. 356, &c.

Point, Gingle or Pun. i. 335

Points of Wit. iii. 5, 261

Point of Honour. ii. 194, 5. See Gallantry, Duel.

Poison to Reason. i. 91

Policy, British and Dutch: Turkish and French. i. 80

Politeness, owing to Liberty. i. 64, 72, 96. (See Liberty.) Flux and Reflux of Politeness. i. 271, 2

Politicians. i. 188, 9

Politicks, part of Morals. ii. 184, 5

Polytheist: Definition. ii. 11

Pope (Clement XI.) iii. 241. See Gregorius, Leo.

Popery. See Rome, Church, Priest, Mass.

Post-way of Writers. See Writers, Correctness.

Power, Balance of. i. 94, 95

Praise of the Deity. i. 41, &c. Qualifications for such Praise. ibid. Value of Praise or Glory from the Ignorant. ibid. Value of forc'd Praise or Applause. ibid. True Praise how learnt. ibid.

Preaching. i. 70, 73, 4, 134, 166. iii. 97, 8, 287. Elegant and gross. iii. 112, 13. Fashionable and unfashionable. ibid. Solemn, melancholy. i. 134. Variously humour'd, alternate, high and low. iii. 130. See Declaration, Pulpit.

Pre-conception. ii. 307, 412. See Anticipation.

Prefaces, Dedications, &c. i. 200, 231, 304. iii. 27. Preface become a word to signify Excuse. i. 329, 30

Prelate. i. 6. See Bishop.

Pre-sensation. See Pre-conception.

Press: Printing-Press. i. 305. See Printer.

Priests, consecrated by the Magistrate. i. 362. iii. 337. Their Faction, Sedition, and Engagement of Mankind in their Quarrels. iii. 51, 59, 60, 80, 86, &c. 342. Their Love of Blood. i. 28. Propagation and Increase of the Priesthood: Manner and Consequence. iii. 44, &c. Model of the AEgyptian and Asiatick Priesthoods; and Difference from the European, or that of Greece or Rome. iii. 43, 49. See Hierarchy.

Prince: see Absolute. Story of an Heroick Prince. i. 176, &c.

Princes, use the plural Style, whence. i. 210, &c. Prince-Authors. i. 213, 14

Princely: see Royal.

Principle: one universally active Principle. ii. 364, 5

Printer. iii. 16. See Bookseller, Amanuensis.

Printing, free. i. 305, 6

Prodicus. ii. 253

PROMETHEUS, poetical Solution of the Phaenomenon of Ill. ii. 192, 201, 2

Poet a Prometheus. i. 207

Proof. See Criterion, Test.

Prophet, the name allow'd to Heathens. iii. 238

Prophets, passive Organs. i. 28. Modern Prophets. i. 46, &c. Compar'd with antient. ibid.

Prophecy catching. i. 45.— The evil as well as the good Spirit. ibid. iii. 116

Prophecy or Prophet-errant, processional, saltant. iii. 117. Naked Prophecy. ibid.

Property, Dominion founded in. iii. 49

Proportion, and Symmetry founded in Nature; not in Opinion or Fancy. i. 353. See Symmetry, Architecture.

Protestant Authors. iii. 18

Protestant Liberty. iii. 235, 6, 319, 330, &c.

Publick. i. 37. See Constitution.

Publick Assemblys. See Assemblys.

Pulpit. i. 31. iii. 255, 265, 287. See Preaching.

Punishments and Rewards, of what use in the State. i. 126. ii. 63, 4. In Familys. ii. 65. In Religion. ii. 65, 6

Puns: see University, Point.

Pupil: see Royal, Pedant, Tutor.

Puppets, in Dialogue. iii. 292. See Dialogue.

Puppet-show. i. 28, 9

Pyrrho, Pyrrhonist. ii. 355. iii. 194, 212. See Sceptick.

Pyrrhus. i. 325, 6 Pythagoras. iii. 77, 127, 203 Pythagorean *Sect.* i. 18 Pythian-*God.* i. 126.—*Prophetess: see* Sibyl.

Q

QUEEN Elizabeth. iii. 150 Quibble. *See* Pun, Point. Quietists. iii. 38, 92

R

Raillery, sober Use of it. i. 128. Defensive Raillery. i. 62. Opposition to Banter. i. 63. iii. 225. Gross sort and refin'd. i. 63, 5. iii. 225. (See Ridicule.) Socratick Raillery. i. 194, 5, 98

Raillery affected by grave Doctors. i. 65. iii. 291. Grim Raillery. ibid. (See Burlesque.) Spirit of Raillery why prevalent in certain Conversations. i. 95. Why carry'd into the Extreme. i. 72. Nothing proof against Raillery but what is honest and just. i. 74

Rake, a better Character than that of certain grave and thoughtful Gentlemen. iii. 302

Reader courteous, uncourteous. i. 303, 4

Reading, wrong Choice and Manner. i. 341, &c. Multiplicity of Reading. i. 342, 3. Task-reading. ibid. Surfeiting. i. 344. Polite Reading and Converse, chief Qualifications in a Character. i. 364. Gothick and barbarous Reading. i. 344, &c.

Realist in Morality. ii. 267, 8

Reason, its Nourishment, Health. i. 69, &c. Its Antidote, Poison. i. 91. Reason Correctrix of the Fancys, &c. i. 322, &c. Intendant, Mistress, House-keeper. ibid. Reason quitted: for what Reason? When? How? iii. 299, &c. Reason confin'd: what effect? i. 71, 77

Reasoning: Habit of Reasoning alone can make a Reasoner. i. 69, 71, 77

Records: Recorders, Compilers, Registers in sacred Matters. i. 360. iii. 231, &c. Rul'd by Law. ibid.

Rehearsal (Comedy.) i. 259. iii. 277, 81

Religion, Virtue, how ally'd, founded, deriv'd, maintain'd. See Treatise IV. viz. The INQUIRY, first of Vol. ii. Religion: a publick Leading, or National Church. i. 17. Religion by Law establish'd. i. 362. iii. 71. (See Law.) Differences in Religion. i. 79. (See Modes, Models.) Religious Antipathy. i. 18. ii. 96. iii. 40, 60, 80, 257. Religious Passion. iii. 35, 6. Different Aspects of Religion, according to the Views or Aspects of Divinity. iii. 39. Power of Fancy or Imagination in Religion. iii. 68. Religion consider'd as a Passion. ii. 88, 9. Its Influence. ii. 51. Religion antient-Grecian. iii. 126, &c. Roman, Egyptian, Syrian. iii. 41, 2. Where first it grew unsociable. ii. 387, 8. Religion cruel Enemy to Virtue, by what means. ii. 256. Religion liberal, illiberal. ii. 272, 73. Knavish Religion. i. 126, 7, 132, 3. iii. 125, &c. True Foundation of Religion. ii. 269, 70. Religion betray'd. ii. 279. Over-laid. i. 97. Exhilaration of Religion. iii. 95, 123. Different Faces or Representations of Religion, with what design. iii. 130, 31. Uniformity in Religion. See Uniformity.

Relish, false, fatal to Painting and the other Arts. iii. 390

Resignation, devout, false. ii. 59

Resolution: see Will.

Retirement, agreeable, necessary. ii. 223, 4

Revelation judg'd by Morals. i. 298. What previous and antecedent. i. 39. ii. 333, 4. See Authority.

Revolution, the late happy one. i. 216. iii. 151

Revolution in the World and Nature. ii. 20, 214, 15, 367, 380, 81. In our-selves, i. 284, 5. ii. 236, 350. See Self.

Rewards and Punishments, of what use in the State. ii. 63, 64. In Familys. ii. 65. In Religion. ii. 65, 6, 273

Future Rewards and Punishments: wrong inforcement. i. 97, 8. ii. 69. Virtue for Reward, not worth rewarding. ibid.

Reward most deserv'd, when unsought. i. 100. No Goodness or Virtue in Nature, if no Motive besides Reward. i. 98. A Knave not the less such, when Reward and Punishment alone make him honest in outward Behaviour. i. 125, &c. 171, &c. Consciousness, only Reward of Friendship. i. 100. See Mercenariness, Disinterestedness.

Rhetoricians. iii. 140

Rhetorick: see Declamation, Preaching.

Rhetorick, in what part of a Discourse its greatest Energy shou'd be employ'd. iii. 353

Rhythmus: false and true. i. 217, 18. iii. 263, 4

Ridicule, its Rule, Measure, Test. i. 11, 12. (See Test.) Appeal to Ridicule. i. 61. Affectation of it by Pedants. i. 65. See Banter.

Ridicule ridiculous, when half-way, lame, or leaning to one side. i. 81. Injudicious and imposing, when far strain'd, and beyond its size. i. 83. &c. Nonsensical, when rais'd from Contrarys, i. 129

Nothing ridiculous, but what is deform'd. i. 128. Virtue not capable of being ridicul'd. ibid. & 129

Right and Wrong. ii. 33, 4. In Nature, not from Opinion, Will, or Law. ii. 35. See Opinion, Virtue.

Rites or Rituals by Law establish'd. i. 360

Rites, Ceremonys, Habits, Processions, Pomp, their use and effect in Religion. iii. 91, 2

ROGER, Sir Roger. iii. 276

Roman Eloquence, corrupted. iii. 22, 3

Roman Monarchy. See Monarchy.

Roman Empire, Rise and Fall. i. 219, &c.

Roman Emperors. iii. 41, 78, 90, 242. (See Caesars) Roman Worthys. i. 267, 8

Romance: see Novel.

Romans old, rais'd from Barbarity by Greece. i. 223, 269, 270, 72. Their gradual Refinement. i. 251. Growth of Heathen Religion under the Romans. iii. 41

ROME old. i. 219, 21. iii. 234. Rome modern. i. 338. iii. 91, 3, 235. See or Court of Rome. iii. 241, 2

Royal Preceptor. i. 214. See Prince.

Royal Pupils. i. 106, 211, 12

Rule. (See Law.) Rule of Dispatch. i. 267

Rusticks. i. 190

ç

Sacrifice human. ii. 35. Familiar to the Inhabitants of the Palestine. iii. 124. (See Abraham, Jephtha.) Sacrifice of Forms, Natures. See Subordination.

Sadducee. iii. 77

Saint—on what terms? iii. 129. Female Saints. iii. 38. Saint-Protectrices. i. 273

Saint-Errantry. i. 20

SALOMON British. i. 214

Salvation: see Saving. Saracen's Head. i. 362

Satirs, Roman: their Origin. i. 258, 9. See Atellan, Fescennin.

Satir, English. i. 266. Spirit of Satir. iii. 109

Satirick and Comick Genius, Style. i. 258, &c.

Satirists, true to Virtue. i. 141. iii. 23. See Poet.

Savage: *see* Goth. Savages. i. 90, 94

Savageness, Inroad whence. i. 96. See Barbarians.

Saving - of Souls. i. 19 - of Complexions. i. 85

SAUL. i. 45. iii. 116, 17

Scandal. i. 265

Scene, of the Story of Hercules, to be laid in the Country. iii. 376. To have nothing in it to call the Eye off from the Subject. iii. 377

Sceptical Conversation. i. 68, 9, 78, &c.

Scepticism, Support to Reason. ibid. See Reason.

Scepticism, fashionable sort. ii. 206. Defence of Scepticism. iii. 71, &c. Partial Scepticism cause of Vice and Folly. i. 81. (See Thinking.)

Scepticism, Remedy against the Dogmatical Spirit. i. 95. Sceptical Wit, Apology. i. 96

Scepticism of a Reverend Divine. iii. 68

Scepticks, the Advantages of their Philosophy. ii. 206, 7

Sceptick personated. iii. 295. Modern Scepticks dogmatize. ii. 230, 31. Real Sceptick. ibid. & 236, 7. Christian-Sceptick. iii. 72. See Academy, Pyrrho.

Scholar and Gentleman. i. 333, &c. Scholar, ill-read. i. 342. True Scholar, or Man well-read, reads few Authors. i. 342, 3

Scholastick. i. 67. (See Style.) Scholastick Brood. iii. 80. Scholastick Weapons. iii. 296

School: inferior Schools of Arts and Exercises, teach Truth and Nature better than some higher. i. 333, &c.

Sciences in general. i. 289, 90. Mock-Science. i. 287. Science of Articulation. ibid. Science:

Scripture, Judgment of. i. 146, 7.— Criticism. iii. 72, 3. Scripture Sacred and Profane. iii. 231, &c. Sacred History, Characters, Scripture, subject to human Criticism, Philosophy, and Rules of Art. i. 147. ii. 268, 69, 333. iii. 229, &c. Scripture interpolated, suppress'd, controverted, manag'd. iii. 320, &c. 330, &c. (See Fathers of the Church.) Variety of Readings, controverted Passages, Books, Copys, Catalogues. iii. 322, 3, 326, 7

Scripture, fragil, volatil. iii. 234

SCYTHIAN. See Goth, Anacharsis.

Sea: Sea to drink. iii. 207, 8

Secular. See Arm.

Sedition. See Faction.

Self: A Man when himself; when not himself. i. 324, 5. (See Revolution, Identity.) What makes a Man himself. ii. 253, 4. (Self-Love. See Love.) True Self-Love depends on Knowledg of Self. i. 121, 282, &c. Self-Knowledg. i. 170. iii. 189, 192, &c.

Selfishness. i. 115, 117, &c. ii. 23, 291. Destructive of Self-Enjoyment. i. 315. iii. 302. Improv'd by certain Philosophers. i. 124, &c. Folly of the Endeavour. ii. 128

Self-Inspection. i. 196. Acknowledgment of a better Self. i. 281. Self-Reverence. i. 171, &c. Self-Abasement. i. 331, 2. iii. 125, &c. See Sycophants, Interest.

SENECA, his Character, Genius, Style. iii. 22, &c.

Sensations. See Pleasure, Pain.

Sense impair'd. ii. 32. Sense in Morals, Life. i. 132. iii. 204, 5. See Taste, Nose.

Common Sense, various Signification. i. 78, &c. Common Sense, honest Sense. i. 132. iii. 204, 5

Sense, equivocal, in Painting, to be avoided in the Story of Hercules. iii. 370

Sensus Communis interpreted. i. 103, &c.

Sermon, Law of. ii. 282. See Preaching.

Sexes. See Love, Women.

Fair-Sex, seduc'd by Tales, Impostures. i. 347, &c. Inclin'd to monstrous Loves, according to our antient Poet. ibid. (See Superstition, Ladys.) Won by appearance of Submission and Tenderness. iii. 115. Exposition of the Modesty of the Sex in barbarous Nations. i. 273, 4. Better Conduct of the more polite. ibid. Prerogatives of the Fair-Sex. ii. 194. Writings. ii. 194, 5. iii. 254. Taste and Humour. ii. 271, 73. iii. 166, 256

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS cited. i. 87

Shepherds: see Arcadia.

SIBYL. i. 46. iii. 232. Sibylline Scripture. iii. 227, 232, &c.

Sight, single, simple. τὸ Ἐυσύνοπτον. i. 143

Silence, to be distinctly characteriz'd in the Figure of Hercules, during the Contention. iii. 361 Simplicity: see Style.

Sinner against Good-Breeding. i. 166. Against Grammar. ibid.

Sins. i. 166. iii. 177

Slavery: Court-Slavery. i. 139. ii. 116, 17. iii. 168, &c. 208, 9. Slavery of Vice. iii. 307, &c. 311. Slavish Principles and Spirit. iii. 148, 168, 251, 2, 306, 310, &c.

Smithfield, i. 28

Social Animals. iii. 220, 21

Social Enjoyment: see Enjoyment.

Social Affection: see Affection.

Society (see Tribe, Government) Early State and Progress of Society. i. 236. Natural Growth of a Society, or National Community. i. 110, 11. Principle of Society, natural. i. 107, &c. Prov'd from Sedition, War. i. 112, 13. From the greatest Opposers of this Principle. i. 89, 90, 92. From its force in ill, as well as in good Passions. i. 16. Society in Nature; not from Art or Compact. i. 109. (See Nature.)

Religious Orders, or Societys. i. 114

SOCRATES. i. 31, 254. iii. 214, 244. See Raillery.

Chartae Socraticae. i. 192, &c. 205, 6

Socraticks: their Characters. i. 254, &c.

Soil, Climate, Region. iii. 146, &c.

Patriots of the Soil. iii. 150

Solemnity: Follys and Amusements become solemn. i. 81. See Gravity, Imposture.

Soliloquy, see Treatise of, viz. Vol. i. p. 153.

Solitude, &c. i. 174. ii. 223, &c.

Solon. iii. 246

SOPHOCLES. i. 244

Sophists once honourable, and of highest Dignity. i. 240. Sophists Language-Masters. iii. 140. First Teachers of Philosophy. iii. 137. Sophistry. i. 74. See Imposture.

Sot: Sottishness. i. 309, 10

Soul: two Souls in Man. i. 184, 5

Sounds articulate. i. 288, 303

Space, Vacuum. i. 301. Space, Plenitude, Substance, Mode, Matter, Immateriality. See Metaphysicks.

Species: Interest of a Species. ii. 16. A whole Species, subservient to some other. ii. 18. Species of Fair. i. 139, 41. (See Fair, Beauty, Decorum.) Moral Species or Appearances, overbearing all other. ii. 100. iii. 33, &c.

Specters. i. 60. iii. 299

Spencer, de Legibus Heb. iii. 55, 6

Spider. ii. 18

Spirits: Judgment of others. i. 54.—of our own. ibid. Fear of Spirits, in an odd sense. See Pneumatophobia.

Animal Spirits confin'd. i. 71

Spleen. i. 20. Objected to Criticks and Satirists. iii. 108, 9

Stage of the World. ii. 184

Stage, English. i. 271, 75, 6. iii. 255, 6, 289, 90. See Drama.

Stage allow'd to instruct as well as the Pulpit. i. 361. iii. 255

Standard of Manners, Breeding, Gentility. iii. 179, &c. Standard of Wit, English. i. 265. iii. 272, &c. Standard of moral Rectitude. i. 107, 298, 353. iii. 303, 4

Statuary, Lysippus. i. 227

Statuary and Statuarys. See Painters.

Statuary, with other Arts and Letters, destroy'd by antient Bishops of Rome and Greece. iii. 239, &c.

Statute against Criticism. iii. 269, 278, 9

Statute of Mortmain, and Repeal, among the Antients. iii. 45, 49, 50, 79. See Hierarchy. Statutes. See Laws.

Storys (Old Wives.) i. 6. Told up and down. i. 37

Storks. iii. 80

Strabo *cited.* i. 208, 252. iii. 153

Styles and Manners of writing, the several kinds. i. 242, &c. 255, &c. Didactive, Preceptive Style. i. 25. iii. 285. Scholastick, Pedantick. i. 256, &c. iii. 141. Metaphorick. i. 242, 3. iii. 140, 261, 2, 337. Methodick. i. 256, &c. Simple. ibid. and iii. 21, 2, 141, &c. Sublime. i. 256, &c. 276. iii. 285. See Sublime, Comick, Tragick, Farce, Bombast.

Heavenly Style in Painting. iii. 220. See Painting, Painter. Style of our blessed Saviour. iii. 122, 3

English Style in Prose and Verse. iii. 264, &c. 276, &c. Gouty Joints, Darning-Work, &c. iii. 264, 5. Discord, Dissonance. ibid. See Monosyllables.

Subjects, Multiplication of them in a Piece perplexes the Ordonnance of a Work. iii. 383 Sublime. iii. 140

Sublime in speaking. i. 8, 335. False and True. i. 241, &c. (See Bombast.) Sublime of Characters. i. 336. Of Actions. iii. 34. Sublime in Things. See Beauty, Admiration.

Subordination necessary in Nature. ii. 214, &c. What requir'd to make it perfect. iii. 383 Succession: Church-Succession. i. 360. iii. 338

Succession of Wit and Humour. i. 253, &c. See Lineage and Genealogy.

Superstition. ii. 166. (See Enthusiasm, Priest, Miracle, Magi, AEGYPT, Hierarchy, Tales.)

Difference between Superstition and Enthusiasm. iii. 39. Anti-superstitious Passion, or
Counter-Enthusiasm. i. 88, &c. iii. 64, 5

Superstition, Fear. i. 295. iii. 65. Superstition the most enslaving and worst of Vices. iii. 305 Female Superstition. i. 348, 9. iii. 48. See Ladys.

Picture or Character of Superstition. iii. 125, &c.

Superstition destructive of Moral Rectitude. ii. 46, &c. The Superstitious are willing Atheists. i. 126, 28. Unable to believe as they desire. ibid.

Quantity of Superstition answers to the number of religious Dealers. iii. 46, &c.

Supineness, proper for the Figure of Pleasure. iii. 371

Surgeons, spiritual. iii. 95, 106

Surgery in Politicks and Religion. i. 16, 17. iii. 106. Inward Surgery. i. 156, &c.

SWEDEN. See DENMARK.

Sycophants in Religion. i. 35. iii. 125, &c. See Beggars, Flattery.

Symbol. See Test, Creed, Watch-word.

Symmetry. i. 353. iii. 263. Real. iii. 168, 180. See Beauty, Decorum.

Synods. i. 360, &c.

Syria: its Religion. iii. 41, 2. See Palestine, Jews, AEgypt.

System: a Fool by Method and System. i. 290. See Hypothesis.

Systems impos'd by Authority. i. 96

System of the World. ii. 287. Particular Systems, and their single Parts united in one System. ii. 19, &c. 286

Τ

Tablature, specifically distinguish'd. iii. 347, 8. The Design of it shou'd be immediately apparent. iii. 378

TACITUS cited. iii. 53, 4, 253

Tail: Works or Pieces without Head or Tail. See Works.

A Tale: its Use, upon occasion. ii. 202, 3

Tales: Love of Tales and monstrous Storys; its Affinity with the Passion of Superstition. i. 348, 9. Tremendous Tale-tellers. ibid.

Talkers. i. 167

TARTAR. See Goth.

Tartar-Notion. i. 86

Taste: Explanation of a right Taste in Manners, Morals, Government. iii. 163, &c. In Wit and Ingenuity, how rais'd and improv'd. i. 239, &c. 250, &c. A Taste in Morals, Life. i. 355. iii. 176, &c. (See Sense, Nose.) Moral Taste or Sense, how acquir'd. ii. 401

Taste in inward Beauty and Characters, founded in Nature. i. 336. iii. 303

True Taste or Judgment in Life, how gain'd. i. 338, 9. Lies in our own power. iii. 186

Virtuoso-*Taste.* i. 135

Ruin of Taste from Multiplicity of Reading. i. 342, &c. Taste barbariz'd. i. 344 Reformation of Taste, great Work. i. 354

Good Taste in the polite World. iii. 154, &c.

TAYLOR, Bishop, cited. i. 99, 100. iii. 40, 41, 318, &c. 326, 7

Temper, the truly divine. i. 37. Best or worst in Man. ii. 96. What makes a good Temper. ii. 114, 15, 17. The fittest Temper for Judgment. i. 12, 32, 3

Temperance: how valuable. ii. 248, &c. Set in opposition to Avarice and Ambition. ii. 251, 2

Terence. i. 334. iii. 184, 263

Terra Incognita. i. 344. iii. 210

Test: Religious Tests, Problems, &c. i. 60, 61. See Symbol, Creed.

Test of Ridicule. i. 11, 30, 31, 61. (See Criterion.) Test of Gravity. i. 74

Testimony, human. i. 45, 148. ii. 331. Divine. ii. 333, 4

Theater: See Stage-Play.

Theism: how it tends to promote Virtue. ii. 71, 2. Compar'd in that respect with Atheism. ii. 72, &c. Theism to what oppos'd. ii. 209. Faith of Theism. ii. 358

Theist: the Belief of a perfect Theist. ii. 11. Theists, nominal, real. ii. 267, &c.

Theogony, Theology, Heathen and Christian. i. 359, &c. See Divinity.

Theology. i. 359

Thinking: Free-Thinking. iii. 297, &c. Free-Thinkers. ibid. Half-Thinkers, a sorry Species. iii. 300. Dishonesty a Half-Thought. iii. 297, &c. Under-thinking, or Short-thinking, its Nature, Cause and Consequences. iii. 301, &c. See Scepticism.

Thorns: Grapes not from Thorns. i. 286

Thought, whether able to produce Matter. ii. 296, 7

THUCYDIDES. iii. 247

Tiberius. i. 105

TILLOTSON (Archbishop) cited. iii. 329, &c.

Time, Points of; the Judgment of Hercules capable of being divided into three. iii. 350. The proper Circumstances of each. iii. 351. Objections against a fourth. ibid.

Time, a future, may be express'd by enigmatical Devices. iii. 353

Tire-men. i. 84

Title of a Work, last determin'd. iii. 26, 7

Titles. i. 203, 4

Toilette, a General's. iii. 186

Toleration, (See Persecution, Liberty) when and on what account oppos'd. iii. 110, 11. When admir'd and recommended. ibid. See Charity.

Top (Child's Top) i. 187. Works without Top or Bottom. See Works.

Tragedy, Genius of. i. 218, 19. (See Euripides.) Prior to Comedy. i. 244, &c. iii. 140, 41

Tragedy, modern: Love and Honour. i. 276. (See Play, Theater.) English Tragedy. iii. 61, 2. Moral and Virtue of Tragedy. i. 317, 18. iii. 309

Tragi-Comedy. iii. 7

Tragick Aspect of certain Divines. i. 66, 74

Trajan. i. 228

Traveller, or Travel-Writer in form. i. 346, 7. History of certain travelling Gentlemen. iii. 99, &c.

Treachery: Negative Vice. ii. 167

Treatise. See Piece.

Trial. See Proof, Criterion, Test.

Tribe: Formation of a Clan or Tribe. i. 110, 11. Of federate Tribes, mixt Colonys, &c. ibid. and 236, &c.

Trustee. See Guardian.

Truth bears all Lights. i. 11, 30, 31, 61. — Ridicule, a Light, or Criterion to Truth. i. 61. Truth injur'd by over-much Discovery. i. 62. Face of Truth suffers by Masks. i. 84, 5

Truth (See Beauty) powerful. i. 4. Principal even in Fable and Fiction. ibid. Poetick Truth. i. 142, &c. 193, &c. 336, 7, 354, 5. iii. 180, &c. 259, &c. 282. Plastick or Graphical Truth. i. 146. iii. 181. Historical, Critical, Moral, Philosophical and Religious Truth. ibid. and iii. 181, &c. (See Revelation, History.) Magna, & praevalebit. i. 148

Truth of Work. i. 261, &c. Truth of Actions. ibid. Verum atque Decens. iii. 162. Strength of Perception no sure Ground of Truth. iii. 68

Truth, Historical, to give way to Poetick or Probable in Painting. iii. 372, 3, 5

Truth, Poetick, presupposes Prognostication. iii. 354

Turks. i. 26. Turkish Policy, destructive of Letters. i. 226. iii. 235

Turn. See Vicissitude.

Tutor. See Pedagogue.

Tutor and Pupil. i. 211. The Age not to be tutor'd. i. 67

Tyranny. i. 107. Worship'd. i. 219. See Absolute, Arbitrary, Force.

Tyro's in Philosophy. iii. 37

U

Undermining or sapping Method in Wit and Philosophy. iii. 134

Understanding and Eyes fitted to so much Light, and no more. i. 62. Plot of Mankind against their own Understanding. iii. 101, &c.

Uniformity in Religion, hopeful Project. i. 19. How practicable. iii. 89, 90, 103, 4, 6, 318, 19, 343

Unity in the Universe. ii. 347

Universe. ii. 212. iii. 224

University-Wit. i. 64. See Pedant.

University-Learning. ii. 286, 298, 334, &c. University-Chair. ii. 258. iii. 287 Modern Universitys not very fortunate in the Education of Youth. i. 333, &c.

Urbanity. i. 72

V

Vanity. i. 206

Varro. iii. 234, 280

Venus: the Venus, Venustum, or Grace in Things. i. 138, 337. See Decorum. Every one a Venus. i. 138, 9

Vice: Artifice of Vice. i. 174. Vice in Opinion. ii. 34, 5. Causes of Vice. ii. 40. Most essential Part of Vice. ii. 97, 8

Vice. See Slavery.

Vicissitude; Law of Discourse and Conversation. i. 70, 76

View. See Sight.

Virgil. i. 46, 7. ii. 223, 343. iii. 233

Virtue, Honesty, and Justice in Nature; not from Will or Law. i. 109, 353. Nothing to do with Fashion or Vogue. ibid. and ii. 35. Independent of Opinion, and above the World. i. 262. Virtue, the Truth and Symmetry of Manners. See Symmetry, Musick, Harmony, Proportion.

Beauty of Virtue. i. 140

Virtue, Fashion and Name only in the Sense of some fashionable Moralists. i. 80, 92, 124, &c. 352.—Less a Sufferer by being contested than betray'd. i. 96, 7. Over-laid by its Nurses. ibid. Under-prop'd. ibid. Forfeited. ii. 34. Trial of Virtue. ii. 36, 7. Degrees of Virtue. ii. 38, 9. Causes of Virtue. ii. 40. Virtue degraded and defac'd. ii. 254, 5. See Religion.

Virtue made mercenary. i. 97. Heroick Virtue. i. 101

Virtue and Morals demonstrated. See in Vol. II. Treatise IV. and in Vol. III. pag. 194, &c. Virtue incapable of being ridicul'd. i. 128, 9. See Jest, Raillery, Ridicule.

Virtue, her Figure in the Piece. iii. 364. To be drawn standing. iii. 362. How habited. iii. 363. Her proper Attitude. iii. 364. Her Palace not to be inserted. iii. 377

Virtuosi. iii. 156, &c. 182. ii. 183, 394. Mock-Virtuoso, or Pedant of the kind. i. 341. iii. 156, 7 Virtuosi and Philosophers compar'd. iii. 156, &c.

Virtuoso-Lovers. i. 137, 185, 6. ii. 183, 394

Virtuoso-Passion. iii. 184

Virtuoso-Taste. See Taste.

Virtuosoship, a step towards Virtue. i. 333. iii. 161. Science of Virtuoso, and that of Virtue, almost the same. i. 338

Visionarys: See Fanaticks.

Vitruvius. iii. 181

Volunteer in Faith. i. 6. In Morals. i. 194

Vossius (Is.) de Viribus Rhythmi. iii. 263

W

WAR: Passion of Heroick Spirits, why? i. 112, 13. England Seat of War, whence fear'd. iii. 148, 9

Watch-maker. i. 293

Watch-word in Divinity. iii. 60

Whitehall, when to be rebuilt, a noble Subject for Architecture. iii. 400, 401

Whole. A Whole and Parts. i. 143, 207. ii. 284. iii. 259. The Whole, a System compleat. ii. 286, 7. iii. 348

Will, Freedom of. i. 185. Resolution and Will, a Nose of Wax. ibid. Top or Foot-ball. i. 187. Will insur'd, ascertain'd. ibid. Readiness to obey the first Motion of Will, is Impotence and Slavery. ii. 231

Will and Power no Rule of Good or Just. i. 107, 124. See Arbitrary.

Will (Testament) Power and Practice of the Priesthood, in making Peoples Wills. iii. 79, 88

Wisdom, in permitting Folly. i. 13, 14. Wisdom as well as Charity begins at home. i. 189

Wise-men of Greece. i. 89

Wit: mere or sheer Wit. iii. 2, 3. Mannerly Wit can hurt no honest Cause. i. 96. Orthodox Wit. iii. 291. Lay-Wit. ibid. Bottom of Wit enlarg'd. iii. 4. Lineage of Wit. See Lineage. Separate Provinces of Wit and Wisdom. iii. 6. Generation and Succession of our National and Modern Wit. iii. 269, &c.

Freedom of Wit, a Cure to false Wit. i. 19, 64. Liberty of Wit. i. 69. See Liberty, Freedom. Liberty of Wit and Trade parallel. i. 69. False Wit, how prov'd. i. 74. Men frighted, not laugh'd out of their Wits. i. 96

Wit and Humour. See Treatise II. viz. Vol. I. pag. 59, &c. and iii. 97, &c.

Wits or Poets, Offspring of. iii. 274. Wits by Patent. ibid. Stratagem of affected Wits. iii. 300 Witches. i. 148

Wolf: Silly Comparison of Man and Wolves. i. 88, 93, 118. ii. 320

Women. See Sex, Lady.

Women Spectators, Judges of Combats, Duels, Amphitheatrical Spectacles, Masculine Games.
 i. 272, &c. ii. 195. Judges of the State, and Poetical Performance. i. 271, &c. Flattery of their Taste by Poets. i. 271, 76. iii. 259, 60

Silly Women won by Preachers. i. 348, 9. Forsake courteous Knights for black Enchanters. ibid. Follow the Hero of a black Tribe. ibid.

Women who live by Prostitution. ii. 128

Wonder, Wonderment. i. 144, &c. ii. 324, &c. See Admiration.

Work. (See Piece.) Truth of Work. i. 261, &c.

Works without Head or Tail, Beginning or End. i. 145, 6. iii. 8, 25. What contributes to the Perfection of a Work. ii. 186

Workman. See Artisan.

World. iii. 33. See Universe.

Worship, vitious. ii. 35

Worth and Baseness acknowledg'd. ii. 420, 21

Wrestler. i. 193

Writer. See Author.

Antient Writer de Mundo. iii. 263, 4

Just Writer, an able Traveller, or Horseman. iii. 26. Modern Writers: their Foundation, Polity, State, Mystery. iii. 2, 3, &c. 272, &c. See-saw of modern Writers. iii. 26. Postway. ibid.

Writings: See Memoir, Essay, Miscellany.

Writing: Fashionable Model of Writing. iii. 25. See Correctness, Incorrectness, Critick, Penmen.

Wrong: Right and Wrong, what. ii. 31, &c. See Right, Virtue.

Χ

XENOCRATES. i. 252, 3

XENOPHON. i. 334. iii. 248. His Commentarys. i. 224. His Genius, Character, Style. i. 254, 5. iii. 248

Z

ZEAL and Knavery. i. 132, 3. ii. 325. iii. 125. Imprudent Zeal. ii. 68

Zeal, Compound of Superstition and Enthusiasm. iii. 39. Offensive and Defensive. iii. 82, 3, 6, &c. See Bigotry, Persecution.

Amorous Zeal. iii. 38

Zealots, bear no raillery. i. 60. Pretend to railly others. i. 61.

Character of modern Zealots. iii. 218, 19

Zealot-Writers, their Grimace. i. 65, 6.—Picture. ibid. Affectation of Pleasantry and Humour. ibid. and iii. 291.

Character of a Zealot Author. i. 67. Anti-Zealots. i. 91. iii. 64, 5.

Zealous Charity for the Conversion of our Neighbour, how far suspicious. iii. 107, 8, 110, 11

The End of the Table

[*N.B.* Page numbers followed by (*n*) indicate footnotes. Volume numbers (I, II, III) precede the page numbers for that volume.]

Abraham, III:34-35, 34(n)-35(n), 39, Absolute degeneracy, II:48 Absolute government: disposition toward slavery and, III:154-55; free government contrasted, I:147-48; patronage of arts and, I:141 Absolute ill, II:12, 23 Absolute immorality, II:48 Academics, philosophy of, II:107-9 Academies: English, status of, III:248-49; for ministers, III:249(n), 249-50 Action(s): capacity for, writing and, III:151-52; contemplation of, II:60-61; fitness and decency in, II:232; ill, dissolute state and, II:49-50; necessary to body, II:91; workmanship in, I:163 Actors: exalted by audience, I:6; studied gestures of, III:225 Advice, III:84; manner of giving, I:97-99; princes' custom of asking, I:130-31; qualification for giving, I:223-24 Advisers: princes as, I:132-33; professional, I:131-32 Aemilius, I:166 Aeneas, I:219-20 Aeschylus, I:153, 153(n) Aesop, III:126 Aesthetic experience, I:vii-viii Affectations: of authors, I:124-25; feigned zeal, I:4; unpardonable, II:151 Affection, intire (whole); II:64, 65-66 Affection(s): balance in, II:75–76, 78; degrees of, II:51-52; fear and hope and, II:33; good or ill and, II:12, 52;

III:119; governing systems, II:50-57; immoderate, II:16; III:24; influenced by opinion, III:120; kinds of, II:50; love and, II:61, 75; love of country, III:88(n), 88–92; misery and, II:57, 80, 97-98; in misfortune, II:42-43; moral sense, opposition to, II:30-44; natural (See Natural affections); opposition of, II:30-44; partial, II:63-65; presence or absence of, III:119-20; proportion in, II:51-53; public (See Public affections); reflected, II:16; religious, II:43, 43(n); sensible or rational, II:21; social (See Social affection); system of, II:49-50; toward species, II:45-46; unequal, iniquity and, II:18, 20; whole, II:64, 65-66 (See also Self-affection; Unnatural affections; Virtue) Air, pure, enjoyment of, II:211 Alchemists, philosophy of, II:108, Alexander, I:140, 154, 200; II:243-44 Allegory: literal meaning and, III:197-98, 199(n); in painting, emblematic devices as, III:217 Ambassadors: heavenly, III:205-8; from moon, III:206-7 Ambition, II:113; consequences of, II:90-91; grandeur of, III:20-21 America, wealth of, II:219 Amorous appetite, consequences of, II:87-89 Anatomy, purpose and, II:170-71 Anger, II:234; effects of, II:83-85; failure of reason and, III:67; ill effects of, II:84-85; of Jonah, III:73-75, 74(n), 75(n)

Animals (creatures): constancy of temper in, II:55-56; fear as advantage to, II:53-54; good breeding in, III:133; good or vicious, II:9, 13-15; III:132, 132(n); herding in, III:134; instinct in, II:173, 173(n); III:131(n); lack of balance in, II:75-76, 75(n); nature of, II:169-70; III:129-30, 132-37; offspring of, II:173-74, 179; purpose of, II:8-9; relation to species, II:10; revered as holy, II:19; sea-drinkers, parable of, III:126-27; system of, II:11, 162; void of public affections, II:47-48 (See also Species) Answerers, originality lacking in, III:166-Anticipation, in history-painting, III:218 Antipater, I:154 Antipathy, moral sense and, II:26 Anti-zealots, I:58–59 Apelles, I:140 Apollo, I:4, 5 Appetite(s): amorous, II:87-89; conduct and, III:108; control of, I:116-17; II:88; III:122; false and unnatural, II:85-86, 95; oppression of thought by, III:186; poetry consecrated to, III:188-89; suitable, II:166 Architecture, I:87; English, failures of, III:245-47; process of pulling down, III:82-83; standards of beauty in, III:110, 110(*n*) Argument, knack of, I:98-99 Aristides, I:166 Aristophanes, I:152, 152(n) Aristotle, I:viii, 149–50, 149(n)–152(n), 155, 155(n) Arrogance, II:95-96 Art(s): artifice of, III:15; barbarism and, I:135, 137; criticism as, III:165; designing arts, linked, III:247-48; effects of peace on, I:138; III:244-45; in England, state of, III:245-49; government and, I:140-41, 147-48; III:247-48; of Greece, ancient, I:153–54; III:85, 86, 86(*n*); liberty and, I:133, 136, 137; models of perfection

in, I:208; moral truth in, III:238–39; originality of, III:86, 86(n); origins in ancient Greece, III:86; perfection of, I:204; perspective in, III:230-31; persuasion as mother of, I:146-47; as pleasure to senses, III:239, 239(n); poetic truth in, III:238-39; poetry and, I:128, 163; pretense of inspiration in, III:140-41; proportion in, I:90(*n*); prostitution of, I:162–63; in religious worship, III:72-73, 73(n), 76(n), 76-77; rigid rules of, I:209-10, 209(n)-210(n); of Rome, ancient, I:138, 141; as soul of beauty, II:226; standards of beauty in, III:110, 110(n); truth in, I:89-90, 89(n)-90(n); voice of public and, III:247; writing, resemblance to, I:128 (See also specific forms of art)

Articulation, science of, I:178–79
Artifice: of art, III:15; in morality, I:55–56; nature confused with, I:52–53, 54; in simple (natural) style, I:144, 160
Association, inclination toward: in animals, III:134; in man, I:69–72
Astonishment, I:149
Astrology: mathematics and, I:179; as

wisdom of Egypt, III:35, 35(*n*)
Atheism, II:6, 7; on creation, II:168, 200–201; deficiency of, II:33; effects of misfortune and, II:42; enthusiasm in, I:34; III:42–44, 42(*n*)–44(*n*); melancholy and, I:15; moral sense and, II:27, 30; natural tendency of, II:40–41; perfect, excluded by religion, II:7; sprung from superstition, II:189; theism compared, II:41–43, 119, 119(*n*); virtue and, II:3–5; writers against, II:146–47

Atheists: as fanatics, III:42, 42(*n*); impossibility of virtue in, II:5; madness of, III:42(*n*), 42–43; martyrdom of, III:42; moral, II:4; reasoning with, II:149–50; taste of, I:212; two sorts of, II:147; view of virtue, II:144; wit of, III:180

Athenians: restraint of licentious wit,

I:154(*n*), 154–55; ridicule of Christianity, I:19; taste and manners in, III:94 (*See also* Greeks, ancient)
Attila, III:58, 58(*n*)

Audience: exalted, inspiration of, I:5-6; influence on authors, I:162-73

Augustus, I:141

Author(s): advice given by, I:97-98; affectations of, I:124-25; audience, influence of, I:162-73; capacity for action and, III:151-52; of catechism, III:150, 150(n); commercial, I:188; controversial writing encouraged, III:9; as copyist of nature, I:218; critics, influence of, I:142-62, 172; critics as, I:148; dialogue, mastery of, I:122-23, 125-27; dialogue, study of, I:124; English, failure of effort, III:159, 159(n); English princes as, I:132-33; feigned correspondence, III:14; freedom of, I:142; III:192-93; gentlemen compared to, I:120-21; as honorable title, III:4-5; indulgence shown to, III:158-59; influences on, I:130-73; as instructors, I:222; jealousy of, II:148; judgments of enthusiasm, III:42-46, 42(n)-46(n); mastery of understanding, I:98; as moral artists, I:129-30, 129(n)-130(n); morality necessary for, III:173-74; orators as, I:105; patrons, influence of, I:130-42, 172; perfection of art, I:204; philosopher as master to, I:119; princes as, I:132-33; prostitution of art, I:162-63; reader and (See Reader); refutation of, as compliment, III:10; religion, attitudes toward, II:5; for self-entertainment, I:187-89; selfexamination and, I:101-3, 117-18, 118(n), 130; on self-love, I:75(n), 75-76; understanding of truth, I:206, 206(n); value of praise of, I:173-74; as zealots, I:43-44; II:145

Authors, criticism of, II:146–58; answerers, III:166–67; poor writing, III:139–64

Authors, modern: fear of critics, I:142-44; imposture of, I:164; lazy and negligent, I:164-65; style and manner of, III:156

Authors, religious: immoderation of, I:104–5; manners lacking in, I:104–5; on principles of religion, II:146–58; sacred writing and, I:219–23 (*See also* Clergy, writings of)

Avarice, I:81, 191; attractions of, I:197; consequences of, II:89–90; panic caused by, III:54

Aversion: for fancy, developing, III:123–24, 123(*n*)–124(*n*); to government by priests, III:59–60; presence or absence of, III:119–20

В

Bacchus, I:10
Bacon, Francis, III:45, 45(n)
Balaam, I:28
Balance: in affections, II:75–76, 78;
order and, II:78, 171–72; in painting,
III:226; in passions, II:55, 166
Balance of power, liberty and, I:60
Barbarism: arts and, I:135, 137; loss of
taste and, I:211
Barbarity, II:95
Bards: legacy of, I:134–35 (See also Poetry;
Poets)

Baseness, acknowledgment of, II:235 Mr. Bays: pedantic manner of, III:170, 170(n); rightful criticism of, III:174

Beauty: appreciation of, I:84-85; of body, II:231; contemplation of, II:43; in design, not matter, II:226; desire to possess, II:221-22; of divinity, II:166; enjoyment of, as good, II:235-36; enthusiasm and, III:20, 21, 21(n); first order of, II:226-27; of form, II:226-28, 231; free will and, I:112; in harmony, III:111–14, 111(*n*)–114(*n*); of heavens, II:112; of honesty, I:88; inward, health as, III:110-11; love and, I:86; II:120; of manners, III:109; mind and, I:86; II:238; III:111; moral (See Moral beauty); morality as part of, I:85-86; most perfect, II:138-39; natural, II:220; III:233; nature

Beauty (continued)

and, I:85-86; II:230-31; III:110; as one with good, II:223, 232; original, representatives of, II:220-21, 225; passions and, I:85; II:220; poetry and, I:85-86; power of, I:111-12, 114; preconceptions of, II:230; of principle, III:109; pursuit of, I:86-87; II:220; refinement of taste and, II:224; science and, II:224; second order of, II:227; self-knowledge and, II:238; senses and, II:16–18; in society, II:120; soliloquy on, III:111(n)-114(n); of soul, discernment of, II:230-31; standards of (See Standard of beauty); supreme, God as, II:121; in symmetry and proportion, III:111–14, 111(n)–114(n); third (highest) order of, II:227-28; true beauty, search for, II:225, 238-39; as truth, I:89-93; of universe, II:112; of virtue, II:166; of water, II:211-12; of women, I:86; II:222

Beavers, III:134-35

Belief, II:31-33; in fairies, by clergy, I:5; fanaticism and, II:186; fear and, II:31-32; in future life, as advantage, II:34, 35-36, 153; imposition by law, III:65; inconsistency in, II:6-7; merit and, II:31, 32-33; in miracles (See Miracles, belief in); mixture of beliefs, II:7, 7(n)-8(n); perfection of virtue and, II:44; punishment or reward and, II:32, 153-54; rational, toleration and, III:65-66; reasons for, II:31-33; safety in, II:35; self-interest and, III:62-64; skepticism co-existent with, III:49; social affection and, III:66; systems of, II:5-8; variety in, III:194-95; virtue and, II:41; weak, fatal to virtue, II:5-8, 35-36, 39(n), 39-40 (See also Credulity; Faith)

Better self: nature of, I:174–75; selfinterest contrasted, I:175(n), 175–76 (See also Self)

Bigotry: freedom of thought and, III:186–87; religious animosity and, III:51–52; as species of superstition, III:52, 52(n)

Biographers, I:138–39 Blood sports: English theater as, III:157–58, 158(n); Roman taste for, I:167–68, 167(n) Body: action necessary to, II:91; beauty

of, II:231; enjoyment of senses, II:236; mind as ruler of, II:192, 201; pleasure of, II:57

Boileau, Nicolas, I:135, 135(n); III:172 Booksellers, profit from controversy, III:9, 11, 12

Bounty: as act of friendship, II:136; of God, II:205-6

Bravery, I:81

Bravery, 1:81
Breeding. See Good breeding
Brutes, without reason, II:237
Buffoonery: base passions and, I:81;
spiritual tyranny and, I:46–47
Building, difficulty of, III:83, 83(n)
Burke, Edmund, I:viii
Burlesque, I:161, 161(n)

C

Caesar, I:139, 141, 168-69 Calliope, I:194-95 Cannibalism, moral sense and, II:27 Canonical scripture, III:202, 202(*n*) Cappadocians, III:154-55 Capriciousness, of partial affection, II:64, Catechism, authors of, III:150, 150(n) Catiline, I:141 Cato, I:166 Catullus, I:141 Censure: criticism contrasted, III:167; freedom of, I:6-14, 40; malicious, II:181; mutual, by men, II:240 Ceremony, as vulgar enthusiasm, III:58(n), 58-59 Cervantes, Miguel de, III:156 Chaerilus, I:140 Chance, in order of universe, II:5-6 Change: compliance and, III:81; in self, II:196-97 Chaos: harmony and, II:192; religious war as, III:41, 41(n)

Character, I:76; of artist, perfection and, I:207; changes in, I:176–77;

components of, I:81; corruption of, III:106–7; court-preferment and, III:104–5; of deity(ies), II:27–29; effect of passions on, I:182; of knaves, I:81–83; of man, I:76; perfection of, I:163; vacillation in, I:82(*n*), 82–83; worth of, III:121

Characters, dramatic: new style of dialogue and, III:178, 179–81; in philosophical writings, I:121–22, 123; III:178; strength of, III:181; understanding of plot and, III:177–78

Charity: application of, II:149; breaches of, III:204; Christian, I:62–63, I:62(n)–63(n)

Charles II, King of England, III:245 Children: infants, helplessness of, II:173– 74, 179; of mind, II:228–29; rewards and punishments of, II:37

Chivalry: gallantry derived from, II:111; standard of manners under, I:169; stories of, astonishing, I:211–12

Christian charity, I:62-63, I:62(n)-63(n)

Christianity: end of miracles and, II:186; enthusiasm in, I:vi; infallibility of scripture, III:144–48, 150–51; persecution and, I:18; III:55–57, 55(n)–57(n); ridicule of, I:19; theism as foundation, II:18–19 (See also Religion; specific churches)

Cicero, I:185, 185(*n*); III:14, 172 Cincinnatus, I:166 Circumcision, III:34–35, 34(*n*)–35(*n*) Civility, I:42

Civil liberty, II:142

Clergy: belief in fairies, I:5; commission by earthly power, III:205–6, 206(n); judgments of enthusiasm, III:42–46, 42(n)–46(n)

Clergy, writings of, II:146; comedy in, III:179; discourse in, III:178–79; ignorance excused, III:174; as theological drama, III:179–81 (*See also* Authors, religious)

Climates, meditation on, II:214–15 Clio, I:195 Coffee-house committee, III:169–71 Cold, meditation on, II:214 Colonization: by Egypt, III:33, 33(n); by empire, I:71

Comedy: instruction by, I:222; mastery of, I:123; origins of, I:150, 151(n), 152(n), 152–53; parody, I:152, 152(n); in writings of clergy, III:179 (See also Drama; Humor; Theater; Tragedy)

Comic philosophy, I:157, 157(n) Comic style, I:160, 161

Common sense, I:50–51; association and, I:69–72; courts (nobility) and, I:64–67; defined, I:50–51; honesty and, I:80–84; self-interest and, I:65(*n*)–66(*n*), 72–76; as sense of public good, I:64–69; unity of view and, I:91; virtue unseen and, I:76–80; wit and, I:49–52

Communication, enjoyment of, II:62 Community, love of, I:70

Company, as provocation to fancy, I:100

Compliance: change and, III:81; good humor and, III:67–68

Composing, resemblance to raving, I:102; II:194

Composition: form of, III:214; rules of, III:140

Conformity: in appearance and opinion, I:53–54; with unity, III:217

Conscience: false, II:70–71; interest and, II:72–73; moral, II:69–70; as reflection, II:69; reproach of false conscience, II:72; wrong taste and, III:108

Consciousness, as proof of identity, III:118

Consistency, rule of, III:217

Contemplation, II:126, 127; achievement of understanding and, II:68–69; of becoming action, II:60–61; of being and purpose, III:97–98, 97(n); of decorum, III:109–10; of existence of deity, II:31; of God, self-examination and, I:21, 26; of grace, III:109–10; of mathematics, II:60; of order and beauty, II:43; regulation of opinion and fancy by, III:121(n), 121–25

Contentment: constant, good as, II:134–35; fancy and, II:244

Controversy: over scripture, III:201-2; as temporary diversion, III:10-11; as writing style, III:8-12 Conversation. See Discourse Corneille, Thomas, III:172 Corruption, iniquity and, II:19-20 Country: definition of term, III:92-93; loss of, common bonds and, III:92; love of, III:88(n), 88-92 (See also Patriotism) Country life, praises of, II:159 Courage: economy of passions and, II:54; nature of, I:74-75, 75(n); safety in, II:82 Court-education, I:169 Court-preferment, character and, III:104-5 Courts (nobility): common sense and, I:64-67; corruption of taste, III:248; philosophy and, III:16(n) Courtship, religion compared, III:71-72 Covetousness, consequences of, II:89-90 Cowardice, I:81, 193; avarice and, I:197; consequences of, II:82; controlling, III:124-25; courage compared, I:75; false shame and, II:233 Creation: atheism's hypothesis of, II:168; consequences of, II:116; omnipotence and, II:115-16; theism's hypothesis of, II:167-68 Creative forms, beauty of, II:227 Creatures. See Animals Credulity, punishment for, II:184-85 Criminals, fear of punishment, I:79-80 Critic(s): ability to write, necessary, III:167, 171-72; accuracy of workmanship and, I:145; answerers as poor sort of, III:166-67; distinguished from writers, III:167-68; fancies of, III:101; fear of, I:142-43; foreign, III:13, 13(n), 14; formation of taste and, III:101-2; humor as proof against, III:68; illhumor of, III:68-69; influence on authors, I:142-62, 172; journalistcritics, III:13, 13(n), 14; origin of, I:148-49; philosophers as, I:148; III:172(*n*), 172–73; ridiculed, III:101–3;

writers distinguished from, III:167-68

Critic-haters: condemned, I:145-46; III:101-3; English writers as, III:166-Criticism: advancement of wit by, I:161-62; as art, III:165; censure contrasted, III:167; in comic style, I:161; elevation of, in reader, III:155(n), 155-56; of English theater, III:157-58; of English writers, III:166–82; freedom of thought and, III:193-94; of holy literature, III:193-94, 196-98; mastery and, I:145; of modern moralists, I:215-18, 215(n)-218(n); of philosophers, II:244; of poets, I:128-29, 172; III:173; of poor writers, III:139-64; as reflection (mirror); II:68; self-criticism, I:104, 105; subdivisions of, I:148-49; taste and, III:101-3; timidity of writers and, III:4; value to literature, III:140 Crocodiles, II:216-17 Custom: corruption of moral sense and, II:27; in opposition to nature, II:26-30

Critical truth, I:92

Dance, in religious worship, III:72-73, 73(n)Daniel, I:28 David, I:28 Dead forms, beauty of, II:226-27 Death: fear of (See Fear of death); misery of life and, II:81 Debate: vigorous, II:172; on virtue, nature of, II:3-8 Debauch, II:73-74, 240 Decency, in actions, II:232 Declamations, I:45-46 Decorum: contemplation of, III:109-10; representation of, in tablature, III:221-22 Defects: as cause of good, II:174; of mankind, II:114-15; of nature, II:114; of philosophy, III:99-100; professions founded on, III:30-31 Defensive ridicule, I:41-42

Deformity: moral (See Moral deformity);

senses and, II:16-18

Degeneracy: absolute, II:48; enjoyment of, II:129–30; misanthropy as, II:112–13

Deism, II:118-19

Deity(ies): belief in (See Belief); benevolent, II:32-33; character of, II:27-29; conscience and, II:69, 70; contemplation of, II:31; corruption of moral sense and, II:26-30; creation by, II:167; demonstration of existence, II:167-68; excellence of, II:154-55; increasing numbers of, III:32-33, 33(n); influence of, virtue and, II:23-44; justice and, II:28; loss of moral sense and, II:23-26; miracles no proof of, II:188; omnipotence, breach of, II:115–16; opposition of affections and, II:30-44; order as proof of, II:155, 156, 157-58; principles of virtue and, II:151; questioned, II:168-69; in systems, search for deity in, II:189-90 (See also

Delphic oracle, divine inspiration of, III:142–43
Demon, ill nature of, II:6
Demonism, II:6, 7, 8

Depravity, II:95; moral sense and, II:20– 21, 27; principles of right and wrong and, II:20–21

Descartes, René, I:182, 182(*n*); III:118, 118(*n*)

Desdemona, I:213, 213(n), 214 Deserts, II:216, 217

Demosthenes, I:166

Design: active principle of, II:204-5; higher order of, III:238-39; in order of universe, II:5-6; as soul of beauty, II:226; unity of (*See* Unity of design)

Desire, presence or absence of, III:119-20 Devotion: ceremony as ingredient of, III:58-59; ill humor and, II:67

Dialogists, poets as, I:122

Dialogue: attention to characters in, III:178; comment on new style, III:178–81; decline of, II:106–7; end of, in modern writing, I:127–28; on faith, III:194–209; between God and man, III:73–75, 74(n), 75(n); mastery

of, I:122–23, 122(*n*)–123(*n*), 125–28; study of, advantageous, I:124; style of, III:175(*n*)–176(*n*) (See also Discourse)

Disappointment, effect on temper, II:67–68

Discontent, with sensual pleasures, II:74
Discourse: boldness in, II:106; effeminate style of, II:106; formal, I:49;
personated, I:121, 121(n), 122; privilege of skepticism in, II:118; with self (See Soliloquy); in writings of clergy, III:178–79 (See also Dialogue)

Discourse, freedom of, I:42; private conversation, I:47(*n*), 47–49; reason and, I:44–47

Disease, indolence and, II:91 Disinterestedness: enthusiasm and, II:153; virtue and, I:62-64, 62(n)-63(n)

Disposition, kindly: compliance and, III:67–68; extent and power of, II:136–37; faith and, III:66; as proof against critics, III:68; religious enthusiasm and, I:14–20, 35; understanding goodness and, I:21

Dissolution, idleness and, II:76–77 Distribution of justice: in family, II:37; by government, II:36–37; in religion, II:38; in theistic view, II:41

Divine(s). See Clergy

Divine inspiration, I:34(*n*)–35(*n*), 34–36; III:141–43; of oracles, III:142(*n*), 142–43; of Sibylline scripture, III:143, 143(*n*); of writing, III:48(*n*), 48–49 Divine love, enthusiasm and, II:152–53

Divinity: in all of nature, II:213–18; aspects of, III:25–26; beauty of, II:166; enthusiasm and, III:22, 22(n); miracles no proof of, II:188; order as proof of, II:189–90

Dogmatism, III:82, 84

Dogmatists: mysteries exposed by, III:52, 52(n); philosophy of, II:108; skeptics contrasted, III:46–48

Dogs: right and wrong natures of, III:133; sea-drinkers, parable of, III:126–27 Dominion, following from property, III:31–32

Donations, religious: in Roman Empire, III:50–51, 50(n)–51(n); superstition and, III:32 Doubt: denial compared, II:147; faith and, III:47-48 Drama, I:135; modern, narrative mixed with, III:177–78; morality in, I:171(n), 171-72; theological, new style of, III:179-81 (See also Characters, dramatic; Comedy; Theater; Tragedy) Dramatists: instruction by, I:222; "Roman" taste of, I:167(n), 168 Dreams: as fancy or truth, II:182-83; represented in painting, III:231 Dual nature of man, I:106-7, 110-15 Earth: as parent to mankind, III:91; relation of man to, II:210-11; III:89-90; system of, II:11 Eating: cooking, fashions in, III:70; enjoyment of, II:236-37 Economy of passions, II:53-55 Ecstasies, religious: amorous ecstasies, III:25; caused by fear, III:23; poetic ecstasies and, III:43; prophetic ecstasies, I:27-33; III:43(n), 43-44, 44(n)Education: court-education, I:169; decline of philosophy and, II:105; discipline of, youth and, III:132; distorted, effects of, I:216(n); of gentlemen, I:76-77; good breeding and, I:205(n); liberal, II:37; in opposition to nature, II:26-30; perfection

of grace and, I:118-19; in philoso-

phy, I:189; of scholar or gentleman,

Egypt, II:215–16; deities of, increase in,

of, III:33, 33(n); Israelites and (See

gious strife in, III:51, 51(n); respect

for, III:34, 38; superstition in, III:27,

III:32-33, 33(n); foreign missionaries

Israelites); priests of, III:27(*n*)-28(*n*), 27-29, 31, 31(*n*), 38-39, 39(*n*); reli-

I:205-6, 205(n)-206(n)

Effeminacy, I:193

29-30, 38

Ego, nature of, III:118

Elements, meditation on, II:210–12 Elephants, III:134–35 Elizabeth, Queen of England, III:93 Eloquence, "leprosy" of, I:100–101 Emblematic devices: caution against, in painting, III:234; in engraving, III:233; in tablature, III:217; III:223, 224, 231 Empires, unwieldiness of, I:71-72 Encomium. See Panegyric England: ascendance of liberty in, I:137-38; climate and literature of, III:60-61; improvement in taste, III:247–49; inhospitable, III:94–95, 94(n)-95(n); modern, improvements in, III:92; Old England, fame of, III:92; palace and House of Parliament, III:246; panegyric as sport in, I:167(n), 167-68; princes of, I:131-33; proper appellation of, III:91; state of arts in, III:245-49; success of comic criticism in, I:161 English academies, status of, III:248–49 English architecture, failures of, III:245-English authors, I:132–33; III:159, 159(*n*) English language, grace of, lacking, III:162-64 English tastes, improvement in, III:247-English theater, as gladiatorial combat, III:157-58, 158(n) English writers, criticism of, III:166-82 Engraving, III:233 Enigmatic ornamentation. See Emblematic devices Enjoyment(s): of beauty, as good, II:235-36; of communication, II:62; of degeneracy, II:129-30; of earth, II:210-11; enthusiasm for, II:223-24; examining subjects of, II:225; of mind (See Mental enjoyments); rational mind and, II:221; regard for grandeur and, III:20-21; of senses, II:220-21, 235-36; shared, of fellowship, II:62; of social pleasures, II:127, 237-38 Enmity, honor of meriting, III:203-4 Enthusiasm, I:1-36; in atheism, I:34; III:42-44, 42(n)-44(n); beauty and,

III:20, 21, 21(n); as cure of skepticism, II:123-24; disinterestedness and, II:153; enchantment of, III:19-20; freedom of censure and, I:6-14, 40; Homer on, III:21, 21(*n*); honesty and, III:22(*n*), 22-23, 24, 24(n); inspiration of audience, I:5-6; judgments of, III:42-46, 42(n)-46(n); love and, I:4-5, 9; II:223-24; III:22, 22(*n*); majesty and, III:21, 27; melancholy and, I:9; II:220, 220(n); as natural and just, III:22, 24-25; nature and, II:124; III:21, 21(n), 23; for pleasure, II:223-24; of reader for author, III:141; tempered, II:209-10; III:24; true *v.* false, I:33–36; vulgar, III:58(n), 58-59, 186-87 Enthusiasm, religious, I:9; in Christianity, I:vi; divine love and, II:152-53; divinity and, III:22, 22(n); ecstasies, kinds of, I:27-33; III:25, 43-44; enemies of, II:153; fanaticism and, III:24, 25; goodness and, I:24-27; inspiration distinguished from, I:34(n)-35(n), 34-36; love v. fear in, III:24-25; for miracles, II:181-82; of mystics, III:25, 59; nature of God and, I:20-24; scriptural infallibility and, III:144-45; second-hand, I:27-28; suppression of, I:12; temperament and, I:14-20, 35; toleration and, I:vi, 12-13 Envy, II:94 Ephesians, temple of, III:53(n), 53-55, 54(n)Epic poetry, I:135 Epictetus, I:ix Epicures: fancies of, II:130-31; mental enjoyments, false praise of, II:131-32; temperate men compared, II:140-41 Epicurism, II:73 Epicurus, I:30-31; II:140, 151 Episcopal Church, III:199, 200 Epistolary style, person addressed, III:13-14, 14(n) Equivocal sense, in painting, III:227 Erato, I:194 Essay, as lower wit, III:5 Essayists, self-absorption of, I:103-4

Esteem: merited, pleasures of, II:62-63; partial affection and, II:65 Ethiopia, power of priests in, III:31-32, 31(n)-32(n)Euripides, I:151(*n*); III:87 Euterpe, I:195 Excess: moderation contrasted, II:80-81; of natural affections, II:52-53; of pleasure, intolerable, II:87; of self-affection, as vice, II:56, 57 Exchange, philosophy of, II:245 Executions, public, II:37 Exercise: of natural affection, II:77; necessary to body, II:91 Existence, random or planned, II:198 Ezekiel, I:28

Fables. See Parables; Tales Fabricius, I:166 Factions: as abuse of social love, I:71-72; religious, unifying guide and, III:195 Faith: desire to believe and, III:64-65; dialogue on, III:194-209; disposition and, III:66, 68; in divine inspiration, III:48(*n*), 48–49; doubt and, III:47-48; freedom of thought and, III:194-209; goodness and, I:24-27; grounds for, I:21-22, 22(n); historical, III:47, 47(n); inconstant, I:27; opinion of God and, I:23; orthodoxy of, adherence to, III:193-94; reason and, I:20-24; II:118; revelation and, II:188, 188(*n*); III:193; self-deception and, I:5;

F

False conscience, II:70–71
False taste, I:210(*n*)
Fame, good and, II:241
Family: distribution of justice in, II:37;
human and animal compared, II:173–74, 179; natural affection in, III:135(*n*), 135–36

skepticism and, III:47-48; of theism,

II:201 (See also Belief)

Fanaticism, I:32(*n*), 32–33, 33(*n*), 34; of atheists, III:42, 42(*n*); belief in miracles as, II:186; enthusiasm becomes, III:24, 25; hydrophobia compared, I:32; miracles and visions

Fanaticism (continued) and, II:186; III:59; of Roman Catholic Church, III:145-47, 146(n)-148(n) Fanatics: poets as, I:32(n), 32-33, 33(n); religious enthusiasm of, III:24, 25 Fancy(ies): betrayal by, III:122-23; company as provocation to, I:100; contentment and, II:244; control of, I:115-16, 191, 198-202; III:121(n), 121-25; covetous, absurdity of, II:221-22; of critics, III:101; desire for luxury, II:222; dreams as, II:182-83; ecstatic, III:44, 44(n); of epicures, II:130-31; examination of, II:243-44; fear of death and, I:193-96, 194(n); free will governed by, I:115, 115(n); goodness and, II:243-44; government by, III:190-91; of lovers, I:191; mind and, I:198, 201; Moorish fancy, I:213(n), 213-15; moral fortress against, I:192; parable of, III:126-27; power of, I:193; regulation of, by contemplation, III:121(n), 121-25; slavery and, III:105-6; will subjected to, II:130-31 Farce, obscene (phallica), I:152(n), 155 Fashion (vogue): conformity in, I:53–54; gentlemen of, I:119; in literary style, III:156; moderation out of, III:208-9; 135(n); theater of, miscellany in, in morality, I:51; pedantry contrasted, I:205(n); power of, III:70; in writing, I:126-27 Favorites, of princes, II:79-80 Fear, I:11; as aspect of divinity, III:25; belief and, II:31-32; compulsion of worship by, II:27; of critics, I:142-44; imposture and, I:20; III:42(*n*); of

liberty, I:48, 56(n), 56-57; nature of, I:182; of punishment, I:79-80; II:34; of reality, I:127-28; religious ecstasy produced by, III:23; in religious enthusiasm, III:24-25; of ridicule, I:7-8, 20; of self-knowledge, I:109, 127-28; as serviceable passion, II:53-54; superstitious, I:182-83; III:42(n); virtue and, I:78-80; II:33 (See also Panics) Fear of death, II:81-82; controlling, III:124–25; as fancy, I:193–96, 194(*n*);

opinion and, III:120; pleasure and, Fellowship: inclination toward, I:69-72; sensual pleasures and, II:73-75; shared enjoyment of, II:62 Fitness, in actions, II:232 Flattery: panegyrics as, I:166-67; self-examination and, II:68 Fletcher, John, I:134 Folly, ridicule of, I:84 Football, controversy as, III:11 Foppishness, condemnation of, II:111 Force: inability to change opinion, III:67; reason and, II:146-47; truth propagated by, dishonor of, III:65 Foreigners, III:94(n), 94-95Forgiveness, rewards of, II:36 Form: beauty of, II:226-28, 231; of composition, III:214; inward and outward, III:225-26; of matter, II:197; orders of beauty and, II:226-28; purpose, rela-

tion to, II:170-71; of writing, III:80, 176-77 Formalism, III:84; imposture of, I:8-9; rule and method of, III:62 France: academies, establishment of, III:249, 249(n); literature of, I:135,

III:6-7 Free choice: in social compact, I:69; virtue as, I:64 (See also Free will) Freedom: spirit of, in ancient Greece, III:85-86 (See also Liberty; specific forms of freedom)

Freedom of censure, I:6-14, 40 Freedom of conversation, I:42 Freedom of inquiry, I:15-16; III:149 Freedom of thought, III:182-209; criticism and, III:193-94; faith and, III:194-209; moral truth and, III:185-86; self-restraint and, III:183; superstition opposed to, III:186-87; tyranny and, III:190-92; vice opposed to, III:187-90

Free-thinkers. See Freedom of thought Free will: beauty and, I:112; governed by fancy and opinion, I:115, 115(n); relation to reason and appetite, I:116-17 (*See also* Free choice)

Friendship: bounty and gratitude as, II:136; capricious, II:65; definitions of, I:62–63, I:62(*n*)–63(*n*); false, II:79–80, II3; good in, II:135; natural affections and, II:112–13; as noble enthusiasm, III:22, 22(*n*); pleasure of, II:63; as private good, II:135–36; universal and individual, II:139; virtue and, II:139–40

Future life (hereafter): belief in, II:34, 35–36, 153; present concerns and, II:133–34; proofs of, II:155–56; self-knowledge and, II:134; supposed, II:155; virtue and, II:156–57

G

Gallantry, condemnation of, II:110-11 General good. See Good; Public good Generative capability: mental, II:228-29; physical, II:230 Generosity, I:81 Genius: virtue of, I:162-63; in writing, I:121-22, 122(n)-123(n)Gentlemen: authors compared to, I:120-21; education of, I:76-77; of fashion (See Virtuosos); scholars compared, I:205-6, 205(*n*)-206(*n*); virtue of, I:78 Gentleness, in giving advice, I:99 Giordano, Luca (Jordano); III:250-51 Gladiatorial combat: controversial writing as, III:9; English theater as, III:157–58, 158(n); Roman taste for, I:167-68, 167(n) Gnostics, III:49 God: ambassadors from, III:205-8;

God: ambassadors from, III:205–8; basis of faith in, I:24–25; creation and, II:167–68; existence of, I:21–22; handiwork of, II:164; heavenly inspiration and, I:5–6; humor of, III:73–75, 74(n), 75(n); immensity of, II:194; meditation on, II:205–7; meditation on nature and, II:213–18; moral sense and (*See* Moral sense); nature of, I:20–24; as sovereign genius, II:197–98; as supreme beauty, II:121; testimony of,

II:187; universal conflagration and, II:213 (*See also* Deity(ies))

Good: appearance of ill and, II:204; beauty and, II:223, 232, 235–36; constant contentment and, II:134–35; different notions of, II:239; fancy and, II:243–44; general (public), II:202; III:136; ill yielding to, II:121–23; inconstancy of, II:127–28; of mind, II:242–43; nature of, II:135–37; presence or absence of affections as, III:119–20; relation of pleasure to, II:128–30, 131; true representation of, II:133; view of, III:127, 127(n)

Good breeding: accomplishment of, III:99–100; in animals, III:133; beauty of manners and, III:109; civility, I:42; development of taste and, III:102–3; education and, I:205(n); human nature and, I:81–83; nature of, II:94; wit and, I:42, 44

Good humor. See Disposition, kindly Good-nature. See Disposition, kindly Goodness (of man): through affection, II:12; deficiency as occasion of, II:174; easiness of trust and, I:59-60; faith and, I:24-27; fancy and, II:243-44; freedom of inquiry and, I:15-16, 21-22; freedom of thought and, III:186; inducements to, II:14-15; as object of enthusiasm, III:24, 24(n); as pledge of truth, II:188, 188(n); private good, II:9-10, 13; religion founded on, III:71; reputation and, I:23-24; ridicule as proof of, I:19-20; self-affections necessary to, II:52; understanding and, I:21, 26-27 (See also Good; Universal good; Virtue) Gothicism. See Barbarism

Government(s): absolute ν . free, I:147–48; allegiance to, I:68; of ancient Rome, III:16(n); arts and, I:140–41, 147–48; III:247–48; by fancy, as tyranny, III:190–91; free, I:134; III:247–49; intrusion in spiritual affairs, I:12–13; by law, as freedom, III:190; morality and, I:67; persecu-

Government(s) (continued) tion by, III:60; by priests, aversion to, III:59-60; role in liberty and letters, I:135-36 (See also Absolute government) Grace: contemplation of, III:109-10; of English language, lacking, III:162-64; nature v. art and, I:118-19; in writing, lacking, III:163-64 Grammar, I:179; III:139-40 Grandees. See Princes Gratitude, as act of friendship, II:136 Gravity: as essence of imposture, I:8; humor as test of, I:48, 48(n) Greeks, ancient: art of, I:153-54; III:85, 86, 86(*n*); as fortunate people, III:85– 86; mastery of dialogue, I:126-28; nympholeptics, I:32(n), 32-33; origins of science and, III:85; poets, conformation to truth, I:163-64; religion of, humor in, III:78-79, 78(n)-79(n); respect for soliloquy, I:107, 107(n); treatment of women, I:169(n)–170(n) (See also Athenians) Grief, presence or absence of, III:119-20

Н

Half-thinkers, III:183-85 Halicarnasseus, Dionysius, III:172 *Hamlet* (Shakespeare), I:171, 171(n) Happiness: mental pleasures as source, II:73; philosophy as study of, II:244-47; self-deception and, I:4-5; social love as source, II:62-63; view of, III:127, 127(n); virtue and, II:99, 100 Harangues, absurdity of, I:105 Hardship, as proof of virtue, II:156 Harmony, I:217-18; beauty in, III:111-14, 111(*n*)-114(*n*); chaos and, II:192; enthusiasm for, III:20; with nature, II:242; in painting, III:229; study of, I:146-47; thought and, II:199, 201 Hatred, presence or absence of, III:119 Health: breach of, III:244; natural, as inward beauty, III:110-11 Heathen: desire for miracles, II:186; persecution and, III:55-57, 55(n)-57(n);

religion of, enthusiasm in, III:26–27; separation of religion and philosophy, III:49; sycophantic manner of worship, III:77, 77(n); treatment of, I:220

Heaven, ambassadors from, III:205–8 Hebrews. *See* Jews Heinsius, I:33, 33(n) Helen of Troy, I:165 Heraldry, religion compared, I:222–23 Herculean law, I:166 Hercules, judgment of: order of time in, III:218–19; principal figure in, III:229–30; story of, III:214–15; tablature

depicting, III:211–39; unity of time in, III:219(n)

Heresy, meaning of, III:66

Heroes, II:239–40; biblical, I:219–20; heroic poetry, III:160(n)–161(n); representation of, I:138–40; III:217

Heroism: chroniclers of, I:138–40; philanthropy and, I:71

Historical faith, III:47, 47(n)

Historical truth, I:91, 92; III:217; poetic truth and, III:228; truth of fact and, III:229

History: muse of, I:195; poetry preferable to, I:91, 91(*n*); scriptural infallibility and, III:148

History-painting: moral beauty in, III:232–33; ornamentation in, III:231–32; past and future in, III:218; poetry compared, III:237–38; unity of design in, III:214–15; unity of time in, III:218–19, 219(n)

Hobbes, Thomas, I:56(*n*), 56–57 Homer, I:165; III:87, 87(*n*); enthusiasm and, III:21, 21(*n*); mastery of dialogue, I:122–23, 122(*n*)–123(*n*); natural (simple) style, I:150, 150(*n*); as poetic sire, I:158, 158(*n*)

Honesty: beauty of, I:88; common sense and, I:80–84; enthusiasm and, III:22(n), 22–23, 24, 24(n); importance of, I:76; philosophy and, I:83; as pleasure, I:191–92; as self-love, I:74; skepticism in defense of, I:59–60;

unseen, I:78-79; value of, I:78; wit and, I:80-81 Honor: conceptions of, II:233-35; sold, III:104-5; taste of life and, III:103-9 (See also Virtue) Horace, II:126; III:15, 172; knowledge, writing and, I:119, 119(n), 121; misfortunes of, III:152, 152(n)-154(n); poets as fanatics, I:32(n), 32-33, 33(n)Hospitality, II:95; III:94(n)–95(n) Hudibras, I:161, 161(n) Human frailties, love of mankind and, II:136-37 Human nature: abuse of, I:59-60; effects of passions on, I:181; good breeding and, I:81-83; inclination toward association, I:69-72; shown in poetry, I:121-22, 122(n)-123(n); soliloquy as control on, I:116-17; wolfish, II:180 Human sacrifice, III:76-77, 77(n) Hume, David, I:v, viii Humor: false jest, I:51-52; as force in religion, III:60-81; gravity as test of, I:48, 48(n); of high style, I:154; licentious, I:154(n), 154-55, 156, 156(n); moralizing by, I:93; to promote religion, III:73 (See also Comedy) Hutcheson, Francis, I:v, viii Hydrophobia, fanaticism compared, Hylomania, III:43

Ι

Ideas: examination of, I:186, 187, 192–93; innate, II:229; III:24, 24(*n*); as mental children, II:228–29
Identity: change and, II:197; consciousness as proof of, III:118
Idleness, dissolution and, II:76–77
Ill: absolute and relative, II:12, 23, 133; appearance of, II:203–4; causes of, II:113–16, 114(*n*); good arising from, II:16; illness of temperament, II:14; mankind as cause, II:164; misery following from, II:49; natural and moral, II:121; necessity of, II:163; order of universe and, II:5–6, 11–12, 47, 163;

pain as, II:132-33; presence or absence of affections as, III:119; vice as, III:136; yielding to good, II:121-23 Ill humor. See Melancholy Ill-will, II:94 Imagination, I:viii; control of, I:116; perception and, III:44; proper application of, III:120(n), 120-21 Immoral state: absolute and relative, II:48; natural affections lacking, II:47-48 Immortality, II:196 Impaired sense, iniquity and, II:19 Impartiality, in reasoning, II:150 Imperfection: in nature, II:160; in state of man, II:165 Impostors, abuse of human nature, I:59-60 Imposture: credulity as aid to, II:184-85; fear of, III:42(n); good humor, fear of, I:20; of modern authors, I:164; modern miracles as, III:46, 46(n); ridicule as test of, I:6-14; zeal and, II:183 Inconsistency of character, I:82(n), 82-83 Inconstancy of pleasure, II:128 Incredulity, wonderment and, II:183-84 India, II:215 Individuality, II:196-97 Indolence: attractions of, I:196-97; consequences of, II:91-92; representation of, III:227-28; of writers, III:168 Indulgence, consequences of, II:86 Inebriation, enthusiastic, III:43(n), Infallibility: of oral tradition, III:202; of scripture (See Scriptural infallibility) Ingratitude, II:96 Inhumanity, II:93-94 Injustice, anger based on, II:234 Innate ideas, II:229; III:24, 24(n) Inquiry: freedom of, I:15-16, 20-24, 45; into scriptural infallibility, III:198-200, 199(n)-200(n) "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit" (Shaftesbury), I:v, 73(n); commentary, III:117-28; text of,

II:1-100

Joshua, I:219-20

Institutes, I:x

Jove, I:5; II:115

III:102-3

text of, III:211-39

Journalist-critics, III:13, 13(n), 14

Journal of the Warburg and Courtnauld

Joy, presence or absence of, III:119-20 Judgment: balance of, III:220-21; faith

and, III:47; lacking in knavery, I:129-

30, 129(*n*)–130(*n*); philosophy and,

II:246; right of, I:8-9; taste and,

"The Judgment of Hercules" (Shaftes-

bury), I:x; commentary on, III:243-51;

Inspiration, I:33; divine (See Divine in-Jupiter, character of, II:27-28 spiration); of exalted audience, I:5-6; Justice: deity and, II:28; distribution of poets' pretense to, III:140; pretense to, (See Distribution of justice); love of, III:140-41 II:234; as proof of future life, II:155-56 Instinct: in animals, II:173, 173(n); III:131(n); nature of, II:229-30 Integrity of mind, II:64, 65-66 Knaves: character of, I:81-83; true Inward beauty, natural health as, III:110judgment lacking in, I:129-30, 129(n)–130(n) (See also Villains) Inward concerns, value of, II:245-46; Knowledge: of metaphysics, III:128; as requisite for writing, I:119(n), 119-Inward proportion, order and, II:48-49 21; self-examination and, III:117; of Isocrates, III:172 world, morals and, III:129-38 Israelites, in Egypt: circumcision, practice of, III:34–35, 34(n)–35(n); expulsion of, III:35-36, 35(*n*)-36(*n*); L influences on, III:36-38, 36(n)-38(n); Labor, lack of, dissolution and, II:76-77 treatment of, III:34, 34(n) (See also Landscape painting, III:231, 232 Jews) Language: of ancient Greece, III:86; ear for, in poetry, III:162, 162(n), 164; English, lacking in grace, III:162-64; Jealousy, II:192 maturity of societies and, I:146 Jesus, writings about, III:149-50 Laughter, at self, I:99 Jews: melancholy of, I:19, 19(*n*); III:72; Law, profession of, III:30-31 need for signs and wonders, II:186; Law(s): Athenian, limiting licentious wit, Pharisees and Sadducees, III:49; self-I:154(n), 154–55; government by, as interest of, I:175(n), 175-76 (See also freedom, III:190; imposition of belief Israelites) by, III:65; of nature, II:122; privilege from, III:29, 29(n) Job, I:21-22, 22(n) Johnson (dramatist), I:134 Laziness, I:191 Jonah, story of, III:73-75, 74(*n*), 75(*n*) Leontinus, Gorgias, I:48, 48(n) Jordano (Luca Giordano), III:250-51 "A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm" (Shaftesbury), I:vi; commentary on, Joseph, captivity in Egypt, III:38, 38(n)

III:10, 12–14, 19–24, 142, 142(*n*); text

"A Letter Concerning the Art, or Sci-

Leviathan (Hobbes), I:56(n)

Libertines, III:188-90

ence of Design" (Shaftesbury), I:x,

Liberty, I:48-49; aid of, in life, II:241-

to, I:42; concern for posterity and,

III:247; by control of fancy, III:123, 123(*n*), 125; of criticism, III:193–

42; arts and, I:133, 136, 137; ascendance

in England, I:137–38; balance of power and, I:60; civil, II:142; civility due

of, I:1-36

III:241-51

94; disposition toward slavery and, III:154–55; fear of, I:48, 56–57, 56(*n*); freedom of censure, I:6-14, 40; freedom of conversation, I:44-47; Hobbes's view of, I:56(n), 56-57; love and, I:112; moral, picture of, II:142-43, 241; philosophical, II:148-49; public liberty, I:59-60; religious, animosity toward, III:69-70; restraint of licentious wit and, I:154(n), 154-55; role of government in, I:135-36; sold for personal gain, III:107-8; use of, I:7; vice opposed to, III:187 Licentiousness: gallantry and, II:111; in humor, I:154(*n*), 154–55, 156, 156(*n*) Lies, as teachers of truth, I:213(n), 213–14 Life: beauty drawn from, I:85; character and value of, I:76; as concern of philosophy, I:186-87; future (hereafter) (See Future life); half-thinkers, idea of, III:184; happy, measure of, I:195; love of (See Love of life); as misery, II:133; of pleasure and reward, I:77-78; preservation of, II:81-82; quality of, II:82; regard for good taste in, I:208 Literate world: judgment of, III:140; mastery of, I:119; sparring in, III:83;

Literature: ancient, massacre of, III:145–47, 146(n)–148(n); extirpation of, I:56(n), 56–57; miscellaneous writing, III:3–7, 17, 53; value of criticism to, III:140

writer and critic separate in, III:167-

Livy, I:30(n), 32

Love: beauty and, I:86; II:120; divine, II:152–53; III:25–26; enthusiasm and, I:4–5, 9; II:223–24; III:22, 22(n); grandeur of, III:20–21; individual, II:137–38; kind affections in, II:61; liberty and, I:112; power of, I:114; presence or absence of, III:119; in religious enthusiasm, III:24–25; story of, I:110–15; supported by natural affection, II:75; universal, II:137–39

Love of life: excessive, misery of, II:81–83; false resignation and, II:34; good

and, II:241; submission and, II:34; virtue and, II:38

Lovers: fancies of, I:191; inability to examine self, I:109–10; philosophers compared, II:104; pretension and, I:203–4

Lucian, III:172

Lucretius, I:31(n), 33, 33(n)

Lusts, unnatural, II:95

Luxury: desire for, as fancy, II:222; as sensual pleasure, II:85–87

Lysippus, I:140 Machine, god-governed, II:189-90 Machine-work, in tablature, III:235 Madness: control of fancies and, I:198-201; resemblance of composing to, I:102; II:194 Maecenas, I:134, 136, 136(n); III:152, 153(n)-154(n) Magi (Zoroastrian priests): abhorrent practices of, I:54(n), I:54-56; control of Persia, III:31, 31(n) Magic: Egyptian, III:38, 38(n); religion as, II:119; spread of, from Egypt, III:39 Magisterial sword, III:223, 223(n) Magistrate: philosopher compared, II:147-48; punishment of unbelievers, Majesty: enthusiasm from, III:21, 27; regard for, enjoyment and, III:20-21 Malefactors. See Villains Malice, II:94; interests and, I:25; in men of taste, III:102-3 Man: changeability of temper in, II:55-56; character of, I:76; conceptions of honor and worth in, II:233-35;

Man: changeability of temper in, II:55–56; character of, I:76; conceptions of honor and worth in, II:233–35; creatures compared, II:171–72; as disturbance of order, II:164; dominion over elements, II:170; dual nature of, I:106–7, II0–15; enjoyment of Earth and, II:210–II; good or ill in, II:12; loss of sense and feeling, II:78–79; nature in, II:169, 170; origins of, proposed, II:177–78; preconceptions in, II:230; revenge in, II:54–55; sociable or

Man (continued)

unsociable, II:175(n), 175–76; source of excellence of, II:172; study of, II:105; superiority of, II:214; testimony of, II:187; thought and reason in, II:173; virtue allowed only to, II:16; weakness of, society and, II:174, 179

Mankind: affection for order, I:68; civil and political state of, III:90; common sense and, I:50–51; contrary pursuits of, II:239–40; defects of, II:114–15; enthusiasms in, I:9–10; friend of, II:139; hatred of, II:94–95; love of, II:136–37, 137–39; religion as natural passion of, III:23; representation of, II:138; social state natural to, II:176–81; state of, II:109–19; thought, unequal in, III:182–83; vanity of, I:144

Manners: lacking in saint-authors, I:104–5; morals and, I:172, 172(n); III:100; poetic, III:160, 160(n)–162(n); regard for good taste in, I:208; relation to philosophy, I:177–78; standard of (See Standard of manners)

Marat, Carlo, III:250(*n*), 250–51 Marcus Aurelius, I:*ix*, 156–57, 156(*n*)–157(*n*)

Marius, I:141

Martyrdom: of atheists, III:42; persecution and, I:16–17; religious zeal and, III:26, 26(n)

Mastery: of comedy, I:123; criticism and, I:145; of dialogue, I:122-23, 122(n)-123(n), 125-28; of literate world, I:119; of morality by philosopher, I:172-73; of passion by virtue, II:22; of poetry, I:123; refinement of taste and, I:172; temptations of, III:29; of understanding, I:98

Mathematics, I:179–80; II:246; enthusiasm for, III:20; order and, II:160; pleasure in contemplation of, II:60

Matter: creation of, II:167; identity and, II:197; immaterial to beauty, II:226; mind as ruler of, II:199; nature of, II:206

Mazarin, Jules, III:249

Medicine, profession of, III:30–31
Meditation, I:211; on elements, II:210–
12; on God, II:205–6; on map of
nature, II:213–18; on nature, II:193–94
Melancholy, II:119–20; accounts of,
III:20; atheism and, I:15; critics as
ill-humored, III:68–69; effects on
temperament, II:66–67; enthusiasms
and, I:9; II:220, 220(n); of Jews, I:19,
19(n); III:72; as natural inebriation,
III:43, 43(n); prophetic ecstasies

caused by, III:43(n), 43-44, 44(n);

Melpomene, I:193

solitude and, II:79

Memoirs: affectation in, I:125; of travelers, I:213; writers of, selfabsorbed, I:103-4

Menander, I:152, 159

Mental children, II:228-29

Mental enjoyments, II:57–58, 60; affections and, II:62–63; falsely praised by epicures, II:131–32; happiness derived from, II:73; natural affections and, II:58, 61–62; partial affection and, II:65; as pleasure, II:131–32; preferable to sensual, II:99; of senses, II:236

Merit: belief in deity and, II:31, 32–33; ill placing of rewards and, I:141–42; merited esteem, pleasures of, II:62–63; neglected, III:188–89; pretension and, I:203–4; pride and, II:234–35; sense of, II:24–25 (*See also* Virtue)

Metaphoric style, I:149–50, 149(*n*)–150(*n*)

Metaphysics: as delusive study, I:179; of identity, III:118–19; knowledge of, III:128; of mode and substance, II:199 Methodic style, I:159–60; III:175 Military heroes, chroniclers of, I:138–39 Milton, John, I:134, 171, 171(*n*), 221 Mimes, I:121, 121(*n*), 122; III:175 Mind: beauty and, I:86; II:238; III:111; discernment of, II:16–18; effects of pleasure and pain, II:132; enjoyment of senses and, II:220–21, 235–37; examination of, III:128–29; God as, I:25; goods of, II:242–43; improvement of,

II:165; mathematics and, I:179-80; offspring of, II:228-29; pleasures of, II:57-58, 60; as ruler of body, II:199, 201; as ruler of whole, II:199-200, 201; search for perfection, II:120-21; symmetry of, I:87; temperament and, II:66; united structure of, II:99-100; universal mind (See God); worth of, II:245-46 (See also Thought) Mind, fancies and, I:198; control of fancy, III:121(n), 121-25, 123, 123(n), 125; domination of, I:201 Mineral treasures, II:211 Ministers: academies for, III:249(n), 249-50; representation of, I:139-40 Miracles: enthusiasm for, II:181-82; modern, II:186-87; III:46, 46(n), 59; not proof of divinity, II:188; as testimony, II:187 Miracles, belief in, II:184, 185-86; fanaticism and, II:186; religion and, II:181-90 Misanthropy, II:94-95, 112-13 "Miscellaneous Reflections" (Shaftesbury), I:v, vii, viii-xi, III:1-209 Miscellaneous writing: author's freedom in, III:192-93; fashion of, as medley, III:70; form in, III:177; liberties permitted to, III:53, 60-61, 80; origin and nature of, III:3-7; random style of,

Mischievousness, II:94
Misconception, iniquity and, II:19–20
Misery: affections and, II:57, 80; anger as, II:84; of avarice, II:89–90; following from ill action, II:49; lack of conscience and, II:70–71; life as, II:133; of selfishness, II:93; self-passions and, II:80–93; unnatural affections and, II:97–98; of vice, II:98–99, 100; III:136

III:17

Misfortune: of ancient poets, III:152, 152(n); effects of, II:42–43
Missionaries, Egyptian, III:33, 33(n)
Mistake of right, II:20
Mode, substance and, II:198–99
Moderation: bigotry incapable of, III:51–

52; excess contrasted, II:80–81; out of fashion, III:208–9; self-interest and, I:72

Monsters, II:78, 122; crocodiles, II:216– 17; miracles and, II:181–82; search for, III:97

Moon, ambassadors from, III:206–7 Moorish fancy, I:213(*n*), 213–15 Moral arithmetic, II:99 Moral artists, I:129–30, 129(*n*)–130(*n*) Moral beauty, II:16–17, 25, 228; acknowledgment of, II:234; in historypainting, III:232–33 Moral conscience, II:69–70 Moral deformity, II:16–17, 25, 122–23;

Moral delinquency, II:100 Moral inquiry, shyness in, II:105–6 Moralists: modern, criticism of, I:215–18, 215(n)–218(n); nominal v. real, II:145;

acknowledgment of, II:234; sense of,

role of, I:107–8, 108(n)
"The Moralists, A Philosophical Rhapsody" (Shaftesbury): commentary, III:175(n)–176(n), 175–77; text of, II:101–247

Morality: common sense and, I:50, 51; concealment of practice and, I:55–56; disposition of public and, I:170–72; necessary for poets and authors, III:173–74; as part of beauty, I:85–86; philosophy and, I:83–84, 172–73; in poetry, I:121; rewards of virtue and, I:61–62, 63–64

Moral liberty, II:142–43, 241 Moral principles, religion and, II:4 Moral rectitude, as standard of true philosophy, I:184

Morals: knowledge of world and, III:129–38; manners and, III:100; philosophical study of, III:128–29; proof of, III:119–27

Moral sense: consciousness of, II:23–26, 24; corruption of, II:26–30; depravity and, II:20–21, 27; formation of, II:30–31; impaired, II:19, 25–26; nature of wrong and, II:18–20; notion of deity

3IO INDEX

Moral sense (continued) and, II:31; opposition of affections to, II:30–44; passions contrary to, II:35; virtue and, II:18, 20, 23–26; wrong or false, II:26–30

"Moral sense" school of ethical theory, I:v

Moral truth, I:91–92; in art, III:238–39; freedom of thought and, III:185–86; lacking, III:173, 173(n); as standard of life, III:185

Moroseness, II:94-95

Moses, I:220

Motion: God as ruler of, II:208; nature

Motives for obedience, II:154

Mountains, II:217-18

Mountebanks, II:116-17

Mummius, I:169

Muse(s): address to, I:3–6; aid of, I:194–96; perfection of, I:133–35; rules of composition and, III:140 (*See also specific Muses*)

Music: English taste in, elevated, III:245; measure and tone in, II:55; persuasion and, I:146–47; in religious worship, III:72, 72(*n*), 78–79, 78(*n*)–79(*n*); understanding of, I:26

Musicians: ear of critic and, I:145; study of speech and harmony, I:146-47
Mysteries: exposed by dogmatism, III:52,

52(n); of holy literature, III:196–98; veneration of, III:193

Mystics: inability to examine self, I:110; religious enthusiasm of, III:25, 59; zeal of, II:153

Ν

Natural affections, II:25–26; attempts to conquer, I:73(*n*), 73–74, 74(*n*); balance in, II:75–76; as basis of society, I:73; charm of, II:60; effect of opinion on, II:26; effects of, II:62–63; excess of, II:52–53; exercise of, II:77; in family, III:135(*n*), 135–36; good of society and, III:35–36; integral to life, II:80;

lacking in immoral state, II:47–48; loss of, II:98; mental enjoyments and, II:58, 61–62; as opposite to melancholy, II:66–67; for order, I:68; pleasure and, II:61–62; proportion in, II:56, 57, 59–60; self-enjoyment and, II:57–80; self-passions contrasted, II:80–93; sensual pleasures and, II:73, 74–75; social pleasures and, II:58; unnatural affections and, II:93–98 (*See also* Affection(s); Friendship; Public affections; Self-affection)

Natural beauty: in painting, truth of, III:233; passion for, II:220

Naturalists: authorized forms and, I:223; understanding of organization, II:159–60

Nature: of animals, II:169-70; III:129-30, 132-37; artifice confused with, I:52-53, 54; attack on, II:168-69; beauty and, I:85-86; II:230-31; III:110; defects of, II:114, 160; designs of, II:52; distribution and economy of, II:172-73; disturbances in, II:201-2; divinity in, II:213-18; education in opposition to, II:26-30; elements of, II:170; energy of, II:201-2; enjoyment from, II:220-23; enthusiasm and, II:124; III:21, 21(n), 23; flawed, II:110-19; foundation of taste and, I:207; grace and, I:118–19; harmony with, II:242; idea of God and, II:205-7; ill yielding to good in, II:121-23; inability to deny, III:130–32, 131(n); of inferior creatures, III:132-37; laws of, II:122; life from, II:229-30; lineage of wit in, III:85; in man, II:169, 170; meditation on, II:193-94, 213-18; miscellany far from, III:6; mutual sacrifice in, II:121-22, 121(n); order of, III:130; origins of wit in, III:85; perfection of, as standard of beauty, III:110; representation of, II:138; song of, II:192-93; structure of, II:159-81; subject to mind, II:200; sympathizing of parts, II:195-96; system of, II:10; taste and, I:207; III:87;

truth in, I:91, 218; II:182; unity of design in, II:200; unity of whole and parts in, III:238; want of order and perfection, II:160 (See also Universe) Nature, state of: defined, II:176; examined, II:177-78; society, role in, II:178–79; as state of war, II:175(n), 175-76, 180 Nero, I:66 Nile River, II:216; III:30 Nobles: as patrons of wit, I:133-34, 138, 140-41 (See also Courts; Princes) "A Notion of the Historical Draught or Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules" (Shaftesbury), I:x, III:211-39

Obedience: servile, fear and, II:32 (See also Submission) Objects, alluring to mind and sense, II:237 Octavius, III:152, 154(n) Offensiveness, in ridicule, I:41-42 Olympic Games, I:170(n); III:86 Omnipotence, breach of, II:115-16 Opinion: analysis of, I:187; conformity in, I:53-54; corrupt, iniquity and, II:19; differences of, in matter of faith, III:194-95; effect of persuasion on, III:62-64; effect on natural affections, II:26; examination of, I:197(n), 197-98; force unable to change, III:67; free will governed by, I:115, 115(n); as grounds for fear, I:182-83; imagination and, III:121; inconsistency in belief and, II:7; influence on affections, III:120; passions caused by, I:183–84, 184(n); regulation of, by contemplation, III:121(n), 121–25; ridicule as test of, I:39-40; as sole measure of value, II:233, 243, 244; taste and, III:114 Oral tradition, infallibility of, III:202 Orations: art of speaking and, III:87-88; declamations, I:45, 46 Orators: manner of, represented, III:222-23, 224-25; pompous style of, I:152-53;

practice of soliloquy and, I:102, 105-6; writer compared to, III:61 Order: balance in affections and, II:78; contemplation of, II:43; of epistolary style, III:15; exercise essential to, II:77-78; importance of balance to, II:171–72; inward proportion and, II:48-49; in kind or species, II:76; man's natural affection for, I:68; in pleasure, I:87-88; principle of, II:203; as proof of divinity, II:155, 156, 157-58, 189-90; simplicity and, in painting, III:234-35, 239; study and love of, III:109-10; system of all animals, II:11; in theistic view, II:42; united view and, I:89–90, 89(n)–90(n); unity of design and, II:161(n), 161-64; universal, reason for, II:203; of universe, II:5-6, 11-12, 47, 159-81, 163 Orders of beauty: first, II:226-27; second, II:227; third (highest); II:227-28 Original forms, beauty of, II:227-28 Originality: of arts in ancient Greece, III:86, 86(n); difficulty of, III:5; in painting, III:230 Ornamentation: casual, III:235-37; false, III:238-39; in painting, III:228-37; in sculpture, III:233

Orthodoxy, determined by persecution, III:55-57, 55(n)-57(n)

Pain, relative to pleasure, II:133 Painter, eye of critic and, I:145 Painting: as declining art, I:209(n)-210(n); English talent in, progressing, III:245; equivocal sense in, III:227; history-painting (See Historypainting); morality depicted in, III:232-33; ornamentation and perspective, III:228-35; project, development of, III:243-44, 250-51; tablature (See Tablature); united view in, I:89-90, 89(n)-90(n); unity and harmony in, III:229

Paknadel, Felix, I:x

3I2 INDEX

Pallas (Athena), III:223 74-75; superstitious fear, I:182-83; Pan, I:10, 10(n) virtue's mastery of, II:22; war as, I:71; Panegyric (encomium): praise by weaning from, III:123(n)-124(n), detraction, I:165-68; as worst of satire, 123-25 (See also Affection(s)) Patchwork cloth, miscellany as, III:5-6 Patriotism, I:63; false, loss of honor and, Panics, I:10-11; religious, example of, III:53(n), 53-55, 54(n); religious pas-III:104-5; nature of, III:88(*n*), 88-92; sion as, III:45, 45(n); second-hand, as social affection, III:89(n) (See also I:27-28 Country) Parables: as first morals, III:126; of Jonah, Patrons and patronage: ill placing of re-III:73-75, 74(n), 75(n); use of, I:41 (See wards, I:141-42; influence on authors, also Tales) I:130-42, 172; princes as, I:133-34, 138, Paracelsus, I:178 140-41 Paradise Lost (Milton), I:171, 171(n) Paul (Apostle): epistles of, III:48, 48(n); Parazonium, III:223, 223(n)visit to Ephesians, III:53(n), 53-55, Parody, I:123, 152, 152(n) 54(n) Partial affection, worthlessness of, Peace, improvement of arts and, I:138; II:63-65 III:244-45 Parties: place in body politic, I:70-Pedagogues: moral inquiry by, II:105-6; 71; purchases and sales of honor temperament of, I:44, 47 Pedantry, I:42-44, 205(n) in, III:104-5; religious, contention between, III:41, 207-9; writings Perception, truth and, III:44 espoused by, III:8 Perfection: in art, I:208; character of Parts: dominance of one over another, artist and, I:207; muse of, I:133-35; II:170-71; relation to whole, II:159search for, II:120-21; sought in uni-60, 162–63, 171; III:160(*n*), 214, verse, II:120-21; in whole and parts, 237-38; sympathizing of, II:195-96 II:160 Passion(s): anger, II:83-85; balance Persecution: denial of, I:17(n), 17-18; of, II:166; beauty drawn from, I:85; martyrdom and, I:16-17; moderate change of, representing, III:217v. resolute, III:67; as offensive zeal, III:55-57, 55(n)-57(n); political and 18; complexity of, I:73; contrary to moral sense, II:35; as deceiver, II:130religious, III:60, 60(n)31; divine, II:43-44; economy of, Persia, controlled by priests, III:31, 31(n) II:53-55; effects on human nature, Perspective: in art, III:230-31; I:181; freedom of, as tyranny, III:190; ornamentation and, III:228-35 hateful, II:15-16; of Hercules, III:220-Persuasion: effect on opinion, III:62-21; ill, corruption of, II:99-100; 64; as mother of arts, I:146-47; infectious nature of, I:27-28; for representation of, III:227 natural beauty, II:220; for novelty, Petulance, II:94 Phallica (obscene farce), I:152(n), 155 II:182-83; opinion as cause of, III:121; panics, I:10-11, 27-28; as poison to Pharisees, III:49 reason, I:58; proportion in, II:53; reli-Philip of Macedonia, I:154 gion as, II:51; III:23; self-deception Philosopher(s): criticism of, II:244; and, I:4-5; against self-interest, II:81; as critics, I:148; III:172(n), 172-73; self-knowledge and, I:183-84, 184(n); education of gentlemen by, I:76serviceability of, II:53-55; slavery to, 77; evasions of, I:83-84; heathen, as II:88–89; social, as self-love, I:74(n), priests, III:49; instruction by, I:222;

magistrate compared, II:147–48; as master to author, I:119; mastery of morality, I:172–73; modern moralists criticized, I:215–18, 215(*n*)–218(*n*); practice of soliloquy, I:102, 102(*n*); role of, I:107–8, 108(*n*); schools of, dissolved, III:51, 51(*n*); selfexamination by, I:110; writer compared to, III:61

Philosophical dispute, fairness in, II:152 A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (Burke), I:viii

Philosophical truth, I:92

Philosophy: affectation in, II:151; attention to characters in, I:121-22, 123; III:178; comic, I:157, 157(n); comprehension of self and, I:176-77; decline of, II:104-5; defects of, III:99-100; destruction of, in hatred, I:54-55; dual nature of man, I:106-7, 110-15; early instruction in, I:189; enthusiasm for, restraining, III:24; honesty and, I:83; later origins of, III:84-85; malicious censure as, II:181; manners and, III:100; mock-philosophy, I:177-79; modern, kinds of, II:107-9; muse of, I:195; open exercise of, II:109; origins of, I:157-59; passion for, II:109-10; of pleasure and reward, I:77-78; as portrait, II:107, 109; pretenders to, III:100; process of pulling down in, III:83; as requisite knowledge for writing, I:120-21; ridicule of, III:97-99; standards of beauty from, III:111(n)-114(n), 112-14; as study of happiness, II:244-47; study of morals and, III:128-29; taste owing to, III:114; virtuosity compared, III:98

Philosophy, religion and: as balance against superstition, I:12; separation of, III:49; unnatural union of, III:51, 51(n); zeal and, III:40–41, 41(n)
Pietists, religious enthusiasm of, III:25
Piety: as completion of virtue, II:44; foundation of, I:15; obstacles to, II:33–34

Pindar, I:165 Planetary system, II:11 Planets, order of, II:208 Plato, I:35(n), 153(n), 158-59, 166 Pleasure, I:77-78; of body, II:57; degrees of sensation, II:87-88; of entire (whole) affection, II:65; false relish, III:239, 239(n); fear of death and, I:194; good and, II:241; highest, due to temperance, II:140; lacking in half-thinkers, III:184-85; of luxury, lessened, II:86; of merited esteem, II:62-63; of mind (See Mental enjoyments); moral, I:191-92; natural affections and, II:57-80; order in, I:87-88; poetry consecrated to, III:188-90; relative to pain, II:133; rightness of, I:208-9; self-interest and, I:190(n), 190-92; sensual (See Sensual pleasures); of social affection, II:62; sordid, I:193-94; synonymous with will, II:128-29; in unnatural affections, II:96, 129-30; values of, relative, II:131 (See also Self-passions)

Pleasure, goddess of, III:214–15, 216, 220, 221; casual ornamentation of, III:236–37; depiction of, III:223, 225, 226–28

du Plessis, Armand-Jean (Richelieu), III:249

Pliny, III:172

Plutarch, I:25(*n*), 34(*n*)–35(*n*); III:78–79, 78(*n*)–79(*n*), 172

Pneumatophobia, III:42(*n*), 42–43 Poetic manners, III:160, 160(*n*)–162(*n*) Poetic truth, I:91; III:160–62, 160(*n*)–162(*n*); in art, III:238–39; historical truth and, III:228; perfection of, I:89, 89(*n*)

Poetry: beauty and, I:85–86; contemplative nature and, II:126; gothic model of, I:135; heroic, III:160(*n*)–161(*n*); history-painting compared, III:237–38; human nature shown in, I:121–22, 122(*n*)–123(*n*); as imitation of men and manners, I:122–23; level of taste and, III:158; liberty of thought in, I:220;

3I4 INDEX

Poetry (continued) of, II:90-91; of mental enjoyments, mastery of, I:123; moral, I:171(n), 171false, II:131-32; mock-praise, III:104; 72; III:232-33; origins of, I:157-59; mutual admiration among writers, persuasion and, I:146; philosophy as, II:169; value of, I:173-74; of virtue, by I:121, 121(*n*); preferable to history, I:91, satirists, I:88 91(n); resemblance to art, I:128; rhyme Preconceptions, in humankind, II:230 in, III:162, 162(n)-163(n); truth as per-Preface: as excuse, I:203; fear of critics fection of, I:89, 89(n); understanding and, I:143, 143(n); as soliloquy, I:xvii of, I:26; united view in, I:89(*n*)–90(*n*) Pretension, merit and, I:203-4 Poets: address to Muse, I:3-5; ancient, Pride: arrogance and tyranny, II:95–96; misfortunes of, III:152, 152(n); disconsequences of, II:90-91; self-worth dain for grammar, III:139-40; divine and, II:234-35 inspiration ascribed to, III:141-42; Priest-philosophers, heathen, III:49 failures of, III:159(n)-163(n), 159-Priests: of Egypt, hereditary, III:27(n)-64; as fanatics, I:32(*n*), 32–33, 33(*n*); 28(n), 27-29, 31, 31(n), 38-39, 39(n); instruction by, I:222; low level of government by, aversion to, III:59-60; numbers of, growing, III:29-30, refinement in, III:162-64; modern, criticism of, I:128-29, 172; practice of soliloquy, I:102, 102(n); rules of art Princes: arbitrary power of, I:67, 67(n); and, I:163; as sages, I:98, 122; satiras authors, I:132-33; custom of asking ists, I:88; self-criticism by, III:173; advice, I:130-31; false friendships of, stage-poets (See Dramatists); virtue II:79-80; as patrons of wit, I:133-34, of, I:129-30, 129(n)-130(n); wanton, 138, 140-41 as slaves to vice, III:188-90; writer Printing press, I:188-89 compared to, III:61 Privacy, self-examination and, I:101-3 Polemics, religious, III:8-9 Private good: friendship as, II:135-36; Policy, common sense and, I:51 public good and, II:13-14, 34, 100 Political arithmetic, III:30 Privy-counsellors, I:131-32 Politics, II:104, 105; common sense in, Prometheus, I:129; II:109-10, 114-16 I:68; enthusiasms in, I:9-10; politi-Promise, social obligation and, I:69 cal capacity, patriotism and, III:90; Property, dominion follows from, role of parties in, I:70-71 (See also III:31-32 Government(s)) Prophecy, I:27-33; III:43(n), 43-44 Polyhymnia, I:195 Prophetic ecstasies, I:28(n), 28-29, 29(n); Polytheism, II:6, 119, 119(*n*) caused by melancholy, III:43(n), Pompous (sublime) style, I:149–50, 43–44, 44(*n*); of oracles, I:29, 29(*n*) Proportion: in affections, II:51–53, 56, 152-53, 160 Popes, learning and, III:145–47, 146(n)– 57, 59–60; in art, I:90(*n*); beauty in, 148(n) III:111–14, 111(*n*)–114(*n*); enthusiasm for, III:20; force of, II:160-61; inward, Portraiture, III:213, 214 Possession, desire for, as fancy, II:221-22 II:48-49; in passions, II:55; truth and, Power: belief in deity and, II:31-32; morality and, I:83-84; public liberty Prostitutes, II:74 and, I:59-60; suitors to, III:107; Provocation, anger and, II:83-84 tyranny and, I:67(n), 67-68 Pseudo-ascetics, I:104-5 Praise: of country life, II:159; by Public: disposition toward morality, detraction, panegyric as, I:165-68; love I:170-72; indifference of, I:145; influ-

ence as audience, I:162-73; refinement of tastes, I:148; solicited by writers, I:188; voice of, art and, III:247 Public affections: creatures void of, II:47-48; degrees of, II:51-52; friendship, II:135-36; public good and, II:50; toward species, II:45 (See also Affection(s); Natural affections) Public conversation, violation of, I:48-49 Public good: consciousness of, II:24; natural temper and, II:15; opposition from self-interest, II:46-47; private good and, II:13-14, 100; prosecution of crime and, I:79; sense of (See Common sense) Publicola, I:166 Punishment: belief in deity and, II:32, 153-54; fear of, I:78-80; II:34; as provocation to ill humor, III:66;

of unbelievers, II:147; virtue and, II:139–40 (*See also* Reward)
Punning, I:42
Purpose: of creatures, II:8–9; form related to, II:170–71
Pyrrhonists. *See* Skepticism; Skeptics

Q

Quietists, religious enthusiasm of, III:25 Quintilian, III:172

R

Raillery. See Ridicule
Rancor, II:96
Rarities, search for, III:97
Rationalism, belief and, II:118
Rational objects, II:21
Rational religion, insincerity of, II:153
Reader: elevation of criticism in,
III:155(n), 155–56; enthusiasm for author, III:141; judgment of, III:155, 164–65; relation to author, III:139–40, 153–54; superiority over author, III:149–50; treatment of, I:204
Reading, as hazard to taste, I:210–11
Reality: fear of, I:127–28; in historical or moral painting, III:234

Reason: adherence to, III:187; control of appetite and, I:116-17; doubt yielding to, II:205; faith and, I:20-24; II:118; fitness to judge and, I:35; force and, II:146-47; free exercise of, I:45-46, 50; passion as poison to, I:58; principal in man, II:173; as proof of belief, III:65-66; relation to philosophy, I:177-78; virtue and, II:20; wit as proof of, I:47-48 Reasoning: impartiality in, II:150; selfpersuasion, honest, II:232-33; wit and, I:44-46 Refinement of tastes, I:148, 155, 164; beauty and, II:224; mastery and, I:172; in poets, lack of, III:162-64 Reflection. See Contemplation Reflection (as mirror): affection reflected, II:16; conscience as, II:69; criticism as, II:68; of human nature, writing as, I:121-22, 124; writing as, III:181 Reformers, skepticism of, I:58-59 "The Rehearsal," I:161, 161(n) Relative ill, II:12, 23, 133 Relief (sculpture); III:233 Religion: aid in controlling passions, II:35; amorous ecstasies in, III:25; attitudes of authors toward, II:5; capability of good or ill, II:30; common sense and, I:50, 51; contradictions in, III:81; courtship compared, III:71-72; debt to zealots, I:92-93; distribution of justice in, II:38; effects of self-interest, II:33-34; feigned zeal in, I:4; half-thinkers and, III:185; heathen, enthusiasms of, III:26-27; heraldry compared, I:222-23; Hobbes's view of, I:57; human sacrifice in, III:76-77, 77(n); humor as force in, III:60-81; liberal and illiberal, II:153-54; as magic, II:119; mercenariness in, II:153-54; miracles, belief in, II:181-90; national church, I:11-12; as natural passion, III:23; notice taken of God, II:198; panics, I:10-11, 27-28; III:45, 45(n); as passion, II:51; practices of

Israelites in Egypt, III:35-36, 35(n)–

Religion (continued) 37(n); prophesying sects, I:27–33; religious affection, II:43, 43(n), 67; scripture, infallibility of, III:143-48; separation from philosophy, III:49; skepticism and, II:117-18; superstitious, II:181-82; sycophants in, I:22(n), 22-23; teaching of, I:20-21; terrors of, III:25; virtue, relation to, II:3-5, 143-45, 157; writing and, I:219-23; III:8-9 (See also Enthusiasm, religious) Religion, good humor and: founding of, III:71; importance of, III:62; virtue of, III:66; in worship, III:72(n), 72-73, Religion, philosophy and: separation of, III:49; unnatural union of, III:51, 51(n); zeal and, III:40-41, 41(n) Religious affection, as remedy for ill humor, II:67 Religious conscience, II:69 Religious toleration: animosity toward, III:69-70; denial of persecution, I:17-18; enthusiasm and, I:vi, 12-13; rational belief and, III:65-66 Religious war: causes of, III:40, 40(n), 51, 51(*n*); persecution as, III:55–57, 55(n)-57(n)Repeal, in history-painting, III:218 Reproach of false conscience, II:72 Reputation, love of fame and, I:23-24 Revelation: faith and, II:188, 188(n); III:193; foundations of theology and, II:151-52, 156; modern miracles, skepticism of, III:46, 46(n)Revenge, II:96; anger as cause, II:84; in man, II:54-55; sense of justice and, Reward, I:77-78, 79; belief in deity and, II:32, 153-54; future, hope of, II:33, 34, 35-36; of virtue, I:61-62, 63-64 (See also Punishment) Rhetoric, I:146, 179 Rhetorical style, I:150(n)Rhyme, III:162, 162(*n*)–163(*n*) Richelieu (Armand-Jean du Plessis);

III:249

Ridicule: appearance of conceit and, I:99; of enthusiasts, I:18; fear of, I:7-8, 20; of gallantry, II:111; kinds of, I:41-42; as necessary diversion, III:137-38; real and false, III:137; sober use of, I:80; as test of imposture, I:6-14; as test of opinion, I:39-40; virtuosos as subject of, III:96-97 Right and wrong, sense of. See Moral Roman Catholic Church: establishment of hierarchy, III:57-59, 58(n); primitive fanaticism of, III:145-47, 146(n)–148(n); scriptural infallibility and, III:201-3, 202(n), 203(n); as spiritual conqueror, III:59-60 Roman Empire: decline of wit and sense in, III:50-52, 50(n)-52(n); fall of, I:136(n), 136-37 Romans, ancient: improvement of arts, I:138; infallibility of scripture in, III:143, 143(*n*); literature of, III:15– 17, 15(n)–17(n); lymphatics, I:32(n), 32-33; patronage of arts, I:141; refinement of styles and manners, I:155-57, 156(n)-157(n); ridicule of Christianity, I:19; taste for blood sports, I:167-68, 167(n); treatment of women, I:169(n)-170(n) Rule of consistency, III:217 courage, II:82 examination by, I:110 panegyric as, I:165-68; style of, III:15

Sadducees, III:49 Safety: in anger, II:83; in belief, II:35; in Sages: poets as, I:98, 122; self-Satire: addiction to, II:181; dull, Satirists, praise of virtue, I:88 Satisfaction. See Pleasure Saul, I:28, 28(n), 63 Scholars, gentlemen compared, I:205-6, 205(n)-206(n) Science: beauty and, II:224; origins of, III:85; true philosophy compared, I:177-81

Scipio, I:166 Scriptural infallibility: ancient literature and, III:145-47, 146(n)-148(n); Christian, III:144-48, 150-51; criticism as necessary to, III:193-94; inquiry into, III:198-200, 199(n)-200(n); literary style and, III:145; Mahometan (Mohammedan); III:143-44; Sybilline, III:143, 143(n) Scripture: authority of, III:195; copies, translations and versions of, III:196-98, 199(n), 201-3, 202(n), 203(n); criticism and interpretation of, III:196-98; guardianship of, III:195-96; infallibility of (See Scriptural infallibility) Sculpture, ornamentation of, III:233 Sea-drinkers, parable of, III:126-27 Sedition, I:71 Self: anger as advantage to, II:83; command of, I:192; discourse with (See Soliloquy); genuine, value of, I:174-75; parts of, II:196; reverence for, I:108-9 Self-abasement, I:204, 204(n) Self-affection, II:13-14; degrees of, II:51; excess of, as vice, II:56, 57; private good and, II:50; wanting, as vice, II:52 (See also Natural affections) Self-censure, II:240 Self-deception, happiness and, I:4-5 Self-enjoyment. See Pleasure Self-examination, I:x-xi; art of writing and, I:201-2, 202(n); benefits of, I:103-6, 172; contemplation of God and, I:21, 26; as dark task, III:128-29; dual nature of man and, I:106-7; fancy and opinion and, I:115-16; III:121(n), 121-25; fitness to judge and, I:35; importance to authors, I:117-18, 118*(n)*, 130; knowledge dependent upon, III:117; mystics incapable of, I:110; poetry and, I:99-100, 121-22; privacy for, I:101-3; wisdom and, I:224 Self-good. See Private good Self-interest: animosity and, III:69-

70; association and, I:72; belief and,

III:62-64; cautions in following, II:39;

common sense contrasted, I:65(n)-66(n); conscience and, II:72-73; consequences of luxury to, II:86-87; effects of, II:33-34; elusiveness of definition, I:75(n), 75-76; examination of, III:98; hope of reward and, II:38; indolence contrary to, II:92; narrow view of, III:186; opposition to public good, II:46-47; pleasure and, I:190(n), 190–92; as security to virtue, II:38-39; self-examination and, I:108-9; true nature of, I:72-76; value of self and, I:174-75 Selfishness, II:13, 13(n); disturbance of order by, II:164; misery of, II:93 Self-knowledge: difficulty of attaining, I:107; fear of, I:109, 127-28; freedom and, III:123, 123(n), 125; future life and, II:134; knowledge of beauty and, II:238; passions and, I:183-84, 184(n); understanding and, III:97 Self-love: as obstacle to piety, II:33-34; social passions as, I:74(n), 74-75; writings on, I:75(n), 75-76Self-passions: amorous appetite, II:87-89; anger, II:83-85; avarice, II:89-90; consequences of, II:92; indolence, II:91-92; intense, misery and, II:80-93; love of life, II:81-83; luxury, II:85-87; pride (ambition), II:90-91 (See also Pleasure) Self-possession, madness and, I:200 Self-restraint, of thought, III:183 Self-sacrifice, enthusiasm and, III:22, Self-worth, pride and, II:234-35 Seneca, epistles of, III:15–17, 15(n)–17(n)Sense(s): art as pleasure to, III:239, 239(n); beauty or deformity and, II:16-18; enjoyment of object of, II:236; nature of, II:206-7; pleasures of (See Sensual pleasures) Sensible objects, II:21 Sensualism, I:81 Sensual pleasures, I:77-78; II:73-75; amorous appetite, II:87-89; enjoy-

ment of, II:222; luxury, II:85-87;

Sensual pleasures (continued)
social pleasure; Self-passions)

"Sensus Communis: An Essay on the
Freedom of Wit and Humour"
(Shaftesbury): commentary on,
III:60–81, 130–32, 130(n)–132(n); text
of, I:37–93
Sentiment, I:viii
Servility, obedience from, II:32, 153–54
Shadow, mistaken for substance, II:220–
21

"Shaftesbury's Illustrations of Characteristics" (Paknadel), I:x
Shakespeare, William, I:134, 171, 171(n),
213, 213(n)

Shame, II:70; false, cowardice as cause, II:233; notion of, II:233-34

Sibyl: divine inspiration of, III:142(*n*), 142–43; prophetic ecstasies of, I:29, 29(*n*)

Sibylline scripture, divine inspiration of, III:143, 143(*n*)

Silkworms, II:215

Simple (natural) style: artifice in, I:144, 160; of Homer, I:150, 151(*n*)

Simplicity: in painting, III:234–35, 239; taste and, III:87; veneration of, I:210(n)

Skepticism, III:82; becoming, II:172; coexistent with belief, III:49; as defense against power, I:59–60; enthusiasm as cure of, II:123–24; of miracles and monsters, II:182, 182(*n*); moderation and, III:208; of modern miracles, III:46, 46(*n*); partial, I:52; as philosophy, II:117–19; privilege of, in discourse, II:118; of religious passion, III:45(*n*), 45–46; of scriptural infallibility, III:144–45; truth *v*. falsehood and, I:52–59; virtue and, I:60–64, 62(*n*)–63(*n*)

Skeptics: dogmatists contrasted, III:46–48; on foundations of theology, II:151–52; future life and, II:134; as ill-humored critics, III:68–69 Slavery: disposition toward, III:154–55;

insensibility to, III:190; to passions, II:88–89, 240–41; rewards and punishments in, II:37; of venality, III:105–7; to vice, III:187–92
Smith, Adam, I:v, viii
Social affection: belief and, III:66; importance to species, III:135–36; as natural unity, III:90; need for, II:68; patriotism as, III:89, 89(n); pleasure of, II:62; weakness of man and, II:174, 179; of wolves, II:180

Social compact: as foundation of society, I:69; free choice in, I:69 Social passions, as self-love, I:74(n),

Social pleasures: enjoyment of, II:237-38; superiority of, II:58

Society(ies): abstinence from, II:127; beauty in, II:120; complexity of, I:72–73; effect of factions on, I:71–72; formation of, I:70; good of, natural affections and, III:135–36; maturity of, language and, I:146; as natural state of mankind, II:176–81; persuasion as guide, I:147; relation of parties to, I:70–71; sensual pleasures and, II:73–75; social capacity, patriotism and, III:90; value of self in, I:174

Socrates, I:119, 119(*n*), 158–59
Soliloquy: on beauty, III:111(*n*)–114(*n*);
control of fancies by, I:115–16, 172,
198–202, 199(*n*), 202(*n*); memoirs and
essays as, I:103–4; in poetry, I:99–
100; preface as, I:*xvii*; privacy suited
for, I:101–3, 178; between reason and
appetite, I:116–17; recommended
to saint-authors, I:104–5; as remedy
against verbosity, I:100–106; sources
of practice of, III:95–96; speculative
philosophy and, I:180–81

"Soliloquy: Or, Advice to an Author" (Shaftesbury): commentary on, III:84–88; style of, III:15, 15(n); text of, I:95–224

Solitude: enjoyment of society and, II:127; misery of, II:78–79 Sophists, I:148, 159 Sophocles, I:151*(n)* Soul: beauty of, II:230-31; capacity of, II:25; effect of ill actions on, II:48-50; effect of indolence on, II:92; God inhabiting, II:207 Space, nature of, II:206 Species: advantage or injury to, II:13-14; affection toward, II:45-46; relation of creatures to, II:10; social affections in, III:135-36 Speculation: speciousness of, I:185–86; true philosophy compared, I:177-81 Speculative pleasure, II:60 Standard of beauty, II:232; in arts, III:110, 110(*n*); from philosophy, III:111(n)-114(n), 112-14 Standard of manners: current age as, I:168-69; taste and, III:109-15 Statesmen: academies for, III:249(n), 249-50; representation of, I:139-40 Still-life painting, III:232 Story-telling, taste for, I:213-14 Strabo, I:156, 156(n) Styles of writing: boldness in, II:106; comic, I:160, 161; metaphoric, I:149-50, 149(*n*)–150(*n*); methodic, I:159–60; III:175; mimes, I:121, 121(*n*), 122; III:175; poetic, III:175-76; rhetorical, I:150(n); simple (natural), I:144, 150, 150(n), 160; sublime (pompous), I:149-50, 152-53, 160; unity of, III:17-18 Sublime (pompous) style, I:149-50, 152-53, 160 Submission: demeaning, III:107-8; fear and, II:32; love of life and, II:34 Subordination, in painting, III:234-35 Substance: mode and, II:198-99; shadow mistaken for, II:220-21 Summer, meditation on, II:214-15 Sun: enjoyment of, II:211, 212; as representative of God, II:208 Superstition, II:95; atheism sprung from, II:189; bigotry a species of, III:52, 52(n); corruption of moral sense and, II:27; dark parts of, III:76-

77, 77(n); in Egypt, III:27, 29–30,

38; enthusiasm becomes, III:24; as excess of religious passion, II:51; as fear, III:42(n); modern miracles and visions as, III:59; nature of, II:202; philosophy as balance against, I:12; played upon by priests, III:32; religious zeal as, III:25-26; in Roman Empire, III:50-51, 50(n)-51(n); tales and, I:214 Surgery, advice-giving as, I:98-99 Sycophants, religious, I:22(n), 22-23 Symbols, in visual images, I:x Symmetry: beauty in, III:111–14, 111(n)– 114(n); study and love of, III:109-10 System(s): affections governing, II:50-57; animal-systems (See Species); coordination of, II:208-9; failures of, good of whole and, III:136-37; good or ill in, II:10, 11-12; immoral state, effects of, II:47-50; kinds of, II:11; as part or whole, II:200; private, self-passions and, II:80-81; private v. public interest in, II:45-47; relation of species to, II:10-11; search for deity in, II:189-90; unity of design in, II:161(n), 161-64; universal, man's relation to, III:136-37

Τ

Tablature: casual ornaments in, III:235–37; change of passion in, III:217–18; composition of, III:213–14; constitution of, III:215–19; defined, III:213; emblematic devices in, III:217, 223, 224, 231, 234; ornamentation in, III:228–35; past and future in, III:218; principal figure in, III:219–22, 229–30; reflections on, III:237–39; second figure in, III:226–28

Tales: as first morals, III:126; judgment of Hercules, III:215, 216; taste for, I:213–14; uses of, II:115 (*See also* Parables)

Taste: art of speaking and, III:87, 87(*n*); conscience and, III:108; corruption of, III:104–6; criticism and, III:101–3; English, improvement in, III:247–49;

Theology: foundations of, revelation

Taste (continued) and, II:151-52, 156; rightful authors of, establishment of, III:101; explanation I:221-22 of, III:100-115; false, I:210(n); for-Thespis, I:153, 153(n) mation of, III:95-96; foundation in Thought: clarification of, I:107-8; nature, I:207; III:87; learned, regard creation of matter by, II:167; halfthinkers, wretched, III:183-85; manfor beauty and, II:224; loss of, I:211; III:88; owing to philosophy, III:114; kind unequal in, III:182-83; nature in philosopher or virtuoso, III:100; of, II:206-7; III:117-18; principal in of reader, refining, III:156; reading man, II:173; as ruler of body, II:192, as hazard to, I:210-11; refinement of 201; weakness of, III:185-86 (See also (See Refinement of tastes); regard for, Freedom of thought) in life and manners, I:208; rude and Threats, ill-humor and, III:68-69 unpolished, III:4; for simplicity and Tiberius, I:66 nature, III:87; standard of manners Tillotson, John (Archbishop), III:201-3, and, III:109-15; standard of nature 202(n), 203(n) and, I:218-19; of virtuosos, I:207-8 Time: nature of, II:206; order of, in Taste of life, loss of honor and, III:103-9 history-painting, III:215-17, 218-19 Taylor, Jeremy (Bishop); III:199-200, Titles: accumulation of, III:204-5; 199(n)-200(n) honorable, author as, III:4-5 Temper (temperament): of animals, good Toleration: animosity toward, III:69-70; or vicious, III:132, 132(n); change of, of rational belief, III:65-66; religious goodness and, II:14-15; effects of dis-(See Religious toleration) appointment on, II:67-68; ill humor, Torrentius, I:33(n) II:14, 66-67; mind and, II:66; natural Tragedy, I:150-52, 151(n)-152(n); spirit of temper, II:15; of pedagogues, I:44, 47; liberty and, I:135; theatrical, miscellany religious enthusiasm and, I:14-20; as following, III:6-7 (See also Comedy; trial of virtue, II:21-22; ungoverned, Drama; Theater) Trajan, I:141 II:165-66; in well-bred man, III:99 Temperance, I:81; highest pleasures due Treachery, II:96 to, II:140; intemperance compared, Treatise, letter compared, III:14, 14(n) II:140-41; rewards of, II:36, 141; virtue Trust, temperance and, II:140-41 Truth: in art, I:89-90, 89(n)-90(n); and, II:142 authors' understanding of, I:206, Terpsychore, I:195 Testimony: divine, II:187-88; miracles as, 206(n); beauty as, I:89-93; in dreams, II:187 II:182-83; goodness as pledge of, II:188, 188(n); historical (See Historical Thalia, I:195 Theater: English, state of, III:156-58; truth); kinds of, I:91-92; moral (See French, miscellany in, III:6-7 (See also Moral truth); natural, I:91, 218; II:152; Comedy; Drama; Tragedy) perception and, III:44; poetic (See Theism, II:6, 7; advantages of virtue Poetic truth); power of, I:4; skepticism and, II:41; atheism compared, II:41and, I:52–59; taught by lies, I:213(n), 43, 119, 119(*n*); effects of misfortune 213-14; use of parables and, I:41; wit and, II:42-43; faith of, II:201; as and, I:41-42 foundation of Christianity, II:118-19; Tully, I:166; III:14 Tyranny, II:95-96; advantages of pernominal v. real, II:151-52; perfection of, II:33 secution and, I:16; buffoonery and,

I:46-47; corruption of, I:67-68;

poetry and, I:135, 136; thought natural by slaves, III:190

U

Understanding: importance of, I:117-18, 118(n); self-knowledge and, III:97 Unity: conformity with, III:217; natural, social affection as, III:90; of universe, II:195-96; of view, common sense and, Unity in writing: of plot, III:159-60, 159(*n*)–160(*n*); of styles, III:17–18 Unity of design: in nature, II:200; in tablature, III:213-14; in whole and parts, II:161(n), 161-64 Unity of time, in tablature, III:218-19, 219(n) Universal conflagration, II:213 Universal good, remoteness of, I:70 Universal mind. See God Universe: atheistic view of, II:40-41; beauty of, II:112; frame of, II:8-9; immensity of, God and, II:207-8; order and perfection sought, II:120-21; order of, II:5-6, 159-81; as perfect work of God, II:209; relation of man to, III:91; system of, II:11, 161(*n*), 161-64; unity of, II:195-96 Universities, ineffectiveness of, I:77 Unnatural affections, II:50, 57; consequences of, II:97-98; indulgence in, II:97; kinds of, II:93-96; pleasure in, II:96, 129-30 Urania, I:195

V

Value: of inward concerns, II:245–46; III:121, 122; opinion as sole measure, II:233 Vanity: caused by opinion, I:183; selfexamination and, II:68 Variety: in belief, III:194–95; in scripture, III:196–98 Varro, III:172 Venality, worth and, III:103–9 Venus, I:165, 207; III:223 Verbosity, soliloquy as remedy against, I:100-106

Vice: appearing as virtue, I:217; causes of, II:23, 98; denial of order as, III:23, 23(n); essential part of, II:56; fear of self-knowledge, I:109, 127–28; force of virtue and, II:165; misery of (See Misery); opinion as sole measure, II:233; slavery of, III:191(n)–192(n); slavery to, III:187–92; unnatural passions as, II:93–98; virtue mixed with, II:22

Villains: degrees of virtue in, II:22-23; false conscience in, II:71; pleasures of mind in, II:58; virtue in, II:22-23; youth as, III:109 (See also Knaves)

Violence, anger and, II:83 Virgil, I:29, 29(n); II:126

Virtue: arduous way of, III:224, 225(n); atheism and, II:40-41; beauty of, II:166; belief and, II:5–8, 35–36, 39(*n*), 39-40; causes of, II:23; degrees of, II:22-23; deity, influence of, II:23-44; disinterestedness and, I:62-64, 62(n)-63(n); distribution of justice and, II:36-38; fixed standard for, I:218; forfeited, ill affections and, II:20; as freedom, III:191–92, 191(*n*)–192(*n*); of genius, I:162-63; of gentlemen, I:78; half-thinkers and, III:185; happiness and, II:99, 100; hardship and, II:156; love of, II:157; love of life and, II:38; mankind and, II:120, 139-40; moral sense and, II:18, 20, 23-30; natural affections and, II:57-80; as natural good, III:136; nature of debate on, II:3-8; as noble enthusiasm, III:22; obligation toward, II:45-47; opinion as sole measure, II:233; order and, II:156; piety as completion of, II:44; of poets, I:129–30, 129(*n*)–130(*n*); power of vice and, II:165; praised by poets, I:88; principles of, II:150-51; proof of, III:119-27; public good and, I:67; II:18, 47, 100; punishment and reward and, II:139-40; religion, relation to, II:3-5; religion v. atheism and, II:3-5;

Virtue (continued)

rewards of, I:61–62, 63–64; as rule of love, II:65; self-affections and, II:80–93; self-interest and, II:38–39, 55–56, 100; trial of, II:21–22; unnatural affections and, II:93–98; unseen, I:76–80; as victim of religion, II:143–45 (*See also* Goodness)

Virtue, goddess of, III:214–16, 218, 220–22; casual ornamentation of, III:236; depiction of, III:222–26

Virtuosos: beauty and, I:85–86, 86–87; defects of, III:99–100; foundations of taste in, I:207–8; inferior, III:97; philosophers compared, III:98; philosophy, treatment of, III:176, 176(n); scholar compared, I:205–6, 205(n)–206(n); as subject of ridicule, III:96–97

Vision, imperfect, appearance of ill and, II:203-4

Visions, inclination toward, I:31–32 Visual images, I:*viii–ix*

W

War: battles, paintings of, III:232; England engaged in, III:244–45; fellowship in, I:71; grandeur of, III:20–21; muses and, I:134; state of nature as, II:175(n), 175–76, 180 War, religious: causes of, III:40, 40(n), 51, 51(n); persecution as, III:55–57,

55(n)-57(n)
Warmth, meditation on, II:214-15
Water, beauty of, II:211-12
Wealth: admiration of, II:225-26; good and, II:240

Whitehall, architecture of, III:246
Whole: comprehension of, simplicity
and, III:234–35; constant nature of,
II:202; defined, III:159(n); individual
as part of, II:197–98; mind as ruler of,
II:199–200, 201; principle of order in,
II:203; relation of parts, II:159–60,
162–63, 171; III:160(n), 214, 237–38;
unity of design, II:161(n), 161–64 (See
also Unity)

Wilderness, II:217
Will: pleasure as, II:128–29; of princes,
I:131; subjected to fancy, II:130–31
Winter, meditation on, II:214

Wisdom: distinguished from wit, III:6; self-examination and, I:224

self-examination and, I:224
Wit: buffoonery contrasted, I:46–
47; common sense and, I:49–52;
distinguished from wisdom, III:6;
enigmatic, on self-love, I:75(n), 75–
76; free discourse and, I:47(n), 47–49;
honesty and, I:80–81; lower, essay as,
III:5; miscellaneous writing and, III:3–
4; moral truth and, III:173, 173(n);
origins in nature, III:85; pedantry
contrasted, I:42–44; reasoning and,
I:44–46; skeptical (See Skepticism); as
trial of opinion, I:39–40; truth and,
I:41–42 (See also Ridicule)

Wolves, human nature compared, II:180 Women: beauty of, I:86; II:222; common weakness of, III:226; courtship of, III:71–72; female saints, III:25; hatred and anger in, I:75; manners of, affecting, II:106; modern gallantry and, II:110–11; prostitutes, II:74; taste for tales, I:214; treatment of, I:168, 169–70, 169(n)–170(n)

Wonderment, love of, II:183–84 Woods, stillness of, II:218 Workmanship: accuracy of, I:145; in actions, I:163; artifice in, I:144

World: charm of, resisting, II:239; knowledge of, morals and, III:129– 38; moral and natural, II:166; system and, II:162, 209; without intelligence, II:200–201

Worth: acknowledgment of, II:235; venality and, III:103-9

Writers: critics distinguished from, III:167–68; indolent and ignorant, III:168; ships at sea, compared to, III:61 (*See also* Author(s))

Writing: aesthetic quality of, I:vii-viii; ancient and modern compared, I:126–27, 144; art of, self-examination and, I:201–2, 202(n); concealment of

method in, III:15; controversial, III:8-12; divine inspiration of, III:48(n), 48-49; epistolary style, III:13-14, 14(n); genius in, I:121-22, 122(n)-123(n); integrity in, III:160(n); knowledge as requisite for, I:119(n), 119-21; manner of, I:188-89; miscellaneous, III:3-7; novels, condemnation of, II:111; pace of, III:18; philosophical, II:148; recapitulation, I:203; as reflection of human nature, I:121-22, 124; religion and, I:219-23; III:8-9; resemblance to art, I:128; sacred, I:219-23; styles of (See Styles of writing); subtlety in, I:vii; translations of, III:13; unity of style in, III:17-18; variation in, III:60-61 (See also Drama; Poetry) Wrong, nature of, II:18-20

Χ

Xenophon, I:139

Y

Youth: discipline of education and, III:132; taste of, correcting, III:109

Z

Zeal: in architecture, III:246; defensive, III:53(*n*), 53–55, 54(*n*); divine love and, II:153; as enthusiasm perverted, III:40; excess of, effect of, II:51; feigned, I:4; imposture and, II:183; as inebriation, III:43, 43(*n*); religious, as superstition, III:25–26; religious war and, III:40(*n*), 40–41, 41(*n*)

Zeal, 41(*n*)
Zeal, offensive: bigotry as, III:52, 52(*n*); persecution as, III:55–57, 55(*n*)–57(*n*)
Zealots: awkwardness as writers, I:43–44; enmity of, III:203–4; enthusiast contrasted, II:124; fear of liberty, I:48, I:56(*n*), I:56–57; growing numbers of priests and, III:39–40; harmlessness of, I:93; lacking knowledge of truth, I:92; narrowness of spirit, II:33–34; as prosecutors of superstition, I:57–58; religious passions of, III:26; skepticism of, I:58–59; virtue as victim of, II:145; writings of, III:12–13

Zodiac, circle of, III:234, 234(*n*)

This book is set in Adobe Garamond. Robert Slimbach modeled his design of Claude Garamond's type on sixteenth-century original manuscripts. The companion italic was drawn from the types of Robert Granjon, a contemporary of Garamond.

This book is printed on paper that is acid-free and meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, z39.48-1992. ⊗

Book design by Louise OFarrell,
Gainesville, Florida
Typography by Tseng Information Systems, Inc.,
Durham, North Carolina
Printed and bound by Edwards Brothers, Inc.,
Ann Arbor, Michigan